

DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1918-1945

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THE WAR YEARS

February 1-June 22, 1941

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1918-1945**

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PREFACE¹

In June 1946 the British Foreign Office and the United States Department of State agreed to publish jointly documents from captured archives of the German Foreign Ministry and the Reich Chancellery. Although the captured archives go back to the year 1867, it was decided to limit the present publication to papers relating to the years after 1918, since the object of the publication was "to establish the record of German foreign policy preceding and during World War II." The editorial work was to be performed "on the basis of highest scholarly objectivity." The editors were to have complete independence in the selection and editing of the documents. Publication was to begin and be concluded as soon as possible. Each Government was "free to publish separately any portion of the documents."

In April 1947 the French Government, having requested the right to participate in the Project, accepted the terms of the agreement of June 1946.

It was originally intended to complete the entire publication for the period 1918-1945 in some twenty volumes. When, however, the preliminary work on the selections for the years from 1933 to 1945 was completed in 1954 it became apparent that an adequate selection of the documents for this period would require a publication on a scale approximately double the size which had been anticipated at the outset. After considering the length of time it would take to carry out a program on this enlarged scale the participating Governments decided to limit the publication in English to the years 1933 to 1941—beginning January 30, 1933, when Hitler became Reich Chancellor and ending in December 1941 after the German declaration of war on the United States of America. Volume XIII (June 23-December 11, 1941) will complete Series D. Series C, of which three volumes have already appeared, will cover the period 1933 to 1937 in six volumes.

Prior to the return to the German Federal Republic in December 1958 of the last of the files of the former German Foreign Ministry a program was carried out of systematic microfilming of the files for the Weimar period aiming to make film copies of all documents of importance for the history of German foreign policy. These microfilms are available to public research at the National Archives in

¹ In each of the first four volumes published in the series there appears a "General Introduction" which describes some of the principles which have guided the editors in their work.

Washington and at the Public Record Office in London. Each document printed in this publication bears a microfilm serial and frame number in the upper left-hand corner. The microfilm copy of the original German text can be located by reference to Appendix II, "List of German Files Used."

The editors have made their selection of documents for publication on the basis of scholarly objectivity. They have exercised complete freedom in the selection of documents and in their editing of this volume and of all volumes published under the terms of the Project. The Governments have determined only the date on which a given volume would be issued. The editors, therefore, accept complete responsibility for the volumes as published.

This volume covers German foreign policy from February 1 to June 22, 1941, and the main theme is the prelude to the war against Soviet Russia. Military preparations for that campaign, although not a part of the diplomatic story, are an essential background to it. The Wehrmacht undertook several operations in this period and made plans and preparations for still others. In accordance with past practice the numbered Führer directives which were issued in these months have been printed as well as such other military directives as reveal important aspects of German foreign policy.

Germany's relations with Finland, with Rumania, and to a lesser extent with Hungary during this period hinge on Hitler's planning for the attack on Russia. Germany's diplomatic representatives in Moscow, in Helsinki, Bucharest, Stockholm, and Budapest saw only a part of Germany's policy toward the countries to which they were accredited. Reports and other papers from military files provide essential supplements to the documents from the archives of the Foreign Ministry.

In the late winter and spring of 1941 Germany came in force to the rescue of Mussolini; in the aerial war in the Mediterranean; in the land campaign in North Africa; and in the Balkans and Greece. German forces flowed into Rumania, looking toward future operations both to the south and to the north. The negotiations with Yugoslavia for her adherence to the Tripartite Pact, the German reaction to the coup d'état in Belgrade, and the subsequent partition of Yugoslavia bulk large in this volume. This story, from the point of view of Berlin, is here presented in full for the first time. In the Near East Germany attempted to attack the British position by giving political and military support to the regime of Rashid Ali al-Gaylani in Iraq. The other important aspects of German policy are also covered.

The documents are printed in chronological order. A topical arrangement of the analytical list at the beginning of the volume is designed to help those who wish to read on particular subjects.

The documents have been selected jointly by United States, British, and French editors, but the United States editors have had full editorial responsibility for this volume. The editors wish to express their appreciation to various officials of the Department of State for cooperation and assistance, and particularly to G. Bernard Noble, Director of the Historical Office, as well as to the members of the American Advisory Committee: Sidney B. Fay, Hajo Holborn, William L. Langer, Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Raymond J. Sontag, Oron J. Hale, and Hans W. Gatzke.

The translations were drafted by the Department of State's Division of Language Services, but the editors have final responsibility for the translations as well as full responsibility for the footnotes and other editorial matter. Valuable aid was given by Beverly A. Smith and Barbara A. Griffith. The technical preparation of edited copy for the printer was done in the Division of Publishing Services of the Department of State under the direction of Norris E. Drew; the editors acknowledge gratefully his assistance and that of Elizabeth A. Vary, Collie E. Halbert, B. Etoile Tine, and other members of the staff of that Division. The editors wish particularly to acknowledge the aid of Robert D. Hodgson of the office of the Geographer in the preparation of the map printed as Appendix V.

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS ¹

AFGHANISTAN

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Mar. 12	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Reports that the Afghan Minister of Economics in a conversation raised the matter of Afghan revisionist aspirations with respect to British possessions in the southeast and in the direction of the Indus.	158	283
May 6	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Afghan Minister of Economics regarding Afghan revisionist desires and German policy toward the countries of the Saadabad Pact.	467	728
June 6	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records that the Afghan Minister of Economics in a conversation regarding German clandestine activities in Afghanistan urged caution in dealing with the border tribes. (See also under "India" and "Middle East.")	598	971

BALTIC STATES

1941 June 19	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> M. Škirpa, the former Lithuanian Minister in Germany, delivered a memorandum on the restitution of the independence of his country and told of Lithuanian partisan bands which had furnished valuable information to the German counterintelligence. Grundherr stressed that he received this information only in a private capacity.	650	1054
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BELGIUM

1941 Mar. 13	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Strongly objects to a recommendation of Abetz, according to which the Rexist and National Flemish movements should be given full support by Germany in the occupied areas.	162	288
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¹ The documents in this volume have been arranged chronologically. For the convenience of readers who wish to trace topics through the volume this analytical list of documents has been arranged alphabetically by countries or regions, with the addition of three subject headings: "Danube Navigation," "Directives for the Conduct of the War," and "Tripartite Pact."

BELGIUM—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Mar. 22	<i>Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to Bergen's telegram (document No. 162), states his views on the internal developments in Belgium, and makes certain suggestions regarding German policy there.	193	336
Apr. 16	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits and recommends for approval a draft of a letter from the Belgian King to President Roosevelt asking for American help to alleviate the Belgian food shortage.	359	568
May 29	<i>Counselor of Embassy Bergen to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Transmits a memorandum in which he advocates a policy of close collaboration with Belgium. (See also under "France.")	569	918

BULGARIA

1941 Feb. 3	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records that the High Command of the Army wishes to advance the date set for the entry of German troops into Bulgaria.	7	8
Feb. 8	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a statement by the Bulgarian Government expressing its willingness to accede formally to the Tripartite Pact upon the settlement of certain military, territorial, and economic questions.	30	54
Feb. 9	<i>The Head of the Foreign Intelligence Branch of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards a memorandum on German-Bulgarian Staff talks held on February 2 in Predeal, Rumania, dealing with the problems arising from passage of German troops through Bulgaria.	39	67
Feb. 10	<i>Minute by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records a conversation of the Reich Foreign Minister with the Bulgarian Minister on February 8. In connection with the pending accession to the Tripartite Pact, Draganov mentioned Bulgaria's pacts with her neighbors, the need for financial assistance for arms, and the problem of informing the Soviet Government.	41	73
Feb. 14	<i>Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Forwards a series of decisions laid down by Hitler on February 13 relating to the movement of German troops into Bulgaria.	51	99
Feb. 15	<i>The Legation in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that contents of OKW directive of February 14 (document No. 51) have been discussed with Bulgarians, who request that German troops not enter Bulgaria before February 28.	54	104

BULGARIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Feb. 26	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> Directs that the Bulgarian Foreign Minister be informed that German troops will bridge the lower Danube on February 28 and that the crossing will begin March 2.	86	160
Feb. 27	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> Outlines steps to be taken by Bulgaria in informing Moscow, Ankara, and Belgrade of Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact and of the entry of German troops; requests that the Bulgarian Government proceed in the suggested manner.	98	180
Mar. 1	<i>Note to the Bulgarian Minister President</i> Ribbentrop confirms on behalf of the Axis Governments that on Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact she will receive an outlet to the Aegean Sea.	114	203
Mar. 11	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Encloses the text of the Bulgarian reply to the Soviet statement regarding the entry of German troops into Bulgaria.	153	274
[Mar.28]	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Record of the conversation between Hitler and the Bulgarian Minister, Draganov, on March 27 in which Hitler declared that the events in Yugoslavia have "settled the question of Macedonia."	216	371
Apr. 1	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records that the Bulgarian Minister hinted that German troops did not occupy the northeast corner of Thrace out of consideration for Turkey and that this would complicate the settlement of frontiers there. Weizsäcker declined to go into a discussion of the subject.	245	429
Apr. 10	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that according to the Bulgarian Foreign Minister the Yugoslav Minister in Ankara invoked the Balkan Pact asserting that Bulgarian troops were fighting against Yugoslavia.	302	503
Apr. 11	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> Directs the Minister to discuss with the Bulgarian Government: the employment of Bulgarian divisions in southern Yugoslavia and the timing of Bulgaria's breach of relations with Yugoslavia and Greece.	312	514
Apr. 14	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> Explains that the fate of the Yugoslav territories will be settled only on the conclusion of peace and that therefore no statements regarding Macedonian boundaries can be made.	347	555
Apr. 16	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Bulgarian uneasiness over the German delay in the employment of Bulgarian divisions in the occupation of southern Serbia and over the Italian occupation of Ohrid. Recommends Bulgarian occupation of Serbian Macedonia.	357	566

BULGARIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Apr. 16	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records that the Bulgarian Minister transmitted the request of King Boris to be received by Hitler.	362	571
Apr. 17	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> Directs that the Bulgarian Government be informed that the Bulgarian Army may occupy Greek Thrace and Yugoslav Macedonia; demarcation line indicated for Macedonia is provisional only.	367	577
Apr. 24	<i>The Legation in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports talks with the King and Foreign Minister in which Bulgaria agreed to German ownership of chromium ore mines near Skoplje; the King is concerned over determination of the frontier between Albania and Bulgarian Macedonia.	393	623
Apr. 25	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> Directs Clodius to tell King Boris that while certain concessions had to be made to Italy in drawing the frontier between Albania and Bulgaria, Ohrid and Mount Ljuboten would go to Bulgaria.	405	639
May 4	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> Directs that King Boris be told that Germany would agree to Bulgaria's acquisition of the area southeast of N ^o but that Germany could not take a position toward Bulgaria's other territorial aims.	450	702
[May 16]	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that serious population problems confront the Bulgarian Government in its newly acquired territories.	524	830
June 8	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with King Boris who "as usual" expressed strong criticisms of the Italians. (See also under "Directives for the Conduct of the War," "Turkey," "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and "Yugoslavia.")	605	983

DANUBE NAVIGATION

1941			
Feb. 8	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> States that the German Legations in the riparian states of the Danube have been instructed to obtain the consent of those Governments to Soviet Russia's accession to the Provisional Vienna Agreement of September 12, 1940, concerning the fluvial Danube.	33	59
Feb. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Describes the first session of the Advisory Committee for matters concerning the fluvial Danube held in Vienna February 20-26.	106	191

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

XVII

DENMARK

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Feb. 27	<i>The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the development of the internal political situation, the attitude of the Danish people, and the prospects of the Danish National Socialists.	101	183
Mar. 23	<i>Memorandum by Minister Hencke</i> Records a conversation with the King on general topics concerning German-Danish relations. (See also under "Iceland and Greenland.")	197	344

DIRECTIVES FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

1941 Feb. 6	<i>Führer's Directive No. 23</i> Guiding principles for the conduct of the war against the English war economy.	23	42
Mar. 5	<i>Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Explains the principles ordered by the Führer for military cooperation with Japan.	125	219
Mar. 22	<i>Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Records Hitler's orders regarding Operations <i>Marita</i> , <i>Barbarossa</i> , and <i>Sonnenblume</i> .	195	338
Mar. 25	<i>Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Extends the boundaries of the blockade zone around the British Isles to include Iceland.	210	363
Mar. 27	<i>Führer's Directive No. 25</i> Outlines plan for the military destruction of Yugoslavia.	223	395
Apr. 3	<i>Führer's Directive No. 26</i> Regarding cooperation with Germany's allies in the Balkans.	256	440
Apr. 13	<i>Führer's Directive No. 27</i> Regarding further operations in Yugoslavia and in Greece.	335	538
Apr. 25	<i>Führer's Directive No. 28</i> Operation <i>Merkur</i> : Preparations are to be made for the occupation of Crete.	403	636
May 1	<i>Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Outlines the steps to be taken with Finland, Hungary, and Rumania with a view to their participation in Operation <i>Barbarossa</i> .	431	685
May 7	<i>Directive of the High Command of the Army</i> Operation <i>Isabella</i> : Plans and preparations to be made to occupy Spain in case of an English landing on the Iberian Peninsula.	469	731
May 17	<i>Führer's Directive No. 29</i> Outlines arrangements for Greece and the Balkans after the Greek campaign.	536	845
May 23	<i>Führer's Directive No. 30</i> Provides for a military mission to Iraq.	543	862

DIRECTIVES FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 May 23	<i>Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Outlines the mission of General von Schobert as "Commander in Chief of the German Troops in Rumania."	544	864
June 9	<i>Führer's Directive No. 31</i> Regarding the chain of command in the Balkans and Greece.	609	988
June 11	<i>Draft Führer's Directive No. 32</i> Preparations for the period after Operation <i>Barbarossa</i> , envisaging operations against British positions in the Mediterranean and the Near East.	617	1012
June 17	<i>Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Lists the services to be demanded of Sweden in connection with <i>Barbarossa</i> .	638	1040

EGYPT

1941 Apr. 15	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Egyptian Ambassador who transmits a message from King Farouk to Hitler expressing the King's admiration for Hitler and respect for the German people.	350	558
Apr. 30	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran</i> Refers to Ettel's report of April 15 (document No. 350) and advises the Minister that Hitler appreciated King Farouk's position and thanked him for his message. The German Government would be glad to consider closer cooperation with the King and to discuss the matter with an authorized representative of the King.	427	680
May 4	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports, as instructed (document No. 427), that according to the Egyptian Ambassador the King could not send another confidential representative and that the Ambassador proposed that any further discussions be carried on with him.	448	701
May 4	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Proposes that a general statement of the Axis' desire for an independent Egypt be given to the Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires in Bern, who had approached the German Minister there. (See also under "Middle East.")	452	710

FINLAND

1941 Feb. 5	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Directs Schulenburg to continue his conversation with Molotov on the Petsamo nickel mines and specifies three conditions which must be met to safeguard Germany's interests as related to existing German-Finnish clearing agreements.	16	24
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ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

XIX

FINLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Feb. 11	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Molotov on German interests in the Petsamo nickel concession, and the latest developments in the Soviet-Finnish talks on that subject.	42	75
Feb. 21	<i>The Military Attaché in Finland to an Officer in the Intelligence Department of the Army General Staff</i> Describes the visit of General von Seidel and of Colonel Buschenhagen who discussed with General Heinrichs the possible military operations if the case should arise of a conflict between Germany and Soviet Russia.	69	122
Feb. 22	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records the latest developments of the Petsamo nickel negotiations and considers the temporary break-off of the Soviet-Finnish talks on this subject as not alarming.	75	134
Mar. 1	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits the Soviet Government's reply to German demands concerning the delivery of nickel ore from the Petsamo mines. (See documents Nos. 16 and 42.)	109	196
Mar. 5	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Molotov's pressure on Paasikivi to accept a Russian general manager for the Soviet-Finnish Petsamo company and Paasikivi's inclination to give in to Molotov's demands.	123	217
Mar. 9	<i>The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> States that the Soviet proposals on the Petsamo nickel concession only approximate Germany's requirements. Directs Schulenburg to stress once more, in detail, the German position.	139	248
Mar. 25	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the main points of the Soviet reply to the German memorandum of March 11 (see document No. 139).	204	352
Apr. 2	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discusses the policy of the Finnish Foreign Minister who would, in case of Russo-German conflict, opt for Germany.	250	433
Apr. 10	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Directs that further conversation on the Petsamo nickel mines be conducted in a dilatory manner.	305	507
Apr. 25	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports easing of tension between the Soviet Union and Finland; attributes this to Soviet preoccupation with developments in the Balkans.	402	635

FINLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
May 12	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records the remarks of General Jodl on the need for military discussions with Finland and his request that these be initiated through diplomatic channels.	501	787
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to Minister Schnurre's conversations of May 20 in Helsinki.		850
May 25	<i>Memorandum of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Protocol of the discussion with the representatives of the Finnish Armed Forces on May 25, 1941, in Salzburg.	554	879
June 4	<i>The Chief of Staff of the German Army in Norway to the High Command of the Army, Attaché Department</i> Reports that Finland is ready for full military co-operation with Germany but wishes certain political guarantees in case war does not take place.	592	963
June 5	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Describes the reply which the Finnish Government has prepared in answer to the British demand for the transfer of Finnish shipping space.	594	965
June 13	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Witting explained Finnish mobilization to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of Parliament.	624	1023
June 16	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records information received from General Jodl on June 14 that the Finnish General Staff, before proceeding with the mobilization of the principal forces, asked for assurances that an armed conflict would take place.	636	1038
June 18	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a reluctance on the part of the Finnish Government to break off relations with Britain in answer to a British aide-mémoire threatening economic pressure.	643	1047
June 18	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records the decision by Hitler that Germany would help to make up Finland's expected grain deficiency.	647	1050
June 22	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the beginning of hostilities by Soviet Russia against Finland, and the importance in Finnish domestic politics that aggressive action proceed from Russia.	669	1079
June 23	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Witting's protest against Russian bombings but with Witting unwilling for a rupture of relations at this stage because of Finland's need of more time for the strategic concentration of her forces. (See also under "Directives for the Conduct of the War," "Sweden," "Tripartite Pact," and "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.")	675	1083

FRANCE

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Feb. 1	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a message by Pétain expressing his intention to recall Laval into the Government; reports the mobilization of public opinion against the Vichy Government and comments on Pétain's message.	1	1
Feb. 1	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits information on Admiral Leahy's activities in Vichy.	2	3
Feb. 4	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the visit of Darian to Paris and conversations with him on various political and economic subjects.	11	16
Feb. 8	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Laval's refusal to return to the Cabinet and the expected interim reorganization of the Government in Vichy.	29	53
Feb. 11	<i>Minute by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Gives detailed instructions to the courier about the transmittal of Ribbentrop's directive to Abetz (document No. 44).	43	76
Feb. 11	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris</i> Requests Abetz' opinion on the possibility of Laval's taking over the premiership in the French Government and French participation in the war against England in return for a peace treaty with Germany.	44	77
Feb. 14	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M</i> Transmits directives of the OKW for future negotiations of the Armistice Commission; it shall be a basic directive that all French requests which would lead to a strengthening of their military power to resist in metropolitan France are to be refused.	50	98
Feb. 15	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the French attitude at the recent meetings of Pétain and Darlan with Franco as related by de Brinon.	56	106
Feb. 17	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been informed by Serrano Suñer about the Franco-Pétain meeting at Montpellier; according to Suñer, Pétain did not believe in a complete German victory, while Darlan took the opposite view.	62	113
Mar. 8	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a dinner conversation with Darlan during which they discussed the British seizure of French merchant ships, Laval's return to the Government, the establishment of a central office for Jewish affairs in France, and Weygand's trip to Vichy.	127	227
Mar. 8	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Suggests that Reynaud and Mandel be shot for having organized civilians to fight German parachutists.	135	244

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Mar. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Reports a conversation with Benoist-Méchin on France's policy in Syria and the appearance of German control officers in Morocco.	152	272
Mar. 24	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on anti-Jewish measures of the Vichy Government and recommends that long-range plans for execution of this policy should not be discussed in the press inasmuch as the United States may persuade the Vichy Government to ease its policy.	198	346
Mar. 26	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With the German Armistice Commission</i> Informs Hemmen that a reduction of the installment payments of occupation costs can be granted to the French only under certain conditions which he enumerates.	213	367
Apr. 3	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the appointment by the French Government of a Commissioner for Jewish Questions and on the status of anti-Jewish legislation in the unoccupied zone.	254	437
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to Benoist-Méchin's meeting with Ribbentrop and Keitel in Berlin on April 13.		541
Apr. 24	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Darlan, de Brinon, and Benoist-Méchin about France's relations with the United States.	395	627
Apr. 28	<i>The Office of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the cooperative attitude of the French Government in various recent negotiations and recommends that concessions be granted to the French in political and economic questions.	417	659
Apr. 28	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Proposes a number of military and political demands in return for permitting the French to rearm seven torpedo boats and six destroyers.	421	663
May 3	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records having informed Abetz by telephone that Ribbentrop had agreed to an Abetz-Darlan conversation.	442	695
May 5	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Darlan's willingness to cooperate in providing arms and planes to Iraq via Syria.	459	718
May 5	<i>Marshal Pétain to Adolf Hitler</i> Welcomes Hitler's intention to receive Darlan and sees in it proof that France will participate in the new order in Europe.	462	721

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 May 8	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records the results of the German-French negotiations in Paris involving French military cooperation in Syria in return for concessions such as German reduction of occupation costs, relaxation of the demarcation line, and permission for the rearmament of seven French torpedo boats.	475	740
May 11	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records the Ribbentrop-Darlan conversation. Discussion of Franco-German cooperation, the inevitability of Germany's victory, and France's role in the defense of the "European-African hemisphere" against encroachments from the outside.	490	755
[May 11]	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records conversation of Hitler with Darlan dealing with Franco-German collaboration in general and French support of German operations in the Middle East in particular.	491	763
May 12	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records that Ribbentrop told Darlan privately that France could play a significant role in the new order of Europe only if she entered the war on the side of Germany against Britain.	499	781
May 15	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Abetz outlines in detail what services France could provide to Germany which would be of use for the conduct of war against Great Britain and German concessions to France in return.	520	823
May 17	<i>The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Embassy in Paris</i> Transmits a telegram from Hitler to Pétain acknowledging a message from Pétain in which the latter had associated himself with the statements of Darlan.	533	841
May 24	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the results of conversations with the French Government regarding French support for German operations in Syria, Iraq, and North Africa, which had been held in Paris since May 20.	546	867
May 27, 28	<i>Protocols Signed at Paris on May 27 and May 28, 1941</i> Text of agreements concerning German-French military and naval cooperation in Syria, Iraq, North Africa, West and Equatorial Africa.	559	892
June 10	<i>The Office of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a directive from the OKW to the German Armistice Commission which, following the Paris Protocols of May 27 and 28, contains new instructions for the negotiations with the French delegation.	610	991

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 June 11	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports in detail about a meeting with Benoist-Méchin and French and German military representatives; the situation in the eastern Mediterranean following the British attack in Syria, the situation in North and West Africa in relation to the Paris Protocols of May 28, and the effects of military events on the internal situation in France were discussed.	616	1008
June 15	<i>The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Minister</i> Asks Ribbentrop that the negotiations with the French for execution of the Paris Protocols be speeded up and that generous concessions be granted to the French for their services and obligations because they were vital for the German war effort. (See also under "Indochina," "Italy," "Middle East," "Spain," and "United States.")	633	1033

GREAT BRITAIN

1941 Feb. 26	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Serrano Suñer who had learned from an agent that Great Britain might consider leasing Gibraltar to Spain and including French Morocco in the Spanish zone after the war.	90	166
Feb. 28	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with a secret agent about views and conditions in Great Britain.	104	189
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Announcement on May 12 of Rudolf Hess' flight to England.		783
May 12	<i>Memorandum by Dr. Albrecht Haushofer</i> Reports to Hitler his contacts with Englishmen and his conversation with Burckhardt on the possibilities of Anglo-German peace preliminaries. (See also under "Directives for the Conduct of the War," "Greece," "Iceland," and "Portugal.")	500	783

GREECE

1941 Feb. 23	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Directs that Greek assurances regarding the absence of British ground forces from Greek soil are to be rejected.	77	138
Mar. 1	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Military Attaché reports that the Italian High Command wishes to defeat the Greek Army before a compromise peace is arranged.	111	199
Mar. 9	<i>The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the number of British troops in Greece and on the effect on the Greek public of the entry of German troops into Bulgaria.	143	253

GREECE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Mar. 12	<i>The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a suggestion from the Greek military, made through the Consulate at Salonika, that German troops replace the Italians on the Albanian front.	155	279
Mar. 16	<i>The Legation in Greece to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports an approach to the Military Attaché, made by Merkouris, a former Cabinet Minister, suggesting German-Greek conversations to be initiated by a German démarche.	170	299
Mar. 18	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Greece</i> Indicates a response considered for the report of the Military Attaché (document No. 170).	179	315
Mar. 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a discussion with the Greek Minister whose explanation of the presence of British forces in Greece in terms of Italian action was rejected; the decisive mistake of Greece was in accepting a British guarantee.	180	316
Mar. 21	<i>Minute by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records the attempt of the Greek Minister, using the channel of the OKW, to submit a document intended for Hitler which explains the Greek position.	189	325
Mar. 24	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IM</i> Records the instruction of the OKW to the Military Attaché in Washington that the British strength in Greece be played up for propaganda purposes.	201	349
Vpr. 5	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Greece</i> Directs that the Greek Foreign Minister be informed next day of the démarche in Berlin announcing that German troops would expel the British forces from Greek territory.	274	464
Apr. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador to Italy</i> Records a series of discussions and telephone conversations with Ciano, Ribbentrop, and Hitler in connection with Mussolini's irritation over surrender of Greek forces to the Germans.	379	599
Apr. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IM</i> Encloses a copy of General Rintelen's memorandum regarding discussions with the Italian High Command about the capitulation of Greek forces in Epirus, April 21-23.	409	643
Apr. 27	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i> Records the démarche made in accordance with Ribbentrop's instructions to get Mussolini's consent to the establishment of a Greek government under General Tsolakoglou.	410	648
May 3	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Athens</i> States Hitler's decision of April 28 appointing a Reich Plenipotentiary for Greece.	444	696
May 6	<i>The Reich Plenipotentiary for Greece to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits telegrams from the Greek Government to Hitler and Göring expressing thanks for the release of Greek prisoners and the wish that Greece be under the protection of the Reich.	463	722

GREECE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 May 9	<i>The High Command of the Army to the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Reports the views of the Commander in Chief of the Army on the situation in Greece; requests that Hitler be informed and that these views be taken into account in discussions with Italy.	482	747
May 11	<i>The Reich Plenipotentiary for Greece to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that there is no doubt regarding the reliability of the Tsolakoglou Government; but that it will be able to stay in power only if military occupation is restricted to a minimum and if the food problem is solved.	495	776
May 13	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records Hitler's decision to leave the protection of Greece as a whole to Italian troops. (See also under "Bulgaria," "Directives for the Conduct of the War," "Italy," "Turkey," and "Yugoslavia.")	510	796

HUNGARY

1941 Mar. 17	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a visit by the Hungarian Minister who urged that Hungarian revisionist claims not be forgotten when Yugoslavia adheres to the Tripartite Pact.	172	302
Mar. 23	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of a conversation between Hitler and the Hungarian Foreign Minister on March 21. Hitler discussed the Vienna Award, Russian policy in the Balkans, the Italo-Greek conflict, United States aid to Britain, and German-Hungarian relations.	191	331
Mar. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Record of a conversation between Hitler and the Hungarian Minister on March 27 in which Hitler asked Sztójay to convey to Horthy his views on the situation in Yugoslavia; Hitler urged that Hungary take military measures and stated that the situation offered Hungary a unique opportunity for fulfilling her revisionist aims.	215	369
Mar. 28	<i>The Regent of Hungary to Adolf Hitler</i> Replies to Hitler's message transmitted through Sztójay (document No. 215). States Hungary's resolve to stand by Germany; emphasizes Hungary's territorial claims; expresses willingness for contacts with the German High Command.	227	400
Mar. 29	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Records a conversation of March 28 between Sztójay, who delivered Horthy's letter (document No. 227), and Hitler, who explained his Balkan policy and indicated support for Hungary's claims on Yugoslavia.	228	401

HUNGARY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Apr. 3	<i>The Regent of Hungary to Adolf Hitler</i> Informs Hitler of the suicide of Minister President Teleki as a result of a "conflict of conscience." Requests as regards Yugoslavia that Hungarian troops perform only such tasks as are reconcilable with Hungary's conscience.	261	447
Apr. 4	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records the information brought by Bartha, Hungarian Minister of Defense, on behalf of Horthy who feels the need of a suitable occasion for conflict with Yugoslavia.	264	450
Apr. 5	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports regarding the rumors circulating about the suicide of Minister President Teleki and on a conversation with Bárdossy on the same subject.	267	458
Apr. 6	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been informed by the Hungarian Defense Minister of his conversation with Hitler, Keitel, and Paulus, and that Hungary would complete mobilization of five army corps by April 15.	282	478
Apr. 6	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Bárdossy who mentioned British threats if Hungary should attack Yugoslavia.	287	483
Apr. 9	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Bárdossy requires and expects the dissolution of the Yugoslav State as a prerequisite for Hungarian military intervention. Bárdossy also expressed fears regarding Soviet Russia and Rumania.	296	493
Apr. 10	<i>The High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards the report that Horthy has agreed that the bulk of the Third Hungarian Army should attack on April 11 without waiting for systematic assembly of forces.	306	509
Apr. 11	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Horthy is about to issue a manifesto referring to the break-up of Yugoslavia and announcing his intention to take back the territories which Yugoslavia had taken from Hungary.	307	509
Apr. 12	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Hungary</i> Directs that any American attempts to mediate with respect to Belgrade are to be rejected.	320	525
Apr. 12	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a discussion with the Hungarian Minister who urged that Antonescu be informed that Hungary would receive the Banat as otherwise there might be an armed clash. Weizsäcker insisted that Hungarian troops were not to cross the Tisza.	321	525
Apr. 13	<i>Adolf Hitler to the Regent of Hungary</i> Requests approval for certain arrangements involving Hungarian troops; states that the collapse of Yugoslavia is a definite fact.	334	538

HUNGARY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Apr. 14	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Hungary</i> Directs that the Hungarian Minister President be informed of Hitler's request that Hungarian troops not occupy the Banat lest there be a clash with Rumanian troops.	340	548
Apr. 14	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having carried out the instruction of April 13 (document No. 340). Bárdossy referred to Hitler's assurances in Berlin (documents Nos. 215 and 282) that Hungary could reclaim from Yugoslavia all territories that previously belonged to Hungary.	344	551
Apr. 15	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records having received a letter from the Hungarian Minister suggesting that the Rumanian Government be told that the Yugoslav Banat will fall to Hungary.	353	562
Apr. 17	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> Transmits a memorandum presented by the Hungarian Minister regarding Hungary's claims to former Yugoslav territory; records his reply differentiating between the military occupation of these areas and their final disposition.	366	574
Undated	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Record of a conversation on April 19 between Count Sztójay and Hitler who mentioned the Hungarian outrages against Volksdeutsche in the occupied areas. Hitler asked Sztójay to tell Horthy that the Yugoslav Banat would become Hungarian eventually but had to remain under German occupation for the time being lest Antonescu's position in Rumania be jeopardized.	371	581
Apr. 23	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Hungary</i> Transmits an account of his conversation with the Hungarian Minister regarding the Hungarian outrages against Volksdeutsche and regarding a frontier rectification in favor of Germany.	392	621
May 28	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records explaining to the Hungarian Minister that the existing provisional arrangement regarding the Banat would have to remain in force.	564	909
May 31	<i>The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Foreign Minister</i> Reports having signed an agreement with Hungary providing for the delivery to Germany of the entire oil output in the former Yugoslav territories which are to fall to Hungary.	580	935
June 15	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Hungary</i> Directs that the Hungarian Minister President be informed of Hitler's intention to clarify Germany's relations with Russia by the beginning of July and that it will be necessary for Hungary, too, to take steps to secure her frontiers.	631	1030
June 21	<i>Adolf Hitler to the Regent of Hungary</i> Sets forth the reasons for the forthcoming operation against the Soviet Union. 25	661	1070

HUNGARY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 June 22	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having handed Hitler's letter (document No. 661) to Horthy who expressed his delight and belief that the German campaign against Soviet Russia would bring peace. (See also under "Directives for the Conduct of the War," "Rumania," "Slovakia," and "Yugoslavia.")	667	1077

ICELAND AND GREENLAND

1941 Apr. 11	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the exchange of notes and on the agreement regarding Greenland signed on April 9 by United States Secretary of State Hull and Danish Minister Kauffmann.	308	510
Apr. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a telephone conversation with the Minister in Denmark regarding the action to be taken by the Danish Government in connection with the agreement on Greenland signed by Secretary of State Hull and Minister Kauffmann on April 9.	309	512
Apr. 12	<i>The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Instructions from Ribbentrop to be forwarded to the German Minister in Denmark asking the Danish Government to disown Kauffmann's action in signing the Greenland agreement and to recall him immediately.	314	517
Apr. 12	<i>The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Minister Kauffmann acted entirely on his own responsibility in concluding the Greenland agreement. Renthe-Fink has told the Danish Government that German confidence in Danish policy was severely shaken.	315	518
Apr. 12	<i>The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Replies to Ribbentrop's instruction (document No. 314). Reports that the Danish Government has accepted German demands in the Kauffmann case and gives details of the actions taken.	318	520
Apr. 13	<i>The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Has told the Danish Foreign Minister in reply to his assurances of good faith that the situation could not be simply repaired by Danish Government statements, and that the half-measures of the Stauning Government had encouraged Kauffmann in his plans.	327	532

ICELAND AND GREENLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Apr. 12	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Denmark</i> Germany intends to take no further steps with the Danish Government in the Kauffmann case, but will await further steps of the Danish Government and continue to hold it responsible for the actions of its Minister. (See also under "Directives for the Conduct of the War" and "United States.")	329	533

INDIA

1941 Feb. 9	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Directs Schulenburg to inquire if the Soviet Government would permit Subhas Chandra Bose to travel through the Soviet Union on his way to Germany from Afghanistan.	36	63
Apr. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Reports a conversation with the Indian nationalist, Bose, in which the latter's propaganda activities and plans for anti-British uprisings in India were discussed informally.	257	442
Apr. 9	<i>Memorandum by Subhas Chandra Bose</i> Outlines a plan for collaboration between the Axis Powers and India. Discusses the establishment of a free India government in Europe, subversive activities in Afghanistan and India, and financial and military support of such activities by the Axis.	300	499
Apr. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Refers to and comments on Bose's memorandum (document No. 300).	323	527
May 1	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records Ribbentrop's conversation with Bose on April 29 on the general war situation, conditions in India, and Bose's plans for India; Ribbentrop will examine the possibilities for action in India "in a sober spirit without any illusions" and maintain close liaison with Bose through Woermann.	425	670
May 25	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Foreign Minister</i> Reports that Bose agreed to a postponement of a declaration of a "free India" and that he had been invited by the Italian Government to come to Rome.	553	878
May 28	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> Informs the Embassy of Bose's trip to Rome as guest of the Italian Government and requests that he be given all necessary assistance during his visit. (See also under "Afghanistan" and "Middle East.")	561	902

INDOCHINA

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Feb. 18	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits the Japanese mediation proposals for the Thailand-Indochina negotiations and Matsuoka's request that the Reich Government support the acceptance of these proposals at Vichy.	64	115
Feb. 27	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Matsuoka who mentioned Vichy's rejection of Japan's proposals of mediation with Thailand (document No. 64) and who explained Japan's new proposals for which he wished German support with Vichy.	96	178
Mar. 1	<i>An Official of the Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits the text of a communication of de Brinon from Darlan who asked for German support in Tokyo for minor modification of the Japanese proposals of mediation with Thailand.	112	200
Mar. 8	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the French and Thai delegations have reached an agreement on the basis of the Japanese proposals.	136	245
June 10	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a request by Oshima to see Ribbentrop in order to discuss the wish of the Japanese Armed Forces to obtain bases in southern French Indochina. (See also under "France" and "Japan.")	611	992

IRELAND

1941 Feb. 24	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Ireland</i> Directs Minister Hempel to discuss with de Valera ways and means of German assistance in case of a British attack on Ireland.	79	152
Mar. 11	<i>The Minister in Ireland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on his conversation with de Valera as directed (document No. 79) and states that de Valera was entirely noncommittal with regard to the possibility of German assistance to Ireland.	150	270
Mar. 13	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records a conversation with Warlimont about possible military assistance to Ireland.	164	290

ITALY

1941 Feb. 1	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a discussion with the Italian Chargé d'Affaires regarding the Italo-Russian political discussions on the Axis guarantee to Rumania, the Danube question, and the question of the Straits.	5	5
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ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Feb. 5	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> Explains the measures which he is preparing for the Balkans and North Africa for the relief of the Italian forces.	17	26
Feb. 6	<i>Memorandum by the Chief of the Economic Armaments Office</i> Records a discussion of Keitel, Clodius, and General Rintelen on February 5 resulting in a plan for partially meeting Italy's requests for oil and other raw materials for the first half of 1941.	19	33
Feb. 11	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Explains the German plan for the defense of Tripoli. Records the instruction to General Rintelen to explain that acceptance of the plan by Italy is required as the condition for committing German forces in North Africa.	24	44
Feb. 6	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records giving Cosmelli an oral reply to his communications regarding the Italo-Russian discussions (document No. 5). In accordance with Ribbentrop's directive suggests that Italy delay further discussions in Moscow.	25	45
Feb. 7	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Clodius reports that in accordance with instructions (document No. 19) he presented Hitler's views regarding Italy's requirements for oil and rubber to Mussolini who appeared to be impressed by Hitler's over-all appreciation.	27	47
Feb. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the Duce's decision not to take Ciano to the meeting with Franco; speculates on the possibility of Ciano's removal from office.	31	56
Feb. 9	<i>The Military Attaché in Italy to the General Staff of the Army, Attaché Department</i> Reports seeing Mussolini, who agreed to the German conception for the defense of Tripolitania as expounded in Hitler's letter (document No. 17).	35	62
Feb. 14	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a summary account delivered by the Italian Chargé d'Affaires regarding the discussion between Mussolini and Franco at Bordighera.	49	96
Feb. 15	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Transmits a report from Reichert, DNB representative in Rome, regarding Italian morale and requests detailed comment on it.	53	101
Feb. 15	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in regard to our observations on the Italo-Russian discussions (document No. 25). He stated that Mussolini felt that Rosso would have to reply to Molotov's question regarding Turkey and the Straits. Mussolini proposed a noncommittal reply.	57	106

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Feb. 16	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> With reference to Reichert's report (document No. 53) submits an analysis of the domestic situation in Italy and public morale.	59	108
Feb. 17	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits an account of the discussions of Franco and Mussolini at Bordighera as presented by Serrano Suñer.	61	112
Feb. 18	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Summarizes information from Grand Admiral Raeder regarding the main points of his conference with Admiral Riccardi: the need for aggressive employment of the Italian fleet; Italian worries about the French fleet; and the fuel oil requirements of the Italian Navy.	65	116
Feb. 22	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Clodius reports discussions with Anfuso and Mussolini in which he emphasized Germany's helpfulness in the matter of supplying Italy with raw materials.	71	127
Feb. 22	<i>Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler</i> Replies to Hitler's letter of February 5 (document No. 17) indicating that the Italian situation has changed for the better.	76	135
[Feb. 24]	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Draws the attention of the Foreign Minister to the Italian plan for the occupation of Corsica which was mentioned in the discussion of Raeder and Riccardi (document No. 65).	82	155
Feb. 26	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Clodius' draft explains the principal features of the Seventh Secret Protocol on raw materials deliveries.	91	166
Feb. 28	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> Discusses Axis policy toward Spain and military plans for North Africa, Greece, and the Balkans.	110	197
Mar. 2	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records a conversation held in Vienna on March 1 between Hitler and Count Ciano on the situation in North Africa and the Balkans.	117	206
Mar. 25	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records a conversation between Hitler and Ciano about conditions in the Balkans and Germany's relations to Turkey and Russia.	208	357
May 14	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records the conversation on May 13 between Mussolini, Ribbentrop, and Ciano on the Hess affair, Darlan's visit to Germany, German-French relations, and general problems concerning the Middle East, Japan, and the United States.	511	797

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 May 14	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Continues and brings to a close the Mussolini-Ribbentrop conversation (document No. 511).	513	810
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Refers to planning for Italian participation in the military campaign against the Soviet Union.		924
June	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between Hitler and Mussolini in the presence of Ribbentrop and Count Ciano at the Brenner on June 2. They discussed the Balkan campaign, American policy, Japan, France, Turkey, and Spain and the situation in Great Britain.	584	940
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to a conversation of von Ribbentrop with Count Ciano in Venice on June 15.		1030
June 17	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Summarizes the status of the negotiations with the Italians for the economic agreement for the coming period.	641	1044
June 20	<i>The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> Informs the Embassy that the German-Italian economic negotiations in Berlin have been concluded with the signature of the Eighth Secret Protocol of June 19.	652	1056
June 21	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> Informs Mussolini of the impending attack on the Soviet Union and states the reasons for the decision.	660	1066
June 22	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records a conversation in which Ribbentrop informed Alfieri of the impending attack on the Soviet Union and explained the reasons for this decision.	665	1075
June 22	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the delivery of the text of Hitler's letter (document No. 660) to Ciano who telephoned it to Mussolini. (See also under "Bulgaria," "Directives for the Conduct of the War," "Greece," "Middle East," "Spain," "Tripartite Pact," and "Yugoslavia.")	666	1076

JAPAN

1941 Feb. 3	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of Japanese Ambassador Kurusu's farewell audience with the Führer in Berlin on February 3 in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and State Minister Meissner, as well as the Japanese First Secretary of Embassy, Koda.	8	9
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JAPAN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Feb. 10	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Matsuoka's plan to visit Berlin, Moscow, and Rome and his suggestions for the agenda in Berlin.	40	71
Feb. 23	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records the conversation at Fuschl between the Foreign Minister and Ambassador Oshima. Ribbentrop discussed the general course of the war and urged that Japan make a surprise attack on Singapore.	78	139
Feb. 27	<i>The Foreign Minister in the Embassy in Japan</i> Urges Ott to work with all means to induce Japan to seize Singapore.	100	183
Mar. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Explains the economic relations between Germany and Japan in preparation for the visit of Matsuoka.	190	327
Mar. 24	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Comments on and submits to the Foreign Minister memoranda drawn up in the Foreign Ministry in preparation for Matsuoka's visit.	200	348
Mar. 25	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ott</i> Discusses possibilities of a Japanese attack on Singapore.	209	361
Mar. 31	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records the conversation on March 27 between the Reich Foreign Minister and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka at Berlin in the presence of Ambassadors Ott and Oshima. Ribbentrop reviewed the military situation and suggested a Japanese attack on Singapore in order to break the British spirit and to keep the United States out of the war.	218	376
Apr. 1	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records the discussion on March 27 between Hitler and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and Ambassadors Ott and Oshima. Hitler argued that the British had lost the war. Matsuoka mentioned the obstacle of the sentiment in Japan favorable to Britain and America and discussed his conversations in Moscow.	222	386
Mar. 31	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records the conversation on March 28 between the Reich Foreign Minister and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka. Ribbentrop urged that real cooperation with the USSR was not possible and recommended that Matsuoka on his return to Moscow avoid discussion of Soviet Russia's adherence to the Tripartite Pact.	230	405
Mar. 31	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records the conversation in Berlin on March 29 between the Reich Foreign Minister and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka. Ribbentrop advised against political discussions with the USSR; admitted that war between Germany and Soviet Russia was possible; explained why Germany could not accept Molotov's terms for Soviet adherence to the Tripartite Pact. Matsuoka stated that he would have to discuss a non-aggression pact in Moscow.	233	413

JAPAN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Apr. 4	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records the discussion between Hitler and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka at Berlin in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and Minister of State Meissner. Matsuoka told of his conversations in Rome. Hitler promised assistance in case of a Japanese war with the United States.	266	453
Apr. 7	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on April 5. Concluding conference before Matsuoka's departure from Berlin.	278	469
Apr. 9	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports being unable to draw out from Matsuoka a straightforward statement of his discussions with Molotov.	297	495
Apr. 10	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the likelihood of the signature of a Japanese-Russian neutrality pact.	301	502
Apr. 14	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister expressed his satisfaction at the conclusion of the Neutrality Pact with Soviet Russia.	339	546
Apr. 16	<i>State Secretary Weizsäcker to Ambassador Ott</i> Opines that the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact opens the way for a Japanese drive southward.	361	570
Apr. 26	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department</i> Reports a conversation with Japanese Counselor of Embassy Kase who considered the Russian initiative for the Pact with Japan inspired solely by the impression of the German advance in the Balkans.	408	642
Apr. 28	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the State Department is in possession of the key to the Japanese code.	418	661
May 1	<i>The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the arrival of the Wohlthat delegation on April 26 and an initial meeting with the Japanese who urged an agreement of Greater Germany with the yen bloc.	429	683
May 3	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Japan</i> Informs Ott that Cripps met Matsuoka in Moscow through the mediation of the United States Ambassador.	447	700
May 5	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Matsuoka informed him of an American four-point proposal of April 16 for a secret agreement with Japan.	454	711

JAPAN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
May 5	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards the text of a verbal interim message to be presented to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on behalf of Foreign Minister Matsuoka.	455	713
May 5	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments on the American proposals (document No. 454) urging that they represent an attempt to neutralize Japan.	456	714
May 6	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Matsuoka who referred to the American proposal (document No. 454) whose origin he attributed to Steinhardt. He asked for Ribbentrop's views regarding the reply by Japan to the proposal attributed to the United States; said Japan would attack Russia in case of Russo-German conflict.	464	723
May 9	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Directs that thanks be conveyed to Matsuoka for his congratulatory message on Hitler's speech of May 4 to the Reichstag.	477	743
May 9	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Referring to Ott's telegram No. 675 (document No. 454), Ribbentrop directs Ott to try to secure from Matsuoka the exact text of the proposal reported to have been made by the United States.	480	745
May 10	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports, with reference to telegram No. 685 (document No. 464), that Matsuoka inquired if there were a reply from Berlin regarding the four-point proposal reported to have been made by the United States.	483	749
May 10	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports delivery to Matsuoka of Ribbentrop's reply to the congratulatory message on Hitler's speech (document No. 477). The Japanese reply to the American Government is to be postponed pending receipt of Ribbentrop's views.	484	750
May 10	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff</i> Analyzes Roosevelt's policy in the negotiations of the United States with Japan (document No. 454). Urges that Roosevelt's purpose is to gain time and to weaken the Tripartite Pact.	487	751
May 11	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports, in reply to telegram No. 577 (document No. 480), that Matsuoka confirmed the substance of the four points of the American proposal (document No. 454), but that he declined to reveal the text.	488	753
May 11	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Matsuoka proposed to make a preliminary reply to the United States; that Ott objected; and thereupon Matsuoka agreed to a brief postponement.	489	755
May 11	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> In response to telegram No. 724 (document No. 489), directs Ott to present to Matsuoka a note suggesting the kind of answer which the Japanese Government should make to the United States.	496	777

JAPAN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 May 12	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a conversation with Counselor of Embassy Kase who was curious about the relations of Germany and the Soviet Union.	502	788
May 13	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that, upon receiving instructions (document No. 496), Ott requested that Matsuoka defer his reply to Washington but that Matsuoka found this impossible for reasons of domestic policy.	507	794
May 14	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports receiving from Matsuoka the text of his instruction to Nomura, and that on reading it Ott protested. Matsuoka pleaded for confidence and asked about German policy toward Soviet Russia.	512	806
May 15	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports learning from Matsuoka that he informed the British and American Ambassadors that Japan might consider a convoy system to constitute an attack within the meaning of article III of the Tripartite Pact.	516	818
May 15	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> Comments on reports from Tokyo (document No. 512). Urges that any political agreement of Japan with the United States is undesirable, that the effort should be made to prevent conclusion of the treaty.	517	819
May 15	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Directs that Ott report fully on the crisis in Japan; that he give Matsuoka an oral statement reiterating the German standpoint toward Japanese-American negotiations; and that he insist that Germany be fully informed.	518	820
May 18	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports carrying out instruction (document No. 518), insisting on the need of an exact commitment by America not to participate in the European war. Matsuoka declined to commit himself to previous consultation with the Axis Powers in his negotiations with America.	537	847
May 27	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Reports a conversation with Japanese Ambassador Oshima who mentioned his views on Japanese-American negotiations, and who asked about German-Russian relations.	558	891
May 31	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Matsuoka who offered an explanation of his policy statement of May 30: a counterblow against Roosevelt and an open fight against the pro-Anglo-Saxon domestic opposition.	575	931
June 6	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Analyzes the political situation in Japan; explains the difficulties facing Matsuoka; recommends that he be given information regarding Russo-German developments lest he be surprised.	596	967

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

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JAPAN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 June 11	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records receipt of a communication from Japanese Counselor of Embassy Kase conveying the content of a recent telegram from Tokyo giving Matsuoka's views on the course of Japanese-American negotiations and American intentions.	618	1016
June 21	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Matsuoka who told him that he intended to seek recognition of Wang Ching-wei by Germany and Japan, and discussed the status of Japanese relations with the United States and Russia. (See also under "Indochina," "Tripartite Pact," "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and "United States.")	653	1057

LATIN AMERICA

1941 Feb. 9	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX</i> Records the details of the arrest, for subversive activities, of 30 Reich Germans in Argentina and their subsequent release due to insufficient evidence.	38	65
Mar. 6	<i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Vice President on the ill treatment of Germans and attacks on Germany in the Argentine press and states that the Vice President is anxious to maintain friendly relations.	128	228
Mar. 13	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Brazil</i> Requests details on the projected customs union of Argentina and Brazil and states that such a plan would be considered favorably in principle as it would be a counterweight to the dominant position of the United States.	166	294
Mar. 25	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the status of Brazilian-Argentine economic negotiations in connection with Argentina's plan for a customs union.	202	350
Apr. 9	<i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports preparations made for the founding of a society to influence Argentine policy more effectively and requests the necessary funds.	298	496
June 6	<i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports disappointment in the Argentine Foreign Ministry over the absence of a German reaction to the Argentine customs union project.	597	970
June 7	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that President Vargas inquired if Germany would agree to his acting as an unofficial mediator during his forthcoming trip to Washington.	601	974

LATIN AMERICA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 June 10	<i>Minute by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records Krupp's difficulties in fulfilling its contract of delivery of war material to Brazil because of OKH objections. Suggests that the Foreign Ministry exert pressure on the OKW and, if need be, bring about a decision by Hitler at least regarding the Krupp contract.	612	993
June 11	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Brazil</i> Rejects Vargas' proposal to act as a mediator during his forthcoming trip to Washington (document No. 601).	613	995
June 18	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that he had carried out instructions (document No. 613) and that Vargas too considered the time for a mediation proposal inopportune. (See also under "United States.")	642	1046

MIDDLE EAST

1941 Feb. 4	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records decisions made by the Foreign Minister regarding arms deliveries to Iraq and associated Arab questions. Italian sensibilities must be considered but Germany may take the initiative in appropriate instances.	12	18
Feb. 5	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division I M</i> Transmits a memorandum of the views of the OKW on strengthening German activities in the Arab countries. Recommends that the OKW examine the military possibilities in the light of Woermann's memorandum (document No. 12).	18	30
Feb. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records information from Cosmelli regarding the conversations in Rome with the private secretary of the Grand Mufti and regarding the attitude of the Italian Government toward support for Iraq and the Grand Mufti.	68	121
Feb. 25	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Paris</i> Requests an opinion on whether Germany should take into account French-Syrian relations in considering a declaration regarding a Greater Arab empire.	53	156
Feb. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a discussion with the private secretary of the Grand Mufti regarding a new political declaration, arms deliveries, and financial support for the Arabs.	92	168
Feb. 28	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> In reply to instructions (document No. 83), explains that public knowledge of German promises of help in the establishment of a Greater Arab empire would give a decisive impetus to the de Gaullist movement and would be considered as contrary to the Armistice Agreement.	103	188

MIDDLE EAST--Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Mar. 7	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Submits a detailed memorandum on the Arab question, and its relations to other aspects of German policy, with recommendations for courses of action.	133	234
Mar. 12	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Comments on Woermann's memorandum of March 7 (document No. 133).	159	284
Mar. 21	<i>The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards Ribbentrop's instructions with regard to the points summarized in section IV of Woermann's memorandum of March 7 (document No. 133).	188	323
Apr. 8	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Forwards a letter from Weizsäcker to the Grand Mufti in reply to his letter of January 20 to Hitler (volume XI, document No. 680). It promised German help in case of Arab conflict with England.	293	488
Apr. 9	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records reporting on the situation in Iraq to the Foreign Minister who authorized the Abwehr to organize an intelligence service in the Middle East which, however, would be confined to purely military matters.	299	497
Apr. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records that the Italian Government agreed to the German counterdraft of a declaration to the Iraq Government.	322	526
Apr. 13	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Minister President who mentioned rumors of a free hand in Iran given to the USSR by Germany and Japan.	326	531
Apr. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Informs the Foreign Minister that the Italian Government has withdrawn its objections to a German liaison staff with the Italian Armistice Commission in Syria but that the French Government objects to the return of Hentig to Syria.	352	561
Apr. 19	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Anfuso who stated that the Iraq Government was resolved to defend itself against Britain and asked for air force support from the Axis.	372	587
Apr. 19	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a discussion on April 10 with Zamboni who stated that the Italian Government agreed to the dispatch of Weizsäcker's letter to the Grand Mufti (document No. 293, enclosure).	373	588
Apr. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Reports to Hitler about the possibilities for assisting Iraq and requests a decision whether deliveries of arms to Iraq by plane should be started.	377	592

MIDDLE EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Apr. 25	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards an Italian report on the situation in Iraq emphasizing the disappointment of the Gaylani Government over the failure of the Axis to provide air support.	401	634
Apr. 26	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Reports discussing the question of aid to Iraq with Colonel Brinckmann who questioned the military intelligence so far received. Woermann requested of Brinckmann that a new military report be made to Hitler regarding employment of the Luftwaffe.	407	641
Apr. 27	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Explains that the Iraq Government's request for aid requires that it have a representative with full powers to negotiate in Ankara where the German Government intends to send Minister Grobba.	412	652
Apr. 27	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Directs that the Italian Government be requested to inform the Iraq Government of the Axis sympathy for its cause; and that the Italian Government be informed that Germany was studying the problem of assistance with arms.	413	653
Apr. 27	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Briefs Hitler on the developments in the situation in Iraq, on the possibilities of arms deliveries, and of support of the Iraq Army by the Luftwaffe.	415	655
May 2	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that fighting has broken out between English and Iraq troops, that diplomatic relations with England are broken off, that the Iraq Minister in Turkey requests Germany to send Minister Grobba, and to render immediate military aid.	432	686
May 3	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Proposes that Minister Grobba be sent to the Iraq Government in accordance with its request (document No. 432) and that he be accompanied by officers who can report on the prospects of military aid.	435	688
May 3	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Informs Ribbentrop that Hitler agrees with the proposals of his memorandum (document No. 435) but that he expressed skepticism regarding the transfer of air forces to Iraq.	436	690
May 3	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Directs that the Iraq Minister be informed at once about the dispatch of a German confidential representative to Baghdad who will discuss the matter of support.	441	694
May 5	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the arrival in Tehran of a special representative of the Iraq Government with specific requests to the German and Italian Ministers for assistance.	457	716

MIDDLE EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
May 6	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Iran</i> Directs Ettel to request the cooperation of the Iranian Government for the clandestine shipment of arms to Iraq.	466	726
May 8	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Explains, in reply to Woermann's instruction (document No. 466), that any arms shipped into Iran will remain there; that the Baghdad Railway is the only sure route for arms shipments to Iraq; that cooperation of the Iranian Government depends exclusively on the Shah.	472	737
May 8	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records that Rahn has gone by plane to Syria to prepare the groundwork there in relation to Iraq.	476	742
May 9	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a telephone conversation with General Warlimont who stated that the Italian Government had asked to use Syrian airfields for operations in Iraq. The OKW wished the views of the Foreign Ministry before replying to the German Armistice Commission.	479	744
May 11	<i>Minister Grobba to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports his arrival in Baghdad where he held conferences with the political and military leaders of Iraq.	493	775
May 11	<i>Minister Grobba to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that he handed certain sums of money to Minister President Gaylani and to the Grand Mufti in Baghdad.	494	775
May 12	<i>Minister Grobba to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been told by Gaylani that Turkey had offered to mediate between Iraq and England.	503	788
May 14	<i>The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Legation in Iraq</i> Replies to Grobba's report (document No. 503) and states that Iraq's apprehensions of Turkish intervention are unfounded.	515	818
May 16	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division I M</i> Gives an account of the steps taken to render military assistance to Iraq. The Wehrmacht at first regarded a German operation in Iraq with skepticism but they now realize its importance even if it should not be completely successful.	528	833
May 22	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Iran</i> Explains the immediate need for gasoline in Iraq. Directs that the Iranian Government be requested to help in supplying gasoline from its own stocks or possibly by purchase from the USSR.	541	853
May 24	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Recommends to Ribbentrop approval of Grobba's proposal that 80,000 gold pounds be made available to Iraq.	549	872

MIDDLE EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 May 25	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> In response to the instruction of May 22 (document No. 541) reports that the Iranian Government fears British retaliation if it delivers gasoline to Iraq, and that Gaylani's Government is considered to have acted rashly.	552	877
May 27	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards the text of a telegram made available by Anfuso reporting a conversation between the Grand Mufti and the Italian Minister in Baghdad. The Grand Mufti expressed concern about the situation in Iraq and urged greater support by the Axis Powers.	557	890
May 29	<i>Minister Grobba to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that he left Baghdad because of the deteriorating military situation; supports Gaylani's requests for Luftwaffe support in the defense of Baghdad and urges that Luftwaffe units which had been withdrawn be again committed.	568	917
May 30	<i>Minister Grobba to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Gaylani and the Grand Mufti have left Baghdad and allegedly crossed the Iranian border but that some generals would fight on if Germany would promise effective military aid.	571	925
May 31	<i>The Foreign Minister to Minister Grobba</i> States that Luftwaffe support will arrive in Mosul the next day.	576	932
May 31	<i>The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to Senior Counselor Rahn</i> States that Iraq resistance to England has ceased. Directs that all German forces are to gather at Alep.	577	933
June 1	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that in a letter addressed to Abetz, Darlan requests the removal of German personnel and material from Syria in order to deprive the British of any pretext for staging an attack.	581	936
June 3	<i>The Foreign Minister to Senior Counselor Rahn</i> Directs Rahn to remain in Syria for the time being as "unofficial representative of the German Government."	587	953
June 1	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Iran</i> Directs Grobba to maintain liaison with Gaylani and the Grand Mufti and to tell them that Germany will continue to support Iraq's struggle for freedom.	590	959
June ■	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Proposes an instruction to Tehran advising Gaylani and the Grand Mufti not to go to Syria but to come to Berlin.	599	972
June 8	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records that he informed General Jodl of the Foreign Minister's proposal that the German liaison unit be withdrawn from Syria and that Jodl agreed to this.	606	983

MIDDLE EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 June 20	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Turkish Government has informed the British and French that it would not permit the transit of arms for the benefit of either side. (See also under "Afghanistan," "Directives for the Conduct of the War," "France," "India," "Italy," and "Turkey.")	651	1056

NETHERLANDS

1941 Feb. 17	<i>The Office of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports certain measures contemplated against Jews following an incident between Jews and members of a Dutch National Socialist organization in Amsterdam.	63	114
Mar. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records the measures intended by Seyss-Inquart for the organization of Dutch business and requests Ribbentrop's approval.	115	203
May 3	<i>Reich Commissar Seyss-Inquart to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop</i> Discusses proposed measures in the Netherlands if efforts to obtain the release of German internees in the Netherlands East Indies should be unsuccessful.	445	697

NORWAY

1941 Mar. 10	<i>Vidkun Quisling to Reich Minister Lammers</i> Complains about German policy in Norway which, as practiced by Terboven and his staff, amounted to sabotage of Quisling's party, the Nasjonal Samling. His own policy, on the other hand, would ensure Norwegian cooperation with Germany in a voluntary association.	147	260
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PORTUGAL

1941 Feb. 20	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Suñer on the prospects of a Franco-Salazar meeting. Suñer, who considered Portugal an ally of Great Britain, was in favor of postponing such a meeting.	66	119
Feb. 26	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that Portugal is by no means as pro-British as Suñer seems to believe and that she has in the past resisted English pressure in the economic sphere.	89	165

PORTUGAL—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Mar. 3	<i>The Legation in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Report of a conversation of the Military Attaché with Under State Secretary Santos Costa, who expressed concern about Anglo-American designs on the Azores and Portuguese Guinea.	120	212
Mar. 17	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports news and rumors concerning the visit of Colonel Donovan to Lisbon.	171	300
Mar. 23	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the denial by the Secretary General of the Portuguese Foreign Ministry of rumors about American or British territorial demands on Portugal; a similar denial was made to the Spanish Ambassador.	196	343
Apr. 20	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation between Salazar and the Italian Ambassador on the course of the war and Portuguese relations with Spain.	374	589
May 12	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Serrano Suñer states that Spain would march into Portugal if Britain or the United States landed troops on Portuguese territory.	498	781
May 17	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a long conversation with Salazar on German-Portuguese relations, the economic future of Europe, British and Spanish policies, and others. (See also under "Spain.")	530	838

RUMANIA

1941 Feb. 1	<i>An Official of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Rumania</i> Directs that the Rumanian Government be informed of Germany's assent to the delivery of 100,000 tons of gasoline to Soviet Russia but beginning only on July 1.	3	3
Feb. 4	<i>The Director of the Information Department to the Legation in Rumania</i> States that an investigation is being made as to whether the SD are hiding Sima and other Legionnaires. Further instructions will be sent on completion of the investigation.	9	12
Feb. 5	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Antonescu who explained his attitude and intended action with regard to the Legionnaire movement (Iron Guard).	14	21
Feb. 22	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports denials by leaders of the Auslandsorganisation that its members are hiding Legionnaires.	72	130
Feb. 26	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Submits a report regarding the support given to the Legionnaire insurrection against Antonescu by Germans in Bucharest, members of the SD, of the AO, officials of the Legation, and journalists.	94	171

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Mar. 1	<i>Minister President Antonescu to Minister Killinger</i> Requests that 11 named German officials be returned to Germany.	118	210
Mar. 8	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between Reichsmarschall Göring and General Antonescu in Vienna on March 5. The discussion concentrated on the problem of increasing Rumania's oil production.	126	221
Mar. 6	<i>Minute by the Minister to Rumania</i> States that his assumption regarding the close connection between the SD and SS and the Legionnaire leadership is confirmed by an exchange of letters between Horia Sima and Himmler.	129	230
Mar. 15	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police</i> Explains Antonescu's conditions for implicated members of the Iron Guard to enjoy asylum in Germany. In accordance with Hitler's wishes, requests that the conditions be put into effect.	169	297
Apr. ...	<i>The Wehrmacht Operations Staff to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Mission in Bucharest</i> Forwards the wish of the Führer that General Antonescu be told of the need for increased defensive preparations on Rumania's eastern border.	249	433
Apr. 3	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Encloses a letter of April 2 from Himmler's office to Ribbentrop explaining that in order to facilitate the return of Minister Killinger to his post, Himmler was recalling all SS and police deputies from Rumania.	258	443
Apr. 5	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i> Directs that General Antonescu be informed that German operation against Yugoslavia and Greece will begin on April 6. Informs the Minister that the entry of Hungarian troops into the Banat is not contemplated.	276	467
Apr. 5	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records informing the Rumanian Minister that in case of Hungarian participation in military operations, Hungarian troops would remain west of the Tisza river.	277	468
Apr. 12	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i> Directs that in case of Rumanian requests for the occupation or possession of former Yugoslav territories they be answered that the definitive partition will come only with the peace treaty and until then it is strictly a matter of provisional military administration.	330	534
Apr. 21	<i>The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Legation in Rumania</i> Directs that no encouragement be given by the Legation to Rumanian claims to the former Yugoslav part of the Banat.	376	592

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Apr. 22	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> In reply to instruction (document No. 376) states that no discussions of the Serbian Banat have been carried on by the Legation; Italian influence may have stimulated Rumanian aspirations.	382	603
Apr. 23	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> Summarizes a memorandum from the Rumanian Government making claim to share in the partition of Yugoslav territory, and encloses comments by Minister Killinger.	387	616
Apr. 28	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Antonescu who, referring to his memorandum (see document No. 387) expatiated on Rumania's territorial claims and urged that Germany attack Soviet Russia.	416	656
May 3	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs asked the opinion of the German Government regarding recognition of the Croatian State.	439	692
May 5	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that General Antonescu expressed his readiness for Rumania to enter an economic union with Germany.	460	720
May 9	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i> States that Bossy's impression that Meissner indicated that Rumania would receive the Serbian Banat is incorrect.	481	746
May 12	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Complains that he receives no political or military information from the Foreign Ministry.	497	780
May 13	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i> Directs that Antonescu be asked for his views as to the treatment to be accorded to Horia Sima.	508	795
May 25	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i> Directs that Antonescu be informed that no reply can as yet be given to his memorandum (document No. 387) but that he is soon to be invited to Germany for a discussion with Ribbentrop and with Hitler.	551	876
May 30	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a conversation with the Rumanian Minister who mentioned the favorable development of Rumania's relations with Germany and the deterioration of her relations with Soviet Russia and who asked about Germany's relations with Russia. In this regard Woermann stated there was nothing new.	572	926
June 13	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of a conversation on June 11 between Hitler and Antonescu in which Antonescu mentioned Rumania's claims and Hitler explained his problem with Soviet Russia who aimed to prolong the war. Rumania would be compensated after the war. Antonescu proposed to take part in the conflict from the start. Hitler explained his plan for the chain of command over allied forces in Rumania.	614	996

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 June 13	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Antonescu as feeling dissatisfied with his discussion with Ribbentrop as regards the frontier with Hungary; he feels the need of success for the sake of his own position.	626	1025
June 18	<i>Adolf Hitler to General Ion Antonescu</i> States that he is compelled soon to attack Soviet Russia; explains the chain of command with Eleventh Army Headquarters issuing orders in the name of General Antonescu; outlines the initial missions of the allied forces in Rumania. (See also under "Directives for the Conduct of the War," "Hungary," "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and "Yugoslavia.")	644	1047

SLOVAKIA

1941 Apr. 8	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Slovakia</i> Directs that the Slovak Government be advised to break off relations with Yugoslavia.	292	488
Apr. 26	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Slovakia</i> Directs that the Slovak Government be told that it would not be appropriate at this time to approach the question of a Slovak-Hungarian frontier settlement.	406	640
Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Special Representative in Charge of Economic Questions</i> Records a discussion with Tuka and Tiso at Bratislava regarding Slovak aspirations for Hungarian territory settled by Slovaks; states that he discouraged Tiso from pressing for a hearing with Ribbentrop in this matter.	424	669
June 21	<i>The Minister in Slovakia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Tuka and Tiso expressed willingness that Slovak armed forces participate in the impending operations against the USSR.	656	1059
June 22	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Slovakia</i> Directs that Tuka be informed of Germany's agreement to the rupture of Slovakia's diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and to her participation in the military struggle against the Soviet Union.	672	1081

SPAIN

1941 Feb. 6	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a general worsening of the internal political and economic conditions in Spain.	21	36
Feb. 6	<i>Adolf Hitler to Francisco Franco</i> Expresses his disappointment at Franco's refusal to enter the war.	22	37

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

SPAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Feb. 7	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits the main points of a memorandum by the Spanish General Staff regarding Spain's economic and military import requirements.	28	51
Feb. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Franco's reaction upon receipt of Hitler's letter (document No. 22).	32	58
Feb. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Comments on Stohrer's telegram of February 7 (document No. 28) and concludes that the excessive demands by the Spaniards can only be taken as an attempt to avoid Spain's entry into the war.	46	78
Feb. 22	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain</i> Directs Stohrer to refrain from any initiative in bringing Spain into the war, as the Spanish Government obviously has no intention of moving in that direction.	73	131
Feb. 26	<i>Francisco Franco to Adolf Hitler</i> Replies to Hitler's letter of February 6 (document No. 22) and explains his position.	95	176
Feb. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Reports the signing of a protocol which establishes the Spanish Civil War debt to the amount of 372 million reichsmarks.	107	194
Apr. 16	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that, according to information from the Spanish Foreign Minister, there are no political clauses to the British-Spanish credit agreement.	355	564
Apr. 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain</i> Informs Stohrer that Don Juan of Spain had tried to arouse German interest in the Spanish monarchical movement through an intermediary and asks that Franco and Serrano Suñer be informed in order to forestall exaggerated reports and rumors.	360	569
Apr. 20	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that, according to the Foreign Minister, the American Ambassador had asked him in a threatening and impudent tone about the Spanish policy and articles in the Spanish press.	375	590
Apr. 22	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the domestic political situation in Spain which is getting more and more difficult and proposes several lines of action.	386	611
Apr. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of a conversation between Hitler and the Spanish Ambassador about possible British intentions toward Spain.	422	664
May 4	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by the Spanish Foreign Minister expressing hope that Germany would not resort to military measures in Spain without Spanish consent.	453	711

SPAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 May 11	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> Refers to Stohrer's report of April 22 (document No. 386) and expresses his belief that Germany should, for the time being, not interfere in Spanish domestic quarrels.	492	774
May 13	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the internal crisis is getting worse and that he intends to see Franco and ask him about the significance of the developments.	509	795
May 27	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of Economics and the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Suggests a new procedure for the delivery of war material to Spain and asks the OKW to expedite matters as fast as possible.	562	904
May 30	<i>Ambassador Stohrer to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Discusses the possibility of Spain's entering the war suddenly and proposes that various political and military preparations for such an event be made.	574	928
June 12	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain</i> Directs Stohrer to request from the Spanish Government that it cooperate in the speedy restoration of the railroad bridge at Hendaye.	619	1017
June 22	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the satisfaction of the Spanish Government over the announcement of the war with Russia and its request that volunteer formations of the Falange be permitted to take part. (See also under "Directives for the Conduct of the War," "France," "Great Britain," "Italy," "Portugal," and "Tripartite Pact.")	671	1080

SWEDEN

1941 Feb. 28	<i>The Minister in Finland in the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports belief of the Swedish General Staff that a base on Swedish territory would be made available for German troops in case of a German-Finnish war against Russia.	105	191
Mar. 19	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Negotiations with the Swedish Government on transit of German troops to Finland should be started immediately because of plans of deployment of German troops there.	184	319
Mar. 20	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Reports a conversation with the Swedish Minister who tells of strong feelings in Stockholm against any increase in transport of German troops through Sweden.	185	321

SWEDEN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Mar. 21	<i>An Official of the Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Swedish Foreign Minister who strongly objected to a proposed increase in transport of German troop replacements for Norway by rail through Sweden, but assented instead to transport by a water route through Swedish territorial waters.	186	322
Apr. 3	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Foreign Minister about his country's neutrality policy in connection with German troop transports through Sweden. Günther mentioned an informal British démarche on this subject. He denied any connection between increases in the transit traffic of German troops on leave and the recent calling up of Swedish reservists.	255	439
Apr. 23	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation of the Military Attaché with the Chief of the Swedish Army office for liaison with foreign Military Attachés on Sweden's attitude toward a Russo-Finnish and Russo-German conflict. In a Russo-Finnish conflict he thought Sweden would give active aid to Finland, but in case of a Russo-German war, Swedish participation would be more difficult.	390	620
Apr. 24	<i>Minute by the State Secretary</i> Transmits to Ribbentrop his comments on Wied's report (document No. 390) regarding Sweden's attitude in the event of a Russo-German conflict.	397	629
Apr. 25	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Swedish Military Attaché about the forthcoming visit of the Swedish Foreign Minister to Helsinki and the main points of his proposed conversations. These would deal with the Swedish attitude in case of warlike involvements of Germany, Finland, and Russia.	400	633
Apr. 30	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Finland</i> Instructs as to the attitude to be taken in discussion of the possibility of a German-Russian war and advises on the position which should be taken by the Finnish Government during the Swedish Foreign Minister's forthcoming visit to Helsinki.	426	678
May 1	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the impending meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Finland, the concern of the Ministers about British and Russian reaction to German policy, and the possibility of Swedish and Finnish adherence to the Tripartite Pact.	430	684
May 2	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports another conversation of the Military Attaché with the Swedish Military Attaché, in which the latter outlines once more his country's attitude toward a possible Russian-German-Finnish war.	434	687
May 3	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Gives his opinion on the aims of Swedish foreign policy from the statements of the Swedish Military Attaché and concludes that the aim of Swedish policy is to maintain Swedish supremacy in the northern area.	437	690

SWEDEN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 May 5	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Günther about the latter's forthcoming trip to Helsinki. The Swedish Foreign Minister stated that, contrary to newspaper reports, he would not warn Finland to avoid close and friendly relations with Germany, since this was not in line with Swedish policy.	458	717
May 8	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports his views on Swedish foreign policy and concludes from recent statements of Söderblom that its aim is to preserve Swedish independence without any claims for political hegemony in the north and that in the case of a Russian-German-Finnish conflict, Sweden would support all measures that would bring about a Russian defeat.	471	735
June 22	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a talk with Günther regarding the German military demands made on Sweden in connection with the invasion of the Soviet Union. The demands would be discussed with the King and Cabinet. (See also under "Directives for the Conduct of the War," "Finland," and "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.")	668	1078

TRIPARTITE PACT

1941 Feb. 15	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Matsuoka's statements in Parliament concerning Japanese-Russian relations and their implications for the Tripartite Pact.	52	100
Feb. 15	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Requests a memorandum on Matsuoka's statements regarding article 5 of the Tripartite Pact.	58	107
Feb. 24	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Directs Ott to call Matsuoka's attention to Nomura's equivocal statement in Washington regarding Japan's treaty obligations.	81	154
Apr. 10	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassies in Italy and Japan</i> Informs Mackensen and Ott about the first meeting of the main committee of the Tripartite Pact.	304	506
May 4	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland</i> Instructs Blücher to find out, in an informal way, the Swedish reaction to an invitation to join the Tripartite Pact.	449	702
June 11	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Serrano Suñer's reaction to a proposal by Ciano that Spain join the Tripartite Pact.	615	1007
June 14	<i>The Minister in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Pavelić's consent, after strong Italian pressure, to go to Venice for Croatia's accession to the Tripartite Pact.	629	1028

TURKEY

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Feb. 20	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the Turkish Foreign Minister's satisfaction over the effects of the Turkish-Bulgarian declaration of February 17.	67	120
Feb. 24	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments on an interview given by Saracoglu regarding the Turkish-Bulgarian declaration and requests that the possibility of a German-Turkish nonaggression declaration be reconsidered.	80	153
Feb. 26	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Supports a request made by Saracoglu that German troops not advance into Bulgaria during Eden's visit to Ankara.	87	161
Feb. 27	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Directs Papen to inform the Turkish Government on February 28 of Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact, and on March 1 of a letter being sent from Hitler to İnönü.	102	187
Mar. 1	<i>Adolf Hitler to the President of the Turkish Republic</i> Explains that the movement of German troops into Bulgaria is not directed against Turkey; that the German troops will keep away from the Turkish frontier; that Germany has no territorial ambitions in the Balkans.	113	201
Mar. ■	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that, in accordance with instructions (document No. 102), Saracoglu was notified of Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact. He made no comment, and mentioned Eden's visit.	119	211
Mar. 4	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having handed Hitler's letter (document No. 113) to President İnönü who expressed his satisfaction and indicated that he would reply.	122	216
Mar. ■	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation regarding Hitler's letter (document No. 113) with Saracoglu who was assured that the reference to German countermeasures applied only in case of Turkish attack or intention to attack.	137	246
Mar. 9	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Directs that complaint be made against the hostile attitude of the Turkish press and radio. Indicates that funds can be available for influencing important people.	142	252
Mar. 11	<i>Ambassador Papen to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop</i> Discusses the possibilities for German propaganda in Turkey in view of Turkey's relations with Britain, the Soviet Union, and Italy and with reference to Ribbentrop's suggestions (document No. 142).	154	276
Mar. 12	<i>The President of the Turkish Republic to Adolf Hitler</i> Replies to Hitler's letter (document No. 113), explains Turkish policy, and expresses hope that a Turkish-German clash will be avoided.	161	286

TURKEY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Mar. 18	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation of March 17 between Hitler and Turkish Ambassador Gerede who delivered President İnönü's letter (document No. 161). Hitler described Germany's policy in the Balkans, explaining that he had no territorial interests there, and that he had refused Molotov's suggestions for Russian bases on the Straits.	177	308
Mar. 27	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Saracoglu regarding Hitler's discussion with Gerede (document No. 177). The Turks were greatly impressed to learn of Russia's demands regarding the Straits and Bulgaria which Hitler had refused.	220	384
Mar. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Turkey</i> Records a discussion with Menemencioglu of the interview of Gerede and Hitler (document No. 177) in which Papen emphasized the importance of Germany's having opted for Turkey in regard to the Straits. He found Menemencioglu more realistic and receptive than Saracoglu.	231	409
Apr. 5	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Directs that the Turkish Foreign Ministry be informed that German troops on entering Greece would have orders to keep back from the glaxis of Edirne, and from the Turkish-Greek frontier.	268	460
Apr. 5	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having carried out instructions (document No. 268).	269	461
Apr. 6	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Directs that Saracoglu be informed that Germany is taking military action against Yugoslavia and Greece, and reassured that Germany has no territorial interests in the Balkans.	285	481
Apr. 8	<i>Ambassador Papen to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Discusses German-Turkish relations and suggests the conclusion of a German-Turkish nonaggression pact to preclude a Soviet-Turkish rapprochement as a result of Turkish fears of German control of the Straits.	295	491
Apr. 10	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Informs Papen of a discussion which Ribbentrop held with Gerede: assuring him that German troops would keep back from the Turkish frontiers; agreeing in principle with Turkey's wishes regarding the railway line; reiterating that Germany refused Russia's proposals regarding the Straits.	303	504
Apr. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador to Turkey</i> Records a discussion with Gerede with reference to his talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop, and exploring the possibilities of a German-Turkish political treaty.	404	637

TURKEY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 May 13	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the situation in Turkey at his return: a discussion with the Iraq Minister of War and the problem of military assistance to Iraq; discussions with Saracoglu and İnönü regarding Turkey's relations with Britain and with Russia and as to the possibilities of a political agreement of Turkey and Germany.	514	812
May 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Requests the Ambassador's views regarding the danger of a coup d'état like that of Yugoslavia in case of a change in Turkey's policy which would lead her into the German camp.	522	828
May 16	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with Saracoglu on the entire complex of German-Turkish relations including the English threat to Syria, arms deliveries to Iraq, and Turkish policy in the event of a Russo-German war which would require neutrality.	523	828
May 17	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Directs Papen to begin discussions directed toward a treaty with Turkey which would include provisions for unlimited transit of German arms and war material.	529	836
May 17	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Papen states, in answer to Ribbentrop's instruction of May 17 (document No. 529), that his reports have been misunderstood: A switch-over by Turkey can be achieved only by stages and with full respect for Turkish dignity.	531	839
May 19	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> In view of Papen's telegram of May 17 (document No. 531), directs him to aim to achieve an agreement with Turkey by stages, but insists that an agreement be reached quickly and that provision be made secretly for the transit of war materials.	538	849
May 23	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with Menemencioglu regarding a treaty with two open articles and three secret protocols. Reports further that the French request for the transit of arms is under consideration.	545	866
May 26	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> In reference to Papen's report of May 23 (document No. 545), directs that only vague phrasing be used to describe the areas of possible compensation for Turkey.	555	885
May 27	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that negotiations over the transit of arms are at a deadlock, but that agreement was reached over certain clauses for a treaty with Turkey. Urges advantages of such a treaty.	556	886
May 29	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Admonishes Papen that his report (document No. 556) indicates that he exceeded instructions in discussing his own draft which would offer guarantees to Turkey without granting Germany concessions in the transit of arms.	565	910

TURKEY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
May 29	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> In reply to Ribbentrop's admonition (document No. 565) Papen justifies his negotiations, explaining that the Turks are not simply to be bought by territorial promises but that their honor must be respected.	566	913
June 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Explains that because of the changed situation in Iraq, the transit of war material over Turkey has lost its importance. Directs that negotiations be resumed for a political treaty.	582	937
June 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Sends the drafts for a German-Turkish treaty in three articles and a secret protocol together with explanations of the wording.	583	938
June 2	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Papen comments on the draft text transmitted (document No. 583) and explains his preference for his own draft.	585	952
June 3	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with Saracoglu who indicated fears of a British attack in Syria.	586	952
June 3	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> States that the Axis is now master of Europe yet Germany offers Turkey a favorable treaty which she should accept in her own interest. Authorizes Papen to resume negotiations according to earlier instructions with minor modifications.	588	954
June 5	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Turkish Government accepts the proposals for a German-Turkish treaty. Menemencioğlu suggests some changes in wording.	595	966
June 7	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the view of the Turkish General Staff that a British attack in Syria would create difficulties for Turkey because of the Baghdad Railway. Expresses doubts that Turkey wishes a British attack in Syria.	602	975
June 9	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Criticizes the wording proposed by the Turks for the preamble and articles one and two of the draft treaty (document No. 595). Expresses doubts about Turkish sincerity.	607	985
June 12	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports new difficulties over the wording of the proposed treaty. Recommends that consideration be given to the Turkish proposal for the preamble.	620	1018
June 12	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division I M</i> Records assurances by the Turkish General Staff that Turkey will not intervene in Syria; that measures along the Syrian frontier are strictly for security. The Turks will be pleased if Germany crushes Russia.	621	1020
June 12	<i>The President of the Turkish Republic to Adolf Hitler</i> Expresses thanks for Hitler's reaffirmation of German policy, belief in common Turkish and German views, hope for good relations in the future.	622	1021

TURKEY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 June 13	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> In response to the Turkish proposal of June 12 (document No. 620), proposes a new wording for the preamble for a treaty.	623	1022
June 13	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Corrects the erroneous impression of Turkey's policy indicated in instruction of June 9 (document No. 607). Reports that Saracoglu and İnönü approve the proposed new text of the preamble (document No. 623).	625	1024
June 14	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that İnönü is happy that the new wording of the preamble will satisfy both sides; expects that the Turkish people will approve the agreement.	627	1026
June 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Explains that the prerequisites now exist for concluding a German-Turkish treaty, for an exchange of letters on economic matters, and for a statement on the press and radio. Provides text and urges signing on June 18.	635	1036
June 17	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that agreement has been reached on the text (document No. 635) and that the German-Turkish treaty will be signed June 18.	637	1039
June 18	<i>German-Turkish Treaty Signed at Ankara, June 18, 1941</i> Germany and Turkey pledge mutual respect for the integrity and inviolability of their territories; they will consult one another on all questions affecting their common interests.	648	1051
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to a conversation of Hitler with the Turkish Ambassador on the occasion of the transmittal of the letter of President İnönü (document No. 622).		1052
June 22	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that he has carried out circular instruction No. 401 (document No. 663); Saracoglu is convinced that this just war will bring peace to the world. (See also under "Bulgaria," "Greece," "Italy," "Middle East," and "Yugoslavia.")	670	1080

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

1941 Feb. 1	<i>Minister Schnurre to Ambassador Schulenburg</i> Describes his reporting to Ribbentrop and Hitler on the problems with the USSR and Finland.	4	4
Feb. 3	<i>Counselor Sonnleithner to Ambassador Schulenburg</i> States that the Foreign Minister has deferred action on Schulenburg's request for home leave.	6	8
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to the remarks of Hitler and of Halder in the discussion of the plan of strategic concentration for Operation Barbarossa.		11

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Feb. 4	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records the report on the German-Soviet economic agreement of January 10, 1941 (volume XI, document No. 637) given by Schnurre who emphasized the need of carrying out the agreement because of the military importance of the imports promised by the Soviet Union.	13	19
Feb. 6	<i>Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Describes developments which indicate a Russian desire to achieve a rapprochement with Japan so that the Soviet Union may protect its rear in the Far East.	26	46
Feb. 22	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Directs that the information be spread that some 680,000 German troops are in Rumania.	70	126
Feb. 27	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Directs that Molotov be informed that Bulgaria will adhere to the Tripartite Pact; and that the threat of English occupation of Greece has forced Germany to shift troops into Bulgaria.	99	182
Mar. 1	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports carrying out the instruction of February 27 (document No. 99); that Molotov insisted that Bulgaria came within the security zone of the Soviet Union.	108	195
Mar. 3	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports in detail regarding Molotov's reaction to the announcement of Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact and of the movement of German troops into Bulgaria.	121	213
Mar. 7	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that unwarranted postponement of the meeting of the boundary subcommission would arouse Russian suspicion but Molotov's suggestion for a border revision may justify some delay.	132	233
Mar. 8	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Soviet Government refuses permission for the conversion of the German Missions at Riga and Tallin into Consulates.	134	243
Mar. 9	<i>The Consulate at Harbin to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports interception of a Soviet Russian instruction indicating that the USSR will not interfere with German action against Greece.	140	250
Mar. 12	<i>The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Calls attention to the sharp decline in Russian deliveries under the economic agreement. Directs that the matter be immediately taken up with Molotov.	157	282
Mar. 12	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the wife of the United States Ambassador showed great alarm over the prospect of a German-Russian war.	160	285

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Mar. 13	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records insistence of General Warlimont and of Captain Bürkner that speedy termination of the activity of Russian commissions on German territory is imperative.	163	289
Mar. 17	<i>Memorandum by Minister Saucken</i> Records that the work of the German-Soviet Russian Boundary Commission has been halted because of the Russian interpretation of the Treaty of January 10.	176	306
Mar. 18	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Recommends dilatory tactics in the negotiations concerning demarcation of the German-Soviet Russian boundary.	181	317
Mar. 25	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Matsuoaka held a 2-hour discussion with Molotov and Stalin.	203	351
Mar. 28	<i>Under State Secretary Woermann to Ambassador Schulenburg</i> Explains that the instruction to conduct the boundary negotiations dilatorily is because of the need to prevent Russian personnel from working on German territory.	229	404
Apr. 3	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Commander in Chief of the Army to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that OKH knows of rumors of impending war between Germany and Soviet Russia being spread by German travelers. Requests that the Foreign Ministry check such rumors and rumor mongering.	260	446
Apr. 4	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statement by Molotov that Soviet Russia would sign a treaty of friendship and nonaggression with Yugoslavia; and that Molotov declined to reconsider despite Schulenburg's expression of disapproval.	265	451
Apr. 5	<i>Memorandum by Minister Schnurre</i> Notes that deliveries of the raw materials stipulated in the German-Soviet Economic Agreement of January 10 lagged in January and February but soared in March and continue at a high level.	280	474
Apr. 6	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Directs that Molotov be informed that Germany is taking military action in Greece and Yugoslavia in order to force England out of the Greek mainland.	284	479
Apr. 6	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports carrying out the instruction of April 6 (document No. 284) and that Molotov expressed regret at the extension of the war.	288	484
Apr. 6	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador who inquired about the military situation in the Balkans and regarding other current developments.	294	490

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Apr. 13	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Matsuoka as saying that a Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact would probably be signed this afternoon.	332	536
Apr. 13	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Stalin's ostentatious friendliness toward the German Ambassador and the Acting Military Attaché on the occasion of the departure of Matsuoka.	333	537
Apr. 15	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Sobolev accepts completely the German position on the demarcation of the German-Soviet Russian boundary and expects speedy conclusion of the problem.	351	560
Apr. 16	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet Russian Neutrality Pact and Stalin's actions at the railway station are interpreted as indicating Russian desire to cooperate with the Axis.	354	563
Apr. 18	<i>German-Soviet Protocol</i> Records that Soviet Russian deliveries reached the value of 310.3 million reichsmarks by February 11 and that German deliveries of that value are promised by May 11.	369	579
Apr. 21	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the High Command of the Wehrmacht and to the Ministry of Transportation</i> Notifies the recipients of the complaint of Krutikov that Russian deliveries of raw materials are greatly retarded by lack of German transportation.	380	602
Apr. 22	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the reception from the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of a note verbale protesting against violation of the border of Soviet Russia by German planes.	381	602
Apr. 22	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union</i> Forwards a summary derived from a secret source of a letter of April 11 of Cripps to Vyshinsky.	383	604
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to the communication of April 23 from the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry containing reports of border violations by Soviet planes.		615
Apr. 24	<i>The Naval Attaché of the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the High Command of the Navy</i> Reports that rumors of a German-Soviet war are fed by travelers from Germany; the British Ambassador predicts the outbreak for June 22.	399	632

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Apr. 28	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Argues (in reference to a memorandum by Schulenburg) that war with the USSR would give Britain new moral strength, and that a German advance even to Moscow and beyond would not bring peace but instead would prolong the war and sacrifice the economic advantages Germany now derives from peace with the USSR.	419	661
Apr. 28	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Describes a report from Gafencu in Moscow that the absence of Schulenburg caused comment there. Gafencu is no longer certain that the USSR will continue to compromise with the Axis.	420	662
Apr. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union, at the Time in Germany</i> Conversation of Hitler with Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg on April 28. Records that Schulenburg urged that the USSR would not attack Germany but wished to cooperate with the Axis. Hitler argued that the USSR could not be trusted.	423	666
May 2	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that every traveler to Moscow brings rumors of war, supported by facts.	433	687
May 3	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Calls attention to the special recognition given Dekanozov on the occasion of the May Day parade.	438	691
May 4	<i>The Head of Political Division I M to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Directs that rumors of impending war are to be combatted.	446	698
May 5	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> States that an intercepted American letter from Moscow indicates that Germany will attack the USSR on May 20.	461	721
May 7	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Stalin has taken over the chairmanship of the Council of People's Commissars which is interpreted as a move to maintain good relations with Germany.	468	730
May 7	<i>Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Requests that in case of war members of Soviet Russian Missions in Germany be treated with consideration because of the danger otherwise of Russian retaliation.	470	734
May 10	<i>State Secretary Weizsäcker to Ambassador Schulenburg</i> Acknowledges receipt of Schulenburg's letter (document No. 470) which was not shown to the Foreign Minister.	485	750

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
May 10	<i>Under State Secretary Woermann to Ambassador Schulenburg</i> Informs Schulenburg of secret reports received regarding his conversations and attitude after his return to Moscow.	486	751
May 12	<i>Ambassador Schulenburg to Under State Secretary Woermann</i> Denies that statements or actions of his could be responsible for reports by his diplomatic colleagues in Moscow that a German-Soviet conflict was impending.	504	789
May 12	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Maintains that recent events fortify the belief that Stalin took the chairmanship in order to avert a war with Germany.	505	790
May 13	<i>The Consul at Harbin to the Foreign Ministry</i> Gives the text of an intercepted Soviet dispatch warning that Germany may force a war.	506	793
May 15	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Directs that the Soviet Government be informed that the reports of frontier violations by German planes are being investigated.	519	822
May 15	<i>Memorandum by Minister Schnurre</i> Presents a summary of recent German-Soviet commercial negotiations and of Soviet raw material deliveries; he believes that Germany could ask even larger deliveries.	521	826
[May 16]	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the Russian Minister, Mme. Kollontay, as stating that troop contingents on Russia's western border are the strongest ever.	527	832
May 17	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports carrying out instruction of May 14 (document No. 519) and Sobolev as saying that German aerial border violations continued.	532	841
May 17	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a discussion with Oshima who asked about German-Soviet Russian relations.	535	844
May 24	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that since Stalin took over supreme power the foreign policy is directed at avoidance of a conflict with Germany.	547	870
May 24	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Acknowledges that Germany's wishes regarding the boundary have been met but states that personnel for the Boundary Commission will not be immediately available.	548	871
May 24	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards a copy of a dispatch of the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow who states that Stalin gravely miscalculated regarding the Balkans and is prepared to make extraordinary concessions to Germany.	550	873

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 May 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs</i> Indicates the general boundaries of the Reich Commissariats as planned by the Aussenpolitisches Amt for occupied Russia.	573	927
June 4	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs</i> Records plans for four Reich Commissariats to be created in occupied Russia and for the related agencies of the Foreign Ministry.	591	960
June 4	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards a memorandum by the Moscow DNB representative purporting to summarize the contents of Stalin's speech of May 5 in the Kremlin.	593	964
June 7	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division I M</i> Quotes the report of May 27 by the Naval Attaché in Moscow which indicates great uneasiness as regards Germany.	604	981
June 14	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Molotov gave him the text of a Tass dispatch denying rumors of an impending break between Germany and the USSR.	628	1027
June 17	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Submits a report from a confidential agent regarding the questions asked of him by the Soviet Embassy.	639	1042
June 17	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Submits a confidential report of a discussion among the Americans in Berlin and their views on German-Russian relations.	640	1043
June 18	<i>Minute by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> States that the Führer suspects the confidential agent reporting to Likus of being a swindler. Directs that he be watched.	645	1049
June 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a visit by the Soviet Russian Ambassador who discussed minor matters in a cheerful mood.	646	1050
June 19	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs</i> Reports a conversation with Rosenberg and Gauleiter Meyer regarding the relationship of the Foreign Ministry and Rosenberg's organization in the administration of areas to be occupied in the East.	649	1052
June 21	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Explains that the Foreign Minister was out of Berlin and unable to see the Russian Ambassador.	654	1059

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
June 21	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> States that the Foreign Minister was still unable to see the Soviet Ambassador, who would be notified when the Foreign Minister returned.	655	1059
June 21	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records receiving the Russian Ambassador who left a note verbale formally protesting against the frequent and systematic violations of the frontier by German aircraft.	658	1061
June 21	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Directs the Ambassador immediately to call on Molotov and to present a declaration explaining that Russian policy has forced Germany to resort to arms.	659	1063
June 22	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with Molotov who asked for an explanation of Germany's dissatisfaction with the USSR, to which Schulenburg replied that he lacked information.	662	1071
June 20	<i>Circular of the Foreign Minister</i> Forwards the text of a declaration to be presented to the given Government in explanation of the German attack on the Soviet Union.	663	1072
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to Hitler's proclamation and German note to Soviet Government published June 22.		1073
June 22	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Ribbentrop announces that Germany has begun hostilities. (See also under "Bulgaria," "Danube Navigation," "Directives for the Conduct of the War," "Finland," "Italy," "Japan," "Rumania," "Turkey," and "Yugoslavia.")	664	1074

UNITED STATES

1941			
Feb. 9	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports various propaganda and protest activities inspired by the Embassy against passage of the Lend-Lease Bill.	34	60
Feb. 22	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States</i> Instructs Thomsen to make a formal démarche and present the German point of view regarding possible seizure and requisition of German merchant ships in the United States.	74	132
Feb. 26	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Military Attaché gives various reasons why actual deliveries of war materials will not be greatly increased in the immediate future despite the forthcoming passage of the Lend-Lease legislation.	88	161

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Feb. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Suggests countermeasures in case German assets are being frozen in the United States.	93	169
Mar. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> States the position of the Foreign Ministry regarding the treatment of foreign Jews in Germany and in German occupied countries.	116	205
Mar. 9	<i>The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the increased powers of the President which he acquired through the passage of the Lend-Lease Act in the Senate and the effects of it on the war.	141	251
Mar. 10	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff</i> Discusses some of the factors that brought about the passage of the Lend-Lease Bill in Congress and the likely course of American public opinion with respect to entry into the war.	146	258
Mar. 11	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the military preparations and rearmament measures in the United States and speculates about its plans with regard to aiding the Allies and entering the war.	148	266
Mar. 14	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Has been informed of Hitler's decision to extend the German operational area around the British Isles up to the limit of the American neutrality zone, including Iceland.	167	295
Mar. 26	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Calls attention to the gap between plans, appropriations, and propaganda, and the actual status of American preparedness.	212	364
Apr. 1	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Recommends approval of a draft order submitted by the Luftwaffe and the Navy concerning offensive action against neutral warships and merchant vessels proceeding in convoy in the extended area of operations around the British Isles.	244	428
Apr. 12	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> Transmits an urgent request from Raeder who wants a decision on German naval warfare in regard to the American security zone and American merchant vessels.	316	519
Apr. 12	<i>The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Foreign Ministry</i> Hitler and the Foreign Minister discussed the employment of naval forces in the American security zone.	325	529
Apr. 27	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Requests that the German press refrain from discussing Lindbergh so as not to jeopardize this valuable influence.	411	651

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
May ■	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records a conversation on May 4 between Ribbentrop and Cudahy, former United States Ambassador in Belgium, about the current military and political situation and the question of American entry into the war; Cudahy urged that a German statement be issued saying that the German Navy would fire on American vessels engaged in convoy duty.	451	704
May 21	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IV</i> Has been informed by Zamboni that the Italian Ambassador in Washington was told by an official of the State Department that the American Government was firmly resolved to continue to provide maximum assistance to Great Britain even at the risk of getting involved in the war.	540	852
Undated	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records the conversation on May 23 between Hitler and Cudahy on problems of German-American relations, America's neutrality, the possibilities of a German attack in the Western Hemisphere, post-war economic policy, and Hitler's attitude toward the smaller occupied countries.	542	854
May 28	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the political and military implications of Roosevelt's radio address announcing the proclamation of an unlimited national emergency.	560	901
May 28	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda</i> Forwards Ribbentrop's views that the Propaganda Ministry's plan for reorganizing the propaganda broadcasts to the United States would not only endanger the very successful propaganda effort of the Foreign Ministry but would lead to a serious setback.	563	905
May 30	<i>Circular of the Foreign Minister</i> Instructs the Missions in Latin America to ask the Foreign Ministers of the respective countries whether Roosevelt's attempt in his speech of May 27 to convey the impression that he spoke for the entire Western Hemisphere was in accordance with the intentions of the Governments.	570	924
June 0	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff</i> Discounts Bötticher's reports on the decisive influence of the United States General Staff on Roosevelt's policy regarding America's entry into the war.	600	973
June 9	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Has been told by Jodl that more sweeping orders to the Navy previously under consideration had been set aside as Hitler wanted to avoid incidents with the United States.	608	987
June 14	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Records the opinion of Ribbentrop in the Robin Moor case according to which further details will have to be provided by the Naval War Staff before a press announcement could be made.	630	1029

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 June 15	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Outlines the meaning and implications of President Roosevelt's order freezing the German and Italian assets in the United States and suggests appropriate countermeasures.	632	1031
June 16	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits the text of the American note requesting the closing of all German consular offices and information agencies and the removal of their personnel, and comments on the causes and implications of this request.	634	1034
June 21	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the receipt of Roosevelt's message to Congress regarding the <i>Robin Moor</i> and gives his view on its implications.	657	1060
June 22	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Concludes from the absence of any official pronouncement on the Russo-German war that the U.S. Government is faced with an unusual dilemma. (See also under "France," "Japan," "Latin America," "Portugal," and "Spain.")	673	1082

VATICAN

1941 Feb. 9	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division III</i> Records the plan for provisional consolidation of the administration of the diocese of Strasbourg with the archbishopric of Freiburg and of that of the diocese of Metz with the bishopric of Speyer.	37	64
Mar. 19	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a visit by the Nuncio who delivered a note verbale protesting against the confiscation of Church property in former Poland.	183	319
Mar. 24	<i>The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports rumors and remarks circulating in the Vatican, according to which inmates of insane asylums and of homes for the aged in Germany were being eliminated.	199	347
May 8	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Nuncio whose request for a personal conference with Suffragen Bishop Dymek has been refused.	474	739
May[29]	<i>Note Verbale to the Apostolic Nunciature</i> States the position of the Reich Government on the confiscation of Church property in the occupied eastern territories.	567	915
June 22	<i>Ambassador Bergen to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Reports that the Vatican considers the broadcasts by the Vatican radio to be very restrained and extremely cautious.	674	1082

YUGOSLAVIA

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Feb. 4	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the News Service and Press Department</i> Records a conversation with the Yugoslav journalist, Gregorić, who felt that Foreign Minister Cincar-Marković had not fully appreciated the tenor of the discussion in Fuschl (volume XI, document No. 417), and who urged that Minister President Cvetković would immediately respond to an invitation to visit Germany.	10	13
Feb. 5	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Reports having been informed confidentially by the Italian Chargé d'Affaires of proposals recently made to Mussolini by a representative of Prince Paul; including an Italo-Yugoslav pact, demilitarization of the Dalmatian coast, and Yugoslav acquisition of Salonika.	15	23
Feb. 6	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i> Directs that in accordance with the suggestion of Gregorić (document No. 10) Minister President Cvetković and Foreign Minister Cincar-Marković be invited to Germany, preferably for the next week end.	20	34
Feb. 12	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records informing the Italian Chargé d'Affaires of the forthcoming visit to Germany of Cvetković and Cincar-Marković.	45	78
Feb. 15	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records conversation of February 14 between Ribbentrop and Cvetković in the presence of Cincar-Marković at Fuschl. They discussed German-Yugoslav relations, the possibilities of Yugoslav adherence to the Tripartite Pact and for a tripartite nonaggression pact, and the Yugoslav plan for peaceful solution of the Italo-Greek conflict.	47	79
Feb. 15	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records Hitler's conversation of February 14 with Cvetković and Cincar-Marković at the Berghof. Cvetković explained a plan for excluding Britain from the Balkans. Hitler expressed doubts regarding this plan; he indicated the danger of Bolshevik penetration of the Balkans; urged Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact; and suggested Yugoslav expansion toward Salonika.	48	88
Feb. 15	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having conveyed to Mussolini, through Anfuso, an oral summary of the discussions of February 14 with the Yugoslav Ministers (documents Nos. 47 and 48).	55	105
Feb. 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i> Explains, in connection with a possible invitation to Prince Paul, that Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact should take place immediately and the visit should be within the week.	60	111
Feb. 25	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Prince Regent Paul accepts the suggestion for a secret, personal meeting with Hitler the next week.	84	157

YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Feb. 25	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> Reports a conversation with the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, who gave an account of the confidential negotiations between Mussolini and Prince Regent Paul.	85	158
Feb. 27	<i>The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> With reference to the Italian-Yugoslav secret negotiations (document No. 85) directs that the Italian Government be requested to go no more deeply into the matter pending the outcome of the German-Yugoslav conversations.	97	179
Mar. 5	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Directs that Mussolini be informed that Hitler received Prince Paul at the Berghof, and that strictest secrecy be asked of the Italian Government regarding the meeting.	124	218
Mar. 7	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i> Gives a summary account of the meeting of Hitler with Prince Regent Paul, who reserved his decision regarding accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact.	130	230
Mar. 7	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Explains that the Crown Council heard Prince Paul's account of his meeting with Hitler (document No. 130); and that as a condition of accession to the Tripartite Pact Yugoslavia wishes a written declaration: (1) respecting her sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) excluding military assistance by Yugoslavia and the passage of troops over her territory; and (3) promising access to the Aegean through Salonika.	131	232
Mar. 8	<i>An Official of the Foreign Minister's Staff to the Embassy in Italy</i> States the three points which the Yugoslav Government wishes to be guaranteed as a condition of accession to the Tripartite Pact (document No. 131). Requests Mussolini's concurrence with Hitler in offering such guarantees.	138	247
Mar. 9	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i> Explains, in regard to the three points raised by Yugoslavia (document No. 131), the concessions which Germany is willing to make. Insists that Germany cannot release Yugoslavia from article 3 of the Tripartite Pact.	144	255
Mar. 10	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports, in regard to the concessions which Germany is willing to grant (document No. 144), that the Yugoslav Foreign Minister was surprised by German insistence on the obligation under article 3 of the Tripartite Pact, and he considered that such a request might involve war with America or even Russia.	145	257
Mar. 11	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports his efforts to persuade the Yugoslav Foreign Minister that Yugoslavia could not be exempted from the military assistance provisions of the Tripartite Pact; says that the Minister promised to bring Germany's arguments to bear in the deliberations.	149	269

YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Mar. 11	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports popular agitation because of rumors of a German ultimatum regarding Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact.	151	271
Mar. 12	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having transmitted the new formula regarding military assistance by Yugoslavia under the Tripartite Pact: Cincar-Marković asked for its publication and for stipulation of publication of other German assurances, and for rewording of the promise of access to the Aegean.	156	281
Mar. 14	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i> Explains, in regard to the Yugoslav request for publication of the new formula regarding military assistance under the Tripartite Pact (document No. 156), that in no circumstances can it be granted; it appears to be inspired exclusively by domestic political considerations and would make the Pact appear to be humbug.	165	291
Mar. 15	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Recommends counteracting enemy propaganda regarding an alleged threat to Yugoslavia's interests by appropriate formulae to be inspired through the foreign press conference.	168	296
Mar. 17	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been informed by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister that the Crown Council has decided in principle in favor of Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact and that it had instructed him to reply to the individual points communicated to him (document No. 165).	173	303
Mar. 17	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the impression that Mussolini would be grateful for being informed of the present state of German-Yugoslav discussions.	174	304
Mar. 17	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Italian Chargé d'Affaires who explained the reply which Mussolini intended for the confidential approaches from the Yugoslav Government. An interpretation was offered for the point relating to the Agreement of 1937.	175	304
[Mar. 18]	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Explains, in response to the suggestion from the Rome Embassy that the Italian Government be informed (document No. 174), that the Yugoslav Crown Council decided in principle to accede to the Tripartite Pact and that the German Government intends to propose that accession take place on March 23 in Vienna; forwards the texts of four notes which the German Government proposes to deliver to the Yugoslav Government.	178	312
Mar. 19	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i> Records that Anfuso was finally able to reach Mussolini, who agreed to the text of the four notes which Ribbentrop proposed be delivered to the Yugoslav Government (document No. 178).	182	318

YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Mar. 21	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records a telephone message from Minister Heeren that three members of the Yugoslav Cabinet resigned.	187	323
Mar. 22	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i> Directs that the Yugoslav Government be informed that Germany hopes for an early settlement of Yugoslavia's internal difficulties which prevent her from taking action at a crucial moment. Until March 24 or 25 Germany is prepared to conclude the agreements prepared.	192	335
Mar. 22	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> In reply to Ribbentrop's instruction (document No. 192), reports the impression gained from conversations with Yugoslav leaders of a determination to accede to the Tripartite Pact.	194	337
Mar. 25	<i>The Reich Foreign Minister to the Yugoslav Minister President</i> Affirms that in the new frontier settlement in the Balkans Yugoslavia's interests "in a territorial connection with the Aegean Sea through the extension of her sovereignty to the city and harbor of Salonika" will be taken into account.	205	353
Mar. 25	<i>The Yugoslav Minister President to the Reich Foreign Minister</i> Promises that the Yugoslav Government will hold secret all written statements received from the Axis Governments, except those regarding Yugoslavia's sovereignty and regarding the passage of troops through her territory.	206	353
Mar. 25	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between Hitler and Yugoslav Minister President Cvetković on March 25 in Vienna on the occasion of Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact.	207	354
Mar. 26	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Yugoslav people were surprised and deeply impressed by the Government's accession to the Tripartite Pact.	211	364
Mar. 27	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that troops occupied the government quarter and that King Peter assumed power and appointed General Simović Head of the Government.	214	368
Mar. 27	<i>Minutes of a Conference Regarding the Situation in Yugoslavia</i> In a conference with his principal military advisers Hitler states his determination to smash Yugoslavia. He outlines the forthcoming military operations; explains how Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria will participate; and states that Operation <i>Barbarossa</i> will have to be postponed up to 4 weeks.	217	372

YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Mar. 27	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been received by Ninčić, the new Foreign Minister, who explained the revolution by the unpopularity of Prince Paul and Cvetković among the Serbian people and who promised continued cooperation with Germany. Predicts that the new Government will try to return to a policy of neutrality.	219	383
Mar. 27	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the view that the new Yugoslav Cabinet, because of its composition, would be able even to carry through an unpopular foreign policy.	221	385
Mar. 27	<i>An Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff to the Embassy in Italy</i> Forwards the text of a letter of Hitler to Mussolini which mentions the military measures being planned against Yugoslavia and requests that Italian forces temporarily suspend operations in Albania and hold the front against Yugoslavia.	224	397
Mar. 28	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been received by Minister President General Simović, who expressed regret over the anti-German incidents of March 27 and declared himself to be a friend of Germany.	225	398
Mar. 28	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits Mussolini's reply to Hitler's letter of March 27 (document No. 224) in which Mussolini expresses his belief that the Yugoslav coup d'état was determined in agreement with Prince Paul, and his compliance with the military measures against Yugoslavia desired by Hitler.	226	399
Mar. 29	<i>The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i> Directs the Minister to avoid all official functions under pretense of illness.	232	412
Mar. 29	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records listening in silence to explanations by the Yugoslav Minister of the domestic political aspects of the situation in his country.	234	420
Mar. 30	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a formal statement by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister regarding respect for international treaties including the Protocol signed at Vienna on March 25.	235	421
Mar. 30	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i> Directs the Minister to come home to report, leaving the Chargé d'Affaires to maintain complete reserve.	236	422
Mar. 30	<i>Memorandum by the Dirigent in the Political Department</i> Records a telephone conversation between Ciano and Ribbentrop who stated that Germany would neither reply to the communication of the new Yugoslav Government (document No. 235) nor publish it, but had recalled Heeren to report.	237	423

YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Mar. 31	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Consulate General at Zagreb</i> Directs that Maček and other Croatian leaders be advised not to cooperate with the present Government in Belgrade but to maintain contact with Germany.	238	424
Mar. 31	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Consulate General at Zagreb</i> Directs that the Croatian leaders be informed that provision would be made for an independent Croatia within the new order if Yugoslavia should collapse.	239	425
Mar. 31	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> States that excesses against Germans in Yugoslavia continue; that the German colony and the families of the Legation have been instructed to depart.	240	425
Apr. 1	<i>The Consul General at Zagreb to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports, as instructed (document No. 238), having warned Maček against participation in the new Yugoslav Government. Lists the conditions which Maček laid down to Belgrade.	241	425
Apr. 1	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been visited by the Yugoslav Minister who stated that a war between Yugoslavia and the Axis would be a misfortune for all concerned which it must be possible to avert.	242	426
Apr. 1	<i>The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Consulate General at Zagreb</i> Directs that the Foreign Minister be kept constantly informed regarding the Croatian leaders. States that Malletke and Veesenmayer are being sent to make contact with influential Croatians.	243	427
Apr. 2	<i>The Consul General at Zagreb to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Maček was sending Košutić to Belgrade to obtain acceptance of Maček's conditions (cf. document No. 241): that Maček appeared to be working for the preservation of peace with Germany and of the Yugoslav State.	246	430
Apr. 2	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that morale is low and that the Government would now presumably make concessions to avoid war.	247	431
Apr. 2	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i> Directs that the Legation be reduced the next day to four or five men; that secret material be destroyed; that the Consulates except Zagreb be closed; and that the remaining staff prepare to leave Belgrade.	248	431
Apr. 3	<i>The Consul General at Zagreb to the Foreign Ministry</i> Suggests propaganda leaflets directed at the Croats in order to widen the gap between them and the Serbs.	251	436
Apr. 3	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Yugoslav Foreign Minister told the DNB representative that he was ready at any time to go to Berlin and speak to Hitler and Ribbentrop.	252	436

YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Apr. 3	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been informed by the Italian Minister regarding the negative Italian reply to a Yugoslav suggestion that two Yugoslav Ministers should go to Rome.	253	437
Apr. 3	<i>Memorandum by the Minister to Yugoslavia</i> States that the Putsch in Belgrade involved only a small group of Serbian officers and not the people at large; that, for this reason, a punitive action against Belgrade would be considered unjust even by the Croats.	259	444
Apr. 4	<i>The Consul General at Zagreb to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the views of Maček as explained to Malletke of the APA: he rejects an independent Croatia and wishes personally to take over negotiations with the Reich regarding the Tripartite Pact; Veessenmayer is in touch with the radical nationalists.	262	448
Apr. 4	<i>The Consul General at Zagreb to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Veessenmayer requests approval for his efforts to unite all important Croatian groups who reject Maček's conduct of affairs.	263	449
Apr. 5	<i>The Consulate General at Zagreb to the Foreign Ministry</i> Veessenmayer reports on his success in establishing a union of Croatian nationalist groups with principles laid down in writing.	270	461
Apr. 5	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the brother of the Yugoslav Foreign Minister appeared and stated that the Yugoslav Government wished to negotiate directly with Germany.	271	462
Apr. 5	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a second appearance of the brother of the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, who stated that the entire Government agreed that Ninčić should go to Berlin.	272	463
Apr. 5	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Slovak Chargé d'Affaires who stated that Slovene leaders anticipate the end of Yugoslavia and wish to know the attitude of Germany toward Slovenia.	273	464
Apr. 5	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Directs that Anfuso be informed of the substance of the official statement to be issued by the German Government explaining the reasons for the action against Yugoslavia; and that Italy be asked to proceed in the same manner.	275	465
Apr. 5	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records that the Yugoslav Minister called on the Italian Ambassador expressing regret over the situation and the hope that a solution was possible.	279	474

YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Apr. 5	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> Explains his decision to attack Yugoslavia and submits proposals for coordinated conduct of the military operations.	281	475
Apr. 6	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i> Sends the code word indicating the start of the operation against Yugoslavia.	283	479
Apr. 6	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having delivered Hitler's letter (document No. 281) to Mussolini, who immediately expressed his willingness to conduct military operations according to the German plan.	286	482
Apr. 6	<i>Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler</i> Expresses his full agreement with the suggestions contained in Hitler's letter of April 5 (document No. 281) and explains Italian dispositions in Albania.	289	485
Apr. 7	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between Hitler and Alfieri on April 6 in Berlin. Alfieri transmitted Mussolini's letter (document No. 289). Hitler commented on the progress of the campaign against Yugoslavia.	290	486
[Apr. 6]	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records the guiding principles laid down by Hitler for the later administration of the Yugoslav area.	291	487
Apr. 11	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports information from Anfuso that Mussolini had expressed himself in favor of an independent Croatia under the leadership of Pavelić, who was trying to reach Zagreb.	310	513
Apr. 11	<i>SS-Standartenführer Veesenmayer to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a message to Hitler from Slavko Kvaternik, who has proclaimed an independent Croatian State. Requests instructions.	311	513
Apr. 11	<i>SS-Standartenführer Veesenmayer to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on his part in bringing about the assumption of power in Zagreb by the Croatian Nationalist leader, Kvaternik, on April 10.	313	515
Apr. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Chief of Protocol</i> Records the text of a message of April 11 to Hitler from Ante Pavelić, declaring that independent Croatia would tie her future to the new order in Europe.	317	520
Apr. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IM</i> Records Hitler's decisions regarding the Croatian problem; there should be no interference in Croatian internal affairs; the Croats themselves should choose their leader; and a Croatian legion should be formed in accordance with existing conditions.	319	523
Apr. 12	<i>The Consulate General at Zagreb to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits requests by Kvaternik for recognition of an independent Croatian State and for establishment of a Croatian armed force.	324	528

YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Apr. 12	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Consulate General at Zagreb</i> Expresses agreement with Veesenmayer's actions (document No. 313) and explains the intention of letting Italy have precedence in the question of Croatia.	328	533
Apr. 13	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Consulate General at Zagreb</i> Requests reply by code word "Pavelić" if things are in order regarding Germany's plan to recognize an independent Croatia under Pavelić in the course of this day.	331	535
Apr. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i> Records a series of telephone conversations with Rintelen and Ribbentrop preparatory to the Ambassador's meeting with Mussolini in regard to Hitler's intended telegram to Pavelić (document No. 337).	336	541
Apr. 14	<i>The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> Transmits the intended text of Hitler's telegram to Pavelić together with instructions from Ribbentrop that the text of Mussolini's telegram to Pavelić be sent to Berlin so that both may be published simultaneously.	337	544
Apr. 14	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports his conversation with Mussolini regarding recognition of Croatian independence: Mussolini stated that recognition left open the question of Croatia's boundaries and emphasized Italy's rights to Dalmatia.	338	545
Apr. 14	<i>SS-Standartenführer Veesenmayer to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the arrival of Pavelić in Karlovac. Kvaternik accepts subordination to Pavelić. They wish to be received by Hitler after recognition of independent Croatia.	341	549
Apr. 14	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Consulate General at Zagreb</i> States that Anfuso will arrive in Zagreb to take Pavelić's telegram to Mussolini. He is to be told that the text has already been transmitted to Rome through German channels.	342	550
Apr. 14	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Text of a draft telegram from Pavelić to Mussolini requesting recognition of Croatian independence by Italy.	343	550
Apr. 14	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on his conversation with Mussolini regarding the text of the telegram by Pavelić to Mussolini (document No. 343).	345	552
Apr. 14	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Record of a telephone message from Mackensen regarding his discussions about the texts of the telegrams from Pavelić to Mussolini and to Hitler. The Italian Government wishes additional clauses respecting the future boundaries of Croatia.	346	553
Apr. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i> Records exchanges with Rintelen and de Ferrariis during the night April 14-15 in clearing for publication next day of the telegrams of Hitler and of Mussolini to Pavelić.	348	555

YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Apr. 15	<i>SS-Standartenführer Veesenmayer to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a telegram from Pavelić to Hitler expressing thanks for German recognition of an independent Croatia.	349	557
Apr. 16	<i>The Consulate General at Zagreb to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that Axis recognition was hailed by Croats, despite the unsettled question of the definitive boundaries of Croatia; agrees with Pavelić that Italian occupation of Dalmatia meets with strong disapproval by the local population.	356	565
Apr. 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legations in Hungary and Bulgaria</i> Repeats message to Zagreb urging the Croatian Government to request recognition by Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania. States that Germany wishes positive replies.	358	567
Apr. 17	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Directs that Mussolini be informed that Germany wishes Ciano to come to Vienna to discuss the partition of the former Yugoslav territory; and informed also that the German borders have been advanced to include the territories formerly belonging to Styria.	363	571
Apr. 17	<i>The Legation in Belgrade to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports signing of the armistice agreement with Yugoslavia by German and Italian representatives; the armistice to enter into force April 18 at noon.	364	573
Apr. 17	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> Explains that the German Legations in Belgrade and Athens are to be transformed into field offices with Minister Altenburg at Belgrade and Minister Benzler at Athens.	365	573
Apr. 18	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Directs that the Italians be informed that Ribbentrop will meet Ciano if he comes to Vienna Sunday before 10:00 a.m. Outlines Germany's views for the partition of Yugoslavia.	368	578
Apr. 18	<i>The Leader of the Croatian State to the Reich Foreign Minister</i> Expresses thanks for the impending opening of German-Croatian diplomatic relations and suggests that Veesenmayer be retained as long as possible as collaborator in the work of reconstruction.	370	580
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to a Hitler-Ciano meeting on April 20.		591
Apr. 21	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the initial discussion between Ribbentrop and Ciano on April 21 in Vienna regarding the future of the former Yugoslav territory.	378	594
Apr. 22	<i>The Director of the Personnel and Administrative Department to the Special Train</i> Reports that Minister Kasche, before leaving Berlin, was carefully instructed not to become involved in disputes between the Croats and Italians.	384	605

YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941			
Apr. 22	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the discussion between Ribbentrop and Ciano on April 22 regarding disposition of the former Yugoslav territory; Ribbentrop sets forth Hitler's position with respect to the Italian views expressed in the previous Ribbentrop-Ciano conversation (document No. 378).	385	606
Apr. 23	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Croatia</i> Explains that Croatian territory is to remain under military occupation for the time being; defines the boundary of the German occupation zone.	388	618
Apr. 23	<i>The Legation in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Pavelić requested an early decision regarding Croatia's boundaries with Germany, Hungary, Rumania, and Serbia, but that he sought to avoid an early determination of the boundary in Dalmatia in view of the Italian demands.	389	619
Apr. 23	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a discussion with Alfieri on April 21 in which it was clearly explained that it was not the business of the German Government to force Croatia to accept a personal union under the sovereign of Italy.	391	621
Apr. 24	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records two points brought up by Alfieri with Weizsäcker: (1) an Italian hope for German pressure on Croatia to accept Italy's wishes; and (2) a meeting of Mussolini with Hitler. These points are presented for Hitler's decision.	394	624
Apr. 24	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Ciano regarding his forthcoming negotiations with Pavelić. Outlines the Italian ideas for a treaty with Croatia.	396	628
Apr. 24	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records the result of German-Italian discussions regarding the disposition of the former Yugoslav territories.	398	630
Apr. 27	<i>The Legation in Belgrade to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Military Commander in Serbia intends to establish a Serbian administration and lists the provisional heads of governmental departments who are to be appointed.	414	654
May 1	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been informed by Ciano about his negotiations with Pavelić regarding the Italian boundary with Croatia and regarding the offer of the Crown to the House of Savoy.	428	681
May 3	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Croatian Minister who stated that the Italians had presented an ultimatum to Pavelić demanding acceptance of a customs union with Italy and of an Italian prince as King of Croatia.	440	693

YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 May 3	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Croatia</i> States that a German-Croatian frontier treaty, based on the line laid down by Hitler, is to be negotiated as soon as possible.	443	696
May 6	<i>The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to the conference at Maribor on the resettlement of the Slovenes from southern Styria and Carinthia. Reports that the Military Commander in Serbia urges that Italy and Bulgaria be induced to take a portion of the total of 220,000 to 260,000 Slovenes scheduled for removal.	465	725
May 8	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on a conversation with Ciano who gave an account of the negotiations at Monfalcone between Mussolini and Pavelić resulting in a Treaty of Alliance, Guarantee, and Cooperation and in the agreement to offer the Crown of Croatia to the Duke of Spoleto.	473	738
May 9	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Gauleitung Styria of the NSDAP</i> Offers to help if there should be any difficulties in connection with the evacuation of Slovenes to old Serbia.	478	744
May 16	<i>Note by the Foreign Minister for the Führer</i> Requests Hitler's decision regarding a proposal that the Slovenes to be evacuated from Lower Styria be sent to Croatia, who would then deport to old Serbia an equal number of Serbs.	525	830
May 16	<i>Confidential Protocol, Signed at Zagreb, May 16, 1941</i> German-Croatian agreement establishing governmental committees for the settlement of economic relations between the two countries.	526	831
May 17	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> Explains the territorial changes resulting from the collapse of Yugoslavia and the defeat of Greece.	534	842
May 20	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records statements by the Croatian Minister critical of Italy, of the Croatian-Italian treaty, and of the establishment of a Croatian monarchy.	539	851
May 31	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Explains that for reasons of foreign policy, the Foreign Minister is unable to comply with wishes for changes in Germany's frontiers with Italy and Croatia.	578	933
May 31	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records having asked the Croatian Minister about alleged statements made to Pavelić by Mussolini expressing doubts regarding final German victory.	579	934

YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 June 4	<i>The Minister in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports regarding a conference of German and Croatian officials on the resettlement of Slovenes and of Serbs, and on the administration of the district of Zemun.	589	957
June 9	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of a conversation between Hitler and the Leader of the Croatian State, Pavelić, on June 7 in the presence of the Reichsmarschall, the Reich Foreign Minister, General Bodenschatz, and Minister Hewel. (See also under "Bulgaria," "Directives for the Conduct of the War," "Greece," "Hungary," "Rumania," and "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.")	603	977

No. 1

221/149082-83

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, February 1, 1941—6:25 p. m.

No. 379 of February 1

Received February 1—6:45 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

1. Ambassador Brinon informed me at 4:00 p.m. today of an instruction given to him by Admiral Darlan by order of the Marshal, the text of which is as follows in the German translation:

Marshal Pétain has the intention of recalling M. Laval to the new Government,¹ the Vice President of which would be Admiral Darlan. The Marshal desires that before the announcement of this decision Admiral Darlan may have a discussion with President Laval and the German Ambassador.

2. The mobilization of public opinion in occupied France against the reactionary machinations of the Vichy Government has set in to the fullest extent. The press campaign has as its motto that on December 13 the Vichy Government betrayed the national interests of France and is following a domestic policy that the French people can never approve. At a banquet of the Paris press yesterday in honor of the foreign press representatives residing in Paris there were speeches by Luchaire,² de Brinon, and Scapini³ calling for a sincere and loyal policy of cooperation. This afternoon the well-known author Alfonse de Chateaubriand is getting even with the Vichy politicians in one of the largest lecture halls in Paris. This evening there will be a sharp attack by Fontenoy⁴ against those responsible for December 13 and a call to establish the Rassemblement National Populaire, which has been joined by the organizations of veterans and the workers' syndicates and in the leadership of which the leftist Marcel Déat⁵ and the fascist-inclined Deloncle⁶ are represented. This coalition movement opposed to the reactionary course

¹ Laval was dismissed as Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs by Pétain on Dec. 13, 1940. See vol. xi of this series, document No. 510 and subsequent documents. For the background of the attempts to have Laval re-enter the Cabinet, see *ibid.*, documents Nos. 674 and 736.

² Jean Luchaire, French journalist, editor of the Paris collaborationist newspaper *Les Nouveaux Temps*.

³ Georges Scapini, delegate of the French Government for prisoners of war.

⁴ Jean Fontenoy, writer and member of the Committee of the Rassemblement National Populaire.

⁵ Editor of the Paris collaborationist newspaper *L'Oeuvre*.

⁶ Presumably Eugène Deloncle, leader of the Movement Social Révolutionnaire, a wing of the Rassemblement National Populaire.

followed by Vichy proclaims as the main points in its program co-operation with Germany and achievement of a social and national revolution. Tomorrow there will be a demonstration in Paris in the same spirit by 1,000 trade union representatives of occupied France.⁷

3. Since under these circumstances public opinion in Paris is very strongly mobilized against Vichy and since, as reported yesterday,⁸ Laval is setting conditions for his return into the Government which go far beyond what is planned in Vichy, a trip to Paris by Darlan would not endanger the impact of our domestic pressure on the Vichy Government. On the other hand, there are a number of technical reasons in favor of Darlan's trip, which are in the interest of the military administration of occupied France. In expectation of the Führer's letter⁹ a number of urgent administrative and economic measures that can be taken only in agreement with the French Government have been postponed, and these could be decided in a discussion with Darlan.

I therefore request instructions whether Darlan's request submitted by Brinon regarding a trip to Paris may be granted.¹⁰

ABETZ

⁷ The way in which the German Embassy attempted to influence French domestic politics was described in detail in a long report of June 14 by Abetz about the activities of the Embassy during the period June 14, 1940-June 14, 1941 (3846/E044361-85). The relevant passages read as follows:

"The collaborationist attitude of the present French Government is in part the result of the strong support which the Embassy gave Laval as leader of an opposition and head of a potential legitimate rival government in the occupied zone.

"The Embassy has followed the same policy in the handling of all other issues of French domestic politics and always endeavored to keep existing oppositions alive and prevent formation of united fronts on a political, ideological, or occupational basis. An effective means to this end is the regulation making all organizations in the occupied zone subject to licensing. Thus, the Vichy-inspired Movement of National Concentration was prohibited in the occupied zone and vigorous support was given instead to the Rassemblement National Populaire, organized by Marcel Déat, which today has already a membership of one-half million. The Legion des Combattants, the single organization for all war veterans brought into existence by the French Government, was likewise prohibited in the occupied zone, while the old war veterans organizations under the leadership of Jean Goy, which the French Government had prohibited, were encouraged in the territory under the authority of the Military Commander in France, to develop a more intensive activity. With similar objectives encouragement was given to tendencies in the youth organizations and farmers associations, which will impede the development of a unified policy of these organizations for France as a whole.

"Particular attention was devoted to the trade unions, which were licensed to operate throughout the entire occupied territory and today constitute a bulwark against both communism and the reactionary tendencies of the French Government authorities in the unoccupied territory.

"Creation of an organization corresponding in ideological and organizational principles to the NSDAP was blocked as a matter of principle, but some smaller groups with fascist tendencies were given scope for their activities."

⁸ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 736.

⁹ See *ibid.*, document No. 564.

¹⁰ On Feb. 2 Ribbentrop informed Abetz that he could receive Darlan in Paris to discuss with him administrative problems. See *Pétain et les allemands: Mémoire d'Abetz sur les rapports franco-allemands* (Paris, 1948), p. 76.

No. 2

221/149078

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

PARIS, February 1, 1941.

No. 383 of February 1

Received February 1—10:30 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

The former Deputy, Montagnon, reports about a trip to Vichy that Flandin is still trying to play off American influences against a return of Laval¹ to the Government and that Leahy is advising the French Government to persist in its resistance a few weeks more.² Admiral Leahy had also demanded of Flandin that Ambassador Henry-Haye be replaced by Herriot. He had been told in reply that this was not possible at the moment but that Herriot could play a role as adviser to the French Government. Admiral Leahy had also told Flandin that it was possible that England would be occupied, but that agreements had already been reached between America and England providing for this case, too.

ABETZ

¹ See document No. 1 and footnote 1.

² Admiral Leahy had presented his credentials as United States Ambassador to France to Marshal Pétain on Jan. 8, 1941. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1959), vol. II, pp. 103-106.

No. 3

2192/472930

*An Official of the Economic Policy Department to the
Legation in Rumania*

Telegram

No.—¹

BERLIN, February 1, 1941.
zu Ha. Pol. IV b. 593.²

With reference to your telegram No. 183 of January 29³ and No. 196 of January 31⁴ and in confirmation of the telephone conversation of Wiehl and Neubacher.

¹ This copy is technically a draft and bears no number. A copy (4854/-E247759) was forwarded as No. 218 to Moscow on Feb. 4 for information.

² The number Ha. Pol. IV b. 541 (which appears on the copy forwarded to Moscow) was typed but crossed out and 593 entered in ink. Neither file number has been identified.

³ This telegram (2192/472932) reported the breaking off of Russian-Rumanian economic negotiations because of Rumania's refusal, at German instigation, to contract for gasoline deliveries to Soviet Russia.

⁴ This telegram (2192/472931) reported that the Russians had insisted on the demand for 100,000 tons of gasoline, and that both the Russians and Rumanians had informed the German Embassy in Moscow of the affair.

Please inform the Rumanian Government as follows:

We agree to Rumania's delivering the 100,000 tons of gasoline desired by the Russians, provided that deliveries do not begin until July 1, 1941, and are spread out in equal amounts over the period of a year.

SCHNURRE

No. 4

277/178798-99

Minister Schnurre to Ambassador Schulenburg

BERLIN, February 1, 1941.

DEAR COUNT: I was in Salzburg for less than a week in order to report to the Foreign Minister concerning Moscow and Finland. I was glad to be able to do this in some detail. The Foreign Minister took me along with him to the Berghof last Sunday in order to give the Führer likewise a detailed report on Russia. The interest that I found in my statements was unusually great and extended not only to the complex of our negotiations and treaties, but to the whole political, military, and social area. I had to talk to the Führer for an hour and a half; he interrupted only to ask questions. We then discussed the Petsamo question. The outcome is known to you from the telegraphic instructions.¹ This trip to the mountains was very gratifying to me personally, since both the Foreign Minister and the Führer expressed themselves very appreciatively about our work. Actually there seems to me to be much that is still in suspense.

I very much regretted that you also were not in Germany recently. I spoke to the Foreign Minister about your letter² and asked whether he approved of your coming here. He very graciously acceded to your request, but said he would like first to await further developments in the Petsamo question and the Bulgarian question. He asked me to speak to him about it again in the coming week. I hope, therefore, that your plan to come to Berlin will still be realized at a very early date.³

General Köstring is here. The Foreign Minister would like to see him, too, and I hope that he will also come to the Führer.

¹ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 717.

² Of Jan. 14; see document No. 6, footnote 1.

³ In his reply Feb. 11 (277/178800-801), Schulenburg remarked: "Your statements about your reception by the Foreign Minister and by the Führer have most keenly interested me. Unfortunately, despite all this, we are still groping in the dark in many things. I wish very much that I could go to Berlin in the near future. For that reason I am especially grateful to you for having put forward with the Foreign Minister my request for home leave and for having supported it."

I am returning herewith the book, *Mystery at Olympia*, with my best thanks.

With best regards, from my wife as well,
Heil Hitler!

K. SCHNURRE

No. 5

104/113019-23

Memorandum by the State Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL
St.S. No. 78

BERLIN, February 1, 1941.

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires¹ brought me today by order of his Government news about the further progress of the Italian-Soviet Russian political conversations.²

Ambassador Rosso had been to see Molotov in order to give him the reply, agreed upon among the Axis Powers, to his three questions:

Regarding point 1, i.e., on the question of the guarantee given to Rumania by the Axis Powers, Molotov had repeated that the Soviet Government considered its complaint against the conduct of the Axis Powers to be justified even now. Among other things Molotov had said that the familiar Russian clause had after all been inserted into the Tripartite Pact,³ whereas in giving Rumania the guarantee, Soviet Russia had not been taken into account, although strongly interested in the question as an adjacent power. For the rest, Molotov had called the Italian explanations "clear and understandable."

Regarding point 2. In the Danube question Molotov had taken cognizance of the Italian statement. He had expressed the hope that the Italian good will to cooperate in a solution satisfactory to all participants might in practice be demonstrated in the future by a less partial attitude on the part of the Italian delegate. Up to now the Italian delegate had systematically and exclusively supported the Rumanian stand without taking account of the Soviet standpoints.

Regarding point 3. The conversation on the Straits question had been rather long and thorough. Obviously this was the most important and most immediate question for Russia. Molotov had immediately recognized that the Italian statement about a possible

¹ Giuseppe Cosmelli.

² See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 599, 646, 688, and 727

³ *Ibid.*, document No. 118.

change in the Statute of the Straits⁴ contained positive and interesting elements. Molotov had asked what "future negotiations" with Turkey should signify, as well as whether the Italian Government had already made an effort to learn the standpoint of the Turkish Government in the matter.

Rosso had replied that Molotov had himself brought up the Straits question in the preceding conversation; therefore the Italian Government had now replied and showed that Italy was taking the Russian interests in this matter into account, even to the extent of agreeing in principle to the traditional Russian demands, that is, to the prohibition of free passage through the Straits by warships of states not bordering on the Black Sea. Since Russia was the power primarily interested, it was not Italy's affair to seize the initiative for a practical solution.

Molotov had admitted that and remarked that if the solution of this question were subordinated to the negotiation with Turkey and thereby to Turkish consent, discussion of it would remain of a purely theoretical and academic nature.

Going over to the war situation, Molotov had expressed the view that the German plan to send German forces to Greece through Bulgaria would have to bring about Turkey's entrance into the war. The Soviet Government had no positive information, but it was convinced that Turkey, who was allied to England and Greece by pacts of mutual assistance, could not remain outside the conflict. The English had already established naval and air bases in Lemnos, that is at the mouth of the Straits. One could therefore predict that the war would extend itself to the Black Sea. This would become a theater of war and thereby threaten the security of Russia.

Events could develop with great rapidity, whereby a theoretical discussion of the regime of the Straits received a lesser importance at the present moment. Although the Russian Government valued the attitude of the Italian Government, the Russian Government had an interest in learning precisely what attitude Italy would take if Turkey were involved in the conflict either voluntarily or involuntarily.

Molotov insisted strongly on this point. He knew very well that he could not expect an immediate answer. But he laid great value on learning the opinion of the Italian Government.

Ambassador Rosso had asked repeatedly what development, in Molotov's opinion, the extension of the war would occasion in regard to the Black Sea. Molotov had replied, the probable entrance of

⁴ For the text of the Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, signed at Montreux, July 20, 1936, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXXIII, p. 213.

Turkey into the war and the occupation of the outlet of the Straits as British naval and air bases.

So much for Cosmelli's report about the Rosso-Molotov conversation.

Regarding the further treatment of the matter the Italian Chargé d'Affaires added the following:

Regarding 1: Molotov had maintained his standpoint on the guarantee for Rumania, although he had found the Italian Government clear and understandable. In these circumstances the Italian Government does not consider it advisable to revert to this point.

Regarding 2: Regarding the Danube question the Italian Government refers to Rosso's explanation. It is of the opinion that for the resumption of the negotiations the instructions to the Italian delegate should be harmonized with those to the German delegate.

Regarding 3: In the Straits question Molotov wanted to learn how Italy would act in case Turkey were involved in the conflict voluntarily or involuntarily. In this regard Molotov had asked whether Italy had understanding for the Russian interest in the Straits from the standpoint of Soviet security in the Black Sea. The Italian Government had limited itself to informing Russia of the formula known to you regarding which agreement was reached in Berchtesgaden.⁵ However, Italy still did not know what Russia herself actually wanted.

The Italian Government believed that one could for the time being reply as follows, pending the further explanations still necessary which would be requested in Moscow:

a. If Turkey entered the war against Italy, then Italy would obviously have a decisive reason for accepting the Soviet stand in the Straits question, within the framework of the statements already made in Moscow.

b. Should Turkey remain neutral or nonbelligerent, then the Soviet views could be the subject of further discussions.

c. In any case Italy was willing, in view of the present Turkish attitude, to regard or to discuss the Straits questions in the light of the priority of Soviet interests.

I have gone over in detail with Signor Cosmelli the Italian suggestions (a-c) mentioned in conclusion in order to reproduce the Italian line of thought as accurately as possible, verbally and conceptually. Nevertheless these points comprise considerable lack of clarity, which Signor Cosmelli also confidentially admitted.

Aside from this, these Italian suggestions certainly go further toward meeting the Russian desires than has hitherto been agreed upon with the Italian Government. I also pointed this out to the

⁵ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 688 and footnote 1.

Chargé d'Affaires without, however, anticipating an official statement on the above communication.⁶

Herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

⁶ See, further, document No. 25.

No. 6

277/178810

Counselor Sonnleithner to Ambassador Schulenburg

BERLIN, February 3, 1941.

DEAR HERR AMBASSADOR: Your letter of January 14, 1941,¹ has been submitted to the Reich Minister, and he has repeatedly given consideration to the question of your trip to Germany which is raised therein. The Foreign Minister has, however, reserved a decision, which he is going to make in the next few days.

I take the liberty of telling you this for your personal information, and remain, with best regards and²

Heil Hitler!

Yours sincerely,

SONNLEITHNER

¹ In this letter (277/178782-83) Schulenburg asked for home leave because of problems of the Embassy and because of his personal affairs including the need to see his dentist.

² Marginal note: "The Foreign Minister has again shelved my request for leave. Sch[ulenburg], Mar. 10."

No. 7

839/281607

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

URGENT

BERLIN, February 3, 1941.

I

In his decision of January 28 which is known to you¹ the Führer decided as follows:

1. The entry of the German troops into Bulgaria is to take place as late as possible . . .²
2. The exact date of the entry cannot yet be foreseen at the moment, but in all probability will not be before *February 20*.

II

Recently the High Command of the Army has wished to advance this date somewhat, perhaps to *February 15 or 16*, for the reason

¹ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 724 and footnote 1.

² Omission indicated in the original.

that otherwise there will not be enough time before April 1 for further preparations in Bulgaria (supply of food and ammunition for Greece).

III

The question has not yet been decided. I am reporting this now, however, because this might possibly shorten the time for concluding discussions with *Turkey*.³

To be submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

RITTER

³ Marginal note:

"I understand the Turkish attitude to be such that if the German advance is unavoidable they would like to barter about their own security in advance and if possible also make a political (and territorial) deal. The opportunity for this will offer itself soon. W[eizsäcker], Feb. 3."

No. 8

F7/0361-66

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

SECRET

BERLIN, February 3, 1941.

Füh. 8

RECORD OF JAPANESE AMBASSADOR KURUSU'S FAREWELL AUDIENCE WITH THE FÜHRER IN BERLIN ON FEBRUARY 3, 1941, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND STATE MINISTER MEISSNER, AS WELL AS THE JAPANESE FIRST SECRETARY OF EMBASSY, KODA

Kurusu expressed his regret at having to leave Germany at this time. Nevertheless he was happy that he had held the ambassadorial post at a time when great historic events had taken place.

The Führer for his part also emphasized the historic character of the events which had occurred during Kurusu's term of duty, above all the final sealing of German-Japanese collaboration. As he (the Führer) had already told the chief of the Japanese general mission a few days ago, in his opinion German-Japanese collaboration would in the future become especially close, since, measured by world standards, the two countries were not rivals and had no conflicting territorial aspirations. Just as Germany had no territorial interests in East Asia, Japan had none in Europe and Africa. Both countries could therefore live together without conflict for centuries, since in the final analysis territorial questions were what caused disputes between nations. This territorial motive was completely lacking in the case of Germany and Japan. Germany would pursue

a colonial policy only on African soil, so that there existed no cause for conflict between the two great nations for as long as was humanly conceivable.

On the other hand, the two countries had common enemies, i.e., England and America. Another country, Russia, was not an enemy at the moment, to be sure, but represented a danger to both countries. At the moment everything was in order with Russia. Germany trusted this country, but 185 divisions, which she had freely at her disposal, assured her security better than did the treaties. Thus the interests of Germany and Japan were absolutely parallel in three directions.

Without a doubt Japan was the foremost power in East Asia, and the Führer hoped that in the course of this year it would also be established beyond a doubt that Germany was the foremost power in Europe. Together with Italy the Axis was actually predominant in Europe, even if some countries, whose judgment was obscured by a few victories in the desert, perhaps did not believe this as yet. Once Germany met the British in open battle the picture would change.

German-Japanese collaboration was based on a concept that was designed for the more remote future. It was a good thing when policy did not change direction every few years. At any rate, collaboration with Japan could extend over a period of 100 to 200 years, for even then England and America would still be the enemies of both countries.

Imperialist America, who now wished to have a say everywhere, did not impress the Führer. For in 1918 she had encountered a Germany that had been drained of her life blood; now, however, Germany was anything but bleeding to death.

In response to Kurusu's reference to the statements in the Führer's last speech,¹ in which he had spoken of the "decisive year," the latter stated that the score would have to be settled this year. On European territory, to be sure, war could not be waged during the winter because of the weather. But preparations for war could be made, and Germany was doing this thoroughly.

Kurusu once more expressed his regret at having to leave Germany at the present time. He was happy, however, that he would be succeeded by General Oshima, who had made so many personal sacrifices in behalf of German-Japanese collaboration. It was no more than just that he should now return to Berlin, for with his recall he had lost not only his post as Ambassador but also his position in the Army.²

¹ At the Sportpalast in Berlin, Jan. 30. Printed in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, February 1941 (Essen, 1941), pp. 123-132.

² Gen. Hiroshi Oshima had served as Ambassador in Germany, November 1938-December 1939.

The Reich Foreign Minister interjected here that Kurusu himself had suggested Oshima as his successor.

Kurusu also stated that he was returning to Japan by way of America and hoped to learn something more definite about the real feeling of the people in the United States, where, as the result of his 10 years of service, he had numerous friends. It was easy for America to speak about a war with Japan, since she well knew that the tremendous distances of the Pacific Ocean made acts of war on either side as good as impossible.

After Kurusu had further thanked the Führer for his message to the Japanese people, which had made a deep impression on the Japanese, the Führer took leave of him in a friendly manner.

SCHMIDT

[EDITORS' NOTE. A directive for strategic concentration for Operation *Barbarossa* (M346/M015812-32) was drawn up by OKH January 31, 1941. In a conference at the Berghof on February 3, Hitler discussed the plan with Brauchitsch, Halder, Keitel, Jodl, and Heusinger.

The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, December 1, 1940-March 24, 1941 (typescript, MS C-065k, of the U. S. Army, Historical Division, European Command, filmed on serial 9936) contains a record of the discussion, pages 159-164, which is printed in Greiner's book, *Die oberste Wehrmachtführung, 1939-1943* (Wiesbaden, 1951), pages 355-360. The record includes these remarks:

"The Führer mentioned in this regard that Turkey would not move when the dice had fallen. A special protective force for the Balkans was therefore not necessary. A dangerous moment could occur if all of Libya fell into the hands of the English. They could then employ their free forces against us in Syria.

"The Führer agrees in principle with the plan of operations of OKH for *Barbarossa*. The theater of operations is gigantic. The encirclement of large portions of the Russian Army, which is to be striven for, will be successful only if it can be carried through without breaks. The immediate abandonment of the Baltic area including Leningrad and of the Ukraine on the part of the Russians is not to be expected as a matter of course. It is, however, possible that the Russians, having recognized the German strategic objective, will retreat on a large scale after the first defeat, in order to prepare a new defense line further to the east behind some kind of barrier. In this case the Baltic area and the region of Leningrad must be occupied first of all, without taking heed of the Russians in position further to the east, in order to win the most favorable supply base for further operations. The objective is to annihilate great parts of the enemy's forces, not to force him to flee. This will be achieved

only if the flank areas are occupied by very strong forces at the same time that in the center one holds back, in order then to maneuver against the enemy's central position from the flanks.

"*The Chief of Staff of the Army* [Halder] continues his exposition: One and one-half divisions of the forces stationed in Norway are to advance against Petsamo, and another one and one-half divisions, including an SS-brigade, are to be transported to northern Finland on the Swedish railroads if these can be used. The mission of these forces is to protect the industrial regions of northern Finland and to tie down and cut off the Russian forces stationed in the Murmansk area. The Finns intend to advance in the south with about four army corps, committing five divisions against Leningrad, three divisions toward Lake Onega, and two divisions against Hangö. They will require strong support, however. Fifteen Russian divisions are reported on the Russo-Finnish border, and about one division in the Murmansk area.

"*The Führer* explains at this point that he assumes that Sweden will participate for the price of the cession of the Åland Islands. A Swedish-Finnish union will not be considered, because it does not fit into the new order of Europe. Norway has to be protected against English attacks; no set-backs can be permitted there, and, therefore, the reinforcement of her coast artillery defenses is necessary. The most important task in Rumania is the protection of the petroleum region, therefore a rapid advance from Rumania is necessary.

"*The Chief of Staff of the Army* proceeds to the attitude of Hungary. Even if she does not herself participate in the operation, she must at least declare her willingness to permit the detrainment of troops in her territory. Rumania is to be announced as the march objective of these troops, and only in the last moment will they be diverted toward the Russian border.

"*The Führer* declares in this connection that Hungary will agree to all German requests if she is given appropriate political assurances. However, the necessary arrangements with the participating states may occur only at the last moment. The exception is Rumania, for whom participation in the operation is a matter of life or death."]

No. 9

201/89314

The Director of the Information Department to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, February 4, 1941—5:00 a. m.

No. 284

Secret for officer in charge.

With reference to your No. 211 of February 3, 1941.¹

¹ This telegram (201/89313) reported that Sima and other leaders of the Iron Guard who were being hidden by the SD had requested safe conduct to go to Germany.

The inquiry with the SD ordered by the Foreign Minister produced the information that it is entirely improbable that Sima and other leading Legionnaires are being hidden by the SD. However, the SD immediately instituted an investigation of the facts of the case. As soon as the results of the investigation, which are expected by tomorrow noon, are available, the Foreign Minister will see to it that you receive further instructions.

Since it is entirely conceivable that the members of the SD in Bucharest know where Sima and other leading Legionnaires are hiding, the SD people, at the request of the Foreign Minister, have received the instruction to get in touch with you for purposes of *information*. In the matter as such, however, you should take further steps only after receipt of the additional instructions from the Foreign Minister which are announced above.²

ALTENBURG

² These instructions have not been found. It is possible that they were transmitted in Foreign Ministry telegram No. 346 of Feb. 11, filed in the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, not found, the reply to which is Killinger's telegram No. 314 of Feb. 11 (201/89363-67).

In this telegram Killinger referred to an account of events given in the Berlin telegram and then proceeded to present his own version of the background of the Iron Guard revolt and the part played by certain German officials. See documents Nos. 72 and 94.

No. 10

1287/344684-89

Memorandum by the Director of the News Service and Press Department

BERLIN, February 4, 1941.

For the Foreign Minister.

Conversation with Dr. Gregorić, Director of *Vreme*.

The conversation which took place this noon proceeded as follows:¹

1. I let Gregorić speak and restricted myself to interjected questions which developed out of the conversation.

2. Gregorić stated the following:

After his conversation with Cvetković he had the impression that Marković's conversations in Fuschl² had not been reported to Cvetković and the Regent in all points in the manner that could have been expected according to his, Gregorić's, talk with the Foreign Minister.³

¹ For the background of this conversation, see vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 708 and 730.

² See *ibid.*, document No. 417.

³ See *ibid.*, document No. 324, footnote 7.

The German reaction to the Yugoslav offer that followed Marković's visit to Fuschl had created the impression with Cvetković that Berlin had expected something else. There was no question, to be sure, that Marković had transmitted the talks in a grammatically correct way, but it was not impossible that here and there he had not grasped the emphasis accurately and correctly and accordingly had not presented it. Thus he, Gregorić, had gained the impression from his talk with the Foreign Minister that on the German side the main emphasis was placed on the accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact. Marković, on the other hand—as he concluded from his conversation with Cvetković—had reported, to be sure, that Germany expected Yugoslavia to take a position on the question of Europe's new order; Marković, however, had evidently considered a non-aggression pact with Germany to be the reply expected by Germany. Marković had probably been confirmed in this view by the fact that in the Fuschl talk the Germans had hinted that as a result of the events in the Balkans, Germany considered the time had come when Yugoslavia had to line up with a policy under German leadership. (Marković scented or evidently insists on having scented in the conversation a German operation to tie Yugoslavia to the German policy without Italy, and even by exploiting Italy's situation.) Gregorić asked me directly whether Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact was mentioned directly in the conversation. Gregorić stated tersely that he had written the letter to me after talking with Cvetković, who cherishes the wish to come here. After having received my communication that he, Gregorić, should come to Berlin, he had spoken with Cvetković once more, who had told him that he would immediately respond to a German invitation. When I threw in the question what time M. Cvetković envisaged for this, Gregorić replied, "Cvetković told me that in case of an immediate invitation I should wait for him in Germany." When I inquired cautiously whether M. Cvetković had expressed certain misgivings in regard to the type of visit, whether he wanted to come incognito or on a visit publicly announced, Gregorić answered: "Cvetković leaves the modalities of the visit to Germany; he merely wishes that Cincar-Marković also be invited. He asks, however, that appropriate arrangements be made also to enable him to speak alone with the Foreign Minister or possibly with the Führer."

I asked Gregorić for his personal opinion as to how matters could develop. At this question he became very cautious. He claimed not to have asked Cvetković directly regarding the question of Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact. He stressed several times that all actions that signified a support of, or concession to, Italy were exceedingly unpopular in Yugoslavia in the present situation.

Accession to the Tripartite Pact with the political statements resulting from it could easily make Yugoslav policy unpopular at the same time. This could be remedied, however, if the national successes deriving from accession—"I am thinking of Salonika, for example," added Gregorić—should appear immediately after the accession. Gregorić justified this view with a detailed explanation of the domestic Yugoslav situation and the elements in the picture. In this connection he advanced the following ideas very specifically:

1. In Yugoslavia policy is not based on parties or forces, but exclusively on the dynasty's claim for power. We do not have an ethnic or party policy, but exclusively a dynastic policy. What does that mean?—he asked the question himself. It means that the Crown considers all decisions, particularly also its foreign policy, exclusively from the point of view of the permanency of its power and dynastic position. In so doing the Crown uses the Minister President who is singled out and made dependent on the Crown. If the policy of the Minister President, whether through his own fault or not, whether intentionally or unintentionally, brings the dynastic position of power into jeopardy, then the thread connecting Crown and Minister President is cut and if necessary, as in the case of Stojadinović,⁴ his fall is brought about reverberating to the most remote Croatian village, in order thereby to consolidate the dynastic position of power. Thus every foreign policy decision must be in harmony with or in the service of the dynastic position of power, which at the same time can only depend upon a few men and for that reason must carry on a definitely opportunist policy. Thus as long as there is obvious uncertainty as to whether foreign policy decisions will jeopardize the authority of the dynasty, which in view of the peculiar structure of the Yugoslav nation is not uncontested, the dynasty will avoid such a decision.

2. I asked Gregorić: In the opinion of the dynasty, have these doubts regarding a final German victory been eliminated for good? Gregorić gave an evasive reply. He was of the opinion, he said, that the last remaining doubts were about to disappear. To be sure, these doubts were fed time and again by the Italian failures, above all in the case of men like Konstantinović who exploited such situations; and so did the lodges.

3. However, the situation must still be considered from a special viewpoint, namely the change in regents. What does that mean? On September 6 Prince Paul's term as Regent will expire. He is ambitious. Even though he does not intend to continue as Regent, nevertheless out of personal and patriotic conviction he would like to continue to exert the prime, politically decisive influence. How

⁴ Milan Stojadinović, Yugoslav Minister President, 1935-1939.

can he do this? Only by becoming the representative of a foreign policy program which is decisive for Yugoslavia's evolution and future. The cooperation with Germany and Yugoslavia's position in the new organization of Europe is such a program. The Prince Regent does not like to make this decision alone, and in that case, too, would like to have the reassurance of a Minister President willing to make the decision. That is to say, what is true for the Regent is true to the same degree for the Minister President, who for his part does not know what position the young King will give him, and who can preserve his policy and his influence only by being the representative of a decisive line of policy for Yugoslavia.

4. It follows from this that the Regent is striving to strengthen his position and to introduce a policy which assures him of permanent influence on the Yugoslav Government. The Minister President has the same ambition, in order to secure his position both with the Regent and with the later King.

5. Gregorić draws from this the following conclusions for handling the matter of Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact: After Marković, the official responsible in the matter, has carried on discussions with the Foreign Minister, the political representative of the Crown, namely the Minister President, should take the political responsibility of such a decision, leaving the formal decision itself to the Prince Regent, who would then have to be received by the Führer after the visit.

DR. SCHMIDT

No. 11

221/149088-90

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, February 4, 1941—11:00 p. m.

No. 413 of February 4

Received February 5—1:15 a. m.

Subject: Darlan's trip to Paris.

For the Foreign Minister.

Yesterday's discussion with Darlan at the Embassy was attended by the chief of the command staff, the chief of the administrative staff, and the chief of the economic staff of the Military Commander in France. Darlan was asked to call the attention of the French Government to the solution of the following questions:

1. Making available unemployed persons from the urban population for the spring planting.
2. Relinquishing gasoline supplies for agricultural tractors for the spring planting.

3. Relinquishing diesel oil supplies for the industrial enterprises in the occupied area.

4. Transportation of pit props from the area south of Bordeaux to the coal region at Lille by French shipping firms.

5. Additional import of bread and meat for those doing heavy work in the occupied area.

6. Detailed information to the German occupation power regarding the food imports of France from her overseas possessions and from abroad.

A settlement in the near future was promised in regard to the requests which Darlan has already made several times; authorization of a 10-day home leave for the sailors who have returned from English internment and whose homes are in the occupied area, and the opportunity to send and receive letters for those French sailors who fought against England at Dakar.¹

Darlan promised for his part to support in the French Council of Ministers the conclusion of an agreement on the reorganization of Havas, as desired by the Embassy, and the elimination of a French objection still obstructing conclusion of this agreement.²

In connection with French food supplies Darlan mentioned the negotiations with South America and the United States on the delivery of frozen meat and grain.³ If necessary he intended to route these deliveries through Casablanca and send them from there by rail to the North African Mediterranean ports or through Gibraltar to Marseilles under the protection of the French fleet. He stated that he had already given the French fleet in Dakar the order to overtake the *Mendoza*,⁴ but he had rescinded the order owing to the fact that these ships, in order to do so, would have had to move too far from their base, and there would have been the danger of a possible English surprise raid on Dakar during their absence.

Political themes were avoided during the conference at the German Embassy. However, at de Brinon's office Darlan discussed with Laval the question of the reorganization of the French Government.

¹ No record of such requests has been found in Foreign Ministry files. See, however, *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice* (Paris, 1957), vol. IV, p. 85.

² No record of the text of such an agreement has been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry. In his report of June 14 (see document No. 1, footnote 7) Abetz noted that negotiations regarding the reorganization of the Agence Havas, which had been going on since August 1940, were concluded by an agreement in March 1941 which gave Germany 47.6 percent and France 20 percent of the shares.

³ For the negotiations with the United States, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 89 ff.

⁴ According to a memorandum of Jan. 24 by Secretary of Legation Grote (378/209402-04) on the activities of the German Armistice Commission, the French delegation had informed the Commission that British forces had captured the French steamer *Mendoza* and apparently intended to bring her to Freetown. The French Admiralty was making plans to recapture the vessel.

Laval answered Darlan's communication that the Marshal is willing to recall Laval to the Government with the demand that he would return to Vichy only on the following conditions:

1. Marshal Pétain will restrict himself to the functions of Chief of State, and Darlan will be installed as official deputy and successor of Pétain by a constitutional act.

2. Laval will take over the office of Premier heretofore held by Pétain, the Ministry of Interior, and the Foreign Ministry.

3. The other ministers of the Cabinet will be appointed by Laval and will be responsible to him. Darlan stated that he personally agreed to these demands of Laval's, but did not believe he would succeed with the Marshal all at once. For the moment the agreement of the Marshal could probably be obtained only for a solution which would leave Pétain as Chief of State and of the Government, and would permit a directorate of Darlan, Laval, and Huntziger to choose the members of the Cabinet; the latter would no longer have the rank of ministers but of state secretaries.

Laval replied that such a reorganization of the Government was not sufficient for him to be able to take over its responsibility.

Considering the influences prevailing in the entourage of the Marshal it cannot be supposed that Pétain will comply with Laval's demands. Since Vichy seems to believe, however, that the Führer is holding off sending his letter⁵ until after the French Government has recalled Laval to the Cabinet, Pétain might be tempted, in the hope of exerting some influence on the text of the Führer's letter even at the last moment, to comply with Laval's conditions to a large extent.

ABETZ

⁵ In the interview with Darlan on Dec. 25, 1940, Hitler stated that he would write to Pétain. See vol. XI of this series, document No. 564.

No. 12

71/50751-52

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

U. St.S. Pol. 54

BERLIN, February 4, 1941.

The Foreign Minister made the following decisions today when a consultation took place on my memorandum of January 27 (U. St.S. Pol. No. 12)¹ regarding arms deliveries to Iraq and the associated Arab questions:

1. In our Arab policy we must continue to show strong consideration for Italian sensibilities.

¹ Not printed (83/61540). It was the record of a conversation with Cosmelli, who told Woermann that the Italian Minister in Baghdad had talked to the commanding general of an Iraq division and had received from him specific requests for deliveries of arms.

2. In view of the fact that the Italians have kept the Arab question pending until now, we may, for our part, in the appropriate instances, take the initiative; however, we should always let the Italians participate in time and let them outwardly take precedence.

3. With regard to deliveries of arms to Iraq, the transportation route through the Soviet Union is not under consideration at present. All other routes can be studied and tried. Particularly the attempt made by Iraq herself to obtain deliveries from Japan,² which, according to instructions, was heretofore to receive only slight encouragement from us, can now be given our full support. The Reich Foreign Minister rejects plans, however, "such as Admiral Canaris had recently set forth." This is especially true of the plan to deliver arms under camouflage to Iraq by way of Iran in connection with the delivery of a blast furnace plant to that country.

4. The Foreign Minister had previously ordered that payments in money to the Grand Mufti should be made only with Italy's consent. Since the Italians have not reacted to our suggestions, the Foreign Minister agrees to the Grand Mufti's receiving money from us and to our notifying the Italians of this somewhat in advance.

5. The Arab questions may be discussed with the OKW in accordance with the foregoing statements. Before individual plans are carried out, the Foreign Minister wishes that the matter be taken up with him again.

6. The Foreign Minister agrees to the proposal to have the appropriate specialist in the Italian Foreign Ministry come to Berlin for a conference immediately after the visit of the private secretary of the Grand Mufti,³ which is now to take place.⁴

WOERMANN

² See vol. XI of this series, document No. 601, footnote 2.

³ Osman Kemal Haddad.

⁴ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 722; see, further, document No. 92.

No. 13

2108/456099-100

Unsigned Memorandum

RECORD OF THE MEETING OF THE INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE OF FEBRUARY 4, 1941

zu Ha. Pol. V a 357.¹

Present: See attached list of those present.²

I

Minister Dr. Schnurre reported on the outcome of the German-Soviet economic negotiations that took place in Moscow and on the

¹ Ha. Pol. V a 357: Not found.

² Not found.

essential content of the German-Soviet Economic Agreement of January 10, 1941.³ He pointed out that at the Moscow negotiations the following, above all, had been achieved:

1. For the transit trade with Iran, Afghanistan, and the countries of the Far East, the Soviet Union granted Germany the same privileges as heretofore.
2. The Soviet side pledged itself, also under the new economic agreement, to supply Germany with the raw materials most important for military purposes, above all, petroleum products, cotton, manganese ore, platinum, manganese oxide, etc.
3. The new agreement represented a decisive contribution to the safeguarding of the German food situation in so far as the Soviet side had pledged itself to supply in the agricultural sector, among other things, 2.5 million tons of grain.

Since, according to the system of the agreement, the development of German imports is dependent on the development of German exports, we must make sure that German exports to the USSR proceed smoothly within the framework of the agreement. Above all, the German exports must be guaranteed in the period up to August 11, 1941, because up to that time the Soviet side had committed itself to especially large deliveries, which in part could not be matched until later by German counterdeliveries.

State Secretary Dr. Landfried⁴ stressed the fact that everything had to be staked on carrying out the agreement. The representatives of the departments concerned and of the Wehrmacht offices should consult with regard to the measures to be taken in detail. Should measures have to be taken exceeding the capacities of the departments or of the Wehrmacht offices, the decision of the Reichsmarschall is to be obtained.

II

Ministerialrat Dr. Ter-Nedden^{*} reported that in the question of the standing supervision of production which the Soviet side desired in connection with the manufacture of certain industrial products, the following arrangement had been made in agreement with the three branches of the Wehrmacht:

A standing supervision of production is out of the question now as before. If the danger should arise that transactions for exports to the USSR would fail because supervision of production has been refused, the German delivery firm may be permitted, entirely by way of exception, to comply with the Soviet wishes. Working quarters may be made available to the Soviet acceptance officials in the plant in question and they may be given permission to supervise the progress of the work on a definite day each week.

³ See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 637 and 640.

⁴ Of the Ministry of Economics.

Since this arrangement applies only to Reich territory, but the productive forces of the occupied areas also have to be utilized for the Russian business, it seems expedient to extend the arrangement to these areas. The matter is to be discussed again with the individual branches of the Wehrmacht and the military commanders are then to be approached jointly.

III

Ministerialdirigent Dr. Schlotterer pointed out that, in accordance with the agreement of January 10, 1941, it had proved necessary within the framework of the over-all import plan to distribute the imports of lumber over the last three quarterly periods. He asked the representative of the Reich Forestry Commissioner for his consent. The latter agreed on condition that the limit of value of 10 million reichsmarks not be reduced.

No. 14

201/89322-24

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 234 of February 5 BUCHAREST, February 5, 1941—6:40 p. m.
Received February 5—7:40 p. m.

In a lengthy conversation I again asked General Antonescu how he visualized the solution of the Legionnaire problem. The General stressed the genuineness of his feelings for the spirit of the Legion, which should rule the country in the future also. Out of regard for the Army, however, it was impossible to integrate the Legionnaires into the governmental machinery now. The Army would not understand this. A postponement was necessary. At present, too, the Government naturally must be guided by the same points of view which the sound part of the Legionnaires want to see prevail. The Army had openly asked whether the General had gone along with the Legion in order to assure himself of the full support of Germany. The Army had dropped this idea. It would never again be anti-German and the General would demonstrate that 80 percent of the population of Rumania would come out for him. Only the alliance with Germany was possible in the political, economic, and military fields.

I asked whether the General was considering taking a leader of the Legion who was entirely without taint and who would assume the leadership of the Legion as the deputy of the real leader of the Legion (the General), but without participation of the Legion in the Government. The General replied that the country now demanded

peace and security. With regard to the political organization, the Constitution of September 6, 1940, was basic even today as far as he was concerned. The primary thought had been to reconcile the old and the young generations with each other, while the Legionnaires had rejected all persons over 35 years of age. The General is convinced that a compromise is necessary, but he believes, particularly after the most recent experiences, that the young people must not attain top positions right away. He emphasized the fact that though the Legion and National Socialism were animated (one group garbled) idea, their strengths were disproportionate and the Legion had now lost a good deal of sympathy. The spirit of the Legion had gained a firm foothold in the people, although this, too, had been disturbed as a result of the latest events. In the work of reconstruction he could not, out of consideration for the Legion, pass over the best elements who really did the work. The General stated that he himself would direct the organization and would himself appoint a leader of the Legion. He had recently given the order to release even those Legionnaires who had committed small offenses. New orders of arrest were not being issued.

When I remarked that, in the opinion of the Legionnaires, there were Freemasons in his entourage, the General stated that he would convince the young people that he was far from entertaining Masonic ideas of any kind and hoped by autumn to clarify matters in this regard, too, without firing a shot. The Legion, as was becoming more and more apparent, had taken in sizable Communist elements. There was proof that alleged Legionnaires had been supplied with large funds from Bolshevik sources. The Legionnaires Groza and Petrascu¹ had not been arrested, but were probably in the safekeeping of the Soviet Legation. It was certain that some of the Communist-minded members of the Workers' Guard were there and that other terrorist organizations were in contact with that office. There was evidence to the effect that the [British] Intelligence Service was even now exerting strong influence on the Legionnaires. Legionnaires had been seen with English families who had ties with the Intelligence Service. The American Minister recently gave a luncheon which, besides members of the British Legation, Legionnaires had also attended. The General remarked in this context that prior to the insurrection a connection between the American Legation and the Legionnaires had not been established.

I again suggested, if possible, a middleman between the General and the decent Legionnaires (group garbled); otherwise the latter might commit silly acts resulting in dangers to the public order. The General thereupon stated that he was already in indirect con-

¹ Groza, a Legionnaire labor leader; Petrascu, secretary-general of the movement.

tact with three Legionnaires whom he wanted to select for such a function. These Legionnaires enjoyed general confidence and esteem. He was, moreover, preparing a proclamation to the Legionnaires in which he would declare that the decent Legionnaires could keep their posts and he would give them the advice to steer clear of mystical elements and muddleheads. The General referred to the unconditional declaration of allegiance tendered him by the Legionnaires from all over the country. The agitation against him had come principally from Bucharest, where Sima had had influence.

KILLINGER

No. 15

230/152473-74

Memorandum by the State Secretary

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
St.S. No. 92

BERLIN, February 5, 1941.

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires called on me this evening in order, by direction of his Government, to make the following urgent and strictly confidential communication:

The Duce had received at Italian headquarters a semiofficial representative of Prince Regent Paul of Yugoslavia. The name of the representative is Stacic [*Stakić*].¹ The latter proposed that negotiations be opened between Italy and Yugoslavia, with the aim of developing the Italo-Yugoslav Agreement of 1937,² and, through the conclusion of a pact with Italy, facilitating the accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact. The following might serve as a basis for the negotiations: for Italy, the demilitarization of the Dalmatian coast; and for Yugoslavia, the territorial acquisition of Salonika (which latter the Duce considered a natural and vital outlet to the Mediterranean for Yugoslavia). The Duce had replied to this:

1) He was favorably disposed toward the idea of developing the above-mentioned Agreement (of the year 1937), on the assumption naturally that there would be appropriate consultation with the Reich Government.

2) The clauses of the new pact were to be the subject of further negotiations. These negotiations were to be concluded in the shortest possible time.

The representative of Prince Regent Paul has returned to Belgrade. In the coming week an official Yugoslav reply is expected for the purpose of starting the negotiations.

¹ The *Ciano Diaries*, entry for Nov. 11, 1940, indicate that Ciano received Prince Paul's representative Stakić on Nov. 11 and that he subsequently referred the matter to Mussolini.

² Political and Economic Agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia signed Mar. 25, 1937. For an English text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1937 (London, 1950), vol. CXXI, pp. 1119-1121.

Meanwhile—the Chargé continued—the Duce makes the following comment:

a) The conclusion of the pact mentioned would be a favorable development for the policy of the Axis Powers in the Balkans and would cause the moral and military collapse of Greece.

b) Great Britain would see the collapse of her last hopes and intrigues in Belgrade and Sofia.

c) Turkey would find herself completely isolated in the face of the German military forces. The intervention of the latter in Greece would then become superfluous; Turkey might change the attitude which she has taken up to now. The further prosecution of the plans of the Axis Powers in the central and eastern parts of the Mediterranean would thus be facilitated.

Signor Cosmelli asked, on instruction of his Government, that the Foreign Minister, and through him, the Führer, be informed at once of the foregoing communication.

Herewith to the Foreign Minister.

I would mention that the wording of the telegraphic instruction to the Chargé d'Affaires indicated the Duce's own hand.³

WEIZSÄCKER

³ In a memorandum submitted to Ribbentrop on Feb. 6 (B13/B001444) Weizsäcker pointed out that there were two gaps in the statement made by Cosmelli:

"a) There is nothing in the Italian communication as to how the Duce visualizes the settlement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the question of Salonika. It is known that the Bulgarians do not want to claim Salonika for themselves at this time but also that they do not yet want to renounce it publicly.

"b) There is no hint as to who is to march into Greece, particularly into the areas to be taken away from the Greeks. All that is being said is 'that the intervention of German armed forces in Greece would become superfluous.'"

No. 16

B19/B003997-98

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

SECRET

BERLIN, February 5, 1941.

No. 227

Ha. Pol. g. 537.

With reference to your No. 209 of January 31.¹

I. Without showing haste, please continue the conversation with Molotov along the following lines:

The German Government has noted with satisfaction that the Soviet Government is prepared for an understanding with Germany concerning the Petsamo nickel question and is seeking an agreement with Finland in which Germany's pertinent interests will in no way

¹ Vol. XI of this series, document No. 737.

be restricted. The German Government also is prepared for an understanding on this basis. If, however, an impairment of Germany's interests is to be avoided, three viewpoints are to be respected along with maintenance of the German-Finnish agreements.²

1) We must have the possibility to continue to obtain Petsamo nickel as heretofore from Finland, through German-Finnish clearing, because purchase through German-Soviet clearing would be considerably more difficult for us.

2) We must have the assurance of obtaining 60 percent of the output without a time limit, as agreed upon with the Finnish Government. A departure from this agreement would mean an impairment of our interests.

3) The guarantee must be given that this 60 percent should quickly result in such a quantity as is necessary for our important military needs. This can be achieved only if the management and the plans for development which have been worked out are not interfered with; that is, if, with the changes striven for in the concession and in the management, the existing German-Finnish agreements are recognized by the Soviet side and taken over by the new companies.

II. The German-Finnish agreements go back to April 1940. Until then the Soviet Government had shown no interest of any kind in the Petsamo nickel mines. This seemed explicable from the mere fact that the Soviet Government was more than amply supplied for its own needs in the rich nickel deposits lying in its territory (see instruction W 5231 g. Rs. of November 16, 1940³). Even at the conclusion of the Finnish-Soviet peace treaty of March 12 of last year, the Soviet Government reserved for itself only general privileges with content relating to political, military, and transportation matters, but not with content relating to the nickel mines (see your telegram No. 1294 of July 4⁴). The Soviet interest in the Petsamo nickel first came into evidence at the end of June of last year (see our telegram No. 1088 of June 27⁴), when the German agreement with Finland was already ready for signature. When you continue the conversation please make this clear in reply to M. Molotov's remark that, as far as he knew, the German-Finnish agreements had not come into being until 1940.

III. With reference to your No. 224 of February 3.⁵

² For the substance of these agreements see document No. 109.

³ Not found.

⁴ Not printed (B19/B003623). See vol. x of this series, document No. 24 and footnote 3.

⁵ In telegram No. 224 of Feb. 3 (B19/B003986-87) Schulenburg reported Finnish rejection of Russian demands for the installation of a Russian general manager and a Russian majority of shares in the new Russian-Finnish corporation. The Finns insisted on a purely Finnish management and a majority of shares for themselves. They were, on the other hand, prepared to give assurances for the respect of the rights of the minority and not to separate the holding from the managing company.

For your personal information:

We agree with Fieandt's stand. A further yielding would, however, be undesirable for us. The most essential thing for him will be to see to it that the management of the technical operations remains in Finnish hands and that Finnish influence continues to be decisive in the business management of the future company. A decisive intervention of Soviet influence in the management of the technical operation will make it impossible to carry out the production plans that were set up jointly with us. A Soviet director of the whole enterprise will, moreover, without regard to majority conditions, largely eliminate Finnish influence in the management.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 17

F1/0475-83

Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini

FEBRUARY 5, 1941.

DUCE: I am writing you this letter with a feeling of concern to do the right thing in order to help you, Duce, to overcome a situation that must in the long run have psychologically unfavorable effects not only in the rest of the world but also among your own people. To speak quite generally, the difficulty in the situation lies in the fact that any help that we are resolved to give can, for a number of reasons, take effect only after some weeks; if we take into account only the meteorological considerations the military conditions for intervention in the Balkans will improve but in North Africa they will deteriorate for us.

I begin with the Balkans.

You are aware, Duce, that our transports—as was discussed on the Obersalzberg¹—are proceeding without interruption, and that we are slowly getting into the situation of building up a certain amount of auxiliary antiaircraft protection for the oil area and a gradually increasing antiaircraft protection for the Danube crossings. The crossing of the Danube itself has now been made much more difficult because of an increasing icing over and a great deal of floating ice. Before this situation changes no bridge construction can take place. I have the hope that in the second half of February the prerequisites for this will be more favorable. Thanks to the exhaustive preparations the crossing will then proceed in a relatively short time. But nevertheless, Duce, many weeks will still pass before we can bring you any real relief on the Greek front. The aggravating thing is:

¹ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 672.

a. The possibility of an English air attack that must be taken into account and must therefore be considered in all our preparations;

b. The uncertain attitude of Turkey, which forces us in any case to provide many more troops than would otherwise be necessary. (I hope as regards Russia that she will make no further difficulties.)

Furthermore it is always conceivable that England will at the last minute undertake landings of rather large formations in Greece. This must also be taken into account in the apportionment of our forces.

Finally, we are so far from our initial bases that we must establish an abundance of depots merely to provide for the maintenance and ammunition supplies.

The advance in Bulgaria will also be impeded by the weather conditions, so that all in all one can hardly count on a certain success before the end of March.

North Africa

When you left me, Duce, we were still of the opinion that perhaps a protracted holding of Tobruk could bring about a delay in the advance of the English forces. I suggested to you at that time, Duce, sending a German blocking unit [*Sperrverband*] to Tripoli or Libya to help to reinforce your front there.² The development since then has impelled me to a reconsideration of the present situation and of the situation which will probably develop in the future.

I have thereby come to the following conviction: Your units in Cyrenaica have now had to taste for weeks the bitterness of the reverses of war. In accordance with experience this has an unfavorable psychological effect on every unit. The soldier loses his self-confidence and his belief in the possibility of success. I am therefore now quite convinced, Duce, that if only for psychological reasons, the intervention of a German unit cannot but have a favorable effect for your own soldiers. For the English, on the other hand, this will result in the suspicion of a threatening intensification of our resistance. But for this reason, Duce, I am just as convinced that such help makes sense only if it is capable of being *really successful*, that is, *if it is able to bring about a turn of fate*. And this, Duce, leads me—and in this I find myself in agreement with the views of the gentlemen in my High Command—to a special appreciation of the situation, and the resulting consequences, which I must pass on to you frankly and candidly.

The arrival of a German unit makes sense only if *by its strength and by its composition* it is really capable of bringing about a turn

² See vol. XI of this series, document No. 683.

of fate. Up to the moment where the possibility of holding the position before Derna still existed I was of the opinion that a very good antitank unit could do good service at that place. Now, since the loss of this position and therewith of almost the whole of Cyrenaica, I believe that even for tactical reasons a unit of this strength and composition will no longer suffice for this purpose. I now believe that besides this blocking unit, which would have to be reinforced by an armored regiment, the provision of an additional complete German armored division is necessary.³ For I believe that the further advance of the English cannot be prevented by the purely defensive holding of a position. The tactics of the English consist in their overtaking each unit by driving across the desert, attacking it from behind, and at the moment they reach the sea receiving for their part the necessary supply basis by means of their unhindered fleet. This results in two things:

1. *The defense itself must be carried on offensively! An armored unit must be thrown against the British armored forces which can meet them at any time and shoot them up or destroy them in a battle of movement.*

2. The British fleet must be prevented from constantly establishing new supply bases for its advancing and overtaking armored forces.

If this procedure is not adopted, then Italian North Africa cannot be held!

Therefore in my opinion two measures are necessary:

1. A combined operation of naval and air forces against the British transport and supply ships and the naval forces escorting them.

2. Formation of a strong armored unit that is equally suitable for defense and for attack.⁴

³ The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, Dec. 1, 1940-Mar. 24, 1941 (typescript, MS C-085k, of the U. S. Army, Historical Division, European Command, filmed on serial 9836) contains these passages at Feb. 1 and Feb. 3, respectively:

"Maj. Gen. Freiherr von Funk considers the dispatch of the proposed blocking unit to Libya in view of the situation there as inadequate to avoid disaster. It would be necessary to transfer more powerful forces, at least one armored division, in order to conduct the defense offensively with the aim of reconquering Cyrenaica. These forces would come too late however because they could not be ready for commitment in Tripolitania before the end of April. The Commander in Chief of the Army supports the view of General von Funk"

" . . . The Commander in Chief of the Army suggests reinforcing the proposed blocking unit with one armored regiment, following this up with the rest of the armored division and placing all mobile forces in Libya under a German corps headquarters which would have to cooperate with the units employed by the Luftwaffe. The Italian Air Force units in Libya should also be under command of the latter. The Führer expresses his approval of these suggestions"

⁴ The OKW directive of Feb. 6 (M179/M005705-06) made provision for these measures.

Regarding point 1: I am at this time having a study made to determine to what extent from our side the dive bomber units and one or two long-range fighter bomber or fighter groups can either transfer their bases to North Africa or attack from intermediate landing fields, both against the British transport ships and naval forces operating in the Gulf of Sidra and against all land targets that offer themselves. If this is technically feasible and if you, Duce, are in agreement, then I believe that it will be possible, without neglecting the objectives of the German air units in Sicily and in cooperation with your own air units finally to stop the British practice of constantly establishing new supply bases along the North African coast by means of their fleet.

Regarding point 2: In order to give your armored forces, and therewith the most active defense, an absolutely firm core I would—as already stated—add a complete armored division besides the blocking unit reinforced by an armored regiment. This proposal which I now make to you herewith, Duce, presupposes something, however, namely: *the certainty that by the time of the arrival of this formation, which would comprise a strong corps, the entire North African coast is not lost to such an extent that the defense would have to be confined to a larger or smaller circumference of the city of Tripoli.* For I consider such a defense no longer possible, Duce, because from there one could neither be effective in the air nor would any further supply by sea be possible. With this the prerequisite would fall away in undertaking the reconquest of the entire territory from such a restricted space, incapable of being supplied. *Independent of this* I further consider it likewise indispensable to destroy completely the British air and naval base at Malta. This is also being given consideration at the present time. To the extent that further German forces of the Luftwaffe are necessary for this, Duce, I shall do everything—if you agree—in order to assure success. The armored blocking unit and the armored division will both be led by excellent and experienced officers. In case my proposal is carried out I have the intention of placing General Rommel at the head of the corps. General Rommel is the most daring general of armored forces whom we possess in the German Army. As the first tank commander of a division in the west he received the Knight's Cross, and he will be the first to receive the Oak Leaves. His services in the western campaign are absolutely unique!

General Rintelen, who is bringing this letter, will be able to give you, Duce, all the oral explanations which you wish.⁵ In case of

⁵ See document No. 35.

your general agreement I consider it necessary for General Rommel to go at once personally to Marshal Graziani together with a small operations staff in order to review with him the general tactical situation. The final decision would then depend upon the results of this review. At the same time General Rommel could personally get a picture of the task which confronts him. He would—I am convinced of this—approach this task with his men with the same heroism and fanaticism as General Dietl in Narvik, for he is of the same caliber. The review of the purely technical questions, such as transports, etc., would be matters for the competent authorities.

We have received a report from Franco⁶ in which he repudiates the notion that he is not on our side and that he does not intend to enter the fight, but in the end states that such entry is after all not possible before autumn or winter—now again for different reasons. I wish still to write him a very polite letter and have only the one wish, Duce, that you may still be able to persuade him to change his mind.

Incidentally, if General Franco had complied with our request, then the attack on Gibraltar would have begun on February 1 at the latest and today, Duce, England would have lost the western approach to the Mediterranean! It is a shame to see how a great chance is lost simply through irresoluteness.

Accept, Duce, my most cordial and comradely greetings.

In all sincerity,

Yours,⁷

⁶ See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 707 and 718.

⁷ The file copy printed here does not bear a signature.

The letter is not included in the published papers of Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe* (Milan, 1948).

A person in the employ of the German Government made translations into German of the papers of Ciano which were seized during the German occupation of Rome. These translations, termed the Ciano Papers (Rose Garden), are deposited with the Adjutant General's Office, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. These contain a copy of the letter, pp. 274-279, which is apparently a retranslation into German from the Italian.

No. 18

533/280739-43

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IM

Pol. I 289 g. Rs.

BERLIN, February 5, 1941.

In the enclosed memorandum OKW has presented a summary of its wishes—already expressed a number of times orally—regarding a strengthening of German activity in the Arab countries.

I thereupon informed the OKW (Captain Bürkner) of the viewpoints set forth in memorandum U. St.S. Pol. No. 54, of February 4,¹ and suggested that the OKW might for its part examine the resulting military possibilities, now that there was a political directive for further work. Captain Bürkner concurred. We agreed to have another joint discussion together with the representatives of the Foreign Abwehr as soon as the military details mentioned above were available.

Herewith submitted to the Under State Secretary of the Political Department.

KRAMARZ

[Enclosure]

The German decision to give the Italians freedom of action also with respect to their political action in the Mediterranean area² to all appearances needs to be re-examined as regards the Arab countries. The Italians have no interest in independent Arab states, since they themselves want to play the chief role there later on. Valuable connections with Arabia have during the last few months been broken off or have deteriorated.

The British are working all the more skillfully in this area. Their exponent is Emir Abdullah of Transjordan. The intention is that he is to rule the fictitious Arab state of Syria-Transjordan-Palestine and, according to other reports, Iraq too. The latter would be made easier by the fact that the minor King of Iraq³ is a nephew of Abdullah's, but complicated by the fact that the Army and especially the lower strata of the population are pro-German rather than pro-English.

An opponent of Abdullah is King Ibn Saud. Here in particular Italy's free hand in the Middle East has not turned out well. Italy does not want to see a strong and expanded Ibn Saud kingdom opposite East Africa.

In view of this situation the following position is being advocated:

1. In our opinion the time has come to direct the future political activity in the Middle East from Germany and to take quick and vigorous action in this matter.
2. This includes our recognition of the independence of Arabia as a war aim of the Axis. We are in a favorable position in so far as we need not promise the Arabs a merely "tolerable" solution of the

¹ Document No. 12.

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 370.

³ King Feisal II, born in 1935, ascended the throne in April 1939, after the death of his father, King Ghazi.

Jewish question in Palestine but can with a good conscience make the Arabs any concession in this field.

3. Whether we are to envisage any political structures in the Middle East and, if so, which ones, or whether we must already take an open stand on this issue, is a question which can be answered only by specialists.

There should be no doubt as to the fact that Ibn Saud must be an important factor in our game and that he should be promised *at least* freedom of action in southwestern Arabia and rectifications of his boundary with Transjordan. The question of a Greater Arab empire, extending from the Persian Gulf and across to the Mediterranean coast and to the Red Sea (possibly under Ibn Saud), seems from our point of view not yet ripe for a decision. The antagonisms between the various Arab leaders are probably too great for that, and other conditions, too, are lacking.

4. If the political decision is made to become active in the Middle East, one of the first steps to be considered would probably be re-establishment of contact with Ibn Saud. If he responds to the war aim outlined above, arms deliveries to him for a future struggle against England should be considered. The best intermediaries for that would be the Japanese (military discussions under the Tripartite Pact). The difficulty lies in bringing the arms through the passage at Aden to the ports of the Red Sea. That can perhaps be overcome, however, by transferring the arms from the ships to small coastal vessels south of the passage and in this way passing through the British control more easily. It should be examined whether arms deliveries by long-range planes to the region south of 'Aqaba are to be considered. It would not be a question of very large amounts, but this would hardly be necessary in view of Arabian conditions. Finally, the arms might be delivered by transporting them from Italian East Africa across the Red Sea. But not much will be available there; nor is it desirable to involve the Italians in this question.

5. The question whether we can or want to send a liaison or control staff to Syria will be studied. That would undoubtedly have its advantages in the Arab question. For various reasons, however, it is perhaps better to content ourselves with agents there.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht would welcome a discussion of these questions as soon as possible between the Foreign Ministry and the leadership of the Wehrmacht.

The Chief of the High Command

of the Wehrmacht

By order:

BÜRKNER

No. 19

Nuremberg Document 1456-PS
U.S. Exhibit 148

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Economic Armaments Office*¹

FEBRUARY 6, 1941.

DISCUSSION OF FIELD MARSHAL KEITEL WITH MINISTER CLODIUS
REGARDING THE SUPPLYING OF ITALY WITH MOTOR FUELS, ETC.,
FEBRUARY 5

Present: Field Marshal Keitel
General von Rintelen
Minister Clodius

In order to continue to conduct the war the Italians have requested 574,000 tons of motor fuel oils as a supplementary requirement for the first half of the year 1941. The German estimate comes to 214,000 tons, which is:

automobile gasoline	15,000
diesel oil	30,000
petroleum	26,000
airplane gasoline	20,000
lubricating oil	13,000
fuel oil	110,000

Clodius stated that this minimum requirement must absolutely be delivered because otherwise the danger would arise of the Italians declaring that without the allocation of this material they could not continue to wage the war.² Minister Ribbentrop had presented the same view to Field Marshal Keitel. On the occasion of a report by Clodius³ the Führer said that he wished absolutely to help the Italians, but that the help could not become a burden on our own supply; a solution would have to be found. On the basis of the estimates of the Economic Armaments Office Field Marshal Keitel maintained that the deliveries could not exceed the 30,000 tons of airplane gasoline and of diesel oil hitherto promised because otherwise our own situation would become critical during the summer. The same applied to the rubber allocation and to that of petroleum coke. After a 3-hour debate, and after the declaration by Clodius that he could not return to Rome with this answer without arousing the deepest misgivings there, it was decided:

¹ This document was introduced at Nuremberg but is not included in the published collection. It is in the custody of the National Archives, Washington, D. C.

² Clodius' memorandum of Feb. 3 (B13/B001425-36) presents a breakdown of the Italian and German figures presented in the negotiations at Rome.

³ The negotiations in Rome which had begun Jan. 20 reached an impasse Jan. 29 and Clodius was called home to report. See vol. XI of this series, document No. 728 and footnote 3.

1) The delivery of 110,000 tons of fuel oil will be refused. By the end of June 15,000 tons of automobile gasoline will be supplied in installments.

The diesel oil demand will be answered with an allotment of 20,000 tons only and with the adjunct that after June no further promises can be made and that the provision of this quantity is also dependent on the development of the situation in Germany. Airplane gasoline will be provided in the amount of 20,000 tons as is already established. The Reich Ministry of Economics will determine the amounts of petroleum and lubricating oil. But such allotments may not become an encumbrance on the Wehrmacht.

General von Rintelen, who attended the discussion, is to be directed to inform the Italian General Staff that these deliveries are the last promises which we can make. With the aid of economizing measures Italy will have to make out with these quantities through June.

2) The rubber industry until June should run on 1100 tons per month, not on the 1500 tons which were requested by the Italians. The German deliveries of buna are to be adjusted to the 1100 tons for processing. Additional promises can no longer be made.

3) In the field of petroleum coke the allotment until June should be increased to 1500 tons per month. We cannot make a settlement for a year because our own situation does not permit it.

Clodius and von Rintelen were directed to inform the Duce that the future German support of Italy cannot lie further in the field of raw materials, but that it will ensue through the delivery of war materials such as is already taking place on a large scale. It is further to be indicated to the Duce that the employment of German troops, particularly those of the Luftwaffe, represents a great relief in the matter of raw materials because the German troops are provided with fuel, rubber, etc., from Germany. Finally the Duce is to be requested to order the sharpest measures of economy in all fields, such as at this time are not discernible in Italy.*

THOMAS

* See document No. 27.

No. 20

230/152476-77

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia

Telegram

No. 105

BERLIN, February 6, 1941—3:55 a. m.

RAM 40

Secret for officer in charge.

Please do not carry out the following instruction until Thursday,

February 6, when the code word "Belgrade" will be telephoned by my aides, probably toward noon.

Dr. Gregorić, who had first made contact by letter with the Director of the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry,¹ came to Berlin a few days ago by arrangement with the latter, and stated in confidence that it was the wish of M. Cvetković to come to Germany together with M. Cincar-Marković in order again to discuss current political problems with me and, if possible, also with the Führer;² I thereupon personally received Dr. Gregorić today, and he confirmed this statement to me.³

Please call on Minister President Cvetković at once and tell him with reference to the foregoing statements of Dr. Gregorić, that I should be glad to discuss further with him and M. Cincar-Marković the complex of questions which was the subject of a first conversation with the latter at the end of November.⁴ Presumably, there will also be an opportunity for the two gentlemen to be received by the Führer. I request him to inform me when it would be convenient for the two gentlemen to make their visit. I myself will be in Fuschl from Friday noon of this week on, and the Führer will probably stay at the Berghof for the week end; consequently, I should be glad to see the two gentlemen then in Salzburg.

Please also ask whether the two gentlemen desire to have the trip kept secret for the present. In this case, the question as to whether and when anything ought to be announced publicly concerning this matter could be decided in the course of the discussion.

Following the visit to M. Cvetković, please also call on M. Cincar-Marković and inform him accordingly.

Please report by wire at the earliest possible.⁵

RIBBENTROP

¹ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 708, enclosure.

² See document No. 10.

³ For Gregorić's own account of these conversations with Schmidt and Ribbentrop, see Danilo Gregorić, *So endete Jugoslawien* (Leipzig, 1943), pp. 119-122.

⁴ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 417.

⁵ Referring to this instruction in telegram No. 97 of Feb. II (230/152479-80) Heeren reported that the Yugoslav Foreign Minister had informed him about the invitation which Ribbentrop had extended to him and the Minister President through Gregorić in Berlin. In view of the first sentence of the instruction Heeren denied having received instructions in this matter. No further reply to this instruction has been found.

No. 21

136/74650-52

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, February 6, 1941—10:10 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received February 6—11:15 p. m.

No. 452 of February ■

For the Foreign Minister.

The domestic situation in Spain has continued to grow still more acute in the last 3 weeks. Reports from German Consulates, agents, and other sources all agree in this respect.

At the present time no bread at all is to be had in many parts of Spain. The scarcity of food will grow still more acute. Hunger revolts are expected. As a consequence of this and because of simultaneously rising unemployment, cases of highway robbery and banditry are increasing. Even the Army, too, is to some extent underfed and ill-clad. Because of that there is dissatisfaction in the barracks. It is feared that here and there soldiers are making common cause with Communist bands and others, and in this way are supplying them with weapons.

The bitterness of the people is also justified in particular by the continued detention of 1-2 million Reds from the Civil War, who are poorly fed and whose families are starving. Increasing cases of corruption and the lack of a community spirit among a large part of the more well-to-do Spanish populace increases the indignation.

The military is strengthening its line of battle against Foreign Minister Serrano Suñer and, at the same time, indirectly against the Generalissimo, who remains firmly attached to him. The feeling in the Army is no longer one of unity.

The battle of opinions has become quite obvious through the increasing attempts by members of both parties to use the Embassy for their purposes (strengthening of the position of the Foreign Minister or overthrow of the Foreign Minister).

The Spanish Foreign Minister expressed himself to me at our last meeting as being considerably more concerned over the development of the domestic situation than previously. He especially described to me, besides the economic distress, the insidious agitation by the English, who were blaming the Spanish Government for the famine and the unemployment and were asserting that the Spanish Government had sacrificed its land at Hendaye¹ by promising to allow

¹ The Hitler-Franco meeting on Oct. 23, 1940; see vol. XI of this series, document No. 220.

German troops to pass through the country toward Gibraltar and Portugal.

Unfortunately, certain effects of the agitation by the English are already appearing within the Army, too. The situation was more serious than was believed by Franco, who did not attach any special significance to the public feeling in the country and to English propaganda.

I pointed out to the Minister that his comments were only proof of the correctness of the predictions contained in our "messages"² of the last few days with regard to further developments in Spain, and that only Spain's entry into the war would immediately bring a clarification and improvement of the situation; after our troops had entered, the English with their innumerable agents would have to leave the country and calm would be guaranteed. To this Señor Serrano Suñer replied verbatim: "I, too, am of this opinion." He added, however: "But we must receive the means beforehand to alleviate quickly the worst need to some extent." In reply I referred to our promise with regard to this and to the 100,000 tons of grain stockpiled in Lisbon,³ which would indeed get here when Spain had given us a positive answer.

The situation is today so tense that attempts to overthrow the Government are not out of the question. For the time being, however, a Putsch against Franco and the entire regime is less to be feared than an ultimatum by the generals to Franco that he form a military government without Serrano Suñer. A military government under Franco which might take the place of the present Cabinet would perhaps—being fully informed about the situation and our intentions, crossing of the border and offers of help—take a more positive position with regard to the matter of the date of the entry into the war than the present Government, which is weakened by inner strife and in the face of which Franco cannot bring himself to decide on a clear policy.

STOHRER

² See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 682 and 702.

³ See *ibid.*, document No. 702 and footnote 2.

No. 22

F5/0384-93

*Adolf Hitler to Francisco Franco*¹

FEBRUARY 6, 1941.

DEAR CAUDILLO: If I write this letter I do so for the purpose of setting forth once more as clearly as possible the individual phases

¹ A Spanish copy of this letter has been filmed on F5/0394-0404.

in the development of a situation which is not only of importance to Germany and Italy, but might have had a decisive significance for Spain as well.

At our meeting² it was my aim to convince you, Caudillo, of the necessity of joint action by the states whose interests, in the final analysis, are indissolubly conjoined. For centuries Spain has suffered persecution by the same enemies whom Germany and Italy are forced to fight today. To the earlier imperial aspirations, which were hostile to our three countries, have now, however, been added antagonisms of an ideological nature. Jewish international democracy, which rules in these states, will not forgive any one of us for having adopted a course which tries to secure the future of our nations in accordance with national postulates rather than principles entailing a commitment to capitalism [*nach volklich bedingten und nicht kapitalistisch verpflichteten Grundsätzen*]. As to Germany's determination to see this fight through to the very end, I need not waste a single word. Nor is the Duce of a different mind. The Japanese people, too, will be unable in the long run to avoid this conflict, save by way of a surrender that would sacrifice the future of the Japanese people. I am convinced that the same fate now confronts Spain, too. If you, Caudillo, were successful in your struggle against the elements of destruction in Spain, then it was only for the reason that the attitude of Germany and Italy forced your democratic opponents to move with caution. *But never, Caudillo, will you be forgiven that victory.* Nor has England the intention, once she again has the power to do something about it, to permit you to remain permanently established in North Africa, opposite Gibraltar. Spain's seizure of the Tangier Zone—that, Caudillo, is my firm conviction—will in that event have been only a transitory episode. England, and probably America as well, will do everything to make their control of that entrance to the Mediterranean in the future if anything more secure than in the past. It is therefore my most sacred conviction that the war which Germany and Italy are fighting today will decide Spain's future destiny as well. Only in the event of our victory will Spain's present regime survive. If Germany and Italy should lose the war, however, there would be no future whatever for a truly national and independent Spain.

For that reason I have made an effort to convince you, Caudillo, of the necessity of joining forces, in the interest of your own country and the future of the Spanish people, with those states which earlier sent soldiers to help you, and which today, too, are of necessity fighting not only for their own existence but indirectly also for the national future of Spain.

² See vol. XI of this series, document No. 220.

At our meeting we reached an agreement that Spain would proclaim her willingness to sign the Tripartite Pact and enter the war. In setting the date, we never contemplated, far less mentioned, periods in the remote future, but always spoke only in terms of a very brief period during which you, Caudillo, believed you would be able to carry through various economic measures for the benefit of your country.

I personally have been skeptical from the outset about the hope that it would still be possible for Spain to obtain substantial economic advantages in the immediate future:

1. England has no intention whatsoever of giving Spain any real help! England's only endeavor is to postpone Spain's entry into the war and to put her off in order thereby continually to increase the distress in the country in this way and thus be able to overthrow the present Spanish regime.

2. Even if England should want to think differently, however, in a fit of sentimentality (which would be unprecedented in British history), she could not really help Spain in any circumstances. With respect to shipping alone she is in no position at all to help any other country at a time when she herself has been forced to submit to the most stringent restrictions in her standard of living. And the shortage in shipping space will not become less but rather more difficult as the months go by.

Although, as I said before, I was absolutely skeptical about this from the beginning, I had full understanding for your efforts of at least trying to have food shipped to Spain from overseas countries before entering the war.

Germany, on the other hand, has stated her willingness to supply, among other things, food grain—on the greatest possible scale as soon as the date for Spain's entry into the war was fixed. Germany, furthermore, declared that she is prepared to replace the 100,000 tons of grain which are lying in Portugal destined for Switzerland, so that these could at once be used for the benefit of Spain.³ All this, of course, was predicated on the condition that Spain's entry into the war was definitely settled. For there is one thing, Caudillo, that must be clearly understood: We are engaged in a battle for life and death and cannot hand out gifts at a time like this. Therefore, the later assertion that Spain was unable to enter the war because she received no advance deliveries is untrue! For immediately upon setting the date of entry into the war, a date, moreover, that would not yet have been apparent to the outside world, Spain would have received her first advance delivery, namely, 100,000 tons of grain. I doubt that it would have been possible within that time to ship 100,000 tons of grain to Spain from abroad, even if there had been the will to do so. I doubt, therefore, that

³ See vol. xi of this series, document No. 357.

this actually happened. The assertion, however, that if our grain had been delivered immediately that fact could have been used in the propaganda to prepare the Spanish people for the entry into the war, is refuted for another reason.

You yourself, Caudillo, personally emphasized to me the importance of not making public the accession to the Tripartite Pact because you were afraid that this might have hampered or even frustrated your other efforts, for instance, to obtain more grain. How much less would it then have been possible, however, to make open propaganda for entering the war. No, I must state once more that:

1. It was never considered in our conversations that Spain would not enter the war until perhaps next autumn or winter, and
2. *Germany was prepared to make advance deliveries to the Spanish Government the moment the definite date for entering the war was set.*

When, prompted by the necessity of relieving our Italian ally, I asked you, Caudillo, to set the date for the middle or perhaps the end of January—that is, to permit the German concentration of forces against Gibraltar to start by January 10 so that the attack could be launched by the end of January—only then, for the first time, were our negotiators told plainly that such an early date was entirely out of the question;⁴ the reasons given were again economic considerations. Thereupon, when I had it pointed out once more that Germany was willing to begin deliveries of grain immediately, Admiral Canaris was finally told that these grain shipments were not the decisive issue at all, for they would have no practical effect whatever if they were made by rail. Since we had in the meanwhile readied batteries for the Canary Islands and intended to use dive bombers for additional protection, we were further told that this was not decisive either, because from the standpoint of food the Canary Islands could not be held longer than 6 months.⁴

That it was not at all a question of economic factors, but of those of a different nature, is evident from the last statement informing us that for climatic reasons a concentration of forces could not succeed at this season of the year and would therefore have to be envisaged for the autumn or winter at the earliest.⁵

In these circumstances I fail to understand, to be sure, why one should at first have wanted to declare an operation impossible on economic grounds which is now supposedly impossible simply for climatic reasons. I really do not believe that a climate, to which we are not actually unaccustomed, could have interfered with the

⁴ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 476, footnote ■ and document No. 500.

⁵ See *ibid.*, document No. 707.

concentration of the German Army in January. In the Norwegian campaign, at any rate, we successfully achieved our task in quite different circumstances and under difficult climatic conditions in snow and ice, quite apart from the fact that as a result of the participation of German soldiers and officers in your campaign, Caudillo, the climatic conditions of Spain are indeed not unfamiliar to us.

I must deeply regret your views and attitude, Caudillo! For this reason:

1. I feel duty bound to afford relief to my Italian friend and ally and thus to help him at a moment when he has suffered an unfortunate mishap. The attack on Gibraltar and the closing of the Strait would at one stroke have changed the entire Mediterranean situation.

2. It is my conviction that time is one of the most important factors in a war. Months lost can often not be regained!

3. Finally, it is obvious that if our advance units had been allowed to cross the Spanish frontier on January 10, Gibraltar would be in our hands by now. This means that 2 months have been lost which otherwise might have helped decide world history.

4. It is my further conviction that the economic situation of Spain would have improved and not deteriorated as a result of what Spain would have received from us in any case; conversely the shipments which have in the meanwhile actually arrived from overseas can only be a fraction of what would immediately have been delivered by us in any event.

But leaving all this aside, Caudillo, I would now like to make the following comment:

Spain's entry into the war, after all, was not considered exclusively in order to benefit the interests of Germany and Italy. Spain herself has put forward large territorial demands and the Duce and I had expressed our willingness to fulfill them to any extent compatible with a reorganization of African colonial possessions that would be acceptable to Europe and its states. And I may point out in this connection that the most tremendous sacrifice of life in this war has up to this point been borne first by Germany and, after her, by Italy, and that both have nevertheless raised only very modest demands. In any case, the date of military operations can be proposed in the main only by the one who will bear the largest burden in the battle and who therefore must include them in the calculations of his total plan for a military conflict which is, after all, on a world-wide scale. That I, myself, have no other goal in mind than our common success is certainly understandable. Yes,

it is my urgency in this instance, Caudillo, which proves the depth of my sense of responsibility also toward my allies. For wherever difficulties should arise in the course of this war, it will be my unshakable will to bring aid, and I am determined to repair in the final settlement that which at one stage of the war or another may temporarily miscarry. That also applies to Spain. *Spain will never have other friends than those represented by present-day Germany and Italy, unless, of course, a different Spain should come about. Such a different Spain, however, would be but a Spain of decay and ultimate collapse. For this reason alone I believe, Caudillo, that we three men, the Duce, you, and I, are linked to one another by the most implacable force of history, and that we should therefore, in this historic conflict, obey the supreme commandment to realize that in grave times such as these nations can be saved by stout hearts rather than by seemingly prudent caution.*

For the rest, Caudillo, this war has already been decided—no matter what transitory successes the British may believe they can achieve somewhere along the periphery. For regardless of this, the fact remains that England's power in Europe has been broken and that the world's most tremendous military machine stands ready to fulfill any task with which it should be confronted. And the future will show how good and reliable that instrument is!

Yours,

ADOLF HITLER

No. 23

8588/E602810-14

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

TOP SECRET MILITARY

BERLIN, February 6, 1941.

The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

OKW/WFSt/Div. L (IL Op.) No. 44095/41 g. K. Chefs.

By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 23

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AGAINST THE ENGLISH WAR ECONOMY

1. *The Effect of our Warfare against England to date:*

a. In contrast to our earlier conceptions the greatest effect in the struggle against the English war economy has come in the heavy losses of merchant ships through naval and aerial warfare. This effect has been further accentuated by the destruction of port installations and of large stocks, as well as by the lessened utilization of the ships when required to sail in convoy.

A further significant increase through the wider employment of submarines in the course of this year is expected and can thereby lead to the collapse of English resistance within a reasonable time.

b. The effect of air attacks carried out directly against the English armament industry is more difficult to estimate. As a result of the destruction of numerous plants and the ensuing disorganization of the armament industry a sharp drop in production may certainly be expected.

c. The effect upon the morale and upon the capacity of the English people to resist is so far the least discernible from the outside.

2. *Inferences for our conduct of battle.*

In the course of the coming months the effect of naval warfare against enemy merchant shipping by greater employment of submarines and surface craft will probably increase still further. On the other hand, *the scale of our air attacks cannot be maintained* because the missions in other theaters of war compel the withdrawal of increasingly large units of the Luftwaffe from operational use against the British Isles.

It will therefore be necessary in the future to concentrate *air attacks* even more sharply and to launch them primarily against such *targets* whose destruction operates in the same direction as that of *naval warfare*. Only in this manner is a decisive result with respect to the war to be expected within a reasonable time.

3. *The object of further military operations* against the English homeland must therefore be the concentration of all naval and aerial means of warfare in combating the enemy imports, and also in holding down the English production of airplane material and wherever possible inflicting further damage upon this industry.

This will require:

a. Destroying the principal British ports of ingress, especially their port installations and any ships in port or in process of construction;

b. Harassing with all means the movement of ships, especially inbound ships;

c. Systematically destroying the key centers of military aircraft production, including the anti-aircraft industry, as well as of the production of powder and explosives.

These tasks must be carried on with those forces remaining for operations against England if during the course of the year large parts of the Luftwaffe and lesser naval elements should be redeployed to other theaters of war.

4. *For the execution of these tasks* the following applies:

a. The sinking of merchant tonnage is more important than combating enemy warships.

This applies also to the use of aerial torpedoes.

The reduction of enemy tonnage not only intensifies the blockade which is decisive for the war but at the same time renders more difficult any enemy operation in Europe or Africa.

b. Even where attacks on port cities or plants of aircraft production yield manifestly good results, such attacks must be constantly repeated.

c. The insecurity and the losses of the enemy are to be increased by constant mining operations.

d. After striking the great ports of ingress, the conduct of battle must follow any shift of English unloadings to the smaller ports, so far as the range of aircraft permits.

e. Only when weather or other operational conditions prevent operating against the targets mentioned in paragraph 3 above, will attacks be justified also against other plants of the armament industry and against cities of particular importance for the war economy as well as against stockpiles in the interior of the country and transport installations.

On the other hand no strategically decisive success is to be expected from systematic terror attacks on residential areas or attacks on fortifications along the coasts.

5. *Until the commencement of regrouping for Barbarossa*, we should strive to step up progressively aerial and naval operations, not only to inflict the greatest possible damage on England but also to simulate the appearance of an attack on the British Isles impending this year.

6. Regulations for overwater reconnaissance necessary for the *coordination of naval and aerial warfare* will be issued separately.

7. Directive No. 9 of November 29, 1939,¹ the Supplement to Directive No. 9 of May 26, 1940,² and Directive No. 17 of August 1, 1940,³ are rescinded.

ADOLF HITLER

¹ Vol. VIII of this series, document No. 399.

² Not printed (8589/E602719-21).

³ Vol. X of this series, document No. 270.

No. 24

B13/B001453-54

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

SECRET

BERLIN, February 6, 1941.

e. o. Pol. I M 294.

General Jodl tells me the following: General von Rintelen, the German Military Attaché in Rome, concluded his last report,¹ which

¹ Of Jan. 29 (M341/M015040-47).

I have submitted to the Foreign Minister, by saying that it is useless to send a German armored division to Tripoli if Graziani does not want to do anything else but wait for the English in a fortified camp around the city of Tripoli.

Yesterday General von Rintelen reported to the Führer on this subject. The Führer agreed with Rintelen's opinion. Rintelen goes back to Rome tomorrow with a letter from the Führer to the Duce² of approximately the following content: Tripoli must be held for various reasons. However, this cannot be done in a fortified camp around Tripoli. The defense frontier must be built up at a suitable position about 200 kilometers east of Tripoli. The Italian divisions now massed around Tripoli must be advanced to this defense position. Only on condition that this strategic plan is accepted by Italy is Germany willing to send to Africa a specially composed German blocking unit [*Sperrverband*] to which an entire armored regiment will be added, this being under the command of General Rommel. Possibly another entire armored regiment and also a part of the German X Air Corps from Sicily will be committed later in North Africa.

General von Rintelen also has instructions from the High Command of the Wehrmacht to discuss further particulars with the Italian General Staff. The High Command of the Wehrmacht wishes that the Italian mobile units also be under command of General Rommel. Furthermore, a few other wishes such as the employment of the Italian submarines will be brought up. If Italy agrees to these proposals General Rommel will first go to Graziani in the near future with a small staff. If Italy does not agree to these proposals the High Command of the Wehrmacht will not send one man to North Africa, and if any small special German units are already committed there it will withdraw them in a suitable manner.³

RITTER

² Document No. 17.

³ See document No. 35.

No. 25

813/276444-45

Memorandum by the State Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, February 6, 1941.

St.S. No. 94

I asked the Italian Chargé d'Affaires to call on me today and made him the following oral reply to his recent communications concerning the Italo-Russian discussions:¹

¹ See document No. 5. In an instruction of Feb. 4 (813/276446-47) Ribbentrop delineated precisely the reply to be made to Cosmelli.

1. The Foreign Minister was very grateful for the communication about the conversation between M. Molotov and Ambassador Rosso. He had noted from this with satisfaction that this conversation had moved quite along the lines which he had arranged with Count Ciano in Berchtesgaden.²

2. The reply to the question posed by M. Molotov during the conversation, as now proposed in Rome, seemed to the Foreign Minister to be questionable especially in the present circumstances. One had to count on indiscretions, and if Turkey should hear of such Italian statements that might have a rather unfavorable effect for the Axis Powers considering the imminent developments.

3. The Foreign Minister requested that consideration be given in Rome once more whether it was necessary at all for Italy now to make further statements in Moscow so quickly. Molotov himself had said during the conversation that he did not expect any immediate answer to his question. Therefore one could perhaps consider delaying a new step by Ambassador Rosso and waiting for the time being to see whether Molotov would himself revert to his question.

4. Should it be thought in Rome, however, that a speedy answer was appropriate, after all, then the Foreign Minister would be grateful if the Italians would contact us once more.³

WEIZSÄCKER

² The meeting of Ribbentrop with Ciano was on Jan. 19. The discussion about relations with Soviet Russia is recorded in Ciano's memorandum of that date, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 627-628.

Cf. vol. XI of this series, document No. 672 and footnote 1.

³ See document No. 57.

No. 26

124/123111-13

*Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsäcker*¹

A 413

Moscow, February 6, 1941.

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: As we know, the Soviet Union some time ago repeatedly suggested to Japan the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, and Japan declined each time. Following the conclusion of our Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union² and probably to a degree as the result of our advice, Japan on her part has tried in the past year to settle her differences with the Soviet Union. The then Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, Togo, negotiated with the Soviet Government for some time to this effect, without being able to settle more than a few minor points. The present Japanese Ambassador, Tatekawa, after his arrival here, in

¹ Copies were also circulated to the Foreign Minister, Woermann, Rintelen, Ritter, and Wiehl.

² See vol. VII of this series, document No. 228.

turn suggested to the Soviet Government the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, but the Soviet Government has now gotten on its high horse and made conditions for the conclusion of such an agreement which Japan cannot accept. With regard to the other points in the negotiations (neutrality pact, fisheries agreement, economic negotiations, etc.), Mr. Tatekawa made no progress and was quite driven to despair. So much the more surprising is it that in the middle of January the Soviet Government took the initiative and within a few days concluded a provisional fisheries agreement in accordance with the Japanese proposals and in an official communiqué called this provisional agreement "an indubitable step forward on the path to improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations," although this provisional agreement has for years been repeatedly extended for 12-month periods. The Soviet Government has further declared its readiness to enter into negotiations forthwith concerning a long-term fisheries agreement, which has long been sought after by Japan, and also to commence economic negotiations with Japan. Included in this complex, finally, is probably the fact that at the end of January, as a result of the disbanding of the Fourth Chinese Chungking Army, the Soviet press for the first time in a long while made a violent attack on Chiang Kai-shek. All this suggests that the Soviet Government has recently considered it necessary to approach Japan. Many people maintain that the Soviet Union wishes "to protect its rear in the East." Whether this view is correct or not cannot be stated with certainty at the moment. I have considered it proper, however, at least to direct your attention to the foregoing.

With the best greetings and Heil Hitler! I am, dear Herr von Weizsäcker,

Yours, etc.

F. W. SCHULENBURG

No. 27

B13/B001448-52

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 248 of February 6
Delegation No. 32

ROME, February 7, 1941—1:15 a. m.

Received February 7—1:50 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.¹

This evening as instructed I had a detailed conversation with the Duce.

¹ In a separate message, telegram No. 257 of Feb. 7 (4876/E253141), Clodius reported that he had extended Ribbentrop's greetings to Mussolini and had stated to him that in the discussions at Berlin the Reich Foreign Minister had vigorously upheld the Italian interests.

To start with I stated that the fact that at the pending negotiations the Italian Government had again very gravely termed the guarantee of an adequate supply of mineral oil and rubber for Italy to be the most urgent question had induced the Foreign Minister to recall me to Berlin for a renewed review of the German possibilities.² Now I had the following to communicate by order of the Führer: The Führer had personally reviewed the two questions in detail. He had thereby arrived at the conviction, in agreement with his responsible advisers, that at the present moment it was not possible to grant the Italian wishes in their entirety. He thought it important that the Duce be directly informed about this before the continuation of the negotiations between the two delegations and be apprised of the motives and the justification for this decision. Naturally the Führer was still resolved, as in the past, to help Italy where this was necessary. However, the extent and the nature of this help could not be determined by the calculations of the experts as regards requirements in certain separate areas, but had to be looked at in its entirety. The direct military cooperation, the provision of weapons of all kinds, and the delivery of raw materials formed a whole. In many cases much more effective results could be obtained by cooperation in the two first-named areas than by the delivery of raw materials.

Thus, for example, the dispatch of the German air corps to Sicily³ was naturally a more effective support than if simply the gasoline which this air corps utilizes were made available. On the other hand, however, in evaluating the amount of German deliveries of raw materials, the amount of gasoline used by this air corps and supplied by Germany naturally had to be taken into consideration. The massing of large German troop units in southeastern Europe would likewise lead to a considerable relief for Italy.⁴ In this case, too, however, the considerably greater German consumption of material had to be taken into account in arranging the amount of German deliveries of material to Italy. The same was true of the dispatch of German units to Libya.⁵ The Führer was resolved to continue the cooperation in this most important military area. General von Rintelen, who would return to Rome from Berlin in the next few days, would bring the Italian General Staff definite proposals in this direction.⁶ Likewise the Führer had complied most extensively with the Italian wishes in the area of deliveries of war material. Hundreds of guns and tanks would be delivered to the Italian armed forces in this month alone. Here, too, one had to consider that very considerable amounts of strategic

² See document No. 19.

³ See vol. II of this series, document No. 487.

⁴ See *ibid.*, document No. 511.

⁵ See *ibid.*, documents Nos. 642, 672, and 683.

⁶ See document No. 35.

raw materials were contained in these weapons which were scarce in Germany, too. The deliveries of war material would be continued in accordance with the Italian wishes. In comparison with the performance which Germany was making in these two areas the raw material deliveries were relatively less important and were in any case not so directly decisive for the further course of the war. Nevertheless the Führer was willing to do what was in his power in this area, too. But one had to restrict the Italian requirements in joint, comradely cooperation to the absolutely necessary minimum. Such a restriction was also in the Italian interest, since every ton of mineral oil or rubber saved in Italy benefited the Wehrmacht and therewith the over-all interest of the Axis. The Führer was convinced that one would find after an additional, exact review that the Italian requirements and the German possibilities of delivery would prove entirely compatible with application of the strict criterion that simply was necessary in wartime. Even now the investigations had shown that in some areas we got along with a proportionately smaller consumption of material than did Italy and without the military necessities being affected thereby. It would in no case lie in Italy's interest if German deliveries were made to Italy at the price of the German armament. We were convinced that the Duce shared this opinion.

Even while I was talking the Duce had shown by various interjections that he was oriented in all the particulars of the problems discussed and that the supplying of oil and rubber to Italy is particularly close to his heart and causes him great concern. In his reply he then stated that he had carefully followed the various negotiations in the last few months and in particular my discussions in Rome. Mineral oil and rubber were of decisive importance for maintaining the Italian war economy.⁷

The Duce then asked in detail about the amount of the deliveries we consider possible and calculated the difference between these deliveries and the Italian wishes. He explained in detail that the Italian fleet actually did have a very large, surely even larger, need of fuel oil than did the German fleet, particularly because of the necessity of maintaining the connection with Libya and Albania. Thus, for example, he had taken 300,000 men to Albania alone under the protection of the fleet. With all understanding for the connection with other problems, he had to say nevertheless that the supply of oil and rubber was after all a technical problem which retained its significance even in view of all other support.

He then repeated my remarks in Italian to Anfuso, who was present, in order to check whether he had understood everything exactly.

⁷ The subsequent portion of this telegram was dispatched on Feb. 7 and was received at 5:20 a.m. that day.

Then he told me in a very cordial and warm tone that he trusted the Führer in all of these things. He understood perfectly the Führer's considerations. He realized very well that the German military necessity could not be narrowed down, even in the common interest of the two countries. He knew that the Führer regarded the German and Italian cause as a joint cause. He was grateful to the Führer for having placed him in a position, by the detailed presentation of the Führer's thoughts, to see the problem of cooperation in the strategic and military areas once more in its totality and to appreciate the over-all evaluation of this problem by the Führer. He was convinced that the Führer's evaluation of the situation and of the interrelationships was the correct one, and he continued to trust in this judgment.

Anfuso, who stayed a few minutes longer with the Duce, told me afterwards that the Duce had told him once more after my departure how satisfied he was that the Führer had informed him so thoroughly and confidentially. He had full confidence that as in the past the Führer would always find the right thing in the future, too.

I gained the impression from the conversation that it is very painful to the Duce, to be sure, to have to accept considerable restrictions in the area of mineral oil and rubber deliveries, but that he is nevertheless convinced that no other solution is possible considering the over-all situation and that the deficit occurring will be more than compensated for by the German deliveries in the other areas dealt with. I believe that he will take care with his personal influence that the members of the Italian Government participating in the negotiations and the leaders of the Italian armed forces will also in the end see matters in this light.

I shall now continue the negotiations over the details of the arrangements with the Italian delegation and the Italian experts. At the same time, in accordance with the instructions issued in Berlin,⁸ the local German military representatives will also take up contact in the same sense with their Italian comrades, in agreement with me, in order to help put through the same ideas with the Italian military authorities, too. In this the attempt will again be made, in particular, to convince the Italian naval chiefs that the Italian estimates of the requirements of fuel oil and diesel oil are indeed too high and that the military requirements can also be satisfied with a smaller expenditure.⁹

CLODIUS
MACKENSEN

⁸ See document No. 19.

⁹ See document No. 65.

No. 28

136/74657-59

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, February 7, 1941.

TOP SECRET

Received February 8—12:55 a. m.

No. 475 of February 7

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 468 of February 7.¹

The memorandum of the Spanish General Staff concerning the Spanish import requirements discusses in the *introduction* the deficient military preparation of Spain and the military situation of the Spanish territories. The program then gives five lists of minimum requirements:

1. General requirements
2. For the Army
3. For the Air Force
4. For the Navy
5. For the transportation system

Summary of the Introduction.

Spain is economically not prepared for the war. The Civil War has decreased production, exhausted provisions and foreign exchange (gold reserves), reduced means of transportation, and has increased considerably the requirement for raw materials for reconstruction. The present war has further aggravated the situation to a considerable degree. Spain needs most of all:

Fertilizers, in order to secure at least an average harvest, gasoline and fuels, grain (the lowest ebb in the supply will be reached this month), cotton, rubber, as well as small quantities of a number of other raw materials which are indispensable to the war industry.

The solution of the transportation problem is imperative. A large part of the coastal shipping must be shifted to the highways. Heavy weapons and antiaircraft guns are lacking. The Air Force has at its disposal only material from the Civil War and material taken from the enemy, and has no fighting power owing to the lack of uniformity of the types. For this reason the necessary (German) air units must be sent to the coasts and islands, and Spanish units must be supplied with spare parts and material. The Navy material was exhausted in the Civil War; the material taken as booty from

¹In this telegram (136/74656) Stohrer reported the receipt of the memorandum from the Spanish General Staff. The Spanish original of this memorandum (2174/471420-35) as well as a German translation (2174/471404-19) were sent as enclosures to Stohrer's report of Feb. 8 (2174/471402).

the Reds is in need of repair. A number of units could be combined into a group of some fighting strength, namely:

Two cruisers, 13 destroyers, 4 submarines. All these units need additional armament, etc. The remaining Spanish units need lengthy repairs and, aside from the military tasks to be accomplished by the minelayers, can be used only for coastal protection. The military situation of the Spanish territories:

The provisioning of the Balearic Islands, with the exception of grain requirements, has been assured.

The Canary Islands are poorly equipped with coast artillery.

The supply situation in the Islands has been extremely bad for the past 6 months because of the scarcity of grain in Spain. The world situation demands that the provisioning of the Islands be assured for at least one year. The Atlantic coast of Ifni and Morocco is in a similar situation. Spanish Guinea is isolated and within the sphere of power of the English.

Fernando Po is in a better situation with regard to defense, but has only a few small caliber cannons at its disposal.

The Spanish zone in Morocco with 7 Spanish divisions has grain supplies for only 1 month.

Only a few inferior antiaircraft guns are on hand.

I. General requirements.

The following are being requested:

Fertilizer in considerable quantities. [Delivery] at once on account of spring planting. Also rubber, cotton, jute, gasoline, and fuels. In part, the requests exceed the requirements indicated earlier and examined by the Embassy (your telegram No. 1957 of November 10 and the Embassy's follow-up report by telegram²). Now a million tons of grain are being requested (instead of 750,000 tons earlier).

II. Requests for the Army involve both previously reported and new material, in part in quantities exceeding earlier requests. New, for example, are 3,750 tons of copper for 3 months. New requests are made especially for the Signal Corps (radio, telephone, telegraph) as well as for pharmaceutical and medical materials. In addition they request about 90 complete 4-gun batteries of different caliber, 400 antiaircraft guns, and certain quantities of ammunition. Also about 8,000 trucks and tractors in considerable quantities.

III. The Air Force requests material for the equipment of 3 squadrons of hydroplanes³ and spare parts of HE-111's and ME-109's which have already been acquired in Germany.

² See vol. XI of this series, document No. 340, footnotes 2 and 7.

³ This passage had been garbled in transmission and was corrected in telegram No. 486 of Feb. 11 (136/74660).

IV. The Navy reports a need for torpedoes, mines, machine guns, depth charges, optical material, meters, and other technical equipment in considerable quantities.

V. As for the transportation system, they ask for 16,000 railroad cars and 180 locomotives. In case railroad cars cannot be delivered, 3 trucks per car can be substituted. Furthermore, over and above the military requirements, 13,000-15,000 trucks are requested.

In the memorandum the right to make further requests has been reserved according to how matters proceed.

The memorandum omits any distinction between advance deliveries before the entry into the war and later monthly deliveries. It is evidently put together out of reports of requirements from different departments, some of which in formulating their wishes did not stay within the framework of the question as to absolute requirements for the war.⁴

STOHRER

⁴ See document No. 46.

No. 29

221/149093-94

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, February 8, 1941—1:35 a. m.

No. 451 of February 8

Received February 8—2:20 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Darlan's conversation with Laval today resulted, as expected, in Laval's refusal to return to the Cabinet, since he wishes to belong to it only as Head of the Government and Minister of Interior and Foreign Affairs, but not, as Pétain has offered, merely as a member of the Directorate and State Minister without Portfolio.¹

On the basis of this attitude of Laval's the following decisions are to be expected in Vichy tomorrow for the interim reorganization of the Government:

1. Marshal Pétain will remain in his position as Chief of State, but will give up his functions as Head of the Government.

2. A new constitutional act will appoint Darlan as Deputy and successor of the Chief of State, Pétain.

3. Darlan will be Head of the Government and besides the function of Premier and that of the Ministry of the Navy, which he already occupies, will take over the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Information. According to an agreement with Laval, Darlan will appoint the following secretaries-

¹ See document No. 11.

general: Ambassador de Robien for the Foreign Ministry, the Prefect, Angeis, for the Ministry of Interior, and the writer, Paul Marion, for the Ministry of Information. Flandin is to disappear and the present Minister of Interior, Peyrouten, will take over the post of Ambassador in Buenos Aires, for which de Robien had been considered.

4. General Huntziger will take over the Ministry of Air and the Ministry of Colonies, in addition to the Ministry of War which he already occupies.

5. Finance Minister Bouthillier is to become the state secretary in the office of the Premier; the Finance Ministry as well as the Ministry of Production and Agriculture are to have new heads.

6. Besides Darlan and Huntziger, someone responsible for all the economic departments will enter the Directorate.

Darlan and Laval have agreed confidentially that at a time to be agreed upon with the Embassy, Laval will move into Darlan's functions as Premier, Foreign Minister, Minister of Interior, and Minister of Information and Darlan will limit himself to the functions of Deputy Chief of State and later Chief of State.

The press and radio of occupied France have been instructed to maintain the greatest reserve with regard to the reorganization of the Government and, with the exception of the person of Darlan, to leave open all possibilities for polemics.²

ABETZ

² On Feb. 10 Marshal Pétain announced that he had appointed Admiral Darlan Vice-President and Foreign Secretary and had designated him as his successor. In telegram No. 674 of Feb. 27 (221/149131-34) Abetz reported the change of Government in Vichy and the names of the new Cabinet members.

No. 30

274/177658-59

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 143 of February 8

SOFIA, February 8, 1941.

Received February 8—1:12-1:50 p.m.

With reference to my telegram No. 142 of February 8.¹

Secret for officer in charge.

Text of the Bulgarian statement:

The Bulgarian Government again confirms the statement made by Minister President Bogdan Filov to the effect that it is prepared to

¹ In this telegram (274/177657) Richthofen reported that the Bulgarian Minister President had explained that Draganov in Berlin had been unable because of illness to communicate the statement of the Bulgarian Government. Draganov would, however, make the statement that very day and it would also be given to Richthofen in Sofia. See, further, document No. 41.

accept the proposal of the German Government regarding Bulgaria's adherence to the Tripartite Pact.² The Bulgarian Government is of the opinion that Bulgaria is already one of the powers of this Pact, as is evident from the activity of the two military delegations, whose task it is to settle certain problems connected with accession to the Pact.³

After these questions are settled, the Bulgarian Government will proceed to the formal signing of the protocol of accession to the Pact.

II. The Bulgarian Government has learned from its delegates that in the course of the deliberations of the two military delegations at Predeal, the question of the signing of the Pact was for military reasons linked up with the passage of the German troops through Bulgaria and with their future military operations. The two delegations therefore come to the conclusion that the formal and public signing of the Pact should not take place until all the defense measures that are necessary to guarantee the safety of our country, as well as the success of the military operations, have been taken, all the more since, according to the suggestion of List's Headquarters, Bulgaria will have to mobilize almost her entire Army in order to cover the passage and concentration of the German troops.

III. In connection with the question of the security of the country and the military operations, the Bulgarian Government is of the opinion that it will be advantageous to do what is possible to tranquilize Turkey and Yugoslavia and thus to reduce the probability of their intervening. For this purpose the Bulgarian Government is negotiating with Turkey, with the agreement of the Reich Government.⁴ At the same time, it is known that the Bulgarian Government is of the opinion that the outcome of these negotiations will be positive if mention is made in the protocol of accession to the Tripartite Pact or in a special protocol that Germany takes into consideration Bulgaria's existing pacts of friendship with the two neighboring states.

IV. The Bulgarian Government expects that State Secretary Weizsäcker's oral statement to the Bulgarian Minister in Berlin concerning the territorial question⁵ will receive written confirmation in a secret supplement (appendix⁶) to the Pact.

V. The Bulgarian Government is convinced that, in view of the friendly relations existing between Bulgaria and Germany, certain questions of a financial and economic kind will likewise receive a favorable solution.

VI. Guided by the desire to give proof of its readiness to accede to the Pact now, without waiting for the military measures which have to be taken prior to the public and formal accession to the

² For the background of German-Bulgarian negotiations on Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact see vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 606, 648, 649, 653, 660, 693, and 704.

³ See *ibid.*, document No. 704.

⁴ See *ibid.*, document No. 714.

⁵ See *ibid.*, document No. 658.

⁶ The German text here reads "Anfang" which is obviously a typographical error and should read "Anhang."

Pact, the Bulgarian Government is prepared to sign a secret protocol of accession to the Pact without delay. For this purpose it has provided the Bulgarian Minister in Berlin with appropriate powers.

RICHTHOFEN

No. 31

B13/B001460-62

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, February 8, 1941—7:45 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received February 8—8:15 p. m.

No. 264 of February 8

With the request for strictly confidential treatment Anfuso told Bismarck today that by a decision of the Duce Count Ciano will not accompany the latter on his trip to Bordighera for the conference with Franco,¹ but will remain "in the operational area." Since Anfuso had explained to the Duce that he must remain in Rome to direct the Foreign Ministry, the Duce will be accompanied by another high official of the Ministry—Anfuso mentioned Buti² or Pietromarchi.³

This decision of the Duce's must have been a complete surprise for Count Ciano, for he had already made detailed travel preparations for participating in the discussions.

The Duce's decision is in my opinion very significant for an evaluation of the further development of what I would like to call the "crisis over Ciano." In the question whether the Duce would part from his present Foreign Minister as a result of the disastrous outcome of the Albanian adventure and the sharp criticism of Ciano which reached far into the broad masses of the people and—not least important—also into the Party, for he is thought to be responsible for the development to a greater degree than Badoglio, for instance, I expressed the [following] opinion at the time: Considering Ciano's special position, given particular prominence by the Duce, as the coexponent of latter-day Italian foreign policy, but

¹ The conference which Mussolini promised Hitler he would hold with Franco. See vol. XI of this series, document No. 672. The conference took place Feb. 12. See document No. 49.

² Gino Buti, Director General of the Office of European and Mediterranean Affairs, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³ Luca Pietromarchi, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary; assigned to the office of the Italian Foreign Minister with the rank of Director General.

also as his son-in-law, this separation was to be expected only if Ciano's remaining should exercise a sympathetic effect on the Duce's own position.⁴ There is no doubt that in recent weeks the situation has developed in this direction, not only here in Rome but also in the provinces. As time goes on, criticism, even from Party circles, tends the less to stop before the person of the Duce. The people who are to be taken seriously do not reproach him for having let himself in for the Albanian adventure as such, but for the fact that he neglected to remove from responsible positions those who in their eyes are mainly to blame for the unfortunate developments. It is not impossible, in spite of the isolation of the Duce which certain quarters have again and again successfully attempted to achieve, that nevertheless some person or other with moral courage has by degrees got through who in the well-understood interest of the Duce has enlightened him as to this true feeling among the people and the relatively increasing bitterness against Ciano. One can also deduce this from a remark which the Duce, after returning from the Obersalzberg,⁵ made to a person close to him, who is my source, in which the Duce made comparisons between the Führer's assistants and his own, leaving no doubt that he feels bitterly the inadequacy of the latter. Thus today it could be entirely within the realm of possibility that he is beginning seriously to consider whether and how he should replace the Foreign Minister. Count Ciano's appointment to the front,⁶ which although it is managed in a way superficially similar to the same appointment to Livorno at the beginning of the war, nevertheless removes him further than at that time from the business of the Ministry; the Duce's refusal to send Ciano to Csáky's funeral;⁷ as well as the present decision regarding the meeting in Bordighera at least allow one to recognize the effort to remove the person of Ciano somewhat further from the public view, even if one does not wish already to evaluate these things as symptoms of an imminent separation which in any case would be staged in a very cautious way. The measure of sending almost all the Cabinet members to the front at this so critical time from the standpoint of domestic policy, which as such is difficult to understand, could also be explained by the desire to cover Ciano's possible removal.

It seems still too early to me today to speak about the question of the possible successor, especially since the present indeterminate

⁴ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 505.

⁵ See *ibid.*, document No. 672.

⁶ See *ibid.*, document No. 731, and footnote 2.

⁷ See *ibid.*, document No. 731.

situation is entirely tolerable for the Duce, who has full confidence in Anfuso. I consider it highly improbable that at some later moment the Duce, as in earlier years, will consider again taking over the Foreign Ministry himself, since he would then have to drop his principle, strictly followed of late, as regards personally receiving no foreign Chiefs of Mission except for the German Ambassador.

MACKENSEN

No. 32

136/74661

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 492 of February 8

MADRID, February 8, 1941.

Received February 8—10:15 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

The Führer's letter¹ was handed to Franco immediately upon receipt this afternoon at 5:45 p.m. The Foreign Minister was present.

The Generalissimo read the translation slowly through and then said: I thank the Führer for this letter. I agree completely with all of his fundamental ideas, especially regarding European problems, the fate of Spain, and ideological comments. I identify myself completely with them. But there must be a misunderstanding (perhaps a mistake in translation) if the Führer assumes that I had wished to postpone the entry into the war until autumn or winter. To a remark of the Führer's that German soldiers could probably not fight well in spring and summer at the Strait because of the heat I replied that Gibraltar does not have an African climate and that the first months of the year were unfavorable because of the thaw, floods, rain, etc.

In conclusion Franco stated that he would answer the Führer's letter² after his return from Italy.³

STOHRER

¹ Of Feb. 6, document No. 22.

² Franco's reply of Feb. 26 is printed as document No. 95.

³ In telegram No. 339 of Jan. 29 (136/74632) Stohrer reported Franco's acceptance of an invitation, tendered by the Italian Ambassador, to meet with Mussolini near Geneva. See, further, document No. 49.

No. 33

3941/E053860-61

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

FEBRUARY 8, 1941.

Ha. Pol. XII b 572.

With reference to our telegram No. 52 of January 10,¹ and with regard to your telegram No. 172 of January 24.²

For your own preliminary information:

1. In agreement with the Italian Government, our Legations in Belgrade, Budapest, Bucharest, Bratislava, and Sofia were instructed by wire yesterday³ to obtain the consent of the Governments concerned to the accession of the Soviet Union to the Vienna Agreement of September 12, 1940,⁴ and to having her invited to participate in the meeting of the Advisory Committee for matters concerning the Danube above Brăila, which has now been called for February 20 at Vienna, and to the dispatching of a delegate to Vienna to attend this meeting.

2. Regarding accession, the following text has been proposed by us and the Italian Government after formal changes have been made in the protocol (cf. annex 1) delivered here by the Soviet Embassy on January 2:⁵

"Protocol concerning the accession of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Provisional Vienna Agreement of September 12, 1940.

"The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of Bulgaria, the German Reich, Italy, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary, and the USSR have agreed as follows:

"Sole Article: The Government of the USSR accedes to the Provisional Vienna Agreement of September 12, 1940, on matters concerning the Danube above Brăila.

"Vienna, February 20, 1941.

"The signatures follow . . . for the Bulgarian Government, etc."

Since the Provisional Vienna Agreement has only one official text, namely, a German one, we have made provision, in accordance with the usual practice, only for this single official text, with respect to the protocol of accession, too.

3. The substance of your telegram of January 24 regarding the consent of the Soviet Government to the postponement of the con-

¹ This telegram (104/112965) informed the Embassy of the delivery of the Soviet note recorded in vol. XI of this series, document No. 592, and of the postponement of the Jan. 13 meeting of the committee for the fluvial Danube.

² See *ibid.*, document No. 641, footnote 2.

³ A draft copy of this instruction is in the files (3941/E053862-64).

⁴ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 53 and footnote 4.

⁵ Not printed (3941/E053915). Cf. vol. XI of this series, document No. 592.

ference for the maritime Danube was at once communicated to Bucharest. According to information which was received today,⁶ the Rumanian proposals may be expected by the end of next week. A continuation of the conference for the maritime Danube as early as February does not seem quite possible for this reason, and also in view of the meeting of the committee for the fluvial Danube, already twice postponed, and now called for February 20. Nor is any importance being attached here to speeding up the reconvening of the conference for the maritime Danube.

Telegraphic instructions may be sent you later concerning possible communications to the Soviet Government.⁷

By order:

MARTIUS

⁶ Not found.

⁷ There is a draft telegram of Feb. 14 (711/262105-07) informing the Embassy in Moscow that the Soviet Ambassador would be handed a note to the effect that the Governments of Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Slovakia, and Hungary had agreed to the accession of the Soviet Union to the Provisional Agreement of Sept. 12 and that the Soviet Government was invited to participate in the meeting of the Advisory Committee for matters concerning the Danube above Brăila which was scheduled to take place on Feb. 20 in Vienna.

The reply (711/262101) acknowledging receipt of this instruction indicates that its number was 289 of Feb. 14.

In telegram No. 348 of Feb. 19 (711/262099) Schulenburg reported that the Soviet Government agreed to the suggested protocol and had instructed Lavrentiev, Soviet Minister in Rumania, to sign the protocol and to participate in the meeting of Feb. 20 in Vienna.

Weizsäcker's memorandum of his conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on Feb. 14 and text of the note are filmed on 3941/E053842-44.

No. 34

589/244054-55

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 354 of February 7

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1941—12:02 a. m.

Received February 9—12:55 p. m.

English propaganda is at the present time trying with all conceivable means, both directly and by way of interventionist American organizations and bribed individual agents, to push the quick passage of the law authorizing aid to England. This has required counteraction on our part, concentrating upon promoting the organization of the isolationist opposition, which does exist but is shouted down by the press and terrorized by the Government, and having it exert pressure on congressmen and senators. This is being done both by means of public demonstrations of protest and by having my agents induce as large a number as possible of the American voters to write to the congressmen and senators of their districts letters

of protest against passage of the bill. This propaganda method has proved effective in so far as the members of Congress are dependent upon their districts and must listen to the voice of their voters.

The following large-scale propaganda steps have been launched in the last few days:

1. The German-American ethnic group in the Middle West, organized in the "German-American National Alliance," was persuaded by [our] agents to give backing to the "America First Committee" and, in the name of this Committee, to write to their congressmen in Washington. The letters of protest are being sent separately by each member.

2. A well-known anti-Semitic woman writer, who possesses a secret membership list of all anti-Semitic and patriotic organizations and personalities, has likewise been induced to organize a similar flood of letters of protest to members of Congress.

3. A leading woman (group garbled) in New York, who for years has been in touch with all the patriotic women's clubs in America, and is herself the chairman of such an organization, has likewise been induced to organize letters of protest from American women, who are attacking the authorization law from the standpoint of the American mothers concerned about the blood of their sons and husbands.

4. In various cities demonstrations of protest were held through the Peace Mobilization Committee, which is closely allied with us. Such a demonstration took place on February 1 before the Capitol and on February 2 before the White House, on which occasion the Irish freedom fighters, Shaemus and O'Shell, regarding whose activity I reported in No. 259 of January 27,¹ were conspicuous owing to their speeches. In addition, there is being prepared, with our financial support, a women's march on Washington, accompanied by sensational publicity, planned in a way similar to the march of war veterans on the Capitol in 1932. It is being organized under the motto "Mothers' Crusade to defeat H.R. 1776."²

5. In connection with points 1 to 4, large quantities of isolationist literature hostile to Roosevelt are being distributed.

Even though it will not be possible to prevent the passage of the bill by means of these propaganda measures, they will nevertheless contribute to lengthening the congressional debate, greatly strengthening the opposition to the law and the credit agreement, and

¹ Not found.

² In English in the original. H.R. 1776 was the bill "To Promote the Defense of the United States and for Other Purposes" commonly known as the Lend-Lease Bill.

thereby demonstrate before the world that the credit agreement and interventionist policy is disapproved by certain portions of the people.

I covered the considerable expense incurred for the above-mentioned measures from the War Press Fund.

THOMSEN

No. 35

M341/M15058-60

*The Military Attaché in Italy to the General Staff of the Army,
Attaché Department*

Teletype

URGENT

ROME, February 9, 1941—10:30 a. m.

CHEFSACHE

No. 0747.

gKdos No. 124/41

By officer only

The same to OKW, WFSt./Abt.L; to OKW/Ausland.

The Duce received me again alone February 9 at 9:00 a. m.¹ He announced to me his agreement to the German conception regarding the conduct of battle for the defense of Tripolitania.² According to the proposal of his generals the defense ought to lie between Misurata and Homs because otherwise the supplying of their own units would be too difficult. I objected that this was too far back and that thereby the English would receive in their hands the city and harbor of Misurata, the villages of the colonists, etc., whereas in all circumstances we must bring it about that the English remain in the desert. For this purpose the defense must lie forward of the inhabited zone and in any case eastward of Misurata. The Duce then agreed to this concept and stated that the defense must be placed between Sirte and Misurata. I then in addition pointed out that a larger commitment of troops against Tunis was not necessary because at the time a defection by Weygand was not to be expected, especially if we succeed, by concentrating all our forces, in keeping the English out of Tripolitania. The Duce also agreed to this conception. He wishes to speak personally to General Rommel, but

¹ General von Rintelen returned to Rome by train where he was met by General Gandin shortly before midnight, Feb. 8. Accompanied by Gandin, Rintelen had a first discussion with Mussolini that same night. See Enno von Rintelen, *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse* (Tübingen and Stuttgart, 1951), p. 130. Hitler's letter of Feb 5 (document No. 17) was apparently delivered at this time.

² For Mussolini's formal reply see document No. 76.

³ See document No. 17.

because he will be away from Rome until February 13, only after the reconnaissance in Tripolitania.³

RINTELEN

³ In a subsequent report of Feb. 9, No. 129 sent from Rome at 7:30 p. m. (M341/M015053), Rintelen reported that Graziani had asked to be relieved, and Mussolini had granted the request and appointed General Gariboldi to command the Italian Fifth Army in Tripolitania. Guzzoni asked of Rintelen that the information regarding Graziani be kept confidential for the time being.

Guzzoni further informed Rintelen that Mussolini that morning had issued a directive for the defense of Tripolitania which called for the formation of a defensive group anchored to the coast midway between Sirte and Misurata. A mobile group was to be formed behind the right wing for offensive defense. The Italian High Command agreed to placing all the mobile units under the command of the German General (Rommel).

In his report of Feb. 11 (M341/M015063-70) Rintelen forwarded a paraphrase of Mussolini's directive which was shown to him by Guzzoni on Feb. 10.

Cf. Helmuth Greiner, *Die oberste Wehrmachtführung, 1939-1943*, pp. 222-223.

No. 36

4137/E071547

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

Special Security Handling

SECRET

BERLIN, February 9, 1941—9:40 p. m.

Received February 10—1:10 a. m.

Pol. VII 511 g.¹

No. 245 of February 8

Subhas Chandra Bose, fighter in the Indian freedom movement, now in Kabul, intends to travel to Germany through the Soviet Union. Bose, who was also active for a considerable time in Europe as leader of Indian students, was twice president of the Indian Congress. After . . .² with the Congress under Gandhi's leadership he founded the Forward Bloc, which is constantly preaching violence in the fight against England. He was arrested by the English at the outbreak of the war, but was able to escape to Afghanistan.

The German Minister in Kabul has sounded out the Soviet Ambassador³ there concerning [Bose's] passing through. The latter suspects English intrigue behind Bose's wish, for the purpose of creating a conflict between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The Ambassador telegraphed Moscow regarding his misgivings concerning Bose.

Please inquire cautiously whether the Soviet Government is willing to permit the passage and to instruct the [Soviet] Ambassador

¹ This number appears on the reply telegram No. 278 of Feb. 10 from Moscow. See footnote 4.

² Omission indicated in the original.

³ Constantin Mikhailov.

[in] Kabul accordingly. I suggest that you indicate in this connection that we consider it more as a matter of personal asylum, without according it any particular political significance. Wire your report.⁴

WOERMANN

*Schulenburg reported in telegram No. 278 of Feb. 10 (98/108650) that the Foreign Ministry would examine the case. In telegram No. 470 of Mar. ■ (195/139121) he reported that the Soviet Government was ready to permit Bose to pass through the Soviet Union on his way to Germany.

No. 37

534/239850-51

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division III

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, February 9, 1941.
zu Pol. III 249.¹

The episcopal sees of Strasbourg and Metz can today be considered as practically vacant, since it is certain that the former French bishops can no longer return. With the internal departments (the Staff Hess, the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs, and Reichsführer SS) there has been for some time the intention to join the two bishoprics Strasbourg and Metz with the neighboring bishoprics of Freiburg and Speyer. The consolidation is to be handled for the time being as a temporary measure for the duration of the war. So far it has been pursued in the manner that the chiefs of the civil administrations in Alsace and Lorraine have, by direction of the Führer's Deputy, asked the Bishops of Freiburg and Speyer to take over the administration of the orphaned bishoprics of Strasbourg and Metz.² This request was based on the desire to avoid a direct involvement of the Vatican in the question and to leave it up to the two Bishops for their part to obtain the assent of the Vatican. The Bishops of Freiburg and Speyer have shown themselves to be willing to take over the administration, but have made this dependent upon prior consent of the Vatican.

The Nuncio,³ who had probably been informed by the bishops of the plan of the internal departments, pointed out repeatedly in the Foreign Ministry⁴ that the consolidation of the bishoprics in question cannot be arranged between domestic state authorities and the bishops themselves, but that this is ■ matter that belongs to the exclusive competence of the Vatican and therefore can only be settled through diplomatic channels. As is evident from the State Secre-

¹ Pol. III 249: Not found.

² Letters in this matter of Dec. 6, 1940, Dec. 17, 1940, and Jan. 31, 1941, are filmed on 534/239713-14.

³ Monsignor Cesare Orsenigo.

⁴ Weizsäcker memoranda of Jan. 13 (534/239678) and of Feb. 5 (534/239846).

tary's memorandum No. 89 of February 5⁵ the Nuncio indicated a certain willingness on the part of the Curia to comply with the desire for consolidation.

The internal departments mentioned above have been informed in the conference held at the office of Under State Secretary Woermann on January 23 that one cannot avoid involving the Vatican in the question.⁶ They expressed their assent. The agreement with Gauleiters Bürckel and Wagner can be considered as complete inasmuch as the representative of Staff Hess who was at the conference is in constant direct communication with the two Gauleiters.

In this situation there is nothing in the way of informing the Nuncio of the Government's wish for a temporary administrative consolidation of the bishoprics of Strasbourg and Metz with those of Freiburg and Speyer, and requesting that the Vatican's consent be obtained for the Archbishop of Freiburg to take over the administration of the bishopric of Strasbourg and the Bishop of Speyer that of the bishopric of Metz.⁷

Submitted herewith to the State Secretary through the Dirigent and the Under State Secretary of the Political Department.

HAILDEN

⁵ See footnote 4.

⁶ No record of such a conference has been found.

⁷ An unsigned marginal note reads: "Minute by RAM: get opinion of Gauleiters Bürckel and Wagner, Feb. 10."

In a memorandum of Mar. 28 (534/239852-53) Haidlen noted that Bürckel and Wagner had replied favorably regarding the proposed consolidations. A memorandum of May ■ (534/239845) records that negotiations were not yet finished between Staff Hess and Gauleiter Wagner.

Weizsäcker's memorandum of May 8 (534/239843-44) records that he delivered to the Nuncio a note verbale stating that pending the final political arrangement in Lorraine the Reich Government considered it desirable for the Bishop of Speyer to administer the diocese of Metz, and requesting the Holy See to grant the Bishop the requisite powers.

No. 38

232/156438-40

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX

BERLIN, February 9, 1941.

Pol. IX 364.

I. At the beginning of July 1940, 30 Reich Germans were arrested in the Misiones territory on the accusation that they had committed subversive acts against Argentina. In making the arrests the Argentine police infringed seriously on the rights of the Reich Germans. The affair was, to begin with, thoroughly investigated by the competent Argentine Government authorities. The result was that the Argentine Ministry of Interior stated publicly that the loyal attitude of the German element in Misiones had been proved.

Counselor of Legation Prince Schaumburg, who was sent to Misiones by the Embassy, also confirmed that the Misiones affair was a result of machinations of hostile elements. There were no witnesses of the alleged discovery of weapons and documents.

Nevertheless the competent judge handed down a decision on July 18 to the effect that 11 of those arrested had to remain in custody on indictment of the crime of high treason.

The trial was delayed time and again by the Argentine authorities. The Embassy in Buenos Aires objected to this repeatedly and pointed out vigorously that none of the accused persons could be proved to have engaged in anti-Argentine activity. Finally the prisoners after 5 months of arrest were released unconditionally because of lack of cause for prosecution. On December 19 the proceedings against them were quashed because the judicial investigation had not brought forth any sort of evidence of alleged activities hostile to the state.

The judge ordered, however, that the proceedings concerning an account of suspected violation of the Argentine decree of May 15, 1939, on the dissolution of foreign political organizations, should be continued. In the opinion of the Embassy it is a question here of proceedings against unknown persons for the purpose of having better opportunities at all times for renewed action against the German element in Misiones.

II. According to a Transocean report, the well-known Argentine newspaper *Prensa* in its issue of February 5 published an article by a special correspondent dealing with the allegedly seditious activity of the Germans in Misiones. At the end of the article an alleged National Socialist decalogue is then reproduced, which is supposed to be in circulation among the leaders of the German colony in Buenos Aires.

The *Prensa* article obviously has the purpose of bringing about renewed unrest in the Misiones territory by spreading journalistic poison.

Our Chargé d'Affaires in Buenos Aires,¹ who was asked for an opinion, has confirmed this view. In his telegram No. 194 of February 8² he reports that the decalogue is an obvious forgery by anti-German elements. He had already sent a note to the Foreign Minister on this score.³ Moreover, he had had a communiqué issued to the press containing a clarification of the facts. The Chargé d'Affaires then characterized court action for libel against the newspaper or the writer of the article as being without prospect of success in view of the Argentine administration of justice and asked that the

¹ Dr. E. O. Meynen.

² Not printed (233/156437).

³ No record of this note has been found.

efforts of the Embassy to clarify matters be supported by references in the German press and through the short wave transmitter.

Submitted herewith as instructed through the Dirigent of the Political Department and the Under State Secretary to the State Secretary.⁴

FREITAG

⁴In a memorandum of Feb. 10 (233/156453) Weizsäcker recorded a conversation with the Argentine Ambassador in which he complained about the *Prensa* article of Feb. 5.

No. 39

839/281589-96

The Head of the Foreign Intelligence Branch of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry

CHEFSACHE

BERLIN, February 9, 1941.

No. 29/41 geh. Kdos. Chefs. Ausl III Org.

Abt. Ausland

By officer only

Attention Ambassador Ritter.

Enclosed we are sending, as agreed, a memorandum on the second conference of Army Headquarters List with representatives of the Bulgarian General Staff in Predeal.¹

BÜRKNER

[Enclosure]

Enclosure 1 to No. 137/41 Chefsache Op. Abt.

HEADQUARTERS, February 2, 1941.

PROTOCOL OF THE QUESTIONS DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ROYAL BULGARIAN GENERAL STAFF AND THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND—FIELD MARSHAL LIST—IN CONNECTION WITH THE POSSIBLE PASSAGE OF GERMAN TROOPS THROUGH BULGARIA AND THEIR EMPLOYMENT AGAINST GREECE AND POSSIBLY AGAINST TURKEY, IF SHE SHOULD INTERVENE IN THE WAR

The representatives of the two General Staffs have evaluated the situation that may arise in connection with the passage of the Ger-

¹For the first conference, see vol. XI of this series, document No. 704 and footnote 1.

The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Dec. 1, 1940–Mar. 24, 1941) contains this passage at Feb. 8:

"The questions which had still been left open in these discussions were settled for the most part in a second conference between General Greiffenberg and General Boydeff in Predeal on Feb. 2."

man troops through Bulgaria, and are in agreement on the following matters:

1. In the operations of the German troops against Greece or Turkey the Bulgarian Army will, by agreement of the two Governments, not be employed offensively against the two countries mentioned. It will be reinforced in order to secure the new order in the Balkans.

2. Until the arrival of the German troops at the southern and southeastern frontier of Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Army will protect its territory with its own troops alone, at first approximately with the following composition:

At the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier with at least six Bulgarian divisions;

At the Greek frontier with sufficient forces for protection of the frontier;

At the Yugoslav border with reinforced protection of the frontier.

Later, too, the Bulgarian Army will assume appropriate defense at the fronts where the German forces are not on the offensive.

The mobilization and assembly of these forces can begin at once in a camouflaged form. However, in order that these measures may have the desired success the deliveries to Bulgaria must be carried out by Germany at once (annex I²).

The German High Command will do everything possible so that its troops will appear in adequate numbers at the Bulgarian-Turkish and Bulgarian-Greek borders within the shortest possible time.

For this purpose, from the very start sufficient German forces—especially armored and motorized divisions—will be brought up behind the Bulgarian border defense units within the shortest possible time. This advance will begin with the assembly of the two armored divisions already in Dobruja and of the armored and motorized divisions in Walachia as well. The other forces intended for the operations, i.e., further infantry and armored divisions, will follow behind them depending on the weather and on road and bridge conditions.

The Luftwaffe will be put in a position of readiness on Rumanian soil in adequate strength from the moment the frontier has been crossed or in case of evident danger and, upon the request of the Bulgarian High Command even before the frontier has been crossed, in order to be able to attack effectively any opponent who becomes dangerous to the Bulgarian defense.

Beginning at the latest with the first day of the advance it [the Luftwaffe] will transfer its own units to the operational areas of Plovdiv and Sofia. The supplying of the airfields must begin at once under camouflage.

² Not found.

German anti-aircraft artillery will be kept ready so that it may move into Bulgaria in case of obvious danger and upon the request of the Bulgarian High Command even before German troops have crossed the frontier. The decision regarding this depends upon the political authorization.

3. The Bulgarian and the German General Staffs will take all measures to camouflage the preparations of the operations and thus to guarantee the most favorable conditions for the execution of the German operations planned.

The representatives of the two General Staffs consider it useful to inform their Governments that, when Bulgaria signs the Tripartite Pact, it would be well to take account of the necessity for secrecy and surprise in order to assure the success of the military operations.

4. In order to protect Bulgaria from every possible opponent before and after the start of the operations, the German High Command will take the following measures:

a. Against Turkey:

From the very start adequate German forces, particularly armored divisions, will be moved toward the Turkish border behind the Bulgarian defense front. At the same time the German air forces will stand ready for defense.

If Turkey should attack Bulgaria while the German operations against Greece are being carried out, the Bulgarian Army will defend itself, supported by adequate German forces. The German High Command will immediately take all necessary measures in order to defeat and repel the Turkish Army with German troops, so that a lengthy defense by Bulgarian troops along the Turkish front will be avoided. The same also applies to Greece, if during the German operations against Turkey the Greeks should attack Bulgaria.

b. Against Greece:

Motorized advance detachments are to be pushed forward toward the Greek-Bulgarian frontier as fast as possible, in order to stand there as support for the Bulgarian frontier defense.

c. Against Yugoslavia:

If Yugoslavia should attack, then in the first place the columns of German infantry divisions echeloned in depth toward the right would take over the protection in the west, and additional German forces would also close in on Yugoslavia from the other side. It is assumed in this context that there is a reinforced Bulgarian frontier defense at the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border, too.

d. Against Russia:

Adequate German forces stand ready for every employment at the German eastern border. In Rumania, moreover, the German instruction units are available in addition to the Rumanian Army.

e. Against landing attempts:

The German troops are in a position, in cooperation with the Luftwaffe, to intervene at any time to ward off any landing on the Black Sea coast. Moreover, List's Army Headquarters will make proposals to the appropriate German naval authority in order to

reinforce the protection of the two harbors Varna and Burgas in accordance with the already known wishes of the Bulgarian High Command.³

The Bulgarian Army for its part will likewise guarantee the protection of the two harbors by making forces available.

5. In order to avoid the bombardment and destruction of the capital, Sofia, the German High Command will not let staffs and troops remain in Sofia. Nor will sizable units be permitted to pass through Sofia.

6. The German troops, during their passage through Bulgaria and their operations against Greece or Turkey, will be supplied from Germany's own stocks. In order to relieve the railroad and transportation routes, however, assistance from Bulgaria is necessary especially in the matter of provisioning. This assistance will only be within the framework of the so-called "contingents." The details as regards the organization of the necessary depots, purchases, payment for labor, rent, etc., as well as the export and import controls, will be regulated by a special commission.

7. It will be necessary to draw upon the Bulgarian state institutions (railroad, postal facilities, etc.) for purposes of the German armed forces, in so far as this is tolerable to the Bulgarian economy. The particulars on this will be regulated by the special commissions already in Sofia. It is assumed in particular that the railroad network and the rolling stock will be made available for the needs of the German Army. For this purpose it is necessary that the Bulgarian railroad should receive in addition about 100 locomotives, 1500 freight cars, and 30 km. of track material, in order to satisfy all the requirements of the Bulgarian Army, the Bulgarian economy, and the German Army. Operation and direction of the Bulgarian state railroads and of the postal and telegraph services will remain in Bulgarian hands. Transportation to supply the needs of the German Army will be organized by the Bulgarian General Staff. The particulars about the railroad, postal, and telegraph facilities will be discussed and settled by a special commission.

8. The question of compensation in case of damage to Bulgarian private and public property caused by the Wehrmacht in the course of its movements, etc., in Bulgaria or caused by measures of the enemy will be mutually settled through diplomatic negotiations.

9. The judicial relationships and questions will be settled by a special commission according to the norms of international law.

10. The activity of the counterintelligence services of the German and Bulgarian General Staffs has already been settled by a special commission.

³ Cf. vol. xi of this series, document No. 649.

11. The question of coordination of command in Bulgaria could not yet be settled conclusively. The German High Command will take up this question again in the near future.⁴

12. The Bulgarian High Command will take measures to protect the progress of the German operations from sabotage, etc.

13. The questions that may come up later will be taken care of by further conferences.

14. The conditions laid down in the foregoing protocol will enter into force, in so far as political questions are concerned, only after approval by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. Independently of this, the preparations for execution of the operations will be carried out most vigorously.

In order to enable Bulgaria to carry out the last preparations of the assembly in time it is necessary that the Bulgarian General Staff be notified 10 days before the Germans cross the border.

End

For the Royal Bulgarian
General Staff:
BOYDEFF
Major General

For the German High
Command:
V. GREIFFENBERG
Major General

Agreed

*The Commander in Chief of the
German Army units in Rumania:*

V. LIST
Field Marshal

⁴In telegram No. 127 of Feb. 4 (274/177644) Richthofen referred to the question of coordination of command which had been left open in the Staff talks of Feb. 2, stating that the Bulgarian Government would take up this question through diplomatic channels with Berlin. It seemed to Richthofen that "for the King's sake, if for no other reason, the Bulgarians attach importance to keeping command over the Bulgarian Army on the Turkish border as long as there are no military operations." See, further, document No. 41 and footnote 2.

No. 40

174/136556-58

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 196 of February 10

TOKYO, February 10, 1941—1:10 a. m.

Received February 10—12:00 midnight.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 77 of [January] 19¹ and to my telegram No. 146.²

¹Not printed (174/136510).

²Vol. xx of this series, document No. 735.

Foreign Minister Matsuoka has just told me with obvious joy that the Emperor, on the Prime Minister's representation, granted him permission to accept the Reich Foreign Minister's invitation to Berlin.³ He intends, presuming an agreement to this from there, to depart after the conclusion of the Thailand negotiations about February 25 and to reach Berlin between March 12 and 15.⁴ He has set aside 12 days in all for the conversations in Berlin and a supplementary visit to Rome and Moscow. Consequently he would arrive in Tokyo again about April 10. If need be, his stay in Europe could be prolonged a few days. However, the Foreign Minister would have to be in Tokyo again at the latest by April 15.

He will probably be accompanied by the head of the European Division, Ministerial Director Sakamoto, Director Nakanishi of the South Manchurian Railway Co., whom he knows intimately, further by the Secretaries of Legation, Kase and Hogen, Attaché Saionji, grandchild of the last Genro who died recently, one younger officer from the Army and the Navy each, as well as two cipher operators.

The Foreign Minister gave me the following details regarding the most important questions which he would like to discuss in Berlin:

I. Attitude of the partners of the Tripartite Pact toward America.

1. Diplomatic influence against entry into war.

The Foreign Minister is endeavoring, in the spirit of the Pact, to prevent America's entry into the war. To this end he has instructed Ambassador Nomura to dwell most emphatically on Japan's unconditional loyalty to the Pact and her military and economic might [in talks] with President Roosevelt, and to point out the senselessness of an American entry into the war. America could not stop the defeat of England by entering the war. On the contrary, by fighting Germany and Japan, who alone are able to create an order in Europe and East Asia necessary even for America in the long run, she would act against her own interest.

2. Preventive attack against Singapore.

Should, in spite of this, America's entry into war appear unavoidable, the Japanese Government is considering a preventive attack against Singapore to remove or make difficult the possibility of America's waging a military war in the Pacific Ocean. In view of the far-reaching political and military consequences of such an action, the Foreign Minister explained that Japan would arrive at such a decision only in complete agreement with the Reich. In the meantime, the armed forces are taking the measures necessary to be ready for war.

II. Termination of the China conflict.

The Foreign Minister has continued his highly confidential sounding of Chiang Kai-shek. The latter was showing signs of greater

³ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 535.

⁴ For the Thailand negotiations, see documents Nos. 64, 96, 112, and 136.

readiness for an understanding with Japan, to avoid increasing danger from the Chinese Communist Army. The Foreign Minister expects favorable progress in his secret negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek as a result of the Berlin conversations, although Japan had to decide to recognize Wang Ching-wei.

III. Relations with Russia.

As the result of a surprise agreement with Chiang Kai-shek, the Foreign Minister expects an important strengthening of his hand in the negotiations with Russia.

The Foreign Minister declared he had informed Ambassador Oshima of the questions, but had taken it upon himself to carry on the negotiations.

The Foreign Minister requests that his intended journey be treated very confidentially. He proposes to publish communiqués of the same tenor in Tokyo, Berlin, and Rome shortly before his departure. Draft of text will follow, as soon as approval of the plan of the journey has arrived from there.

In view of the importance of the decisions to be made I request to be called to Berlin at the same time as the Foreign Minister to be able to report for my part about the situation here and to receive personal instructions for the execution of the decisions reached there.

OTT

No. 41

274/177665-67

Minute by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, February 10, 1941.
e. o. Pol. I M 329 g. Rs.

I

The Bulgarian Minister first came to see me on Saturday afternoon.¹

With regard to the settlement of the supreme command, he said he could not say anything definitive as yet, because Colonel Popov had not yet arrived.² The Bulgarian Government had agreed to the proposed settlement, but still had two small comments of secondary importance to make.

Subsequently, on instruction of his Government, he expressed uneasiness, first because Bulgarian partial mobilization was stopped;

¹ Feb. 8.

² The mission of Colonel Popov of the Bulgarian General Staff who was to discuss in Berlin (see document No. 39, enclosure) the question of coordination of command was referred to in two memoranda by Ritter drawn up on Feb. 7 and Feb. 8 (839/281598-99).

second, because the Bulgarian Government was still in ignorance of the real strength of the German troops. In this respect the Bulgarian General Staff had been given only rather vague information.

II

Later on in the course of his conversation with the Bulgarian Minister, the Foreign Minister asked me to join them.

From this part of the conversation I gathered that the Bulgarian Minister gave the Foreign Minister the statement that Richthofen had already communicated to us.³

With regard to point III of this statement, namely, whether at the signing of the Tripartite Pact a protocol should likewise be signed to the effect "that Germany takes into consideration Bulgaria's existing pacts of friendship with the two neighbor states," the Foreign Minister said that he would first have to think this over further. It appeared to him somewhat unnatural that Germany should make such a statement with respect to Turkey, which was the ally of England.

The Bulgarian Minister then pointed out that as a result of Bulgaria's action, primarily through partial mobilization, inevitable financial expenses were ensuing. No funds had been provided for this in the Bulgarian budget. The Bulgarian Government therefore wanted to use for the mobilization the funds that were provided for the payment of the German arms deliveries to Bulgaria. Since in that case these arms deliveries cannot be paid for at once, however, the Bulgarian Government requests Germany's cooperation in the financing of these deliveries of arms. Perhaps the arms deliveries could also be made on loan. The Foreign Minister reserved a decision on this, but he was not opposed to it. It was agreed that this question should be further discussed between Minister Draganov and me.

The Bulgarian Minister then pointed out that it would be appropriate for the Bulgarian Government to inform the Soviet Government at the proper time concerning its accession to the Tripartite Pact. The status of the conversation between Moscow and Sofia on this point at the present time was that the Bulgarian Government had some time ago informed the Soviet Government of its intention to accede to the Tripartite Pact, but that the date was still unsettled. It was therefore the turn of the Bulgarian Government to inform the Soviet Government at a given time that it had now made this decision. The Bulgarian Government would like to clothe this communication in a form agreeable to the Soviet Government. It would like to "coat with some sugar this bitter pill for the Soviet Govern-

³ See document No. 30.

ment." It would like, therefore, to state on this occasion, that the good relations with the Soviet Union would by no means be disturbed by the accession to the Tripartite Pact. The Foreign Minister said he would have no objections if at the proper time the Bulgarian Government made such a communication in an agreeable manner orally to the Soviet Minister in Sofia. He would consider it proper for the Bulgarian Government to inform us in advance of a communication worded in that manner. We might then perhaps also be able to give it some good advice.

BITTER

No. 42

B19/B004004-05

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

Moscow, February 11, 1941—5:33 a.m.

No. 283 of February 10

Received February 11—1:00 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 227 of February 5.¹

I. Instruction carried out with Molotov this evening. Molotov repeated that in the Petsamo matter German economic interests would certainly be protected. As to the German demand for delivery without time limit of 60 percent of the nickel production, however, there was no foundation for this in the German-Finnish agreements submitted to the Soviet Government. On the contrary, the assurance therein was limited to 1947. The Soviet Government would, in certain circumstances, likewise be prepared to give an assurance with a time limit to 1947. When I pointed out that the promise without time limit was anchored in a special German-Finnish correspondence, Molotov replied that he had so far no knowledge of this correspondence.

Regarding 3) of our demands, Molotov stated that the Soviet Government did not have the intention of curtailing nickel production in Petsamo, but would develop it with all the means at its command.

In conclusion, Molotov promised to inform us as soon as possible in writing of his attitude to all three points of our demands.

II. This time, too, Molotov did not wish to admit that the Soviet Government had manifested its interest in the nickel mines so much later than we. He insisted that as early as the end of June he had informed Paasikivi and me of the wishes of the Soviet Government with regard to the Petsamo concession, while the German-Finnish agreements had not taken place until the end of July.

¹ Document No. 16.

III. Fieandt has meanwhile continued his negotiations in accordance with our desires. Status of negotiations up to now is set forth in dispatch No. Dg. 22 of February 10,² which went off by special courier today. Fieandt has just informed me that in today's evening session he adhered tenaciously to the Finnish position. Krutikov had at first stated that in that case negotiations would have to be conducted on a higher level, that is, Vyshinsky-Paasikivi, but then unexpectedly suggested new conversations for tomorrow at 7:00 p.m., which Fieandt regards as a favorable sign.

SCHULENBURG

² Not found.

No. 43

F10/141

Minute by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, February 11, 1941.

INSTRUCTION FOR THE COURIER, ATTACHÉ DR. RUDOLF STEG,
TO AMBASSADOR ABETZ

I have been instructed to ask you to bring the enclosed directive¹ of the Foreign Minister to the attention of Ambassador Abetz. Ambassador Abetz should read the directive and should give his opinion in writing.² As soon as Ambassador Abetz has completed his written statement you will take it, as well as the directive of the Foreign Minister, and deliver both papers by the shortest route to the quarters of the Foreign Minister.

You are personally responsible that no minutes pertaining to the questions of the Foreign Minister, or the like, are left behind in Paris.

Furthermore I ask you to tell Ambassador Abetz by order of the Foreign Minister the following:

1) The political directives given to Ambassador Abetz by the Foreign Minister in Fuschl³ to the effect that Laval should stay in Paris and that, for the time being, an agreement between Laval and Vichy should, if at all possible, be avoided, remain in force.

2) The questions posed are exclusively for the guidance of the Foreign Minister and should not be mentioned to anyone, even indirectly. Furthermore Ambassador Abetz should not waver, on account of these questions, in the continuation of his policy based on the instructions given to him in Fuschl.

SONNLEITHNER

¹ Document No. 44. According to a marginal note on another copy (F10/140) both documents were handed to the courier at 7:35 p.m.

² See document No. 44, footnote 2.

³ No record of these political directives has been found.

No. 44

F10/142-143

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris*¹

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, February 11, 1941.

For the Ambassador personally.

1. Would you consider it possible to form a French Government under Pétain with Laval as the French Premier and with Darlan and other ministers acceptable to us?

2. Do you believe that such a French Government could be prevailed upon, in return for a peace as discussed between us on several occasions, to declare war on England, to make the French Navy available for the fight against England, and to give us bases in French Africa, as well as to support in every way the landing of German troops there for the fight against England and de Gaulle?

3. Would General Weygand follow Pétain unconditionally in such a policy?

Please do not mention this inquiry to anyone, since I am interested in your opinion only for my personal deliberations. Such ideas have not been discussed at all with the Führer, and even for me these deliberations are at present only of theoretical interest.²

RIBBENTROP

¹ Marginal note: "Submitted to the Führer by the Foreign Minister. B[runs], Feb. 24."

For the instructions to the courier about the transmittal of this document, see document No. 43.

² Abetz' reply, in his own handwriting at the bottom of the document, is as follows:

"1. A further reorganization of the Vichy Government and transfer of the post of Premier to Pierre Laval is possible in about 3 weeks if all available means of internal political pressure are utilized.

"2. In such a government Darlan, Chief of the Navy, would have decisive influence, in addition to Laval. Like Laval, Darlan has always subscribed to the operations plan of bringing about a situation which, by an offensive against the Chad Colony and armed protection of French merchant shipping in Africa and the coastal waters, would actually be tantamount to a state of war with England, without, however—at least on the part of the French—involving an open declaration of war. As soon as for all practical purposes a state of war between England and France exists in Africa, it would certainly be possible also to utilize the French Navy under French command in naval theaters other than the immediate coastal waters and to obtain bases and landing places for German—but not Italian—naval units.

"3. Yes.

Paris, February 13, 1941."

No. 45

230/152485

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 108

BERLIN, February 12, 1941.

Today I informed the Italian Chargé d'Affaires of the status of the German-Yugoslav discussion in accordance with the enclosed memorandum.¹ I did not read the text of the enclosure aloud to Signor Cosmelli verbatim, but communicated it to him in substance and asked Cosmelli to inform his Government at once accordingly.

Cosmelli received my communication, but seemed to me to be somewhat surprised to learn that the German-Yugoslav talks have already led to an agreement on an early meeting of the leading men. The Chargé d'Affaires did not say this outright, to be sure, but merely mentioned on that subject that actually Rome was starting from the idea of developing the Italo-Yugoslav Treaty of 1937.² For my part, I only mentioned that the factors involved in the discussion of the Axis Powers with the Yugoslavs seemed to me to be the same, and likewise the aim, namely, the accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Of Feb. 11 (230/152486-88). It reviewed the attempts of the Axis Powers to draw Yugoslavia into the Tripartite Pact; informed the Italians of the impending visit of the Yugoslav Ministers to Salzburg on the following Friday, Feb. 14; and asked that the Foreign Minister be informed in case of any interesting developments, prior to the arrival of the Yugoslav Ministers in Salzburg, in the conversations between Italy and Yugoslavia (see document No. 15).

Another copy of this memorandum (813/276455-59), also dated Feb. 11, is initialed by Ribbentrop, shows some handwritten corrections, and bears the introductory notation to Weizsäcker that the message was to be given to Cosmelli for transmission to Rome.

² See document No. 15 and footnote 2.

No. 46

2174/471436-37

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, February 12, 1941.

Ha. Pol. 28.

Subject: The memorandum by the Spanish General Staff regarding Spanish economic and military needs.¹

The most important parts of the memorandum contain requests that are so obviously unrealizable that they can only be evaluated as an expression of the effort to avoid entering the war under this pretext. Generally speaking, it must probably be admitted that it would be necessary to satisfy the needs listed in order to establish

¹ See document No. 28.

the full economic and military striking power of Spain for a war. Since we cannot completely satisfy these needs, however, we indeed do not expect Spain to have full military striking power but we are prepared to help as much as possible and to take into account the reduced striking power. This has been told to the Spanish on many occasions. In spite of that the memorandum fails to make any allowance for this situation by setting up minimum demands in line with our capacities.

The position taken regarding the individual requests in the memorandum follows from the enclosure.² Of the most important needs the delivery of rubber, cotton, and jute is impossible. Moreover, fertilizers, mineral oil, grain, trucks, and railroad cars cannot be delivered without setting aside important German interests. If by top-level decision Germany's own requirements for the last-named goods could be deferred to some extent, certain deliveries might be conceivable, but on a scale which would not by a long way approach the Spanish requests and which, because of the transportation difficulties, could furthermore not be brought to Spain in the time requested in the memorandum.

The view of the German military authorities regarding the military requests for weapons, ammunition, and equipment has not yet been obtained.³

Herewith submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister according to instructions.⁴

WIEHL

²Not printed (2174/471438-41).

³To a request from the Foreign Minister of Apr. 16 (4896/E254526) the OKW replied on Apr. 28 (4896/E254527-28) that the Army as well as the Luftwaffe was unable to provide any material whatsoever but that the Navy could supply 4,000 mines, 500 depth charges, some mine searching equipment, a limited amount of torpedoes, and various other nautical material.

⁴Marginal notes:

In Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]."

"RAM: No further action is to be taken. St[eengracht], Feb. 16."

No. 47

67/47498-508

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RAM 9

FUSCHEL, February 15, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND YUGOSLAV MINISTER PRESIDENT CVETKOVIĆ IN THE PRESENCE OF YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER CINCAR-MARKOVIĆ ON FEBRUARY 14, 1941, IN FUSCHEL

After a few words of greeting the Reich Foreign Minister stated that he had heard through M. Gregorić of the desire of the Yugo-

slav Minister President and his Foreign Minister to come to Germany,¹ and now welcomed the possibility of discussing with the Yugoslav gentlemen all the questions of interest to the two countries.

Cvetković replied that Gregorić had reported to him about his conversation with Minister Schmidt (Press).² The two gentlemen had come to the conclusion that a direct contact between the leading statesmen could be useful for both countries, and would offer the opportunity of clarifying certain questions regarding the situation in the Balkans and particularly the position of Yugoslavia. He (Cvetković) had thereupon immediately stated that he was ready at any time to respond to an invitation to Germany.

For the rest he stressed that, for his part, he had always done everything in his power still further to consolidate the existing friendly relations between the two countries. Furthermore he was willing to make every effort so that peace would be preserved in the Balkans, as Germany and Yugoslavia desired. He had always done everything to prevent a disruption of the peace in the Balkans. Thus, for example, Yugoslavia had rejected certain suggestions, no matter where they came from, because the peace in the Balkans would have been disturbed by them. She would continue to make every effort in the future, too, to the extent of her possibilities, to assure the peace necessary both for the country herself and for the entire Balkan area.

The Reich Foreign Minister expressed his understanding for these efforts of Yugoslavia. He stressed that since the [National Socialist] seizure of power the relations between Germany and Yugoslavia had been entirely regular and even friendly to an increasing degree. Germany had been glad to pursue this policy because there were no differences of any kind between herself and Yugoslavia. The Führer had begun this policy at a time when Germany was still relatively weak. It had fallen on fertile soil in Yugoslavia. Therefore it had been consistently pursued until the present day, when Germany was one of the strongest powers in the world.

The Reich Foreign Minister brought the conversation around to the general situation with the remark that although Cvetković had spoken of peace one must not forget that, after all, war was still going on. He stressed Germany's firm conviction that the war had already been won for the Axis. In 1941 it would only be a matter of finally securing this victory of the Axis and forcing the English to admit their defeat as a result of the coming events. Of course

¹ See document No. 20.

² See document No. 10.

he could say nothing about the form of these events. One thing was certain, however: Germany would beat the English wherever she could get at them in any way.

The Reich Foreign Minister stressed that Germany, too, had always been of the opinion that peace in the Balkans was an aim worth striving for, as such. However, matters had turned out differently. The Greek-Italian conflict had broken out. As was known, there were several versions concerning its antecedents, but it was certain that in one way or another the Greeks had provided bases for England before the outbreak of the conflict with Italy. Now, the Führer was an exceedingly cautious man. Remembering the creation of the Salonika front in the World War he had taken precautionary measures in time in order to preclude from the very start a repetition of such an episode. Germany did not know whether the English would establish a further foothold in Greece, whether they would occupy other islands besides Crete, or where they would set up additional airfields. Numerous reports were being received by the German authorities concerning these things. Germany had not concentrated certain troop contingents in southeastern Europe arbitrarily. It would perhaps be more pleasant for us if these troops did not have to fight; but it had to be absolutely clear that if the English established a further foothold in Greece, Germany would sweep them out of there exactly as had happened in other places in Europe. In doing so she would proceed with definitely superior forces which were prepared to meet every eventuality that was being hinted at by the Turks and other peoples.

Cvetković replied that German-Yugoslav cooperation involved economic and political questions. Economically Yugoslavia had done, and would continue to do, everything possible in order to supply Germany with the food and raw materials which she desired. This was also useful for Yugoslavia herself, for by increasing her exports she raised the living standard of the country. At any rate, the Yugoslav peasants could be very much satisfied with this development. For the time after the war, too, the German market was of the greatest importance to Yugoslavia.

Politically Yugoslavia had oriented her foreign policy toward Germany for a number of years. After first having shifted to strict neutrality in 1934, she had brought her policy into increasing harmony with German policy within the framework of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente.

In domestic policy Yugoslavia was doing everything to prevent Bolshevik infiltration. Her attitude here was anti-Communist. Thus in this respect, too, she was in agreement with Germany. She wanted to replace anarchy with discipline, and did not have a demo-

cratic system, but a regime that was well organized and accorded the labor of the people the place it deserved.

Cvetković then turned to the dangers which emanated from England and her propaganda. The English attitude was exceedingly dangerous for peace in the Balkans. He therefore believed that Yugoslavia could play a useful role as mediator in creating a Balkan bloc to prevent British penetration into the Balkans. Yugoslavia had tried with every means—and would continue these attempts—to convince her Greek neighbors that it would not be in their interest if the English should gain a foothold on their territory and thus endanger the peace in the Balkans. For, as a result of this—as the Reich Foreign Minister had very correctly stated—other countries would be impelled to take measures to meet a danger from this direction. In this context there existed certain possibilities of solving the momentary difficulties in such a manner that the peace in the Balkans desired both by the Reich and by the Balkan countries would be restored once more.

The Reich Foreign Minister expressed his entire agreement with the three points of view from which Cvetković had regarded Yugoslavia's position toward Germany at the beginning of these remarks. In the Führer's opinion Germany had an interest in the existence of the Yugoslav State for the three reasons mentioned above. This was not a policy of the moment, but, as already stated, a political line which had begun in 1933 and since then had been consistently followed. These considerations were at the basis of Yugoslav-German relations, and resulted in the interest of the Reich in a politically and economically thriving Yugoslavia. Once this basic interest of Germany's was properly understood, it should not be difficult to find appropriate solutions for all other questions.

In the economic sphere no country in the world other than Germany provided such a market for the Yugoslav export surplus in raw materials and agricultural products, whereas Germany for her part had so far supplied Yugoslavia with everything she needed, and would supply her with more and more in the future. In this economic sphere Germany was pursuing a policy of a very long-term sort; in general she was trying in the entire Balkan area, where she had no territorial interests of any kind, to conclude economic agreements extending over decades and entire generations.

He intended to speak very frankly with Cvetković concerning the further development of the relations between Yugoslavia and Germany. He knew very well that the English propaganda was today still very active in the Balkans, and particularly in Yugoslavia. Churchill was a skillful propagandist to the extent that he had made a mountain out of a molehill, gigantic victories out of the conquest of a few strips of desert, and the most glorious retreat in

history out of the catastrophic defeat at Dunkirk. Germany, on the other hand, regarded things very soberly. She believed that she had already won the war. Conscious of her own strength and aware of her capacities now and in the future, Germany was absolutely certain of her victory. In these circumstances he believed that it was important for all countries in some way or other to take a position regarding the new order planned by Germany.

In connection with this subject the Reich Foreign Minister made statements regarding the general situation in Europe. He emphasized the military strength of the Reich. The last months had passed more quietly, to be sure, but one should not assume that Germany had done nothing during this rest period. He recalled that the Führer had originally wanted to attack France as early as the autumn of 1939, but had then calmly waited for spring. As a result of this waiting the lives of thousands of German soldiers had been saved. The German method of waging war was characterized by the greatest economy with regard to German blood. When the English stated that Germany had to win the war quickly, because otherwise the American aid to England would alter the situation fundamentally, this was a fallacy. Although Germany naturally wanted to end the war soon, she was nevertheless waging it with the aim of suffering as few losses in human life as possible. Therefore the Führer always struck only after the plans were completely and thoroughly prepared. In the course of this year we would strike out repeatedly. Germany was in a totally unassailable position militarily, economically, and from the standpoint of food. No conceivable military combination could do anything to her, and she would strike down any such combination with lightning speed. In order to defeat Germany, England first had to conquer Europe, and this she was unable to do. England would still meet with a number of surprises in the course of this year, similar to those she had experienced last year. Therefore Germany regarded further developments calmly and with confidence in victory, whereas she knew that the situation in England did not look good and would grow more and more disastrous after the combined submarine and air warfare set in, a small sample of which had been given day before yesterday.³ In these circumstances England would recognize before the year was over that the continuation of the war was useless.

In connection with Cvetković's remark that Yugoslavia would do everything to keep England from gaining a foothold in the Balkans, the Reich Foreign Minister pointed to the Führer's well-

³ The sinking of 18 ships of a British convoy in the Atlantic by German naval units was reported in a German communiqué of Feb. 13.

known policy, which had always aimed at friendship and cooperation with England. Prince Regent Paul also had worked toward that end. In these efforts the Führer had been badly disappointed by England. If Great Britain had wished, a relationship of permanent peace with Germany would have been established. However, England had preferred war and had thereby committed the greatest folly of her history. This had already emerged clearly from the latest events, and was doubtless admitted even by Churchill in his heart of hearts. This stupidity, however, had now been committed. England had thus embarked on a terrible course. If she were wise she would conclude peace at once. To be sure, it was doubtful whether the Führer would still go along with this. Because of his disappointment he was so hostile toward England that he would continue this war to the very last, until one of the two antagonists was prostrate.

In the World War England had lost her mastery of the seas; this time she would certainly lose a large part of her empire, no matter whether she was totally destroyed or whether another government than Churchill's should sue for peace prior to that. In such a gigantic fight as the present war certain things simply took their course of necessity. If Roosevelt continued his present policy he would thereby call Japan into the fray, who could deal the English terrible blows in East Asia. If Japan decided to take action against the English there, then there would be no obstacle. The American fleet would not dare to go beyond the zone of the Hawaiian Islands, no matter what Colonel Donovan may have said with truly American naïveté during his trip through the Balkan capitals.⁴ In a clash between the Japanese and American fleets the former would emerge victorious without a doubt. The Führer and his naval experts were absolutely in agreement on this point. Roosevelt was taking the most dangerous course that was possible for a statesman: He was entering into something the end of which could not be foreseen. Viewed in terms of power and realistically, this would entail endless difficulties for the United States also, for in judging the situation one might not rely upon phrases but had to act according to the real factors of political power. In spite of Wavell's desert victories, however, the great German nation with her military strength, her genial Führer, and her friends Italy and Japan, who would perhaps be joined by still others, remained such a factor of political power of the first order.

In England, however, on the basis of calculations made in Germany regarding her tonnage losses, the catastrophe could occur from one moment to the next.

⁴ See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 685 and 713.

Even if the war should last a long time—although in the Reich Foreign Minister's opinion it would be short—Germany with her allies would retain absolute supremacy in the Eastern Hemisphere consisting of Europe. England and America had no business in this Hemisphere; here hegemony belonged to the Axis.

In the further course of the conversation the Reich Foreign Minister brought up the subject of Russia, with whom a settlement had been reached on the basis of sober considerations. However, the Germans were not Bolsheviks nor would they ever become such. Thus in this point, too, there was agreement with Yugoslavia. As long as Stalin lived, whom the Reich Foreign Minister had come to know as a sensible, clear-thinking man, Russia would not undertake anything against Germany, for Stalin knew that a conflict with Germany would lead to the destruction of his regime and his country. In spite of her treaty of friendship with Russia, Germany was on her guard and did not rely in this sphere merely upon treaties, but above all on the strength of the divisions at her disposal.

Thus whereas in this Eastern Hemisphere no foreign power could threaten Germany together with Italy, the little English island lay open to the German bombing attacks, which after the end of the bad weather period in the near future would set in again in full strength day and night. In about 6 weeks the real submarine war would also begin, and the world would then see how thoroughly it would be waged. Finally, there were still other possibilities. Thus Germany could regard the further developments very calmly. Confident of victory, she was thinking of the new order of Europe.

It appeared doubtful to him, the Reich Foreign Minister, whether Yugoslavia or any other country could prevent England from gaining a foothold in Greece, for the English seemed to be proceeding according to a firmly fixed plan. But Germany's plans were clear, too. She would not tolerate England's gaining a foothold anywhere on the Continent.

Regarding the question of the new order of Europe the Reich Foreign Minister clarified a misunderstanding that had arisen during the last conversation with Cincar-Marković.⁵ (He, the Reich Foreign Minister, had in his conversation with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister proposed to him that his country should join the Tripartite Pact.) Therefore the Führer for his part had not reverted to the particulars of this proposal any more, but had merely spoken of a nonaggression pact and of the inclusion of Yugoslavia in the great, new system that was to extend from Asia to Europe. In response to a question by Cincar-Marković the

⁵ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 417 and footnote 1.

Reich Foreign Minister had said that one could do something more and had in this connection envisaged a guarantee of Yugoslav territory by Germany and Italy. Cincar-Marković remarked here that he had believed that only a tripartite nonaggression pact was involved, because the Führer had not spoken of further matters. He had interpreted his words "inclusion in the new system and positive attitude toward the new order" as referring to the conclusion of a tripartite pact.

Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister stressed that what the Prince Regent desired, namely an understanding between Germany and England, had been offered by Germany, but England had chosen to fight, and he believed she would admit that she had lost only after she lay prostrate and thoroughly defeated. Possibly a more reasonable relationship would develop between England and Germany only after England had received such a blow from Germany that she would know exactly how little she could do against the Reich. For that reason Germany was resolved to strike England wherever she could and deal her the absolute knock-out⁶ blow at the first opportunity.

The Reich Foreign Minister thereupon turned to Yugoslavia again. He knew that in politics it was sometimes not easy to choose and to find a clear way; he believed, however, that he should repeat to the Yugoslav gentlemen the proposal already made to Cincar-Marković in November. In his view it would be good for Yugoslavia—and particularly in consideration of her friendly relations with Germany—if she would take a positive decision in the question of the Tripartite Pact. When Cincar-Marković stated that if Yugoslavia acceded to the Tripartite Pact a pact of nonaggression would become superfluous, he, the Reich Foreign Minister, could not fully share this opinion. At any rate one should examine this question. The Tripartite Pact had the aim of preventing the extension of the war. Thus it did not represent any treaty of alliance against England which Yugoslavia would join. It aimed to prevent America from entering the war; in this connection it should be noted that Japan for her part would participate in the war only after America's entry. Furthermore the Tripartite Pact was meant to serve "for the early restoration of the peace." Here it should be noted that a rapid termination of the war was in the interest of all countries, including the present enemies of the Axis. Germany had practically reached an agreement with Italy on the basis envisaged in the earlier discussions. In the interest of the new order of Europe, however, it would be good if the countries of the European Continent stood together and formed a united front.

⁶ "Knock-out," in English in the original.

Cvetković in his reply mentioned the discussions which he had had with the American, Colonel Donovan.⁷ The latter had told him that America would help all countries which resisted the Axis. He had replied that not only the Atlantic Ocean but also a wide strip of the European Continent separated Yugoslavia from America and her assistance. Yugoslavia felt herself in no way to be threatened, but maintained cordial relations with Germany and therefore needed no help.

Cvetković then inquired about the Reich Foreign Minister's opinion concerning the plan put forward by him for a diplomatic initiative to bring about a peaceful solution of the Italo-Greek conflict, as well as to prevent the establishment of an English front in the Balkans. This diplomatic action would also extend to Turkey. If it failed, then Yugoslavia would have freedom of action and could then consider accession to the Tripartite Pact. (*Si l'action diplomatique échouait, la Yougoslavie aurait les mains libres et pourrait en suite envisager l'adhésion au pacte tripartite.*)

In his view the difficulty lay less with England than with the anti-Italian public opinion in Yugoslavia, which was only made worse by newspaper articles such as the one recently written by Marshal de Bono, in which far-reaching territorial claims by Italy on Yugoslavia were asserted.

Regarding the question of a diplomatic action by Yugoslavia for settlement of the Greek-Italian conflict the Reich Foreign Minister replied that in spite of the different versions that were circulating regarding the origin of this conflict, it nevertheless had to be stated that before the outbreak of the war with Italy, Greece had in every way provided bases for English submarines and, as emerged from the documents found in France, had given substantial assurances to England and France.⁸ For the rest, Germany was not affected by the Greek-Italian conflict. She kept in the background and was interested only to the extent that her ally Italy was engaged in the matter. He could not say how Italy would receive the Yugoslav plans for settlement of the conflict. In any case Mussolini's opinion on this matter would be decisive.

In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister asked Cvetković the direct question whether he really considered it possible to get the English out of the Greek territory peacefully. Considering England's activity in Greece, displayed in the construction and expan-

⁷ In telegram No. 62 of Jan. 25 (230/152462) Heeren had reported regarding Donovan's visit to Belgrade on Jan. 22-25, mentioning that Donovan's conversation with Cincar-Marković was "conspicuously brief." Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 938-939.

⁸ French documents to prove such assertions were later published in German White Book No. 7, *Documents relating to the conflict with Yugoslavia and Greece* (Berlin, 1941), pp. 151-207.

sion of new airfields and the occupation of the islands such as Crete, which were obviously meant to serve as points of departure for an attack on the Rumanian oil fields, this seemed to him to be more than doubtful. Even the Greek King would no longer be able to get rid of the English.

Cincar-Marković replied that the Yugoslav proposal provided that Yugoslavia and the other Balkan countries named would themselves guarantee the peace in the Balkans. Considering the German troop concentrations in Rumania, pressure could, with the help of Bulgaria and Hungary, be exerted also on Turkey, in order to induce her to participate in these plans. The condition, however, was that Germany, too, would not march into the Balkans.

In conclusion the Foreign Minister again expressed his strong doubts regarding the success of these plans.

During the return to Salzburg after the luncheon Cvetković, in the absence of Cincar-Marković, again touched on the subject of the diplomatic action to be undertaken by Yugoslavia. In this connection he expressed the idea that if this action should fail Yugoslavia would possess freedom of action to line up on the side of the Axis (*se ranger du côté de l'axe*).⁹

SCHMIDT

⁹ For Cvetković's account of this conversation and of the background of the Yugoslav Ministers' visit to Germany, see Dragiša Cvetković, "Razgovori u Berhtesgadenu," *Dokumenti o Jugoslaviji*, No. 8 (Paris, July 1956), pp. 7-12.

No. 48

4691/E226203-13

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Füh. 10

FUSCHL, February 15, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND YUGOSLAV MINISTER PRESIDENT CVETKOVIĆ IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER CINCAR-MARKOVIĆ AT THE BERGHOF, ON FEBRUARY 14, 1941¹

Cvetković first conveyed to the Führer the greetings of Prince Regent Paul and expressed his satisfaction at now being able to make

¹ In telegram No. 56 of Feb. 14 from Fuschl, No. 310 from the Foreign Ministry (230/152497-99), Ribbentrop forwarded a brief account of this conversation to Rome for oral transmission to Anfuso and through him to Mussolini.

Another record of this conversation (F7/0368-85) bears the notation: "Seen by the Führer. Version for Mussolini."

A memorandum of Feb. 21 by Bismarck (2281/482118) records that this version was brought to Rome by Clodius on Feb. 19 and was handed by Bismarck to Anfuso for immediate transmission to Mussolini. Anfuso requested an Italian translation, a copy of which was retained in the files of the Rome Embassy (2281/482119-31).

the personal acquaintance of the Führer. He had been in Germany four times: immediately after the war, when he had become acquainted with the Germany of the reparations and the great internal difficulties; in the year 1925, at the time of the great internal political battles; and in the year 1938, when he had found a strong, disciplined, and well-organized Germany whose welfare had been assured. On this last trip he had learned many a lesson which he was able to take home with him and utilize in his own plans of reform in Yugoslavia. He had personally always championed economic and political cooperation with the German people and had advocated this policy most vigorously especially since 1934. In the same spirit he had now come to Germany in order to develop and broaden the cooperation between the two countries.

Even before the present war the common economic interests of the two countries had been clearly apparent. During the war, Yugoslavia had done her share to uphold these common interests, and after the war she would continue to do so. In obedience to natural economic laws, the Yugoslav economy had become oriented toward the large German market. In Yugoslavia they were fully aware of the great advantages that such a market area offered for the economic welfare of the country. Yugoslavia had therefore done her full duty in the economic field and would continue to do so.

At the moment Yugoslavia and Germany had a common concern: the preservation of peace in the Balkans. Yugoslavia was prepared to resist every attempt to disturb the peace in the Balkans. She intended for this purpose also to call upon other Balkan nations with which she had influence. Both in the interest of Germany and in that of the Balkan countries Yugoslavia intended, jointly with the other Balkan States, to guarantee peace in the Balkans. In the conference with the Reich Foreign Minister, he had already explained in detail the intentions of his Government.²

In his reply, the Führer expressed his pleasure over the fact that after having been acquainted for many years with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, he was now also making the acquaintance of the Yugoslav Minister President. He expressed his thanks for the good wishes of Prince Regent Paul, conveyed to him by the Minister President, and expressed the conviction that his conversation with the Yugoslav Minister President and the Yugoslav Foreign Minister would contribute substantially to a clarification of the Balkan problems and particularly of the German attitude toward them. He regretted that the meeting had to take place in the existing circumstances. Germany, however, had not wanted the war; she bore not the slightest responsibility either for its origin or its extension to

² See document No. 47.

the Balkans. German policy toward Yugoslavia even under his predecessors had always been the same because no political differences of any kind existed between the countries. Germany regarded Yugoslavia as her natural trade partner, who served as a market for German exports. Germany exported her finished goods to Yugoslavia; at the same time, however, she acted as an importer of Yugoslav exports (food and raw materials), and would in the future emerge increasingly as a market for Yugoslavia. This was of decisive importance. Many countries, particularly America and England, were, to be sure, interested in the sale of their own products, but, as a result of a domestic economic balance, based on the possession of huge territories, they were not in a position to act as buyers and importers. In contrast, the countries of Europe were interdependent, since some, being industrial countries, produced and exported manufactured goods, while others, being predominantly agrarian countries, absorbed these goods and delivered to the industrial countries agricultural products and raw materials in return. This was the basis of the long-term German economic policy. The European countries therefore must bring their interests into harmony with each other and promote them jointly with respect to others.

The greatest difference between the English and German policies was that Germany was vitally interested in seeing that the European countries were represented by strong and nationalist-minded regimes, since only in this way could the economies of the countries concerned be kept in such order that they would produce the export surpluses necessary for Germany. Germany derived her existence from orderly conditions in the European countries, while England derived hers from her world empire and desired no consolidation of the European countries, particularly not under the leadership of strong states, since she perceived therein—quite without justification—a threat to her world empire. She therefore encouraged everywhere the destructive tendencies, while Germany and Italy supported the authoritarian forces of order.

This difference in attitude, in the last analysis, had resulted in the present war. England had, to be sure, erroneously visualized this venture as a sort of military promenade. She had entertained completely false ideas about the German military and economic strength. A press that was not allowed to report the truth, but had to print what its financial backers demanded, had supported these tendencies.

Over against this, it had to be stated that at the beginning of the war England had at her disposal 64 Polish, 6 Norwegian, 16 Dutch, 22 Belgian, 132 French, and 12 of her own divisions. If, even with this military might, she was not able to prevent Germany from

carrying out her plans, how was she going to do so today, when she herself had lost all this, whereas Germany had 60 more divisions, so that she could face every eventuality with utter composure. It would soon be evident how Germany had worked during the period of temporary quiet, and it would become clear that she had not slept the winter away. Everywhere that England appeared she would be attacked by Germany. Now England had made an appearance in Greece. Germany was preparing to intervene at once if the situation became intolerable. The attitude of other states, which, like Turkey, for example, lent themselves for relay services to England, as perhaps the Greeks also did, would make no difference. For the military means that Germany could commit were so tremendous that the entire matter represented no military problem at all. Moreover, Germany was not turning against Greece, but against England, who was getting a foothold in Greece.

With regard to the peace initiative in the Italo-Greek conflict, mentioned by the Yugoslav Minister President in the conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and Cvetković, the Führer remarked that he could not take a position on this since it was not a matter involving Germany. Whether or not Italy wanted to make peace with Greece and on what terms was exclusively Italy's affair. Suggestions in this regard therefore had to be addressed to Italy.

The Führer expressed strong doubts, however, as to whether the English would be ready to evacuate the Greek positions forthwith. Not until Stukas and armored corps appeared would they abandon Greek territories just as promptly as they had done in other cases when similar means were employed. Germany had no demands to make on Greece, but here, as in other cases, it was England singly and alone that was the cause of the difficulties. France, too, had been baited into the war by England; similarly, the possibility of an understanding with Poland which was opening up on the basis of the generous German proposals for the solution of the Corridor question was thwarted by England. England's warmongering activities, moreover, find their confirmation in the statements of the American, General Wood, who had stated that since 1936 Churchill had been agitating for war. In England there was a clique that thus far had removed every one who had opposed these warmongering tendencies, the English King included. Now England was getting her historical deserts. She would be destroyed.³ If the English now declared that they were the country of the long wars and tried to substantiate this theory by the course of the Napoleonic wars, he had to comment that at that time the English had held out so long

³ In the original this sentence is crossed out and underlined. It is omitted from the version for Mussolini (see footnote 1).

only because the Germans⁴ were fighting on their side. Even at the very last, the English would have been beaten if the Prussians⁵ had not come to their aid in the battle of Waterloo. Those who showed endurance were, therefore, the Germans, not the English.⁶

In the further course of the conversation the Führer spoke of the attitude that the Greek Government had taken toward Italy before the outbreak of the conflict. From the documents that had been found in France, the authenticity of which would be⁷ confirmed at any time by Daladier, Laval, and Pétain, it was quite clear that the Greeks had lent themselves as cover for the English.⁸ Italy was also in possession of absolute proof that British naval forces had with the tacit consent of the Greek Government occupied bases on Greek islands.

Cvetković declared himself in agreement with the plans for the economic and political organization of Europe presented in broad outline by the Führer. Yugoslavia was not a country that was organized on a democratic, that is, defeatist, basis. The democracies, with their weakness, had made a pitiful impression upon him. Yugoslavia had therefore given herself an organization of discipline and order, and particularly with respect to the harmonious development of relations between labor and capital she had taken Germany as her model with noteworthy results as far as her production was concerned. The Parliament, with its destructive influences, had been eliminated; an accord between the Serbs and the Croats had been achieved. Everything was being done with the one aim of employing all forces for the economic welfare of the country and its political consolidation. For this reason the Government was also taking vigorous action against Bolshevik and Communist trends. Yugoslavia was the only Balkan country that had clearly recognized the Bolshevik danger and was resisting Communist penetration with all the means at her command.

In this connection the Führer dropped the remark that if Germany should collapse this time,⁹ the situation would be different

⁴ Marginal note: "Führer corrects: Prussians."

In the version for Mussolini the word "Prussians" is substituted for "the Germans."

⁵ In the version for Mussolini the word "Blücher" is substituted for "the Prussians."

⁶ Marginal note: "Deleted."

The last sentence in this paragraph does not appear in the version for Mussolini.

⁷ Marginal note: "would have to be".

In the record for Mussolini this passage reads: "... would have to be confirmed ..."

⁸ See document No. 47 and footnote 8.

⁹ Marginal note: "Ever."

In the version for Mussolini this passage reads: "... if Germany should ever collapse. ..."

from what it was in 1918 when no great power at hand was oriented toward Communism-Bolshevism. This time Russia and Bolshevism would inherit the whole of Europe.¹⁰

Politically, Cvetković continued, the question of the preservation of peace in the Balkans was paramount. This involved:

1) the Italo-Greek conflict which, as the Führer had very correctly observed, was a purely Italo-Greek affair. With some good will it would be possible, however, to contribute much to a settlement of the conflict.

2) the resistance to any attempt of the British to gain a foothold in the Balkans. Yugoslavia was ready to take the initiative in this matter and, together with Turkey and Bulgaria, to form a bloc against any attempt to land in the Balkans. Since all Balkan countries desired peace, he thought that Yugoslavia would succeed through such clear and unequivocal action in making each of these Balkan countries realize where the danger came from and from what direction the peace in the Balkans could be disturbed. The participation of Turkey in this bloc was not only in her own interest but also in that of Germany. If this policy should not lead to results, each state would have complete freedom of action and the statesmen would then have done everything in their power and would know who was to blame for the failure of these efforts.

Yugoslavia esteemed highly the intentions of the Führer with respect to the safeguarding of peace and the good will he manifested toward the Balkans.

In conclusion Cvetković once more stressed the great interest of Yugoslavia in increasingly friendly relations¹¹ with the German people. Her policy would always be determined by this. He also alluded to the moral effect that this diplomatic initiative referred to above would have, and rated it very highly.

In his reply the Führer again referred Cvetković to the Duce with regard to the first part of the Balkan peace problem, that is, the Italo-Greek conflict. Regarding the second point, he again expressed doubts that the English would leave the Balkans. It was clearly England's tendency to wage war on the periphery. Therefore she would not, of her own free will, leave either Greek territory or the island archipelago.

To a remark by Cvetković that if Germany feared air attacks from English bases in Greece on the petroleum regions in Rumania, these attacks could perhaps be met if the countries of the bloc envisaged by Yugoslavia, by a formal declaration, prohibited flights across their territories, the Führer replied that the defense of the Rumanian oil region was being conducted by Germany not defensively but

¹⁰ Marginal note: "Deleted."

The words "Russia and" are crossed out. They do not appear in the record for Mussolini.

¹¹ Marginal insertion: "Also."

The word appears in the version for Mussolini.

actively. Moreover, England would not allow herself to be deterred at all by such a declaration, precisely as in the case of neutral Switzerland.¹²

In the further course of the conversation, the Führer spoke of the danger of Bolshevism that threatened the Balkan States. Only through the Vienna Award¹³ and through the intervention of Germany and Italy had Rumania been saved from being submerged by the tide of Bolshevism. The guarantee to Rumania existed not only on paper, like English guarantees, but was backed by a strong military force ready to go into action at any time. German guarantees were also, in contrast to those of the English, not freely hawked about, but Rumania herself had asked for one. In view of German interest in the continued existence of the Rumanian state, which was one of the greatest suppliers of certain raw materials and food, Germany had agreed to comply with Rumania's request. Because of her extensive trade with the Balkan States, Germany was similarly interested in the existence and stability of all the other countries of this region of Europe. England, on the other hand, would not shrink from leaving Russia a free hand here.

As for Bulgaria, Molotov had told him personally that the Soviet Union wished to offer this country a pact of mutual assistance,

¹² The next two paragraphs (to the asterisk) do not appear in the version for Mussolini which has instead the three following paragraphs:

"In response to a further remark by the Yugoslav Minister President that Yugoslavia, under certain conditions, was prepared with respect to Salonika to assume also military obligations or to guarantee that the British would not gain a foothold there, the Führer answered that it was not a question of Salonika, but of whether the British would gain a foothold on the Continent at all. Accordingly, it made no difference whether this happened in Salonika or in the rest of Greece. Germany would in no circumstances look on while England established a position in that part of Europe in order to take up the struggle against Germany and Italy at the opportune moment from there. Moreover, it was in the interest of the Balkan countries themselves to avert this.

"Rumania, for one, had been able to escape the threat of a political and social collapse only by calling on the Axis states to be guarantors and by the fact that Germany—actually contrary to her own military interests—sent troops to buttress and strengthen that country.

"The promise of a guarantee had not been easy, especially for him—the Führer. He was no Englishman. To those people, giving a guarantee meant the obligation of the others to help England. Only the importance of preserving Rumania as a supplier of raw materials had finally moved the Führer to assume a military commitment [to preserve] the future integrity of the Rumanian state. Naturally, because of her extensive trade with the other Balkan States Germany also had an interest in the stability of conditions in these countries. Therefore, if he was now advising Yugoslavia to enter a closer relationship with Germany and Italy by joining the Tripartite Pact, this was likewise not done with the idea that aid or support from Yugoslavia was perhaps desirable. Germany and Italy did not need to do that. But in this way a clear situation would be established and, he believed, it could not but be of advantage to Yugoslavia's future, too."

The texts again run the same from the place indicated by the asterisk, p. 95.

¹³ See vol. x of this series, document No. 413.

which also provided for the transfer of Russian troops to Bulgaria.¹⁴ At the expense of Yugoslavia, moreover, Bulgaria had been promised by the Russians large-scale revisions in Macedonia and in connection with the establishment of access to the Aegean Sea. King Boris and the Bulgarian Government had rejected this, however. However, once Russian military units had arrived in Bulgaria, and particularly if, due to the existing economic difficulties, disorders should have broken out there, the Bolshevization of the country would have been certain. From Bulgaria Russia would then have set her sights on other Balkan countries, for it was her aim to bring the Balkans up to the Dardanelles under Russian domination.

* In the further course of the conversation, the Führer again expressed strong doubts as to whether one would succeed in getting England to evacuate the occupied Balkan territories. Nor did he believe that Turkey, which was in bondage to England and in addition had an alliance with Great Britain, would participate in any operation directed against England.

The present war would one day be over, but the nations and states would remain, and the new order in Europe had to reckon with them as realities. The present situation was favorable to the recognition of such realities. For Yugoslavia a unique, historic occasion had arrived to fix her place in Europe definitely for all time. She now had to take a clear position regarding the new order in Europe, and that, to be sure, in her very own interest; that is, to take her place in the order envisaged by Germany and Italy by immediate accession to the Tripartite Pact.¹⁵ There was no time to lose, since Italy's misadventure in Albania was only temporary. Already no further progress was being made in Albania by the Greeks, and after a while the situation would be completely reversed. Germany's new methods of combat would, moreover, in the not too distant future make the Mediterranean into a real hell for England. Germany and Italy would, moreover, make the agreements contemplated in the conversation between the Führer and Cincar-Marković in November.¹⁶ In this connection the question of the demilitarization of the Adriatic coast was also mentioned briefly. It was clear that this had been more in the nature of a gesture, on which, however, the Duce had not insisted.¹⁷ However strong the interest of Yugoslavia was at the moment in the establishment of an

¹⁴ See vol. xi of this series, document No. 323.

¹⁵ The following three sentences are omitted from the record for Mussolini.

¹⁶ See vol. xi of this series, document No. 417.

¹⁷ In the record drawn up for Mussolini the latter part of this sentence reads as follows: "... a gesture which, however, the Duce had not mentioned again."

outlet to the Aegean Sea, in the future in any case the possibility of expansion toward Salonika would entail substantial benefits.¹⁸ At any rate, the thing for Yugoslavia to do would be to build its naval port not on the Adriatic, which is blocked off by the Strait of Otranto but on the Aegean Sea. Instead of demanding demilitarization here, it would, the Führer remarked facetiously, be actually in the interest of Italy to insist on the retention of naval ports on the Dalmatian coast and to prevent their transfer to the Aegean Sea. As soon as Yugoslavia had joined the Tripartite Pact, Italy and Germany would also be prepared to give her a guarantee. The longer the war lasted, the more necessarily would it lead to a consolidation of the European states. An old world was passing and a new one was coming into being. The democracies, which claimed that they were fighting for democratic institutions, were being forced for the time being to suspend them, and thus were reducing themselves *ad absurdum*.

After time out for tea, the conversation was resumed, and it was apparent that the Yugoslav gentlemen had followed the statements of the Führer with much understanding. They stated that they would report on everything to Prince Regent Paul in Belgrade. In the course of the further conversation, consideration was given to the possibility of a meeting between the Führer and Prince Regent Paul. The Yugoslav gentlemen stated on this point that they would consider such a consultation useful.¹⁹

SCHMIDT

¹⁸ The next three sentences are omitted from the record for Mussolini.

¹⁹ For Cvetković's account of this conversation, see Dragiša Cvetković, "Razgovori u Berhtsgadenu," *Dokumenti u Jugoslaviji*, No. 8, pp. 12-17.

No. 49

B13/B001493-94

Memorandum by the State Secretary

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, February 14, 1941.

PRIORITY

St.S. No. 113

Telephone message to the Foreign Minister.

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires called on me this afternoon in order to transmit, at the personal behest of the Duce, the following communication to the Führer and the Foreign Minister regarding the Duce's meeting with General Franco:¹

¹ For the Italian record of the Mussolini-Franco meeting at Bordighera on Feb. 12 see Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 631-643.

Mussolini had assured Hitler at the Berghof on Jan. 19 that he would make another attempt to induce Franco to enter the war. See vol. XI of this series, document No. 672.

The general political situation had been considered exhaustively between the Duce and Franco in a 5-hour conference. Franco had expressed himself as follows: Now as hitherto he was convinced of the victory of the Axis Powers. Spain wished to continue to cooperate with the Axis in order to do her part for the final victory. Spain, however, was suffering from a regular famine and militarily was completely unprepared. Franco was therefore not in a position to make an effective contribution to the victory of the Axis Powers. In any case Spain's entrance into the war was dependent on two prerequisites:

1. economic and military assistance;
2. an exact definition of article 5 of the well-known protocol of the three Powers.² In this definition it would have to be stated that Spain would also receive French Morocco in addition to Gibraltar.

Regarding the pending economic agreements with the United States and Great Britain, Franco had stated that these would not be tied up with political commitments.³

As far as the military action against Gibraltar was concerned, the attack would have to be carried out with Spanish forces, even though with the support of German forces. Franco gave the Duce a copy of the memorandum of the Spanish General Staff in which the military and civilian requirements of Spain are listed. This copy was evidently identical with the one already received by the German Government.⁴

The Duce had remarked that the discussion had been a very thorough one. At the end the customary communiqué had been published.

As his general impression the Duce stated that Spain was not in a position to enter the war. Even if Germany were willing to deliver everything that Spain desired, a period of several months would be necessary merely for the transportation of these things. The Duce was therefore of the opinion that the German-Italian program with regard to Franco should be restricted to keeping Spain in the political sphere of the Axis Powers. Spain would thereby gain the necessary time to get over her present grave food crisis and also to improve the current entirely inadequate condition of her armaments.

So much for the communication which the Italian Chargé d'Affaires had to make by order of the Duce.⁵

² See vol. XI of this series, Editors' Note, p. 466.

³ Regarding United States grain deliveries to Spain, see *ibid.*, document No. 577. On the Anglo-Spanish agreement, see document No. 355 and footnote 1.

⁴ See document No. 28.

⁵ In Rome Anfuso told Bismarck, who reported the matter in telegram No. 310 of Feb. 14 (B13/B001498), that the protocol of the meeting would be transmitted through the Italian Embassy in Berlin. In a memorandum of Feb. 18 (B13/B001531), Weizsäcker recorded that Cosmelli had given him the protocol which according to the Italians was to be considered strictly confidential, since the Spaniards did not know about its existence and it was not intended to give them a copy. No copy of this protocol has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

I told Cosmelli that the Führer and the Foreign Minister would certainly be very grateful for the prompt information regarding the meeting in Bordighera.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 50

378/209459-60/2

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M

BERLIN, February 14, 1941.

Pol. I M 353 g. Rs.

Drafting Officer: Secretary of Legation von Grote.

On February 8 the OKW issued an order regarding "Directives for the Negotiations of the Armistice Commission," the text of which is as follows:

"Subject: *Directives for the Negotiations of the Armistice Commission.*

"1. The Laval affair has destroyed the relationship of mutual confidence that was developing between Germany and France. It is the duty of the French Government to earn this confidence again. Until then the Armistice Agreement alone will remain the foundation of our mutual relations. Concessions made up to this point will stand.

"The controls are to be very rigidly exercised. Any attempt at evasion or violation of the treaty is to be reported.

"2. Our own demands on the French can be based only on the Armistice Treaty or on a violation of this Treaty by the French.

"3. In the case of almost all the attempts of the Armistice Commission to direct requests to the French which exceed the provisions of the Armistice Treaty, the French make not only economic, but also military counterdemands. The following basic directives shall govern the attitude of the German Armistice Commission in such cases until further notice:

"All wishes of the French [compliance with] which would lead to a strengthening of their military power to resist in metropolitan France are to be refused.

"So long as the possibility exists that we might one day be forced to occupy the rest of France, our efforts must be inexorably directed toward rigid application of the Armistice Treaty and toward not tolerating any strengthening of the French power to resist. This applies especially to all wishes of the French to increase even further their antiaircraft artillery and their fighter planes.¹

"Our attitude toward such French wishes could only change if it

¹As a concession to the French Government for permitting the placement of German armament orders in the unoccupied zone, the German Armistice Commission recommended to the OKW (as reported by Hencke in telegram No. 31 of Jan. 29: 378/209421-23) that France be permitted to install 46 antiaircraft batteries for protection against possible British air raids.

should turn out that the English are attacking France and not—as it appears—trying to win over France and particularly North Africa to their side again.

"The same is true of the French colonies in Africa. There, too, the French forces are adequate for taking up the fight against the de Gaulle movement. Until proof is furnished that the French are doing this, there is only the danger that every military concession on our side will one day work against our allies and thus also against us.

"4. The Foreign Ministry agrees with the intention to take over the military control of Morocco through a German Commission.² The German Armistice Commission, in agreement with the Italian Armistice Commission, will take care of the rest.

"5. The attempt to transform the present Italian control of the other French Mediterranean forces into a mixed control can be made with the Italian Armistice Commission.³

"6. The attempts to achieve an external control, while easing the demarcation line, are to cease.⁴

"For the further regulation of traffic of all kinds over the demarcation line, our own military and defense economy needs shall be the determining factors. Special directives on this point will follow.⁵

"The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel."

GROTE

² See vol. XI of this series, document No. 671, footnote 3.

³ In a telephone message of Feb. 8 (3697/E03603-05) Grote reported the arrival of representatives of the Italian Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden. Among other items they planned to discuss was the organization of a mixed German-Italian Control Commission in French Mediterranean ports.

⁴ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 712.

⁵ No such directives have been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

No. 51

839/281566-67

Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht¹

TOP SECRET

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, February 14, 1941.

High Command of the Wehrmacht

No. 44150/41 g K Chefs., WFSt/L (I Op.)

Ausl/Abw No. 38/41 Chefsache!

FS HSFL 057 13/2 2255 to Chef L.

On February 13 in the presence of the Foreign Minister the Führer decided, or approved, the following:

1. There are no further objections to the continuation of Bulgarian mobilization. It is to be concluded, if possible, by February 24.

2. All preparations are to be made with respect to the following schedule:

February 21. Commencement of bridge construction over the Danube. Simultaneous entry of the Dobruja group and of the anti-

¹ On the copy printed here, the Foreign Ministry file number, Anlage zu Pol. I M 363, is written in ink. Pol. I M 363 has not been found.

aircraft battalions provided by the VIII Air Corps for the protection of Sofia and the port cities.

February 24. Crossing of the Danube.

3. For political reasons, the Dobruja group must not for the time being cross the line Tirnovo (on the Maritsa)—Yambol-Burgas to the south.

4. The Bulgarian War Minister and the King are to be informed that the strength of the German troops that are to be provided for Bulgaria amounts to 680,000 men, but that the concentration may be further fed from inexhaustible reserves so that we are equal to any political and military developments in the Balkans.

5. The Führer again points to the great importance of adequate protection for the Rumanian oil region, which is vital to us. If anti-aircraft artillery battalions assigned to that task should be transferred to Bulgaria, they must be replaced.

6. If it is at all possible, German and Bulgarian antiaircraft artillery protection in Bulgaria is to be separated according to the installations and not indiscriminately mixed.

7. If, contrary to expectations, Turkey should open hostilities against Bulgaria when German troops enter, the 1st Squadron and the 2nd Armored Division must be diverted to that purpose. Early shift to the attack in the direction of Istanbul desirable, of course, with the participation of the Bulgarians.²

OKW/WFSt³

² This directive was forwarded as No. 176 by the Operations Department, Army General Staff, OKH, through the Military Attaché in Sofia to Major General Greiffenberg, Chief of Staff at General List's Headquarters (M341/M015081-82).

³ No other signature appears on the copy printed here.

No. 52

174/136565

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 224 of February 15

Tokyo, February 15, 1941—11:00 a. m.

Received February 16—3:00 a. m.

Foreign Minister Matsuoka's explanation yesterday in response to inquiry in Parliament regarding Japanese-Russian relations: In harmony with the basic ideas of the Tripartite Pact, Japan is making a serious effort to bring about a fundamentally improved relationship by clearing up pending individual questions. Russia shows appreciation for the sincerity of the Japanese intention by greater accommodation, as, for example, in negotiations on a long-term fisheries agreement and regarding commercial traffic.

To the question of what guarantees Japan had regarding Russia in consideration of article 5 of the Tripartite Pact,¹ the Foreign Minister replied that there are no secret agreements of any sort between the partners of the Tripartite Pact. The Japanese Government was of course giving the most serious attention to the question of Russia's future attitude. He could not say today as yet whether a Japanese-Russian nonaggression pact was attainable.

The Foreign Minister stated further that a termination of the Anti-Comintern Pact,² whose ideological aims had not been affected by either the German-Russian Nonaggression Pact or the Tripartite Pact, was not intended by the partners of the Tripartite Pact.

OTT

¹ See vol. xi of this series, document No. 118. Article 5 reads: "Germany, Italy and Japan affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia."

² Agreement and Supplementary Protocol between Japan and Germany, signed at Berlin, Nov. 25, 1936; with Protocol of adherence by Italy, signed at Rome, Nov. 6, 1937. For texts, see *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. II, pp. 153-155 and 159-160, respectively. For the Secret Additional Agreement to the Anti-Comintern Pact, see vol. I of Series D, document No. 463, footnote 2a.

No. 53

B13/B001509-11

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 57 from the SPECIAL TRAIN, February 15, 1941—3:20 p. m.
Special Train Received Berlin, February 15—3:55 p. m.
No. 313 from the Foreign Ministry

For the Chargé d'Affaires personally.

Dr. Reichert, the DNB representative in Rome, who recently wrote a report on the situation in Tripoli, has sent a new report about Italy's internal situation which was submitted to the Führer and which follows below.

The report appears exceedingly pessimistic. Please send a detailed report at once regarding the separate points.¹

RIBBENTROP

The report follows: Italy's internal situation as I found it after an absence of ■ weeks has continued to deteriorate impetuously.

¹ See document No. 59.

The actual reasons are probably to be sought in the military situation. However, it should be stated in this regard that the entire people has already more or less written off the empire and, for example, the loss of Abyssinia would meet with a prepared frame of mind. The food situation and the internal opposition to the Duce are taken more seriously here. The food situation is deteriorating rapidly. The organization of rationing was done much too late and was not based on the German experience. To cite details here would go too far. I was told by an informed source that bread grain is so scarce that the Minister of Agriculture² has had to dispense with rationing and still does not know today how the dangerous period before the new harvest, that is about April till June, is to be surmounted. This is only one example of many.

The opposition against the person of the Duce had its beginnings in the failure to dismiss Ciano after the catastrophe in Greece. It is said that at that time the Duce, who had originally been willing to give in to the popular feeling against Ciano (who is still considered the "best-hated man" in the whole country), was encouraged by German quarters to retain Ciano. When that became known within a few days as if by command the popular feeling against Ciano is supposed to have turned away from him and concentrated on the Duce himself. Today he is publicly reviled in the street and in public transportation vehicles. After dark, as the DNB and Stefani offices have observed or heard, for example, on 3 successive days, good-sized groups of young people have streamed across the Piazza di Spagna calling "Pace! Pace!" (Peace).

The removal of Ciano, who had to go to the front, was probably a delayed recognition—it is to be hoped not too late—by the Duce that considering the unanimous rejection which Ciano finds in the entire people from top to bottom, he simply cannot be held any longer. The fact that at the same time a large number of ministers were ordered to the front is considered a camouflage for the effective removal of Ciano. Some of these ministers, to be sure, are considered today to be not desired by the Duce (Pavolini³ and other ministerial colleagues tied to Ciano). In the case of others the assumption of a purely camouflage measure in favor of Ciano is probably correct. Ciano himself, as an earwitness stated here, said literally to his being called up: "So I'm to be the one who has to pay the whole bill!" By the same source I was assured most definitely that Ciano will not return to the Foreign Ministry.

² G. Tassinari.

³ A. Pavolini, Minister of Popular Culture.

The internal mood in Italy here pictured should not lead to the conclusion that a revolution on the part of the people against the Duce or Fascism would be conceivable. The people are too used to hardship and are too apathetic to let themselves be moved to such a measure; the active part of the people are bound to Fascism, and are for their part in the situation of defenders of the regime. As a real danger, on the other hand, two factors have been mentioned to me: In the first place, the discrepancy between the leadership of the armed forces and the regime is a danger which we in Germany should watch sharply. From this quarter surprises of dangerous proportions could arise regarding which probably no one in Germany is thinking today. The other danger comes from the Royal House and the army leadership allied to it. The King himself was too old and in particular much too tired to be thinking of dangerous excursions. The active part of the Royal House was the Queen and the Crown Prince. From a person who is a good friend of the Crown Prince and is with him several times a week the situation was described to me to the effect that the Crown Prince and the armed forces circles friendly to him did not yet show concrete intentions today, to be sure; they were oriented toward waiting to see how things developed. However, should the spring and summer bring disappointments in the hopes placed on Germany and German victories (no one speaks any more of Italian victories without German help), then in the autumn there would certainly be the danger of a coup d'état and a separate peace from this quarter.

It is reported of the Duce that he had gone on the trip to Berchtesgaden in the most anxious mood, but had returned like a changed man with great confidence and actually with optimism. He spoke about the meeting with the Führer in the most positive manner, both as regards the human side and the political and military prospects. Regarding the latter he told one of the ministers: "In 2 months everything will be different."

Since the conclusion of the above report I have learned two other interesting particulars: Among the ministers who were sent to the front there is also Grandi, who, contrary to all expectations, is going to Albania as lieutenant colonel in an Alpine unit.

Surprisingly, the Pope has several times spoken exceedingly optimistically of late about the German prospects of victory. In conversations with the high Italian nobility he has left no doubt that everyone in Italy must accustom himself to the idea of certain victory on the part of Germany.

without signature

No. 54

M341/M015080

The Legation in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

CHEFSACHE

MOST URGENT

No. 173 of February 15

SOFIA, February 15, 1941.

Received February 15—5:05 p. m.

To Attaché Branch, High Command of the Army, for the Operations Department.

Teletype 176¹ has been received.

The contents have been discussed with the Chief of the General Staff, with the Minister of War, the Minister President, and with the King.

Everything is clear on both sides.

The Bulgarians request solely that the entry of troops not take place before February 28, because their mobilization measures run at least until then.

In the question of the chain of command the Bulgarians have signed the draft of the [Twelfth] Army Headquarters.² The King requests that no more changes be made. Since there is no essential difference in content between the proposal of the Army Headquarters and that of the Operations Department, there is no longer any objection here, particularly since the discussion resulted in achieving full understanding and the projected commitment of forces will follow according to German wishes.

In the question of a proclamation to the Bulgarian people I have taken the position that this is the business of the Bulgarian Government. If you have a different view, please send orders.

¹ Document No. 51; see footnote 2 of that document.

² The draft proposals of General List's Headquarters are attached to Ritter's memorandum of Feb. 10 (839/281578-83), which records a discussion of them with the Bulgarian Minister. They provided that German and Bulgarian units would respectively remain under their own national command as long as there were no threat against Bulgaria from her neighboring states. In case of such threat the two forces would operate in accordance with uniform directives emanating from List's Army Headquarters. Upon the opening of the German offensive against Greece, the Bulgarian Army would defend the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier. Command authority would devolve on the Germans along the Bulgarian-Greek frontier upon the arrival there of strong German forces. If large-scale operations along the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier were to require the commitment of strong German forces, then the command would devolve on the Germans on this front also.

The Bulgarians request that antiaircraft artillery enter under camouflage even earlier. The Army Headquarters will do this in so far as possible.

The Chief of Staff sends regards to the Colonel General.

GREIFFENBERG

BRUCKMANN

RICHTHOFEN

No. 55

230/152501

The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 326 of February 15

ROME, February 15, 1941—5:25 p. m.

Received February 15—5:35 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 310 of February 14.²

Instruction carried out at once this morning with Anfuso, who immediately informed the Duce of the content of my communications and then told me the following regarding the Duce's position, for further transmission to Berlin:

The Duce has noted with great interest the communications made by the Foreign Minister and thanks him cordially for them. Everything that he learned from them about the talks with the Yugoslavs at the Berghof confirms him more and more in his opinion, namely, that the situation in Yugoslavia is a question mark with respect to which clarification is necessary as soon as possible.

Anfuso furthermore told me in confidence that the Duce, showing great interest, had the substance of my démarche repeated to him several times and had expressed his pleasure at the attitude taken by the Führer toward the Yugoslavs. The Duce's disappointment over the Yugoslav attitude had been unmistakable, particularly in view of the recent conferences with the representative of the Prince Regent.³ The Yugoslav idea to form a bloc consisting of Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Bulgaria, was reminiscent of the times of the Little Entente and was in accordance with the mentality of Beneš.

BISMARCK

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 507 to Fuschl, Feb. 15."

² See document No. 48, footnote 1.

³ See document No. 15.

No. 56

221/149106

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 548 of February 15

PARIS, February 15, 1941—5:35 p. m.

Received February 15—6:30 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

Darlan has asked de Brinon to inform me regarding the conversation between Franco, Pétain, Serrano Suñer, and himself.² The French had stressed the fact that collaboration with Germany was the fixed basis of French policy and that France recognized Germany's claim to leadership in the new order. It was also in the French interest that the Mediterranean be purged of English influence. In Africa, which had to be reserved in its entirety for continental Europe, a reasonable delimitation of French and Spanish interests would be found.

ABETZ

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 497 to the Special Train, Feb. 15."

² Franco and Pétain met at Montpellier on Feb. 13. See also document No. 62.

No. 57

B13/B001524-25

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 120

BERLIN, February 15, 1941.

Teletype to the Foreign Minister.

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires brought me the following communication today:

The observations and remarks which the Foreign Minister had had conveyed to the Duce regarding the Italian-Soviet Russian conversation¹ had been reviewed by the Duce with great attention and interest. There was no doubt that Turkey would of necessity be very much taken aback if one should now in Moscow go too deeply into the question of the Straits, for one had to count on the fact that Ankara would soon be informed of this. The Duce agreed with the German view that this had to be avoided in consideration of the coming events. On the other hand, it would of necessity have an unfavorable effect in Moscow if one should now leave Molotov's question unanswered.² Since the Italo-Russian conversation had been begun last summer, it would now be better, after all, if Rosso

¹ See document No. 25.

² See document No. 5.

gave some sort of reply. This should, to be sure, not contain any new commitments or say anything new. It could be somewhat along these lines:

Rosso had already stated what Italy had to say regarding the Straits, considering the present political situation. This communication had been received in a friendly way by Molotov. Italy had therewith shown her good will toward Russia and her desire for cooperation. Molotov had recognized this too. The new question which Molotov now asked of Italy referred to the future; it was a hypothetical one. At present Italy could not give a reply. Should the hypothesis become reality, however (what is meant is the entry of Turkey into the war against the Axis Powers), then Italy would be willing to review Molotov's question in the same spirit of understanding and cooperation as before. For Italy desired that this spirit should govern Italo-Russian relations also in the future.

The Duce would be grateful if he could learn as soon as possible the opinion of the Reich Government regarding this proposal.

I promised Cosmelli that I would pass this on at once. Without going into the subject itself, I nevertheless see no substantive consideration against the instructing of the Italian Ambassador in Moscow in the manner suggested.³

WEIZSÄCKER

³ A message from Altenburg of Feb. 16 (813/276468) informed Weizsäcker that Ribbentrop agreed to having the Italian Ambassador in Moscow make a statement on the Straits question, provided it coincided with the standpoint of the German Foreign Ministry.

Weizsäcker's memorandum of Feb. 17 (813/276467) records that he told Cosmelli that the German Government agreed to the instructions for Rosso which were contemplated by the Italian Government.

Schulenburg's telegram No. 417 of Feb. 26 (B13/B001565) reported that Rosso on Feb. 24 had given Molotov a noncommittal reply. Molotov had said that this Italian statement was not entirely clear.

No. 58

174/136562

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 125

BERLIN, February 15, 1941.

In recent days the Japanese Foreign Minister has made statements about the significance of article 5 of the Tripartite Pact¹ which seemed to me to signify that in case of a Japanese-Russian conflict Japan would not consider herself adequately covered as a result of this article 5. Contrariwise one could conclude that Japan

¹ See document No. 52 and footnote 1.

does not feel any unequivocal obligation as a result of article 5 to provide assistance in case of a Russian-German clash.

I should be grateful for a memorandum on Matsuoka's statements and their import.²

Submitted herewith to the Director of the Political Department.

WEIZSÄCKER

² Not found.

No. 59

B13/B001514-18

The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 330 of February 16

ROME, February 16, 1941—8:15 p. m.

Received February 16—9:00 p. m.¹

Foreign Office, Berlin; also for Special Train RAM.

For the Reich Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 313 of the 15th.²

The report of the DNB representative, Dr. Reichert, on the internal situation of Italy, which strings together somewhat indiscriminately a number of facts, should, upon critical scrutiny, be broken down into two parts: the facts reported by Dr. Reichert, and the conclusions reported to him by an informant. As far as the facts cited in the report are concerned, they are in part correct and have also been known for a long time. I refer in this connection to our report No. 32/41 [23/41] g. of January 29 of this year,³ and to our telegram No. 264 of February 8.⁴ Specifically the following should be remarked in this matter:

1. There can be no talk of an "impetuous deterioration" of the internal situation in Italy in recent weeks; on the contrary, a certain tranquilization has set in at the moment. Matters are now such that the Italian people, who from the beginning showed no great enthusiasm for war, took until the beginning of the Greek operation an attitude of watchful waiting. After the failures in the Greek campaign, around the end of November or beginning of December, a severe internal political crisis became clearly apparent, and this was directed mainly against Ciano, who was considered by the people to be the one generally responsible for the Greek campaign. Criticism was not confined to him alone, however, but turned also, in addition to the responsible men belonging to his intimate circle of friends,

¹ Typewritten marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 515 to Fuschl, 10:10 p. m."

² Document No. 53.

³ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 731.

⁴ Document No. 31.

against Ricci, Minister of Corporations, who was made responsible for the malfunctioning of the rationing system. As reported in detail in the report of the Embassy—23/41 g. of January 29—the Duce drew the necessary conclusions from this and sent almost all the Ministers to the front, and in this connection Dr. Reichert's statement is correct, to the effect that a number of them received this order as a subterfuge in order to protect those most exposed to criticism. There has as yet been no decision as to whether Ciano will return to the Foreign Ministry or not. There are, as is well known there, various indications that his recall is out of the question for the present. On the other hand, however, it must be assumed that the Duce sent him to the front in his own interest, and out of consideration for his daughter will be very reluctant to decide for a final separation. I take the liberty of referring in this matter to secret telegram No. 264 of February 8, from here, in which the case of Count Ciano was discussed in detail.

Dr. Reichert's statements to the effect that the view is widespread among the people that the Duce had been encouraged by Germany to retain Count Ciano, and when this became known, "popular sentiment against Count Ciano is supposed to have been concentrated as if by command, on the Duce himself," are a complete distortion of the facts. It is undoubtedly correct that in the critical weeks around Christmastime, the people criticized the Duce for keeping Count Ciano in office; on the other hand, the assertion that this was due to German influence was never made at all. There is still criticism of Count Ciano. Criticism of the Duce has been noted for some time, and both the Embassy and the various Consulates in Italy have called attention to this fact. Nothing is known here of the demonstrations on the Piazza di Spagna, mentioned by Dr. Reichert.

2. The military situation has naturally created a severe depression in all sectors of the population. The realization that the military strength of Italy is not sufficient in itself to resist the foe has had a crushing effect. As this realization took hold, it expressed itself in sharp criticism of the leadership, but it did not, as might perhaps have been possible, lead to a definite war-weariness. There still exists in the broad masses of the people the will to hold out, although they are, to be sure, aware that victory is no longer possible without strong German support. From the state of affairs it is evident the situation in Abyssinia is considered the most serious, and that in Abyssinia itself certain defeatist trends are present is evident from the last telegram of the German Consulate General in Addis Ababa.⁵ Despite the realization of the gravity of the situation there, the

⁵ Bismarck reported these trends in telegram No. 315 of Feb. 14 (B13/B001499).

actual loss of Abyssinia would create a deep impression especially on the generation that had participated in the conquest, and its consequences could not fail to have their effect also on the political situation at home. It is wrong to say, therefore, as Dr. Reichert maintains, that the Italian people have already written off the empire, or that public opinion would be prepared for its loss.

3. The statement that the food situation is rapidly deteriorating is too bald a representation of the facts. In many areas of Italy, the food situation is, to be sure, already very serious, but this is principally due to difficulties of distribution. It is true that the organization of rationing came much too late. Meanwhile, however, the energetic Minister of Agriculture, Tassinari, has made the attempt to introduce strict rationing, but it is still too early to judge the results. The fact that the Minister of Agriculture has not yet introduced bread rationing is due to the fact that, for the sake of the impression it would create abroad, rationing would have to be estimated so high that the existing supplies would not suffice for it. Also, in the opinion of Minister Clodius and the agricultural expert at the Embassy, whom I again consulted personally, an acute food crisis is not to be expected in the months of April to June of this year, if the 200,000 tons of maize requested by Italy are delivered by Germany.⁶ In connection with the entire food situation, the capacity of the Italian people for enduring privation of the hardest kind must also be considered.

4. As far as the conclusions reached by Dr. Reichert in his report are concerned, they represent the view of a single informant, which is not applicable in this form. It is natural that in view of the serious military and internal situation in Italy, responsible men in all circles are wondering and worrying about the future of the country. At the moment all hope and trust is being placed on a German victory in the summer of 1941. As is well known, the Italian Government has long been of the opinion that Italy cannot stand a prolonged war, and this view has even greater validity today. Should the decision be further deferred, the situation will become extremely serious, particularly because of the food situation and the situation with regard to raw materials, with which you are sufficiently acquainted through the reports of Minister Clodius.⁷ Nevertheless I consider Dr. Reichert's conclusion false, that there would then be a definite danger of a coup d'état or a separate peace as is believed by his informant. The situation is, rather, such that, despite all the criticism which is to be found to an equal extent both within and outside of the party, there can be no talk of any beginnings of an organized opposition to the person of the Duce as the

⁶ See document No. 71 and footnote 9.

⁷ See documents No. 27 and No. 71, footnote 2.

embodiment of the fascist regime. It is therefore incorrect to mention in this connection the command of the armed forces or the Royal House. This does not mean, of course, that criticism is not being leveled here and there against the administration, precisely in military as well as in fascist circles.

As far as the Royal House is concerned, despite all rumors, no beginnings of an opposition to the Duce are noticeable either in the case of the King or of the Crown Prince. I am rather of the impression that the Duce is including the Royal House as an element in his political calculations, and is using the monarchistic attitude of the Italian people as an asset toward this grave situation. The King and the Crown Prince are naturally among those who, as indicated above, are seriously concerned about the future development of the country. The attitude of both toward the Duce is, however, undoubtedly absolutely loyal and is expressed in positive collaboration. It is incorrect, in my opinion, to speak of a "watchful waiting" on the part of the Royal House.

5. In summary it should be said that Italy's situation is to be described as quite serious. The reasons for this lie in the military and economic, but not in the internal political field. Further military reverses, together with the further deterioration in the economic situation, which is to be expected with certainty, might, of course, have consequences at home and abroad that cannot yet be foreseen.

BISMARCK

No. 60

230/152503

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia

Telegram

URGENT

FUSCHL, February 16, 1941—11:30 p. m.

No. 64 of February 16

from Fuschl

Received Berlin, February 16—11:50 p. m.

No. 146 from the

Foreign Ministry

Sent February 17—12:45 a. m.

In dealing further with the question of a possible meeting of the Führer with Prince Regent Paul as well as as in the question of Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact, please keep in mind that in order to attain the effect desired by everyone this accession ought to take place at once—and not after several weeks—both in our interest and that of Yugoslavia. In case Prince Regent Paul for his part should also like to speak to the Führer, please bring your influence to bear so that this meeting if possible can take place in the

first half of this week, preferably at the Berghof. Please, however, do not make any new démarche on this account.¹

RIBBENTROP

¹ In reply Heeren reported in telegram No. 138 of Feb. 18 (230/152511-12) that the Yugoslav Foreign Minister in discussing the visit to Germany had said that he and the Minister President had recommended to Prince Paul that he accept Hitler's suggestion for a personal discussion. Heeren also reported that he had urged the Yugoslavs to decide quickly and then added the following comment: "Apparently the main question of the accession to the Tripartite Pact has not yet been settled internally. Therefore, the date of the Prince Regent's visit is still open although I believe that fundamentally there is willingness to let this visit take place."

No. 61

136/74685-86

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, February 17, 1941.

TOP SECRET

Received February 18—1:20 a. m.¹

No. 602 of February 17

For the Foreign Minister.

The Spanish Foreign Minister, who returned here only last night, described to me in detail this evening the course of the meeting between Franco and Mussolini at Bordighera.² His account coincided with the information communicated by the Italian Ambassador in telegram No. 584 of February 16.³

Señor Serrano Suñer emphasized especially the extremely clear, objective description of the war situation by the Duce, who had avoided any whitewashing of the Italian reverses, and who had expressed himself as very firmly confident of victory and very grateful for Germany's armed assistance. The Duce had also shown understanding for Spain's difficult situation and visibly put faith in her assurance that she was adhering resolutely to her political principles (closest collaboration with the Axis) and wanted to enter the war as soon as this was in any way possible. The Minister emphasized in this connection that it was absolutely necessary, through propaganda preparing for the entry into the war, also to raise the morale of the Spanish people, which had reached a low ebb under the influence of hunger and economic distress. The news of Franco's trip to Italy had already occasioned the greatest anxiety generally that Spain would presently enter the war. The bombardment of Genoa had then, however, almost created a panic—especially in Barcelona—and had resulted in innumerable memorials about the

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 530 to Fuschl, Feb. 18."

² See document No. 49 and footnote 1.

³ Not printed (136/74681-83).

defenselessness of the port cities. The lifting of the morale had to be undertaken through skillful propaganda simultaneously with the improvement of the food situation.

In reply to my question whether a definite time for Spain's entry into the war had not been considered at Bordighera, the Minister replied in the negative, adding that the time depended on the speed and extent of the measures that could be taken to alleviate the very great distress in Spain.

The Minister said nothing about the Spanish objections to article 5 of the Hendaye Protocol⁴ and to the acquisition of mining rights by Germany, mentioned in the telegram referred to above.

STOHRER

⁴ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 221, footnote 4, and Editors' Note, p. 466.

No. 62

221/149111

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 603 of February 17

MADRID, February 17, 1941.

Received February 18—2:35 a. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

Regarding the meeting between Franco and Pétain, the Spanish Foreign Minister told me that no political problems of any kind affecting Spanish-French relations had been discussed.² The conversation after dinner had been but a brief one. Pétain had tried to surprise Franco by asking him bluntly as to the result of the meeting at Bordighera.³ This had miscarried and the conversation had turned to more monotonous subjects.

The statements of Serrano Suñer showed the great mistrust that the Spaniards feel for France and also the desire to make us distrustful of France. The Minister stated that Pétain behaved pro-German only when it was necessary, as, for example, toward Darlan, who was anti-English. At heart he hoped for England's victory. Pétain had apparently told him he did not believe in the complete victory of Germany. England and America's resources were too great for this. Rather, after a very long war, there would be a compromise. Darlan had taken a decidedly opposite view and stated that England's fleet had failed, American aid was coming too late.

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 532 to Special Train at Salzburg, Feb. 18."

² See document No. 56 and footnote 2.

³ See document No. 49 and footnote 1.

The war was already decided in favor of Germany. He, Serrano Suñer, had emphatically agreed with this view and then, because of the lateness of the hour, suggested that they break up.

STOHRER

No. 63

4805/E237507-08

The Office of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

D Pol. 3 No. 8

THE HAGUE, February 17, 1941.
D III 1437.

Subject: Jewish question.

Last week clashes occurred in the Jewish quarter of Amsterdam between Jews and members of the NSB, in the course of which a number of persons suffered light and serious injuries. One NSB member has died since as a result of the injuries received. He will be buried today with special funeral services.

The Office of the Reich Commissar has now been prompted by these incidents to adopt an energetic approach to the Jewish question in the Netherlands, which, as the Reich Commissar¹ had repeatedly stated, called for an urgent solution.

The first measure in this respect will be the separation of the Jewish quarter in the future. Aryans living in it will be resettled in exchange for undesirable Jews from other parts of Amsterdam. Aryans will be prohibited from entering the Jewish quarter. The Jews living there will receive identification cards in the Hebrew and Dutch languages, and will be permitted to cross the boundary of the Jewish quarter only upon presentation of these identification cards. For the purpose of maintaining order a Jewish Council has been formed, which must furnish the Amsterdam City Council certain guarantees that it will ensure public order.

Simultaneously an ordinance, prepared some time ago, has been issued, designed to reduce the number of Jewish students at the universities in the Netherlands. The proportion of Jewish students is at present estimated to be roughly 8 to 10 percent, but no accurate figures are available. The purpose of the ordinance is first of all to establish the exact number of Jewish students. It is the intention to reduce the proportion to about 3 percent.

By order:
MOHR

¹ Arthur Seyss-Inquart.

No. 64

216/147683-64

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

Tokyo, February 18, 1941—2:15 a. m.

No. 233 of February 17

Received February 18—1:15 p. m.

Foreign Minister Matsuoka gave me today the mediation proposal drafted by him for the Thailand-Indochina negotiations.¹ By its terms France is to cede to Thailand the following areas:

1. The territories named in article 2 of the Franco-Thailand agreement of February 13, 1904 (Luangprabang).²

2. "The dispersed territories northward of the right bank of the river Mekong, on the one hand, and northward of the boundary of the two provinces of Battambang and Pursat, on the other, from the line which, commencing at the point adjacent to Tonle Sap and the southernmost point of the boundary of the two provinces of Siemreap and Battambang, follows the meridian of longitude to the parallel of 15 degrees north latitude, and thence, eastwardly, along the said parallel to the river Mekong."³

3. Thailand shall pay France an indemnity of 10 million ticals (about 10 million gold marks).⁴

The Foreign Minister asked that the foregoing mediation proposal be forwarded to the Reich Government with the request that it support its acceptance by the Vichy Government.⁵ He pointed out that acceptance of the proposal was also in the interest of Germany for the following reasons:

1. Failure of the negotiations would mean a serious loss of prestige for Japan and indirectly also for the other signatories of the Tripartite Pact;

2. Failure of the mediation would inevitably lead to resumption of hostilities;

3. Hostilities would make it impossible for Germany to obtain strategic raw materials, especially rubber, from Indochina.

4. Conclusion of the agreement is exceedingly desirable because of the danger that Thailand might otherwise switch over to the British camp and that in certain circumstances a new theater of

¹ For previous developments, see vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 372, 458, and 484.

² For text see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1903-1904*, vol. xcvi, pp. 961-965.

³ This paragraph is in French in the original.

⁴ In telegram No. 251 of Feb. 21 (216/147670) Ott reported that according to Matsuoka Thailand had accepted the Japanese mediation proposals in general but had refused to pay an indemnity to France.

⁵ Woermann transmitted Tokyo telegrams Nos. 233 and 251 of Feb. 17 and 21 to Paris on Feb. 24 (4443/E086216-18) together with Ribbentrop's directive (216/147678) to support the Japanese mediation proposal and to advise the French Government to accept its terms.

See documents Nos. 96 and 112 for the French reaction in this matter.

war, and one undesirable for the Axis Powers, might come into existence.

The Foreign Minister stressed in this connection that England, by intensive propaganda, was doing everything in her power in Thailand to cause Japan's mediation to fail.

Summing up the Foreign Minister stated that Japan had a vital interest in peace in Indochina. This was the point of view motivating her mediation proposal. The territorial cessions demanded by it from France were minor in comparison with the demands originally advanced by Thailand. Acceptance was on the other hand also in the interest of France because given the present balance of strength Thailand was in a position to enforce her demands by force of arms, if necessary.

OTT

No. 65

2083/445154-59

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter¹

BERLIN, February 18, 1941.

Pol. I M 393 g. Rs.

Grand Admiral Raeder informed me through Admiral Fricke of his meeting with the Italian Commander in Chief of the Fleet, Riccardi, as follows:²

Present:

On the German side:

Grand Admiral Raeder,

Admiral Fricke,

Admiral Weichhold (Naval Liaison staff in Rome),

Admiral von Löwisch (Naval Attaché in Rome).

On the Italian side:

Commander in Chief of the Fleet Under State Secretary

Admiral Riccardi,

Admiral Brenta (Chief of the Operations Staff),

the Italian Naval Attaché here³ and some other Italian Naval officers.

The conversations took place in a very friendly and candid atmosphere. For the first time it was apparent that the Italians were ready to accept and follow German advice. Significant are the concluding words of Admiral Riccardi to Grand Admiral Raeder:

¹ Although the document was not signed, Ritter initialed it on the margin. In a covering note to Wiehl accompanying the annex (2083/445160) he refers to it as his memorandum.

² For Raeder's report to Hitler regarding this conference, see U. S. Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, "Führer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the Germany Navy, 1941" (Washington, D.C., 1947), vol. I, pp. 28, 30.

³ Capt. C. conte Pecori Giraldi.

"Rest assured that for me your wishes are commands." On the German naval side, they are aware, however, that this greater readiness also harbors a risk. In view of the lack of training and initiative of the Italian Navy, there is reason to doubt whether in acting on Germany's advice, it would have the necessary military strength to carry it out.

On the first day Admiral Fricke gave a long presentation on the action of the German Navy up to the present and its aims. He put the main emphasis on showing the Italians that the German Navy, despite its numerical inferiority, was always anxious to retain the initiative and that it had succeeded in doing so. He referred in this connection especially to the strategic importance of planting mine fields and the dispatching of auxiliary cruisers and warships into the Atlantic Ocean and overseas.

On the second day the appropriate use of the Italian Navy was discussed. The main point was the effective closing of the Strait of Catania (between Sicily and North Africa). It was pointed out by the German side that much could still be done here with mines.

The following special points were made by the Italians:

1. Riccardi again requested that Germany give her support to the further reduction of arms of the French fleet in Toulon, or better, to its complete disarming. He pointed out the possible threat that might in certain circumstances arise in the western Mediterranean for Italy from a French fleet ready for action. No promises were made on this point by the German side. The question is being studied here anew.⁴

2. Admiral Riccardi called attention—as was to be expected⁵—to the dangerous situation of the Italian Navy because of lack of fuel oil. In the present situation, the Italian surface units would no longer be able to be committed from June on and the Italian submarines from October on. Grand Admiral Raeder recognized the importance of this question (from the German standpoint too, since we were also interested in tying up the English fleet in the Mediterranean). He made no promises, however. The Grand Admiral also demanded greater economy on the Italian side. He said the German warships in general had the order, "fires out" as soon as

⁴In a memorandum of Feb. 19 (2281/481096-98) the German Naval Attaché in Italy, Admiral von Löwisch, emphasized Admiral Riccardi's worries over the French fleet at Toulon, and quoted him as stating that Mussolini had authorized planning for a preventive seizure of Corsica. On Feb. 17 Löwisch took the matter to General von Rintelen who discussed the matter with General Guzzoni. Guzzoni assured Rintelen that there would be no seizure of Corsica without preliminary notification of the German High Command.

See also document No. 82 and footnote 3.

⁵Wiehl's memorandum of Feb. 11 (2033/445137) had warned of the possibility of the Italians using the naval conference as a means for making a plea for a higher quota of fuel oil. Clodius' telegram No. 289 of the same date (B13/B001467-68) reiterated the warning.

In telegram No. 286 of Feb. 12 (4876/E253167) Clodius was assured that Raeder and Fricke had been provided with extensive memoranda explaining the position of the Reich Government regarding fuel oil for the Italian Navy.

they were in port. The Italian warships, on the other hand, remained with steam up in port. Riccardi denied this. Admiral Riccardi gave the Grand Admiral a short memorandum on this point, which I am putting separately through regular channels.⁶ Grand Admiral Raeder asks that no promises be made at the expense of the fuel oil stocks of the German Navy, without giving him an opportunity to express himself first. I told Admiral Fricke that—as far as I was informed—Germany did not at all intend to make new promises to Italy on this question *at the present time*. In no case would promises be made at the expense of the Navy without its being first consulted.

Another point of importance from the standpoint of foreign policy was also raised by the Italians. I am submitting a special memorandum concerning it.⁷

[Annex]

Italian Naval War Staff
SECRET

FUEL OIL AND GERMAN-ITALIAN AGREEMENTS FOR ITS SUPPLY

1. *Situation*

Fuel oil stocks on February 1	Tons 612,000
Requirements for a year of submarine warfare	" 50,000
February 1, 1941—Balance remaining for surface forces	" 558,000

If one fixes the total monthly consumption of the *nation* at 140,000 tons, and includes the imports provided for in the agreements for the months of April–May–June of the current year, the following balance remains for the following months:

On March 1st	Tons 418,000
On April 1st	" 278,000
On May 1st	" 165,000
On June 1st	" 52,000

and from this it appears that in the middle of June the surface forces will no longer be available for commitment, and the submarines will have oil stocks sufficient for 8 additional months.

2. *Possibilities of an increase of fuel oil imports from Rumania*

During the conversations that recently took place between the Italian and German delegates, they were occupied especially with

⁶ See annex.

⁷ This apparently refers to a memorandum about Italian construction of tank cars which Ritter intended to write for Admiral Fricke. He alludes to such a memorandum in his covering letter (see footnote 1) but the memorandum itself has not been found.

the problem of transportation. The *technical* possibility was stressed, after the Danube became ice-free, and Germany had resumed river shipments of oil on a full scale, of promising Italy up to seven daily rail shipments via Kurtici-Budapest, *aside from* the three or four shipments now being made via Jimbolia. Since in the plans submitted in the last few days by the German delegation, it is provided that three, or at most four, shipments be prepared a day, the increase by two additional shipments on the same stretch would give Italy the opportunity, as of next April, to import 22,000-23,000 tons a month more, and so the critical situation anticipated would be very much improved. This concession would naturally reduce the overland importation of oil to Germany by a like amount, but Germany will have the opportunity this year too, as she did last summer, of importing as much as possible by river, supplementing the daily rail shipments which will remain available to Germany, as of April, 200,000 tons a month in all.

No. 66

136/74705

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 640 of February 19

MADRID, February 20, 1941.

Received February 20—3:00 a. m.

Regarding the rumor of a supposedly projected meeting between Franco and Salazar, reported in telegram No. 580 of February 15,¹ the Spanish Foreign Minister stated to me that some time ago (prior to Franco's trip to Italy) the Portuguese Ambassador² had let it be known here that Salazar would like to meet with the Caudillo. At first Franco thought of making a trip to Portugal but he (Serrano Suñer) had counseled against this, saying that Spaniards had no business in Portugal. Thereupon the Portuguese Ambassador had indicated Salazar's willingness to come to Spain. However, nothing has as yet been said about a date.

When I inquired what purpose the Portuguese had in mind in arranging this meeting, the Minister replied that all that had been mentioned was a discussion of questions of common interest to both countries. He had no doubt, however, that Salazar wanted to try to dissuade Franco from entering the war. Portugal, he said, was today again solidly Anglophile and was firmly convinced of an English victory. He claimed to know from various sources that Salazar himself had made statements to this effect. Salazar, he

¹ Not found.² Pedro Teotonio Pereira.

said, was afraid that Portugal, too, would become involved in the war if the Germans marched into Spain. The Portuguese were afraid all around, but were at present convinced that England would win, and were acting accordingly.

The Minister stated that he would like to defer this meeting as long as possible, inasmuch as in the present circumstances Spain was not interested in exchanging mutual expressions of friendship with Portugal, the ally of England.

Compare also telegram No. 4480 of December 31, 1940.*

STOHRER

* In this telegram (129/121017) Stohrer reported Suñer's concern regarding developments in Portugal who had become much more friendly to England as of late. The reason for this, according to Suñer, was Portugal's fear of getting involved in the war and the highly optimistic evaluation of Britain's position.

No. 67

265/172620

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 159 of February 20

ANKARA, February 20, 1941—8:14 p. m.

Received February 21—4:00 a. m.

Today I had a detailed discussion with Saracoglu, who showed himself to be exceedingly well satisfied with the effects of the Turkish-Bulgarian declaration.¹ He had not expected that this declaration would meet with such an excellent response all over the world. He was also very satisfied with the comments in the German press. The English criticism did not seem to bother him; rather, I believe that he considers the statement to be a convenient weapon against English pressure.

On the other hand I hear that the English are furious because Turkey has not been able to induce Bulgaria to make a statement concerning neutrality. Evidently the present declaration weakened the Turkish role in the English game.

As regards the development of the situation, Saracoglu stated that because of the English pressure Greece would hardly be in a position to make peace. On the other hand he could tell me that Turkey was certain there would be no military intervention by England in Greece. At most three reserve divisions available in Egypt could be put into field fortifications north of Salonika. But this only if Germany should march. Therefore it would be better if we helped Italy by way of Albania.

PAPEN

* Of Feb. 17; see vol. XI of this series, document No. 714 and footnote 4.

No. 68

71/50753

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

U. St.S. Pol. 137

BERLIN, February 21, 1941.

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires told me today that he had now received a report on the conversation of the private secretary of the Grand Mufti in Rome,¹ which contained the following conclusions:

1. Rome did not intend to put too much pressure on Iraq to take action against England. The area was militarily more easily accessible to England than to the Axis Powers. Consequently an operation directed against England might easily result in an English success.

2. The Italian Government agreed to the plan for delivering arms to Iraq, in exchange for goods.² I again pointed out to Signor Cosmelli that the matter of the arms deliveries was now being studied by us, so that a duplication of the work was not desired.³

3. The Grand Mufti had been paid certain sums by Italy, as he—Cosmelli—had in fact already told me in detail.⁴ The Italian Government did not wish to approach us with the request that we contribute to these payments already made by Italy. The Italian Government had no objections, however, if we, too, for our part supported the Grand Mufti financially. It merely requested, in view of the peculiarities of the Orientals, that it be informed if we should do so.⁵

4. The representative of the Grand Mufti had also requested financial support in the name of Iraq, in addition to the sums to be paid to him. This point had not been studied much in Rome. In that connection Rome was probably thinking less of monetary payments than of financial benefits within the framework of the exchange of goods.

A proposal to be put before the Foreign Minister will be advisable only when all the questions connected therewith have been definitively clarified here.

WOERMANN

¹ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 722.

² See *ibid.*, document No. 482.

³ Earlier statements to that effect made to Cosmelli were recorded by Woermann on Feb. 7 (83/61542-44) and Feb. 15 (83/61547).

⁴ No record of such statements by Cosmelli has been found. Regarding Italian financial support, see vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 40 and 57.

⁵ Cf. document No. 12.

No. 69

M341/M015101-08

*The Military Attaché in Finland to an Officer in the
Intelligence Department of the Army General Staff*

HELSINKI, February 21, 1941.

DEAR MATZKY:¹ Since General v. Seidel² and Colonel Buschens-
hagen have again left Helsinki, I wish to report to you briefly by
letter. I am choosing this form because I agreed with Buschen-
hagen that he is to report upon the conclusion of his journey. He
has now gone to northern Finland, where he will stay some 8 more
days. He is accompanied by a Finnish officer who is acquainted
with the region and by my aide. I myself did not go along, as I
should very much have liked to do, so that any unnecessary sensa-
tion would be avoided. In the next few days I have a number of
official functions, in connection with which any prolonged absence
on my part would be noticed by my dear colleagues. Since these
gentlemen are very much interested in all that we Germans are
doing up here, they would certainly investigate, which is not what
the author has in mind. I wish, then, to go alone to the north at
the beginning of March.

The Foreign Ministry has been very much in favor of the visit
of Lieutenant General v. Seidel. Seidel, the Minister, and I have
the impression that there has been a little row between Ribbentrop
and Göring because of the trip. Apparently R. did not want Seidel
to go, because as a "prominent" person his trip might have created
■ stir.

In accordance with Ribbentrop's telegraphic instructions,³ Seidel
appeared here in civilian clothing. He felt as if he cut a some-
what ludicrous figure, especially when the Grand Cross of the Fin-
nish White Rose was presented to him by Field Marshal Manner-
heim, on which occasion Seidel, in accordance with instructions, had
to appear in a light-colored business suit. In Rovaniemi, too, with
the troops of the supply organization of the Luftwaffe, General v.
Seidel appeared in civilian clothing. At the request of the Minister,
who had also received by telegraph the instructions from the For-

¹ Col. Gerhard Ernst Ludwig Matzky, Military Attaché in Tokyo after Sep-
tember 1939; was assigned to the Intelligence Department (O Qu. IV) of the
Army General Staff in January 1941; promoted to the rank of Major General
in April 1941.

² Lt. Gen. Hans Georg von Seidel, General Quartermaster of the Luftwaffe,
1937-1944.

³ These instructions have not been found. Blücher was notified of the trip
by telegrams Nos. 112 and 113 of Feb. 13 (4963/E276606-07). His report No.
98 of Feb. 14 (B19/B004022) stated that Seidel had gone on to north Finland
and was expected back in Helsinki on Feb. 18 or 19.

eign Ministry regarding the trip, he was put up in the barracks, not in the hotel.

General v. Seidel is nevertheless very well satisfied with his sojourn here, above all, because he has gotten what he went after. The bestowal of the Grand Cross is a somewhat un hoped for matter. Field Marshal Mannerheim apparently took to General v. Seidel quite especially. He said to the Chief of the Deuxième Bureau of the Finnish General Staff that he had a very special esteem for the officer type, as represented by Seidel. He spoke with General v. Seidel on all possible matters, but mostly about hunting and social matters; asked him home to tea in the evening; in short, showed him such marks of favor as had seldom been shown to anyone.

Certainly General Seidel will report on this to the Reichsmarschall, and the latter will be very pleased with the way in which the trip of his General Quartermaster came off. Questions of an operational or tactical nature were not mentioned in the talks between the Field Marshal and General v. Seidel. Political questions, too, as, for example, relations between Finland and Russia, were mentioned only very superficially.

Also in his conversation with the Finnish Chief of the General Staff, as well as with the Finnish supply man, General v. Seidel avoided political questions and only expressed his thanks in general for the fine cooperation given by the Finns with respect to the supply facilities of the German Luftwaffe on Finnish territory.

At any rate, it must be said in conclusion that General v. Seidel made the very best impression here with all German and Finnish authorities. Too bad that such persons do not visit us oftener. Since the visit of Colonel General Halder,⁴ we have, unfortunately, not had "big shots" here in the country, but for this again the war is to blame.

Should the question arise as to how much I was occupied with General v. Seidel's visit, although I am no longer Air Attaché, I should say that General v. Seidel visited the *Supply Organization* of the Luftwaffe in Finland. Pursuant to an order of the OKW, this establishment has remained in my charge.

In so far as the visit of Colonel Buschenhagen is concerned, you will get a detailed report from him upon conclusion of the entire trip. I can only inform you in a general way of what was discussed here in Helsinki.

Buschenhagen made an official call on the Field Marshal. Conversations were held with Lieutenant General Heinrichs, with whom

⁴Halder visited Finland June 29-July 3, 1939. See Wipert von Bittcher, *Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie* (Wiesbaden, 1951), p. 145.

you are acquainted, his first assistant General Airo, and with the Chief of the Operations Department, Colonel Tappola.

It resulted from the conversations that the Finns, with all their deliberations, are concerned with interests which nevertheless are primarily *local*. They are anxious to regain the territories lost to the Russians in the war; perhaps their thought extends as far as the line Lake Ladoga-Lake Onega-the White Sea, but therewith their interests would be completely exhausted. Sympathy or enthusiasm for broader war aims cannot be found among the Finnish people.

The Finns likewise have little interest in operations in the Petsamo region. The region has, to be sure, very great importance for Finland for economic reasons, especially in wartime. But it is too far off for Finland to defend it with her meager forces, and in view of the long frontier. The *people*, moreover, hardly know where Petsamo is, and are therefore not interested. Any operations in the northernmost part of Finland would, therefore, have to be conducted by us alone. And, indeed, as is known, there are scarcely any Finnish troops up there. That our activities in the Petsamo region may possibly afford them relief, is, on the other hand, very gratifying to the Finnish military command. They will furnish us with every support in relation to the preparations.

That the Finns are but little interested in Petsamo because they cannot defend it alone also principally accounts for the fact that they again and again press for completion of the road from Tornio via Palojoensuu to Skibotn. On the Finnish side, along the Swedish-Finnish border they are very busy constructing the road, and hope that we will aid them in the construction of the last section of the road—that is, on Norwegian territory, as far as Skibotn. Several Finnish proposals regarding this matter have in recent months been sent both to the Foreign Ministry through the Legation and to you, or the Army Headquarters Norway, through me.⁵ Once there is a fine road from Tornio to Skibotn, Petsamo will lose in importance, for then the Finns would have safe access to the Atlantic Ocean, not exposed to the constant encroachments of or danger from the Russians.

Naturally, Finnish military interest in the region of Rovaniemi is very much greater.

The Finns are expecting, in the event of war, just as in the Finnish-Russian War of 1939-40, a Russian thrust from the region of Salla-Kantalahti. Such a thrust would be very disagreeable for

⁵ Such proposals were recorded in Woermann's memorandum of Feb. 11 (B19/B004012-14) and his supplementary memorandum of Feb. 15 (B19/B004029-30). In a memorandum of Mar. 24 (B19/B004103) the Finnish Legation in Berlin announced the decision to go ahead with road construction on the sector Ivalo-Inari-Kaamanen-Karasjok.

the Finns because of the threat to land communications between Finland and Sweden. All the more do they welcome possible support by German troops in this area.

Buschenhagen's question as to whether the Finns, *if ever such a case were once to arise*, could undertake to protect our concentration in this area, was answered by the Finns in the affirmative. They have one or two divisions available for this, namely, from the Finnish V Corps, in Oulu, which they wish to commit in the Kemijärvi area. The Finns hope that the Finnish forces at Kemijärvi, destined for the protection of the German concentration at the beginning of a possible war, will later be released and be able to be used in the south of the country.

The Finnish General Staff is not worried about Russian attacks from the region that lies between Kantalahti and Kem. For a group of forces advancing from west to east on Kantalahti to pivot southward from there toward Kem, is considered impractical by the Finnish General Staff, because there are no roads there running north and south. The Finns consider an advance from Kuusamo via Ukhta to Kem possible and desirable.

The Finns themselves intend to advance on Petrozavodsk with a group of forces—as Lieutenant General Heinrichs has already told Colonel General Halder.*

Buschenhagen has conducted all his conversations in a *very cautious* manner, and just as I did previously, has repeatedly pointed out that all the deliberations were a study, from which it would be entirely wrong to draw conclusions. He has, moreover, likewise pointed out, just as I did in the discussions in the past months, that what was discussed was intended for only a very small circle of officers; that all fuss had to be avoided, and that in no case might nationals of other countries, particularly those of Sweden, receive any knowledge.

This naturally leaves a gap, to which the Finns, however, have tactfully avoided making reference. One must, indeed, finally ask oneself *how* a possible German force can get into the Tornio area at all.

I believe I can assume from my many years of knowledge of the Finns that they will absolutely keep quiet. It is understandable, however, that the Finns will avoid doing anything to frighten off the Swedes. We are giving them no positive assurances. It is entirely conceivable that they may again stand alone in a new Finnish-Russian war, but then they will need Swedish support, precisely as in the last year.

Lieutenant General Heinrichs finally also made the following statement to Buschenhagen on the occasion of a dinner at my house.

* See vol. XI of this series, Editors' Note, p. 1231.

He pointed out that it was also possible, aside from a military conflict with Russia, that the Russians might make the Finns an "offer." Apparently Heinrichs was here alluding to considerations of Finnish politicians, to which both the Minister here and I, too, have already referred in reports or telegrams.

One must reckon that the Russians could propose to the Finns that parts of Karelia be ceded or returned to them, either in exchange for parts of the Petsamo area or in order to keep Finland out of a war. Lieutenant General Heinrichs suggested that it was entirely possible that, under the influence of the lost war, Ministers of the Left would be in favor of the acceptance of such an offer. If, too, in my opinion, such an offer has little probability, the possibility must still be faced.

In a conversation with the first assistant of the Chief of the General Staff, the question of the Åland Islands was only briefly mentioned. It was evident from a remark of General Airo's that their occupation by German forces is expected.

I believe that these are the most important points in the conversations conducted in Helsinki. The report of Buschenhagen to Colonel General Halder will be much more detailed. The purpose of this letter is only for the time being to inform *you* in a general way. I agreed with Buschenhagen that I would not report. Hence this private letter. Above all, a report from me would have to be submitted to the Minister, which indeed might not be desirable at the present time.

I am quite pleased that Buschenhagen for once had to play the part of a tightrope walker. It is not easy to speak about such matters and always to mention only eventualities, studies, and considerations, without being able to offer something positive. It is very good that if things should again go entirely differently here, I shall not be the only goat.

With best regards, I am

Yours,

R[össing]

No. 70

426/218062

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

BERLIN, February 22, 1941—6:25 a. m.

No. 353 of February 21

Received February 22—11:00 a. m.

Special security handling. For Chief of Mission or his representative personally. Top secret. To be decoded personally. Reply by courier or secret code.

In our telegram No. 36 of January 7¹ it was stated that, for the time being, vagueness with regard to the strength of the German forces was desirable and that at a given time word would be given for publication of the full strength of the troops. That time has now come.

In Rumania there are 680,000 (six hundred and eighty thousand) German troops in readiness. Among these troops there is an unusually high percentage of technical troops with the most up-to-date military equipment, especially armored units. Behind these troops there are inexhaustible reserves in Germany, including the permanent units stationed on the German-Yugoslav border.

I request the members of the mission and any available trusted persons [*Vertrauensleute*] to start, in suitable ways, to let this strength be known in an impressive manner—indicating that it is more than sufficient to meet any eventuality in the Balkans from any side whatsoever—and to do so not only in Government circles there but also in the foreign Missions concerned. I leave it to your discretion not always to mention the exact figure given above. On the contrary, innuendo and circumlocution may also be used, as, for example, “almost 700,000,” and the like.

RITTER

¹ Vol. XI of this series, document No. 616.

No. 71

B13/B001542-45

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 380 of February 21
Delegation No. 62

ROME, February 22, 1941—10:35 a. m.
Received February 22—11:25 a. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

I had another conversation with the Duce today.

When the negotiations were continued after my return on February 19, I had the impression that the Italian negotiators and the Italian Government members concerned did not sufficiently appreciate Germany's helpfulness and accommodation in the matter of supplying iron and steel and ensuring Italy's aluminum production.²

¹ Marginal note: “Forwarded as No. 606 to Fuschl, Feb. 22, 12:05 p. m.”

² On Feb. 12 by telegram No. 291 (B13/B001469-71) Clodius reported that the Italians themselves had set their estimates of their iron and steel requirements too low. He recommended a monthly increase of the iron-steel quota from 45,000 to 65,000 tons.

A minute by Altenburg of Feb. 15 (4873/E258073) records that the problem was brought to the attention of Hitler who directed that the Italians be helped as much as was possible as regards iron and steel.

Consequently I described in broad outline yesterday to Anfuso, as the representative of the absent Foreign Minister,³ the increased importance of our aid to Italy. At the suggestion of Anfuso, who thought the Duce would like to talk to me himself, the Duce then asked me to see him today.

At the beginning of the conversation the Duce asked very cordially about the health of the Führer. He said he would write to the Führer this very day⁴ to thank him for the most interesting memorandum on the Führer's reception of the Yugoslav Minister President.⁵

I thanked the Duce first of all because he had granted the German request to furnish 200,000 additional industrial workers. (The total number of Italian workers employed in Germany, including the 60,000 farm workers, is thereby increased to 315,000.⁶) I mentioned in that connection that the Führer had personally taken a special interest in the sending of the 200,000 industrial workers. I further thanked the Duce because Italy had fulfilled Germany's wishes for the delivery of militarily essential Italian raw materials to the limit of her capabilities and in general to our satisfaction. I added that in my report on the progress of the negotiations to the German officials concerned I had made particular mention of this. The Duce replied that Italy would of course do everything also in the future to help Germany in those areas where she was able to do so. He was obviously very pleased because, as a result of this introduction to the conversation, the impression that the negotiations dealt exclusively with the satisfaction of Italian wishes was avoided.

Referring to our last conversation⁷ I then gave the Duce a complete picture again of the Italian raw materials situation based on the outcome of our negotiations. Regarding the greater part by far of the Italian demands we had been able to ensure that the needs would be met for the entire year 1941; even in the cases in which it had not been possible to make arrangements for such a long term we had at least made certain of the supply for the first half of 1941. The important thing was that the five key items of the Italian war economy, namely coal, iron and steel, mineral oil, aluminum, and rubber, had been ensured. For coal, the deliveries of last year would be maintained for the entire year 1941 and would even be somewhat increased. For iron and steel, our deliveries had likewise been pledged for the entire year 1941, and on a scale twice that of 1940

³ Mussolini had ordered Ciano to the front. See vol. XI of this series, document No. 731.

⁴ Document No. 76.

⁵ See document No. 48.

⁶ A memorandum of Feb. 20 by Woermann (B13/B001535) records that the Italian Chargé d'Affaires complained of ill-treatment of Italian laborers in Germany.

⁷ Of Feb. 6; see document No. 27.

(87,500 tons per month, instead of 40,000 tons per month, as previously). As regards mineral oil, it had not been possible to meet Italy's wishes in full, but even with regard to that, there was agreement with the Italian specialists and officers that with the exception of fuel oil for the Navy the supply of mineral oil of all kinds would be ensured by our deliveries, at least for the first half of 1941. Only in the case of fuel oil for the Navy was there a substantial difference between the German estimate of the minimum requirement of 80,000 tons and the Italian minimum requirement of 110,000 tons.⁸ In the production of aluminum, to be sure, we could not by our deliveries of pitch coke and petroleum coke ensure the present Italian monthly production of 4,000 tons per month in full, but we could ensure a monthly production of 3,400 tons. The resultant annual production of 40,000 tons corresponded to the annual production in 1940, and so did not in any case mean a reduction in the last annual average. By our buna deliveries we made possible a monthly rubber production of 1,100 tons. Although this was about 15 percent less than the Italian estimate of the minimum requirement, it was after all sufficient, even in the opinion of the Italian specialists, for the most essential war needs.

To some extent I also went briefly into the Italian food situation and told the Duce that the Italian requests for the delivery of fertilizers had not yet been definitively studied. In this field, as well as in regard to the aid requested by Italy in the purchase of maize in southeastern Europe,⁹ we would, however, do what we could.

The Duce agreed with what I said on all points with one exception. My statements had confirmed to him that Italy was secure in the most important area of the war economy, thanks to the strong support of Germany. There was only one question which still caused him serious concern; that was the supply of fuel oil for the Navy. There followed a rather long discussion on this subject, in which I tried again to prove by all the documents and figures available to me that on this point too there would be no cause for worry before the end of June if the consumption were anywhere near that estimated by Germany, since Italy would then still have at her disposal enough to cover her needs for 2½ months; in the meantime ways and means would have to be found to supply Italy with fuel oil. We were firmly convinced that the military events of the next

⁸ Cf. document No. 65.

⁹ In telegram No. 381 of Feb. 22 (B13/B001546-47) Clodius recommended that Italy be permitted to purchase 200,000 tons of maize from southeastern Europe before June, not only to help the Italian food supply but also to facilitate the purchase in Italy of 120,000 tons of rice for Germany.

Wiehl's telegram No. 412 of Feb. 24 (4876/E253163) authorized Clodius to state that Germany would assist Italy in purchasing that amount of maize in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Rumania.

In the final agreement the German quota of rice was raised to 135,000 tons. See document No. 91.

few months would enable us to find such ways, and therefore we faced the future with full confidence also in this regard. In this war Germany had already successfully overcome much more critical situations with respect to her supply of raw materials.

At the close of the conversation the Duce repeatedly assured me that he was very well satisfied with the result of the negotiations and cordially expressed his thanks.

I am convinced that the goal we sought has been achieved: Without making any sacrifices that would be intolerable for our military interests we have made certain that the Italian war economy will function at least for the first half of 1941, and have furthermore been successful in that the Duce himself is convinced of this and gratefully acknowledges the services Germany has rendered to Italy. We have thereby strengthened not only the position of the Duce but also the position of all active circles in Italy that are the pillars of moral and military resistance and of the alliance with Germany. That the Duce is resolved to transmit this conviction which he has gained not only to his close collaborators but also to the Italian people, has already been shown by the fact that immediately after our conversation he gave the Italian press an announcement of that tenor, which, I learned later, he drafted himself.

CLODIUS

MACKENSEN

No. 72

201/89427

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 453 of February 22 BUCHAREST, February 22, 1941—11:42 a. m.
Received February 22—12:30 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 464 of February 21.²

I spoke at length with Landesgruppenleiter Konradi and Deputy Landesgruppenleiter Langenecker. Both assured me that neither men in their immediate entourage nor members of the Auslandsorganisation in Bucharest were hiding any Legionnaires. They considered it possible that Reich Germans might be doing this in the provinces. On my instruction they will issue clear orders to terminate the hidings. I stated my willingness, in case it should involve leading Legionnaires, to try to get them out of the country.

KILLINGER

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 605 to Salzburg, Feb. 22."

² In this telegram (201/89416) Ribbentrop had asked Killinger to verify reports that members of the Auslandsorganisation were hiding Legionnaires in Bucharest.

No. 73

136/74707-08

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain

Telegram

No. 87 of February 21
from Fuschl

FUSCHL, February 22, 1941—9:10 p. m.
Received Berlin, February 22—11:15 p. m.

No. 430 of February 22
from the Foreign Ministry

Sent February 22—11:55 p. m.
zu RAM 17/R.¹

Secret for officer in charge.

From the course of the discussion with Franco it became unequivocally clear that Spain is not ready to enter the war on our side. This is confirmed for us once again by the content of the information given to us by the Italians concerning the course of the talk that Mussolini had with Franco and Suñer in Bordighera.² At this talk the Spanish Government took the position, as I am pointing out for your exclusively personal and strictly confidential information, that Spain could enter the war only if

(1) the question of grain was solved beforehand, in which connection Suñer also emphasized that Spain wanted the grain not only for today, but for as long as she was dependent upon it;

(2) the Spanish Government was explicitly assured of the fulfillment of all of the Spanish territorial desires in Africa in modification of the Secret Protocol of Hendaye;³

(3) the Gibraltar operation was carried out solely as a Spanish operation and not as a German one, since the Spanish could never allow other troops to take over their place.

In these circumstances Spain could not set a date for her entry into the war.

From this position taken by the Spaniards it is quite evident that Franco has not the least intention of entering the war, because the conditions stated actually postpone *ad calendas graecas* this entry into the war; or, they make the entry into the war completely problematical, because it is most likely quite clear to Franco, too, in spite of his thinking, which is evidently untroubled by much military experience, that Spanish troops would never succeed in wresting Gibraltar from the English.

Since even the statements of Franco and Suñer regarding your démarches⁴ could be evaluated only as a negative answer to our

¹ RAM 17/R: Not found.

² See document No. 49.

³ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 221, footnote 4, and Editors' Note, p. 466.

⁴ See *ibid.*, documents Nos. 695 and 718.

question regarding the willingness of Spain to enter the war immediately, although you for your part neglected to confront both men expressly with this fact during your talks, today the matter is to be regarded as having been clarified completely in a negative sense. We do not intend to charge the Spanish Government at this time with having broken its promises made in Hendaye, or to draw any further conclusions from this with respect to German-Spanish relations. However, please do not take any more steps whatever in the question of Spain's entry into the war, and refrain from any initiative in this respect. If the Spanish Government should, for its part, revert to the list of requirements in raw materials, grain, etc., please limit yourself to the comment that it is unnecessary to go into this list, which was apparently drawn up from the departmental point of view, since the question of Spain's entry into the war is not being considered.

In general I request you to exercise reserve toward the Spanish Government; you should act, in principle, in an objective and friendly manner but be cool and reserved with respect to the question of Spain's participation in the war. Now that the situation has been clarified, please proceed no longer on the assumption, even in your reports, that through some action or other we might still induce Spain to enter the war.

Your propaganda efforts in the local press, etc., to counteract English propaganda, are to be maintained as before.

RIBBENTROP

No. 74

148/129135-36

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States

Telegram

No. 242

BERLIN, February 22, 1941.

R 3157 Ang. II.

With reference to my telegram No. 125 of January 31.¹

The Missions in South America concerned have now each received the instruction to make a *démarche* with the relevant government conveying a warning in the matter of the laid-up merchant ships.²

¹ In this telegram (5129/E295940-42) Welzsäcker cited various legal opinions and reasons why the taking over of Axis merchant ships by the United States would be an unneutral act.

² This included the following telegrams of Feb. 22: No. 171 to Rio de Janeiro (148/129130-32); No. 44 to Lima (148/129133); No. 29 to Montevideo (148/129133); No. 171 to Buenos Aires (148/129133); and No. 71 to Santiago (148/129133-34).

They have been instructed to put the main emphasis on the political aspect, stress violation of neutrality, and point to the economic consequences for the future.

Even though it is not to be supposed that the Government of the United States could be restrained from any decisions by German protests, it is nevertheless not permissible to be entirely silent in Washington. In the first place such silence in Washington at this time could be interpreted to mean that we had so to speak given the United States a license to confiscate the merchant ships. Furthermore this is not permissible because of its general significance as a matter of principle and for the reason that the well-known repeated statements by the English Minister of Shipping, Cross, and the Lord Halifax memorandum were directed precisely at the United States.³ However, it would be inappropriate to put the main emphasis on the political arguments or neutrality obligations in Washington since in the past we have not, for well-considered reasons, formally denounced much more serious violations of neutrality by the United States. Therefore only the legal viewpoints passed on in telegram No. 125 of January 31 are to be presented in Washington.

Please make a clear formal démarche accordingly. Proceed in this from the statements mentioned above by the English Cabinet members as well as the English Ambassador in Washington. These statements provided the Reich Government for its part with an occasion to explain its legal position. Continue with the legal explanations mentioned in our telegram No. 125.

If in the course of the démarche the other side should lay claim to the Right of Angary for the United States, please stress sharply that the first prerequisite for applying the Right of Angary is that there existed a "pressing emergency." No one in the world would believe that there was such an emergency in the United States in this regard, since the United States has from the start of the war given permission for the sale of a large number of merchant ships to third states.

Before the démarche please get in touch with the Italian Ambassador and suggest to him a parallel démarche on the subject of the

³ In telegram No. 250 of Jan. 28 (84/62458-59) Thomsen reported that a memorandum on the Right of Angary had been sent from the British Embassy to the Department of State. In a memorandum from the German Embassy to the Department of State of Mar. 4 (*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 451-453) Thomsen referred to statements of Ronald Cross, British Minister of Shipping, which dealt with merchant ships of Germany and German occupied countries in United States ports and the rights of the United States to requisition these ships under the Right of Angary.

Italian ships. The Italian Government will be informed from here regarding the content of the instruction to you. Wire your report.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER

⁴Thomsen reported the carrying out of the démarche in telegram No. 596 of Mar. 8 (589/244193-94). For a record of Thomsen's conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Acheson and the exchange of German-United States notes on this subject, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 453-455.

No. 75

B19/B004041-42

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, February 22, 1941.

Dir. Ha. Pol., 44.

Subject: The status of the Petsamo negotiations.¹

I. In the negotiations conducted since the end of last year by a Finnish delegation in Moscow, the Finns, under continual pressure from the Russians, finally declared themselves ready to withdraw the Petsamo concession from the Canadian Company by law, despite the English protest, and to transfer it to a Finnish-Russian company. At the same time, at our wish, they asked that the existing German-Finnish agreements concerning nickel deliveries be taken over by the new company. With regard to participation in the new company, they had agreed to 50 percent each for Russians and Finns. On the other hand, they had insisted on Finnish management of the company and of the mining operations, as well as on preservation of the agreements with Germany. The Finnish Minister in Moscow, to be sure, in a conversation with Deputy Foreign Commissar Vyshinsky 10 days ago with regard to the demand for an exclusively Finnish management of the company, hinted at the possibility of further Finnish concessions; but, at the direction of his Government, on February 18 he again stressed the demand for exclusively Finnish management. Vyshinsky thereupon broke off the negotiations abruptly and spoke vaguely of further consequences.²

II. We stated in Moscow in July and November of last year that we were not interested in the concession,³ but that we laid stress on the fulfillment of our delivery wishes. At the end of January Count Schulenburg again spoke to Molotov about our interest in the deliveries.⁴ Molotov stated that the Soviet Government was pre-

¹ Typewritten marginal note: "Already passed on to Fuschl by telephone."

² Cf. *Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy, March 1940-June 1941* (New York, 1941), p. 94.

³ See vol. x of this series, document No. 250 and vol. xi of this series, document No. 355, footnote 1.

⁴ See vol. xi of this series, document No. 737.

pared for an understanding with Germany on the Petsamo nickel question and was only seeking an agreement with Finland in which the German interests would not be restricted. On February 11 Count Schulenburg told M. Molotov specifically that, according to the German agreements with Finland, 60 percent of the nickel production without time limit had to be assured to Germany under the German-Finnish clearing.⁵ Molotov promised the promptest written statement of his position on this, which, however, has not yet ensued.

III. The Finnish Foreign Minister calmly considered the breaking off of the negotiations by Vyshinsky as one of the usual crises of negotiation. He asked that Germany again exert influence in Moscow on the negotiations.⁶ We replied that we were just as unperturbed about the situation as he and were therefore of the opinion that there was no cause for renewed German intervention in Moscow, but that we should wait for the written reply that was promised us by Molotov.⁷

Nothing is known as yet of any Russian measures against Finland. The Finnish negotiators are still in Moscow.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister, in accordance with instructions.

WIEHL

⁵ See document No. 42.

⁶ Helsinki telegram No. 106 of Feb. 19 (B19/B004036-37).

⁷ See document No. 109.

No. 76

F1/0466-74

*Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler*¹

ROME, February 22, 1941/XIX.

FÜHRER: With many, perhaps too many, days' delay, I am replying to your letter of February 5.² But if I waited, I did so in order that several factors in the situation might become sharply defined and make it possible for me to report on elements which once again were positive.

I shall begin with the domestic situation.

There is no doubt that between November 11 and the present day we passed through a very trying time and had to give the Italian people a number of unpleasant reports. They were painful to the Italian people, but all this had no political repercussions on the

¹ This text is from the German translation in the film of the files of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat. Mario Toscano published the Italian text in *Epoca*, June 6, 1954.

² Document No. 17.

Government. Only the well known stupidity of the English could assume or expect that. The strain existing at the present time will be eased as soon as the wind changes and a favorable Army communiqué of some sort can be issued to the Italians, who have been waiting for it with anxious suspense.

As far as the war fronts are concerned, I shall not speak about East Africa, where the fighting will go on to the bitter end. Fortunately the country is enormously large; the Viceroy³ is a capable soldier, his generals are outstanding and large masses of the natives are friendly to Italy. No false hopes should be entertained. The fortress is under siege and the only communication with the mother country is by air; but the English have suffered a serious defeat at Cheren. The English plan is aimed at the occupation of Eritrea and Somaliland in order to cut off all possibility of communication with the outside world and provide the bands of the Negus with arms and other supplies. I do not think that the English forces from the mother country wish to penetrate into the interior of Abyssinia.

Albania

The situation has drastically improved in every respect. I intend to go to that front in order to look over the situation at close range. All Greek efforts to reach Berat and thus encircle Vlonë on the one hand and Elbasan on the other, have miscarried. I do not know whether they will be repeated, but I do not believe they will succeed. This raises, therefore, the problem of our counteroffensive, for which we are assembling men and material. Commercial traffic across the Adriatic Sea continues without disruption. We have transferred 301,000 men by sea and about 50,000 by air, for which credit is due also to the valuable aid by your squadrons stationed at Foggia. All in all I regard the situation as consolidated. This is also the opinion of the General Staff and of Cavallero.

Libya

While I was putting off replying to your letter, events got ahead of me. As has probably been reported to you, we have chosen the Sirte as the new line. The arrival of the battalions of your "light division" has had a vitalizing effect.⁴ On that line we have assembled the Bologna, Savona, and Pavia infantry divisions and the "Ariete"

³ Amedeo di Savoia-Aosta, Duke of Aosta.

⁴ The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Dec. 1, 1940-Mar. 24, 1941) contains this passage at Feb. 12:

"On February 11 the first echelon of the transport of *Sonnenblume* reached Tripoli. On February 14 the second echelon should arrive which has on board a reconnaissance battalion and some antitank guns."

It has this passage at Feb. 18:

"In the North African theater there are now near Sirte two Italian divisions, one German reconnaissance battalion, and one German antitank battalion."

armored division, which has medium tanks (18 tons, with 27-mm. guns). A motorized division will also be sent there. Large masses of artillery are on hand. With the sending of a second German armored division,⁵ a very strong army will be formed, which will be in position to advance on Cyrenaica and apply pressure against any possible hostile acts on the part of Weygand. I have also ordered that the Italian armored and motorized troops be placed under the supreme command of General Rommel in order to achieve unity of action.

As regards the situation of the naval forces, I should like to inform you that the battleships *Duilio* and *Littorio* will be ready for action again early in April, while the *Cavour* can probably not be sent into action again till the beginning of January 1942.

In the field of aviation, mass production of our new fighter and bomber planes, which will be among the best in the world, is beginning just now. In April the production of tanks will reach such a scale that in the second half of the year I shall have at my disposal two to four heavy armored divisions.

Permit me, Führer, now to pass on to the political field. I have transmitted to you the text of the Bordighera conversation.⁶ It is almost stenographically faithful. I shall give you my personal impressions, Führer, when I shall once again have the pleasure of welcoming you to Italy. I reiterate to you my opinion that Spain today is in no position to embark on any sort of belligerent action. She is starved, has no arms, and strong tendencies in the country (a pro-English bourgeoisie and nobility) are hostile to us; and in addition she is now being subjected to natural disasters. I believe we shall be able to draw her over to our side, but not just now. That will furthermore depend on whether the progress of the war will be more or less rapid.

I thank you very much, Führer, for having sent me the memoranda of your conversations with the Yugoslav Ministers.⁷ While you, as always, spoke very clearly and openly, the Serbs as usual were very vague and bombastic. My impression is negative. They are people who are inwardly hostile to us, but hope to be able later to show it outwardly also. In this instance, too, the progress of the war will be of decisive importance. When once Great Britain is driven out of southeastern Europe by the defeat of Greece, Belgrade will have to decide and then she will also demand her share of the booty, namely Salonika. It is obvious of course, that Salonika belongs to

⁵ OKW directive of Feb. 19 (M179/M005708) recorded a decision by Hitler of the previous day that a complete armored division was to be sent to Tripolitania in addition to the 5th Motorized Division with its armored regiment.

⁶ See document No. 49 and footnote 5.

⁷ See document No. 48 and footnote 1.

the living space of ■ Yugoslavia friendly to us, one that is not in hostile opposition to the Axis.

In spite of the unpleasant events from November 11 to the present day, my faith in our victory is firmly rooted, strong and unshakable; and the Italian people feel the same way. In a speech, which I shall deliver in a few days, I shall state my reasons for this.⁸ The principal reason is that we have pooled our manpower and war material resources and shall fight shoulder to shoulder until victory, which will signify the triumph of our revolution and compensate our peoples for the sacrifices they have made with such admirable fortitude and discipline.

Accept, Führer, my greetings, the greetings of a faithful comrade, and my gratitude for the aid which you so willingly and from a sense of solidarity have extended, as well as my thanks for your speech of January 30,⁹ which found an exceedingly strong and favorable echo everywhere in Italy.

Yours,

MUSSOLINI

⁸ The speech was delivered the next day, Feb. 23. Text in *Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 1940-1943*, p. 4477.

⁹ The text of the second part of the speech is in *Monatshefte für auswärtige Politik*, February 1941, pp. 123-132.

No. 77

426/218061

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union*¹

Telegram

Multex No. 98 of
February 22

BERLIN, February 23, 1941—3:10 a. m.
Received February 23—9:50 a. m.

Special Security Handling. Top Secret. To be decoded only by official in charge of top secret material. Immediately to be submitted to Chief of Mission personally. Reply by courier or secret cipher.

Recently there have been frequent Greek assurances, intended for German ears, that, except for ■ number of English planes, there are no English forces in Greece and that the Greek Government has rejected and will reject English offers to send strong English forces to Greece. These assurances are apparently being made according to plan at the direction of the Greek Government directly through Greek diplomats and Military Attachés and indirectly through foreign governments and Military Attachés.

¹ This copy, which is from the files of the Moscow Embassy, has the following marginal notes:

"Herr Ambassador: May this be made public in a Press Conference? v. Timpelskirch, Feb. 23."

In Schulenburg's handwriting: "Yes."

Please do not accept such assurances without rejoinder. The answer should be that the Government of the Reich had its own information regarding the numerical strength of the English troops in Greece and regarding the further intentions of the English. English Prime Minister Churchill himself revealed the intentions of the English when he declared in the House of Commons, in the course of statements on the English military situation in North Africa on December 19, 1940²: "[Air] Marshal Sir Longmore experienced the most critical moment in his preparations when he saw that a big portion of his military forces was taken from him in order to be sent to Greece." The Reich Government attaches more importance to these and other statements of Churchill than to the assurances of Greece, whose purpose it is easy to see through.

Confirm receipt.

WEIZSÄCKER

² For text see *Parliamentary Debates*, fifth series, H of C, vol. 367, col. 1401.

No. 78

F20/318-292

Unsigned Memorandum

[RAM 56/R]¹

FUSCHL, February 23, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND
AMBASSADOR OSHIMA AT FUSCHL ON FEBRUARY 23, 1941²

Present: The Foreign Minister
Ambassador Oshima
Ambassador Stahmer
Minister Altenburg

First conversation, from 1:00 p. m. to 2:30 p. m.

After an especially cordial greeting on both sides, the Foreign Minister declared that Ambassador Oshima had been justified as against the numerous skeptics in Japan with respect to the policy which he had pursued with Germany. By the victory of Germany in the West this policy had been completely upheld. He (the Foreign Minister) regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan, for which he, along with the Ambassador, had labored for some years past, had been achieved only after a number of twists and turns, but sentiment in Japan had not been prepared for it earlier. The main thing, however, was that they were now together.

¹ The number is supplied from an extract of the memorandum (1447/-365178-95).

² Ambassador Ritter on Feb. 17 prepared a memorandum outlining the points which Ribbentrop should cover in the discussion with Oshima (833/280747-49).

Referring to the general political situation the Foreign Minister stated the following: The Führer had always striven for an understanding with England and the Foreign Minister himself had at the time been sent to London as Ambassador in an endeavor to accomplish this aim. A measure of hope had been afforded by the person of King Edward, but there was doubt from the outset as to whether he would be able to carry his point. The Foreign Minister had been more than skeptical right from the start in London and had rated the chances for an understanding as 1 in 100. As a matter of fact, the warmonger clique in England did win the upper hand. By the time he left London the war had become unavoidable. When the war came the Führer decided to reach a settlement with Russia, which was a necessity in order to avoid a two-front war. That moment had perhaps been difficult for Japan. Yet the settlement was also in Japan's interest, because the Japanese Empire was interested in the quickest possible victory by Germany, which was ensured by the settlement with Russia. Besides, the Foreign Minister had immediately made it clear to both Stalin and the world that the agreement of the Reich with Russia did not in any way affect Germany's relations with Japan. Now the German-Japanese alliance has been concluded. Ambassador Oshima was the man to whom credit was due for this on the Japanese side. With the alliance concluded, the question of developing it further now came to the fore. What was the situation in this regard?

As far as Germany was concerned, there existed no more military problems on the Continent likely to imperil her. Germany would on no account tolerate England's establishing a foothold anywhere on the Continent. Wherever the English should make such an attempt, in the Mediterranean, in Greece, or perhaps in Portugal, they would be driven out at once. Actually the Axis had already won the war, and all that remained to do was to demonstrate to England that she could no longer take any effective action against the Axis and that it was futile for her to hope that the Axis Powers might be brought to their knees by the blockade, or hunger, or civil unrest in the Axis countries or the occupied territories. England would have to be forced to realize that all hope for victory was gone and that she had to sue for peace.

The developments in France, the Foreign Minister continued, were being closely followed by Germany. Germany was not interested in extending the occupation to the entire country, if only for the reason of keeping French Africa from falling into the hands of de Gaulle. For the rest, France was no problem any longer, either politically or militarily. Her power had been broken once and for all, and so it would remain.

As regards the occupation of the other countries now held by German troops—Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Poland—Germany had merely a policing function which required only a few troops. With present-day technical weapons (dive bombers, tanks) it was possible to control very large areas with relatively small troop units. England's hopes for unrest in the occupied territories were futile. Actually absolute peace reigned there. In Germany there was no food shortage; her needs were covered for years ahead. There was enough food in the occupied countries too. In respect to raw material supplies, certain shortages occurred from time to time, but practically nothing could happen to us. This was due to the Four-Year Plan which made Germany daily more independent, as well as to the immense economic region under Germany's control.

In the military field, the Foreign Minister continued, the Führer had ordered that a number of new units be activated during the winter. By next spring we would have 240 divisions, including 186 first-line divisions, equipped for offensive warfare. The Führer was determined not to let any English troops remain on Greek soil. Rumania, Hungary, and Slovakia had already joined the Tripartite Pact, and we could sign with Bulgaria tomorrow. The accession would be timed to suit the military necessities. Upon our instigation Bulgaria had recently concluded an agreement with Turkey.³ This Turko-Bulgarian declaration showed clearly that Turkey was disassociating herself from the hostile developments in the Balkans and from England. Neither Turkey nor Russia would move in the event of German intervention in Greece. If, contrary to all expectations, Turkey should take action, enough German troops had been assigned to the operation to crush her completely.

The Yugoslav statesmen had paid a visit to Germany recently in order to demonstrate their desire to live in peace with us and Italy.⁴ We were calmly awaiting further developments. Sooner or later Yugoslavia would have to come over to our camp, either through accession to the Tripartite Pact or through some other agreements. Prince Regent Paul still seemed to be hesitant, but he, too, would have to bow to the interest of the State. After that the Balkans would be in our hands. It did not matter whether the Greeks gave in or whether we had to go through with the military operation against them, the English had to get out of Greece in any case.

Italy had suffered reverses, the Foreign Minister continued; Greece had unfortunately been attacked without our knowledge; the Duce had believed he had to do this because Greece had put bases at England's disposal. Military preparations for the operation had

³ See document No. 67.

⁴ See documents Nos. 47 and 48.

been inadequate. Five Italian divisions were sent up against 12 Greek divisions, and in bad weather at that. The Italian soldiers were good, but they were poorly equipped and led. Today the Italian front in Greece was stabilized, and there was no danger any longer. No German troops had been employed there. As regards Italy's situation in North Africa, the fact was that Graziani had attacked too late. As a result, the Italians at Sidi Barrâni were taken by surprise. General Wavell's victorious sweep could be explained by the tank fright of the Italians, who had not been sufficiently trained for combat against tanks. To help the Italians we had now sent to Libya a unit commanded by a capable general, which was to hold certain positions as bridgeheads and would afterwards deal the English a crippling blow. As regards the Italian people, they were firmly behind the Duce; there was no cause for anxiety. We were helping Italy also in the matter of raw materials wherever we could. After all, the developments in North Africa would in no way affect the ultimate victory, which was assured.

As for Spain, the Foreign Minister continued, we were on good and friendly terms with her. She would sooner or later join the Tripartite Pact, but at the present moment she did not see her way clear to take an overt step because of difficulties with her food supply. To be sure, if Spain had made up her mind quickly it would have been possible to tackle the Gibraltar problem at a very early date and so hasten the ultimate victory.

Regarding Russia, it should be noted that Stalin was a cool and clever politician who would not think of starting anything against us, mainly because of our military strength. It was true that Bolshevism continued to give evidence of its tendency to transplant its seeds to other countries. If Germany should lose the war the Soviet star would rise over Europe. We were watching developments in the East attentively and with supreme calm. But a German-Russian conflict would result in a gigantic German victory and spell the end of the Soviet regime.

As to the war against England, even though we had had bad weather for our bombers throughout the autumn and winter, we had nevertheless caused serious devastation which had had the effect of severely retarding English war production, etc. The bombings would be continued on a mounting scale so that we hoped to destroy much more than America was able to replace. We now possessed air supremacy over the whole Continent. When we would also control the air over England would depend on further developments.

On the sea, submarine operations had been on a relatively small scale to date; but from late March onwards they would be greatly

increased within a short time. The air force and submarines combined would then inflict terrific blows on England. Even now, England was experiencing serious trouble in keeping up her food supply as the result of losses in tonnage. Meat and fats were already in very short supply. The important thing now was to sink enough ships to reduce England's imports to below the absolute minimum necessary for existence. That would have a disastrous effect on the situation in England overnight. The invasion of England was all prepared, but its execution was contingent on a number of factors, the weather in particular.

As regards America, the Foreign Minister continued, it had to be stated that Roosevelt was the bitterest enemy of Germany and Japan. He really wanted to enter the war, but it was still in our interest to keep America out. But if America should nevertheless enter the war, she would be unable militarily to carry it on. The vast expanses of ocean between us and America made that impossible. And in the Far East it was unlikely that America would dare to send her Navy beyond Hawaii, where it would be threatened with destruction by the Japanese Navy. In the Atlantic Ocean there was no possibility of employment except in England. It was impossible to land in Europe, and Africa, too, was too far away. There were no supply bases for Navy and ground troops. Thus practically the only thing left was the establishment of American air bases in England. But in the air war our strategic position was superior to that of England. We were able to bomb England concentrically from the broad base offered by the European coast, whereas England in her attacks on Europe had to spread out fan-like and thus dissipate her efforts. In an air duel between Europe and England, Germany would always be superior. We believed, however, that if the powers combined with us brought their policies skillfully into alignment, it ought to be possible to keep America out of the war.

The Führer would smash England wherever they met. Besides, our forces were not only equal but were at all times superior to the combined Anglo-American air forces. Our supply of pilots was limitless; that was also true of our facilities for aircraft production. In quality we had always been superior to the British (let alone the Americans) and we were now about to outdistance them even more. The antiaircraft arm was also being greatly strengthened by order of the Führer. With the Army supplied far beyond its requirements and with tremendous stocks in reserve (we had cut back ammunition production because of the enormous stocks on hand), production was now being concentrated on submarines, aircraft, and antiaircraft guns. Every contingency had been provided

for; the war was already won militarily, economically, and politically. But it was our desire to bring the war to a quick conclusion and to force England to sue for peace at an early date. The Führer was alert and healthy, filled with confidence in victory and resolved to bring the war to a victorious conclusion at the earliest possible moment. Japan's cooperation was important for achieving that goal. But it was also in the interest of Japan that she intervene herself at the earliest possible opportunity. The decisive blow would be the attack on Singapore. Of course, it would be necessary to make sure of military success. This would wipe out England's key position in the Far East, and Japan for her part would thereby consolidate her position in the Far East, which she could attain only through war. In order to bring the war to a quick conclusion, Japan would have to effect the seizure with lightning swiftness, if possible without a declaration of war and in the midst of peace. The creation of such an accomplished fact would also be the best way to keep America out of the conflict.

Ambassador Oshima replied that he shared this view, and that certain preparations had already been made for the seizure of Singapore. They would be completed about the end of May. But to make sure, war had to be prepared not only against England but also against America. The raw material supply, especially with respect to steel and iron, was difficult for Japan. Since the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact Japan had suspended construction of the 45,000 ton ships, and instead turned to the production of submarines, torpedo boats, and motor torpedo boats, which were to be used for the protection of the islands. As to the timing of the seizure of Singapore, that would have to be coordinated with the operations in Europe.

The Foreign Minister then asked that all matters of a confidential character always be discussed with him. Ambassador Oshima agreed.

Second Conversation, from 3:45 p. m. to 6:00 p. m.

Ambassador Oshima stated that there had been different views in Japan at the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. Thereupon the Emperor had intervened with an edict. But it should be noted that Japanese public opinion, impressed by Germany's victory in the West, had completely swung around to approval of the Tripartite Pact. The Army and Navy were now carrying forward the preparations for the attack on Singapore. The experts held, however, that it would be very difficult to take Singapore from the sea. Unfortunately no effort had been made in the past to promote seditious activities among the Indian troops in Singapore. Now only seizure by force of arms could be considered. The attack would

have to be made from the land side. Plans were also being considered for the seizure of Hong Kong and the Philippines, the latter in the event that America should enter the war.

The Foreign Minister here suggested that it might be preferable to put off the Philippine project and for the time being concentrate on a surprise seizure of Singapore alone. If Japan followed up this action with an appropriate explanation of her reasons for it, America would presumably stay out of the war. In response to the Ambassador's remark that the Japanese Navy had certain misgivings with regard to the difficulties involved, the Foreign Minister explained that there were three principal reasons which dictated swift action:

- 1) The occupation of Singapore would be a critical blow at the heart of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser warfare, etc.). The effect upon the morale of the British people would be very serious and thus conducive to an early termination of the war.

- 2) A surprise capture of Singapore was likely to keep America out of the war, because the possession of Singapore would give Japan control of southern Asia and hence of the whole of East Asia. America, who had not yet finished rearming at the present time and in any case was very reluctant to expose her Navy to danger west of Hawaii, would be able to do so all the less after that. If, moreover, Japan would then respect the American interests and refrain from attacking the Philippines, this would nullify even the argument of prestige which Roosevelt might want to use to make the war acceptable to the Americans. America could scarcely afford to declare war and then have to watch impotently while the Japanese took the Philippines, without being able to do a thing about it.

- 3) It would appear to be in Japan's interest with a view to the coming reorganization of the world, which would also affect the Far East, to secure for herself now during the war the position which she would want to occupy at the conclusion of the peace, for England could never be induced by negotiation to give up Singapore, and would rather keep on fighting to the last for her Empire.

Ambassador Oshima concurred entirely with this line of thought and said that he would do everything to make this policy prevail.

The Foreign Minister then added that if America should declare war because of Japan's attack on Singapore, that would be an indication that she had intended sooner or later to enter the war in any case. While it was desirable to avert this, her entry into the war, for the reasons stated before, would not have any decisive effect whatever and could not imperil the ultimate victory of the countries of the Tripartite Pact. The Foreign Minister further expressed his belief that any temporary strengthening of English morale as a result of America's entry into the war would be amply offset by the loss of Singapore. If, contrary to expectation, however, the Americans should nevertheless be foolhardy enough to

send their Navy beyond Hawaii to the Far East, that would offer the countries of the Tripartite Pact their best opportunity of bringing the war to a rapid conclusion. The Foreign Minister was convinced that the Japanese Navy would then do a complete job. Ambassador Oshima replied that he did not believe that the Americans would do that, which was a pity, but he had complete faith in the victory of his Navy in Japanese waters.

The Foreign Minister then stated that, if convenient for the Ambassador, he would hold the opening session of the Political Commission of the Tripartite Pact on his return to Berlin.⁵ The Political Commission would draft the outline of the work of the other commissions. The basic decisions, according to the text of the Pact, lay exclusively with the Political Commission.

Ambassador Oshima said that he had requested Foreign Minister Matsuoka to come to Berlin with as definite proposals as possible. The Foreign Minister replied that it would be very desirable if Matsuoka would bring with him the decision for the attack on Singapore. The further joint conduct of the war would require the closest collaboration in all spheres, especially with regard to intelligence and the press.

Ambassador Stahmer would be available as liaison for the regular exchange of intelligence reports. As regards the press, Minister Schmidt, who headed the Press Division of the Foreign Ministry, had recently voiced certain complaints about the cooperation with the Japanese Domei News Agency. The working relationship with the Italians was already exemplary, and the same held true for the cooperation with Rumania, Hungary, and Slovakia. The press, radio, etc., in those countries had already been harmonized to a point where they constituted a unified instrument of war. Teletype, ticker tape, and other machines had been set up in the Foreign Offices of these countries, which were in constant contact with one another. The same close contact would have to be established with Japan. Minister Schmidt had been instructed to get in touch with the Ambassador to that end. The Ambassador said he was glad this had been done and he intended to draft a program together with our men aiming at intensification of our propaganda in all fields in Japan.

Ambassador Oshima noted that resentment against America in Japan had mounted considerably under the influence of events. The Foreign Minister pointed out with respect to the recent declaration by Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador in the United States, relative to Japan's attitude in the event of America's entry into the war,⁶ that he thought it advisable to use firm language with the

⁵ See document No. 304 and footnote 1.

⁶ See document No. 81.

United States. Ambassador Oshima answered that the Japanese Foreign Minister had issued instructions to that effect. The Foreign Minister stressed that especially with a view to keeping America out of the war it would be necessary to use plain language. The United States would hold back only if it realized that it was confronted with an iron determination. The people of the United States had no love for National Socialism, but they were nevertheless opposed to entry into the war so as not to have to sacrifice their sons. The American people felt instinctively that Roosevelt and his Jewish wirepullers were trying to drag them into the war without any reason. On that account the United States had to be confronted with a direct and strong policy, though of course not an aggressive one. The United States had to be made to understand that while Germany, Italy, and Japan bore the American people no ill will, any aggressive ambitions would find themselves up against an iron wall of determined nations, one which comprised virtually the whole world. In this connection it would be necessary to counter the distortion attempts of English propaganda by the closest cooperation. All policy speeches and addresses should be preceded by a continued exchange of views. To illustrate the point, the Foreign Minister called attention to Matsuoka's recent statement about Japan's willingness to act as peace mediator,¹ which the enemy propaganda had used extensively for its purpose.

The friendship of Japan, continued the Foreign Minister, had made possible the rearming of Germany after the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Japan on her part had thereby been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of influence in China. The victory of Germany on the Continent following the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact was now bringing great advantages to Japan also. France had disappeared as a power factor in East Asia (Indochina). England was also already weakened to a great extent and Japan had been able to advance ever closer to Singapore. Germany had therewith already made a great contribution to the framing of the destiny of both nations. In the future as well, as a result of our geographic position, we would have to bear the heaviest burden in the final struggle. If it should now come to a collision with Russia, which we did not desire, in that case also we would have to bear the heaviest share of the burden. If Germany were to become weak, Japan would find herself confronted in a short time by a world

¹ Ott had reported from Tokyo on this incident in his telegrams Nos. 235 of Feb. 18 (174/136566D-66E), 241 of Feb. 19 (174/136567), and 250 of Feb. 21 (174/136569). Ribbentrop in telegram No. 82 of Feb. 21 from Fuschl, No. 201 from the Foreign Ministry (174/136568), instructed him to discourage mediation offers as they might be interpreted as signs of German and Italian weakness. Boltze's report from Tokyo of Mar. 8 (1671/394655-64) forwarded copies of documents exchanged between the British and Japanese Governments in this connection.

coalition. We were in the same boat. The fate of both nations for centuries to come was now being determined. What had been said applied to Italy as well. The interests of the three countries would never come into conflict. The defeat of Germany would also denote the end of the Japanese Imperial idea and Japan would lose again everything which she had conquered with the blood of her soldiers. Thus it would be a crime against the spirit of the future to try now to evade the assumption of final responsibility. A tremendous opportunity was offered to Japan. To bring the war to an end there was still required one final exertion. Every statesman of the combined powers must have day and night no other thought than to defeat England at whatever point in the world that could be done. Then victory would come quickly and reconstruction could begin. Ambassador Oshima expressed his explicit agreement with these views and he indicated the determination of Japan to maintain her Imperial position. The Japanese Prime Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister, he was able to state in confidence, shared his view and were in favor of an early attack on Singapore. The Foreign Minister commented that England would never forgive Japan for forcing her out of China.

The Foreign Minister then discussed the tremendous tasks which the reorganization of Europe and the Far East would impose upon the Powers of the Tripartite Pact. The problems arising from it called for a solution on a large scale. The plan was to oppose any overcentralization, and rather to find a solution on a basis of parity, especially in the economic field. The Foreign Minister here enunciated the principle that there should be free commercial intercourse on a large scale between the European-African hemisphere, controlled by Germany and Italy, and the Far Eastern sphere of interest, controlled by Japan. He visualized this in such a way that, for example, Japan would continue to trade and conclude commercial treaties directly with the independent states of the European hemisphere as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade and conclude commercial agreements directly with the countries in the Japanese sphere of interest, such as China, Thailand, and Indochina. Furthermore, there should be a basic policy of granting each other preferential treatment as against third parties. The Ambassador concurred with this proposal. The Foreign Minister stated in this context that Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat would go to Japan to conclude a commercial treaty.⁸ His mission would be limited to

⁸ For the background of the Wohlthat mission, see vol. XI of this series, document No. 341 and footnote 10 and document No. 424. For further developments in this matter, see documents Nos. 190 and 429.

that. The broad outline of the new commercial policy would be laid down by the Economic Commission of the Tripartite Pact in Berlin, as agreed.

Then the Foreign Minister, making clear that this was strictly a theoretical question, spoke of the possibility that new outrages by the United States might some day compel the Pact Powers to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy were basically resolved to do so, but now, after the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, this step, too, should be taken jointly if it were taken at all. That would be a lesson that would open the eyes of the people of the United States to the situation, and under certain circumstances it might lead to a change in public opinion in favor of isolationism. Naturally a situation would have to be picked in which America was completely in the wrong. The joint step of the Pact Powers would have to be followed up by appropriate propaganda. However, this was by no means a matter of immediate concern at the moment.

The Foreign Minister then expressed his pleasure over the impending visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister, who was expected in Berlin for March 12 to 15.* Ambassador Oshima remarked that the Japanese Foreign Minister would subsequently go to Rome and Moscow. The Foreign Minister stated that Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact would be effected either in Berlin or in Vienna.

Replying to the Foreign Minister's question as to what he thought the tasks of the Military Commission would be, Ambassador Oshima enumerated the following: the question of the procurement of new weapons; the exchange of experiences on the management of armament plants; the exchange of inventions in the armaments field, and other matters of military collaboration.

The Foreign Minister then talked about the shipment of crude rubber from Indochina to Germany; the first installment of 6,000 tons should have been sent in the middle of February, but this had not been done so far. He asked expressly that Japan give special attention to the crude rubber deliveries to Germany. Oshima replied that Matsuoka had stated that shipping of the rubber from Indochina to Germany would be expedited in every possible manner, but that the question of transport involved difficulties. The Ambassador said he would get in touch with Tokyo immediately to urge that the matter be speeded up.

The Ambassador went on to say that the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden had released to the French 25,000 tons of crude rubber for shipment to America. Japan would like to keep the rubber from America and was opposed to this. Oshima requested the Foreign Minister to lend his support in making the Armistice Com-

* See documents Nos. 218, 222, 230, and 233.

mission rescind this decision and, if this were still possible, in placing the rubber in question at Japan's disposal. Inquiries made by the Foreign Minister indicated that the rubber had not been released for America but for sale to other countries because France was in need of foreign exchange for Indochina; the Foreign Minister then gave the necessary instructions to comply with Japan's wishes.

The Foreign Minister stated that the question of the communication of patents would have to be discussed in the Economic Commission; he asked that Japanese patents also be made available to us in return if we desired them. Oshima gave his agreement.

Oshima then asked whether accession to the Tripartite Pact had been discussed with the Russians. The Foreign Minister answered in the affirmative. Molotov had submitted the proposal to Stalin and had afterwards declared that they were in principle willing to accede, subject to certain conditions. These conditions included Russia's interest in Finland, the wish for a closer relationship with Bulgaria, and the problem of the Straits. Russia's wishes respecting Bulgaria did not coincide with Bulgaria's view of the matter. Regarding the question of the Straits we had declared ourselves willing to support a revision of the Montreux statute, but expressed doubt that the Turks would be prepared to give favorable consideration to far-reaching Russian requests. The Russians had not been very pleased with the Axis guarantee to Rumania, but in the end Moscow had accepted the fact in view of our large economic interests in the Balkans, especially in respect to the Rumanian petroleum. However, the political conversations with Russia were still suspended; they might be continued after matters had progressed further in the Balkans. The large-scale commercial treaty with Russia represented a value of over 2.5 billion reichsmarks.¹⁰

To the question of the Foreign Minister regarding Japan's relations with Russia, the Ambassador replied that Molotov was prepared to conclude a pact on the condition that the concessions in North Sakhalin were returned to Russia. In general the relations were good. The Russians sent relatively little to Chiang Kai-shek, and that only against cash. It was important to reach a settlement with Russia in order to have a free hand in the south. The Foreign Minister promised to study the question of how he could be of help to Japan.

In regard to China, Ambassador Oshima stated that there were two tendencies in Japan. One group wished to strengthen Wang Ching-wei, the other sought to reach an understanding with Chiang Kai-shek. Negotiations with the latter had lately been stopped.

¹⁰ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 637.

There was no one unified line of Japanese policy, however, as he had said. The Foreign Minister suggested that Japan should put off any new attempts to reach an understanding with Chiang Kai-shek until the German armies had resumed operations, so that a settlement of the most far-reaching scope could be achieved with Chiang Kai-shek under the impact of the success of German arms. It would be advisable not to expose oneself to a rebuff, and Germany did not wish to waste her powder prematurely if any mediation should be desired. However, Germany was willing to support Japan in any way she desired, even by strengthening the position of Wang Ching-wei, if necessary. Ambassador Oshima pointed out that it was essential to settle the Chinese question in order to free the Japanese troops for other operations. To the question whether Germany would be prepared to recognize Wang Ching-wei, the Foreign Minister replied that he personally had a positive attitude toward the matter and would recommend recognition to the Führer, if the occasion arose.

The Ambassador then requested the Foreign Minister's support in inducing the Vichy Government to accept Japan's mediation proposal in the Thailand-Indochina conflict.¹¹ The Foreign Minister will give Ambassador Abetz immediate instructions to intervene.

Ambassador Oshima then said that new times called for new concepts. The concept of repression and colonialism had to be done away with. In speaking of this he had the Dutch East Indies, Burma, and Africa in mind. The Foreign Minister replied that this was not an easy problem, and that it would require careful study to find new ways here. The main thing at this time, however, was to win the war, and to do so as soon as possible.

Ambassador Oshima requested assistance in his endeavor to have the Japanese commissions housed in the new building of the French Consulate General, next door to the Japanese Embassy. The Foreign Minister promised this.

Replying to the Ambassador's question of when the Foreign Minister thought he would be able to present his credentials to the Führer, the Foreign Minister replied that he would submit the request to the Führer at the earliest opportunity; he thought Oshima would be received in Berlin or at the Berghof in the early part or the middle of the coming week.¹²

¹¹ See document No. 64 and footnote 4.

¹² The Foreign Minister, through Minister Altenburg, directed that copies of this memorandum, with certain passages omitted, be sent to Göring, Himmler, and Lammers and also to a further group of officials mainly in the Foreign Ministry (F7/0386-88).

A copy, with some omissions, was sent to the Embassy in Moscow (1447/365178-95).

An extensive résumé was sent to the Embassy in Tokyo by telegram No. 233 of Feb. 28 (174/136587-93).

No. 79

91/100655-56

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Ireland

Telegram

TOP SECRET

FEBRUARY 24, 1941—2:05 a. m.³

No. 94 from the

Special Train

Received Berlin, February 24—3:00 a. m.

No. 97 of February 24 from the Foreign Ministry

For the Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 154 of February 19, 1941.²

Your replies to telegram No. 79 of February 11³ make it appear inadvisable to me to go further into the inquiries of L, in view of the present situation. Now, however, please take up the conversation with de Valera, which did not take place in December, regarding the possibility of English intervention in Ireland and our willingness to render assistance in such a case.⁴ You may mention by way of introduction that you had wished back in December to discuss with the Prime Minister personally certain possibilities that were, indeed, of the greatest importance for Ireland, but that de Valera's eye ailment had at the time prevented you from carrying out your intention. Then, please express our willingness in principle to render assistance in the event of an English attack on Ireland. This assistance is naturally based on the condition that the Irish Government desires it and that it is, moreover, determined to offer vigorous resistance to a British invasion. The Irish Prime Minister himself has indeed repeatedly proclaimed such determination, just as he has already declared that in such a case he would fight on the German side. Actually there is no doubt that the fate of Ireland depends very largely on the outcome of the struggle between Germany and England. Ireland will be able to assert her national demands as well as to maintain fully political independence only if England is vanquished; Germany, too, is keenly interested in the realization of both aims after the war. And so, in the last analysis, we are already in the same camp today, although we, of course, scrupulously respect Irish neutrality. Although it is far from us to anticipate in any way the decisions of the Irish Government as to how, if need be, the battle against England is to be fought, we nevertheless wonder whether there is not an element of danger in the fact that if prepara-

² Another date, "Fuschl, Feb. 23," appears at the end of the document.

³ In this telegram (91/100647-52) Hempel summarized a conversation he had had with a high ranking officer of the Irish Army, who gave him some information on personalities in the Irish Army and attitudes of the Government. For security reasons Hempel called him L, as he had reported in telegram No. 109 of Feb. 4 (91/100629-32).

⁴ Not found.

⁵ See vol. xi of this series, document No. 523.

tions are inadequate, German assistance through the delivery of arms and ammunition for example (particularly captured English arms), which would not start until after the attack was made, might easily come too late. We would therefore be prepared even now to make certain preparations for this contingency, if the Irish Prime Minister would let us know what kind of requests for assistance Ireland would make. It is clear that questions are involved which require the strictest secrecy, and it is for this reason that you wished to speak only with him in person, so as to exclude any other way which might involve danger of exposure. Thus you are at his disposal in case he wishes to make any suggestions at all with respect to purely internal German measures in preparation for a possible assistance, which, as stated, we were prepared to take. Should de Valera discuss your statements in detail, you may carry the conversation further in accordance with telegrams Nos. 402 and 422 of November 26 and December 5⁵ of last year. If, on the contrary, he shows no inclination to go along with your ideas you may hint that you have mild doubts as to Ireland's determination to resist; for a will to resist that did not make every effort to be in a position to conduct a successful defense, in the last analysis, had only theoretical significance. Please report on the course of the conversation as soon as it has taken place.⁶

RIBBENTROP

⁵ Vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 407 and 455.

⁶ See document No. 150.

No. 80

265/172626

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 171 of February 24

ANKARA, February 24, 1941—3:10 p. m.

Received February 24—7:30 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 170 of February 24.¹

The wording of the interview corresponds entirely to the views of the Turkish Government so far reported. The sentence to the effect that Turkey would [by no means] remain indifferent² toward a penetration of her security zone is in some places interpreted to mean that in this case Turkey would strengthen her ties with Eng-

¹ This telegram (265/172625) reported the text of an interview with Saracoglu published in the newspaper *Ulus* on the subject of the Turkish-Bulgarian declaration.

² This passage was apparently garbled in transmission. The German text reads "Kampf indifferent" which perhaps ought to read "Keineswegs indifferent". This reading would be in accordance with the French text of the interview to which reference is made in footnote 1: "La Turquie ne saurait en aucune façon rester indifférente . . ."

land without herself entering the war. In any case the interview represents a definite position with respect to Eden's attempt at applying very great pressure. The closing sentence of the communiqué³ can be interpreted as an invitation to Germany to bring about a nonaggression declaration between our countries in line with the efforts which I began in December and later halted at your instructions.⁴ Considering an increased interest in Axis policy on the part of Turkey I request that such a possibility be given renewed consideration, all the more since it does not appear to me to involve any sort of option between Russia and Turkey.

PAPEN

³ It reads: "Toute intention qui se manifesterait dans les mêmes circonstances et pour la réalisation d'un but pareil serait d'ailleurs accueillie par la Turquie avec le même empressement."

⁴ See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 434 and 459.

No. 81

174/136582

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan

Telegram

No. 95 of February 24 FUSCHL, February 24, 1941—5:30 p. m.
 from Fuschl Received Berlin, February 24—6:10 p. m.
 No. 209 from the Foreign Ministry Sent February 24.
 RAM 26/R

For the Ambassador.

According to a report from the Embassy in Washington,¹ Ambassador Nomura, at a press conference, answered the question whether Japan was obligated to declare war on the United States if the latter declared war on Germany: "That is a question of treaty interpretation which I do not want to go into."

I ask you to speak to the Foreign Minister about the accuracy of this statement and point out that the statement evidently does not correspond with the facts, because the question of Japan's entry into the war in case of an American declaration of war is unequivocally clarified by the text of the Tripartite Pact.

Please conduct the conversation in a definitely friendly manner, but indicate thereby that in our opinion it would have been more expedient for Nomura to have simply referred to the clear text of the Tripartite Pact.

For the rest we did not accord any exaggerated importance to the Ambassador's statement, and therefore left it to the Japanese Gov-

¹ Telegram No. 446 of Feb. 21 (174/136578-74).

ernment as to whether it considered a rectification necessary or not. In principle, however, we were definitely of the opinion that toward America clear language is more appropriate than an evasive statement.²

RIBBENTROP

² In telegram No. 285 of Feb. 27 (174/136585) Ott reported that Matsuoka shared Ribbentrop's view on Japan's obligation under the Tripartite Pact and that Nomura had been instructed accordingly.

No. 82

833/280730-31

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

[BERLIN, February 24, 1941.]¹

Pol. I M 394 g. Rs.

In the meeting between Raeder and Riccardi² the Italian side mentioned incidentally in the discussion of the disarmament of the French fleet in Toulon the following Italian plan:

The Italian Navy had a long time ago made preparations for a surprise occupation of Corsica. The naval forces and troop transport vessels have been ready for it for a long time. Because of the preparation of the troop transport vessels for that purpose, the repeated requests by the German Navy that Italian merchant vessels be placed at its disposal could not be granted.

Grand Admiral Raeder and Admiral Fricke took up this point, showed the great importance of this question for foreign policy, warned against it and demanded that in no circumstances should this plan be carried out before the Führer had defined his attitude toward it. In the further discussion of this plan the Italians said that they had worked it out for their Navy, especially for the contingency that Tripoli had to be abandoned.³

Grand Admiral Raeder pointed out that from the military standpoint the occupation of Corsica was unnecessary even if Tripoli were lost. The area around Corsica could be dominated by the proper

¹ No date appears on the document, except in a marginal note: "Submitted to the Führer by the Foreign Minister. H[ewel], Feb. 24."

² See document No. 65.

³ The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Dec. 1, 1940-Mar. 24, 1941) contains this passage at Feb. 15:

"In case Tripolitania should be lost to the English, the occupation of the French Mediterranean coast including Corsica and also Malta takes on increased significance. Therefore the execution of *Attila* must at all times be possible. The High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces are requested to report all changes in degrees of preparation for *Attila* (this applies particularly to the air landing corps). With the execution of Operation *Attila* the surprise occupation of Corsica comes also into question. Guiding lines for working this out will follow."

For the *Attila* Directive, see vol. XI of this series, document No. 488.

employment of the Italian naval and air forces from the north, east, and south (Sardinia).

The occupation of Corsica might serve militarily to drive France and especially French North Africa directly into the arms of the English.

Grand Admiral Raeder requested especially that the Foreign Minister be informed about the matter and that its importance to foreign policy be pointed out. He intends to make a report on it to the Führer. The Grand Admiral would prefer, however, to report to the Führer about this point first within the framework of his full report of the meeting. I pointed out, on the other hand, that the Foreign Minister would probably consider this matter very urgent and mainly related to foreign policy. In any case Grand Admiral Raeder requests that care be exercised lest his confidential relations with the Italian Navy are affected. In this connection the Navy also points out that the Führer has dealt with the question of Corsica once before, in connection with the previously prepared Operation *Attila*.⁴

BITTER

⁴In his report No. 187 of Feb. 17 (M341/M015084-87) Bintelen wired:

"B. In regard to the explanations given me on Feb. 9 of the preparations for a possible occupation of Nice and Corsica, I asked Guzzoni if these preparations for the occupation of Corsica were to be understood within the same framework as he had indicated at the Obersalzberg regarding the occupation of Nice, that is for the case that we would decide to take possession of unoccupied France.

"General Guzzoni explained that the same naturally applied to Corsica; no provocations on their (the Italians') part were intended, because in that case one would have to reckon with a strong reaction in North Africa which could have most unpleasant consequences for Libya. There was also a further point of view which could bring them to take the step of an occupation of Corsica, namely if there were sure information that the English on their side wished to occupy Corsica, a measure which they would unconditionally have to anticipate. But in this case also they would communicate with us in advance."

No. 83

647/255195

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Paris

Teletype

SECRET

BERLIN, February 25, 1941—3:30 p. m.

No. 651

For Ambassador Abetz personally.

The Foreign Minister has instructed me to submit a proposal for the further handling of the Arab question, especially as to how this problem is to be dealt with in view of our aim of defeating England.

For this proposal it is of importance whether we are to comply with the Arab wish that we issue a new declaration on the future of

the Arab countries in the sense of an over-all Arab solution.¹ In this respect we are to some extent hampered by considerations for Italy; but we have thus far also been acting on the assumption that declarations involving a crumbling away of the French colonial empire are at present inadvisable, and we have therefore since the Armistice taken this circumstance into account with respect to the Arabs. This of course had the result that the conversations with the Arabs become tortuous. The fact that Syria is not a French colony but from a formal point of view a protectorate under the League of Nations is in my opinion only of secondary importance for our decision. With respect to Indochina we have now to a limited extent departed from this attitude because of our Japanese policy.

I should appreciate a statement as soon as possible on whether in your opinion account should be taken of French-Syrian relations in issuing declarations regarding a Greater Arab empire. I am anxious to make use of your view in my proposal to the Foreign Minister.²

WOERMANN

¹ Such wishes had been expressed in a memorandum of Jan. 14 from an "Arab National Committee" in Beirut which had reached the Foreign Ministry through Hentig. The document was submitted to Rintelen by Melchers on Feb. 4 in a German translation (647/255092-96). The Arabic text is filmed on 647/255097-102.

² In a message of Feb. 26 (647/255191) Woermann supplemented this instruction by asking Abetz whether, in his opinion, there would be objections to adopting the following formula in negotiations with Arab representatives: "Germany and Italy declare that they have no objection to Syria and Lebanon obtaining complete independence." Woermann added that this formula would be kept secret until the conclusion of peace.

For Abetz's reply, see document No. 103.

No. 84

230/152524

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BELGRADE, February 25, 1941—6:15 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received February 25—8:18 p. m.¹

No. 159 of February 25

Exclusively for the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 157 of February 24² and to your telephoned instructions of today.³

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 670 to Fuschl, Feb. 25, 9:35 p.m."

² In this telegram (230/152521) Heeren reported that Cincar-Marković had asked him to speak with Ribbentrop personally "in a matter with respect to which the greatest importance is being attached to keeping it absolutely secret." Heeren therefore requested instructions.

³ Not found.

The matter concerning which the [Yugoslav] Foreign Minister asked me to report personally and orally to the Reich Foreign Minister in order that absolute secrecy be observed is the following:

The Prince Regent accepts the Führer's suggestion regarding a meeting at the Berghof for the purpose of an oral discussion. He proposes the beginning of next week as the time. He intends to cross the border over the Wurzen Pass up to Villach by automobile. From there on by train. Arrival at the Berghof desired if possible at noon of the day in question. The Prince Regent requests that all the details be discussed with me orally in order to make sure that absolute secrecy is observed.

HEEREN

No. 85

230/152522-23/2

*The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister*¹

Teletype

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, February 25, 1941.

St.S. No. 129

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires told me today on instruction of his Government that the Italian-Yugoslav conversation had now been continued; the confidential representative of whom you know² met with the Duce again yesterday.

The representative had stated that Prince Regent Paul was determined to conclude an agreement with Italy with the intention in this way to develop the Italo-Yugoslav Treaty of 1937.³ In this connection the representative had recalled the Yugoslav wishes already known (Salonika was meant). The Prince Regent believes, however, that before conclusion of this new agreement the atmosphere has still to be improved. Otherwise public opinion in Yugoslavia, influenced as it is by British propaganda, would be too greatly surprised. The same was also true of the circles close to the Prince Regent which had close relations with the British Royal House.

For this reason the Prince Regent suggested to the Duce that he make a friendly gesture toward Yugoslavia as a prelude to the new agreement. This gesture could consist of some sort of suitable public statement.

¹ A slightly different version of this document (813/276473-75) in a file on visits of foreign diplomats is marked "canceled." The only significant textual difference is noted in footnote 5.

² See document No. 15.

³ See document No. 15, footnote 2.

The confidential representative had proved to be informed about the recent Yugoslav conversations at the Berghof.⁴ He had furthermore pointed out how important the conclusion of the new agreement planned would be to Italy, for the agreement was calculated to bring about the collapse of England's last positions in the Balkans. Turkey would decide in favor of the Axis, and Greece would lose her last will to resist.

Finally, the confidential representative had also intimated that Prince Regent Paul was in a difficult situation because he now had to make the decision for Yugoslavia. The Regent was convinced, however, that England could not win the war and had drawn from this the conclusions mentioned.

According to Cosmelli's account, the Duce had answered the confidential representative as follows: He considered the development of the Treaty of 1937 to be a useful contribution to clarification of the position of the Balkan Powers toward the Axis. The Duce, then, did not mistake the advantages of such an agreement. He understood Yugoslavia's natural aspirations in the direction of the Aegean. To be sure, he believed that these should not be publicly defined prematurely.

On the other hand the Duce had stated that it was advisable to speed up Yugoslavia's enrollment in the front of the Axis Powers. He considered the new agreement to be a fundamental prerequisite to Belgrade's rapprochement with Berlin as well as to the inclusion of Yugoslavia in the system of the Axis Powers in the form of Yugoslav accession to the Tripartite Pact.

The Duce had declared himself ready to make the gesture suggested by the Yugoslavs in order to prepare the Yugoslav public for the new agreement; in this way, a psychological start with Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact would also be made simultaneously.⁵ The Duce had emphasized the harmony of German and Italian interests in this matter.

In conclusion, according to Cosmelli's account, the confidential representative had said that the Prince Regent would probably agree with the Duce's statements; therefore the confidential representative would probably return soon and this time together with official Yugoslav representatives.

I interrupted the Italian Chargé several times in the course of his statements in order to be able to render correctly the contents of

⁴ See document No. 48.

⁵ In the canceled version (see footnote 1) the remainder of this paragraph reads as follows:

"For the road to Rome was not possible either, without going to Berlin, and in the same way the Duce considered the agreement discussed as useful not only for Rome but also for Berlin. The interests of the Axis were identical in this matter."

his (not entirely clear) instruction. In this connection it developed that Cosmelli was not able to state, any more precisely than he had done, what the planned Italo-Yugoslav agreement is actually supposed to look like. On the one hand, according to his explanation it can only be a question of a *public* agreement, for the Prince Regent wants to prepare public opinion in Yugoslavia for it. The international effect of the agreement is also spoken of. On the other hand the Duce calls a public definition of the Yugoslav aspirations premature.

Nor could Cosmelli say what sort of preparatory gesture the Duce was to make.

In any case I asked the Chargé d'Affaires to make sure that no further steps are taken in the matter until a reply from here has been sent to Rome.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 86

274/177756

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

FUSCHL, February 26, 1941—3:10 a. m.

No. 102 of February 25 from Fuschl

Received Berlin, February 26—3:30 a. m.

No. 228 of February 26

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent February 26—3:50 a. m.

For the Minister personally.

Please inform the Bulgarian Foreign Minister at once that the bridging of the lower Danube by German troops will take place on February 28. A number of German antiaircraft artillery units and air defense forces will be dispatched ahead onto Bulgarian territory the same day in accordance with the request of the Bulgarian Government.¹ The crossing of the Danube by the German troops will begin on March 2.

Please point out to the Bulgarian Foreign Minister explicitly the necessity of the Bulgarian Government's observing the strictest secrecy with respect to this information.

Report by wire on the execution [of the instruction].²

RIBBENTROP

¹ See document No. 54.

² In telegram No. 232 of Feb. 26 (274/177761) Richthofen reported that the instruction had been carried out.

No. 87

265/172631

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 179 of February 26

ANKARA, February 26, 1941.

Received February 26—12:55 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

A fortunate coincidence brought it about that yesterday, on the eve of the Eden visit, I had the Minister President,² the Foreign Minister, the Minister of War,³ Ali Fuad,⁴ and Allied Chiefs of Mission with whom I am friendly to dinner and exhibited to them the film "Victory in the West" as the extreme unction for English pressures. I believe that the impression was very strong. Whereas at first the Minister President and the War Minister assured me emphatically that our Balkan policy was with certainty driving Turkey into the war, Saracoglu requested me after the object lesson was over in all circumstances to see to it that our troops did not advance as long as Eden was in Ankara and the decision regarding the English position was not known. He promised to inform me immediately after Eden's departure. I strongly recommend that we do not make the position of the Turkish Government difficult during Eden's visit by advancing into Bulgaria. Eden leaves on February 28. Please do not publish the fact that the film was shown.

VON PAPEN

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 678 to Fuschl, Feb. 26."² Refik Saydam.³ Saffet Arikan.⁴ Lt. Col. Ali Fuad Eaden, head of the Turkish War College.

No. 88

589/244145-50

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1941—10:37 p. m.

No. 505 of February 25

Received February 27—5:50 p. m.

For OKW, Ausland; OKH Attaché Branch; Chief of the General Staff; Air Ministry Attaché Group; Chief of the Operations Staff.

The Authorization or Lend-Lease Law now before Congress comes from the pen of leading Jewish intimates of the President. He is to be given the possibility of carrying out without restriction his

policy of influencing the progress of the war by measures "short of war."¹ Thus with the passage of the law the Jewish ideology will have prevailed to a very considerable extent in the United States. Opponents of the law, among them persons of the greatest stature such as Lindbergh, recognize that the Jews (one group garbled) organ of Roosevelt have now not only seized all the means of influencing the war economically, but also, in the course of American rearmament, could use the law in order to drive the United States into the war. Ideological questions are here very closely connected with questions of the conduct of the war. Since the officers' corps, in particular in the Army, naturally sees things differently from the Jewish leadership, the important thing must be to support these circles which consider Lindbergh to be their greatest protagonist. In this it is essential that the American armed forces and their leadership, as well as the American rearmament, be discussed in the German press all the less, the more sharply the political press battle is fought.

1. The Authorization Law is meant to free Roosevelt from all internal legal ties and give him the possibility of supporting at his discretion the present and possible future American vassals, particularly England. Under the law he would receive full powers to manufacture and repair all conceivable war material for England or other countries not only in private American factories but also in government arsenals, as well as issue the necessary instructions, even of a secret nature, for their use. Release of war material from American armed forces stocks up to a value of 1.3 billion dollars is also provided for. War material is understood to include not only arms, ammunition, airplanes, armored cars, etc., or such equipment as is needed for their production or use, but probably also goods such as cotton, wheat, meat, etc.

The cost would, for the time being, be assumed by the United States. Congress would have to appropriate funds for this purpose annually. It is estimated that the deliveries of war material to England, China, and other vassals will amount to 7 billion dollars by the middle of next year. It is within Roosevelt's discretion to ask of the English in return for this support whatever he considers proper in the interest of the United States, either warships, territorial concessions, especially oil concessions, money, or other things. Thus the English are at the mercy of the Americans and will be all the more dependent on them the more their financial situation deteriorates and their armament industry is further destroyed by the German air attacks; and the more in consequence the [task of] supplying goods of all sorts and of supplying all parts and

¹ In English in the original.

states of the British Empire, which otherwise is done from England, passes over fully to the United States.

The full powers which Roosevelt would receive under the law in addition to those he already has as President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces have never been concentrated in one president of the United States, either in peace or war. He decides the course of American foreign policy, he decides where the conduct of the war should be supported by arms deliveries and where not, he can mobilize the entire economic resources of the United States to carry out his policy, along with extensively influencing public life. The measures to be expected after passage of the Authorization Law already cast their shadows before them. There is more and more talk of an early establishment of a full war economy with restrictions on consumption, price control, longer working hours, etc. Especially significant is Mrs. Roosevelt's warning that the Americans must get used to doing without new automobiles, aluminum cooking pots, etc. It is not impossible that certain clothing materials and foodstuffs will also be included in the restrictions on consumption.

2. With the same speed in which the Authorization Law is to be pushed through Congress, all the organization and technical details for its execution are also being prepared. Roosevelt has already appointed the liaison man in London necessary for this, the New York banker, Harriman, whose function is to conduct all war transactions in England, and inform the Americans of the English requirements and the English of all the possibilities for American deliveries. In order to get a clear picture of the latter, lists are being compiled here at the present time showing the stocks of war material of the American armed forces, the war orders of the Americans and English, their needs in war material in the next 2 years and the expanded capacities for delivery of American industry. At first, however, large deliveries of new war material would not be possible, and therefore only deliveries from the stocks of the American armed forces could be made. They speak of the possibility of handing over additional old destroyers and submarine chasers, various long-distance seaplanes, American merchant ships and foreign ones in American ports, also airplanes of the Army Air Force, expendable weapons and ammunition of the Army, and still more (see telegram No. 427 of February 17²).

Considering the fact that the American-Japanese situation is becoming constantly more tense, however, it is questionable whether the United States will decide to give up considerable amounts of

² Not printed (589/244090-94).

war material from armed forces stocks. This applies in particular to airplanes and arms, but also to ships, which would be needed especially urgently for supplying the fleet in case of a conflict in the Pacific. The statements by the Commander in Chief [*Chief of Staff*] of the Army, General Marshall, to the effect that all armed forces have a minimum armament, are very revealing in this regard (see telegram No. 466 of February 22³). A second question is where the Americans would place the main emphasis in arms deliveries: whether in England, Greece, the Near or the Far East, and whether they will keep their promise to deliver everything necessary to the Latin American countries. The policy of delivering war material carried on with pompous speeches for years, will, exactly like every other branch of warfare, have to strive for the concentration of all forces on one focal point. If the Latin American countries lacking other sources should soon and urgently demand large quantities of war material from the Americans, the American war policy could find itself in considerable embarrassment as to how it will keep its promises.

Finally it is of prime importance when at the earliest England and the various vassals can obtain possession of the war material after passage of the Authorization Law, to be expected at the beginning of March 1941. This is in the first place a problem of availability, and secondly a problem of transportation. There is little ship tonnage available, and some of the ships would have to cover long and dangerous distances. Even if, in view of the fact that immediate large deliveries by the armament industry are impossible, Roosevelt should make stocks from the armed forces available in March, these would have to be transported to the harbors, loaded, and shipped. According to present experience months could pass before the English or other vassals gain possession of the war material. The exact time cannot be estimated, however, because the effect of the German warfare on shipping cannot be predicted. The same is true of the transportation of the increasing deliveries of new war material which are to be expected from the more rapid increase of American industrial production starting with the middle of 1941.

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

³ Not found.

No. 89

129/121083-34

The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

LISBON, February 26, 1941—11:35 p. m.

No. 388 of February 26

Received February 27—10:00 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 227 of the 22nd.¹

1. No rumors of an intended meeting between Salazar and Franco, which used to crop up repeatedly at regular intervals, have been heard of here for months.

2. Although Salazar is kept continuously informed of the plans of the Caudillo and his Government through Ambassador Franco, with whom he works in closest cooperation, a meeting of the two Heads of Government with a view to establishing direct contact would undoubtedly be what Salazar had in mind, and would be in the interest of the relations as laid down in the 1939 treaty of friendship between Spain and Portugal.² To be sure, Salazar might be little disposed toward such a contact as long as Serrano Suñer is in office, especially with news reaching here from Spain about his being increasingly rejected by a majority of the Spanish people; this would hardly be conducive to the intended purpose of a mutual understanding.

3. It is correct that Salazar does not wish to become involved in war, in line with his neutrality declaration. This, however, has nothing to do either with his alleged pro-English attitude which actually does not exist with Salazar or his closest associates, nor with a belief in England's victory, of which influential persons here, Salazar included, are by no means convinced.

4. Suñer's contention that Portugal is afraid all around is not true. For one thing, as stated in continuous reports from this Legation,³ Portugal is stubbornly resisting English pressure in the economic sphere, notwithstanding the obvious threat to her overseas possessions. As an instance of this, Portugal categorically refused to follow English suggestions for suspending Portuguese economic relations with Germany and the Axis countries, whereas Spain, as has now been disclosed,⁴ last year secretly made England the firm promise to bar the transit of Portuguese goods to Germany.

HUENE

¹ Not found. Internal evidence seems to suggest, however, that this telegram forwarded to Madrid the text of document No. 66.

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 255, footnote 2.

³ These were telegrams Nos. 1590, 1639, and 111 of Dec. 2, Dec. 10, 1940, and Jan. 18, 1941, respectively (136/121008, 121011-12, 121026).

⁴ In Madrid telegram No. 408 of Feb. 3 (136/74638-39).

No. 90

136/74717

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 736 of February 26

MADRID, February 26, 1941.

Received February 27—12:40 a. m.

The Foreign Minister¹ told me yesterday that English Under State Secretary Butler had informed him through a reliable Spaniard acting as intermediary, that the English Government was not disinclined to enter into negotiations regarding a "leasing" of Gibraltar after the war and the inclusion of French Morocco in the Spanish Zone upon the conclusion of peace.

In reply to my question whether he thought that this proposal was meant seriously or was only a maneuver, and what was to be understood by "leasing", Serrano Suñer replied that he also had considerable doubts as to the sincerity of the proposal. He, too, did not know what was meant by "leasing." In any case, it made sense only if Gibraltar was ceded outright to Spain. The Foreign Minister further stated that he had taken no action regarding the report.

A cipher letter follows² regarding the person of the intermediary mentioned above.

STOHRER

¹ Ramón Serrano Suñer.

² This letter has not been found; see document No. 104.

No. 91

4876/E253160-62

*The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*Teleprinter draft message¹

SECRET

ROME, February 26, 1941.

No. —

Delegation No. 81

The agreements were signed this evening.² The most important points are repeated below in summary:

I. War economy

The Italian deliveries of raw materials are to be maintained at least at their present level, and to be considerably increased with

¹ This draft has the date Feb. 26 but it bears no number except delegation No. 81, and is marked *cessat*.

² The Seventh Secret Protocol, signed by Clodius and Giannini on Feb. 26, together with its annexes is filmed on 2032/445080-106.

respect to some important items, e.g., in 1,000 tons annually: hemp from 26 to 40; iron pyrites from 50 to 100; silk from 1.6 to 3.4; rice from 108 to 135; tobacco from about 3 to 20.

Regarding German deliveries of raw materials, full reports have been given by telegraph and orally. In summary it may be said that the most urgent Italian requirements have been satisfied till the end of June and that the Italians acknowledge this with gratitude, although their wishes could be satisfied only in part.³ The question of fuel oil, however, is still causing grave concern here, as hitherto.⁴

II. Workers

It was possible to settle satisfactorily the particularly urgent question of procuring additional Italian workers. It has been agreed that in the course of the year about 315,000 workers can be employed in Germany. In view of the inadequate supply of *skilled* workers in Italy itself and the strong demands made here too by the armed forces, this constitutes an accommodation by the Italians.

III. South Tirol

Long negotiations dissipated the Italian fears that the establishment of a special company for the liquidation of the German property in South Tirol, which we were striving for, would be more political than economic in character and would, if anything, hinder an early implementation of the resettlement. The arrangement now made settles the question in the manner desired by the Reichsführer SS.

IV. Occupied territories

Trade and payments between Italy and the occupied territories were discussed in detail, and the requisite conditions for an exchange of goods, although only on a small scale, were established. Concrete lists were agreed upon for trade with Holland and Belgium. The agreement for Norway, which had already gone into effect, was extended until June 30.

³ See document No. 71. The Seventh Secret Protocol stipulated the delivery to Italy of 12,600,000 tons of coal for the year 1941; of 800 tons of aluminum per month provided Italy supplied Germany with 2,500 tons of alumina; of rubber and buna sufficient for the monthly production in Italy of 1,100 tons of rubber products.

⁴ As regards oil the agreement stipulated:

"Germany will assure the supply to Italy, not in the scope indicated as necessary by the Italian experts, but nevertheless to the following listed monthly figures of consumption:

airplane gasoline	15,000 tons
automobile gasoline	35,000 "
gas oil	26,500 "
refined petroleum	38,000 "

(total consumption for the first half year)

fuel oil	110,000 tons
lubricating oil	8,000 " "

V. Insurance

The Italians brought up a large number of insurance questions. In particular, the activity of insurance companies in occupied territories was regulated, as was also the cooperation of German and Italian insurance companies in the future.

I have already discussed the political and military significance of the negotiations by other channels of communication.⁵

CLODIUS

MACKENSEN

⁵ Süsskind's memorandum of Mar. 5 (4878/E253179-83) provides another summary of the principal features of the economic agreements of Feb. 26. It suggests the hope that the problem of the restricted fuel supply of the Italian Navy might disappear if the war situation should change in the Eastern Mediterranean.

No. 92

71/50754-56

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

U. St.S. Pol. 160

BERLIN, February 26, 1941.

The private secretary of the Grand Mufti called on me today.

We discussed the Arab wishes, known to us, for a new political declaration to be issued,¹ for delivery of arms and ammunition, and for financial support.

With respect to the wishes for a political declaration, I told him that in the present circumstances the text which he had submitted to Minister Grobba would encounter objections.² M. Tewfik wished to know exactly which points were objected to. I did not go into that but mentioned only by way of example that declarations concerning Syria were difficult because they involved the danger of pushing Syria into the camp of de Gaulle. I ended the conversation on this point by saying that we were giving the proposal further study.

On the question of arms deliveries I confirmed that the matter was being seriously studied by us. Regarding this point it was news to me that, according to Tewfik, the negotiations with Japan were promising.³ Japan was prepared in principle to deliver equipment for a whole division. The British, too, had no objection to that. Iraq was ordinarily supplied with arms by England, which at the moment was not in a position to make any deliveries, so that England had no objection if Japan stepped in.

¹ See document No. 83, footnote 1.

² There is in the files a "draft of the Grand Mufti's secretary for an official declaration by Germany and Italy regarding the Arab countries," handed to Minister Grobba end of February 1941 (71/50794-96). This paper was annexed to Woermann's memorandum of Mar. 7 (document No. 133).

³ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 601, footnote 2.

On the question of a financial subsidy the private secretary said the following:

A distinction should be made between a subsidy in the form of credits for arms deliveries, for which procedures could undoubtedly be found, and a subsidy in the event of a conflict between Iraq and England. In the latter case the loss of the British payments would make necessary a credit of two million pounds to Iraq.

I listened to this statement showing understanding, without making any promises.

I said offhand that financial support for the Grand Mufti (independent of the subsidy for the Iraq Government) could be considered.

The private secretary assured me again that apart from small contingents of the English Air Force there were no English troops on Iraq territory, except for the few that were continually in transit to Palestine. He mentioned that the conflict between Rashid Ali al-Gaylani and the English had also involved the construction of the Baghdad-Amman asphalt road. This road was under construction. Some sections were already completed. The Iraq Government had successfully rejected the British request for a financial contribution. The feeder lines of this asphalt road from Amman to Jaffa and Egypt were already completed.

On the question of the resumption of diplomatic relations the private secretary again advanced the well-known thesis that this was possible only if Iraq received the desired political declaration from us and if the question of supporting Iraq in case of war with England was clarified.

WOERMANN

No. 93

589/244182-33

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, February 26, 1941.

Dir. Ha. Pol. 47.

Subject: Projected freezing of German assets in the U.S.A.

According to the reports from the Washington Embassy¹ and the American press received during the last few weeks, it does not appear impossible that President Roosevelt will carry out the intention, discussed for months, of freezing the assets of the European or belligerent countries in the U.S.A., as soon as Congress has passed

¹ In telegram No. 260 of Jan. 28 (84/62471-73) Thomsen reported on the steps which the United States Government would probably take in freezing European assets and discussed ways of evading them by transfer of the assets to Latin American banks.

the law to aid England. One can count on this law's being passed in about 1 week.

In case of an American freeze it is intended at once to bring about the same situation with respect to the American assets in Germany, effective immediately, by means of appropriate German counter-measures. A special decree is not necessary for this, since under the German foreign exchange legislation American assets, too, have already been frozen for years and it is only a question of stopping those transfers (interest, etc.) which have nevertheless been made up to now. This can be done by an internal order of the Reich Minister of Economics and the President of the Reichsbank.

The American freeze, even though it will be formally proclaimed against the belligerent or the European states, is nevertheless to be considered a measure directed particularly against Germany and has indeed been announced as such in America. For this reason it appears necessary to make the German countermeasure, too, although it will be only an internal administrative order, particularly conspicuous with regard to the outside, so as not to give the impression that the American freeze is being accepted passively; especially not among the neutral countries which will probably likewise be affected by the freeze (Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria) and of whom we would likewise expect countermeasures. It is therefore intended to announce the German countermeasure in a DNB report and, since the freeze in the United States will be proclaimed by means of an order by the President, to refer therein to an "order by the Führer." A proposal for the DNB announcement is enclosed.²

As soon as the freeze has been ordered, the German press is to be given orally the guidelines for handling the matter as indicated in the memorandum which is also enclosed;³ they should be amended depending on which countries are affected by the American freeze.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary, with the request that the course of action planned in the event that the American freeze is proclaimed be approved and that if necessary the instruction be issued to obtain the Führer's consent to the DNB announcement with the words "by order of the Führer." Another copy of the memorandum of January 20, submitted earlier, is enclosed.⁴

WIEHL

² Not printed (589/244134).

³ Not printed (589/244135-40).

⁴ In this memorandum (589/244141-42) Wiehl discussed a possible freeze of German assets by the United States and countermeasures which Germany might take. He concluded that Germany was in a relatively better position than the United States in this respect. For further developments, see document No. 632.

No. 94

1127/822162-70

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

TOP SECRET

BUCHAREST, February 26, 1941.

No. 4 g.

Subject: Report to the Foreign Minister regarding participation by Reich Germans in the attempted revolution by the Legionnaires.

I have the following to report in reply to the "special security handling A" telegram for Minister von Killinger of January 25,¹ in which Minister Fabricius, Minister Neubacher, and I were ordered, with a reference made to the oath of office, to report whether and what German elements were present which supported the rebellion of the Legionnaires or encouraged them in an action against Antonescu, so that they counted on support by Germany:

I reported in my first short report by teletype² that I suspected that no Germans were directly involved in the attempted revolution, to be sure, but that some German circles by their conduct had contributed to the bringing on of this attempted revolution. These are the representatives of the SD, SS leader von Bolschwing, Kriminalrat SS leader Geissler, SS leaders Koenen and Waschinowski, also Agricultural Attaché SS leader Kräutle, SS leader Count Meran, SS leader Wenzel of the Economic Department of the Legation. Furthermore I consider several members of the AO, especially party member Knoll, to be intellectual supporters. Furthermore, the following journalists were close friends of the Legion and probably initiated into its plans: Christoph, Streiter, and also the DNB representative, Schickert, the latter more out of journalist's curiosity, which is part of his business.

The reasons which after lengthy observation have convinced me of this are the following:

1. When I came to Bucharest and a number of the arrests had already been made and I had hardly found time to speak with Minister Fabricius, SS leader von Bolschwing was the first to call on me; he protested against the arrests of the Legionnaires, tried to prove to me at once that the Legionnaires were in the right and asked me to intervene by inducing General Antonescu to free the prisoners.

2. The same thing was done, and with exactly the same arguments, by Agricultural Attaché SS leader Kräutle, SS leader Wenzel, Journalist Christoph.

¹ Vol. XI of this series, document No. 706.

² The reference is not clear. The point is clearly made in Killinger's telegram No. 314 of Feb. 11 (201/89363-67) but this is neither short nor designated a teletype message.

I saw from this intervention that these men must have strong ties with the Legion, and that they approved of the action of the Legionnaires while trying to belittle Antonescu in my eyes, who, they said, was surrounded by Freemasons.

3. SS leader Count Meran, who belongs to the SD office, maintained the closest relations with the Legionnaires. According to his own statements he had attended a peculiar oath-taking ceremony of 13 Legionnaires (taxi drivers) at the home of Countess Cantacuzino, a rabid fanatic, at which they, i.e., the drivers, had to swear on pistol and on Bible to shoot Antonescu. I am of the opinion that one should not accord too great significance to this crazy act, even though it is symptomatic.

4. SS leader Waschinowski is office chief in the SD office and supplied provisions to the Legionnaires in hiding.

5. Likewise Deputy Landesgruppenleiter Langenecker and party member Knoll, who was the liaison man to the Legion, supported the Legionnaires most ardently. Even though there are no more Legionnaires in hiding with members of the AO, nevertheless the two approached me time and again about getting approximately 30 hidden Legionnaires to Germany. Party member Knoll negotiated with sheltered leaders of the Legionnaires in regard to settling the conflict between the Legion and Antonescu. He was acting on my instructions. It is correct to assume that Knoll, who thus was in a position to continue the contact, had the closest relations with the Legion. Men in hiding do not let just any outsider approach them.

6. Von Bolschwing, the representative of the SD, assured me of absolute loyalty and aid in the attempt to carry through a pacification campaign, but concealed from me that he was hiding 9 of the principal leaders (not 3, as stated by Berlin), in an extraterritorial building of the Legation. Only after I had been made aware of this by the Rumanians and after my report to Berlin, did he admit this to me, pretending that he had not wanted to involve me. The matter was made still worse precisely by this lack of confidence shown me for the leading Legionnaires now had to stay on extraterritorial ground for weeks without my having had an opportunity to get them out of here. For now I, too, could not deliver them up to the knife, so to speak. In the first days a settlement of the matter would have been much easier for me. The affair became particularly difficult when General Antonescu had an intermediary tell me to my face that leading Legionnaires were in hiding on Strada P, that is, in the house of the SD on German extraterritorial ground. I should like to remark that the SD secret transmitter is still in this house and continues in use. It was installed at my suggestion and with the approval of the Reich Foreign Minister when I was car-

rying out my special assignment last winter.³ Because of the war-time regulations the order was issued to dismantle this transmitter once more, or at least not let it remain on extraterritorial ground. This order by the Reich Foreign Minister was not followed. The transmitter continues to stand in its old spot.

7. A further proof that there was a close connection between the SD and the Legionnaires is furnished by the circumstance that it was possible to get to the headquarters of the rebels only with the help of the SD, in order to institute the negotiations for a surrender and cessation of fighting. Minister Neubacher, who was the principal mediator, confirms this. The discussions which thereupon were begun took place in Bolschwing's office in the house of the SD. The house was well known to the Legionnaires. Indeed, the leading Legionnaires were subsequently hidden there. These were the following: Papanace, Iasinschi, Stoicanescu, Mihailescu, Axente, Borobar, Trifa, Garneata, and Georgescu. Except for Georgescu and Trifa these men were removed to Germany, which would hardly have been possible without the assistance of the Army mission. Bolschwing asserts that he could not have set these leaders on the street after the armistice negotiations. That may be so. The fact that they were hidden in this extraterritorial house, however, proves how closely the SD group was connected with the leadership of the Legion which led the rebellion.

8. When after a considerable length of time I had found out that the Legionnaires were hiding out with the SD representative and Bolschwing had to confess this to me, he gave the impression of being absolutely prostrate and had tears in his eyes, although he is otherwise a brave man. I could not avoid the impression that he was deeply shaken like someone who has suffered a great disappointment and defeat and considers the fight to be lost.

9. Kriminalrat Geissler, who played a rather unpleasant role, was the liaison man with the Legion police. He stated publicly, and this was passed on to the Rumanians, that the murder of the 72 prisoners in Jilava⁴ was an absolutely justified piece of popular justice. When I asked him whether this was correct he remarked that this was after all also the Führer's opinion. I advised him to keep still about it if that were actually the case.

Geissler came to me and informed me that Gruppenführer Heydrich had called him up and had requested that I make efforts to obtain the release of Ghika and Maimuca, the leading officials of the Legionnaire police under arrest. I did this, and had to learn to my astonishment that material was found in their possession

³ See vol. VIII of this series, document No. 495 and footnote 1.

⁴ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 426 and footnote 1.

representing plain espionage by them in favor of Germany's enemies. In enclosure 1⁵ there are photostats and translations which reveal that Maimuca had under constant observation the incoming German troops and passed this on by radio, at first openly and then under code. Thus through Maimuca's activity the English were always informed as to what German troops were arriving. He not only passed on the number of soldiers but also the weapons brought up. It would not have been necessary at all to establish facts regarding the German troops, since the Rumanian General Staff was after all kept constantly informed. Even in the World War Maimuca worked for the S.I.S.⁶ Naturally I gave up intervening on behalf of these two men.

10. Geissler approached my *Kanzler* asking him to transfer 3 million lei to Germany for the leaders of the Legion whom I have gotten out of the country in the meantime. This amounts to about 60,000 marks. The *Kanzler*, Blücher, reported this to me. I gave instructions that I would have to have a written statement from Geissler, to the effect that this money did not represent either funds of the Legion or stolen property, and that it was purely private property of the men who had been gotten out of the country. I did not receive the written confirmation and forbade the transfer. If after all these events Geissler offers his help in this, the relationship between him and the leadership of the Legion must have been the very closest.

11. I asked Bolschwing about the place where Horia Sima is staying. He told me that he knew it but had pledged his word of honor not to tell it. This pledge provides proof that there is a relationship involving loyalty between the SD and the Legion. It is impossible for me to assume that this came about only after the Putsch. It certainly existed earlier, and considering this relationship of loyalty and friendship I am convinced that the plan for the future was discussed in these circles and that therefore the SD must have known that they were fighting Antonescu and intended to overthrow him.

12. Furthermore, I learned the following fact, which indicates how far the propaganda against Antonescu had already gone in German circles:

On the occasion of a social function at the Legation before the Putsch, Reichsschulungsleiter Schmidt, upon hearing that Antonescu had a cold and could not come, remarked: "Let's hope he succumbs to this cold. That would be the best thing that he could do." Minister Neubacher had to point out to Schmidt that it would be

⁵ Not found.

⁶ Apparently a reference to the British Intelligence Service.

better to omit such remarks. It is evident from this that Schmidt had already been influenced against Antonescu by members of the AO to such a degree that he allowed himself to be moved to make this remark.

From these facts it is evident that:

I. A direct participation of German circles in the rebellion cannot be proved.

II. The SD had a very close relationship with the Legion, and the SD must have known of the tension between the Legion and Antonescu.

III. The SD ought to have put a stop to the Legion's efforts to overthrow Antonescu. This was not done. The Legion was certainly encouraged by the attitude of the SD.

IV. The AO also contributed to making the Legionnaires of necessity believe that Germany was behind them and not behind Antonescu, for otherwise the knowledge of the whereabouts of the persons in hiding and the remark by Reichsschulungsleiter Schmidt could not be explained. Even now Langenecker wants me to help 30 Legionnaires to get across the border. These are not in hiding with Reich Germans.

In summary, it is my conviction that:

I. There was no direct participation by German circles in the attempted revolution.

II. There should have been a duty to restrain the Legionnaires from their senseless step. This was not done.

III. In their effort to eliminate Antonescu, the Legionnaires were supported intellectually by the SD, by members of the Legation who are close to the SD, by a number of German journalists, and by the AO. (Here I disregard entirely the support by the Russians and the S.I.S.)

IV. The Legionnaires had to assume that they would be supported by Germany in their effort to set up the totally Legionary state. Their disappointment was tremendous when the Führer announced that the German Army was backing Antonescu.

V. A portion of the rabid Legionnaires, unwilling to learn anything, are calling the Germans traitors, i.e., [they say] that they have been betrayed by like-thinking people who knew their plans and about whom they *had* to assume that they approved of the plans and possibly also would help them in an operation.

In the enclosure I am including the report of an old Legionnaire,⁷ in which he tries to prove that Antonescu made the revolution, but indirectly proves that the Legion strove for the elimination of Antonescu by every possible means.

⁷ Not found.

Unverifiable reports from the Rumanian General Staff state that: I. Bolschwing, Geissler, Kräutle, and Koenen took part in the uprising.

II. Horia Sima believed firmly that he would have the support of the Gestapo agent, Geissler.

Up to now I have intentionally not tried to learn anything about the statements of the arrested persons concerning this matter. Nor do the Rumanians tell me anything, because they know my sympathies for the decent part of the Legion, which I assert frankly and openly to everyone, including Antonescu.

VON KILLINGER

No. 95

F5/0380-83

*Francisco Franco to Adolf Hitler*¹

EL PARDO, February 26, 1941.

DEAR FÜHRER: Your letter of February 6² causes me to send you an immediate reply, for I consider it necessary to present a few clarifications and confirmations of my loyalty.

I am convinced, as you are, that we are indissolubly linked in a historic mission—you, the Duce, and I. It has never been necessary to convince me of this; as I have said to you more than once, our civil war, from its very beginning and throughout its development, was more than enough proof of this. I also share your view that the position of Spain on both sides of the Strait forces us to look upon England, who aspires to maintain her domination there, as our greatest enemy.

Our attitude of the past has not changed—we are resolute and of the firmest conviction. Do not doubt therefore the absolute sincerity of my political ideas and my conviction that our national destiny is linked with that of Germany and Italy. With this same sincerity I have, since the beginning of these negotiations, explained to you the circumstances of our economic situation, which are solely responsible for the fact that so far it has not been possible to set the date for Spain's intervention.

If you consider the difficulties of our postwar situation, you will recall that I have never fixed such a very short period for our en-

¹ Translated from a German text. The file copy of the original Spanish text is incomplete, with one page missing (F5/0375-78). There is in the files a different German translation of this letter (F5/0371-74) which, according to a note of Mar. 11 (F5/0379) by Counselor Lohmann of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, was an unofficial translation done in the Foreign Ministry, while the translation printed here was made at Fuschl and submitted to Hitler.

² Document No. 22.

try into the war. Permit me to state, Führer, that the time which has so far passed has not been completely lost. Though we have not been able to obtain grain in sufficiently large quantities to permit us to build up our stocks we have at least a part of the bread necessary for the daily sustenance of our people. Otherwise a large part of the people would have perished of starvation.

Moreover, it must be admitted that in the question of supplying food Germany did not make concrete offers of effective aid until very recently. We are only now beginning to deal with concrete facts, and in view of this I have no other desire than to hasten the negotiations as much as possible. For this purpose I sent to you some days ago data on our needs as to foodstuffs and requirements in general economic and military fields.³ These data are subject to renewed examination, classification, verification, and discussion for the purpose of reaching a speedy solution in which we are both equally interested.

You will undoubtedly understand that a time during which the Spanish people are suffering from extensive starvation and are experiencing all possible privations and sacrifices is certainly not propitious for me to ask new sacrifices of them, unless my appeal is preceded by a betterment in this situation; this would make it possible to carry out beforehand skillful propaganda concerning the constant friendship and effective aid of the German people, so as to arouse anew in the Spaniards the sentiments of sincere friendship and admiration which they have always had for your nation.

My remark regarding our climate⁴ was simply a reply to your suggestions, and by no means a pretext for putting off indefinitely what at the proper moment will be our duty.

Only recently in the interview at Bordighera⁵ I gave proof before the world of my determined attitude. This conference also served as an appeal to the Spanish people marking the direction in which lie its national obligations and the maintenance of its existence as a free nation.

One consideration I must still express: the closing of the Strait of Gibraltar is not only indispensable for the immediate relief of Italy but probably also a prerequisite for the end of the war. In order to give this closing [of Gibraltar] the significance of a destructive blow, however, it is also necessary that the Suez Canal be closed at the same time. Should this latter event not take place, we, who would like to offer to you the effective commitment of our military strength, have to state in all sincerity that Spain's position in a prolonged war would become extremely difficult.

³ Document No. 28.

⁴ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 707.

⁵ See document No. 49.

You speak of our demands and you compare them with yours and those of Italy. I do not believe that one could criticize the Spanish demands as excessive. The less so if one considers the tremendous sacrifices of the Spanish people in a struggle which was a glorious precursor of the present war. An appropriate statement concerning this point is still lacking in our agreements. The Protocol of Hendaye⁶—permit me to say this—is, in this respect, rather vague and you undoubtedly remember the motives, which do not exist today, for leaving matters vague and open. The facts in their logical development have today left far behind the circumstances which in October brought about this Protocol, so that it can be considered obsolete at the present time.

These, my dear Führer, are my replies to your statements. I wish to dispel thereby any shadow of suspicion and declare my readiness to be completely and decidedly on your side, united in a common destiny; to desert it would mean surrender for me and betrayal of the good cause which I have led and which I represent in Spain. There is no need to assure you of my faith in the triumph of your cause, of which I shall always be a loyal supporter.⁷

Your sincere friend, etc.

F. FRANCO

⁶ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 221, footnote 4 and Editors' Note, p. 466.

⁷ The letter was handed to Hitler at the Berghof by the Spanish Ambassador on Mar. ■ (136/74742-43).

No. 96

216/147689-90

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOKYO, February 27, 1941—9:40 a. m.

No. 287 of February 27

Received February 27—6:55 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 271 of February 25.¹

The Foreign Minister just informed me that the French Ambassador² had delivered today the negative reply of the Vichy Government to Japan's last mediation proposal. The Ambassador had stated that his Government was prepared to cede Paksé and the part of Luangprabang situated on the western bank of the Mekong river, in addition to agreeing to minor rectifications of the northern boundary east of the river. It rejected the proposal of demili-

¹ In this telegram (216/147679-80) Ott reported the partial rejection by France of the Japanese mediation proposals and new proposals made by Japan for which Matsuoka wished to have German support at Vichy.

² Charles Orsène-Henry.

tarizing a zone east of the river because experience showed that such artificial formations were a constant source of frictions. The Foreign Minister had offered a Japanese guarantee for this zone together with reconsideration of the formerly envisaged financial indemnification of 60 (sixty) million yen, and received the promise of the French Ambassador that he would seek a new answer from Vichy. He added that he had warned the Ambassador of the extremely serious developments that might ensue if mediation should fail and had intimated the possibility that Japan might possibly be compelled to denounce the exchange of notes of August 30, 1940,³ in order to have complete freedom of action. In regard to the military situation the Foreign Minister informed me that the Japanese experts had arrived at a favorable estimate of Thailand's chances, and that the Japanese armed forces had ordered two additional warships to Saigon and stopped the return transportation of the infantry units relieved in Indochina. Japanese nationals in Indochina had moreover been instructed to leave the country.

The Foreign Minister felt constrained to ask the Reich Government to bring heavy pressure to bear on Vichy once more in order to avert, if it should be in any way possible, a warlike development the outcome of which no one could foresee.

The armed forces Attachés of the Embassy estimate the present strength of the Japanese armed forces in Indochina as follows:

In and near Indochina, including Hainan, at least eight infantry divisions available for commitment in Indochina, and in addition at least 600 (six hundred) bomber and fighter aircraft. The naval forces in Indochinese waters comprise at present at least one cruiser and four destroyers.

OTT

³ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 732.

No. 97

230/152526

*The Dirigent in the Political Department to the
Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

Teletype

MOST URGENT
No. 108

FUSCHL, February 27, 1941—4:15 p. m.
Received February 27—4:30 p. m.

For State Secretary Freiherr v. Weizsäcker.

Regarding the State Secretary's memorandum about his talk with Cosmelli on February 26 [25]¹ the Foreign Minister has issued the following instruction:

¹ Document No. 85.

The talk with the Italian Chargé d'Affaires is to be continued along the following lines:

We had learned with interest of the progress of the conversation between the Yugoslav confidential representative and the Italian Government. We wanted to state that the discussion between us and the Yugoslavs begun at the Berghof was being continued at the present time, and in connection with this we expected a reply within the next few days. In view of this state of affairs it seemed to us good to proceed in unison in the matter. Therefore we would like to suggest that the Italian Government, in case the Yugoslavs should approach it once more, should not go more deeply into the subject in the conversations for the time being and certainly should not consider any sort of agreements until the result of our negotiations now pending was certain. We for our part would naturally inform the Italian Government at once about the further course of our conversation with the Yugoslavs. Should the Yugoslav negotiator come again in the meantime, then we would suggest that one proceed as indicated and that we be informed at once about the substance of the Yugoslav communications.

End of the instruction.²

RINTELEN

² Weizsäcker's memorandum of Feb. 28 (230/152527) records that he had informed Cosmelli in accordance with this instruction.

In a memorandum of Mar. 3 (230/152534) Woermann noted a reply from Cosmelli indicating that Mussolini accepted the suggestion.

No. 98

274/177770-71

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

MOST URGENT

FUSCHL, February 27, 1941—8:05 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received Berlin, February 27—8:35 p. m.

No. 110 of February 27 from Fuschl

No. 258 of February 27

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent February 27—8:48 p. m.

RAM 43/R

For the Minister personally.

Please call at once on the Bulgarian Government and inform it that the proposal made in telegram No. 230¹ is invalid and that we

¹ In this telegram sent Feb. 26 (274/177758) Ribbentrop had expressed approval of a proposed Bulgarian statement to be addressed to the Soviet Government regarding the entry of German troops into Bulgaria. The text of that statement had been sent by Richthofen in telegram No. 223 of Feb. 24 (274/177745).

request that the following procedure be adopted in the steps to be taken by the Bulgarian Government with respect to Moscow, Ankara, and Belgrade.

1. Toward evening on February 28 the Bulgarian representatives in the three cities should each undertake a *démarche* stating that the negotiations on Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact carried on between Germany and the Italian Government on the one hand and the Bulgarian Government on the other had now been concluded and that the accession of Bulgaria would take place on March 1. It is left to the Bulgarian Government to add to this *démarche* explanatory statements about its accession to the Tripartite Pact, but we request expressly that the subject of the entry of German troops not be broached in this *démarche*.

2. We request that on the evening of March 1 the Bulgarian Government make the *démarches* with the Turkish and Russian Governments and possibly also with the Yugoslav Government regarding the entry of German troops into Bulgaria. We are in agreement with the formulations of the proposed *démarches* in Turkey and in Moscow as contained in your telegrams No. 213 of February 22² and No. 223 of February 26 [24].³

Please inform the Bulgarian Government that we have instructed our representatives in Ankara and Moscow, but not in Belgrade, to undertake *démarches* of similar content on these same days.⁴ If only for this reason I request that very clear arrangements be made with the Bulgarian Government to have the dates for the respective *démarches* observed most precisely.

The foregoing communications will likewise be made at the same time to the heads of the Turkish and Soviet Russian Missions in Berlin.⁵

RIBBENTROP

² This telegram (274/177734) transmitted a statement regarding the entry of German troops which the Bulgarian Foreign Minister proposed to communicate to Turkey.

³ See footnote 1.

⁴ The instruction to Ankara is printed as document No. 102. The instruction to Moscow is printed as document No. 99.

⁵ The two communications to the Soviet Ambassador were made by Weizsäcker on Feb. 28 (104/113088) and Mar. 1 (104/113098-99). A communication made to the Turkish Ambassador on Feb. 28 was recorded in a Weizsäcker memorandum of Feb. 28 (265/172644).

No. 99

104/113086-87

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 114 of February 27

No. 403 of February 27

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent February 27—10:58 p. m.

RAM 45/R

For the Ambassador personally.

Please go to see M. Molotov on Friday, February 28, toward evening and communicate to him verbally the following:

1) As the Soviet Government knows, negotiations have for some time been in progress between the Government of the Reich and the Italian Government on the one hand and the Bulgarian Government on the other, regarding the accession of Bulgaria to the Tripartite Pact.¹ These negotiations have now been concluded, and it has been agreed that Bulgaria will accede to the Tripartite Pact, and the protocol regarding this accession will be signed on March 1. The Government of the Reich is anxious to inform the Soviet Government of this in advance.

2) I ask you to go to see M. Molotov again on March 1, toward evening, and to tell him the following:

Reports in our possession concerning English intentions in Greece have forced the Government of the Reich to take further security measures forthwith, making necessary the shifting of German troops to Bulgarian soil. Referring to the statement made to the Soviet Government on January 23,² please add that this is a precautionary measure taken to prevent the English from gaining a firm foothold in Greece. Should M. Molotov go into the subject in any further detail, we remind you—for your guidance—that, in the first place, these security measures are taken exclusively to prevent English entrenchment on Greek territory; secondly, the measures are not directed at Turkey, and that we shall respect Turkish sovereignty unless Turkey commits a hostile act against us; thirdly, these German troop concentrations are war measures, and that the elimination of the English danger in Greece will automatically result in the withdrawal of the German troops.

Please inform me by wire how M. Molotov receives your communications.³

¹ See documents Nos. 30 and 41; see also vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 606, 648, 649, 658, 660, 693, and 704.

² See *ibid.*, documents Nos. 681 and 694.

³ See document No. 108.

For your personal information, you are further informed that the Bulgarian Minister in Moscow ⁴ will also make similar communications from his Government on February 28 and on March 1.

RIBBENTROP

⁴ Ivan Stamenoff.

No. 100

174/136586

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan

Telegram

No. 119 of February 27 FUSCHL, February 27, 1941.
from Fuschl Received Berlin, February 27—11:30 p. m.

No. 232 of February 27
from the Foreign Ministry Sent February 27—11:50 p. m.
RAM 49/R

Secret for officer in charge.

For the Ambassador personally.

I ask you to work with all the means at your command to the end that Japan takes possession of Singapore by surprise as soon as possible. You will learn everything else from the information telegram dispatched today, at the same time.¹

RIBBENTROP

¹ Telegram No. 233 of Feb. 28; see document No. 78, footnote 12.

No. 101

979/303561-66

*The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in
Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

Draft

COPENHAGEN, February 27, 1941.

Subject: Development of the internal political situation.

Drafting Officer: Secretary of Legation Meissner.

Although the Stauning regime is trying to work in a quiet and restrained manner, it is nevertheless obvious that this regime has experienced some serious setbacks through the various events of the past weeks. The ousting of Christmas Møller, former Minister of Commerce, from Danish politics,¹ and the removal of Folketing

¹ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 537 and footnote 1.

Deputy Hedtoft-Hansen, from the leading political positions in the Social Democratic party have been construed politically as weaknesses of the Stauning regime. So also did the delivery of the torpedo boats² lower the prestige of the present Government in the eyes of the people. Another measure tending to weaken the administration is the ban on local elections, on the holding of which Stauning and the large coalition parties had pinned their hopes of achieving a numerical result that would clearly demonstrate the insignificance of the nationalist opposition. There is still up for debate the question of the amnesty for Danish National Socialists, on which the Government at our request has already begun its final deliberations. The proclamation of amnesty for Danish National Socialists is therefore to be expected in the immediate future. Despite the political difficulties and economic troubles of his regime, Minister President Stauning seems still to be holding tenaciously to his post, although he was originally prepared to content himself with some other Ministry, in favor of a nonpolitical Minister President. Although the King was not at that time inclined to dismiss Stauning of his own accord, he was nevertheless prepared to release him at his request from his post as Minister President. If, despite these conditions, Stauning nevertheless decided later to remain in his post as Minister President, this was connected in some way with the opinion held in the Government at the time that as a result of a few events and the pattern of military developments in Africa and Greece, which was favorable to the English, the military issue was still undecided. Also regarding events in Norway, the Government had evidently received information by way of Sweden which showed that the opposition of the Norwegian population to Quisling was so great that Germany would probably be forced, by about the 25th of March of this year, to make other arrangements with regard to the internal political order in Norway. A third factor influencing the attitude of the Stauning Government was the events in Rumania, where, in Danish opinion, the taking over of government business by the Legionnaires had proved unfeasible, and where the Germans had been prepared, for the sake of collaboration, to abandon the Legionnaires politically in favor of a more moderate nationalist trend. Finally the attitude of America, too, made an impression in Danish political circles and led to the false assumption that a compromise between the Axis Powers and England would still come about, and if it did Germany would be forced to abandon the occupation of Nor-

²On Jan. 10, Ritter directed Renthe-Fink to press the Danish Government for the transfer of 12 Danish torpedo boats to the German Navy (telegram No. 24 of Jan. 10: 247/164250-51). After some negotiations, Renthe-Fink reported that the Danish Government had given its consent and that the Minister of Defense had been authorized to work out the technical details (telegram No. 101 of Jan. 22: 247/164260).

way and Denmark as well as of Holland and Belgium. For all these reasons, Stauning considered it right to put off the decisions regarding the internal political situation in Denmark and to gain time for himself by acceding to our demands for an improvement in the relations between Denmark and Germany. Rumors circulating here regarding various political trends in Germany, which might give the Danes cause to hope that perhaps on the German side, too, the readiness might exist to come to terms with the old regime, doubtless also influence the attitude of the Stauning regime. Even if these rumors have been without foundation, they have nevertheless been credited to a certain extent by the adherents of the regime.

After it had become apparent that Stauning was choosing this course for his Government, the opposition had to undertake a change in its tactics. This change of procedure was initiated in the DNSAP³ by the party leader, Dr. Clausen, who had the newspaper *Faedrelandet* adopt a calmer tone in its attitude toward the internal political situation. At the same time a greater concentration of the organizational work of the DNSAP was undertaken through the establishment of a central office in Copenhagen, whereby the constructive tasks of the party were particularly to be aided. This change in political tactics created discord between some of the more radical forces and Clausen, and in this connection the newspaper *Faedrelandet* in particular was the object of strong criticism. When Clausen proved unwilling to abandon the new course, the familiar split occurred and an opposition group was formed. Even though this opposition group has thus far not been able to find appreciable support, the fact of the split in the party has naturally been seized upon by the press of its opponents and has been exploited propagandistically against Clausen.

The Danish National Socialists have also in part gained the impression that we were pursuing an unstable policy, since we took the stand in all internal political maneuvers against the Stauning regime that no solution was to be effected that might be detrimental to the general peace and order. The exploitation of Denmark from the standpoint of the war economy further compels us to practice a close collaboration with the dominant elements in present Danish politics. Therefore, in view of these assumptions, it has only been possible to pursue a middle course, which did not give the impression of a solution of the internal political situation by force, but which, at the same time, from a long-range point of view, was to work out to the advantage of the National Socialists.

The general attitude of the Danish people has strengthened the impression in recent months that internal political developments will decidedly depend on the outcome of the further course of events in the

³ The Danish National Socialist party.

war and that there will be great difficulties in the path of the Danish National Socialists as long as, in the opinion of the Danes, a definite decision in the over-all political situation does not become evident.

The distinct signs of decisive military preparations on the part of Germany for the present spring and the heightened political and military activity connected with them have in the past 2 weeks already brought it about that on the Danish side the anti-German attitudes which found expression particularly in rumors and underground printed propaganda have become much more restrained. This moderation of political opinion will doubtless mean a further weakening in the position of the Stauning regime, particularly since the regime will in the future have to contend with insuperable economic difficulties as the result of its former vacillating policy. The great disproportion between prices and wages that has arisen as a result of the indecision of the Danish Government, and the large number of unemployed, for whom prospects of employment even in the coming spring are only very slight, has already led to differences between the labor unions and the Government, which so far it has still been possible to compose with some effort. The attitude of the leading trade unionists in this controversy is clearly influenced by the fact that they gained the impression when visiting Germany that their socialistic aims are not jeopardized by the over-all political development and the prospects of a German victory. It is to be expected that the differences between the labor unions and the old Government politicians will grow as economic difficulties increase.

For the Danish National Socialists the path leads, through constructive work that takes full account of the burning issues of domestic policy, to a larger coalition with those circles and groups which heretofore have separately constituted the opposition. At the same time it will be necessary for the National Socialists to purge the party, to which in recent months a number of unsuitable elements have gained admittance, and to organize it on more rigid lines. For this work, the need of which Clausen has fully recognized, Hoffmann-Madsen, the organization chief, has already been designated. His activity will at the same time give Clausen the opportunity to occupy himself more than ever with the constructive plans. Clausen will then, for his part, try to enter into closer contact with influential personages in Danish public life, in order thereby to expand decisively the group of leaders of the opposition. Parallel with this work on the part of the Danish National Socialists there will have to be carried on the maintenance of relations with the labor unions in order to find, so far as possible, in the further course of developments, the broad basis of a coalition which is necessary for a later assumption of power.

No. 102

265/172638-40

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL TRAIN, February 27, 1941—8:45 p. m.

No. 111 of February 27 from the Special Train

Received Berlin, February 27—9:30 p. m.

No. 150 from

the Foreign Ministry

Sent February 28—12:10 a. m.

RAM 44/R

For the Ambassador personally.

For your strictly confidential and exclusively personal information I am advising you that on March 1 Bulgaria will accede to the Tripartite Pact and that the entry of German troops into Bulgaria is imminent. I ask you now to proceed as follows with respect to the Turkish Government.

(1) I request that you make an appointment with the Turks for February 28, toward evening, and inform them that the negotiations on Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact, conducted on one side by the German and Italian Governments and on the other side by the Bulgarian Government, have now been concluded and that Bulgaria's accession will take place on March 1. On February 28, toward evening, the Bulgarian Minister will likewise make a statement about Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact. I leave it up to you whether you would want to get in touch with your Bulgarian colleague to coordinate the timing of the visit. On this visit, please limit yourself to making the communication about Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact and, for your part, do not touch upon any other subject. Should the Turks themselves bring the conversation around to the military measures taken by Germany in the Balkans or to Germany's Balkan policy, I request you to counter briefly and sharply any new statements that may be made about Germany's policy in the Balkans driving Turkey into the war (your telegram No. 179 of February 26¹) as follows:

"The Führer has stated that the military security measures taken by Germany in the Balkans are not directed against Turkey but against the British getting a foothold in Greece.² These decisions are irrevocable and the Führer does not issue such statements as a joke. If, however, the Turks are looking for a reason to start a war, they should say so. You were now requesting the Turkish Government to tell you whether the statements made were meant as a threat

¹ Document No. 87.

² Perhaps a reference to the assurances which Papen conveyed to President İnönü on Nov. 29, 1940 (see vol. XI of this series, document No. 422).

to Germany and as a hint that you should pack your bags. You were compelled to request a precise statement in the matter in order that you could inform your Government immediately."

We are convinced that such plain talk will serve to clear the air and put things straight. Please report immediately by telegram how your step was received.³

(2) I request that you again call on the Turkish Foreign Minister on March 1, toward evening, and tell him that you have received information from Berlin according to which a personal letter from the Führer was on its way to the President of Turkey.⁴ You could not tell as yet when it would arrive, but would transmit it to the President when it had come.

I shall wire you further information as to whether the letter will be brought there by a courier on a plane or, what is more likely, will be transmitted to you by telegram and then sent afterward by courier.⁵

The Bulgarian Government intends to make a statement to the Turkish Government through its Minister at your post to the effect that it gave its consent to the entry of German troops only after Germany had stated that this operation was not directed against Turkey. This step by the Bulgarian Government will also be taken, as agreed upon, on March 1 toward evening.

RIBBENTROP

³ See document No. 119.

⁴ Document No. 118.

⁵ In telegram No. 127 from Fuschl, sent to Ankara as No. 156 (265/172645), Ribbentrop notified Papen that the text of the letter would first be transmitted in a special telegram while the original was being sent by courier. Papen was instructed to request an audience with President İnönü for Mar. 3 to hand him the letter. The text of the letter (document No. 113) was transmitted in Ribbentrop's telegram No. 157 of Feb. 28 (2361/488400-02). See document No. 122.

No. 103

71/50757-58

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 684 of February 28

PARIS, February 28, 1941.

Received February 28—3:15 a. m.

For Under State Secretary Woermann.

With reference to your telegrams No. 651 of February 25¹ and No. 672 of February 26.²

¹ Document No. 83.

² Probably the telegram referred to in document No. 83, footnote 2.

Public knowledge of secret German promises to Arab states concerning help in the establishment of a Greater Arab empire would undoubtedly give a decisive impetus to the very strong de Gaulist movement in Syria and be considered by the French Government as contrary to the Armistice Agreement, under which France is committed to maintain French authority in the colonies and mandated territories. It therefore seems to me to be of decisive importance that there is an assurance of confidential treatment of the matter by the Arab partners. If this is not sufficiently assured, it would be advisable for the time being to advocate merely the formation of a federation of the six Arab states, in which Syria, Transjordan, and Palestine, the three territories under mandate, might if necessary occupy a special position. Regarding the question of the formation of a Greater Arab empire French experts on Africa sometimes raise the objection that the Arab movement indirectly through the Mohammedan religion and through utilizing the foothold which it thereby already has in Africa carries on a propaganda among the native Negroes which in the hands of a united Greater Arab empire might at some later date create grave social and racial conflicts in Africa, the economic hinterland of Europe.

ABETZ

No. 104

98/108672-74

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 776 of February 28

MADRID, February 28, 1941.

Received March 1—3:45 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 736 of February 26.¹

The secret agent of military intelligence in London, mentioned in cipher letter No. 1935 g. of February 26,² has just arrived for a temporary stay in Madrid. He reports the following:

1. British Under State Secretary Butler is at heart a great admirer of the Führer. In an intimate circle he refers to the English situation as desperate. He appears particularly disturbed about the course of events in the Balkans (Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement³).

2. Great anxiety prevails in English Government circles in view of the appearance of German troops in Tripoli. Eden's trip to

¹ Document No. 90.

² Not found.

³ Signed Feb. 17; see vol. XI of this series, document No. 714, footnote 4.

Ankara⁴ seems to be for the purpose of persuading the Turks after all to give assistance to the Greeks, since England does not have sufficient troops to maintain herself in North Africa *and* to come to the aid of Greece.

3. General de Gaulle had little hope for the success of his action and the favorable outcome of the war. He had moods in which he regretted the stand which he took against his fatherland. De Gaulle had told the secret agent that he considered French concessions to Spain in Morocco as justified.

4. The secret agent confirms the report of Serrano Suñer regarding the idea of a possible leasing of Gibraltar after the war, as developed to him by Butler.⁵ As far as Morocco is concerned, according to the report of the secret agent, Butler did not come out quite as clearly in favor of a cession of French Morocco to Spain as Señor Serrano Suñer told me he had (telegram No. 736 of February 26), but spoke only of a revision of the frontiers in favor of Spain.

5. Churchill had recently sent word to Serrano Suñer suggesting that he visit London; that he would get a really big reception there. The Spanish Foreign Minister had, however, replied through the Embassy at once by wire that he had no intention of going to England.

6. Churchill was convinced of the possibility of English resistance. He expected increasing unrest in the countries occupied by Germany, which would in 2 years form suitable bases for England's intervention on the Continent.

7. The Communist movement was growing alarmingly in England. The action taken by the British Government against the Communist leaders had caused grave acts of sabotage. Thus, for example, 1½ million cartridges had been turned out by Communist ammunition workers without powder filling.

8. Alba⁶ was speaking most venomously against the Führer. The last time that Alba had stayed briefly in Madrid, he had expressed to Franco his conviction that England would triumph. Franco had taken the opposite position, and in support of his view, had mentioned to Alba certain figures regarding the military strength of Germany. Alba had noted down these figures and, despite the objection of a member of the Spanish Embassy, he at once passed them on to the English upon his return to London.

9. A Spanish general—whose name, however, the secret agent has so far not wished to mention—had a liaison agent in England, through whom he had communicated to London his willingness to

⁴ See document No. 119 and footnote 7.

⁵ See document No. 90.

⁶ Jacobo, Duke of Alba and Berwick, Spanish Ambassador in Great Britain.

resist if German troops invaded Spain, provided he received immediate support from England. The English had thereupon promised to come to his aid at once with troops and material from Gibraltar.

The foregoing statements were made by the secret agent before he saw the Spanish Foreign Minister.

The secret agent, in whom the English evidently have the greatest confidence, also brought with him a number of military intelligence reports, which are being forwarded to Berlin by another channel.

STOHRER

No. 105

205/142619

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

HELSINKI, February 28, 1941—11:42 a. m.

No. 124 of February 28

Received February 28—1:40 p. m.

The Military Attaché¹ has learned from the Finnish General Staff that the Swedish Military Attaché here²—who has returned from General Staff discussions in Stockholm—informed the competent Finnish General Staff officer in confidence that in case of a war of Finland and Germany against Russia the Swedish General Staff believes that Swedish territory would be made available as a base for German troops. This was true of Gotland in particular. Sweden did not wish to suffer the same fate as Norway.

Please inform the Attaché Section of the OKH.

BLÜCHER

¹ Col. Horst Rössing.

² Maj. G. Friherre von Stedingk.

No. 106

2159/470118-20

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, February 28, 1941.

Ha. Pol. XIIb 932.

The first working session of the Advisory Committee for matters concerning the Danube above Brăila, established by the Provisional Agreement of September 12, 1940,¹ took place under my chairmanship from February 20 to 26, 1941, in Vienna. Including Germany there were altogether 8 Governments represented by up to 30 persons.

¹ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 53 and footnote 4.

From the German point of view the course of the meeting may be termed satisfactory. The record of the proceedings of the meeting is drawn up in the German language. June 30 is under consideration as the date for the next meeting, though not definitely fixed. It was possible to thwart the short-sighted attempt made initially by Hungary and Bulgaria to enable the Advisory Committee by broadening the informational obligation of the Iron Gate Committee—of which Germany is a member besides the two riparian countries, Yugoslavia and Rumania—to have a say in the details of this administration, such as occurred in an intolerable way in the Versailles Danube Commission. In the practical questions, too, of the budget and of the Iron Gate loan, everything remained according to our wishes.

The main credit for this favorable outcome is due to the good cooperation of the German representative on the Iron Gate Committee, Oberregierungsbaurat Wolf, with the Yugoslav and Rumanian members of this Committee, who spontaneously expressed their thanks for this in spite of the antagonism existing between them. The separate discussions which I had to conduct at their request with both delegations in a number of controversial questions during the afternoon sessions confirmed to me the considerable difficulties of a cooperation directed toward practical goals which I was acquainted with from former occasions. In almost every discussion the propensity of the two main delegates, Ministers Ninčić² and Pella,³ to seek their arguments not in the practical requirements of navigation or of the Iron Gate administration, but in propositions which have been frequently taken up for decades, became noticeable time and again.

Of the other delegations, the Italians and the Slovaks remained almost silent. The physically ailing Hungarian delegate, Admiral Dietrich von Sachsenfels, in spite of his German sympathies and the directives expressly issued him that he should adopt a friendly attitude toward the Yugoslav delegation, could be restrained only with difficulty from giving free play to his dislike of many years' standing for M. Ninčić and from treating the Iron Gate as being still Hungarian territory. The Bulgarian delegate, who in spite of his 75 years seemed like a man in his fifties, was considerably more manageable and as always he was simply interested in a settlement. He was also the only one to try to keep contact with the Soviet delegate.

Lavrentiev, the Soviet Minister in Bucharest, who is only 33 years old, and who appeared in the company of Pereverzev, the young Russian Consul General in Vienna, and two secretaries, among them

² Yugoslav delegate.

³ Italian delegate.

the very gifted M. Michailov whom I know from the conference for the maritime Danube, displayed great skill and determination and in almost every question he succeeded in one way or another in securing a free hand for the future. His wishes regarding material and information were scarcely limited and will probably still cause some difficulties in the future.

The language difficulties could be surmounted this time, too, although the Soviet delegate spoke only Russian during the negotiations, which was interpreted into French, and although his presence caused the Bulgarian delegate, too, to use the French language almost regularly, whereas the Hungarian and Yugoslav delegates spoke predominantly German.

The social functions which helped to maintain a good atmosphere among the delegates consisted of two luncheons for the more important participants, attendance at a brilliant opera performance (*Tannhäuser*), and a visit to the new harbor installations, arranged by the Reich Ministry of Transport; in this connection a noticeable impression was made by the type and organization as well as by the speed of construction of the buildings begun as late as June 1940, and by the excellent organization of the German-Italian barracks, especially as regards their commissariat.

More useful than the negotiations in the Advisory Committee were the various smaller discussions for promoting practical matters. Among these there was in particular the matter suggested by the Rumanian Government of simplifying the various border controls, which was discussed in a number of meetings with the Rumanian and Yugoslav delegations, whereas it is now to be taken up in a positive sense directly between Hungary and Yugoslavia in response to a suggestion made by us. It was also possible to promote the German-Slovak negotiations concerning a postal omnibus.

Only the Italian and the Rumanian, but not the Russian, inquired about the maritime Danube. But the subject was not gone into after I stated that we were first awaiting the Russian position on the Rumanian memorandum.⁴

⁴ A French text of the Rumanian memorandum on the maritime Danube had been transmitted in Bucharest telegram No. 290 of Feb. 10 (3941/E053850-59). It discussed the situation following adjournment of the Bucharest conference in December 1940 and stated that Rumania was prepared to accept, with certain reservations, the German-Italian proposal of Dec. 11 (see vol. XI of this series, document No. 489 and footnote 3).

According to a memorandum by Martius of July 15 (2159/470085) he was told by the Rumanian delegate at a meeting of German, Italian, and Rumanian experts for questions of Danubian navigation that the Soviet Government had repeatedly expressed to the Rumanian Minister in Moscow its dissatisfaction with the Rumanian memorandum of February 1941. He was told further that in the second half of March, Sobolev, the former Soviet chief delegate at the Bucharest Danube conference, had informed Gafencu that the Soviet Government would give a thorough reply to the memorandum, but that in fact the Rumanians had received no reply prior to the outbreak of hostilities with the Soviet Union.

The conviction that the present organizational situation in regard to questions of Danube navigation can only be temporary is probably shared by all the delegations. The good thing about this temporary situation is that it leaves the possibilities of development open in all directions and that it can be replaced either by an international cooperation on the basis of more internationalization or by a purely technical cooperation of the waterway administrations of the riparian states in accordance with the German note of November 14, 1936.⁵ During the war it will have to be the aim of the future activities of the German chairman to further influence this evolution according to German requirements.⁶

MARTIUS

⁵ This note announced Germany's withdrawal from the International Commissions for the control of the Rhine, Elbe, Oder, and Danube. For the text, see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, December 1936, pp. 354-355.

⁶ Marginal note: "Please [send] the complete text of the Rumanian memorandum regarding the maritime Danube. W[iehl]."

See footnote 4.

No. 107

332/196315

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, February 28, 1941.
zu Ha. Pol. 991 g.¹

Subject: War demands on Spain.

The text of a confidential protocol concerning war debts which was agreed upon between the German and Spanish commissions in the middle of January² has been approved by the Spanish Government. The German and Spanish texts of the protocols were signed today by Counselor Wohlthat and Minister Vidal (the German text is enclosed³).

With this, clarity has been achieved regarding the extent of our demands, and the acknowledgment of the Spanish Government that it owes us about 372 million reichsmarks has been obtained. This sum will form the basis of later negotiations. A reduction was not granted; we merely promised to be willing, at the proper time, at the request of the Spanish, to discuss the amount of the sum to be paid back.

The demand for 372 million reichsmarks concerns only our deliveries to Spain. Our claims for compensation of the Reich Germans

¹ Ha. Pol. 991 g.: Not found.

² In a memorandum of Jan. 16 (136/74575-76) Wiehl outlined the Spanish position and recommended the adoption of a protocol to terminate the negotiations.

³ Not printed (332/196316).

who suffered losses (45 million reichsmarks) during the Civil War were not discussed between the two commissions. Aside from the fact that the Spanish commission had no authority to do so, it seemed expedient to continue to pursue this claim, which up to now had been taken up by the Ambassador personally, through special channels, also in the future.

Herewith submitted to the Director of the Economic Policy Department.

SABATH

No. 108

104/113094

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, March 1, 1941—12:25 a. m.

No. 444 of February 28

Received March 1—2:10 a. m.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 403 of February 27.²

I called on M. Molotov this evening and carried out instruction 1).

Molotov received my communication with obvious concern and stated that the German Reich Government had been informed of the viewpoint of the Soviet Government on November 25, 1940 (see my telegram No. 2562 of November 25³). The position of the Soviet Government in the question brought up by me was still determined by the communication of that date. In this the future position of Bulgaria was considered within the framework of certain particular circumstances. In the meantime, events had taken a different turn. The view of the Soviet Government, on the other hand, that Bulgaria belongs to the security zone of the Soviet Union, remained unchanged.

Despite my objections that the accession of Bulgaria was in no way prejudicial to the interests of the Soviet Union, Molotov held to his standpoint with the remark that the accession of Bulgaria was taking place under circumstances quite different from what had been anticipated, and that it was unfortunately not evident to him that events were unfolding within the framework of the Soviet Government's démarche of November 25.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 744 to the Foreign Minister's special train, Mar. 1. 2:55 a. m."

² Document No. 99.

³ Vol. XI of this series, document No. 404.

No. 109

B19/B004045-46

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, March 1, 1941—2:59 a. m.

No. 443 of February 28

Received March 1—6:25 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 395 of [February] 27.¹

Even before I could carry out with Molotov the instruction regarding Petsamo, which arrived this morning, Vyshinsky asked me to come to see him at noon and handed me the written reply promised by Molotov on February 10.² It reads as follows:

"1. In view of the agreement of July 23, 1940,³ existing between Germany and Finland, for the delivery of 60 percent of the nickel production of Petsamo to Germany, as well as of the circumstance that, in accordance with the German-Finnish Agreement of September 16, 1940,⁴ this treaty cannot be terminated before December 1, 1947, the Soviet Government advocates that Germany receive the right to obtain nickel ore that is produced from the mines of the Soviet-Finnish corporation that is to be formed in Petsamo, in the same quantity as specified in the said German-Finnish Agreement and for its entire duration, that is, to December 1, 1947.

"As far as the question of the deliveries of nickel ore and the scope of these deliveries in the period after December 1, 1947, is concerned, this question must be given special study. The Soviet Government can naturally not guarantee to Germany 'the right of procurement of 60 percent of the nickel ore for an unlimited period,' because it is not the owner of the mines. But it will defer to Germany's interests and is prepared to give sympathetic consideration to this German proposal within a definite period of time, in so far as this will depend on it, that is, if Finland will raise no objections.

"2. The question of the future validity of the provisions of the German-Finnish agreements concerning delivery of nickel ore by Finland, is subject to a direct settlement between Germany and Finland.

"3. The Soviet Government is prepared to conclude a special agreement with the German Government for the delivery to Germany of nickel ore from the Petsamo mines, in so far as the quantity of nickel ore that Finland supplies from the 50 percent of the production which is hers, proves to be less than the above-mentioned share of 60 percent, that is, to the extent of an additional 10 percent of the output.

"4. The Soviet Government is naturally not in a position to judge of the quantity of nickel ore that may guarantee satisfactorily the

¹ In this telegram (B19/B004043) Schulenburg was instructed by Ribbentrop to remind Molotov of the promised written reply regarding Petsamo.

² See document No. 42.

³ See vol. x of this series, document No. 221.

⁴ See vol. xi of this series, document No. 308 and footnote 6.

requirements of the German economy, and naturally cannot assume the obligation to cover these full requirements from the production of the Petsamo area.

"The Soviet Government confirms its interest in the greatest possible development of nickel ore extraction in the Petsamo area. It is in conformity with this that the production plan of the future Soviet-Finnish corporation will be set up. The Soviet Government is thereby deferring to Germany by assuring her requirements of nickel ore and nickel in such a way that 60 percent of the nickel ore mined in Petsamo will be delivered to Germany."

SCHULENBURG

No. 110

100/65602-04

*Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini*¹

Telegram

OBERSALZBERG, February 28, 1941.

DUCE: In the first place accept my thanks for your letter,² as well as for transmission of the protocol on the conversation with Franco.³ Since I myself am expecting a letter from Franco,⁴ I should like to postpone taking a position on this matter until that time. Be that as it may, however, the gist of the long Spanish speeches and written explanations is that Spain does not want to enter the war and will not do so either. This is very regrettable since this eliminates, for the time being, the simplest possibility of striking at England at her Mediterranean position. But the Spanish decision is also to be regretted because it deprives us of the best opportunity of putting an end to the French seesaw policy. I can only evaluate Franco's statement that Spanish troops would lead the attack on Gibraltar as a naïve overestimate of the ability and striking power of the Spanish armed forces.

Aside from this, I likewise regard the situation as a whole as considerably better at present.

1. I, too, believe that the situation in Albania may now be regarded as consolidated.

¹ The text of this letter was sent by Ribbentrop on Mar. 1 in telegram No. 438 (100/65601) to the Embassy in Rome where it was received at 7:15 a.m. with the instruction that it was to be delivered to the Italian Foreign Ministry for Mussolini. The written text was to be brought to Rome by Consul General Wüster and delivered subsequently. The Italian text supplied by the German Foreign Ministry (100/65605-08) follows the German.

² Of Feb. 22, document No. 76.

³ See document No. 49 and footnote 5.

⁴ Of Feb. 26, document No. 95.

2. In North Africa—if we just have ■ weeks more time—a new British attempt to advance against Tripoli then will certainly fail. I am very grateful to you, Duce, that you are making available to General Rommel your motorized forces in Tripoli. He will certainly not disappoint your trust. But he will also—this is my conviction—gain the trust and—I hope—even the love of your soldiers within a short time. The opinion which I received from Colonel Schmundt, who was also in Tripoli, about his impression of the Italian soldiers was exceeding reassuring.⁵ He brought with him the conviction that with these men it will be possible without further ado to bring the situation back into order. For me it is especially a real joy that we, too, may and can assist in doing so. I believe that already the arrival of the first armored regiment will be an extraordinary strengthening of the situation in our favor. The arrival of the armored division can then be the prerequisite for the further considerations which I hope, Duce, to be able to discuss with you personally.

3. Greece

The present, probably final freeing of the Danube from the threat of ice gave me the opportunity of ordering the start of the bridge construction for February 28.⁶ Likewise, since early this morning a number of antiaircraft detachments are under way in order to reinforce the air defense of Bulgaria. On March 2 the entry of the first division into Bulgaria will take place.⁶ The advance to the Greek border will take place in the course of the next few weeks. I hope that with this there will be a noticeable relief along the Albanian front. I have one more worry at the present, Duce. It concerns your islands in the Dodecanese. It would very greatly facilitate the conduct of the air war in the eastern Mediterranean if these islands could be held. A more secure build-up of Rhodes would probably definitely block the Suez Canal for England. The loss of Rhodes will greatly lengthen the approach flight, at least for the time being. But the decisive thing, Duce, is the certainty that now the winter will finally pass and that with it the paralysis of our operations imposed by nature will cease.

⁵ Colonel Schmundt accompanied General Rommel to Italy and North Africa. See Enno von Rintelen, *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse*, p. 130.

⁶ See document No. 86.

In concluding today's letter I should also like to inform you that I am writing the Turkish President, Ismet İnönü, a letter¹ in which I state that the entry of German troops into Bulgaria is not directed against Turkey and that on the contrary I really believe that it would lie in the interest of Turkey, too, to bring about a good relationship with us. Germany has no territorial interest either in Bulgaria or in Rumania, and immediately after the British danger has been eliminated would again evacuate these areas, the sooner the better. If Mr. Eden did not succeed in diverting the Turkish statesmen and soldiers from a sober evaluation of their own interests, then I see no danger here, either. For the rest, we have naturally prepared ourselves for everything.

Accept, then, my most cordial and comradely regards.

Yours,

ADOLF HITLER

¹ Of Mar. 1, document No. 113.

No. 111

B13/B001575

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, March 1, 1941—4:00 p. m.

SECRET

Received March 1—4:40 p. m.

No. 457 of March 1

To be submitted also to the State Secretary.

- 1) For OKW Ausland.
- 2) For OKH Attaché Group.

On the morning of March 1, General Gandin¹ informed me, by direction of General Guzzoni, of the wish of the Italian High Command as follows: "The Italian armed forces wish to defeat the Greek Army before a compromise peace might possibly be arranged. This is necessary for the prestige of the Italian armed forces, and the German Wehrmacht will surely understand this." In response to a question from me, Gandin stated that this wish was being transmitted with the understanding of the Duce.

I asked him when the Army Group, Albania would be in a position of readiness for attack and received the reply that this could be done in a few days if the Greeks weakened their front substantially in Albania. I pointed out that the Greeks may possibly not reduce their troops in Albania, but might decide in all circumstances to maintain this front, and I asked when, under these conditions, the

¹ Antonio Gandin of the Italian Armed Forces General Staff.

Italian attack could take place. Gandin was unable to answer this and he said he would have to inquire of General Guzzoni or General Cavallero.

General Guzzoni is with the Duce in Apulia.

RINTELEN
PLESSEN

No. 112

216/147691-92

An Official of the Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

PARIS, March 1, 1941—8:45 p. m.

No. 716 of March 1

Received March 1—10:25 p. m.¹

Dr. Schwarzmann, Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

For the Foreign Minister.

Ambassador de Brinon presented at 6:00 o'clock this afternoon the text of a communication received from Admiral Darlan regarding the Japanese mediation proposal in the Indochinese dispute, with the request, in accordance with the last paragraph of the communication, that the Reich Government's influence at Tokyo be enlisted with a view to preventing the rejection of the minor concessions which the French Government has asked.

The communication is as follows:

"My telegram of February 26 informed you of the reasons why the French Government feels that it cannot accept the mediation proposal which was presented to it on February 25 by the Japanese Government acting as mediator in the conflict between France and Thailand.² In response to this refusal Mr. Matsuoka adopted a new attitude by assuming the role of an arbitrator and no longer that of a mediator. He gave his terms the character of a formal demand, adding that if they were rejected Japan would withdraw from mediation and disregard the situation characterized by the Franco-Japanese Agreement of August 30,³ in order to ensure settlement of the matter by other means.

As France is in no position to resist these threats, the Government had no choice but to yield to the imperative demands presented to it in this manner.

The appropriate instructions went out to our Ambassador in Tokyo yesterday evening.

The Japanese mediation proposal has thus been accepted in its entirety. The only changes which the French Government requests are the following:

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 763 to the Special Train, Mar. 2."

² In telegram No. 663 of Feb. 27 (216/147687-88) Abetz had reported the contents of this message, given to him by de Brinon.

³ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 732.

1. Rejection of the indemnification of 10 million ticals, offering in return extension of the demilitarization and settlement clause, which Mr. Matsuoka envisaged only for the areas specified in article 1 of the Treaty of 1907,⁴ to all ceded territories.

2. Two minor rectifications of the proposed boundary line:

A. One in the north, so as to retain the area opposite the town of Luangprabang, with the royal tombs.

B. The other in Cambodia, to reserve the right bank of the Mekong river opposite the town of Stungtreng.

3. Particulars on how the question of the Mekong river islands is to be settled.

4. Particulars regarding the scope and subject matter of the Japanese guarantee.

Finally we requested in regard to procedure that the final agreement be preceded by an exchange of letters between France and Japan indicating that France had decided to accept the present solution in response to Japan's demands.

The foregoing requests are made only with a view to mitigating in some measure the reaction of the native population, an intensification of which would not be in Japan's interest nor our own.

I would therefore be grateful if in informing the German Ambassador of the latest development in this question, you would make an appeal for the Reich to use its influence in Tokyo to preclude rejection of these minor concessions.⁵

For the Admiral of the Fleet. Rochat."

SCHLEIER

⁴ For text see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1906-1907*, vol. c, pp. 1028-1034.

⁵ In telegram No. 134 of Mar. 2 from Fuschl (216/147697) Rintelen informed the Foreign Minister's Secretariat that Ribbentrop had decided not to comply with the French request. "Ambassador Stahmer, in connection with the talks held to date, is to inform the Japanese Ambassador of the new situation resulting from the telegram and to say that the Foreign Minister would not support the French request, leaving it entirely up to the Japanese Government what attitude it would take."

This message was communicated to Abetz by Woermann in telegram No. 740 of Mar. 5 (4682/E225037). He further advised Abetz that nothing was to be done about the second Japanese request for pressure on the French Government because this had been superseded by the latest French representation.

No. 113

F11/0308-10

*Adolf Hitler to the President of the Turkish Republic*¹

MARCH 1, 1941.

M. PRESIDENT: In the fight which, contrary to the will of the German Government, was forced upon the German people by the Anglo-French declaration of war on September 3, 1939, it is now the aim of the German Reich to eliminate the British influence on

¹ For background of this letter see document No. 102 and footnote 5.

the European Continent. This will be a prerequisite for bringing to an end a century-long method of playing the forces of Europe off against one another. England's continued efforts to gain military influence in the various areas of Europe therefore force the German Reich to take defense measures which have nothing to do with any sort of German intentions of a territorial or political nature in these areas. I am therefore taking this opportunity, Excellency, at a moment when the British measures designed to gain a foothold on Greek territory are becoming more and more threatening, to inform you that I have decided in these circumstances that Germany will take certain steps of a preventive nature.

I have therefore asked the Bulgarian Government to permit parts of the German Wehrmacht to carry out certain security measures to this effect. Bulgaria, which has always had friendly relations with Germany, has made these relations even closer through accession to the Tripartite Pact;² certain that the intended measures are not directed against Turkey she has accordingly given permission for the execution of the steps mentioned.

For my part, too, I now take the opportunity of solemnly informing you, Excellency, that these German steps are in no way intended to be directed against the territorial or political integrity of Turkey. On the contrary: in memory of that great and fateful common struggle and the subsequent years of suffering I should like to assure you that it is my deepest conviction that in the future, too, all of the conditions necessary for a really friendly cooperation between Germany and Turkey will exist, for:

1. Germany has no territorial interest of any kind in these areas. Immediately after the dangers mentioned have been eliminated, the German troops will therefore leave Bulgaria and—in accord with the desire of Leader of the State Antonescu—Rumania likewise.

2. The economic development which is destined to heal the European wounds after the end of this war will of necessity make close trade partners of Germany and Turkey once more. The decisive thing is that Germany is not only interested in selling her industrial products but is also able to make purchases on a very large scale.

Moreover, I believe that the new territorial arrangements which will occur after this war can never put Germany in opposition with the aims of Turkish policy; on the contrary, a rapprochement of the two countries will be equally advantageous for the interests of Turkey and those of the Axis.

I therefore see no reason of any sort either now or in the future which could ever make enemies of Germany and Turkey. For this reason I have given orders that the German units entering Bulgaria remain at a sufficient distance from the Turkish frontier so that no

² See document No. 114 and footnote 1.

wrong conclusions can be drawn concerning the reason for their being there; that is, unless the Turkish Government itself considers it necessary to take measures aimed at forcing us to alter this attitude. Even this, however, would change nothing in the resolution to oppose the British measures aimed at gaining a foothold on Greek territory.

Please accept this letter, Excellency, as an expression of my sincere determination not to impair Germany's relationship to Turkey in any circumstances, but if in any way possible to improve it and make it fruitful for both sides in the more distant future as well.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 114

844/282738

Note to the Bulgarian Minister President

VIENNA, March 1, 1941.

M. MINISTER PRESIDENT: With reference to the discussions that have taken place as a result of the accession of Bulgaria to the Tripartite Pact,¹ I have the honor herewith to confirm to Your Excellency in the name of the Reich Government the understanding between the Governments of the Axis Powers and the Royal Government of Bulgaria to the effect that, in connection with the new settlement of the frontiers in the Balkans, Bulgaria is to receive an outlet to the Aegean Sea extending approximately from the delta of the Struma in the west to the delta of the Maritsa in the east.

With the request that you treat the foregoing communication in strict secrecy, and make it public only in agreement with the Governments of the Axis Powers,² I take this occasion, etc.

VON RIBBENTROP

¹ For the text of the protocol of accession, signed at Vienna on Mar. 1, 1941, see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, March 1941, pp. 233-234.

² By a note of the same day, signed by Count Ciano (F17/034) the Italian Government made a similar declaration to Filov.

No. 115

4041/E064230-88

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, March 1, 1941.

Subject: Aryanization of Holland.

In his decree of October 1940, Reich Commissar Seyss-Inquart ordered the registration of all Jewish business enterprises in Hol-

land. Handling of the registrations filed and the preparation of further measures was assigned to an office for business investigation within the office of the Reich Commissar, headed by Secretary of Legation Kühn of the Foreign Ministry. Approximately 20,000 registrations were received, of which about 16,000 have been dealt with. Of the approximately 1,600 industrial enterprises registered, only 10, which are of special importance to us, have so far been taken over to be administered under a trust. No further measures have been taken so far.

The Reich Commissar now plans to issue a new decree permitting extension of the process of Aryanization (appointment of trustees, removal of Jews from management, liquidation of Jewish assets). In view of the possible repercussions of such a measure on foreign policy, especially as regards the inflammatory propaganda against Germany, I have reserved the Foreign Minister's concurrence. The Reich Commissar now has signed the new decree on February 27, however, deferring its promulgation which was planned for early next week pending the Foreign Minister's concurrence. He holds that promulgation of the decree at this time is essential as a countermeasure to the general strike in behalf of the Jews in the Netherlands.¹ Minister Bene advised² upon inquiry that, following a presentation by the Reich Commissar, the Führer had in principle decided 3 months ago that the Aryanization plan could be carried out. Reichsleiter Bormann is informed about the current status of the matter.

Inasmuch as the recent disturbances in Holland and the coercive measures against the Jews necessitated by them have already provoked extensive comment abroad, promulgation of the decree is scarcely expected to cause any substantial difficulties for our international relations. Following presentation to the State Secretary and in concert with Minister Luther, I therefore recommend that no objections to the decree be raised, with the assumption that where the property of Jews who are nationals of neutral countries is concerned, it will be applied only in consultation with the Foreign Ministry, as has been the procedure in the case of Aryanization measures in Germany.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister with the request for instructions.³

WIEHL

¹ In a memorandum of Feb. 26 (173/84416), Woermann referred to the recent general strike in Amsterdam and noted that this was obviously a demonstration against the deportation of Jews from the Netherlands to Germany.

² Not found.

³ Marginal note: "Yes. R[ibbentrop]."

In a minute of Mar. 2 (4041/E064229) Altenburg informed Wiehl that Ribbentrop was in agreement with Wiehl's proposal regarding the decree of Seyss-Inquart.

No. 116

4608/E193832-34

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, March 1, 1941.

Pol. IX 585.

zu D III 1001.¹

The Foreign Ministry has in the past, to my recollection, always taken the stand that action against foreign Jews in Germany on the basis of German legislation should be undertaken in individual cases only after prior consultation with the Foreign Ministry.

In this connection the position always mentioned by Pol. IX has been taken here, that such measures should not be taken against Jews who are nationals of the United States, mainly for the reason that there are relatively few cases involved and that the Americans should not be given the opportunity in this way of making themselves the spokesmen in the matter of action against foreign Jews in Germany.² The matter should rest here.

The same would apply accordingly to the Americans in the occupied areas. This point of view was last expressed in Ministerialdirektor Wiehl's memorandum—Dir. Ha. Pol. 51 of March 1³—in a proposal made to the Reich Foreign Minister in accord with Minister Luther. Taking account of this point of view the action against American Jews in France, too, should probably be reviewed once more. In this matter a copy of the letter of February 22 of this year from the Administrative Staff with the Military Commander in France to the State Secretary has been received by the Department for German Internal Affairs.⁴

With regard to non-American Jews the decision should likewise be made from case to case; in this connection it can be stated from the outset that there are no political objections to actions against Hungarian Jews and Jews from the Balkan countries.

The Soviet Russians in Germany will almost all be officials or employees of the trade mission, etc., so that for this reason action against them will be out of the question. Things are different in the General Government, where in any case care must be taken that

¹ D III 1001: Not found.

² In a memorandum of Feb. 27 (4608/E193831) Freytag noted that for political reasons no discrimination against Jews of American nationality in Germany had taken place so far. Doing so now would further complicate Germany's relations with the American states, which in any case were strained already. He suggested, therefore, to postpone measures of this kind to a more propitious moment although "from our point of view equal treatment of American Jews and German Jews would be desirable."

³ Not printed (1125/321636-37).

⁴ Not printed (1125/321634-35).

there is no discrimination.⁵ As far as the present memorandum from the Swedish Legation is concerned,⁶ there is no reason to give the Swedish Jews a special position. However, it should not be admitted with respect to them either that they are discriminated against in comparison with the Americans and possibly other countries. I would therefore consider it appropriate to leave the memorandum unanswered and also to treat further reminders in a dilatory way.

Returned herewith to the Department for German Internal Affairs through Ambassador Dieckhoff.

WOERMANN

⁵ In a memorandum of Feb. 26 (1125/321638) Woermann noted that an official of the Soviet Embassy who inquired about the assignment of special living quarters for certain Soviet citizens in the General Government was told that the arrangement applied to Jews.

⁶ Not found.

No. 117

F11/0108-15

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Fü. 12

SALZBURG, March 2, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND COUNT CIANO IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER IN THE HOTEL IMPERIAL IN VIENNA, MARCH 1, 1941

After a few words of welcome the Führer made a number of introductory statements on the general situation. He said that the crises of the past winter could now probably be considered as having been overcome. He was convinced that the situation in Albania was finally consolidated. The further development there would be accelerated by the pressure which would be exerted by the German Army in Bulgaria.

In North Africa the situation would be critical for 2 more weeks. After that time there would be a sufficient number of German armored units available to keep the English from advancing any farther. Moreover, the English themselves seemed to have given up continuing their advance beyond Cyrenaica. The weapons used by the English in Africa have been carefully examined by the Germans. On the basis of these studies, the German armored regiment which had already been sent off had to be considered as superior to the English as far as weapons were concerned. After the 15th German Armored Division had also arrived in Africa, further steps could be considered at leisure.¹

¹ Hitler's decision regarding the task of the Africa Corps for Operation *Sonnenblume* was laid down in OKW directive of Apr. 8 (M179/M005711-12).

The stabilization of the situation in North Africa which would thus be brought about would also be advantageous toward the French, especially in connection with the relationship between Vichy and French North Africa. At the moment the consolidation of the Axis position in North Africa was the sole means of pressure on French North Africa that Italy and Germany possessed, since Spain had declared definitely that she was not willing to join the fight on the side of the Axis Powers.² Among the many and devious expositions of the Spaniards there was a new argument, namely, that they wished to have Gibraltar conquered only by Spanish troops. On the basis of her thorough preparations, especially in the field of artillery, Germany could judge how slight the Spaniards' prospects were of taking Gibraltar alone. Probably they would not attain their objective in 10 years.

Although it was naturally extremely regrettable that Spain was eliminated in this way, air warfare in the Mediterranean could nevertheless be organized on a large scale if the position in Tripolitania were consolidated. Sensational successes could not be expected in the first few days, to be sure, but in 2 or 3 months the Axis Powers would be able to "nibble" at the ship tonnage, which was already much reduced as a result of action in other operational areas, to such an extent that it would gradually become extremely difficult for the English to remain in the Mediterranean.

In the further course of the conversation the Führer expressed his satisfaction with regard to the Bulgarian accession to the Tripartite Pact,³ and said he assumed that Yugoslavia might possibly also adopt a more positive attitude. He stressed that all means had to be concentrated on breaking down England. Everything had to be directed toward this objective. In these circumstances it would be especially advantageous psychologically if all the countries on the Continent were gradually united into an anti-English bloc. For this reason, too, it was naturally too bad that Spain did not join in and thus made it impossible to create a bloc of the continental countries from Kirkenes to Gibraltar and from the North Sea and the North Cape to Constantinople.

The Bulgarians, by the way, had been more afraid of Yugoslavia than of Turkey. The Führer believed, however, that this fear was unfounded.

The Reich Foreign Minister stated with regard to this point that he for his part also considered Bulgaria's fears to be entirely unjustified. Yugoslavia would certainly not undertake anything. Count Ciano remarked here that he had arranged with the Reich For-

² Cf. document No. 95.

³ See document No. 114 and footnote 1.

eign Minister that further steps (Stacic)⁴ should not be taken in Italo-Yugoslav relations before the attitude of Yugoslavia on the question of her accession to the Tripartite Pact had been clarified. After Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact, moreover, a bilateral agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia appeared to the Duce to be less interesting than formerly.

The Führer replied that naturally the aim was to bring about Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact and in this way achieve a further psychological success against England. Even if it should not be possible to bring about Yugoslavia's accession, however, an Italo-Yugoslav pact would still be useful.

Count Ciano remarked in this connection that it was not exactly known in Italy what the contents of this pact should be, for actually the old Italo-Yugoslav Pact of 1937⁵ was still in existence and he was not clear about what could be added to it.

In the further course of the conversation the Führer stressed how important it was for Italy to hold her position in Rhodes, and he informed Count Ciano that according to reports which had just arrived the Italians had reconquered the small island in the Dodecanese which the English had taken a few days before.

Count Ciano answered that Rhodes was extremely well fortified and had two airfields. He did not believe, therefore, that an English attack would be successful. Only the question of supply was difficult. The English had cut off the supply of both gasoline and food. As soon as the Greek question had been settled, however, Rhodes could be rescued, since the distances, which were important for the supply lines, would then be greatly shortened.

In the past, to be sure, they had kept up the connection with the Dodecanese islands by means of airplanes, submarines, and sailboats moving at night, but the quantities which could be transported in this way were naturally not sufficient for supplying what was necessary.

In connection with the Greek matter the Führer, using a map, stated that the execution of the operations did not pose any great military problem. His only concern was the possibility of an English air attack on the oil fields at Ploesti. If the English should venture this attack, he would have German long-range bombers attack the oil fields at Mosul as a countermeasure. For this, however, the island of Rhodes was absolutely necessary as an intermediate landing place and refueling station.

With the aid of a map the Führer then sketched the probable course of the operations against Greece. He said that he expected

⁴ See documents Nos. 15, 85, and 97.

⁵ See document No. 15, footnote 2.

Greek resistance. He assumed that the Greeks would evacuate without further ado the narrow strip of their territory lying between Bulgaria and the Aegean Sea. But they did have the possibility of putting up resistance at the narrow spot where this strip of territory led into the compact mass of the rest of Greece. This spot was only 50 kilometers wide; of this 35 kilometers were swampland with only two road crossings, while 15 kilometers lay in mountainous territory which was difficult for heavy motorized weapons. Naturally this obstacle, too, would be overcome, but there was a possibility of resistance here. Furthermore, the loss of Salonika would be a severe psychological blow.

Count Ciano replied that in the opinion of the Duce, too, there was no longer any danger threatening from Albania. Signs of fatigue among the Greek troops were clearly discernible. Likewise the situation in Libya was apparently becoming consolidated.

In Italian East Africa, however, the situation was very serious. It was impossible for the Italians to offer resistance in the flat country because the psychological powers of resistance of the colored troops there did not stand up against modern motorized weapons. The Italians would withdraw to the high plateau, however, and offer energetic resistance there, as had already been demonstrated in the battles around Cheren in Abyssinia. In the mountainous areas the resistance could be kept up for a long time.

On the other hand the attitude of the Abyssinian population, which had gone over to open revolution in the provinces of Shoa and Amhara, offered considerable difficulties, even though the arrival of the Negus in Abyssinia had so far not had the psychological effect which could have been expected. As far as supplies were concerned, Abyssinia was naturally entirely cut off. In the past only a connection by airplane had been possible.

The Führer then brought up the imminent entry of the German troops into Bulgaria, which would be carried out across three large emergency bridges, one of them a double bridge, and across the permanent bridge at Cernavoda. Air force units would occupy airfields in Bulgaria in the next few days. Vulnerable points in Rumania and Bulgaria had been protected with antiaircraft artillery, among others also the harbor city of Constanța, which was particularly important because of the great quantities of oil stored there for Germany.

Then Count Ciano told something about his flights at the Albanian front. The English Air Force was not very well represented, and was not using its best models and pilots with either the fighters or the bombers. The fighters seemed to be more numerous than the bombers.

In conclusion the conversation turned once more to Spain. The Führer expressed his satisfaction at the fact that the Duce intended to draw up an exact list of everything that Italy had delivered to Spain at the time. Germany would do this for her part, too. When the Führer incidentally pointed out that Franco had said that without German and Italian assistance the fighting in Spain would only have been somewhat more "lengthy" than with it, Count Ciano answered that this was absolutely untrue. On July 25, 1936, Franco had sent two generals to Italy and stated that if he were not sent airplanes at once the situation would be lost for him. He would then have to flee to Africa.

The Führer answered that the last few months had shown that Franco was not a good comrade. He had seen that things were not going well for Italy at the moment and unquestionably should therefore have been willing to provide support.

Count Ciano pointed out in this connection the unfortunate role played by Serrano Suñer, whom he termed a 150 percent Jesuit. It was also known that Spain was still in close contact with England. The Duke of Alba was known to be entirely on the English side at heart. The former Spanish Queen,⁶ who lived in Rome and was herself an Englishwoman had, with the participation of the Spanish Ambassador in Rome,⁷ also kept up these connections, which in the case of Italy had deteriorated into actual espionage. It was only after Mussolini had threatened that he would have the Spanish Ambassador arrested for this activity without regard for his diplomatic immunity that the latter had been recalled by the Spanish Government.

The conversation was ended after a cordial leave-taking.

SCHMIDT

⁶ Victoria of Battenberg, consort of King Alphonse XIII.

⁷ Pedro Garcia Conde y Menendez.

No. 118

201/89557-58

Minister President Antonescu to Minister Killinger

BUCHAREST, March 1, 1941.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor of sending you enclosed the list of several persons whose activity in Rumania unfortunately puts me in a position where I must ask you to have them taken to Germany so that they may continue their activities there. I am doing this in

the interest of domestic tranquillity in my country and of a wholesome defense of our common interests.¹

Yours, etc.

ANTONESCU

[Enclosure]²

1. Bolschwing
2. Geissler
3. Count Meran
4. Könen [*Koenen*]
5. Wentzel [*Wenzel*]
6. Konradi
7. Landecker [*Langenecker*]
8. Geiger (Consul in Constanța)
9. The Consul in Ploesti
10. Kreutle [*Kräutle*]
11. Wüssow (Consul in Orșova)

¹ An unsigned copy of a letter of Mar. 30 in the State Secretary's file (201/-89554) directed Bohle, Head of the Auslandsorganisation, to take appropriate measures regarding the persons under his jurisdiction.

² Regarding the persons listed, cf. documents Nos. 72 and 94.

No. 119

265/172651

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ANKARA, March 2, 1941.

No. 193 of March 1

Received March 2—8:37 a. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

1. The démarche, in accordance with your telegram No. 150 of February 27,² was carried out today at 12:30 p. m.³ Saracoglu received the statement in a very friendly way without making any sort of comment on it, saying only that Turkey had foreseen this Bulgarian step and he had already been informed by the Bulgarian Minister⁴ that Bulgaria's accession did not indicate any change in the Turkish-Bulgarian nonaggression declaration.⁵ The Bulgarian Minister, as arranged, made his démarche a quarter of an hour before mine. His reception, likewise, was friendly. An audience with the State President was arranged for Monday morning.⁶

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 772 to the Special Train, Mar. 2."

² Document No. 102.

³ In telegram No. 191 of Mar. 1 (265/172649) Papen explained that telegram No. 150 was routed through the mail and had just arrived that day.

⁴ Sava Kirov.

⁵ Of Feb. 17; see vol. XI of this series, document No. 714 and footnote 4.

⁶ Mar. 3.

2. Saracoglu stated regarding Eden's visit:⁷

England had fully understood the Turkish position, which applied only to the protection of her own borders. He continued to consider it improbable that English troops in any strength would be sent to Greece. He could say nothing regarding England's other military intentions. Cripps, who accompanied Eden to Adana, would return and tomorrow have a conference with him. The Russian Ambassador⁸ told me that Eden had expressed the intention of speaking with him about mistakes in English policy toward Russia. However, at a visit which thereupon took place Eden had only talked in generalities. The total impression of Eden's visit:

Lots of superficial clamor; Turkey is content that her policy prevailed without her being pushed into assuming new obligations.

PAPEN

⁷ Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, were in Ankara Feb. 26-Mar. 1. Cf. Winston S. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance* (Boston, 1950), pp. 96-97.

⁸ Sergey Vinogradov.

No. 120

129/121036

The Legation in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

LISBON, March 3, 1941—11:35 p. m.

URGENT

Received March 4—1:25 p. m.

No. 422 of March 3

For OKH Attaché Branch.

During an unusually long reception accorded our Military Attaché,¹ Under State Secretary Santos Costa² displayed a strongly anti-English attitude, in the first place on account of their blockade which even subjects official mail going to Portuguese colonies aboard Portuguese vessels to censorship. Santos Costa manifested great alarm over the Azores, which would become greatly threatened if the United States actively entered the war. For the past 3 months England had proposed occupying the Azores as a protective measure against any threat from Germany. The Portuguese Government had consistently turned this down, citing its firm resolve to defend itself independently against any aggressor. The forces stationed on the islands had been strengthened and would be further reinforced by infantry and mortar units. Portuguese Guinea was no

¹ Col. Freiherr v. Eisebeck.

² Of the Portuguese War Ministry.

less threatened than Dakar had been earlier and was virtually without defenses; thus it was exposed to a repetition of the Dakar operation, being of equal value to England. The fact that the German Military Attaché was received for a full hour must be given due notice and at the present time interpreted as an anti-English gesture.

Military Attaché
HUENE

No. 121

104/113110-15

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

Moscow, March 3, 1941.

No. 104

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact and the transfer of German troops to Bulgarian territory.

With reference to my telegrams No. 444 of February 28¹ and No. 453 of March 1.²

The statements which, as instructed, I made to M. Molotov on February 28 and March 1, 1941, regarding Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact and concerning the necessity of transferring German troops to Bulgarian territory, obviously made a strong and lasting impression on him. In tone and manner Molotov betrayed his great concern over my statements and took the following position on the specific points in my two démarches.

1. Regarding the statement I made in accordance with point No. 1 of telegraphic instruction No. 403,³ Molotov said after deliberating for a little while that the German Government was well aware of the position of the Soviet Government in this matter. The Soviet Government had recorded it in its statement of November 25, 1940,⁴ and following this had it presented orally to the Foreign Minister through its Ambassador in Berlin, M. Dekanozov.⁵ The position of the Soviet Government in the question I had just brought up was

¹ Document No. 108.

² Not printed here (104/113100-101). The text is published in Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 278-279.

³ Document No. 99.

⁴ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 404.

⁵ The reference is presumably to the démarche presented to Weizsäcker by Dekanozov on Jan. 17, the text of which is printed in *ibid.*, document No. 668.

also at present defined by the content of the *démarche* of November 25.

In reply to my objection that Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact, which was now involved, did not in my opinion run counter in any way to the *démarche* mentioned by him, Molotov said he could only repeat that the statement of November 25 set forth the position which the Soviet Government still took today. He recalled that in the said *démarche* the future position of Bulgaria and with it also Bulgaria's possible accession to the Tripartite Pact had been placed within the framework of certain circumstances. There was still no reply from the Reich Government to that *démarche* of the Soviet Government; at the same time he had to state the fact that in the meantime events had developed in a direction other than the one expected.

In answer to my reply that Germany was not pursuing any territorial interests in Bulgaria and that therefore the anxiety of the Soviet Government was incomprehensible to me, Molotov replied that the German Government knew the Soviet Government's interpretation according to which Bulgaria belonged to the security zone of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government attached great importance to its statement of November 25, because it reflected the security interests of the Soviet Union. He could not refrain from pointing out that Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite or to the four power pact respectively had been considered at that time in connection with certain joint actions of the participating powers. This standpoint of the Soviet Government was still today unchanged and its attitude toward our statement about Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact ensued from that.

I tried to explain to Molotov that in the *démarche* of November 25 mentioned by him the scope was much extended by the Soviet Government. On January 23, 1941,⁶ the German Government had informed the Soviet Government through me that although the deliberations on the Soviet counterproposals were not yet concluded the German Government still adhered to the ideas formulated in Berlin. I reminded him in this connection that other states too, such as Rumania, Slovakia, and Hungary, had in the meantime acceded to the Tripartite Pact.

Molotov countered with the statement that Bulgaria could not be compared with the states I mentioned, because Bulgaria had a special importance from the point of view of the security interests of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the Soviet Government was assuming a separate position on this question. He had to emphasize repeatedly that Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact was taking place in circumstances completely different from those that

⁶ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 681.

had been envisaged at the time and that he could not unfortunately affirm that the events were taking place within the framework of the Soviet Government's *démarche* of November 25.

I stated in conclusion that the misgivings of the Soviet Government seemed to me to be unfounded but that I would naturally make a report to my Government about them.

2. My communication to Molotov about the transfer of German troops to Bulgarian territory took place on March 1 at 6:30 p. m., Moscow time.

Molotov showed that he was already informed about the fact itself because, as he told me, the Bulgarian Minister here had been to see Vyshinsky in the course of the day and had given him a communication to this effect. Molotov thereupon expressed his great concern over the fact that the German Government had made decisions in a question of such importance for the Soviet Government, which ran counter to the views of the Soviet Government about its security interests. The Soviet Government had repeatedly emphasized its special interest in Bulgaria to the German Government both during the talks in Berlin and afterwards as well. It could not consequently remain indifferent to the most recent German measures in Bulgaria, and had to take a position with regard to these. It hoped that the German Government would attribute an appropriate significance to this standpoint.

In my presence Molotov then drew up an informal memorandum in his own hand, had it copied, and handed it to me. The memorandum reads as follows:

"1. It is regrettable that, regardless of the warning by the Soviet Government contained in the *démarche* of November 25, 1940, the German Government has considered it possible to take the course of infringement of the security interests of the USSR and has decided on the military occupation of Bulgaria.

"2. In view of the fact that the Soviet Government now as before stands on the basis of its *démarche* of November 25, the German Government must understand that it cannot count on the support of its actions in Bulgaria by the USSR."

In my reply to Molotov's statements I held myself within the scope of my instructions and emphasized in particular that there could be no question of an infringement of Soviet security interests.

In closing, Molotov requested me to report to my Government on the position of the Soviet Government. He added that he could not understand what had actually happened in the meantime in the Balkans and why the German Government had decided on such a step.

I repeated that it was a question of a security measure directed exclusively against England's getting a foothold on Greek territory;

that the measures were not directed against Turkey; and that the removal of the English threat in Greece would automatically have as its consequence the withdrawal of German troops.

My impression is that the Soviet Government, in spite of the anxiety expressed by it in such emphatic form, will undertake no further steps. It even seems doubtful at present whether it will perhaps show disapproval of our actions in the press in the manner in which this was done in the memorandum handed to me. So far the Soviet press has limited itself to reporting on March 2 the fact of the accession of Bulgaria to the Tripartite Pact; to publishing the contents of the protocol signed in Vienna; and on March 3 to carrying a Tass report giving the DNB report from Sofia according to which German troops, in agreement with the Bulgarian Government, had arrived in Bulgaria. Finally the Soviet Government's attitude is probably also influenced by a certain resentment because Bulgaria side-stepped Soviet proposals for the conclusion of a treaty of guarantee while, on the other hand, she acceded to the Tripartite Pact.

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

No. 122

265/172660-61

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 203 of March 4

ANKARA, March 4, 1941.

Received March 4—1:40 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

In consequence of loss of time because of a plane damaged and replaced in Bulgaria, the letter² did not land here until today at 10:00 a.m. My offer to inform the State President yesterday of the text of the letter forwarded to me by wire³ was declined with thanks in expectation of the arrival of the letter in the original.

The audience has just taken place at 12:00 noon.

After reading the letter attentively and thoroughly the State President asked me to express to the Führer his most sincere thanks for having personally approached him in such a grave hour. He would pass on the letter to his Government for a thorough examination of the questions raised and hoped to be able to make a personal reply to the Führer in the very near future. Of very particular value to him was the assurance that German troops would be

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 807 to Fuschl, Mar. 4."

² Document No. 113.

³ See document No. 102 and footnote 5.

kept at a distance from the Turkish frontier. This was a guarantee that no incidents of any sort could arise which in such a situation could easily lead to more serious occurrences.

Following these words the State President discussed the present situation in detail, making these statements:

The obligations arising out of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty⁴ were known to me. At the same time, however, I had known for a long time that Turkey would do everything to avoid a conflict with Germany. What caused her great concern at the moment was the Bulgarian mobilization, which could only be directed against Turkey. In this regard I gave the President the most calming assurances, referring to the recent Bulgarian-Turkish declaration, which had come about with the full approval of the Reich. Turning to the Greek conflict, the President said that he would be very sad if Germany should have to attack valiant Greece. But the bombardment of Larissa by Italian flyers showed him how deep the hatred was between the two peoples, and that a peaceful way could hardly be found. German flyers would never have bombed Larissa.

At the conclusion of the conversation, in which the State President again warmly expressed thanks for the letter, which very much impressed him, I told him that, on the basis of Germany's policy thus defined, an improvement of our relations was entirely possible and very desirable. The State President agreed, without enlarging on the subject.⁵

PAPEN

⁴ Turkey's mutual assistance pact with Great Britain and France, signed Oct. 19, 1939. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167.

⁵ In subsequent telegram No. 204 of Mar. 4 (265/172662) Papen reported having agreed to a communiqué which would state that a personal message from Hitler had been handed to the Turkish President. Papen's original request that no mention be made of the letter in the communiqué about his audience with İnönü was dropped upon the latter's insistence.

No. 123

B19/B004049-50

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, March 5, 1941—1:45 p. m.

No. 482 of March 5

Received March 5—5:00 p. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 443 of February 28.¹

Fieandt reports as follows:

Molotov sent for Paasikivi on March 4 and told him in a serious tone that the Petsamo matter now finally had to be settled once and

¹ Document No. 109.

for all. The Soviet Government insisted on a Soviet general manager in order to assure efficient operation of the concession. Paasikivi countered with the familiar argument and repeated that a Soviet general manager was unacceptable to the Finnish Government. Molotov insisted on his demand and requested Paasikivi to report to his Government that for the Soviet Government a further delay in the Petsamo matter was unbearable.² At the same time Molotov handed Paasikivi a memorandum of the German démarche of February 10³ and the reply of the Soviet Government of February 28.⁴ Paasikivi said Molotov had thereby wanted to give him the impression that the matter had already been settled between the Soviet Government and Germany.

Because of Molotov's démarche yesterday, Paasikivi is even more inclined to get his Government to yield. Fieandt, too, seems to have become uncertain and has stated that Finland is in urgent need of German advice as to how she should proceed. He fears that, as a result of the refusal to accept a Soviet general manager, Finland's difficulties would shortly increase still further and finally compel the Finnish Government to yield after all. Fieandt is of the opinion that the time has now come for him to leave, but he has let himself be persuaded by us to wait a few days longer.

To me, Vyshinsky incidentally justified the Soviet demand for the appointment of a Soviet general manager by saying that the Soviet Government had assumed toward us the obligation for the delivery of nickel ore and therefore had to insist on Soviet management in order to assure fulfillment of the obligation assumed.

SCHULENBURG

² Cf. *Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy, March 1940-June 1941*, pp. 94-95.

³ Document No. 42.

⁴ Document No. 109.

No. 124

2281/482139

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

MOST URGENT

FUSCHL, March 5, 1941—6:40 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received March 5—7:20 p. m.

No. 479 of March 5

To be decoded only by officials charged with handling top secret matters. To be submitted to Chief of Mission personally at once. Reply through courier or secret cipher.

For the Ambassador personally.

Please tell Anfuso to inform the Duce that yesterday, Tuesday, the Führer in my presence received Prince Regent Paul of Yugo-

slavia at the Berghof.¹ The Führer will in the next few days give the Duce the details in the letter already announced.² We request the Italian Government to let nothing leak out concerning the fact of the meeting, because we promised the Yugoslavs that strict secrecy would be observed regarding the confidential visit of the Prince Regent.³

RIBBENTROP

¹ See document No. 130.

² No letter from Hitler to Mussolini has been found between the dates of Feb. 28 and Mar. 27 (documents Nos. 110 and 224).

³ In telegram No. 499 of Mar. ■ (2281/482140) Mackensen reported that he had carried out his instruction with Anfuso.

No. 125

8589/E602826-29

Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, March 5, 1941.

High Command of the Wehrmacht

WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) No. 44282/41 g. K. Chefs.

By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 24¹

REGARDING COOPERATION WITH JAPAN

The Führer has ordered the following regarding cooperation with Japan:

1) The *aim* of the cooperation initiated by the Tripartite Pact must be *to bring Japan into active operations in the Far East* as soon as possible. This will tie down strong English forces and the focal point of the interests of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific.

In view of the still undeveloped military preparedness of her foes, Japan's prospects of success will be the better, the sooner the intervention occurs. The *Barbarossa* Operation creates especially favorable political and military conditions for this.

2) For the *preparation* of the cooperation it is necessary to strengthen *Japanese military power* by every means.

To that end, the commanders in chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht will extensively and liberally comply with Japanese requests for the communication of German war and battle experience, and for aid in the field of war economy and of a technical nature. Reciprocity is desirable, but must not impede the negotiations. This

¹ Although this was ■ numbered directive it was issued by the OKW and signed by Keitel rather than by Hitler.

naturally concerns in the main such Japanese requests as could have application in military operations within a short time.

With respect to special cases, the Führer reserves his decision.

3) The *coordination of plans of operations* on both sides pertains to the High Command of the Navy.

The following principles apply hereto:

a) The quick defeat of England is to be designated as the common aim in the conduct of the war, thereby keeping the U.S.A. out of the war. Otherwise Germany has neither political, nor military, nor economic interests in the Far East which give occasion to reservations respecting Japanese intentions.

b) The great successes which Germany has achieved in the *war against merchant shipping* make it appear peculiarly appropriate that strong Japanese forces be directed to the same purpose. In addition, every possibility of assistance in Germany's war against merchant shipping is to be exploited.

c) The *situation* of the [Tripartite] Pact Powers with respect to *raw materials* requires that Japan take over those territories which it needs to continue the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber deliveries must take place even after Japan's entry into the war, since they are vital to Germany.

d) The *seizure of Singapore*, England's key position in the Far East, would signify a decisive success for the combined warfare of the three Powers.

Moreover, attacks directed against other bases of the English sea power system—against those of American sea power only if America's entry into the war cannot be prevented—are likely to weaken the power system of the enemy and, just as in the case of attack upon his sea communications, to tie down essential forces of all kinds (Australia).

A date for the beginning of operational conversations can not yet be fixed.

4) In the *military commissions* to be set up under the Tripartite Pact² only those subjects should be discussed which concern the three Powers in the same fashion. This will primarily include the problems of economic warfare.

Dealing with them in detail is the task of the main commission in concert with the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

5) No hint of the *Barbarossa Operation* must be given to the Japanese.

*The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht
signed in draft: KEITEL*

² See vol. XI of this series, document No. 270 and footnote 3.

No. 126

67/47488-87

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, March 8, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN REICHSMARSCHALL GÖRING AND GENERAL ANTONESCU IN THE PRESENCE OF STATE SECRETARY NEUMANN, MINISTER NEUBACHER, PROFESSOR BENZ,¹ AND DR. FISCHER,² AND OF THE RUMANIAN STATE SECRETARY, DIMITRIUC, IN THE BELVEDERE PALACE IN VIENNA ON MARCH 5, 1941³

At the start of the conversation the Reichsmarschall, in his capacity of head of the German economy, who above everything else also bore the responsibility for supplying the German Wehrmacht with the necessary oil, asked Antonescu to cooperate in increasing Rumanian oil production as much as possible.⁴ To be sure, Germany possessed oil deposits herself and had constructed a large number of hydrogenation works, so that with the most intense concentration on the requirements of the Wehrmacht she could satisfy them. In this way, however, practically no consideration would be given to the economy itself. If the English should succeed in bombarding one or two hydrogenation works, the situation with respect to the petroleum supply could become critical.

Germany possessed two suppliers of oil: Rumania and Russia. If one could assume that the Russian deliveries would always be carried out satisfactorily, then one would not have to fear any difficulties. He (Reichsmarschall Göring) was very much worried, however, that the situation as regards the Russian oil deliveries would not always remain as it was at the moment. But he stressed explicitly that this remark did not refer to the general relationship between Germany and Russia—quite to the contrary, it applied only to the petroleum deliveries.

¹ Economic expert in the Office of the Four Year Plan.

² General Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan and of the Economics Ministry for all matters concerning petroleum.

³ In telegram No. 460 of Feb. 21 (201/89415) Ribbentrop first informed the Legation in Bucharest of Göring's wish for a meeting with Antonescu. Telegram No. 541 of Feb. 28 (201/89452) conveyed instructions to invite Antonescu for Mar. 5 at Vienna. Telegram No. 553 of Mar. 1 (201/89455) reported Antonescu's acceptance.

In telegram No. 121 of Feb. 28 (201/89448-50) Ribbentrop emphasized to Göring that the Foreign Ministry had the responsibility for general economic relations with Rumania and was discharging the responsibility successfully. In view of the special importance of the petroleum problem he urged that it would be most advantageous "if you would concentrate on this problem exclusively in your conversations."

⁴ Wühl's telegram No. 790 of Mar. 3 to Fuschl (9908/E694002-05) records that Clodius and Fischer had worked out a program for Göring's discussion of the petroleum problem, a program stipulating an annual increase of Rumania's production from 5 to 6 million tons.

If Russia should align herself more closely with England, or if there should be a break with Russia on account of the Finnish or the Rumanian question, then the situation with respect to the petroleum supply would become awkward unless Rumanian oil production were increased.

It had often been pointed out that the question of the German oil deliveries from Rumania was basically a transportation problem. Up to a certain point this was correct. Therefore Germany had very greatly increased the construction of tank cars and tankers and had in part gone so far as to cut tankers from the Rhine into two parts and transport them to the Danube via the Reich Autobahns, there to reassemble them and utilize them in the traffic with Rumania.

In any case it was important, however, for Rumania to produce still more oil in the future, for if the German troops in Rumania should be strengthened still further, for example, and should have to engage in combat operations from the territory of Rumania, the presence of considerable stocks of petroleum in the country itself was necessary.

If nothing were done, there would certainly be reduction in output because of the obsolescence of the installations and drilling equipment. It was also absolutely necessary to open up new fields. Naturally production was to be intensified in this way only as long as the war lasted. In peacetime, of course, the Rumanian oil supplies had to be conserved as the Rumanian Government had always desired.

Now Rumania was not in a position to undertake such an increase in production alone, if only because she lacked the drilling equipment. Germany would be able to help out here by mobilizing all of her drilling equipment that was in any way available. In the present circumstances it was absurd to waste drilling equipment on unproductive German fields if the same equipment could drill three times as much in Rumania.

Rumania for her part could contribute to an increase in production by rescinding old bureaucratic laws which make it possible to award concessions for petroleum fields to be newly opened up only within a very long period of time. There was no time for this now, for production had to be increased at once, while simultaneously new refineries had to be constructed for the production of high-test gasoline and lubricants. Thus Germany would make available machines, specialists, technical skill, and finally capital for carrying out this program, so that the established goal of an increase in production could be reached as quickly as possible.

In this connection the Reichsmarschall gave General Antonescu the solemn assurance that Germany did not intend to penetrate in this way into the Rumanian petroleum industry commercially through the back door as it were, and to take anything away from the Rumanians. However, according to business principles it was natural that someone who contributed machines and technical skill also had to be granted commercial participation in the enterprises involved. But this participation by Germany did not need ever to be greater than that of the Rumanian State or other interested Rumanian parties.

As regards those oil fields which were not being exploited intensively enough by their present owners, it would be advisable to proceed in a way similar to that employed in Germany in the past in regard to the ore deposits. In cases of insufficient exploitation the owners were ordered to work them more intensively; and if this instruction was not followed the ore fields were taken away from them and handed over to other more efficient enterprises for more intensive exploitation.

In summary, the Reichsmarschall stated that Germany was thus interested in increasing the production in the oil fields now being worked and in carrying out additional drilling operations; in so doing, however, Germany did not want to invade Rumanian property and impose on General Antonescu an unpleasant liability with respect to his own people. It was important to approach the job of planning at once and to find out how much more oil could still be brought out of the ground. Germany would make available experts, machines, and technical personnel for this purpose.

At the same time Germany requested that she be enabled to participate in consultations regarding the export of Rumanian petroleum to France, Switzerland, and Italy. It was difficult to make a distinction economically between unoccupied and occupied French territory. In the final analysis Germany would have to be responsible for all deliveries. The same was the case with Switzerland. Italy likewise was supplied by Germany, so that here, too, consultation regarding direct Rumanian exports would be useful for the coordination of war supplies. It was necessary to consume the petroleum at the spot where it would be most effectively used for the war. Furthermore, the countries mentioned formed, as it were, an economic unit.⁵ At the close of his statements the Reichsmar-

⁵ Wiehl's telegram of Mar. 3 (see footnote 4) mentions the agreements between Germany and Italy of Dec. 3, 1940, and of Feb. 26, 1941, for the division of oil imports from Rumania, and German assistance in regulating the export of Rumanian oil to Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia. To ease the transportation problem, Germany was trying to shift Switzerland from Rumania to Germany herself and Slovakia as sources for oil supply.

shall summarized once again the German wishes as he had explained them previously, and stressed once again in particular the necessity of acting as quickly as possible.

In his reply Antonescu stated that from the moment when he aligned himself with the Axis he had expressed the view that the war had to be won as quickly as possible, and therefore he had rendered assistance on grounds of principle as far as it was in any way possible. Thus he was again prepared to do everything within his power in order to increase the production and refining of Rumanian petroleum. He was also grateful for the help of German experts in attaining this objective. The details of the cooperation naturally had to be worked out among the experts. At the moment one could only discuss matters of principle. In this connection he pointed to the negotiations with the German Legation which he had carried on while still in prison in Bistria concerning the political and economic bases of German-Rumanian cooperation.⁶ Minister Neubacher had accepted these principles. The Führer, too, had stated his agreement with this when General Antonescu spoke to him about it in the course of his discussions.⁷

What was involved was the following:

1. That Rumania was ready to exploit her mineral resources jointly with Germany, but that there must be no alienation of property (?) in the process. (*La Roumanie ne peut pas altérer le fond des richesses*):

2. That the direction of the enterprises and the exploitation of the mineral resources must lie in Rumanian hands; and

3. That Rumania herself would define the extent of foreign penetration of her economy. (*La Roumanie fixera elle-même le plafond de pénétration étrangère.*)

Regarding these conditions Antonescu also remarked that the Rumanian Government was striving to Rumanianize the economy of the country, i.e., to eliminate foreigners and particularly Jews. However, Rumania was not in a position to fill completely the gaps with respect to capital and technology created as a result of this. Here German economic influence could have a sphere of activity.

The conditions cited above had also been accepted by the Führer with the words that if General Antonescu acted otherwise he would not be a good Rumanian.

The petroleum industry had been organized by the Anglo-American interests in such a way that the Rumanian oil reserves would be exhausted as soon as possible as a result of wasteful exploitation, so that in the future Europe would be dependent as far as this im-

⁶ Nothing found.

⁷ See vol. xi of this series, document No. 381.

portant strategic raw material was concerned exclusively upon extra-European sources in Anglo-American hands.

Thus, for example, the Anglo-American companies had carried on "degasification," i.e., they had let the ground gas, through which the petroleum was forced to the surface, escape so that the oil had sunk down into the earth again. With the aid of compressed air the attempt was now being made to overcome this difficulty.

As a consequence of this, the entire system of exploitation of the petroleum fields had to be reorganized. In this context the aid of German companies on the basis of agreements with the interested Rumanian parties, which could naturally be concluded only in Bucharest, was very much desired.

As regards the economic relations with third countries, Antonescu remarked that he was willing to comply with the wishes advanced by the Germans on condition that the price structure for petroleum were re-examined. Many Rumanian companies were working almost at a loss and were exerting pressure on the Government for a price increase. Minister Neubacher knew about these matters and knew that the petroleum business was bad. In order to continue to stimulate initiative care had to be taken that appropriate profits were made.

Regarding France Antonescu stated that her petroleum purchases were regulated by a treaty from the year 1936, which was violently criticized in Germany at the time because Rumania came off very badly thereby. However, Rumania would revise this treaty, taking into account her interests in order to accommodate the German wishes for consultation on exports.

Furthermore, Rumania was willing to stop her exports to Turkey and Bulgaria entirely if Germany would supply her with the raw materials obtained from these countries.

In conclusion General Antonescu expressed Rumania's wish that the exceptional prices at which Germany paid for Rumanian petroleum not be allowed to benefit third countries.

Reichsmarschall Göring thanked General Antonescu for his statements, to which he had nothing to add except the request that the General might hold his protective hand over the projected conferences of experts, since no time should be lost in any circumstances. He (the Reichsmarschall) had calculated that if the necessary technical arrangements were made immediately, the increased production of petroleum would be available approximately at the time when in the course of the political developments in the East difficulties might possibly develop. He (the Reichsmarschall) would therefore, if General Antonescu agreed, immediately issue the necessary orders so that the drilling equipment in Germany would be

dismantled as quickly as possible and its use in Rumania prepared as soon as possible. As regards the necessary capital as well as the price structure, Rumania's legitimate demands would of course be satisfied. The decisive thing was to force the plan through as quickly as possible. Therefore machines and drilling equipment would be immediately dismantled in Germany and experts would be sent to Bucharest at once to arrange the technical details.

General Antonescu promised for his part, too, that the matter would be speeded up as much as it was possible; for the rest he called attention to a total of 1,400,000 tons of oil in storage which was available in Rumania and awaiting transportation. Now that the Danube was free of ice again and the military transports had slowed down a little this transportation could perhaps be accomplished more quickly. Moreover, Rumania would devote the most vigorous efforts to the building of a new pipeline, through which a portion of the 1,400,000 tons could likewise be transported.

Regarding the increase in production one had to differentiate between insufficiently exploited petroleum fields in petroleum areas already known, in which 135 probes for immediate production had been newly installed, whereas 50 experimental probes had likewise been applied.⁸ In addition there were two areas where petroleum was likewise found but was not yet being exploited in large quantities; one of these was in Central Rumania and the other in Moldavia.

Furthermore, Antonescu also expressed the wish that in industrial negotiations one should always deal only with a person appointed by the Government. When several companies carried on negotiations simultaneously it easily resulted in confusion, which was being exploited politically against General Antonescu by the opponents of the Government, i.e., the pro-Anglo-Saxon circles of Maniu and Bratianu, and weakened his position.

In the further course of the conversation General Antonescu presented to the Reichsmarschall several graphic charts in order to prove that the special price which Germany paid for petroleum in Rumania should be re-examined.

At the end he spoke again privately with the Reichsmarschall about the question of the Iron Guard and about domestic political conditions in Rumania in the same sense as in the morning conversations.⁹

Passing on to military questions he expressed a certain concern about Rumania's antiaircraft protection, which seemed to him not quite adequate, and especially about the air raid warning service which in his opinion was not yet fully organized. He stated that

⁸ In the original, this sentence is also ungrammatical and incomplete.

⁹ No record of such an earlier conversation has been found.

Rumania was ready for combat with 30 divisions, and laid before the Reichsmarschall maps showing the strong concentration of troops and airplanes of the Soviet Union on the Bessarabian border. He stated that he feared air attacks by the English less than possible attempts by the Russians to fly into the petroleum area.

Furthermore he pointed to the importance of the Iron Gate and the lack of cooperation by the Yugoslavs in carrying out the necessary protective measures.

In the main intermission of the performance of the opera *Madame Butterfly* the Chief of the General Staff of the Fourth Air Force [*Luftarmee*] then showed General Antonescu more exact maps concerning the deployment of antiaircraft artillery in Rumania and Bulgaria, as well as the distribution of the air raid warning service in the two countries. Antonescu repeated his misgivings in regard to the Iron Gate, and he was promised that the air raid warning service in Rumania, too, would be advanced directly up to the Danube as far as the Iron Gate.

SCHMIDT

No. 127

221/149146-47

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 768 of March 6

PARIS, March 6, 1941—5:30 p. m.

Received March 6—6:00 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister, through Dr. Schwarzmann, Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

1. At yesterday's dinner at the Embassy, Darlan, in reply to my question, confirmed the accuracy of the American press report published several days ago, according to which he had declared before members of the French war veterans association that if the English continued seizing French ships at sea, France would have naval vessels escort her merchantmen and use force of arms to resist English encroachments. He added that he had requested the American Ambassador, Leahy, in writing to inform the English of this position taken by the French Government.¹ He had furthermore emphasized that such action by the English was directed exclusively against the French population. Germany was not affected by such blockade measures since she could rely on a large continental base for the food supply of her own population.

¹ Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 116-118.

2. Concerning Laval's return to the Government, Darlan advanced the proposal of creating the post of premier, which had not existed in Vichy before, and which would then be assumed by Laval. I remained noncommittal toward this proposal. Laval told me that he would not return to the Government until we advised him to do so.

3. Regarding the question of establishing a central office for Jewish affairs in France, Darlan indicated his willingness to let the French Government set up such an office, but at the same time called attention to the fact that there was much vacillation in Marshal Pétain's attitude toward the Jewish question. The Marshal would not want native Jews and those French Jews who had distinguished themselves in military service for France to be treated the same way as Jews who had immigrated from other countries. Despite this attitude of Pétain, which would suggest that a central office for Jewish affairs organized by the French Government would not proceed very vigorously, it would be advisable to have the French Government establish this office. The central office for Jewish affairs would thus have a valid legal foundation and its activity could then be stimulated through German influence in the occupied territory to such extent that the unoccupied territory would be forced to join in the measures taken.

4. On the subject of General Weygand's trip to Vichy, Darlan stated that it was undertaken on the initiative of Weygand himself, who wanted to report to the French Government on the military and economic situation in North Africa. Darlan will return to Vichy from Paris tomorrow and will keep us informed about Weygand's report.²

ABETZ

²No further reference to such information from Darlan has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

No. 128

233/156467-68

The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 334 of March 6

BUENOS AIRES, March 6, 1941—11:15 p. m.

Received March 7—6:15 a. m.

In a lengthy conversation with Vice President Castillo, representing the sick President,¹ I pointed with emphasis to the increasing deterioration of our friendly relations; also, to the threatening

¹Roberto M. Ortiz.

impairment of the future great economic opportunities resulting from the German victory, because of the treatment of the Germans in Argentina, as well as of the reckless abuse of the so-called freedom of the press for attacks on Germany and her Führer.

The [Vice] President stressed, as had the Foreign Minister (cf. my telegram No. 298 of February 27²) that the treatment of the Germans was doubtless greatly improved; he mentioned his personal intervention on account of the representations I had made before my departure in favor of the Germans arrested in Misiones, who were indeed released at once. Regarding the press excesses he pointed to a new legislative proposal which was specifically meant to eliminate abuse of the heads of foreign states. I have learned confidentially in this connection that the American Ambassador has also made representations because of caricatures of Roosevelt.

I again mentioned in this connection the astonishment of the German Government at the fact that the document forger, Juerges, is still at large.³ The President stated that on the basis of the representations I made recently the Foreign Minister had approached the Minister of Interior with regard to proceedings against Juerges; he personally would support this. The [Vice] President, who, in spite of the serious conflict on domestic policy, especially with President Ortiz, made a gratifyingly fresh impression, emphasized his sincere desire to maintain the Argentine-German friendship and his firm determination to preserve [Argentina's] neutrality.

THERMANN

² In this telegram (233/156462-63) Thermann reported a conversation with Minister of Justice Dr. Rothe, who was acting Foreign Minister at that time, in which the latter expressed his regrets about the abuse of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press and informed Thermann of a law which he had proposed to curb this abuse.

³ Enrique Juerges had been involved, in March 1939, in the discovery of an alleged letter from the deputy leader of the Argentine group of the NSDAP to the head of the Colonial Office of the NSDAP, which gave a survey of the spying activities that had been carried out, on instructions from Berlin, in Patagonia. The publication of this letter led to the so-called Patagonia trials. Details of this have been filmed on serials 233, 2551, and 6584.

No. 129

1951/436750

Minute by the Minister to Rumania

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SALZBURG, March 6, 1941.¹

For the Foreign Minister personally.

My assumption that the SD or SS were very closely connected with the Legionnaire leadership is confirmed both by the fact that Reichsführer SS Himmler wrote a letter to Horia Sima,² and that Horia Sima, on his part, wrote a long report to Reichsführer SS Himmler, dated February 6, 1941,³ which Ministerialdirektor Schroeder read to me yesterday. Such a voluminous report is, in my opinion, sent only to persons who are familiar with one's plans and intentions.

VON KILLINGER

¹ Killinger apparently had been recalled to Germany at the beginning of March. The document printed is one of several drawn up by Killinger in Salzburg between Mar. 5 and Mar. 10 to refute accusations made against him by the SD, and to establish the responsibility of members of that organization for the Iron Guard revolt of January (1951/436718-51). No records of these SD charges, which apparently formed also part of a letter from Heydrich to Ribbentrop, have been found.

² Not found.

³ Not printed (1951/436697-717).

No. 130

230/152540-41

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia

Telegram

TOP SECRET

FUSCHL, March 7, 1941—2:20 a. m.

No. 151 of March 6

from Fuschl

Received Berlin, March 7—3:20 a. m.

No. 240 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent March 7.

For the Minister for his personal information exclusively.

In the conversation with Prince Regent Paul at the Berghof on March 4, the Führer first sketched a picture of the general situation which was characterized by the fact that the war actually had already been lost by England and that the time had come for all European countries to adapt themselves to the coming new order in Europe. Today Yugoslavia was being offered the unique opportunity which would not recur, to establish and secure her position in the reorganized Europe of the future. By aligning herself

with the Axis Powers by way of accession to the Tripartite Pact, Yugoslavia could today secure for herself Germany's definitive guarantee of her territorial integrity and, since the early collapse of Greece was only a matter of a short time, of access to the Aegean Sea. Greece would surely not be able to maintain her position at Salonika, and the German troops in the Balkans would one day withdraw. In case Yugoslavia had not secured her claim in time, she would run the risk of having the path to the Aegean ultimately blocked by a third power.

The Prince Regent was visibly impressed by these remarks, but he explained frankly how difficult for him the decision was which the Führer advised him to take; and he said plainly that, as far as he personally was concerned, the Greek descent of his wife, his personal sympathies for England, and his attitude toward Italy as well were opposed to it. Nevertheless, the Prince Regent termed a further agreement with Italy a possible first step along the course counseled by us.

With regard to this, the Führer stressed the interest of Yugoslavia, through accession to the Tripartite Pact in having Germany, too, as a partner and at the same time as a guarantor of her present and future territory. Furthermore we did not expect of Yugoslavia more than accession to the Tripartite Pact; particularly no participation in the war. We would see to it that when the war ended, Salonika would go to Yugoslavia.

The Prince Regent expressed his apprehensions regarding internal policy by stating that he feared that he would no longer be here in 6 months if he followed our advice. I replied that I feared the reverse might happen, that is, that he would no longer be here in 6 months if he did not take our advice and thus let a unique opportunity slip by.

When he took his leave, the Prince Regent reserved his decision. We shall now wait and see how Yugoslav policy will further develop; in this connection one ought to consider, however, that it is in the interest of Yugoslavia to make this decision within the next fortnight.¹

¹ The United States Minister in Yugoslavia reported on Mar. 30 that according to a reliable source Hitler told Prince Paul during this visit that Yugoslavia had to sign the Tripartite Pact in her own interest because he was going to attack Russia in June or July. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, p. 978.

No record of such a statement has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

Please do everything you can in every possible way to hasten the accession of Yugoslavia.²

RIBBENTROP

² In telegram No. 152 from Fuschl, No. 241 of Mar. 7 from Berlin (230/-152542), supplementing this instruction Ribbentrop stated that Prince Paul had begun to waver and would perhaps "in the event of another discussion come around to a positive decision regarding Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact." For this reason he was considering suggesting to Prince Paul that they meet in Bled during the coming week.

According to published accounts by Deputy Minister President Maček and by the Yugoslav Ambassador in the United States, Prince Paul had another meeting with Hitler in Germany on Mar. 18. See Vladko Maček, *In the Struggle for Freedom* (New York, 1957), p. 209; also Constantin Fotitch, *The War We Lost* (New York, 1948), pp. 64-65.

No record of such a visit has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

No. 131

230/152543-44

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 203 of March 7

BELGRADE, March 7, 1941.

Received March 7—5:45 p. m.

Exclusively for the Reich Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 240 of March 6.¹

The Foreign Minister asked me to call on him this noon and informed me as follows:

The Crown Council met here yesterday, and in the presence of both Regents,² of the Minister President, the Croat leader, Maček, the Slovene leader, Kulovec, the Foreign Minister, the War Minister³ and the Court Minister,⁴ the Prince Regent reported on his talk with the Führer and Chancellor and on Germany's wish that Yugoslavia accede to the Tripartite Pact. The deliberations, which lasted several hours, showed that the question of Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact was regarded as a very serious one and in view of public opinion as a very difficult one. In this connection expression was given to the deep concern caused here in the last few days by the revisionist demonstration in Bulgaria and the anti-Yugoslav tone of the Bulgarian press. The result of the deliberation was that before a decision was taken, the Foreign Minister should clarify through me the following additional question:

¹ Document No. 130.

² R. Stanković and I. Perović.

³ Gen. Petar Pešić.

⁴ Milan Antić.

"In the event of her accession to the Tripartite Pact, would Yugoslavia be able to receive a written declaration from Germany and Italy stating that:

1) The sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia will be respected;

2) No military assistance will be requested of Yugoslavia and also no passage or transportation of troops through the country during the war;

3) Yugoslavia's interests in free outlet to the Aegean Sea through Salonika will be taken into account in the reorganization of Europe."

With respect to this question the Foreign Minister remarked that he himself, as well as the Minister President, had already gathered, to be sure, from the talk that had taken place that there was willingness to give such assurances. The Prince Regent had also reported that the Reich Foreign Minister had offered to give such assurances in written form. For the purpose of having the situation completely clarified, he was nevertheless asking for a precise reply to the question; if it was in the affirmative, it would extraordinarily facilitate the policy desired by the Government.⁵

HEEREN

⁵ Cf. document No. 138.

In telegram No. 204 of Mar. ■ (230/152545) Heeren reported his definite impression that Yugoslavia was determined to accede to the Tripartite Pact provided the questions received an affirmative reply; if not, then another conversation between Prince Paul and the Foreign Minister would be entirely appropriate.

No. 132

1447/365170

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, March 7, 1941.

SECRET

No. 508 of March 7

Special Security Handling

With reference to your No. 456 of March 6.¹

Unwarranted postponement of the meeting of the subcommissions² would undoubtedly be calculated to arouse suspicion and to give

¹ In this telegram (1447/365167) Woermann asked whether the meetings of the subcommissions for demarcation of the German-Soviet border could be postponed without arousing Russian suspicion.

² For the demarcation of the frontier defined in the Boundary Agreement of Jan. 10, 1941. For text of the agreement, see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, February 1941, pp. 132-133.

Cf. vol. XI of this series, document No. 640, footnote 2.

annoyance to the Soviet Government. However, since Molotov yesterday made a suggestion for border revision which concerns not only the section of the frontier from the Igorka to the Baltic, which is not yet marked off, but also the old German-Soviet border already demarcated (see telegraphic report No. 500 of March 7³), the functioning of the subcommissions is partly dependent on a prior agreement concerning this proposal.

Within the limits of an appropriate period of time needed for this accord, postponement of the meeting of the subcommissions would seem acceptable in view of the factors mentioned.

SAUCKEN
SCHULENBURG

³ Not found; see, however, document No. 178.

No. 133

71/50780-77

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, March 7, 1941.

A memorandum on the Arab question is herewith submitted in accordance with instructions.

The memorandum of Minister Grobba, of February 18,¹ together with the sealed letter of the Grand Mufti² to the Führer is submitted again at this time.

Reference is made to the report on Greater Arabia and the situation in Syria by Minister von Hentig.³ Use has been made of the conclusions of that report in the present memorandum.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WOERMANN

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, March 7, 1941.

Pol. VII 123 g. Rs.

MEMORANDUM ON THE ARAB QUESTION

The instruction was that a proposal be drawn up for the further handling of the Arab question, especially on how this problem is to

¹ Not printed (647/255201-04); it records a conversation with the private secretary of the Grand Mufti and deals with political developments and personalities in the camp of Arab nationalism.

² Vol. XI of this series, document No. 680.

³ Drawn up Feb. 26 (71/50821-24) following his trip to Syria. A separate memorandum of Mar. 7 by Woermann (71/50825-26) dealing with Hentig's proposals in some detail is also in the files. For the background of Hentig's trip to Syria, see vol. XI of this series, document No. 626.

be handled with reference to our aim of achieving England's defeat. *A summary of the proposals will be found at the end of this memorandum.*

I. Delimitation of the Arab area

Consideration of the Arab question, for the purposes of the present memorandum, will be limited to the following countries: Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, the British sphere of influence in the Arabian peninsula and the mandated territories of Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

The Arab sphere includes also Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. These countries, however, have been considered here only as required in the context. A map is attached as annex 1.⁴

Annex 2⁵ contains the population figures for these countries as also the number of Arabs in the most important North African territories, which also are not being considered here.

A complex system of treaties exists among the Arab states and between them and Turkey and Afghanistan, as shown in annex 3.⁶ Friend and foe in the Arab world are intermingled in a motley pattern. For this reason alone it cannot be expected that anything will remain secret.

The Islamic idea (Holy War) is impracticable under the present grouping of powers. Arab nationality and Islam are not identical. The Arabs to be brought into our plans are fighting not for religious, but for political, aims. The questions touching Islam, however, must be dealt with tactfully.

II. The Significance of the Arab area

Seen in the context of the war with England, the Arab area holds a position of great strategic significance. The Arab area which includes the Suez Canal, one of the most important English sea routes, forms a land bridge between Africa and India. Vast numbers of troops and war material have been shipped in the east-west direction to Egypt, and war material to Turkey and probably also to Greece through Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine. There is a probability that now, with British troops released in North Africa, a movement in the opposite direction will also take place: Palestine and Transjordan as possible jump-off points for an English thrust toward Syria, or through Syria in the event of an intervention in Turkey. Reports about English intentions in this respect are increasing.

Through these areas passes also a main route on which England and the Soviet Union might join hands, if the occasion should arise.

⁴ Not printed (71/50780).

⁵ Not printed (71/50781).

⁶ Not printed (71/50782).

These territories are of special importance for the air routes of the British Empire.

Essential for Britain's conduct of the war are finally the oil fields of Mosul with the pipeline to the Mediterranean; for particulars see annex 4, with special map.⁷

III. Possibilities for action in the Arab area

A *decisive* blow to the British Empire could be delivered in this area only through operations against Egypt and/or military occupation of the Arabian land bridge.

An appraisal of the operational possibilities, including those of the Luftwaffe, is not the subject of this memorandum. This is a problem, however, that deserves our greatest attention. We may reasonably proceed from the assumption that this area lies beyond the effective range of the Axis Powers *at the present time*—except with respect to the Luftwaffe. This situation will not change as long as Turkey remains neutral.⁸

The remaining opportunities for action in the Arab area have for the time being no decisive bearing on our aim of crushing England. This does not mean, however, that these opportunities should not be exploited in every manner.

The leadership in the Arab question is claimed by Egypt as well as by King Ibn Saud and Iraq. While certain contacts with Egypt still exist, the country is at the moment more or less out of the picture in this connection, as far as we are concerned. Rather, our potential partners are King Ibn Saud and the Iraq Government.

In addition to these, the *Grand Mufti* of Jerusalem, who is now living in Baghdad, occupies a recognized if not entirely unchallenged position of leadership among the Arabs. At the least he enjoys recognition as a front. Information on his person will be found in annex 5.⁹ Liaison with him is maintained through his secretary who has several times been in Berlin and Rome, and is now in Berlin.¹⁰ The main thread of the all-Arabian question should be spun in this way.

A sealed letter from the Grand Mufti to the Führer, which the secretary left here, is being separately submitted. It will not be necessary to grant to the Grand Mufti the monopoly of the all-Arabian questions, which he is seeking to obtain. Rather, it is desirable to keep on maintaining other contacts such as with Ibn Saud and directly with the Iraq Government, or the contacts again started in Syria by Minister von Hentig; these latter of course only

⁷ Not printed (71/50783-88).

⁸ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Via Russia-Iran?"

⁹ Not printed (71/50789-90).

¹⁰ See document No. 92.

in so far as they do not involve us in a conflict with the Grand Mufti.

Specifically, the following possibilities may be taken under consideration apart from any military action:

1. *Propaganda*

Propaganda will be conducted mainly by radio broadcasts in the Arabic language, the exertion of influence on Arab newspapers and periodicals, the cultivation of personal relations with individual Arabs, etc. The machinery for this is [available] (see annex 6¹¹), and efforts for improving it are continuing.

Additionally, something conspicuous needs to be done from time to time, such as the dispatch of Minister von Hentig to Syria.

The reception of Ibn Saud's representative, Khalid al Hud, by the Führer¹² had a telling effect.

2. *Sabotage and uprisings*

In the area referred to the Arabs can be of value to us to a limited extent by carrying out acts of sabotage and uprisings. The Grand Mufti and his men are to some extent already active in this respect. Further organizing activities in this regard would be primarily a matter for the Abwehr. So far, in compliance with the wishes of the Foreign Minister, it has refrained from action for the most part, especially out of consideration for Italy. Greater latitude of action in this respect, also with a view to improving the intelligence system, is essential in the interest of the struggle against England. The Italian Government could be informed of this in quite general terms, without any details being disclosed, so as to ensure secrecy. Acts of sabotage could be carried out in Egypt, Transjordan, Palestine, and against the English installations in Iraq. Uprisings would at this time be of some purpose only in Palestine and Transjordan, but not in the other countries, including Syria and Lebanon.

Admiral Canaris has requested that activities along these lines be authorized in writing.¹³

3. *Political declaration for Greater Arabia*

The Arabs have pointed out time and again that they are ready to enter a relentless struggle against England, but that they would have to know what goals they were fighting for. They consequently seek a declaration stating that Germany and Italy promise them the full independence of a future Greater Arab empire on a federative basis. They have indicated that such a declaration would be the

¹¹ Annex 6 is entitled "German Propaganda in the Arab area" (71/50791-92).

¹² On June 17, 1939; see vol. VI of this series, document No. 541.

¹³ In a conference with Grobba on Feb. 6 (Grobba memorandum of Feb. 6: 647/255061-62) Canaris had requested the Foreign Ministry to authorize the activities of the Abwehr in the Arab area.

essential prerequisite for an open struggle against England. The declaration which we issued earlier over the radio and in the press, and also in writing (annex 7¹⁴), is too vague, as had been emphatically stated here by the Grand Mufti's secretary¹⁵ and as we also have learned through the Italian Minister in Baghdad.¹⁶ The scope of the Arab wishes in this regard is indicated by the proposal which the Grand Mufti's secretary has presented to Minister Grobba (annex 8¹⁷).

Purely from the standpoint of the German interests, there could be no objection to such a political declaration. Given the Arabs' dislike of the English and of the Italians, it would certainly be easy for us to attain a position of influence in a Greater Arab empire. To be sure, there is no uniform opinion regarding the question whether the Arabs are sufficiently mature for such a form of state, however. The weakness of such a state would lie in the absence of the possibility for self-defense. This problem need not, however, stand in the way of giving them such a declaration now. The difficulties, rather, arise from considerations relating to other powers.

a) Considerations for Italy.

We are aware that the Italian Government is pursuing plans of its own in the Near East; for achieving these, broad guarantees of full independence and federation of the Arab states are undesirable. In dealing with us the Italian Government has therefore been very reserved on the Arab question until a short time ago. Recently there has been a certain relaxation of this attitude; it has kept us better informed than before, as for example, by referring the Grand Mufti's secretary, who first came to Rome, to us in Berlin. The cautious attitude of the Italian Government is indicated by the draft of a declaration, handed in by the Italian Chargé d'Affaires here in February, which is so tortuous that it would be preferable to have it dropped (annex 9¹⁸).

A decision should be made whether an open discussion should be entered into with the Italian Government, to have it define its objectives in the Arab area. The moment for this, however, does not seem to have arrived as yet.

b) Considerations for France?

A declaration issued at this time favoring a Greater Arabia would, because of Syria, be contrary to our general policy of not including the French colonial empire, at the present time, among the subjects under discussion. As it is, it has already been necessary to depart

¹⁴ See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 190 and footnote 4, 496, and 596 and footnote 6.

¹⁵ See *ibid.*, document No. 190.

¹⁶ Luigi Gabbrielli.

¹⁷ See document No. 92, footnote 2.

¹⁸ Not printed (71/50797-99).

from this principle because of our Japanese policy. Such a policy could have the result that the already strong de Gaulle movement in Syria might bring about an open defection to the de Gaulle camp; the necessary support in this matter could be supplied by the English in Palestine and Transjordan. Even France herself and other parts of her colonial empire might in this way be driven further toward de Gaulle and England.

Ambassador Abetz, who was consulted on this point, has stated his view of the subject, as indicated in annex 10;¹⁹ in this connection he correctly calls attention to the terms of the Armistice Agreement.

As regards France, this question is of more than mere tactical significance at the moment. Underlying it is also the question whether French influence in Syria is to continue at all.²⁰

These questions, too, are not yet ripe for discussion.

c) Considerations for Turkey?

Ambassador von Papen has repeatedly spoken in favor of discussions with the Turks on Arab questions. For practical purposes this would mean among other things that Turkey could be promised a portion of Syria under certain conditions.²¹

It remains to be decided whether this consideration should be included in our calculations at the present time.

d) Considerations for the Soviet Union?

The question to be decided would be whether, e.g., as regards Iraq, our Arab policy must take account of the Soviet Union (diversion of Soviet aspirations toward the south).

When all these factors are taken into account, it appears to be difficult in any case to issue a declaration in favor of a Greater Arab federation, which is based on an accord with Italy and goes substantially beyond our former declaration. Some kind of reaction to the wishes expressed by the Grand Mufti and to his letter addressed to the Führer, which could be given to the Grand Mufti's secretary to take along, would however be desirable (see draft, annex 11²²).

In any event, it will always be safe to repeat in talks with the Arabs that the victory of the Axis Powers is certain, that Germany has no territorial ambitions in this area, and that we are linked with the Arabs by being opponents of their English oppressors; that we share their views on the Jewish question and that the Arabs can always be sure of our support within practical limits whenever they themselves take up the struggle against England.

¹⁹ Printed as document No. 103.

²⁰ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "No German interest."

²¹ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Presumably no objections as such but would adversely affect Mufti?"

²² Not printed (71/50802-04).

4. *Assistance by arms and ammunition.*

In the present circumstances such assistance should be considered mainly with regard to Iraq. Smaller shipment of arms, e.g., to Palestine, could easily be effected as part of the task assigned to the Abwehr.

The Iraq Army, according to the information available, consists of four or five fully equipped divisions and one good constabulary division.

The Iraq Government has approached us, Italy, and Japan with the request for arms and ammunition. The question will have to be considered first of all from the point of view of German capabilities for delivery. The Iraqis want, immediately,

- 400 light machine guns with ammunition,
- 50 light tanks,
- 10 antiaircraft batteries with ammunition and instruments,
- High explosives,
- Antitank material, including machines,
- 100,000 gas masks,

and, in addition, equipment for a full division. This matter has been the subject of discussions between the specialist of the Economic Policy Department and the OKW; details of this are found in annex 12.²³ According to it, neither captured English arms nor arms from German Army stocks may in any substantial quantities be released without the Führer's authorization. It will not be necessary to seek such an authorization, however, until the question of a route for the transport of the material has been definitely settled. Since the route through the Soviet Union must be ruled out, there is no route except through Turkey. Today, Turkey would surely refuse transit of shipments to Iraq. But since Turkey permits transit of arms shipments to Iran and Afghanistan, the question is now being studied of whether it might not be possible, under some camouflage, to add such shipments to those going to Iran. This matter, too, has been dealt with in annex 12. This could not be accomplished, however, without the cooperation of either the Iranian or the Afghan Government. A suitable middleman would be the Afghan Minister of Economics, Abdul Majid, who is here now and who can be regarded as reliable.

The Japanese Government has so far shown great reserve with regard to Iraq's wishes to obtain assistance in arms.²⁴ The discus-

²³ Ripkin memorandum of Mar. 6, "Arms Shipments to Iraq" (71/50805-08).

²⁴ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 601, footnote 2.

In a memorandum of Mar. 5 (792/273137) Woermann recorded a conversation on that subject with Japanese Counselor of Embassy Kase, who stated negotiations regarding arms deliveries between the Iraq Government and a Japanese firm had been carried on until January 1941, but were broken off since the situation in Iraq was considered to be uncertain following the fall of the Gaylani Cabinet.

sions have been suspended since the reorganization of the Iraq Government. The objective of Japanese deliveries of arms should be actively pursued through Ambassador Oshima.

5. *Financial support.*

This is to be taken under consideration with respect to Iraq and the Grand Mufti.

a) Iraq would like to obtain financial support in the form of easy credit terms in connection with the arms deliveries. This request could be granted if arms transactions should come about.

b) Iraq also wants a pledge of financial support in the event that she should enter the struggle against England. A general statement on this point could be issued even at this time.

c) The Grand Mufti has repeatedly asked for financial support for his own plans, especially for sabotage and uprisings in Palestine and Transjordan. The Foreign Minister agreed in principle to such financial support some time ago, making it, however, contingent on Italy's concurrence.²⁵ Consulted on this matter, the Italian Government replied at the time that it was already supplying the Grand Mufti with so much money that it did not feel that any additional support was necessary.²⁶ It is characteristic of the increasing relaxation of the Italian attitude toward us in the Arab question, that recently the Italian Chargé d'Affaires brought up the subject again on his own accord, informing us in accordance with instructions that the Italian Government had no longer any objection to any support given by Germany, but merely wished that it be kept informed²⁷ in the same fashion as it had kept us informed of the financial assistance which it had extended. The Grand Mufti's secretary has mentioned a required amount of £ 20,000 a month, to be supplied in equal shares by us and by Italy. A support in such an amount appears to be unnecessary at this time. It is therefore suggested that for the time being the Grand Mufti receive the equivalent of 100,000 reichsmarks through the suitable channels and in the appropriate ways.²⁸

6. *Inducing Iraq to enter the war.*

In conversations which were held between the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad and General Dallah Hudin, in the presence of the then Minister President Gaylani in January 1941, the latter laid down specific political conditions for Iraq's open resistance to England, namely:

The political declaration, dealt with above;
Formation of a national government in Syria;

²⁵ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 35.

²⁶ See *ibid.*, document No. 40.

²⁷ See document No. 68.

²⁸ Marginal note in Welzsäcker's handwriting: "Possibly more."

Neutrality on the part of Turkey and Iran, to be guaranteed by the Axis Powers.

Our position on the political declaration has been stated above. Formation of a national government in Syria, the Italian Government also agrees, would not be in accord with the present situation. No guarantee can be assumed regarding the attitude of Turkey and Iran.

Given the present situation and the facility for English troops to be moved by sea, by way of Basra, and over the Arabian land bridge from Egypt, open resistance by Iraq against England could have only a brief success, and in the final outcome, in the view of the Italian Government too, lead to a success which would strengthen English prestige.

In these circumstances it must be our policy to keep Iraq's confidence in us alive through the measures discussed above, so that Iraq will strike when the over-all military and political situation makes such action desirable.

If the moment should arrive that our own troops are on the Arabian land bridge or if the moment of England's collapse is near, Iraq could still render valuable services to us, e.g., by sudden destruction of the British airfields and communications in Iraq, annihilation of British troops in transit, and, if circumstances permit, by a thrust in the direction of Transjordan and Palestine.

7. Syria

In accordance with the proposals of Minister von Hentig,²⁹ a German delegation to the Italian Armistice Commission in Syria should be established, to be headed by Minister von Hentig (formally perhaps in his military capacity of Major in the reserves).

Removal of de Gaulle followers in key positions from Syria.

IV. Summary of the proposals

1. With respect to Italy, that country's claim to predominance in the Arab area is not affected, but Germany will take greater initiative, making due allowance for Italian sensibilities. A change to that effect is already under way.

2. Expansion of propaganda activities.

3. Authorizing the Abwehr to develop its intelligence system in the Arab area, to undertake acts of sabotage, and instigate uprisings in Palestine and Transjordan.³⁰

4. Further examination of the possibilities of a political declaration, jointly with the Italian Government. A declaration in

²⁹ See footnote 3.

³⁰ In a memorandum of Mar. 19 (647/255137) Woermann requested an early decision in this matter by the Foreign Minister in view of the fact that "the Abwehr urges almost every day that a reply be made regarding authorization for its activities in the Arab countries."

favor of a Greater Arab federation taking full account of the wishes of the Arabs is impracticable at this time out of consideration for Italy and other powers.

A friendly interim reply to the Grand Mufti's secretary, in conformity with annex 11, perhaps with reference to the Grand Mufti's letter to the Führer, which should, however, not be answered by the Führer himself.

5. Further following up of the matter of support by means of arms and ammunition. If necessary, a decision of the Führer may be requested, once the question is sufficiently clarified.

Authorization for the Economic Policy Department to discuss the matter with the Afghan Minister of Economics, Abdul Majid. Ambassador Oshima is to pursue further the matter of Japanese arms deliveries.

6. Financial support according to the proposals, especially immediate payment of the equivalent of 100,000 reichsmarks to the Grand Mufti.

7. Iraq's open rebellion against England should not be actively promoted until the moment is conducive of success. Meanwhile the will to resist must be kept alive.

8. Establishment of a German delegation with the Italian Armistice Commission in Syria.

9. Démarches with the French Government, in accord with the Italian Government, regarding the removal from Syria of officials and officers friendly to de Gaulle.³¹

WOERMANN

³¹ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting:
"Clear memorandum. Minor additions a), b), d), and e). The fundamental factor also in this instance is the policy toward Russia. Abandonment of the opportunities inherent in the Russ[ian] offer of Nov[ember] is to be regretted in my opinion."

No. 134

104/113121-22

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 505 of March 7

Moscow, March 8, 1941—12:05 a. m.

Received March 8—3:15 a. m.

On the question of the conversion of the present Missions at Riga and Tallin into permanent Consulates, I had a detailed talk with Molotov yesterday. I presented the matter appropriately and asked Molotov to give me the final decision of the Soviet Government.

Molotov replied that the decision of the Soviet Government had unfortunately been entirely negative. The Soviet Government could

not approve an immediate conversion of the German Missions in Riga and Tallin into permanent consular agencies, since it can make no exception to its rule of not permitting foreign Consulates in the Baltic Soviet republics, and it would like to avoid an appeal from a third party because of this. The Soviet Government at the moment finds the maintenance of foreign Missions in the Baltic countries inconvenient and could, therefore, not comply with our wish.

I took note of these statements with regret.

Regarding the Reich-owned buildings in Kaunas, Riga, and Tallin, I informed Molotov that these buildings should be kept for the Reich after the closing of the Mission, just as in Tiflis, and that we intended to appoint house stewards and guards to maintain and guard them. In this connection M. Molotov remarked that Germany's ownership of the buildings which were Reich property was, of course, undisputed, and our wish was therefore justified. In these circumstances, I consider it hopeless to pursue further the plan for an immediate conversion of the German Missions in Riga and Tallin into permanent Consulates. I have consequently informed our Missions there of the negative decision of the Soviet Government and would like to request that not only Kaunas but these agencies also be provided with instructions regarding liquidation as soon as the resettlement is completed.

SCHULENBURG

No. 135

4661/E211847

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, March 8, 1941—2:30 a. m.

No. 780 of March 8

For the Foreign Minister.

There are in German captivity a number of Frenchmen who belonged to civilian units organized and armed to fight German parachutists, who under martial law should be regarded as francs-tireurs and shot.

Since the order to form these units emanated from Premier Reynaud and Minister of Interior Mandel, who was in charge of its execution, I recommend that the extradition of Reynaud and Mandel be demanded of the French Government and that they be shot in place of the men they misled.

The execution of Reynaud and Mandel would hit two men who are chiefly responsible for the war and be a just expiation for the crimes committed against German fliers and parachutists.

The consent of the French Government to Reynaud's and Mandel's extradition could, in my opinion, be obtained.¹

ABETZ

¹ In telegram No. 164 of Mar. 9 (221/149156) Rintelen replied that "the Foreign Minister, with reference to the proposal made by your telegram No. 780 of Mar. 8, has indicated that pursuance of this proposal would not be expedient."

No. 136

216/147705

The Chargé d'Affaires in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 339 of March 8

TOKYO, March 8, 1941—11:10 a. m.

Received March 9—5:00 a. m.

1. The Foreign Ministry states that the delegations to the Thailand-Indochinese negotiations have reached an agreement on the following basis in accordance with the Japanese proposal:¹ The French delegation agreed to the territorial cessions to Thailand proposed by Japan with the provision that the ceded territory must be completely demilitarized and that Thailand accords absolute legal equality to the inhabitants. The Thai delegation will in addition grant to the inhabitants of Indochina free access to the royal tombs at Luangprabang, allow the town of Stungtreng to keep a larger hinterland, and agree to the placing of the Mekong river islands under joint Thai-Indochinese administration.²

2. The Japanese Government declared in an exchange of confidential notes with both parties that it was prepared to guarantee the foregoing agreement. In return Japan demands from France and Thailand assurances that they do not at present maintain nor would they conclude in the future any political, economic, or military agreements directed against Japan.

3. Each delegation has agreed to this exchange of notes and has requested its government's consent to it and to the agreement outlined under paragraph 1.

The Foreign Ministry expects to receive the replies not later than March 10.³

BOLTZE

¹ See documents Nos. 64 and 96.

² With his report of Mar. 12 (2281/480924-38) Boltze transmitted the text of the documents comprising the agreement.

³ In telegram No. 376 of Mar. 12 (216/147706) Boltze reported that Deputy Foreign Minister Ohashi had conveyed the gratitude of the Japanese Government for Ribbentrop's support of the Japanese mediation effort.

No. 137

265/172669

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 221 of March 8

ANKARA, March 8, 1941.

Received March 8—6:35 p. m.

The Foreign Minister stated again in the course of a detailed conversation that the Führer's letter¹ had been most satisfactory, with the exception of the sentence that, if Turkey resorted to counter-measures Germany could not keep the commitment to stay at a distance from the frontier. This sentence has been interpreted here to mean that even in case of troop movements on Turkish territory Germany could retract this assurance. In consequence I told the Foreign Minister categorically that this interpretation was wrong; Germany would keep to her promise in so far as Turkey did not attack or indicate that she intended to attack. This definition satisfied the Foreign Minister very much, and he asked me to find out whether Germany could not give the same assurance regarding the Turkish-Greek frontier during the advance into Greece.² At the same time he said that it was of great interest for both parties that the Istanbul-Sofia railroad connection be maintained. Since neither the Bulgarians nor we seem suitable for taking over the section passing over Greek territory, I propose that we offer to the Turkish Government that it assume the technical operation of this section of railroad until a definitive settlement is made.

The State President's reply to the Führer is being prepared.³

My renewed suggestion that the exchange of letters between the heads of state should lead to a fundamental change in our relations was received by the Foreign Minister in principle in a positive way.

When I complained about the Turkish press the Foreign Minister promised to intervene at once.⁴

PAPEN

¹ Of Mar. 1, document No. 113.

² Marginal note: "But this goes without saying. W[eizsäcker]."

³ See document No. 161.

⁴ Marginal note: "Please let me have the Führer's letter again. Then submit this again. W[eizsäcker], Mar. 10."

No. 138

2548/523336

An Official of the Foreign Minister's Staff to the Embassy in Italy

Teletype

BERGHOF, March 8, 1941.

Received Berlin, March 8—6:40 p. m.

[Sent March 8—6:45 p. m.]¹

No. 519 from Berlin

For the Ambassador personally.

Please submit immediately.

Today the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, referring to the discussion between the Führer and the Prince Regent, has inquired whether Yugoslavia, in case of accession to the Tripartite Pact, would be able to obtain a written statement by Germany and Italy² saying that:

1) The sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia will be guaranteed;

2) No military assistance will be requested of Yugoslavia and also no passage or transportation of troops through the country during the war;

3) Yugoslavia's interests in free outlet to the Aegean Sea through Salonika will be taken into account in the reorganization of Europe.

These are the conditions whose acceptance the Führer and the Duce have promised to the Yugoslavs even earlier in the event of their accession to the Tripartite Pact. The Führer is of the opinion that the previous position with respect to the Yugoslav Government should be maintained and a promise regarding these three points should be made provided Yugoslavia now joins the Tripartite Pact at once, that is to say, certainly this coming week. The Führer would appreciate a statement from the Duce in reply so that the Yugoslav Government may be informed this very day.

The Foreign Minister will telephone the Ambassador right away regarding the use that is to be made of this instruction.³

SCHWEIMER

¹ The time of dispatch is supplied from another copy (100/65238-39).

² See document No. 131.

³ No record of this telephone conversation or of Mussolini's reply has been found.

No. 139

171/135041-45

*The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Embassy in the Soviet Union*

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, March 9, 1941—4:30 a. m.

No. 477 of March 8

Received March 9—10:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 443 of February 28.¹

The Soviet proposals show the tendency, to be sure, to approximate our wishes, but still provide no regulation, such as Molotov previously promised us, assuring that our economic interests in the purchase of nickel from Petsamo are not restricted through the reorganization of the concession. Therefore, please call on Molotov and communicate to him the following comments on the Soviet reply, leaving a note on the subject with him.

I. With regard to the various points of the reply:

Regarding 1. The Soviet reply fails to take into account that, besides the private agreements between I. G. Farben Industrie and the Petsamo Nickel Company, there exists the agreement of July 24, 1940,² known to the Soviet Government, between the German and Finnish Governments, which constitutes the basis of the German claims to delivery of 60 percent of the nickel output of Petsamo. While the I. G. agreements can be terminated by December 1, 1947, the Finnish Government has, by the above-mentioned agreement, undertaken additional commitments for an unlimited time, including the one about making continuous deliveries of not less than 60 percent of the output. In order to guarantee fulfillment of these obligations, even in the event of Soviet participation in the mining companies, it is necessary that the Soviet Government declare its readiness also to take into account the German-Finnish governmental agreement. Since the Soviet Government has agreed in principle that Germany receive 60 percent of the output (see below No. 3), such a statement on the part of the Soviet Government would probably not encounter any difficulties.

Regarding 2. The German Government is also of the opinion that the question of the continuance of the German-Finnish agreements concerning Petsamo nickel should be settled directly between Germany and Finland. It is anxious, however, that the implementation of these agreements through the proposed reorganization of the mining company should cause no complications and it would like to have confirmation of this from the Soviet Government.

Regarding 3. If the German Government understands the Soviet proposal correctly, the Soviet Government would be ready to conclude an agreement with the German Government whereby Germany could get from the Soviet Government 10 percent of the nickel output of Petsamo, should such an agreement be necessary to

¹ Document No. 109.

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 221.

raise Germany's total imports to 60 percent. Such an agreement is not necessary because Germany already has a right to imports of 60 percent under her agreements with Finland. As previously stated, the German Government is anxious to get the full German share of 60 percent through the German-Finnish clearing.

Regarding 4. The German Government naturally does not expect the Soviet Government to assume the obligation to supply the entire nickel requirements of the German economy from the production of the Petsamo area. It is convinced, however, that the German-Finnish private contracts and governmental agreements provide assurance that Germany will be able to get as much nickel from the Petsamo area as she needs for her essential military requirements. This certainty is offered only if the existing complex of agreements is preserved in its entirety. As far as the private agreements are concerned [it is necessary³] that, in the event of a change in the mining company, the new company enter into all agreements concluded between I. G. Farben Industrie and Petsamo-Nikkeli. This applies to the delivery contract of July 23, 1940, the credit agreement of September 16, 1940, together with supplements, and the nickel matte agreement of February 19, 1941.⁴ The Soviet Government has already been informed by the Finnish Government of the first two agreements. With regard to the nickel matte agreement, whose conclusion was definitely provided for both in the delivery contract and in the credit agreement, the Finnish Government has also been requested to inform the Soviet Government of the text forthwith.

A departure from the line prescribed in these agreements would undoubtedly have the result that the production program, which is geared to German requirements, would suffer interruptions and interferences which might affect adversely the yield of the mines precisely at a time when it is of especial importance that Germany get the full amount of her imports.

II. To sum up, the following should be stressed:

It is important to the German Government that its interests, as now embodied in agreements, should suffer no restrictions through the contemplated changes in the mining company. For this it is necessary that the new company take over the existing agreements with I. G. Farben and that no complications arise through Soviet participation in the mines in the implementation both of these agreements and also of existing German-Finnish governmental agreements. It is the desire of the German Government, therefore, to obtain from the Soviet Government a statement that it agrees to such an assumption of the private contracts and is prepared to prevent any difficulties from arising in the execution of the private contracts and of the governmental agreements. Over and above such an assurance, this would entail no obligations, particularly no direct delivery obligations for the Soviet Government with respect to the German Government, since Germany's claims arising out of the private contracts and governmental agreements would still be

³ These words appear in the draft (B19/B004057-62) but not in the Moscow Embassy copy which is printed here.

⁴ Not found.

directed against the Finnish Government or the new mining company. Close of the note.

With reference to your No. 482 of March 5.⁵

The Finnish Minister here has represented the substance of the Molotov-Paasikivi conversation of March 4,⁶ as stated in your telegram. He added that the Finnish Government would be glad if we mentioned also to the Soviet Government the question of the management of the new company, stating approximately that a Soviet management could not function well on foreign soil. The same applied also to the Soviet demand for participation of a fifth of the officials in the new company. He was told that we had no policy on this, since the question of the organization of the new Finnish-Russian company was pending only between Finland and Russia. With reference to Vyshinsky's comment, mentioned in the last paragraph of your telegram, please state, however, to Molotov or Vyshinsky when the opportunity occurs as follows: as we had always stressed and did again in the above-mentioned memorandum, we were anxious to be able to get the nickel not from the Soviet Government but from Finland, namely, through German-Finnish clearing (see also telegram No. 227 of February 5⁷). The reason alleged by Vyshinsky as to why the Soviet Government had to insist on Soviet management of the company was therefore inapplicable.

CLODIUS

⁵ Document No. 123.

⁶ This is recorded in the Wiehl memorandum of Mar. 6 (B19/B004056).

⁷ Document No. 16.

No. 140

104/113181

The Consulate at Harbin to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

HARBIN, March 9, 1941—4:45 a. m.

No. 7 of March 9

Received March 9—3:30 p. m.

Secret for officer in charge.

With reference to our telegram No. 6 of March 6.¹

Informational instruction from the Foreign Commissariat in Moscow, presumably intended for the foreign Missions, intercepted on March 8:

The Soviet Government will not interfere with German activity against Greece; this is necessary in order to exert pressure on the English colonies, to threaten the Suez Canal, and harass the English

¹ This telegram (104/113116-17) forwarded intercepts of Russian messages from Ankara and Washington.

troops in Africa who have to be supplied. On the other hand, there is a growing feeling among the Balkan peoples against intervening in the war. We must warn the Balkan Governments which actively support Germany against the danger which this entails for the peace of the Balkans. We must exert pressure on Yugoslavia and Turkey not to intervene in the war on either side and at the same time strive to win the sympathy of the Greek people, who must fight against the German invasion. In pointing out the foregoing, however, we wish to emphasize at the same time that we are not thinking of jeopardizing the German-Russian treaty, which is necessary for the achievement of the most urgent goal, namely the destruction of the English Empire.

PONSCHAB

No. 141

589/244201-02

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 619 of March 9

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1941—6:07 a. m.

Received March 10—8:10 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 618 of March 9.¹

Although the passage of the Authorization Law in the Senate with 59 against 31 votes after 3 weeks of lively debate does not give a convincing picture of the unity of the nation, the President has now acquired powers that have never before been granted in peacetime; these enable him among other things:

1. To replace the present military aid to England, which was being paid for until now, by the delivery, free of charge, of war material of all sorts.

2. To permit such free deliveries to go to China and Greece, too, to the extent possible; also to future opponents of the Axis Powers, and probably even to the Latin American countries in pursuance of the hemisphere policy "U.S.A. as the arsenal of democracy."

3. To support rebels such as de Gaulle.

4. To open American ports to the English fleet for repairs; that is, to give the English the possibility of carrying on warfare from American waters contrary to the Panama and Havana Conventions.²

5. To suspend past legislation in so far as it stands in the way of the Authorization Law.

6. To stimulate the armaments program to such an extent that past failures in New Deal policy can be covered up by new govern-

¹ In this telegram (589/244199-200) Thomsen reported the Senate vote on the Lend-Lease Bill and on the proposed amendments.

² For text of the Declaration of Panama of Oct. 8, 1939, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957), vol. v, p. 36; see also vol. viii of this series, document No. 306.

For text of the convention on provisional administration of European colonies and possessions in the Americas, concluded at Havana July 30, 1940, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 977 or U.S. Statutes at Large, 1939-1941, vol. 54 (pt. 2), p. 2491; see also vol. x of this series, document No. 316.

ment orders and subsidies given. As is evident from the reports of the Embassy and the Military Attaché,³ even after passage of the law sudden miracles in the sphere of arms deliveries are not to be expected. On the other hand, like everything which Roosevelt has done since the outbreak of the war, the Law has the effect of lengthening the war, especially owing to its psychological repercussions on England. At the same time it should again be regarded as an expression of Roosevelt's determination—even though America herself is not taking part in the war—to make his claim to leadership in world policy prevail; and to do this without sentimental considerations for the democratic ideals which are displayed toward the outside, but rather in the spirit of a deliberate American imperialism in which, for the present and for later, England has been assigned the role of a paid vassal.

THOMSEN

³ Such reports were sent by the Embassy in telegrams No. 74 of Jan. 10 (84/62345-51), No. 135 of Jan. 17 (84/62395-97), and No. 179 of Jan. 22 (84/62432-35).

No. 142

265/172671-72

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

SECRET

FUSCHL, March 9, 1941—3:45 p. m.

No. 161 of March 9

from Fuschl

Received Berlin, March 9—4:07 p. m.

No. 179 of March 9

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent March 9—4:20 p. m.

zu RAM 78/r.¹

Secret for officer in charge.

For the Ambassador and Minister Jenke personally.

I am struck by the fact that the Turkish press and the Turkish radio continue to display an attitude of extreme hostility toward Germany. It appears necessary to me that we take appropriate steps against this at once. In the first place, please call the attention of the Turkish Government to the serious damage to German-Turkish relations if the press and radio should continue in this tone, and demand that the Turkish Government do something to remedy the situation at once. Furthermore, it also seems to me to be necessary that the attempt now be made at once to exert direct influence on the important people of the Turkish press and radio, who are evidently in the pay of England. I am willing to make available for this purpose at once a sum of several millions in foreign exchange, if need be. Please wire immediately your opinion and any sugges-

¹ RAM 78/r: Not found.

tions which you might have. What is the status of the other question in this connection, which I discussed orally with Jenke?²

RIBBENTROP

¹In his reply, telegram No. 226 of Mar. 10 (265/172674-75), Papen referred to his démarche regarding the Turkish press (reported in document No. 187), stating that one Turkish newspaper had been banned and new instructions to the Turkish press had been issued. As for the funds which Ribbentrop offered to make available, they could profitably be used only if the Turkish Government adopted a new policy of improving relations with Germany. See, further, document No. 154.

With regard to Jenke, Papen stated that the latter would have a conference in this matter on Mar. 15. Nothing was found which would indicate what was involved.

This telegram also mentioned that Menemencioglu had been instructed to draft a reply to Hitler's letter expressing the Turkish Government's intention to improve relations with Germany, and it further reported information concerning statements about Soviet policy which Eden was said to have made in a conversation with the Yugoslav Ambassador in Turkey, Ilja Šumenković.

No. 143

449/228082-84

The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ATHENS, March 9, 1941.

No. 263 of March 9

Received March 9—4:53 p. m.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 182 of March 8.²

Regarding point 1: As of March 4, the number of British troops on the Greek mainland according to a cautious estimate was limited to a total of about 7,000 airmen with the necessary ground personnel, antiaircraft and motor transport troops as well as staffs and administrative authorities.

Of these about half were in Athens and at airfields in the adjacent and more distant vicinity (Tatoi, Ellinikon, Eleusis). The main part is around Eleusis, the supply center of the English. There are additional smaller or larger British air bases in Halmyros southwest of Volos, Larissa, in the neighborhood of Trikkala, Ioannina, Korçë, and west of Patras. The exact strength is known only for Larissa, the base for the advance home fields, with about 450 men.

So far it has not been established with certainty that there are any English east of the Vardar. Our own latest reliable observations in this regard from Salonika are of the morning of March 7.

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 935 to Fuschl, Mar. 9."

² In this telegram (449/228079) Rintelen transmitted to Erbach Ribbentrop's request for information about the presence of British troops in Greece and the impact on the Greek Government and public opinion of Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact.

All of the islands in the Aegean and Ionian Seas with the exception of Crete were likewise unoccupied by the English up to March 4. An air force unit which had landed at Cephalonia at the start of the conflict was withdrawn again after the airfields in western Greece had been developed. There are no data indicating that an occupation of individual islands of the Aegean Archipelago has been under way since March 4.

Only partial observations are available from Crete. The strength of British troops there was so far assumed by other, neutral observers, to be about 10,000 men, including infantry; for the rest, flying personnel, antiaircraft and coastal artillery.

According to a report from the German Consul at Kalamata based on his own detailed inspection on March 5, there are no English in Pylos, nor are any base installations there; it has heretofore been supposed that an English submarine base was there.

Since March 4 further removals of British troops have begun, especially from Crete to Athens and its vicinity, so far about 5,000 men, mainly infantry and to a lesser degree also antiaircraft troops and engineers. The troops are a mixture, in large part Australians but also New Zealanders and many Cypriot Greeks. They are equipped with rifles but not with heavy infantry weapons. Half of them are in a camp at the Tatoi airfield and east of it, and about a thousand men are at the airfield at Eleusis.

The way in which they are quartered in the vicinity of English airfields indicates protective measures with respect to a possible air landing operation. It is therefore to be assumed that the other advanced British airports will also be provided with protective forces; it cannot yet be foreseen whether these will be parts of the troops already landed in Piraeus or of other formations that debarked elsewhere or are still being transported. So far no such reports have been received.

Regarding point 2: After the entry of German troops into Bulgaria the public feels directly threatened by Germany. Resistance is considered as being hopeless, but for reasons of national honor as being unavoidable. In any case, in accordance with Greek mentality, which does not want to yield to pressure, the will to resist has not been broken by the nearness of German troops. Despite the unpopularity of the English, which naturally does not find expression in the press, the Greek people do not believe that they can let the German troops enter without a struggle, even if their purpose is merely to drive the English out, because therewith the Albanian front would collapse, and the war, which has been felt to be a holy war, and which so far has been successfully conducted

against the hated Italians, would be lost. Confidence in the person of the Führer and the role of the German Reich in a new Europe where the national honor of Greece would be treated with consideration has been shaken in wide circles, to be sure, but it is still strong enough that expressed assurances with respect to Italy could influence public opinion.

The Government accordingly seems resolved to wage a desperate fight. At any rate no new official attempt to settle the questions which can make the possible German attack unavoidable, namely the conflict with Italy and the presence of English air forces in Greece, has become known so far. The firm language used by all officials also bears this out. Nevertheless it is possible that the still unsettled attitude of Turkey and Yugoslavia could exercise an influence on the ultimate decisions of the Government.

ERBACH

No. 144

230/152547-48

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia

Telegram

No. 165 of March 9

FUSCHL, March 9, 1941—6:15 p. m.

from Fuschl

Received Berlin, March 9—6:50 p. m.

No. 254 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent March 9.

Secret for officer in charge.

For the Minister personally.

With reference to today's telephone conversation¹ I wish to give you the following supplementary information regarding the three points mentioned in your telegram No. 203 of March 7,² regarding which the Yugoslav Government wishes to obtain a written statement from Germany and Italy:

Regarding point 1: We are willing to concede to the Yugoslav Government in a special note respect of [Yugoslavia's] sovereignty and territorial integrity. This promise can be published by the Yugoslav Government.

Regarding point 2: Here two questions are involved, namely, in the first place, the question of passage and transportation of troops through the country and in the second place, the question of military assistance.

a. As regards passage or transportation of troops through the country we are willing to promise the Yugoslav Government in a

¹ No record found.

² Document No. 131.

special note that during the war we will not make the demand of Yugoslavia that she permit us to march or transport troops through the country. This promise, too, could be published if the Yugoslav Government should consider this necessary for reasons of domestic policy; this and the time could still be discussed at the time when matters are concluded.

b. As regards the military assistance we have always in the previous discussions proceeded from the assumption that Yugoslavia's aid will not be requested by us in the *Greek conflict*. Nor would any obligation in this respect arise for Yugoslavia under the Tripartite Pact because Greece is already involved in the European war. There is nothing to prevent a corresponding confirmation on our part and if necessary a clarification of this state of affairs before the Yugoslav public at a time still to be arranged.

c. On the other hand, we cannot formally release Greece [*Yugoslavia*] from the obligation of military support in the cases in which the Tripartite Pact applies (attack by a power not presently involved in the war), for this would again cancel the effect of Yugoslavia's accession. Here article 3 of the Tripartite Pact must stand. Should this point present difficulties at your end, one might consider our telling the Yugoslav Government in confidence that of course its military assistance under article 3 of the Tripartite Pact was problematical in its practical effects and would probably not be requested by us either; if it should be considered at all it would be left, in any case, to a special agreement with the Yugoslav Government to decide on its extent. Please, however, do not make this statement now beforehand but hold back with it for the time being and indicate this possibility only if this should prove necessary in order to obtain Yugoslav accession. Of course, nothing can be made public concerning this question.

Regarding point 3: We are willing to promise Yugoslavia in a secret note that in the new settlement of frontiers in the Balkans Yugoslavia's interest in free access to the Aegean Sea by way of Salonika will be taken into account. But of course this promise must remain strictly secret.

Please discuss these points without delay with the Foreign Minister at your post in accordance with the above statements, and wire at once about the outcome.³

RIBBENTROP

³ See document No. 145.

No. 145

230/152551-52

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BELGRADE, March 10, 1941—4:25 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received March 10—7:35 p. m.¹

No. 208 of March 10

With reference to your telegram No. 254 of March 9.²

The instruction in the telegram cited above has just been carried out.

The Foreign Minister did not raise any objections to the supplementary statements regarding point 1, point 2a and 2b as well as point 3, either with respect to the substance or the question of formal treatment and publication.

The Foreign Minister was obviously very much surprised by the content of point 2c. He stated that the Yugoslav inquiry in this regard had been made in full knowledge of article 3 of the Tripartite Pact, and had had exactly the purpose of making clear that Germany and Italy would not demand any military assistance of Yugoslavia even after her accession to the Tripartite Pact. As a result of my communication he was placed in an extremely embarrassing situation, since this involved the most important point and he had already told the Prince Regent and the Minister President that the Yugoslav inquiry had been answered affirmatively in this regard, too.³ Precisely the military assistance provided for in the Tripartite Pact was the obstacle to Yugoslavia's accession. One was here quite willing to cooperate sincerely in the reorganization of Europe under German leadership and to make every possible effort to support it politically and economically. However, the discharging of an obligation to lend military assistance could involve Yugoslavia in a war—possibly with America or even Russia—which would be in crass contradiction to the mood of the people and to Yugoslavia's fundamental peace policy. He therefore feared that grave difficulties would result from our position regarding this point.

In the subsequent detailed discussion I tried to make clear to the Foreign Minister the senselessness of acceding to the Tripartite Pact while at the same time canceling one of its essential provisions

¹ Marginal note: "On instructions of the Foreign Minister transmitted by telephone Mar. 10, 11:15 p.m.; encoding not necessary. Foreign Minister's Secretariat."

² Document No. 144.

³ In telegram No. 206 of Mar. 8 (2548/323335) Heeren, referring to a telephone instruction from Ribbentrop of the same day, reported having informed the Yugoslav Foreign Minister "that the question posed is answered affirmatively by us and Italy in all three points."

and to convince him of the overriding importance of the promises contained in points 1, 2a, and 3.

The Foreign Minister listened to me attentively but reverted again and again to the statement that Yugoslavia could not be expected to enter a war on the basis of article 3 of the Tripartite Pact as long as her vital interests were not threatened.

The Foreign Minister said following this that he would immediately inform the higher authorities of my communications and for his part seek a way for a solution. He believes that the Crown Council will meet tomorrow.

HEEREN

No. 146

589/244211-13

Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff

BERLIN, March 10, 1941.

Subject: The passage of the Lend-Lease Law¹ in the Senate.

1. The President:

As was to be expected, his will prevailed almost entirely. He is receiving essentially all of the powers which he wanted, and the concessions which he had to make to the opposition are slight. On the basis of the large majorities in both Houses of Congress he can with some justice point to the "national unity" regarding aid to England—a fact to which he attached great importance from the start, and which is significant for further developments as the President desires them. The President played his game in a masterly way, well supported by Senators Barkley and George.² Immediately after signing the Law the President will proceed to its implementation, which has already been thoroughly prepared in many particulars.

2. Congress:

It was very easy for the Administration to put the bill through the House of Representatives; on the other hand, the opposition in the Senate provided rather obstinate resistance. The opposition was weakened, however, by the fact that it lacked great leaders; Borah and Lundeen³ are dead, Hiram Johnson is a toothless old lion, and Wheeler⁴ fights more out of personal hatred of Roosevelt than out

¹ Approved Mar. 11, 1941; U.S. Statutes at Large, 1941-1942, vol. 55, p. 31.

² Alben William Barkley, Democratic Senator from Kentucky and majority leader of the Senate; Walter Franklin George, Democratic Senator from Georgia.

³ William Edgar Borah, Republican Senator from Idaho (1907-1940); Ernest Lundeen, Republican Senator from Minnesota (1937-1940).

⁴ Hiram Warren Johnson, Republican Senator from California; Burton Kendall Wheeler, Democratic Senator from Montana.

of objective conviction. Furthermore, the opposition was weakened from the start by the fact that it did not include the entire Republican group, but only a part; as a result there was a lack of clear leadership in the debate. Seventeen Republicans voted against the Law, 10 for it. If 13 Democrats had not voted against the Law, the defeat of the opposition would have been still more striking. Even so the Administration majority amounted to almost two-thirds; if all of the Senators had been present (four were absent at the voting), the two-thirds majority for the Administration would have been even more clearly evident.

3. Public opinion:

Since the start of the war all of the public opinion polls have indicated time and again that about 85-90 percent of the American electorate (at least in so far as they express their opinion) are in favor of extensive support of England "short of war."⁵ The Government has made use of this circumstance. It found decisive support in this fact from the very start, and by referring to this public opinion it exerted time and again decisive influence on the Representatives and Senators whenever they wavered. To be sure, there has been increasing concern in the country in recent weeks regarding the course taken by Roosevelt, which has found expression in the press, but the movement was not strong enough to influence Congress. On the other hand the Government must continue to reckon with the fact that even today 70-80 percent of the American voters still reject entry into the war by the United States. It is possible that this feeling will become stronger and more consolidated as a result of the campaign which several Senators of the opposition are going to launch all over the country in the coming weeks, and which we will promote secretly in so far as possible. Essentially the development of public opinion in this matter will depend upon the progress of the war; if Germany succeeds in defeating the English decisively in the near future, then in all probability American public opinion will be in favor of staying out of the war; if the war continues undecided for a considerable time, then there is a considerable danger that public opinion will develop in the direction of a growing willingness to enter the war.

4. The propaganda effect of the passage of the Lend-Lease Law on England will be considerable. The practical effect of the American aid, however, now increased in both quantity and pace, will not become noticeable for England until a few months at the earliest.

Herewith submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister.

DIECKHOFF

⁵ This phrase is in English in the original.

No. 147

*Vidkun Quisling to Reich Minister Lammers*¹

OSLO, March 10, 1941.

DEAR REICH MINISTER DR. LAMMERS: Last December, when you afforded me the opportunity to describe the over-all situation in Norway,² I pointed out that a favorable solution of the Norwegian problem looking toward a popularly supported voluntary association in a Great Germanic federation depended upon two crucial factors:

First, establishment of a close relationship of trust and confidence between the German authorities and me as leader of the Nasjonal Samling which is oriented toward this objective.

Secondly, a basic willingness to enter into peace preliminaries with a Norway led by the Nasjonal Samling. These would be based on considerations which already envision the future organization of a Great Germanic federation. This would not require an exact formulation or any precise draft of specific provisions; merely a manifestation of the desire to respect and to advance the special character and historic development of the Norwegian people along these fundamental lines, and to guarantee its freedom as a nation, would have sufficient decisive effect to promote further developments.

The attempt initiated by Reich Commissar Terboven after his appointment to work with the old Norwegian political parties through the intermediary of the Storting toward a solution favorable for Germany ended in complete failure. At the time I had repeatedly cautioned against this attempt in the light of my familiarity with Norwegian conditions and attitudes. Pursuant to the Führer's explicit decision the Nasjonal Samling was then declared to be the sole recognized political party in Norway, and last September a provisional regime was established.³ Its term was fixed during the preliminary discussions for approximately 6 months (to about March 1, 1941), as was also down in writing. In the meantime the Nasjonal Samling was to step up its activities in order to enlarge its following, despite the unavoidably increased difficulties in living conditions in general caused by the war. In the intervening period the Nasjonal Samling has increased its registered membership to something like 30,000, which roughly corresponds percentagewise to the strength of the NSDAP prior

¹ This document is from the files of the *Aussenpolitisches Amt* and has been filmed as item EAP 250-d-18-42/3, serial 40, roll 19, and the film microcopy, T 81, has been deposited in the National Archives.

² See vol. XI of this series, Editors' Note, p. 814.

³ See *ibid.*, document No. 144, footnote 1.

to the seizure of power. Its internal structure has been consolidated and it has gained in influence especially among the farming and country population of Norway. Unfortunately, the requisite condition that the German authorities adopt and pursue a clear-cut attitude with respect to the Nasjonal Samling in order to demonstrate to the Norwegian people, for their own benefit, in unmistakable terms Greater Germany's intention to seek a far-reaching solution of the Norwegian problem with the Nasjonal Samling under my leadership, has not been fulfilled. What has been given to the Nasjonal Samling with the right hand has been taken away with the left. Otherwise the expansion of the Nasjonal Samling would have reached quite different proportions, despite any reaction due to the attitude of the United States or the partial successes of the English in Albania and Africa.

I do not propose at this time to enumerate to you, Herr Minister, all those vexations and their consequences which the Nasjonal Samling has encountered among the people due to the attitude of the German authorities. I would merely like to mention a few striking examples:

1. Last autumn the new administration, the responsibility for which was placed by the population squarely with the Nasjonal Samling, received orders for a 20 percent reduction in wages. Compliance with these orders from the German authorities, which were pressed with the greatest vigor, would have spelled *the political suicide of the Nasjonal Samling*. All counterarguments were unavailing. Nevertheless, the Nasjonal Samling refused to go along with this request, and subsequently its attitude was justified. A request like this in itself demonstrates either a wholly blind attitude on the part of the German authorities as regards the political objectives being envisioned, or else it reveals a disguised intent on the part of certain authorities in the German administration to frustrate these objectives through the Nasjonal Samling, using the Nasjonal Samling itself as lever.

2. Retention in office of the trade-union leadership has given rise to a steady opposition which the Nasjonal Samling encounters in its efforts to win support among the laboring classes. When this opposition became intolerable, and all attempts to remove the persons in question had failed, the Reich Commissar himself undertook to bring influence to bear upon the trade-union leaders along the lines desired. Following the conference between Reich Commissar Terboven and Tangen, the trade-union leader, a communiqué by Tangen appeared the next day in all Norwegian newspapers, reporting complete accord between the Reich Commissar and Tangen, on maintaining the current policy! The entire population and particularly labor circles interpreted this as a censure of the

Nasjonal Samling, which now again found the doors closed to it. What is more, this same Tangen and a number of other labor leaders were invited by the Reich Commissar to make an inspection trip to Germany, which, of course, could only be interpreted as favoring the opposing forces as against the Nasjonal Samling. By way of comparison within a larger context this would be as if Reich President von Hindenburg, after his expression of confidence on January 30,⁴ had held friendly discussions with the Marxist trade-union leaders in Germany about the continuance of their organization. The above-mentioned trip turned out to be a big failure, in any case, as the returned labor leaders are not reticent about charging Germany with indulging in tactics of deception.

3. An evening social affair of the Nasjonal Samling for the German Wehrmacht and German administrative authorities which, after lengthy discussions, had been arranged for January 24 was postponed to January 26 on request of the Reich Commissar. The date had been cleared by the Reich Commissar with the chief Wehrmacht officers. The navy people accepted the invitation, but on the 24th I received word from Colonel General v. Falkenhorst that the date was not suitable. This doomed the carefully prepared celebration, news of which had, of course, spread like wildfire throughout Norway, and the Nasjonal Samling was plainly compromised. What hurt me particularly was to learn later on that General v. Falkenhorst apparently had had the time on the night of the planned festivities to dine in public at the Grand Hotel in Oslo.

4. For racial and political considerations I have advocated collaboration between Norway and Germany for more than 10 years, based on mutual respect of the two nations for each other. This concept also moved me to resolve to recruit Norwegian men for the SS-Standarte "Nordland", a decision which was bitterly attacked by my opponents. This same racial philosophy was also stressed by the Reichsführer SS in his speech in Oslo.⁵ How can this be reconciled with the point of view of the Wehrmacht that a German soldier may treat Norwegian girls as fair game and is not permitted to marry a girl even if she expects a child by him, as was set forth in an order issued by General v. Falkenhorst? The obligation to support children born out of wedlock is supposed to fall upon the Norwegian Government, similar to the so-called "French children" during the seizure of the Ruhr. On the other hand, Norwegian men are considered worthy to be accepted into the German Army and

⁴ Jan. 30, 1933, when President Hindenburg entrusted Hitler with formation of a Cabinet.

⁵ Speech of Reichsführer SS Himmler in Oslo, Jan. 30, on the occasion of the swearing in of the SS-Standarte "Nordland"; text in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, February 1941, pp. 140-142.

to fight under German colors in the "Nordland" Standarte, while it is forbidden to marry their sisters.

And so I could tell you of a whole series of constant occurrences; of letters written by the German authorities, mentioning a "probationary period" for the Nasjonal Samling; or, point to the sudden orders from the press section, abruptly changing the title "Fører of the Nasjonal Samling" to "Leiter of the Nasjonal Samling," even though the term "Fører of the Nasjonal Samling" has been in use in Norway for the past 8 years; there have heretofore never been any objections to such appellations as "Reichsführer SS" or "Reichsbauernführer" as suggesting equality of rank with the "Führer"; and other things of this nature, very likely not worth mentioning. Taken together, however, these things all produce a very unmistakable effect upon the people in one direction, namely, that the German authorities in Norway and hence Greater Germany are not fully backing up the Nasjonal Samling but are using it as means to arrive at quite a different solution. The attitude of the German authorities has added to the impression among the entire people that Greater Germany is not dealing fairly with the Nasjonal Samling, and that *I am the "traitor" betrayed by the Reich, thus suffering the fate which all such persons deserve.*

As against this, there is no doubt that the hostile elements are stiffening their resistance, spurred on by the more acute effects of the war and by English propaganda. It may be anticipated that there will come a time, assuming that the present policies of the German authorities continue unchanged, when the expansion of the Nasjonal Samling will come to a halt, whereupon there will be a search for other solutions, and this is, after all, just what the intention is!

However, I feel I must utter a warning about this very thing, just as I warned about Reich Commissar Terboven's unfortunate attempt with the Storting. The argument that since the Nasjonal Samling, despite greater financial support, was unable to achieve the objectives which had been set up and that therefore some other solution would have to be found, perhaps on the order of Bohemia and Moravia, or even the General Government [of Poland] or the Reich territories of Alsace-Lorraine after 1870—which is being whispered about on the streets in Oslo—I consider as inviting disaster.

Similarly, the fact that German heavy industry and German large financial interests are expanding very noticeably and displacing Norwegians is causing much dissatisfaction among the people and stiffens their resistance to Germany.

Dear Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, I would not have written you these words, especially in view of the war measures which over-

shadow all problems, if I were not firmly convinced that *lack of success with the Nasjonal Samling in Norway would be equivalent to losing an entire military campaign in Scandinavia*. Failure to reach the goal of a Great Germanic federation, with a shift, perhaps by stages, to some other *purely* schematic solution based on power politics, would make its impact felt in the entire North of Europe for generations to come and even have repercussions in the Netherlands and other countries. For, instead of an integration by the free consent of a major part of the population into a Great Germanic federation, there would arise a power organism borne only with resentment and envenoming the future, and bearing within it the germ of its own destruction.

It is this very significance of the political solution in Norway for the whole future of the North and also for Germany which moves me to turn to you again to ask if you could not possibly arrange for me to present the situation to the Führer in person, or else to bring about a decision on the part of the Führer.

Last December I took the liberty to propose January 30 as the date for forming, as already approved in principle by the Führer, an independent, purely Nasjonal Samling government in Norway under my leadership, after it had been stipulated earlier, in writing, that this would have to be done by March 1, 1941, at the latest. Since the date of January 30 was not agreeable, may I ask that another date, satisfactory to the Führer, be fixed, *perhaps May 17 (Norwegian national holiday)*. On the date chosen there would be a declaration of Norway's independence along with conclusion of a preliminary peace settlement and there would take place the transformation and redesignation of the Office of the Reich Commissar, as already approved in principle by the Führer.

Please therefore obtain for me the Führer's consent to my announcing at this time that the Führer is in principle willing to conclude a preliminary peace arrangement with Norway as a friendly nation.

The anniversary of the occupation of Norway, April 9, could then perhaps be utilized for such a declaration by the Führer.

Such a declaration would not fail to have an effect on the world in general. It would bear witness to the strength of Greater Germany which at the moment of the bitterest struggle with England can afford to make a special settlement with a people led astray and deceived by its former Government. It could not be taken as anything other than the expression of Germany's unshakable certainty

of victory. I should deplore it if such a solution were delayed until the final decision against England has been obtained, for in such a case Norway would be on the wrong side at the peace negotiations. From a practical standpoint it would surely be an impossible situation for the Nasjonal Samling to sit on Germany's side and Norway as a country to be on the side of England.

I would also like to mention in this connection that I consider it very unfortunate to hold, as is intended, a great military review on April 9, the anniversary of Germany's entry. As mentioned above, a declaration of principles by the Führer would have quite a different effect on the Norwegian people. A demonstration of German might would no doubt also make an excellent impression, but not on this date. As I know the Norwegians, it would be the right timing if the Führer's declaration of principles came on April 9 and a great military review were held on the Führer's birthday. A parade on April 9 would gain Germany nothing, and she would only lose by it.

I have always believed in Germany's victory, and I would consider it a point of honor, for myself and for the Norwegian people, to be able to attest to this belief by an attitude which would be unequivocal in the eyes of the world, prior to ultimate victory.

Finally I should like to say something briefly about the incident in Svolvær.⁶ Regrettable though the attitude of a part of the population of Svolvær may be, we should not give way to exaggeration by insisting that a friendly policy toward Norway is of no avail and that only drastic military measures against the population are effective. If a military dictatorship were now instituted, it would only make the position of the Nasjonal Samling before the people more difficult and thereby jeopardize the link with Germany. What we need is not a sterner policy against the Norwegian people but a *clearer* one, such as I have been advocating for a long time in the interest of both our peoples; so far without success, I regret to say. I can guarantee that if the Führer promises the Norwegian people a quick and honorable peace and national independence within a voluntary association with Germany, there would be a wide shift of sentiment in favor of Germany.

Yours, etc.⁷

⁶The reference is to the raid carried out by British and Norwegian forces on Mar. 4 on Svolvær, the main trading center of the Lofoten islands.

⁷This copy of the document bears no signature.

No. 148

589/244219-22

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1941—1:13 p. m.

SECRET

Received March 11—3:20 p. m.

No. 631 of March 10

Subject: America's entry into the war.

For Chief of the General Staff of the Army personally; Chief of the Air Force General Staff personally; Chief of Department Ausland OKW personally.

The reports passed on to me from the OKH and other indications permit the assumption that the foreign Missions of the United States of America, as well as the armed forces Attachés and chambers of commerce, have been instructed to speak of the possibility or even the probability of American entry into the war in the near future. Considering the strict guidance for their conversations to which the American Missions are subjected, it can be assumed to be certain that this is an intentional oral propaganda in support of the American aims. Probably Colonel Donovan, too, talked in this way.¹ Since 1918 the United States of America regards itself in the role of the arbiter of the world. Wide circles, especially around Roosevelt, have since been suffering from overweening presumptuousness, believing that simply the announcement of the possible or probable entry of the United States of America into the war is bound to influence the decisions of other nations in accordance with America's ideas and induce them to believe that America's entry into the war will bring about a repetition of the events of 1918, and thus the decision against Germany.

For years Roosevelt has operated with bluffs, when he threatened economic quarantine, then measures just short of war, and, as early as 1938 and 1939, when he spread abroad by means of appropriate oral propaganda, that a war with England, and later that a serious threat to England, would result in America's immediate entry into the war.

Then, as now, Germany realized how little weight these threats had. For as we knew, America was first, not prepared for war; second, not capable of building up an adequate war industry within a short time; third, not sure of the attitude of the Latin American countries; fourth, the American people were against entry into the war; and fifth, the United States, in fundamental contrast to 1917, was not sure of Japan and was thereby hampered in its decisions.

¹ For some details of Colonel Donovan's mission at the beginning of 1941, see document No. 171, footnote 2.

In the meantime the war preparations of the American armed forces have been in full swing. The war industry is developing, is overcoming its bottlenecks, and in the summer of 1941 will greatly increase its performance; the Latin American countries are being forced more and more into the sphere of influence of the United States, both militarily and economically, and a war mood is being created among the American people, even though they are today not yet psychologically ready for all sacrifices. On the other hand, however, there have been decisive developments since the middle of 1940, which invalidate any comparison with 1917. Germany is the master of Europe. No longer can American armies land and assemble undisturbed behind an existing front. There is as yet no air power that could be employed decisively in England or elsewhere. The shipping losses, as a result of the German blockade, are much greater than could be predicted in the middle of 1940, and cannot be compensated for in the next ■ years by American aid, the less so as the fleet needs numerous auxiliary ships in view of the situation in the Pacific. Even an illegal seizure of available foreign ships could not by any means have a very important effect. America's own rearmament and aid for England are practically contradictory and can only be harmonized to some degree by 1942, when the war industry will have gotten into gear. The Air Force is antiquated and, if there are further big transfers of material to England, will not be capable before 1942 of attaining any considerable strength, in spite of excellent human material. Finally, the situation at the Pacific front, especially since the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, has become much more serious than was assumed here in the summer of 1940. In addition there is the important fact that America will hardly enter the war if this means a great risk; rather she wants to avoid entry into the war. To be sure Roosevelt, erratic as he is, might, under Jewish influence, make some hasty decision, especially in case of a serious incident. Here lies the factor of uncertainty in evaluating the future. But here comes into play the significance—the influence of which I have often stressed—of the coldly calculating General Staff, which, sometimes in contrast to the Navy, sees things as they are, not as Roosevelt—influenced by Jews and Englishmen—wants to see them.

There is nothing to change in my past reports about the probable development of the armed forces and the war industry, although unrestricted aid to England can be expected to slow down American rearmament, especially of the Air Force. Furthermore, nothing has been changed in Roosevelt's intention to prevent a collapse of the British Empire around the Pacific and in his aim of excluding Japan—if possible without war—perhaps after the

collapse of the English island with the participation of the evacuated fleet. Nothing has been changed in the fact that the American fleet alone will not, for a long time, be capable of forcing America's will on the Japanese by way of aggression. Thus, always in closest accord with the Chargé d'Affaires and his political evaluation of the situation, I have arrived at the conclusion that the present propaganda by word of mouth regarding America's imminent entry into the war is a new bluff with the aim of influencing Russia in accordance with the interest of the United States, inducing the Balkan States and Turkey to hold out, Spain to remain neutral, and England to continue fighting, and of working on Pétain and Weygand in accordance with American interests. The Balkan States, Turkey, and England may bleed to death if they only fulfill the function of gaining time for America so that first of all a victory by Germany and Japan which would decide the war can be avoided until:

1. the United States has completed its land army; establishing it at full strength will take until 1942 as a result of the new plans, based on war experience, for organizing not 4, but ■ to 10 armored divisions,

2. the American war industry is in full swing, and

3. the Air Force is a really modern air force. They have a rather clear idea about pressure on Japan, perhaps fighting against Japan with the participation of the British fleet, and the security of the British Empire in the Pacific. But this idea, already reported earlier, still counts on the uncertain prerequisites that the Middle and Near East can be held, the British fleet employed for concentric pressure on Japan; that Japan until then will await inactively the fate assigned to her by the Americans, and that Russia will be brought under American influence or at least will be induced to observe restraint. For the rest, Roosevelt and his circles hope that the gain in time could also bring about a favorable situation that would permit America to decide the war without any great risk. Along with these hazy considerations they also indulge in pure fantasy and wishful thinking, such as [bringing about] ■ paralysis of Germany through inciting the occupied areas of Europe and the possibility of making Japan come to terms by means of a blockade. For the time being Roosevelt believes in the decisive effect of his material aid for England, China, and other vassals. He operated within the framework of the true Jewish conception regarding the power of money and business. Accordingly he will first demand more billions and expect that misled vassals, deluded by his siren

song, will fight so that after the war is over American money and American imperialism will rule the world.

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

No. 149

2548/523382-33

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BELGRADE, March 11, 1941—2:30 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received March 11—5:20 p. m.

No. 212 of March 11

With reference to my telegram No. 208 of March 10¹ and to the Foreign Minister's telephoned instruction of tonight.²

In accordance with the telephonic instruction I have just explained once more to the Foreign Minister that neither we nor Italy wished to involve Yugoslavia in a war. We also realized that Yugoslavia's obligation to render military assistance would naturally remain problematical in its practical effect and most probably—if only for geographical reasons—the question would not arise at all. It was, however, entirely impossible for us to rescind or alter in any way whatsoever the provision of the Tripartite Pact under discussion. The Tripartite Pact was a unified structure with fundamentally equal obligations for all members. It was therefore impossible to grant an individual member a special position. Consequently, the assumption of the obligations under article 3 was inseparably linked to the protection of Yugoslavia's future resulting from accession to the Tripartite Pact.

The Foreign Minister assured me that he fully comprehended the situation. He would do what he could to bring our arguments to bear in the deliberations, but he expected great difficulties; they were entirely aware here of the gravity of the decision to be made. Therefore, aside from the deliberations in the Crown Council, which would probably take place this afternoon, certain other persons had to be consulted; this could take several days.

With reference to that I told the Foreign Minister that at any rate it appeared to me that the greatest possible speed was in the most urgent Yugoslav interest.

¹ Document No. 145.

² No record found.

In conclusion the Foreign Minister expressed his firm hope that no matter how the decision should turn out there would never be any conflict between Germany and Yugoslavia.

I have the impression that the Foreign Minister is sincerely concerned that he may not be able to push through a positive decision.

HEEREN

No. 150

91/100666-67

The Minister in Ireland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 218 of March 11

DUBLIN, March 11, 1941.

Received March 11—5:45 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 97 of February 24.¹

In a 1-hour conversation this afternoon I made the statements as ordered to de Valera. De Valera listened very attentively and with evident interest. He was essentially noncommittal and stayed meticulously within the limits of a neutral policy.

With regard to the present Irish situation, he remarked that so far he saw no signs of British intentions to attack, and hoped that things would stay that way. The situation might, of course, change, for instance if the United States entered the war. Ireland would rely primarily on her own strength and on the proven martial qualities of the Irish population. The procurement of arms was his main problem.

In the question of the preparation for possible future assistance from Germany, de Valera studiously avoided further discussion. He intimated, however, that for the present he did not care to discuss this very delicate subject, and that any arms deliveries—which I was able to mention (see telegram No. 422 of December 5, 1940²)—were too dangerous. De Valera said half in jest that the German General Staff, even without Irish participation, would presumably with German thoroughness take the measures that seemed to it appropriate in the event of a British attack. I stated that this was not so simple. When I brought up the question of the determination of the Irish Government to offer vigorous resistance in the event of a British attack, de Valera remarked firmly and earnestly "you can take that

¹ Document No. 79.

² Vol. xi of this series, document No. 455.

for granted.”³ I likewise had the impression again, although de Valera avoided committing himself on this point too, that he was counting on German assistance if the English should attack.

General impression: de Valera was not prepared for this conversation and its details. He avoided a clear and definitive answer. His reaction was not completely negative. I do not, to be sure, think that de Valera will for the present revert to the subject on his own initiative. But this conversation might have given him food for thought and have had a good effect in the sense that the subject was for the first time brought up for discussion in principle and the ground prepared for future discussions that may come about.

When I left de Valera, I urged him not to let strong misgivings and mistrust make him delay too long and incur the danger of being too late. I would always be at his disposal. I considered the conversation between him and me entirely secret.

Though the chances are slight, I believe that for the present we should wait a while and see if, after reconsidering the conversation, de Valera will perhaps revert to one or another of the questions soon.

HEMPEL

³ This phrase is in English in the original.

No. 151

2548/523330-81

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BELGRADE, March 11, 1941—11:30 p. m.

SECRET

Received March 12—2:30 a. m.¹

No. 215 of March 11

For the Foreign Minister.

The present situation with respect to public feeling.

Numerous reports about an alleged German ultimatum in the matter of Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact have, in conjunction with extensive mobilization measures, occasioned great agitation among the population and have further increased the pressure of chauvinist circles on the Government. At the same time everything is being done on the part of the English and Americans to strengthen the Government's resistance to the alleged German pressure. Thus, as I have heard from a reliable source, Roosevelt has directed personal messages in this sense to the Minister President, to the Croatian

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 977 to Fuschl, Mar. 12."

leader, Maček, and to the Slovene leader, Kulovec. In the Army, too, the agitation against accession to the Tripartite Pact is growing and the assertion is being made that this would violate the honor of the Serbian soldier.

Because the Government, in consequence of internal weakness, can offer only slight resistance to this pressure, the possibility is growing that in spite of a positive reply to the questions asked of us it will evade a clear decision and that it will try to clarify the German-Yugoslav relationship in a way which would spare it the odium of accession to the Tripartite Pact or which would grant it time for a step by step preparation for accession, even if this should jeopardize the German assurances hoped for.

The meeting of the Crown Council scheduled for this afternoon has been postponed until tomorrow.

HEEREN

No. 152

70/50248-50

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

U. St.S. Pol. No. 196

BERLIN, March 11, 1941.

M. Benoist-Méchin called on me today at the suggestion of Dr. Schwarzmann in order to discuss Syria. He said he was now going to Vichy and would have occasion there, as the state secretary in charge of German affairs under Admiral Darlan, to speak about all current questions. Among these, Syria now moved into the center of interest. An English attack on Syria was possible. How should France act in this case? Should she defend herself? Should the French Government perhaps make a statement even at this time that the French troops in Syria would offer resistance to anyone? Or was such a formula inappropriate because Germany would herself possibly intervene at some time in Syria?

I told M. Benoist-Méchin that I could not make any political statements to him. German-French relations were directed by the Foreign Minister through Ambassador Abetz. However, I could answer his first question without difficulty. It was of course entirely natural that the French colonial empire would have to defend itself wherever it might be attacked by the English, just as it had done at Dakar. Moreover, I could communicate to him in an entirely unofficial way a number of observations regarding Syria. In the first place a number of officials and officers there were working very actively for de Gaulle. It was possible that we would make a démarche with the French Government in this respect. In this connection I mentioned

to him the name Conti.¹ Furthermore, there were still two English Consulates functioning in Syria, in contrast to metropolitan France and other portions of the French colonial empire. These naturally cooperated very closely with the English intelligence service and would do everything to facilitate an English attack on Syria. Finally, there was no German observation post in Syria; this question had to be settled somehow in the near future.² But I was not bringing up this point, either, in order to make any demands on him, Benoist-Méchin; this would be done elsewhere.

M. Benoist-Méchin remarked in this connection that it would be well if personnel matters were not handled through the Armistice Commission but through Ambassador Abetz, since in this way one could be sure of a more discreet treatment on the French side. He then spoke at some length about Germany's appearance in Morocco.³ It had been extremely difficult for General Huntziger to comply with the German wishes for the institution of a German control. General Huntziger feared that the appearance of numerous German officers undermined the authority of France with the native population and there were conjectures regarding its significance to which he did not give credence.⁴

I pointed out that the fears in connection with Auer's⁵ arrival in Morocco had not proved to be justified, and neither had those in connection with Hentig's visit in Syria. This would be the case in the future, too.

WOERMANN

¹ The reference is to François Conty, *Chef de Cabinet* to Gabriel Puaux, High Commissioner for the Levant, 1939-1940.

² See vol. xi of this series, document No. 626.

³ See document No. 50.

⁴ A note of Mar. 1 from the French Foreign Ministry which used similar arguments in objecting to the size of the German Commission was forwarded to Berlin by the Embassy in Paris on Mar. 15 (4649/E209656-58).

⁵ Counselor of Legation Theodor Auer, representative of the German economic delegation in Casablanca.

No. 153

274/177823-26

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

A 282 g. Ang. II

SOFIA, March 11, 1941.

Subject: Reply of the Bulgarian Government to the Soviet Russian statement of March 3, 1941.¹

With reference to my telegram No. 294 of today² I have the honor to submit enclosed the German translation of the text which the Bulgarian Minister in Moscow has been instructed to bring to the attention of the Soviet Russian Government. The Foreign Minister told me that he would probably be able to do without submitting it in Berlin once more; the Bulgarian statement, after all, displayed the same train of thought as our draft, except that a direct reference to the pact of assistance offered by the Russians was avoided.

They wish to refrain from publication here, since they want to avoid polemics in which Bulgaria could draw only the short end. The Russian statement was not published here at the time, either. It became known to the public here through the Moscow and London radios. The Government believes it can find ways and means of

¹ This was the statement issued by the Soviet People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs regarding the entry of German troops into Bulgaria which was published in the Soviet press on Mar. 4. The text was reported in Moscow telegram No. 474 of Mar. 4 (274/177796-97).

The English text of this statement as published in *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, selected and edited by Jane Degras (London, 1953), vol III, pp. 483-484 is as follows:

"On 1 March M. Altynov, representing the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, informed the Soviet ambassador in Bulgaria, A. A. Lavrishchev, that the Bulgarian Government had given its consent to the entry of German troops into Bulgaria, with the object of preserving peace in the Balkans.

"On 3 March the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky handed the Bulgarian Minister M. Stamenov the following reply:

"In reply to the Bulgarian Government's communication transmitted on 1 March by Altynov, representative of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, to A. A. Lavrishchev, Soviet ambassador in Bulgaria, to the effect that the Bulgarian Government had agreed to the entry of German troops into Bulgaria and that this action had the purpose of preserving peace in the Balkans, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state that:

"1. The Soviet Government cannot share the Bulgarian Government's view of the correctness of its attitude in this question, as, irrespective of the Bulgarian Government's wishes, it leads not to the consolidation of peace, but to an extension of the sphere of war and to the dragging of Bulgaria into war;

"2. The Soviet Government, true to its peace policy, cannot render any support whatever to the Bulgarian Government in the execution of its present policy;

"3. The Soviet Government is compelled to make this statement, particularly in view of the rumours freely spread in the Bulgarian press which fundamentally misrepresent the real attitude of the USSR."

² In this telegram (274/177822) Richtofen reported having been told by Foreign Minister Popov that he had drafted a reply to the Soviet note based on the draft proposed by Germany but that he would have to discuss it first with the King and the Minister President. The German draft proposal for a reply had been sent by Ribbentrop in telegram No. 154 of Mar. 7 from Fuschl which was forwarded to the Legation in Sofia as telegram No. 326 on Mar. 8 (274/177807-10).

bringing the content to the knowledge of the public, though not through the local press but in some other way.

RICHTHOFEN

[Enclosure]

COPY OF THE BULGARIAN NOTE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

The communication which the Bulgarian Government had made in Sofia and Moscow in the question of the entry of German troops into Bulgaria was answered by M. Vyshinsky on March 4 with the statement issued under the number above.

In order to justify this statement and to publish its contents the Soviet Russian Government pointed to rumors which had been circulated by the Bulgarian press and which had given a false picture of the actual position of Soviet Russia. The Bulgarian Government is duty-bound to stress that if the Bulgarian press did publish such rumors they were exclusively of foreign origin and taken from various news agencies and newspapers abroad. In no case were they inspired by the Bulgarian Government, all the less since the latter had no indications of any sort for drawing conclusions from the conduct of the Soviet Government with respect to the present case.

The Bulgarian Government has accepted Germany's proposal that it permit German troops to pass through the country bearing in mind the German Government's statement that it is a question of a temporary operation having the purpose of securing the peace in the Balkans and preventing the formation of a front against Germany in the Balkans along Bulgaria's southern frontier. The Bulgarian Government and the Bulgarian people bear no blame for the outbreak of the Italo-Greek conflict, nor have they participated in it in any way. As long as this conflict was limited to Greece and Italy it did not represent any danger for the Balkans. The participation of England, however, deepened the conflict, and Bulgaria found herself between two enemy camps: In the south there was England with her allies and in the north the German Army. In this situation, there was now the danger that at any moment Bulgaria could be transformed into a war zone. In order to preserve the security of the country the Bulgarian Government has done everything possible to prevent an involvement of the Bulgarian people in the war. For this reason the Bulgarian Government accepted the proposal of Turkey and signed the well-known nonaggression agreement.³ Also the German proposal of permitting German troops to pass through Bulgaria was accepted in order to prevent a clash within Bulgaria herself, for this would have drawn the Bulgarian people into the war.

³ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 714, footnote 4.

The Bulgarian Government gave its consent to this after the German Government had declared that it would take account of Bulgaria's friendship treaties with her neighbors, primarily the Bulgarian-Turkish nonaggression agreement and after the German Government had given the assurance that the [movement of the] German troops was not directed against Turkey. Furthermore, the Bulgarian Government emphasized expressly that it did not want to interfere with the conflict and that it wanted to save the Bulgarian people from trials; all of this was accepted with understanding and approved by Germany. Bulgaria quite generally worked to avoid a widening and deepening of the conflict and to avoid participation by Bulgaria in the war. The Bulgarian Government is of the opinion that in the present state of affairs—for which it has no responsibility—it has preserved not only the interests of the Bulgarian people, but also those of the Balkan States.

As far as Bulgaria's conduct toward Soviet Russia is concerned, the Bulgarian Government emphasizes the statement which the Bulgarian Minister President delivered in Vienna on March 1 of this year.⁴ The Government repeats once more its determination to cultivate and develop the traditional friendly relations with Russia. The newly created situation cannot alter these basic lines of Bulgarian policy, particularly when one recalls the friendly relations between Russia and Germany, as well as Germany's assurances that her troops in Bulgaria have a provisional task to perform.

⁴ On that occasion Filov had stated that Bulgaria "was determined to continue and further develop the traditional friendly relations with the Soviet Union." For a complete text of Filov's statement in German, see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, March 1941, p. 234.

No. 154

2361/488433-37

Ambassador Papen to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop

SECRET

ANKARA, March 11, 1941.

DEAR HERR VON RIBBENTROP: Following my telegram of yesterday¹ regarding the funds for press purposes, etc., which you promised us, I should like in agreement with Jenke to report once more to you concerning the present situation:

As I have many times explained in my telegrams, Turkey's decision, forced on her by necessity, to refrain from any action against the Axis, in spite of the Anglo-Turkish treaty, was bound to result in a strong psychological reaction. The adherents of the Anglo-Turkish alliance have, as is logical, whistled the same tune as Mr.

¹ See document No. 142, footnote 2.

Eden. They repeat that after the occupation of Bulgaria and Greece and after the closing of the Aegean Sea Turkey will actually be blockaded. M. Saracoglu has told the Greek Ambassador repeatedly: "You will be attacked first, and then it will be our turn."²

In this tense situation the Führer's letter³ without a doubt brought the Turks great relief. They are now convinced—which was not the case in the past—that it is our sincere wish not to draw Turkey into the conflict. This, however, is only in the light of the *present* operation. They argue as follows: The occupation of Greece and the intended closing of the Aegean will—if the operation is to affect the Suez Canal—make further steps necessary and confront Turkey with new and difficult decisions.

The view here of the political situation is best reflected in a statement of Saracoglu: "By June or July it will be evident whether the Axis is capable of delivering a decisive blow against England, a blow which will paralyze the American aid and make the victory of the Axis probable. *Until that moment* it will remain Turkey's most important rule not to commit herself to either side."

Even if the reply to the Führer's letter should give indications, in accordance with the promise made me by Numan, of a rapprochement of the Turkish position toward that of the Axis,⁴ we must nevertheless proceed from the assumption that this good intention will be realized only when the events of the spring and summer have tipped the scales in favor of the Axis.

As always, the position of the Soviets plays a decisive role in Turkey's attitude. Without a doubt Moscow's negative attitude regarding the occupation of Bulgaria and the categorical assurance apparently given Eden by the Soviet Government (see my telegram of March 10⁴) that it had no kind of agreement with Germany in regard to the Balkans, furthermore the support offered by the Soviets to Bulgaria and then to Yugoslavia, have strongly affected the Turkish hopes of cooperation with Soviet Russia. From the same source from which I learned the particulars of the Eden-Šumenković conversation it is reported to me that there are differences of opinion within the Soviet Government concerning the policy to be pursued. Molotov was of the opinion that the present situation favored Germany, and that the time had not yet come to make a decision in regard to Germany. Vyshinsky, on the other hand, demanded an early alignment with the democratic bloc. One had to exploit the present situation and help the democracies before Germany's position became more favorable.

² This quotation is in French in the original.

³ Of Mar. 1, document No. 113.

⁴ See document No. 142, footnote 2.

No matter how one regards the Turko-Russian problem from here, one is bound to become convinced that Germany's appearance on the Black Sea coast and the blockade of the Dardanelles bring Russian and Turkish policies together of necessity. Should German-Russian relations deteriorate further, then it would be logically consistent with English policy to include Russia in the Turko-English alliance in one way or another and to give Turkey far-reaching assurances both by the English and the Russians, concerning her existence, the Straits question, and her subsequent economic basis.

Assuming this to be so, the question should be examined what can be done by us in order to follow up the situation created by the Führer's letter and to give Turkey a further incentive to rapprochement with the Axis:

In my opinion little or nothing can be done as long as one wishes for other reasons to avoid an option between Soviet Russia and Turkey.

The Straits question, i.e., the preservation of Turkey as a European great power, is the alpha and omega of her policy. As long as it is impossible to make her definite concessions in this question, guaranteed by a treaty, her position toward us must perforce remain uncertain. Of course the question of the Dodecanese also belongs to this chapter.

As far as the influencing of Turkey's political attitude by way of the press, etc., is concerned, this remains in the opinion of us all a matter of secondary importance. No journalist will dare to write in a pro-Axis manner as long as permission to do so has not been given generally by the Turkish Government. I recall the case of the *Cumhuriyet* when after a talk with me in September Yunus Nadir launched a few pro-German articles and was punished for it with a prohibition of the newspaper and almost with the loss of his seat as deputy. It is certainly correct that several of the leading journalists have taken English money. But because it was the avowed policy of the Government to help the democracies, if not with arms then at least through the press, it was a cheap opportunity for England to expand this policy as far as possible by way of financial bribes.

For us matters are entirely different. Up to now we have been able to influence the State President and his Marshal⁵ with good political and military arguments. Turkey's course in the future, too, rests upon the decisions of these two persons.

In accordance with your suggestions,⁶ however, we are examining again where we can help through financial means as soon as the Turkish Government will have considered it appropriate to create a better atmosphere with respect to the Axis. In particular we intend to

⁵ Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, Chief of the Turkish General Staff.

⁶ See document No. 142.

try to have political pressure exerted through persons who are economically interested in us. For this purpose Minister Kroll will now go to Izmir in order to speak with some friends who have connections with Saracoglu. At the same time, as I wired you, Jenke will undertake a cautious advance in the direction known to you.⁷

It is after all no secret that our position here is made very much more difficult by the unbounded hatred of the Turks for the Italians. In order to compensate for this situation it would be advisable if the German press and particularly the radio could continue to speak, in the sense of the Führer's letter and of an improvement of the political atmosphere, less of the Axis and more of the past and future German-Turkish relations.

In conclusion I should like to present a request of a political character: M. Kirov, the Bulgarian Minister here, has shown himself during the very decisive past weeks and months to be a diplomat particularly open-minded toward understanding of the Axis policy, and has supported us most loyally in every respect. I should therefore like to suggest that he be awarded the Great Cross of the German Eagle.

If this request should be granted, we also ought not to pass over the man who has been Hungarian Minister here for many years. M. de Mariassy, who enjoys a position of particular trust in Budapest, has in the 5 years of his stay here, and particularly since the beginning of the war, always and everywhere upheld the view that Hungary's destiny is indissolubly linked with that of the German Reich. At all times I have obtained from him much valuable information [which was given] most willingly.

I should therefore like to recommend most strongly that he also be proposed to the Führer for this decoration.

Yours, etc.

Heil Hitler!

PAPEN

⁷ See document No. 142, footnote 2.

No. 155

449/223086-87

The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 275 of March 12

ATHENS, March 12, 1941.

Received March 12—10:05 a. m.

The German Consulate at Salonika has just reported as follows by special courier:

"Colonel Petinis, Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief of the Greek (group missing) in northern Greece, whom I know well per-

sonally, had the following communicated to me by order of the latter through Secretary of Consulate Paulus, on whom he called at his home:

"He had been directed by the Commander in Chief, whose name he could not mention for understandable reasons, but who gave assurances of his regard and friendship for Germany, to transmit the following statement:

"1. The Greek Army would halt the hostilities at the Albanian front if the Italian troops there were replaced by Germans, even if only in the strength of a division, and if a guarantee were given that the negotiations on territorial matters in the Albanian sector would be carried on directly with Greece by the Germans with the Italians being excluded.

"The basic principle in this would have to be the ethnic origin of the inhabitants. The areas of southern Albania predominantly inhabited by Greeks would have to be awarded to Greece.

"2. Should the German forces attack Greece from the positions now occupied in Bulgaria, this would have to be interpreted as aid for Italy, and the Greek troops would fight to the last man.

"3. If the proposal regarding point 1 were complied with, the Greek Army would see to it that the English would leave Greece.

"4. The occupation of Crete by the English occurred without the cooperation of Greece.

"In response to the probing remark pointing out that the English had bases in Macedonia and on the islands, the Chief of Staff gave assurance on his honor as an officer that no English bases were set up on islands in the Aegean Sea, that there were no English forces whatsoever in Macedonia and Thrace, and that only the English air units known to us together with service crews were present in old Greece and at the Albanian front.

"In my opinion there are two possibilities: Either the step by the Commander in Chief of the Army was taken in accord with the Greek Government, which perhaps expects more success from the participation of the military authorities; or it is a question of an independent action by the Commander in Chief, who perhaps remembering the World War wishes to avoid bloodshed and a catastrophe for northern Greece.

"The Commander in Chief has been informed that I am informing the Legation of his proposal."

End of the report from Salonika.

The Military Attaché assumes that the Commander in Chief referred to is General Tsolakoglou. This man, who is supposed to be close to Drakos (cf. my telegram No. 273 of March 11¹), was heretofore the Commanding General of the III Corps and is said now to have command of the troops on the Bulgarian front. I assume that it is a question of an independent action by the military.²

ERBACH

¹ Not found.

² In telegram No. 278 of Mar. 12 (675/258364) Erbach commented that the feelers reported in the document printed were proof that the Greeks were coming to their senses. "Time is working for us, in accordance with Greek mentality which does not yield to acute pressure but gives way to arguments of reason as time goes on."

No. 156

230/152555-56

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BELGRADE, March 12, 1941—4:45 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received March 12—6:45—7:05 p. m.

No. 216 of March 12

I. Today I transmitted the new formulation on point 2c of your telegram No. 254¹ issued to me yesterday from the Berghof with the following text:

"Taking into account the military situation, Germany and Italy assure the Yugoslav Government that they will not, of their own accord, make any demand for military assistance. If the Yugoslav Government should at any time consider it to be in its own interest to participate in military operations in accordance with the Tripartite Pact, it will be left to the Yugoslav Government to make the necessary military arrangements for this with the Powers of the Tripartite Pact.

"This assurance could be given in writing. Naturally, there could be no publication."

The Foreign Minister stated that he agreed to this.

II. On this occasion the Foreign Minister presented the following individual requests as the result of the deliberations held here thus far:

Regarding point 1 of your telegram cited above: Publication should be by both sides and be simultaneous.

Regarding point 2a: In view of the domestic situation here publication appeared absolutely necessary and extremely urgent. It should likewise be made by both sides and be simultaneous.

Regarding point 2b: Importance will probably be attached here to having the situation regarding Greece clarified before the Yugoslav public, which we had said was possible.

Regarding point 2c: For compelling reasons relating to the domestic situation the urgent request is made that we agree to publication in this regard, too, which appears to be made easier by the content of the new formulation. The Foreign Minister said that with respect to this point he was appealing to Germany's friendship. It was a matter of silencing agitation which was very dangerous for the Government and which operated precisely with this argument. I urgently recommend complying with this request if at all possible, because the desired conclusion [of the treaty] appears gravely endangered by any delay. I refer to my telegram No. 215 of March 11.²

Regarding point 3: The Yugoslav Government requests that the words "in ■ free access to" be replaced by the words "in a territorial connection with," so that the promise in question would be to the

¹ Document No. 144.

² Document No. 151.

effect that in the new settlement of the frontiers in the Balkans account will be taken of Yugoslavia's interest in a territorial connection with the Aegean Sea through Salonika.

III. The Crown Council is to convene for the purpose of final decision immediately after receipt of our reply.³

HEEREN

³ In telegram No. 219 of Mar. 13 (2548/523329) Heeren reported having received assurances indirectly from Minister President Cvetković that he was making every effort to overcome resistance against Yugoslav accession to the Tripartite Pact: "He had certain generals put under police surveillance in order to be protected against surprises. He was likewise determined, if necessary, to arrest leading persons of the opposition."

No. 157

2108/456207-28

*The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to
the Embassy in the Soviet Union*

Draft Telegram

BERLIN, March 12, 1941.
e. o. Ha. Pol. V a 598.

Drafting Officer: Consul General Dr. Rud. Walter.

The imports from the USSR in the month of February amount to only a few million reichsmarks. Since February 11 the Soviet deliveries have fallen off to such an extent that it must be seriously doubted whether the Soviet side is prepared to make deliveries. The Soviet side, which under the German-Soviet economic agreement of January 10, 1941,¹ should be considerably ahead with its deliveries precisely during the first quarter of the year, is on the contrary critically in arrears.

It is therefore deemed necessary that the Ambassador call M. Molotov's attention to this disquieting development and press for immediate instructions to the Soviet organizations to conclude delivery contracts conforming to the existing price agreement.

If the démarche should not meet with the expected compliance from the Soviet side and if the Soviet deliveries should not immediately be increased to an adequate degree, the German deliveries would at once have to be made proportional to the volume of the Soviet deliveries. I leave it up to you whether you want to intimate that even now.

¹ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 637.

In view of the importance of the matter, the earliest possible action and a telegraphic report are requested.²

CLODIUS

² No direct reply has been found.

Details of the current status of deliveries and related questions were given in a letter of Mar. 15 from Walter to Schnurre (2108/456209-12).

In a memorandum of Mar. 28 (3784/E042129) Schnurre noted that after a lag during February the Russians were delivering large quantities of grain and raw materials.

Cf. document No. 280.

No. 158

617/249982-33

Memorandum by the State Secretary

[St.S. No. 163]¹

BERLIN, March 12, 1941.

The Afghan Minister of Economics, Abdul Majid Khan, who has been staying here for the purpose of medical treatment and will remain in Germany and Switzerland for approximately another 2 months, called on me today. He soon started a general political conversation in which he offered to discuss with the German Government the possible territorial changes resulting for Afghanistan from the war. I established the fact that so far Abdul Majid Khan had no explicit instructions from his Government to carry on such conversations here; on the other hand he believed he would obtain such instructions, being a Cabinet member, if the atmosphere for this were favorable here.

The conversation did not go beyond generalities, but it could be clearly noted, as is usually the case in such conversations with Afghan representatives, that the Afghan revisionist wishes are directed toward the British possessions in the southeast and south, to Karachi, and the Indus as the new Afghan border. The hopes for a territorial expansion at the expense of Soviet Russia in the direction of Merv, however, are not really considered important.²

Abdul Majid intends to inquire of me shortly whether there can be a continuation of the conversation which he began with me.

I believe that I should receive him a second time, perhaps in a few weeks when the general situation will be still more clarified.³

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The file number appears on another copy of the same document which is, however, dated Mar. 11 (617/249919).

² Marginal note: "Yes. R[ibbentrop]."

In a minute of Mar. 12 (617/249981) submitted to Weizsäcker, Altenburg explained that Ribbentrop's comment applied to the Afghan revisionist aspirations.

³ Altenburg's minute of Mar. 12, referred to in footnote 2, also recorded the Foreign Minister's approval of a second meeting between Weizsäcker and the Afghan Cabinet member.

No. 159

71/50811-12

Memorandum by the State Secretary

URGENT

BERLIN, March 12, 1941.

For Minister von Rintelen.

Enclosed I am submitting to the Foreign Minister:

1. My position with respect to the memorandum on the Arab question.¹

2. The original of the letter of the Grand Mufti to the Führer² with two copies, and the translation with two copies.

3. A new draft of a letter to the Grand Mufti (annex 11 to the memorandum of March 7).³

The letter to the Grand Mufti, after having been approved in principle, could perhaps be made somewhat warmer in tone.

Orally it could be added that our public support of the Arabs must always take into consideration the threat to Syria by the English.

[Enclosure]

CONFIDENTIAL

MARCH 12, 1941.

Comments on the enclosed memorandum of March 7, 1941, on the Arab question by Under State Secretary Woermann.

I find the memorandum very clear and valuable. In addition, I would like to make the following general comments in regard to it:

How the Arab movement is best to be exploited against England depends on the larger problem of Germany-Russia.

a) If we do not need to show consideration for Russia, then the course of action outlined by Herr Woermann is the right one. The narrow-minded Arab policy of the Italians should gradually be curbed. A discussion with the Turks, as suggested by Herr v. Papen,⁴ would, in my opinion, alienate the Arabs. There remains, therefore, the supplying of some arms, some money, and good words, the effect of which on the Arab movement should not be overestimated.

b) In the Arab area only the entry of a hostile great power would be a menace to England; that is, the unleashing of Russia in this direction, somewhat in the sense of the Soviet suggestion of November of last year (telegram No. 2562 of November 26, 1940, from Moscow⁵).

¹ Document No. 133, enclosure.

² Vol. XI of this series, document No. 680.

³ See document No. 133, footnote 22.

⁴ In a dispatch of Feb. 25 (2361/488391-94) Papen had suggested an exchange of views with Turkey regarding Syria.

⁵ Vol. XI of this series, document No. 404.

There would be other good reasons too, in favor of this course of action. It should only be taken up in greater detail, in this connection, however, if military decisions of an entirely different kind have not already been made.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 160

359/204198-99

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

A 869

Moscow, March 12, 1941.

At a social function the day before yesterday the wife of the American Ambassador here¹ took me aside and asked me with tears in her eyes to tell her truthfully whether it was a fact that there would very soon be a German-Soviet war. In such a case she wanted to leave with her daughter immediately. She did not want to be caught "in this country" in a trap from which she later would perhaps never be able to escape. Recently the rumors of an immediately impending war between the Reich and the Soviet Union had multiplied to such an extent that she had become extremely worried about her family. I reassured Mrs. Steinhardt as best I could and told her that in my opinion the whole thing was only a matter of empty talk. The Soviet Government was very wise and circumspect. It grasped the actual power relationship accurately and would certainly not do anything on its part to pick a quarrel with us. As far as the Reich Government was concerned, I could not find the slightest reason why Germany should provoke a conflict.²

In the last issue of the local newspaper *Krokodil* there was a drawing (not a caricature!) representing a Soviet general at a review. The caption underneath it reads: "Gentlemen! We must now muster all our strength, for we shall soon have a real enemy."

The persistently circulating war rumors have obviously impressed the Soviet Government too. That, I believe, accounts for the seriousness with which M. Molotov has regarded the matter of the "reprimand" of the Berlin correspondent of Tass at the press conference of the Foreign Ministry. I believe it would be well if this incident in particular, by which the Soviet Government feels "inconsiderately treated," could be satisfactorily settled. I am convinced that it would be possible to find some way of doing so in consultation with the Soviet Ambassador there.

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

¹ Laurence A. Steinhardt.

² Cf. Steinhardt's report of Mar. 11, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 132.

No. 161

F11/0311-14

*The President of the Turkish Republic to Adolf Hitler*¹

ANKARA, March 12, 1941.

HERR CHANCELLOR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the personal letter² which Your Excellency sent me through the intermediary of your Ambassador. I wish to express my sincere appreciation of the delicate and courteous attention which you have been so kind as to show me by sending this message; its contents, communicated by me to the Government of the Republic, were studied with all the interest which they deserve.

After the last great war, which we fought side by side, and the glories and hardships of which we therefore shared, the policy of the new Turkey has always followed the line of conduct laid down at the beginning of our national struggle: protection of Turkish independence in its most absolute sense and peaceful development without interference with the rights of others.

Your Excellency is perfectly aware of the fact that it is still the same principle which forms the basis of the policy adopted by Turkey since the early spring of 1939.

Turkey cannot consider her territory and her integrity from the standpoint of political and military combinations between one or the other group of powers, and she cannot allow her sacred right to inviolability to be judged from the point of view of the victory of any foreign country. For this reason she is determined to oppose any encroachment upon her national domain.

By the conclusion of her treaty of defensive alliance³ and by her attitude during all the vicissitudes of the present war, Turkey has given proof of this same unshakable determination to maintain her right to absolute independence.

The Balkan policy of the Government of the Republic has never had any other objective than to spare the peninsula the ravages of war, and after the repeated assurances given to us by Your Excellency's authorized representative we were justified in believing that Germany was also pursuing the same goal and that therefore there existed a reassuring parallel between Turkish and German policy with respect to southeastern Europe.

Your Excellency will readily admit that the change which has occurred in this situation is due to causes entirely independent of the Turkish attitude and policy and that the development of actions in

¹ Translated from the original French. A German translation is filmed on F11/0315-20.

² Of Mar. 1, document No. 113.

³ See document No. 122, footnote 4.

the Balkans since the outbreak of the Italo-Greek war is in no way the responsibility of my country.

We have been and are still convinced that there is no reason for any conflict between the Turkish Army and the armies of the Reich, and that such a misfortune could not come about as long as Germany evidences understanding with regard to the exigencies of Turkish security and independence.

Moreover, the Government of the Reich has on several occasions affirmed to us that it does not intend to demand of Turkey anything incompatible with the obligations which she has assumed to this end.

For this reason I have with great satisfaction taken cognizance of the assurances given by Your Excellency regarding your concern for avoiding any ambiguity on this subject, and I wish to tell you for my part that the Turkish Army, which will continue its vigilant watch as in the past, will follow the same line of conduct with reference to the German troops as long as the Government of the German Reich does not take measures which could compel the Government of the Republic to change this attitude.

I hope with all my heart that Turkish and German soldiers, who not long ago shed their blood together, will never find themselves opposing each other for the satisfaction of temporary needs which, in my opinion, could not justify before history the perpetration of a calamity exceeding by far the importance of the political or strategic combinations.

In reading the message which Your Excellency has addressed to me at a critical moment in the Balkan situation, I have gained the distinct impression that the Führer and Chancellor desired of me as frank and [loyal] a statement of the Turkish position as that which he was good enough to give me of the German line of conduct. I accepted it the more gladly since the serious situation through which the world is passing demands of leaders who are responsible to their peoples a language which can in no case be belied by events which are about to happen in the more or less immediate future.

I am convinced that Your Excellency will find in the wording of my reply message the expression of the same concern for loyalty, on the basis of which alone can be maintained a relationship of reciprocal understanding between our two countries.

The exchange of views which has just taken place between us, thanks to Your Excellency's auspicious initiative, will certainly contribute toward normalizing and improving Turko-German relations.

With this hope, Herr Chancellor, I beg you to accept the expression of my highest consideration.

ISMET İNÖNÜ

No. 162

141/128736-37

*The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German
Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France to the
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BRUSSELS, March 13, 1941.

SECRET

Received March 13—7:00 a. m.

No. 268 of March 13

To be handed to the State Secretary personally.

The Military Commander has just transmitted to me the following telegram, which Ambassador Abetz has sent to the Foreign Minister:¹

"The further strengthening of anti-German feeling which has set in in Belgium and northern France as a result of the deterioration in the food situation shows that it is imperative to fortify the political sector of the Military Administration in Belgium and northern France as soon as possible and give greater possibility of development to the movements which have an ideological affinity with National Socialism. The promised reception of Degrelle by the Führer² in early February would clarify whether and in what manner the Rexist movement can be used propagandistically and organizationally for improving public sentiment in the Walloon areas of the country. In the case of the Flemish population too, it is urgently necessary to make more use of those movements which are suitable to exert political influence. Abetz."

With regard to the foregoing telegram I have the following comment to make:

In the opinion of all the competent authorities on the spot there is no question whatever of an increase of anti-German feeling in Belgium in the last few months. The mood of the people is from indifferent to negative, with an outward show of correctness. Virtually no open hostility can be observed. There is no passive resistance, there are no serious cases of sabotage, and no political actions against the occupying power. Even isolated strikes which had occurred on account of the bad food situation had no political tinge and were broken off immediately when sufficient food was supplied. According to all the reports available to me the situation in Belgium is incomparably better politically than in any other occupied area. Only recently a Belgian confidential agent who had traveled through Holland at some length told me that the political conditions here are incomparably better than in Holland. The policy followed thus far, which leaves all possibilities open for the future but avoids experiments for the

¹ This was telegram No. 818 of Mar. 10 from Paris (141/128733).

² No record of such a promise by Hitler has been found.

present, has proved completely successful. Any change in this course would, it is true, satisfy the political ambitions of a few Belgians but would alienate large parts of the population from us and do serious injury to German interests. Making use of Degrelle, who has lost almost all of his supporters, and of extremist Flemish elements outside the "Flemish National Society" would immediately lead to a critical hardening of the situation here and produce results similar to those in Norway and Holland. In view of the difficult food situation such a development would have especially unfavorable effects and unnecessarily disturb the work of the military in Belgium. The industrial capacity of Belgium, which of all the occupied areas contributes most to the German war economy, would also be greatly impaired by political unrest. I therefore warn most urgently against such experiments. An indication of the probable effect of using Degrelle is the fact that the rumors which he himself secretly disseminated about his allegedly impending reception by the Führer, as the military administration has found out, have led already to considerable unrest. I therefore wish most respectfully to advise the Foreign Minister against supporting the proposal of Ambassador Abetz.³

BARGEN

³ On Mar. 13 Bargaen stated in a telephone conversation with Siegfried (Siegfried memorandum of Mar. 13: 141/126738-39) that his views were fully shared by all official agencies, including the Military Commander and the chief of the military administration. As a result of the continuous interference by the Paris Embassy in Belgian affairs, there existed now a serious conflict between General Falkenhausen and Ambassador Abetz.

In another memorandum of Mar. 18 (141/126740) Siegfried noted that Bargaen had been in Paris to discuss the Belgian situation with Abetz. Abetz planned to go to Brussels on the following day to clear up the situation with General Falkenhausen. See also document No. 193.

No. 163

34/24471

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, March 13, 1941.

e. o. Pol. I M 653 g. Rs.

General Warlimont and Captain (Navy) Bürkner pointed out that for certain reasons a speedy termination of the activities of the various Russian commissions at work on German territory in the east and their immediate dispatch home is necessary.¹ Such commissions are still on German territory in connection with the return of Lithuanian emigrants from Germany to Lithuania. The German-Russian boundary commission is also active, as well as several local subcom-

¹ See document No. 132.

missions. Of these subcommissions some are located on Russian territory and others on German territory (and in fact south of Suwalki?). The work of these subcommissions was to have started by March 10. For some reason, they have not yet begun their work. The OKW requests that everything be done to prevent this work from being begun.

The presence of Russians in this part of Germany can only be permitted up to March 25. In the northern sector strong elements of German troops are already being assembled. From March 20 on an even heavier massing will take place.

The question is raised in this connection as to whether the Russian Consulate in Königsberg is occupied.²

RITTER

² Marginal note: "Herr Schliep: I request confirmation that there are no commissions of this sort within the area of competence of Pol. V now on German territory (including the General Government). W[oermann], Mar. 15."

Schliep replied on Mar. 17 that there were no such commissions on German territory, including the General Government (34/24470).

No. 164

1005/307445

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, March 13, 1941.

e. o. Pol. I M 657 g. Rs.

Supplementing the recent letter of the OKW¹ on the subject of Ireland, General Warlimont stated that, aside from the operations therein indicated, there were also the following possibilities:

1. A stronger concentration of German submarines upon any Irish ports and other places occupied by the English.
2. Likewise a stronger concentration of the Luftwaffe upon Irish ports and other places occupied by the English.

Captured British arms as follows have been collected and made ready for a possible shipment of arms to Ireland:

46 field guns, 550 machine guns, some 10,000 rifles, 1,000 antitank rifles, all with the necessary ammunition.

RITTER

¹ This letter has not been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

No. 165

230/152558-62

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia

Telegram

MOST URGENT

FUSCHL, March 14, 1941—5:23 a. m.

TOP SECRET

No. 183 of March 14

from Fuschl

Received Berlin, March 14—6:30 a. m.

No. 281 of March 14

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent March 14.

For the Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 216 of March 12.¹

Please tell the Yugoslav Foreign Minister the following:

We had believed that we had already been so accommodating toward Yugoslavia in order to facilitate the decision to accede to the Tripartite Pact that we had actually no longer expected the Yugoslav Government to present new requests. Since, however, the Foreign Minister had once more expressed several requests to you in the conversation on March 12 and had asked that they be answered before the meeting of the Crown Council, you were now authorized to define the position of the Reich Government regarding the individual points of his statement as follows:

1. We agreed to having the German-Italian promise to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia published simultaneously both in Yugoslavia and by us. It would be best if this publication took place on the day of the act of accession by making public the text of the relevant notes of the two Axis Powers.

2. With respect to the public announcement of the promise that the Governments of the Axis Powers will not make the demand of Yugoslavia during the war that she permit the passage or transportation of troops through Yugoslav national territory there stood the objection that other partners of the Tripartite Pact had not been given the same kind of promise. Moreover, this could easily lead to undesirable appeals to precedent in the case of later accessions. Nevertheless, in consideration of the special importance which the Yugoslav Government attached to such an announcement, and in order to ease its situation, we were willing to comply with its wishes in this matter to the extent that we would leave it free to make use of this promise, which we were prepared to give in a note not meant for publication, in the form of an announcement in the Yugoslav press which was to be arranged with us.

¹ Document No. 156.

3. We have no objections to its being made clear in the Yugoslav press that Yugoslavia's accession does not commit her to intervene in the Greek conflict, since this follows in any case automatically from the generally known text of the Tripartite Pact.

4. In no circumstances can we consent to the publication of the assurance we have offered, that we would not, of our own accord, make any demand for military assistance from Yugoslavia and would leave it to the Yugoslav Government to make the necessary agreements with the Powers of the Tripartite Pact if at some time or other it should consider in its own interest participation in the military operations of the Powers of the Tripartite Pact. We hope that you have stated this, for your part, too. The only matter that can be considered by us is addressing, simultaneously with the completion of the protocol on the accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact, a strictly secret note to the Yugoslav Government containing both the assurance and our promise regarding Yugoslavia's territorial connection with the Aegean Sea through Salonika.

In order to deprive the Yugoslav Foreign Minister of every possibility of objection to this, please state approximately the following:

If one considered the pros and cons of the publication of our assurance as desired by the Yugoslav Government, it became quite clear that there was no foreign policy interest at all *in favor of doing this*, but exclusively domestic policy considerations of the Yugoslav Government. However, as soon as the question was considered from the standpoint of international policy, there could not be the slightest doubt that not only this or that viewpoint, but simply everything spoke *against* undertaking such publication. For:

a. It was in itself entirely irregular, and only to be explained by our highly cooperative attitude, that simultaneously with the conclusion of an important treaty we were willing to give our partner, Yugoslavia, the assurance that we would not make any demand of her that she actually fulfill an essential obligation contained in the treaty. If, in addition, this were announced publicly, it would practically provoke malicious comments along the lines that the entire treaty complex was nothing but a lot of humbug and actually did not amount to anything.

b. Accession to the Tripartite Pact involved accession to a collective treaty in regard to which it was as such hardly possible to permit special exceptions in the case of a single party since this of course forced the other parties to ask the question why these special exceptions should not apply to them as well. Furthermore, we also had to keep in mind that still other countries wished to join the Tripartite Pact. It was clear that if the promise made to Yugoslavia were published, newly acceding countries would then refer to this and

likewise come up with requests for exceptions. In this way the whole structure of the Pact could be watered down.

c. The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact and the accession of additional countries to it represented a coherent action of high political purpose. The Pact was the expression of the efforts of the three Great Powers directed toward the final objective of world peace, and at the same time was to have a deterrent effect upon third powers which might be tempted to oppose these efforts by intervening in the war. A political instrument of this kind would naturally become a dull weapon if powers on which it was supposed to have the effect mentioned above could point out that according to published texts any intervention in the war which they might undertake would, nevertheless, not encounter any resistance by the countries who had joined the Pact.

These considerations were so clear and convincing that even the Yugoslav Government would not be able to close its eyes to them. Should it nevertheless still insist on the request for publication of the assurance, we could explain this only on the grounds that evidently the countertendencies of an internal political nature in Yugoslavia were stronger than we had thought. In that case we would even have to ask ourselves whether in these circumstances the conditions really existed for Yugoslavia to be able to join the Tripartite Pact as a partner; for the time being, however, we did not want to consider such questions, and we assumed that your explanations had convinced the Foreign Minister of the untenable nature of the request presented by him for publication of the assurance.

6. With respect to the request that the promise regarding Salonika be formulated in such a way that the new settlement of the frontiers in the Balkans should take account of Yugoslavia's interest in a territorial connection with the Aegean Sea through Salonika, we were willing to comply with the proposal of the Yugoslav Foreign Minister. As for the Yugoslav Government's agreeing to maintain the strictest secrecy in connection with this promise, as reported by you, I should like to say that the Yugoslav Government itself probably has the greatest interest in having this promise kept secret.

Please make the foregoing statements to the Foreign Minister in a friendly but urgent form, and leave him in no doubt that it is now up to the Yugoslav Government to make up its mind whether or not it wants to accede to the Tripartite Pact on the basis as outlined. You can also tell the Foreign Minister from me personally that we had been as accommodating to him as we possibly could be. For the rest I would like to assume with certainty that in consideration of the future Yugoslavia will not miss this unique opportunity of seeing her sovereignty and integrity guaranteed and her ancient wish for access to the Aegean fulfilled without having to make any sac-

rifices herself. Finally, please tell the Foreign Minister also that after the Yugoslav position has been taken we will still have to get in touch with the Italian and Japanese Governments in order to obtain their agreement.

Report by wire about carrying out.²

RIBBENTROP

² In telegram No. 224 of Mar. 14 (230/152564-65) Heeren reported having carried out these instructions and having met with full understanding for the German position on the part of Cincar-Marković who promised to see to it that the matter was speeded up, but who pointed out that several days would be required for "indispensable consultations" in view of the significance of the decision involved. Heeren reported his impression "that the leading persons fundamentally had already made up their minds in favor of a positive decision."

See, further, document No. 173.

No. 166

1053/312127-28

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy
in Brazil*

Telegram

MARCH 13, 1941.

[No. 261]¹

[Sent March 14.]

zu Ha. Pol. IX b 618.²

In a note of December 23,³ and requesting an opinion, the Argentine Ambassador communicated the plan of his Government to conclude customs unions with Brazil and other neighboring countries, to be put into effect by stages. What the separate stages are to consist of is not stated. We do not wish to express an opinion without knowing more about the planned privileges, particularly the first stage; perhaps it will be formulated in the new Argentine-Brazilian trade agreement which, according to Transocean report of February 23, was supposed to be signed as early as the first part of March.

Please report by wire (without making an official inquiry with the Government at your post) what is known there.⁴ The Embassy at Buenos Aires, which had already been asked,⁵ only knows of the basic tendency to grant reciprocal customs privileges and customs exemption for products of industries which are already in existence or are to be newly developed and to equalize mutual consumption

¹ The number and the date of dispatch are supplied from the reply telegram (document No. 202).

² Ha. Pol. IX b 618: Not found.

³ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 555.

⁴ See document No. 202.

⁵ Berlin telegram No. 196 of Mar. 1 (233/156464-65) contained instructions similar to those in the document printed here.

needs with respect to agricultural products; it is not informed about further particulars, especially the first stage.⁶

For your information:

In our opinion, our consent is, to be sure, necessary to an exception from the most-favored-nation clause to which we are entitled. However, the Argentine and Brazilian plans for a customs union merit our encouragement as a counterweight to the dominant position of the United States. Subject to examination of concrete details, we therefore intend to reply that we would not insist on the most-favored-nation clause based on treaties with regard to possible La Plata preferences, in so far as all the other countries enjoying most-favored-nation treatment do the same and Argentina for her part agrees to reciprocity regarding possible German preferences granted to other European countries.

WIEHL

⁶ In reply to telegram No. 196 of Mar. 1 (see footnote 5) Thermann reported on Argentina's economic policy and the customs union project in telegram No. 337 of Mar. 7 (341/199371-72).

No. 167

4669/E221449

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, March 14, 1941.

e. o. Pol. I M 661 g. Rs.

Counselor of Legation von Steengracht informed me of the following by telephone from Munich. Telegram No. 659 of March 13 from Washington¹ had given occasion to the following directive by the Führer:

The generally known German operational area around England² is to be extended in such a manner that it includes Iceland and borders on the security (neutrality) zone declared by the American States.³

Captain von Puttkamer⁴ has the instruction to inform Admiral Schniewind⁵ of this.

¹ In this telegram (589/244235-36) Thomsen transmitted a report from the Consulate General at New York, according to which a large convoy of 120 ships was being assembled to be sent under American protection to Iceland; another smaller convoy, also under American protection, was planned to be sent from the Gulf Coast to Africa.

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 291.

³ See vol. viii of this series, document No. 306 and footnotes.

⁴ Karl von Puttkamer, Captain, Hitler's Naval aide.

⁵ Otto Schniewind, Admiral, Chief of the Naval Operations Staff, 1938-1941.

The Foreign Minister expects immediately the draft for the statements by the Reich Government necessary for this.⁶

RITTER

⁶The following handwritten notes appear on the margin:

"Will the Washington Embassy be informed in time? D[ieckhoff], Mar. 17."

"Ambassador Dieckhoff: Ambassador Ritter, together with the military authorities, is of the opinion that a somewhat divergent proposal should be made. As soon as the matter has advanced further the Washington Embassy will be informed. W[oermann], Mar. 17."

For further developments, see documents Nos. 210, 244, and 325. See also U.S. Navy Department, ONI, "Führer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy, 1941," vol. I, pp. 27-34.

No. 168

230/152567

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 231 of March 15

BELGRADE, March 15, 1941—9:40 p. m.

Received March 16—12:15 a. m.

Because the public here is disoriented concerning the true meaning of the pending German-Yugoslav negotiations, partly as a result of the influence of enemy propaganda, and because a certain psychosis regarding the alleged danger to the highest interest as well as to the state itself has spread, I recommend appropriate counteraction by suitable instructions in the foreign press conference on the language to be used. The recent reassuring instructions on language to be used in regard to the unchanged friendly relations of Germany with Yugoslavia have been given the greatest publicity in the local press and had a visibly reassuring effect. For this reason I would recommend that such instructions as to language to be used be repeated particularly in the next few days, which in all probability will not yet bring any final clarification of the situation and therefore could produce new anxiety. It would be expedient in this connection to emphasize not only the unchanged friendly relations but also the loyal intentions of the Reich toward Yugoslavia, which, in this way, has in view the preservation of Yugoslav interests.

HEEREN

No. 169

201/89501-03

The Foreign Ministry to the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police

BERLIN, March 15, 1941.

D III 60 g.

In view of the close cooperation of German party agencies with the Rumanian Legionnaires and of the role played by German agencies in the Putsch of the Iron Guard, the Rumanian Chief of State, Antonescu, has agreed to our proposal that certain members of the Legion who during the attempted Putsch opposed him for reasons of idealism rather than greed, not be brought to account in Rumania itself in accord with the criminal law but be permitted to receive asylum in the German Reich.¹

In a letter of February 25 to the German Minister in Bucharest,² General Antonescu laid down the conditions under which he was willing to do this, as follows: The Legionnaires would have to be assigned a compulsory place of sojourn and be put under the strictest supervision of the German authorities so that they could not leave their place of internment. Their modest support will be paid by the Rumanian Government. He (Antonescu) also requested that he be given as comprehensive a list as possible of the Legionnaires who have fled to Germany and that he be told the camps in which they were interned.

The Führer has approved the form of internment requested by General Antonescu and instructed the Foreign Ministry to take the necessary steps in this matter jointly with the domestic authorities concerned. Please make the arrangements necessary for this as I assume that these are essentially within your sphere of jurisdiction.

In particular I would like to make the following additional remarks with regard to this:

1. The Foreign Ministry transmitted to the Reich Main Security Office (Sturmbannführer Schellenberg) through Counselor Rademacher³ as early as February 20 the request that all Rumanian Legionnaires crossing the German border be seized, their passports

¹ In telegram No. 298 of Feb. 10 (201/89352-53) Killinger had reported Antonescu's agreement in principle to his suggestion that certain Iron Guard leaders be taken into custody by the German military in Rumania and transported to Germany. Nothing more has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry concerning negotiations between Antonescu and Killinger in this matter.

² Not found.

³ Of the Department for German Internal Affairs.

taken from them, and that they be placed under police supervision.⁴ Every Legionnaire would have to sign in duplicate the statement on his word of honor which had been handed to Herr Schellenberg; on that occasion they should all be informed that they would immediately be extradited to the Rumanian Government if they violated this statement. A sojourn of the Legionnaires in larger sized cities was not desired. The Foreign Ministry requested that it be given one copy of each statement submitted, as well as a list of the Legionnaires involved. In spite of repeated inquiries the Foreign Ministry has so far not been able to obtain any confirmation that these requests have been complied with. It has so far received neither a list nor the statements submitted.

2. Now that General Antonescu has laid down in the manner mentioned the conditions under which he agrees to the Legionnaires' being granted asylum, I request that lists of names be compiled and transmitted as soon as possible, indicating where the people concerned are interned, and also that a copy of each of the signed written declarations be transmitted. The immediate settlement of this matter is all the more urgent since, according to a telegram of March 12 from the Legation in Bucharest,⁵ reports have been received by the Rumanian Government that the leaders of the Legion were being officially received and cordially greeted in Berlin. General Antonescu considers this to be in contradiction to the assurances given him by us. I shall not argue the point whether this information received by the Rumanian Government is based on actual occurrences. In any case it is urgently necessary that all Rumanian Legionnaires who have fled to the Reich and are at large be taken into custody at once, so that no new complaints may be raised by General Antonescu about the treatment of the Legionnaires in Germany, as a result of which important foreign policy interests of the Reich would be placed in jeopardy.

⁴No record of this communication has been found. However, in telegram No. 74 of Feb. 19 from Fuschl (201/89401) Rintelen transmitted an instruction from the Foreign Minister to his Secretariat that the Reich Main Security Office be approached in the matter of the grant of asylum to the Iron Guard members. This instruction also contained the text of the statement to be signed by the Iron Guard members on their word of honor as well as reference to the threat of extradition both of which are mentioned in the subsequent sentence of the document printed.

⁵In Bucharest telegram No. 622 of Mar. 12 (201/89481) Neubacher had reported information received from Mihai Antonescu based on statements made by Grecianu, the former Rumanian Minister in Germany, regarding the "official and cordial reception" given to Iron Guard leaders in Berlin.

I should be grateful for information as soon as possible about what has been done there.⁶

By order:
WEIZSÄCKER

⁶No reply to this letter has been found. A letter of Mar. 30 from the Foreign Ministry to Heydrich (201/89561) briefly refers to a letter of Mar. 16 from Heydrich in the matter of the Rumanian refugees in Germany which may have been the reply to the Foreign Ministry's letter printed here. However, in a letter of Apr. 1 (222/149463) Himmler informed Ribbentrop that the Legionnaires in Germany meanwhile had signed a written promise that they would refrain from any political activities. At the same time Himmler proposed to the Foreign Minister that all Legionnaires in Germany should be concentrated in one place where they might be kept under more intensive surveillance and also be prepared for use in the labor force.

On Apr. 17 Weizsäcker informed Himmler that Ribbentrop had agreed to the proposals made in Himmler's letter of Apr. 1 (1199/331598). See also document No. 508.

No. 170

449/223107-08

The Legation in Greece to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 286 of March 16

ATHENS, March 16, 1941.

Received March 16—6:10 p. m.

For the OKH Attaché Department.

On March 15 I had another talk with Merkouris, who was mentioned in teletype report No. 274 of March 11,¹ at his request and with the consent of the Chief of Mission.

Merkouris, who according to his statements had in the meantime talked twice with the Minister President,² said that the Greek Government desired nothing so much as an early peace in Albania which would preserve Greek honor and which would make possible the withdrawal of the English from the Continent. It [the Greek Government] would therefore accept gratefully any mediation with this objective. In consideration of the present English ally, however, the Greek Government could not seize the initiative.

The Government would therefore welcome it as a way out of this situation if a discussion could be got under way through a German diplomatic inquiry about the latest landings of English troops or through a German démarche aimed at a termination of the Albanian conflict, so that Greece would not take the first step in this matter which could be interpreted by the English as betrayal.

¹ According to this teletype report (449/223106) the Military Attaché had discussed with Merkouris, a former Greek Cabinet Minister, the possibilities for avoiding German military intervention in Greece and for starting German-Greek conversations.

² Alexander Korizis.

I remained entirely noncommittal and merely doubted the necessity of the latest landings of English troops if the Greeks were really willing to negotiate. Merkouris replied that Greece hoped for a peaceful solution, to be sure, but feared that Germany was determined to solve the problem by force in consideration of the prestige of her Italian ally, and that she [Greece] had therefore had to accept English support.

In conclusion Merkouris said that the only ones on the Greek side who knew of his efforts were the King and the Chief of the Government.

Military Attaché CLEMM
ERBACH

No. 171

129/121041-42

The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

LISBON, March 17, 1941—1:00 a. m.

No. 520 of March 15

Received March 17—1:35 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 416 of March 3.¹

First: Donovan flew back to the United States today, en route from England after having stopped off a few hours in Lisbon where he conferred with Salazar, as well as with Roosevelt's emissary, Harriman, and with Hoare, British Ambassador to Madrid. It is difficult to obtain any authentic information about his three sojourns in Lisbon.² His second visit last week, especially, and his ensuing hour-long talk with Salazar is shrouded in secrecy. Spanish Ambassador Franco, who was summoned to Salazar immediately after this conversation, expressed to me his conviction that the primary topic of conversation was economic, concerning the shipment of raw materials from the United States, and that Donovan had promised to suggest relaxing the blockade in favor of Portugal when making his farewell visit to England. In addition, however, according to reliable information reaching me, they supposedly discussed also important political problems which dealt with the granting of air bases in the Azores and Cape Verde Islands, possibly going as far as a proposed lease of the Azores to the United States. For that matter the same

¹ Not found.

² No report on Colonel Donovan's visits to Lisbon has been found. Stohrer reported on Donovan's visit to Madrid and his conversation with Suñer in telegram No. 884 of Mar. 6 (136/74748-50).

Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 881-885, and Sir Samuel Hoare, *Ambassador on Special Mission* (London, 1946), pp. 107 ff.

source also reports that a parallel proposal had been made to Spain with regard to leasing the Canary Islands. Donovan furthermore is reported to have taken up the British proposal, already reported,³ for maintaining surveillance of all Portuguese ports by installing in them control officials, counseling that American control officers be employed in the interest of Portuguese neutrality. Salazar is supposed to have rejected all of Donovan's proposals. The strengthening of the Azores garrison which was carried out in the last few days is said to have something to do with the Prime Minister's realization during this conversation of the threat to the islands.⁴

Second: Donovan's repeated sojourns in Portugal have given rise to all sorts of alarming rumors. Thus, Donovan is said to have proposed to Salazar that, in the event the Germans occupied Portugal, the seat of the Portuguese Government be transferred to the Azores in order to exercise governmental authority from there over the colonial possessions and the Atlantic islands, with the United States Government assuming protection against attacks from other quarters. Another version has it that in the event of an occupation of Portugal a part of the Government would escape to the Azores and there under the Minister of Colonies form a so-called "free government" on the pattern of the Belgian and Dutch Governments, while President Carmona and Salazar would remain in the country and cooperate with the Axis Powers. Other recent rumors reported by the Abwehr here speak of an imminent English threat to Portugal, with a landing being planned on the Atlantic coast in the Bordeaux-Irún sector so as to seal off the Iberian Peninsula from France and then carry out an operation in the Mediterranean. Simultaneously the United States is to occupy the Azores. There is also a marked increase in the frequent rumors about English designs for driving the Government from power and eliminating Salazar.

Third: On the other hand, leading members of the Government here display complete calm in their official conversations as well as their personal (apparently one group missing) to persons in their confidence. Thus it does not seem altogether impossible that the rumors referred to above originate in Anglo-American quarters,

³ In telegram No. 19 of Jan. 4 (129/121020-21).

⁴ See document No. 120.

hoping to induce the Axis Powers to engage in premature intervention in the Iberian Peninsula so that they may then have an apparent legal justification for occupying the islands, as intended. Current rumors, which produce considerable nervousness among the population, will continue to be carefully investigated with respect to their background.

HUENE

No. 172

73/53141

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 176

BERLIN, March 17, 1941.

The Hungarian Minister wanted to speak with me yesterday afternoon, Sunday, since he had urgent instructions. However, I saw him only this morning. His request corresponded with the one which Herr von Erdmannsdorff reported in his telegram No. 268.¹ Sztójay asked by instruction of his Government that when Yugoslavia accedes to the Tripartite Pact care be taken that Hungary's wishes for revision with respect to Yugoslavia will not be obstructed. In carrying out his instructions Sztójay did not go into as many particulars as Bárdossy had done in talking to Erdmannsdorff. He only wanted to recall to mind the well-known Hungarian claims as a matter of principle on this occasion, without, of course, wanting to disturb our negotiations with the Yugoslavs. Sztójay, too, took as his point of departure that we were on the point of giving the Yugoslavs a guarantee of their present territory. (Of course, in actuality we only stated in Belgrade that we wished "to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.")²

I replied to the Minister that his request did not seem so urgent to me as he himself had probably supposed. For the rest, the Reich Government had not forgotten Hungary at the other revision fronts either.

I refrained from making a more exact communication about the status of the negotiations to Sztójay.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ This telegram of Mar 16 (73/53136-37) reported a démarche by Foreign Minister Bárdossy in the same manner.

² See document No. 165.

No. 173

2548/D523327-28

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BELGRADE, March 17, 1941—4:00 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received March 17—7:50 p. m.

No. 234 of March 17

With reference to my telegram No. 224 of March 14.¹

The Foreign Minister, who had asked me to see him, just told me the following:

I. The Crown Council has decided in principle in favor of Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact.

II. The Crown Council has instructed him to reply as follows to the individual points of the communication which I made him on March 14 (on the basis of your telegram No. 281 of March 14²):

Regarding point 1 (respect for sovereignty and integrity): The Crown Council considers it necessary for the relevant notes to appear as annex No. 1 to the protocol of accession.

Regarding point 2 (passage or transportation through the country): The Crown Council considers it exceedingly important, in view of the domestic situation here, that the proposed announcement appear in the Yugoslav press simultaneously with the accession, and in the form of a communiqué. Thus the content would have to be agreed upon in advance. The following text is proposed:

"The Yugoslav Government has been able to satisfy itself in the course of the discussions which preceded Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact that as a result of the existing military situation the Governments of the Axis Powers will not address the demand to Yugoslavia that she permit the passage or transportation of troops through Yugoslav national territory."

Regarding point 3 (Greek conflict): No remarks.

Regarding point 4 (military assistance): The Crown Council accepts the form of assurance desired by us (strictly secret note), but is of the opinion that the assurance regarding military assistance and the assurance regarding Salonika should be given in two separate notes, since two questions are involved which have no connection with one another.

Regarding point 5 (Salonika): The Crown Council believes that the text of the promise last proposed by Cincar-Marković could still give rise to doubts as to the interpretation, and therefore attaches importance to amending the text of the promise to the effect that

¹ See document No. 165, footnote 2.

² Document No. 165.

in the new settlement of the frontiers in the Balkans account is to be taken of Yugoslavia's interest in a territorial connection with the Aegean Sea through the extension of her sovereignty to the city and harbor of Salonika.

III. The Foreign Minister told me in conclusion that he was expecting a further communication from us as to the time and place for the signing of the protocol of accession.

HEEREN

No. 174

230/152574

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

ROME, March 17, 1941—9:40 p. m.

No. 624 of March 17

Received March 17—10:05 p. m.

From various conversations with Anfuso, Bismarck gained the impression in the last few days that the Duce would attach great importance to being informed in more detail about the present state of German-Yugoslav discussions, but that he did not want to approach the Reich Government officially in this matter—either through me or through the Italian Embassy in Berlin. Today, too, this desire was noticeable again when Anfuso informed Bismarck of the contents of the telegram sent Cosmelli yesterday, on the basis of which Cosmelli informed the Foreign Ministry regarding the communications from Static [*Stakić*] that had arrived here and the reply which the Duce planned to make in this matter.¹

Therefore should there be a possibility of providing the Duce with information about the present state of the German-Yugoslav discussions, it is my impression that he would surely be especially grateful for it.

MACKENSEN

¹ See document No. 175.

No. 175

230/152571-73

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 172

BERLIN, March 17, 1941.

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires called on me today and told me the following according to instruction:

The Yugoslav confidential representative who had been in Rome earlier¹ had let the Italian Government be informed by an agent of the following:

No agreement which Yugoslavia would now conclude would give the country the feeling of peace and security unless Italo-Yugoslav relations were clarified and strengthened at the same time. The Yugoslav Minister President and the Yugoslav Foreign Minister had therefore considered a few days ago that a visit in Rome would be useful. However, they had abandoned this intention since they had feared that such a journey might perhaps produce a bad impression in Germany, [namely], that Yugoslavia wanted to play Germany off against Italy and Italy against Germany, which was by no means the case. At any rate the unsettled state of Italo-Yugoslav relations was the reason for the feeling of general insecurity still present in Belgrade.

The Duce intended to reply to these communications as follows:

1. The Italian Government is ready to give the desired tranquilizing assurances;
2. The Italian Government is likewise ready to strengthen Italo-Yugoslav relations by consolidating the Italo-Yugoslav Pact of 1937;²
3. The inclusion (*inquadramento*) of this Pact of 1937 in the Tripartite Pact could represent for Yugoslavia a special political guarantee in the present situation.

An inquiry regarding point 3 revealed that Signor Cosmelli had already asked Anfuso by telephone for an interpretation of this point, but that Anfuso, too, was not able to provide one. Together we established the following as the presumably correct interpretation:

From Cosmelli's statement it appeared that the suggestion was being made that, in addition to the Tripartite Pact, an Italo-Yugoslav treaty be concluded also which would constitute a "consolidation" of the Italo-Yugoslav Pact of 1937. Point 3 did not mean that this Italo-Yugoslav pact to be newly concluded should in any way become a part of the Tripartite Pact, but that it should be harmonized with the Tripartite Pact. Signor Cosmelli will report to Rome accordingly.³

The Chargé d'Affaires asked, on instruction, for information whether such a statement would fit into the framework of the negotiations now being conducted between the German and Yugo-

¹ See document No. 15.

² See document No. 15, footnote 2.

³ According to Weizsäcker's memorandum of Mar. 18 (230/152575) Cosmelli had telephoned him the previous evening that this interpretation of point 3 was correct.

slav Governments and would be useful to these. The Italian Government was greatly interested in a reply at the earliest possible.⁴

Submitted herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister (by wire).

WEIZSÄCKER

⁴ See document No. 178.

No. 176

2362/488940-48

Memorandum by Minister Saucken

BERLIN, March 17, 1941.

The negotiations concerning the marking and surveying of the German-Soviet boundary from the Igorka to the Baltic Sea began in Moscow on February 17¹ and, proceeding at a rapid tempo and in mutual understanding, led at first to a number of partial conclusions. It was agreed that the total length of the boundary to be surveyed was to be divided into a northern and a southern section, that on the northern section a mixed subcommission under Soviet direction and on the southern section a similar subcommission under German direction would carry out the work of marking and surveying the ground, and that the work of these subcommissions would begin on March 15 of this year.

In the further discussion of the instructions for the subcommissions, however, a basic difference arose between the German and the Soviet view. Whereas the German delegation insisted that the marking and surveying should be done on the actual boundary now existing, the Soviet delegation took the position that the boundary line would first have to be ascertained on the basis of the agreements mentioned in the German-Soviet treaty of January 10, 1941,² particularly the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors of March 15, 1923.³

Since in the opinion of our experts the Soviet standpoint entailed a German territorial loss of about 45 square kilometers and on the other hand also made the interpretation of the treaty of January 10, 1941, a matter of debate, I asked the Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, to settle the controversial question with M. Molotov.

In this discussion, which took place on March 6, the Ambassador pointed out:⁴

¹ Minutes of the sessions of the mixed German-Soviet boundary commission held on Feb. 17, 25, and 27, 1941, are in Saucken's files (2362/488951-58).

² See vol. xi of this series, document No. 640, footnote 2.

³ See League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xv, p. 260.

⁴ A memorandum of Mar. 7 on this discussion between Schulenburg and Molotov is in Saucken's files (2362/488933-35).

that the German-Soviet treaty of January 10, 1941, had put the present, actual boundary line in the prominent position;

that the reference therein to German-Lithuanian treaties and the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors was only in the nature of a historical explanation;

that a re-implementation of these already executed treaties or of the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors was contrary to reason; and

that in the conclusion of the treaty of January 10, 1941, no change whatever in the existing boundary line had been intended.

M. Molotov did not go into these arguments in any detail but based the Soviet position on the standpoint that in the carrying out of the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors an injustice had been done to the Lithuanian State, whose legal successor the Soviet Union considered herself to be, to whose perpetuation he could not consent. For a settlement he therefore proposed a revision in such a way that the German-Soviet boundary would run, not to the Igorka River, but approximately in a north-south direction along the Marycha River. Lithuania would thereby acquire a triangle which in area would comprise only a fraction of the territory that would be involved if the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors were strictly enforced.

The Ambassador reserved his position on this matter. I myself told the chairman of the Soviet delegation⁵ that the decision on M. Molotov's proposal could not be taken by the German-Soviet boundary commission but only on the government level, and I agreed with him that the beginning of the subcommissions' work, which was planned for March 15 of this year, should be postponed for the present.

The boundary revision desired by M. Molotov involves an area of about 15 square kilometers in the angle formed by the old German-Soviet boundary, already marked, and the new boundary, which is still to be marked. The area contains a good stand of forest as well as three settlements and probably seems desirable to the Soviet side also for the reason that, as the boundary now runs, it cuts across the important Soviet highway from Kapciamiestis to Sopotskin.

If M. Molotov construes the naturally understandable wish for this area as a Soviet claim arising out of the legal succession to the Lithuanian State, it will mean that any German claims for compensation for granting this wish are to be excluded from the outset. This interpretation is therefore unacceptable to us. If the Soviet side should nevertheless insist on it, a certain pressure could be exerted to counter it by pointing out that the treaty of January

⁵ L. M. Kuroptiev.

10, 1941, which is basic, has not yet been ratified, or by suspending the current negotiations.

If, however, the Soviet side should agree to treat its territorial wish on the basis of compensation, this wish could be balanced by corresponding German counterclaims which we are especially interested in putting through. In order to establish a real balance between the reciprocal wishes it would, however, be necessary to limit the Soviet territorial wish to an area of about 4 square kilometers extending from the Igorka to the above-mentioned highway from Kapeciamiestis to Sopotskin—including that highway.

An outline of such a German counterproposal together with a map and the text of the treaty of January 10, 1941, are enclosed herewith.*

Herewith respectfully submitted to the Foreign Minister through: Senior Counselor Schliep; the Deputy Director of the Political Department; the Under State Secretary of the Political Department; State Secretary von Weizsäcker.

SAUCKEN

*The outline of a German counterproposal is not printed (2362/488944-45). The map has not been found.

No. 177

F7/0159-70

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Füh. 12a

BERLIN, March 18, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND TURKISH AMBASSADOR GEREDE IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE REICH CHANCELLERY ON MARCH 17, 1941

The Turkish Ambassador first presented the letter of reply of the Turkish President¹ to the Führer's message.² After the Führer had read it, he developed for Ambassador Gerede his views on the current problems in a lengthy discourse. He was impressed with the fact that the communication just handed to him was of extraordinary importance, and would like to repeat his assurance that Germany had no territorial interests in the areas in question, any more than in Bulgaria, Rumania, or Greece. She was perhaps the only state that could truthfully say that of herself. It was extremely unpleasant for Germany to have to resort to military intervention in the Balkans as this was, after all, contrary to the fundamental strategic principle of concentrating all forces upon a single

¹ Of Mar. 12, document No. 161.

² Of Mar. 1, document No. 113.

objective. Nor would Germany have sent a single soldier if the Italo-Greek conflict had been confined to these countries alone. If the Turkish President stated in his letter that Turkey was not to be blamed for this conflict, this held equally true for Germany. It should not be assumed, because of the Führer's presence in Florence on the day hostilities began,³ that Germany saw eye to eye with Italy in the determination to go to war. Germany's ally had embarked on the war with Greece on her own responsibility. Only at the last minute had the Führer learned of it and he had immediately hurried to Florence. But it was too late.

On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the Greeks had not conducted themselves in good faith. The least to be said was that they covertly helped England all along. They had run their ships for England's benefit and made bases available to English submarines. He (the Führer) was no more responsible for Italy's reaction to this attitude than was the Turkish President.

If the conflict had been kept confined to Italy and Greece, there would not have been any reason for German intervention. But Germany observed her obligations under the treaty of alliance. Accordingly, she in turn intervened as soon as the English appeared in Greece.

Memories of the World War also played a part in this. The British tactics obviously were first to establish air bases in Greece, then to bring in material, and finally to send troops. Germany was on her guard now precisely because she remembered from the World War her experience in Salonika with its frightful consequences. With the present leadership of the state there would be no repetition of the levity with which, in 1915, the Salonika question was managed for dynastic reasons.

Therefore, he (the Führer) would be remiss in his duties if he did not intervene, although it was personally disagreeable to him that he might have to take action against Greece. With her past record, Germany had no military ambitions, but he (the Führer) saw no other way of preventing a repetition of the fate suffered in the World War, unless the Greeks chose to follow a sensible course. But there was increasing evidence that they were choosing a different course. And yet Germany had openly declared from the beginning that she would intervene if the English should establish themselves in Greece.

Turning to German-Turkish relations, the Führer stressed the fact that Germany was the only state that had no territorial interests in the areas in question. This apart, his attitude toward Turkey to date had caused him in other respects more difficulties than Turkey imagined.

³ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 246.

In this connection the Führer referred to the conversations during Molotov's visit to Berlin.⁴ On that occasion Germany had exerted herself to draw Russia into the great combination against England. Molotov had thereupon immediately brought up the Dardanelles problem and then talked about his plan to conclude a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria, which would provide for the stationing of Russian garrisons in Bulgarian territory; in this connection, however, he had stressed that no action would be taken against the Bulgarian King. The Führer had taken the position that this was a matter on which the Bulgarians themselves should be consulted. Subsequently King Boris had rejected the Russian proposals.

In regard to the Dardanelles question, the Russians had spoken about the granting of bases. He (the Führer) had answered, however, that he did not believe this would be possible and that he did not consider it feasible. He had merely declared that he was prepared to advocate a revision of the Montreux Convention⁵ to the effect that the warships of the riparian states of the Black Sea would have the right of exit from that Sea through the Dardanelles, while foreign warships would not be permitted to enter.

In this context the Führer referred to the personal attacks against him in Turkey. From what had been said above, it was evident that he had done everything possible to deserve the opposite kind of treatment by the Turkish press. For if he had acted in the way the press attacks seemed to indicate, the problems would have been very much simpler. If, for example, he had declared that Germany was disinterested, as he had done with respect to the Baltic States, it would not be England by any chance that would be in the Balkans today, but Russia would have occupied the whole area. However, he (the Führer) had adopted a different attitude. He had refused to consent to the establishment of "Hangö type" bases, which were Russia's ambition, and had so prevented the liquidation of the Balkans and Turkey by Russia. Nevertheless, he was being attacked in the Turkish press as if he had injured Turkey's interests. A historic injustice was being done to him here.

He had taken this positive attitude toward Turkey's interest not for any sentimental reasons, although the memory of the German-Turkish comradeship in arms during the World War was still very strong; rather, he had acted from a feeling that it would be against Germany's own interests if anything were to happen to Turkey. It would not be to the advantage of Germany to watch any other power establish itself in the Balkans and on the Dardanelles. Accordingly Germany had intervened in behalf of and not against the interests

⁴ See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 325, 326, 328, and 329.

⁵ See document No. 11 and footnote 4.

of the Balkan countries, such as Rumania and Bulgaria, who would otherwise have become the victims of the Russians. The ultimate consequences that would have resulted for Turkey were obvious of course.

For this reason he (the Führer) was sincerely pleased with the letter from the Turkish President. The contact thus established could perhaps be developed further. He wished to emphasize at once, however, that he had no intention of asking for any aid from Turkey. (He had made this plain to Yugoslavia as well.) England was lost and no amount of talk by the Americans could change that. Germany's position today was simply infinitely more favorable than during the World War, when she had to battle the whole military might of the Allies all the time in France. He would not waste any words on where Germany would attack England and how she would go about it. That would be plain to all when the time came.

In North Africa the English had kept advancing until the German steel helmets came into sight. They would not have a chance to capture Tripoli now. It was foolish for them to assert that they had not planned to do so. They could not now carry out that conquest any more. Germany was pressing them hard also in North Africa, and German tanks and German antitank defense were absolutely superior to the British.

Germany was the factor of reason, particularly in the Balkans, and she was in many instances in a position to bring her influence to bear in favor of a sensible solution of existing problems. Thus it might be possible in the course of the political reorganization to find solutions for questions of interest to Turkey such as, for example, the railroad to Edirne. It was, of course, impossible to satisfy all wishes, while on the other hand it was often necessary to make painful sacrifices.

As an example in point, the Führer cited the Vienna Award between Rumania and Hungary.⁶ Rumania had had to make heavy sacrifices and Hungary was not completely satisfied, but all concerned had come to realize that the Award was still preferable to a war, from which Russia alone would ultimately emerge as victor.

For the rest, Germany would be happy to be able to withdraw her soldiers again from the Balkans, where, as he had said, she had no territorial interests. Sending troops to those areas was expensive. The lines of communications were immensely long, and, in addition, all supplies, including foodstuffs, had to be brought in from Germany.

Notwithstanding all these efforts, Germany had no selfish territorial ambitions of her own to promote. She had enormous areas of

⁶ See vol. x of this series, document No. 413.

her own in the General Government and in the West, the development of which would keep her occupied for a long time to come. In the Balkans she merely wished to carry on trade and would be able to do so all the better the more this area was politically consolidated. This was the reason for her interest in settled conditions in the Balkans.

Perhaps the letter of the Turkish President would afford an opportunity for cooperation between Germany and Turkey. The exchange of ideas which had begun might possibly develop into a sincere and close relationship. Turkey had really no interest in Germany's losing the war, and thus seeing the country perish which was the strongest restraining factor with respect to Turkey's biggest neighbor. By the same token, Germany had an interest in the continued existence of Turkey as the guardian of the Dardanelles. Perhaps Germany had even forfeited Russia's friendship on account of her attitude in the Dardanelles question.

Here the Reich Foreign Minister broke in with the remark that Russia might perhaps have joined the Tripartite Pact by now if it had not been for the Dardanelles question.

The Turkish Ambassador, who was visibly gratified, thanked the Führer for his words and promised to do everything in his power to carry on along the road that had now been taken. He cherished the great hope and the firm conviction that friendship between Germany and Turkey would prevail.

SCHMIDT

No. 178

2366/489273-78

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 599 of March 18

BERLIN, [March 18, 1941.]¹

Received March 19—2:35 a. m.

To be decoded only by official with top secret clearance. Submit at once to the Chief of Mission personally. Reply by courier or secret code.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your No. 624 of March 17.²

I. The discussions held so far with the Yugoslav Government have now led to the result that the Yugoslav Crown Council decided on March 17 that Yugoslavia will accede to the Tripartite Pact. In the course of the conversations there were particularly tedious dis-

¹ No date of dispatch is listed.

² Document No. 174.

cussions regarding the form in which the assurances were to be issued which the Yugoslav Government had requested on March 7³ in the event of its accession to the Tripartite Pact; you were informed of this on March 8 when the telephone conversation with the Duce was arranged, and the Duce expressed his agreement the same day. We now intend to propose to the Yugoslav Government March 23 for the accession and Vienna as the place for it. As soon as the consent of the Yugoslav Government is at hand we shall address an appropriate invitation to the Italian Foreign Minister.

II. We propose the following texts for the notes to be handed to the Yugoslav Government simultaneously with the accession, subject to the agreement of the Italian Government:

1. Note concerning territorial integrity.

"In the name of and by instruction of the German Government I have the honor to communicate the following to Your Excellency: "On the occasion of Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact this day the German Government confirms its decision to respect at all times the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Accept, etc."

This note is to be published simultaneously with the accession.

2. Note concerning the passage or transportation of troops through the country.

"With reference to the discussions which have taken place on the occasion of Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact today, I have the honor to confirm to Your Excellency herewith in the name of the Reich Government the agreement between the Governments of the Axis Powers and the Royal Yugoslav Government that during the war the Governments of the Axis Powers will not address the demand to Yugoslavia that she permit the passage or transportation of troops through Yugoslav territory.

"Accept, etc."

This note is not to be published, but we have stated our agreement that simultaneously with the accession the Yugoslav Government will publish in its press a communiqué with the following text:

"The Yugoslav Government has been able to satisfy itself in the course of the discussions which preceded Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact that as a result of the existing military situation the Governments of the Axis Powers will not address the demand to Yugoslavia that she permit the passage or transportation of troops through Yugoslav territory."

3. Secret note regarding military assistance.

"With reference to the discussions which have taken place in connection with today's accession by Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact, I have the honor to confirm to Your Excellency herewith in the

³ Document No. 131.

name of the Reich Government the agreement between the Governments of the Axis Powers and the Royal Yugoslav Government on the following:

"Germany and Italy, taking into account the military situation assure the Yugoslav Government that they will not, of their own accord, make any demand for military assistance. Should the Yugoslav Government at any time consider it to be in its own interest to participate in the military operations of the Powers of the Tripartite Pact, it will be left up to the Yugoslav Government to make the necessary military agreements for this with the Powers of the Tripartite Pact.

"With the request that you treat the foregoing communications as strictly secret and make them public only in agreement with the Governments of the Axis Powers, I take this opportunity to, etc."

4. Secret note regarding Salonika.

First and last paragraph identical with those under 3.

The middle paragraph reads as follows:

"In the new settlement of the frontiers in the Balkans the interests of Yugoslavia in a territorial connection with the Aegean Sea, through the extension of her sovereignty to the city and harbor of Salonika, are to be taken into account."

Conclusion of the texts of the notes.

Regarding the last two notes the strictest secrecy has been arranged with the Yugoslav Government. In notes of confirmation the Yugoslav Government will state that it will treat these communications as strictly secret and will make them public only in agreement with the Governments of the Axis Powers. Appropriate security handling of these texts must also be assured in Rome.

III. The Italian Chargé d'Affaires yesterday informed State Secretary Weizsäcker that the Yugoslav Government had informed the Italian Government through a confidential representative that no agreement would give Yugoslavia the feeling of peace and security if the Italo-Yugoslav relations were not at the same time clarified and strengthened.⁴ The Duce intends to reply to this Yugoslav communication that:

1. the Italian Government is prepared to give tranquilizing assurances;

2. it is prepared to consolidate the Italo-Yugoslav Pact of 1937;⁵

3. the Pact of 1937 is at the same time to be harmonized with the Tripartite Pact, which represents for Yugoslavia in the present situation a special political guarantee.

The Chargé d'Affaires asked for a reply at the earliest possible.

IV. Please inform Anfuso at once in strict confidence about the contents of paragraphs I and II above with the request that he

⁴ See document No. 175.

⁵ See document No. 15, footnote 2.

immediately apprise the Duce of them. Please tell Anfuso the following regarding the Italian query given above under III:

We had no objections whatsoever if the Italian Government wanted to use Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact as the occasion for special Italo-Yugoslav agreements in the sense of a consolidation of the Pact of 1937 along the lines discussed between State Secretary Weizsäcker and Signor Cosmelli. However, since Signor Cosmelli's communications had still been made in ignorance of the exact state of the German-Yugoslav discussions, we assumed that the Italian Government would still examine whether in view of the foregoing communication additional Italo-Yugoslav agreements beyond Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact were to be considered.

We assume that the Italian Government is in agreement with the composition of the draft notes.

Please report the carrying out [of the instruction].⁶

RIBBENTROP

⁶ In telegram No. 633 of Mar. 19 (2366/489279) Mackensen reported having carried out his instruction with Anfuso who promised that he would get in touch with Mussolini at once. See document No. 182.

No. 179

449/223108-10

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Greece

Draft Telegram ¹

BERLIN, March 18, 1941.

For the Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 286.²

The Greek Government, which is at war with our allies, the Italians, and is drawing more and more English forces into its country, is mistaken if it assumes that it can pass on to us the responsibility for taking the initiative in terminating the conflict. In particular, however, it seems to harbor illusions regarding the price which it would have to pay for such a termination.

Please wire me your personal opinion about what conditions Greece presumably has in mind in now making efforts to end military opera-

¹ Marginal note: "Canceled."

Another draft (449/223111) of a reply to document No. 170 reads as follows: "Please observe the greatest possible reserve with regard to attempts such as the one made by M. Merkouris to enter into a political discussion with members of your Legation. An initiative by us of the kind M. Merkouris has tried to pass on to us is out of the question. The conversations of the Military Attaché with Merkouris must not be continued or resumed without instructions from me."

² Document No. 170.

tions. Of course, no approach of any kind should be made to officials there. I also request that the conversations of the Military Attaché reported in telegram No. 286 should not be continued, much less resumed, without instructions from me.

V. RIBBENTROP

No. 180

449/223102-03

Memorandum by the State Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL
St.S. No. 186

BERLIN, March 18, 1941.

The Greek Minister¹ called on me today seeking personal support and advice in his concern about German-Greek relations and the fate of his country. He spoke of the large capital of sympathy which Germany had gained in Greece in the last two decades and which he had tried to the best of his ability to preserve during his 7 years of activity in Berlin.

This last I conceded to the Minister. However, I could not let him go on even in the form of a private conversation, as he desired, when he tried to represent matters as if the present misfortune for his country had started with the Italian occupation of Albania. Rizo-Rangabé wanted to establish the thesis that a natural consequence of this had been the British guarantee for Greece under which his country had preserved neutrality until the conflict broke out because of the unilateral Italian action. British troops, except for flyers, had arrived on the Greek mainland only now, in a response to the German entry into Bulgaria, and even today there were still no English in Thrace. As stated, I had to cut off this conversation, in which I was of an entirely different opinion. I replied that Greece had made her decisive error by accepting the British guarantee. The history of this war proved the fatal effect of accepting such guarantees. Two things were certain: Greece was at war with our ally and she had drawn units of the British armed forces into her country. But it was intolerable to us to have the English on the Continent.

Rizo-Rangabé, who was very nervous, said with a shrug of the shoulders that Greece could not send the English home as long as she was involved in a struggle with Italy. The Minister then summarized the purpose of his visit by saying that he had merely wished to make himself available if he could in any way serve in preserving the peace between Germany and Greece. He did not have instruc-

¹ Alexander Rizo-Rangabé.

tions from his Government, nor did he have any proposals to make of his own accord.²

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

² Cf. document No. 189.

No. 181

34/24472-73

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, March 18, 1941.

STANDPOINT OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT ON THE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM OF MINISTER VON SAUCKEN¹

(1) OKH has expressed the urgent request that no Soviet commissions work in the German-Soviet border region in the immediate future. If the negotiations carried on by Minister von Saucken about the marking and surveying of the German-Soviet boundary from the Igorka River to the Baltic should proceed normally, overcoming the difficulties that have now arisen, commissions would soon have to be sent in for the marking of the boundary in this sector, which originally was to begin on March 15.

In these circumstances it is necessary to be dilatory in the conduct of the negotiations.

(2) The following procedure is therefore proposed:

Minister von Saucken, who on March 11 left Moscow for Berlin in order to report, will remain here for the present. Since Molotov's latest proposal to Ambassador Count Schulenburg goes beyond the task of negotiating about the marking and surveying of the boundary, with which Minister von Saucken was charged, the Ambassador will be instructed at the end of March to negotiate further with Molotov. In the course of these negotiations Count Schulenburg might bring up for discussion the draft of a German counterproposal attached to Minister von Saucken's memorandum.² The negotiations on it could then be carried on at a slow tempo. The Ambassador might first, as a delaying tactic, take the position that Molotov's proposal means a revision of the existing boundary treaties, so that the matter cannot be settled simply in the course of the discussions on the marking and surveying of the boundary; rather, a special legal form must be

¹ Document No. 176.

² See document No. 176, footnote 6.

found for it. The date of Minister von Saucken's return to Moscow will then depend on the course of these negotiations.

It may be assumed that in this manner the deliberate use of delaying tactics will not be too obvious.

WOERMANN

No. 182

2366/489280-81

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy

ROME, March 19, 1941.

Signor Anfuso called me around 1:00 p.m. to tell me that he had not yet succeeded in getting in touch with the Duce.¹ The latter had left his quarters and was with a troop unit. He hoped, however, to be able to inform me of the Duce's decision before the end of the day.

At 2:00 p.m., in accordance with his request, I sent Anfuso the German texts of the four draft notes by special messenger in a sealed envelope to the Palazzo Chigi.

The receipt of the secretary on duty in the Cabinet is enclosed.²

Shortly after 5:00 o'clock, Minister von Rintelen telephoned me on direct instructions from the Foreign Minister in order to find out whether I already had an answer from the Duce; the Foreign Minister quite particularly wished to receive such before the day was over. I informed Herr von Rintelen of the state of the matter and promised him further news, if possible, before the day was over.

About a quarter of an hour later Signor Anfuso telephoned me and informed me that he had just been able to conduct the conversation with the Duce. The latter had agreed absolutely to everything. As far as the subject of the Weizsäcker-Cosmelli conversation mentioned in telegram No. 599 of the 18th³ was concerned, the Duce had decided for the time being, at any rate, to do nothing at all, but to handle the matter in a dilatory manner. Whether Italy would in some manner or other again take up the idea aired in the conversation was being left for a later decision. Signor Anfuso and I agreed that there would, indeed, soon be an opportunity for a discussion of this subject between Count Ciano and Herr von Ribbentrop.

Immediately following the telephone conversation, I informed Herr von Rintelen of its substance, and he said that he would pass it on to the Foreign Minister at once.

I added to this information that, from my conversations with the Italians (Anfuso and Celesia⁴) to date, I assumed that Count Ciano

¹ See document No. 178 and footnote 6.

² Not found.

³ Document No. 178.

⁴ Andrea Geisser Celesia di Vegliasco, Chief of Protocol in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

would make his arrangements for the trip for the signing dovetail with the measures that had been taken for the signing in connection with Bulgaria's accession.

MACKENSEN

No. 183

534/239758

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 193

BERLIN, March 19, 1941.

Today the Nuncio brought me the accompanying note verbale¹ regarding the confiscation of church property in the formerly Polish area.² It deals with the legal question whether church property can be equated with government property and is therefore equally liable to confiscation in the formerly Polish area with property of the former Polish Government. The Nuncio considered the matter rather important.³

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Not printed (534/239759-60).

² Records of earlier complaints are filmed on serial 534.

³ See document No. 567.

No. 184

205/142637-38

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, March 19, 1941.

e. o. Pol. I M 706 g. Rs.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH SWEDEN ON THE TRANSIT OF TROOP REINFORCEMENTS

The plan¹ is to commit three German divisions at the extreme left wing in northern Finland, i.e.:

1. One of the mountain divisions already in northern Norway in the direction of Kola Bay. Its task, at the same time, is to prevent the English from gaining a foothold on Kola Bay. This mountain division will touch only Finnish territory. Therefore no arrangements with Sweden are necessary.

2. Two infantry divisions to be committed in central Finland against the area between the White Sea and Lake Ladoga. *These are the two divisions involved in the negotiations with Sweden.* One of these divisions is to come straight from Germany. The other is

¹ Cf. Editors' Note, p. 11.

to be transported from southern Norway to the north. The two divisions are to be brought through Sweden by rail to Finland to the area north of the Gulf of Bothnia. They are to join one or two Finnish divisions there so that all of them together can be employed against the above-named area.

As camouflage Sweden is to be told that the mountain divisions now in northern Norway are to be later relieved by ship since they are needed elsewhere. In their place two infantry divisions are to be brought up. These two infantry divisions are, as stated above, to be transported through Sweden by rail, with the decision reserved for later on whether the remaining distance through Finland to northern Norway will be covered by automobile transport via the Arctic Highway or whether part of it will go to Narvik via Swedish railway.

At the time in question the sea route via the Gulf of Bothnia is out of the question because of ice.

An *immediate decision and immediate negotiations* are necessary because if the railway route through Sweden is not available the entire plan of troop deployment must be changed.

It is therefore suggested that the negotiations on this be taken up this very week in Stockholm. The Swedish Government has already by way of hints been given some advance preparation for such new negotiations through the request that the present agreements on the transport of men on leave and replacements be placed on a new basis.² The Swedish Government, in response to this suggestion, has already indicated its readiness to enter into such negotiations.

I suggest that Minister Schnurre be sent to Stockholm for this purpose; he has already conducted the first negotiations on military transports by rail.

ITTER

²The arrangements for transport between Norway and Germany through Sweden of German troops in Norway and their replacements were outlined in exchanges of notes of July 8, 1940, between Swedish Foreign Minister Günther and Minister Schnurre. See vol. x of this series, documents Nos. 132 and 133. Some alterations had been made in these arrangements later; see *ibid.*, document No. 133, footnote 3.

In a discussion in Stockholm on Mar. 1, 1941, Günther had indicated to the German Minister, Prinz zu Wied, that transport of German troops in a south-north direction was exceeding the permitted figures (Stockholm telegram No. 205 of Mar. 1: 205/142621).

Counselor of Legation Geffcken reported in telegram No. 260 of Mar. 14 (205/142634) that in a further discussion of the transit question he had indicated, in accordance with instructions, the German desire for a new arrangement of the whole transit question and that Günther had expressed agreement.

No. 185

205/142639-41

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI

BERLIN, March 20, 1941.

Pol. VI 1220 g.

I. After his return from Stockholm the Swedish Minister, Richert, called on me yesterday, March 19. After a short discussion of several less important questions he stated that he wanted to inform me, as he said, "privately and personally," of his impressions from Stockholm:

The question of transport of men on leave had in the meantime been as good as settled. Nevertheless it had caused some repercussions in Stockholm. Now, however, Ambassador Ritter had indicated to him that it was desired to talk once more about the question of transit, and Herr Ritter had hinted to him of the possibility that in given circumstances we would at some later time ask for Swedish consent to certain increased German troop transports through Sweden.¹ He, M. Richert, could not imagine that any Swedish Government would be strong enough in the face of Parliament and public opinion to be able to comply with a possible German wish for troop transports through Sweden. The Swedish Government, in the desire to maintain good relations with Germany, had complied with a number of German wishes to the limit of what was possible; a further concession would no longer be compatible with the Swedish neutrality policy. Moreover, the Swedish Government placed the greatest importance on the statements in the letter of the German Reich Chancellor to the King of Sweden in the spring of 1940, in which this line of Swedish policy found express recognition.²

M. Richert stressed once more in conclusion that he naturally had no instructions of any kind from his Government and was speaking privately and personally; however, he did not want to keep from me his impressions from Stockholm.

II. I replied to M. Richert as follows—likewise as my personal opinion:

When I was in Stockholm last autumn I had the opportunity to speak several times during conversations with Foreign Minister von Günther, among other things, about the subject of "neutrality policy." We had been in agreement, at that time, that in such fast-moving times as the present, with their tremendous political changes, a rigid concept of neutrality was an impossibility; the neutrality concept was also in a state of flux and had to be adapted to the developing political situation. If [as] M. Richert stressed, Sweden was a particularly conservative country difficulties would undoubtedly occur, for in such times of revolutionary upheaval a conservative attitude

¹ No record of a Richert-Ritter conversation has been found, but see document No. 184.

² See vol. ix of this series, document No. 161.

brought particular difficulties with it. If Sweden had fulfilled certain of our wishes in some points that was only a certain and all too justified compensation for the attitude of the Swedish press toward us—unneutral to say the least—which had already led to the frequent impairment of our relations. Moreover, I was not oriented on the particulars of whether we intended to present requests of the kind mentioned, and if so, what they were. Certainly, however, it would be highly inexpedient if the Swedish Government should prepare a rigid “No” even at this time. With good will on both sides a form could doubtless be found for all these questions which would also save the face of the Swedish Government.

Minister Richert did not contradict my statements and finally expressed the idea—with the request that he not be cited as the source of it—that transit through the Swedish territorial *waters* might perhaps be discussed more readily.

GRUNDHERR

No. 186

205/142644

An Official of the Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, March 21, 1941—6:35 p. m.

No. 288 of March 21

Received March 21—10:00 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 386 of March 20 (Pol. I M 1916 g.).¹

The secret instruction was carried out today. The Foreign Minister declared that he could agree to the transport of 10,000 men as replacements only by water through Swedish territorial waters.² In his opinion there were no difficulties in the way of this. However, he could only give a final reply tomorrow after consultation with the other members of the Cabinet. A one-sided transport by rail in a northerly direction of more than 15,000 men beyond March 24 was entirely impossible. The present concession as well as the permission for transport of a railway battery (cf. telegraphic report No. 282 of March 20³) had already caused the greatest political difficulties inside the country. Sweden had no objection to Germany's reinforcing her troops in Norway. She would not feel threatened in any way by such reinforcements. What was important for Sweden, however, was the equality of the railway transports in each direction. At the time the agreement was made this had been the condition which had made it possible, and the agreement was burdened to the extreme limit by the concessions granted up to now. Günther finally

¹ Not found.

² Cf. document No. 184 and footnote 2.

³ Not printed (205/142642).

urgently expressed the hope that Germany would accept the proposed solution. To my objection that the tonnage question would probably make difficulties he replied that for such relatively small sea transports the tonnage difficulties could probably be overcome.

GEFFCKEN

No. 187

230/152580

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, March 21, 1941.

Minister von Heeren, Belgrade, telephoned the following at 6:40 p.m.:

"The Foreign Minister informs me that, as a result of the resignation of three ministers, it had become necessary to complete the Cabinet, and that this might take a few days, since negotiations had to be carried on with several Serbian groups. Up to the last moment the attempt was made to avoid these resignations but, unfortunately, without success. On the other hand, these resignations of the three Ministers represented a clarification of the situation in the Cabinet. The Foreign Minister definitely hopes that it will be possible to complete the Cabinet in a few days and that the decision, with respect to which the majority have already expressed themselves favorably, may then be carried out with all speed. von Heeren."

Minister von Heeren added that he would immediately draft a detailed telegram,¹ which he would relay to Berlin in code.²

LOHMANN

¹ In telegram No. 254 of Mar. 21 (230/152581-82) Heeren reported a conversation with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister regarding the background of the resignation of the three Cabinet members, Minister of Justice Konstantinović, Minister of Agriculture Čubrilović, and Minister of Social Welfare Budislavljević. Cincar-Marković said that he welcomed the resignation of these three ministers who had always made difficulties for the policy of the Government but that it would take some time to replace them as they represented important parties among the Serbs.

² Marginal notes:

"The foregoing was telephoned to Minister Rintelen, Munich, 6:45 p.m."

"Herewith respectfully submitted to the State Secretary. Lohmann, Mar. 21."

No. 188

71/50830-31

The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Foreign Ministry

Special Train No. 228 IN THE TRAIN, March 21, 1941—8:45 p.m.

Teletype No. 189 to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat and for Under Secretary Woermann through the State Secretary:

Your memorandum Pol. VII 123 g. Rs.¹ was presented to the Foreign Minister, who gave the following instructions in regard to

¹ Document No. 133, enclosure.

the various points summarized under section IV of your memorandum:

1. With regard to IV, point 2: The Foreign Minister agrees to the measures indicated or contemplated in annex 6.² The operations planned under III, point 4, of annex 6,³ may be initiated as soon as the local conditions for initiating action are suitable. The departments in question are to be informed accordingly.

2. With regard to IV, No. 3: You are to discuss this question again with C[anaris]. The Foreign Minister considers a general authorization in writing impracticable, if only for reasons of principle. He agrees, however, that the attempt should be made to carry out certain operations in this way, but he would like to know in advance what is being specifically contemplated in this connection. He requests that after discussion of the matter with C[anaris] in accordance with the foregoing, you report to him on the matter.⁴ With regard to informing the Italians, the Foreign Minister agrees to your proposal (p. 6, bottom⁵).

3. With regard to [IV], point 4: The Foreign Minister is in agreement with your view that the moment has not yet arrived for a more detailed talk with the Italians (p. 8, below⁶). The letter and the draft reply will now be submitted again from here.

4. With regard to [IV], point 5: Ambassador Stahmer is to speak about the matter again with Oshima.⁷

5. With regard to [IV], point 6: Agree to payment as proposed (page 14, above⁸). The Foreign Minister also agrees with the general statement for the contingency as provided for on page 13 of your memorandum under section B.⁹

² See document No. 133, footnote 11.

³ See footnote 2. The portion of this annex referred to here dealt with German support for Syrian newspapers by providing them with equipment and news services.

⁴ Woermann reported back to the Foreign Minister in his memorandum of Mar. 26 (71/50832) which records the discussion he held on Mar. 24 with Canaris. Woermann expressed no objection on the part of the Foreign Ministry to the Abwehr's developing a program in the Near East provided the Foreign Minister were informed in advance of what was intended. It was agreed that in Syria there would be no acts of sabotage, no fomenting of insurrections.

Canaris's memorandum of Mar. 25 (792/273126) outlines the program planned for the Middle East.

See, further, document No. 299.

⁵ The reference is to part of section III, point 2 of Woermann's memorandum.

⁶ The reference is to part of section III, point 3a) of Woermann's memorandum.

⁷ Woermann's memorandum of Mar. 24 (792/273128-29) records that he took the problem up with Stahmer who at the time maintained liaison between Ribbentrop and Oshima. He urged "that a very intensive effort in influencing Oshima is required for the sake of the objective which the OKW is particularly anxious to attain."

⁸ The reference is to part of section III, point 5c) of Woermann's memorandum.

⁹ The reference is to part of section III, point 5b) of Woermann's memorandum.

6. With regard to [IV], point 7: We must strive for an early date, and that in consultation with the Italians.

7. With regard to [IV], point 8: It is to be clarified first by careful soundings out (without mentioning names), whether the Italians would consent. In this connection, especial care should be taken in justifying our request with our special interests there.

8. With regard to [IV], point 9: The Foreign Minister agrees to the procedure proposed.

RINTELEN

No. 189

962/302202-08

Minute by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, March 21, 1941.

On March 18, while I was with General Jodl, the aide brought in a document and said that this document had been given to Admiral Canaris by the Greek Minister with the request that it be transmitted to the Führer in a suitable manner. Field Marshal Keitel refused to do this and said it was up to the Foreign Minister to decide what should be done with this document.

I informed the Foreign Minister of this on the same day. He said he did not wish to see the document. The delivery of this document might be used by the Greeks some time later, for stating that the Greek Government had officially approached the Reich Government. This had to be avoided. I should let Admiral Canaris know through the OKW that the Foreign Minister wished him to tell the Greek Minister that his document could not be forwarded, or, better still, that it was being returned to him.

I informed the OKW of this, and returned to it the document for Admiral Canaris. The OKW told me that Admiral Canaris had been instructed accordingly.

The OKW told me subsequently that, according to a directive from the Greek Government to the Greek Minister, intercepted by military authorities, the Greek Government had given instructions for this démarche. Thus, the statement of the Greek Minister to State Secretary von Weizsäcker (cf. memorandum by the State Secretary, No. 186, of March 18¹), that he did not have instructions from his Government is, according to this, not true.

R[ITTER]

¹ Document No. 180.

[Enclosure] ²

After the Italian attack on our country, which resulted in the Greek-Italian war, the Royal Greek Government—in its own interest, it is to be noted—considered it its chief task, not only to give Germany no cause for misunderstanding by preventing our getting any kind of help other than the well-known assistance in the air by the English, confined solely to the Albanian sector, but also to try incessantly to continue cultivating the existing friendly relations with Germany. It should be mentioned in this connection that it had been stressed both in the German press and by the German Legation in Athens,³ that in so far as no British troop concentrations were taking place in Macedonia and the Rumanian oil wells were in no way threatened, Germany had no reason to alter her friendly and benevolent policy toward Greece.

As soon as the preparations for the entry of German troops into Bulgaria were completed, assurances were given by the Reich both to Turkey⁴ and Yugoslavia⁵ that these countries were not threatened at all by Germany's entry into Bulgaria. No similar assurance was ever given to us. On the contrary, we were confronted with a campaign in the German press which stressed the fact that the Greek-Italian war was approaching its end, evidently as a result of a German action which was to paralyze our resistance.

In view of this threat, which was also effectively underscored by the fact that many German divisions had taken up positions along our border in Bulgaria—quite apart from the 14 mobilized Bulgarian divisions, it was the most elementary duty of the Government to take defensive measures, since our native soil was obviously threatened. And it would really be paradoxical if, in taking our purely defensive measures, we had rejected an insignificant amount of help that had been offered to us.

We emphasize expressly, however, that up to this day there has been no English soldier either on Albanian soil or in Epirus or in

² There are a number of marginal notes in shorthand on the first page of this enclosure. In so far as they can be deciphered they read as follows:

"Original received from Jodl (Bürkner). Greek Minister handed it to Canaris with the request that it be forwarded to the Führer.

"Foreign Minister: Return, does not want to see it. Bürkner should telephone and return it. R[itter], Mar. 18."

"Bürkner, Mar. 19.

"1) Misunderstanding. Memorandum is to be shown to OKW only, not to the Führer.

"2) Canaris informed the Gr[ee]k Minister that the paper has not been forwarded.

R[itter], Mar. 19."

"He has given it to the Chief, OKW; it will not be forwarded from there. "It is not correct that it was for Chief; rather it was for Canaris only."

³ Marginal note: "?"

⁴ See document No. 119.

⁵ Cf. document No. 98.

Macedonia, and also that our policy toward the Reich remains unchanged and that we have never harbored any aggressive intentions toward the Reich—a possibility in which, incidentally, nobody in the world would believe.

It was stressed, moreover, in the joint declaration published on the occasion of the arrival of Minister Eden in Athens⁶ that we would leave no stone unturned in order to avoid the extension of the war to another front.

Adhering to the friendly policy toward the Reich which we consistently pursued after the Italian attack, we do not yet want to believe, even in view of the danger threatening us, that our attitude could ever have given Germany cause for misunderstanding. Still less do we want to believe that Germany and her Führer would order the German troops to stab us in the back at a moment when we are defending ourselves in a very unequal struggle against the unjust and undeserved Italian attack, of which both the Führer and also his aides have disapproved, to say the least.⁷

At any rate, the decision rests with the Reich.⁸

⁶Eden visited Athens Mar. 2-5. For the text of the communiqué, see *Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 1940-1943*, p. 4500.

⁷Marginal note: "?"

⁸In a memorandum of Mar. 20 (962/302201) Weizsäcker recorded that the Greek Minister in the course of the visit which he had made 3 days earlier (see document No. 180) had wanted to hand him the memorandum printed here. After having read it, Weizsäcker told the Minister that he was not in a position to accept it.

No. 190

174/136717-22

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

Dir. Ha. Pol. 64

BERLIN, March 21, 1941.

German-Japanese Economic Questions for the Conference With the Japanese Foreign Minister.

1. *General matters.* The attitude of the Japanese Government in economic questions has not been very satisfactory during the last few years. Our efforts in 1938-39 to obtain at least equal rights with the Japanese in order to maintain our commerce with occupied China in return for our support in China (recall of the military adviser, cutting off arms deliveries to China) were unsuccessful.¹ It was not even possible to obtain preferential treatment over third countries, but solely the assurance of the most favorable treatment enjoyed by third countries. After the outbreak of the present war

¹See documents on these negotiations in vol. I of this series, pp. 826-897, *passim*; vol. IV, pp. 680-712, and those appearing in the sections of vols. VI and VII relating to the Far East as listed in the Analytical List of Documents in each of those volumes.

our hope of obtaining important raw materials (rubber, tin, tungsten) from third countries was fulfilled only to a very small extent. To be sure, we received considerable quantities of whale oil, but mainly because we offered higher prices for it than did the English. On the other hand, whereas we formerly got about 1 million tons of soybeans a year from Manchuria, only about 150,000 tons were delivered in the first year and a half of this war, although the Siberian Railway would have been in a position to transport considerably more. In occupied China, German commerce is not only not treated on a footing of equality with Japanese, but in practice often actually worse than English and American commerce. Even in Japan itself there is still the tendency to shut out the German firms more and more. Continued representations by our Embassy in Tokyo have been unsuccessful. Even under the Konoye Government there was no change at first. Not until recently has more cooperation been noticeable (assistance in transportation of rubber).

But even now the tendency evidently still exists among the Japanese to provide themselves with the most far-reaching economic advantages at our expense on the basis of the alliance in the Tripartite Pact, without themselves making further concessions. They expect hundreds of millions in credits and the gratuitous surrender of patents and licenses of all kinds, and want to exclude us in favor of themselves from direct commerce with the entire Far East. On the other hand, we are trying to be generous in economic concessions, to be sure, in so far as these are necessary, in order to make the Japanese, as our allies, as strong as possible and to induce them to take the political and military action desired by us, but at the same time as far as possible to insist on reasonable economic counterservices and in particular to avoid undesirable restrictions for the time after the war.

At the desire of the Japanese a German delegation under the leadership of State Councilor Wohlthat will go to Tokyo at the beginning of April² in order to reach agreements on regulating the exchange of goods in wartime, as well as to improve the situation of German commerce in Japan and China in so far as possible. The Japanese have made separate proposals for an exchange of goods in a volume of 150 million yen in each case, which can probably be fulfilled to a large extent. On the other hand, we do not wish to discuss the Japanese wishes for the surrender of patents, licenses, etc., in the amount of many million yen during the negotiations of the delegation in Tokyo, but rather, owing to their connection with political questions, in the committees of the Tripartite Pact in Berlin.

² See document No. 429.

2. *Separate questions.*

a. Rubber. There are negotiations in progress on rubber shipments from Indochina, according to which Germany would receive 25,000 tons from the 1941 harvest, Japan probably 15,000 tons, America 10,000 tons, and France 18,000 tons. The Japanese Government has promised transportation help as far as Japan and Dairen for shipping our rubber from Indochina. German ships as blockade runners are intended for the further transport to Germany. However, in order to get the rubber to Germany in time it is also urgently necessary that Japanese ships be made available as *auxiliary cruisers*, and on the return trip they could take along valuable German deliveries to Japan. In addition, we are also expecting support from Japan in obtaining rubber from other countries (see *b*).

b. Raw material supplies via Japan.

We are interested in buying raw materials from third countries via Japan and getting them to Germany, e.g., rubber and tin from the Netherlands Indies and Thailand; tungsten from southern China; tin from Bolivia. We are willing to provide Japan with foreign exchange for this purpose. So far Japan has done little in this direction because of consideration for England and America, her own supply situation, lack of tonnage, etc. But also where there were no such reasons, bureaucratic inhibitions and complicated regulations on procedure have caused difficulties and delays. On the basis of a promise of Matsuoka, the Wohlthat delegation will probably be able to obtain improvements in Tokyo.

For transporting such raw materials to Germany we are likewise counting on Japanese assistance with blockade runners and auxiliary cruisers.

c. Transports via the Siberian and South Manchurian Railway.

In the negotiations in Moscow for the purpose of eliminating difficulties on the Siberian Railway (rate questions, provision of cars, etc.) the closest cooperation of the German and Japanese Embassies in Moscow has been arranged. The sea communication between Japan and Vladivostok with Japanese ships should be strengthened and improved. So far transportation via the South Manchurian Railway has not been adequate to cope with an increased German-Japanese exchange of goods such as could be accomplished via the Siberian Railway across the Russian-Manchurian border. The Japanese side, too, should work for greater efficiency of the South Manchurian Railway, especially for the transportation of soybeans.

d. German commerce in China, Japan, and Manchukuo.

In the South Chinese and Yangtze harbors the German firms are excluded from any business activity because commerce is reserved only for Japanese companies. Otherwise, too, the German firms

are often subject to practical restrictions to which Japanese, and also American and English firms are not subjected. The commodity exports to Germany from the occupied area in northern China are supposed, according to the Japanese proposals for the Wohlthat negotiations, to be routed exclusively via Japan. This would result in the total elimination of German commerce from northern China, too. In Japan and Manchukuo, too, the German firms are being progressively forced out of business by Japanese export cooperatives and monopolies, whereas in Germany the Japanese firms are treated on a basis of equality with the German firms. It is therefore urgently desirable by a general promise by Matsuoka to facilitate the efforts of the Wohlthat delegation to improve this situation of German business. This would also be in the Japanese interest, since the time-tested German business organization in the Far East, which has existed for decades, will be able to perform valuable services in connection with German support in the Japanese expansion of the Greater East Asian economic sphere.

e. New organization of business relations after the war.

In German opinion, the great possibilities existing for the new organization of business relations between the European-African economic sphere under the leadership of Germany and Italy and the Greater East Asian economic sphere under the leadership of Japan can only be exploited if one proceeds on a generous scale. Therefore the commercial exchange should be as free as possible. With respect to third countries we should treat one another on a preferential basis as a matter of principle. An overcentralization with the accompanying unavoidable restrictions should be avoided. Rather, Japan should be able to trade and make trade agreements directly with the independent countries in the German-Italian sphere, and, vice versa, Germany and Italy with the independent countries in the Japanese sphere. In contrast to this, the Japanese view, according to the statements of governmental representatives in Tokyo so far, is to the effect that Germany should not carry on business directly with countries such as China, Indochina, and also the Netherlands Indies, but only via Japan. There has been no basic discussion of this question heretofore, since, for the duration of the war, in our commerce with the countries mentioned we in any case are dependent upon Japanese support in obtaining goods.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WIEHL

No. 191

67/47465-75

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Füh. 12a

MUNICH, March 23, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER LÁSZLÓ DE BÁRDOSY IN THE FÜHRERBAU IN MUNICH, ON MARCH 21, 1941 ¹

The Führer began by mentioning the policy of cooperation between Germany and Hungary pursued under the late Foreign Minister Count Csáky.² This policy had been very successful for Hungary, for thanks to it she had been able to carry out revisions which only 4 or 5 years ago Hungary herself had not expected.

In the past year, Germany had counseled a solution of the Hungarian-Rumanian conflict, that could be achieved without resort to military means.³ He (the Führer) knew precisely that a compromise could never be entirely satisfactory. It was, however, better than great sacrifices of blood and military conflicts, the end of which in this case could not have been foreseen.

Germany had in general pursued the policy of keeping the Balkans tranquil, if at all possible, in view of the gigantic contest that had to be fought out with Great Britain. At the time of the Hungarian-Rumanian Award, Germany had not yet anticipated a Greco-Italian conflict, but was entirely aware of the two possibilities involved at the time: either a total collapse of Rumania, with all possibilities of a Bolshevization of the country and the penetration of the Balkans by Russia, or a solution which would have been barely tolerable for a Rumanian Government. Although King Carol, whose intrigues had been seen through in Germany, enjoyed no sympathy of any kind, it was still a question of seeking a possible solution of the Hungarian-Rumanian conflict which would permit the Rumanian state, as such, to survive because otherwise a vacuum would have formed, into which Russia would have entered. For in contrast to 1918, when revolution and disorders prevailed also in Russia, that country was today an organized power factor. Russia was only waiting to find chaos somewhere in order to establish herself. For Hungary, too, dangers would have arisen if Russia had started moving in this manner. In contrast to rivers, which represented a

¹ Weizsäcker's memorandum of Feb. 11 (73/53068) records that Bárdossy (who had become Foreign Minister on Jan. 28) had directed Sztójay on Feb. 11 to convey his wish to visit Germany some time in March.

In a memorandum of Feb. 19 (73/53082) Weizsäcker recorded having informed Sztójay that a visit by Bárdossy in March would be welcome.

A memorandum of Mar. 20 by Woermann (73/53145-46), drawn up in preparation for the visit, reviews Hungary's relations with her neighbors.

² Count István Csáky, Hungarian Foreign Minister, 1938-Jan. 27, 1941.

³ See vol. x of this series, documents Nos. 410 and 413.

definite frontier, mountain ranges, such as the Carpathians and their passes, were areas of struggle rather than boundaries. Count Csáky had understood this. It was not possible, moreover, to live at peace for a thousand years with the gigantic, Bolshevik empire. Despite the agreement between Germany and Russia, the Bolshevik appeals to the proletariat and the insidious agitation against the alleged bourgeoisie did not cease. More than on treaties, he (the Führer) relied on the 255 divisions that were available to Germany. Count Csáky had given cool and sober consideration to all this and had pursued a policy which gave Hungary a territorial increase of 100,000 square kilometers, while the War of 1870, for example, brought the German Reich only 14,000 square kilometers.

The Führer then turned to the Italo-Greek conflict. Germany's policy with respect to the Balkans had again resumed the Bismarckian line. She took the position⁴ that it did not pay to shed much German blood for the Balkans. If, nevertheless, Germany was now intervening, it was in order to prevent a second Salonika.⁵ He (the Führer) regretted, however, that the Greco-Italian conflict which was the occasion for this action, had come about. In his opinion, it could have been avoided. He (the Führer) was entirely innocent of this conflict and had had nothing to do with it. He himself would never have attacked in October, after faulty preparations, and in Albania itself, but would have turned at once toward Crete. To be sure, it had to be admitted that the Greeks had been disloyal and had helped the English. In a similar case, when Sweden seemed to be giving haven to British submarines, Germany had, however, kept her nerves steady.

If the conflict had remained a purely Italo-Greek one, Germany would not have interfered any more than Italy, let us say, would have helped Germany in Norway. The English, however, attempted first to establish air bases, then to transport material to Greece, and finally, to land troops, in order in this way to establish again a Salonika front; and therefore the German Army would throw the British out of Greece. Greece would become a second Dunkirk for the English.

Turning to Yugoslavia, the Führer remarked that Germany did not intend to give this country any guarantee of its frontiers. He (the Führer) was no Englishman, and the Yugoslavs, indeed, also gave no guarantee of the German frontiers. Germany was simply telling the Yugoslavs that she would not harm them so long as they

⁴ In another copy of this document in the Foreign Minister's file (F20/268-78) this passage was amended in handwriting to read: "It amounted to stating."

⁵ A reference to the Allied landings in Salonika during World War I.

did not take an anti-German attitude. His World War friends were, in any case, closer to him than his former enemies.

The Führer then told at some length about the conversations with Molotov,⁶ in so far as they referred to the Russian demands on Finland, as well as to the question of the Dardanelles and to the offer of a guarantee to Bulgaria, and he defined the German position regarding these points.

He emphasized in this connection that Germany needed for her trade with the Balkan countries a free Danube and that later on, through the construction of the Danube-Rhine Canal, she would make the Danube river a waterway linking peoples and states, by which the coal of the Ruhr and the Saar would be brought to the Balkans and in return agricultural products and raw materials would be imported into Germany. He pointed out in detail how Germany was an ideal trade partner for the Balkans, in contrast to France, England, and America, which, with their colonial empires, formed closed economic areas and did not want to import any agricultural products and raw materials.

Turning to the war situation, the Führer stated that the war was already won militarily by Germany. The most dangerous moment had been in April of last year. He admitted that if the English had established a foothold in Scandinavia, Germany's position would have become extremely serious. Not only her iron imports, but also the Baltic Sea would have been threatened by this.

The second danger had been a possible attack on the Ruhr area through Belgium and France. It had been possible to avert this, too. France had been crushed in the process. With Russia, there were treaties, and security was established primarily by the German troops.

American aid to England was, in general, greatly overrated. Germany's military potential was extremely large. By way of example, the Führer compared the employment figures in the American and German aviation industry (America, 60,000 workers; Germany, 400,000 workers). The United States was talking of wanting to increase this figure to 170,000. Meanwhile, however, the number of workers employed in the German aviation industry had risen to 700,000, and 400,000 more would be added. Incidentally, the German air and naval forces were increasingly successful in cutting the British off from American imports, and finally, sooner or later, the day would come when the weather would be good, the sea calm, and other conditions favorable. Then Germany would present her calling card.

⁶ See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 325, 326, 328, 329, and 348.

Germany desired to end the war as soon as possible, not because she did not want to fight, but because any peace was better than the most glorious war.

In conclusion the Führer expressed the wish that German-Hungarian relations should not only remain as good as they were now, but that they might continue to prosper on the basis of an objective, loyal, and candid friendship. Hungary was a factor not to be lightly dismissed from German policy, not only because she supplemented Germany economically, but also in memory of war and suffering experienced in common. The Führer asked M. de Bárdossy to convey to the Regent his thanks for the loyal cooperation, and he added the assurance that if Hungary herself should get into trouble, Germany would always be found by her side, just as she was now aiding Italy, in view of her loyal attitude, particularly in the question of the Austrian Anschluss.

The Führer stressed the satisfaction with which he had welcomed the accession of Bulgaria to the Tripartite Pact. One must now jointly wipe out the disgrace of the World War. Precisely for that reason he was so sorry that in this affair Turkey was not on the side of the Axis.

The Hungarian Foreign Minister expressed his thanks for the statements of the Führer and gave his assurance that keeping faith with Germany had a very special significance for the entire Hungarian nation. Hungary's place was on Germany's side in the present war, as well as in the future; and this was for geopolitical, emotional, military, and historical reasons. He was especially grateful for the Führer's assurance that Hungary, if she should get into a difficult situation, could turn to the Reich for help.

With regard to the Vienna Award, M. de Bárdossy said that it was well understood in Hungary that a compromise solution was necessary. Hungary did not want to upset this now, but she hoped that at some later date there would be a change in favor of Hungary that might for economic reasons be of interest to Germany, too. He stressed several times, moreover, that with respect to Germany Hungary could play the useful part of a "go-between country toward the south."

In conclusion the Führer again took up economic questions and expressed the confidence that petroleum would also be found in Hungary. As a supplier of petroleum and wheat, Hungary would then be of the very greatest importance to Germany.

The Führer concluded the conversation with a reference to the reorganization of Europe in the field of agriculture which would bring with it the possibility of a self-contained European internal

economy, as well as the abolition of the passport and customs barriers and the opening up of extensive possibilities of travel.⁷

SCHMIDT

⁷ According to the account by a Hungarian Foreign Ministry official who went to Germany with Bárdossy, a conversation between Ribbentrop and Bárdossy took place at the Hotel Vier Jahreszeiten in Munich prior to the conversation between Hitler and Bárdossy. See Antal Ullein-Reviczky, *Guerre Allemande, Paix Russe* (Neuchâtel, 1947); see also C. A. Macartney, *A History of Hungary, 1929-1945* (New York, 1956), vol. I, pp. 471-472.

No record of such a Ribbentrop-Bárdossy conversation has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

No. 192

2548/523319-20

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SPECIAL TRAIN, March 22, 1941—1:50 a. m.¹

No. 191 from the

Special Train

Received Berlin, March 22—2:25 a. m.

No. 320 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent March 22—4:50 a. m.

For the Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 254 of March 21.²

Please inform the Government at your post as follows; I leave it to you whether to approach the Foreign Minister, the Minister President, or the Prince Regent:

The Reich Government understands the awkward situation in which the Cvetković Cabinet has been placed as a result of the resignation of the three ministers. It considers it urgently necessary, however, in Yugoslavia's own interest, that the internal political difficulty which has arisen be resolved at once in one way or another. Otherwise, Yugoslavia would, at an extremely crucial moment for this country, deprive herself of the possibility of taking action in matters of foreign policy and prove incapable of steering a course. The situation is now such that we are still ready, until March 24th, at the most until March 25th, to conclude the agreements prepared. The Japanese Foreign Minister arrives in Berlin on March 26 and subsequently other foreign policy matters will claim our whole attention, so that a date for the meeting with the Yugoslavs could be considered only when the conclusion of the agreements envisaged would no longer have much point. We therefore very much hope that the Cvetković Cabinet will so quickly regain its ability to act that the appointed time set for Yugoslavia will not expire without having been used.

¹ Another date line, "Munich, Mar. 22," appears at the end of the document.

² See document No. 187, footnote 1.

Your statements as set forth in the foregoing will provide the Cvetković Government with an effective argument for checking all tendencies for prolonging the crisis which may crop up there. Apart from carrying out this démarche, please for your part also do everything, in all circumstances, to achieve the accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact at the appointed time.

Please report by wire currently and speedily about further developments in the situation there.²

RIBBENTROP

² See document No. 194.

No. 193

141/126742-43

Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

PARIS, March 22, 1941.

No. 944 of March 22

Received March 22—8:50 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 911 of March 17, 1941.¹

1. Herr von Bargaen was informed of the content of telegram No. 816 of March 10, 1941, from Paris² only through the Military Commander in Belgium and northern France. The latter had learned of the telegram through the Military Commander of France, with whom the Embassy had reached a friendly understanding to exchange information in certain cases about what went on. The liaison officer of the Military Commander of France with the Embassy has been told by me that such information was not intended to be transmitted to third parties and would in the future have to be restricted accordingly.

2. I cannot share the position advocated in the telegram of Herr von Bargaen of March 13, 1941, from Brussels³ that the line of policy followed thus far in Belgium has proved completely successful. The outward calm which no doubt exists is, in my opinion, insufficient, because it does not furnish any kind of a basis for a sincere consent by both the Walloon and the Flemish population to a later, permanent linking of their political fate with the Reich. In a discussion the day before yesterday and today General von Falkenhausen, the Military Commander in Belgium and northern France, agreed to my proposal to permit the Rexist and Flemish movements for national

¹ Not found.

² See document No. 162 and footnote 1.

³ Document No. 162.

regeneration [*Erneuerungsbewegungen*] a greater degree of propagandistic and political development and to give their leaders preference in the new appointments to key positions in the government, administration, and in the cultural sphere. I especially pointed out to General von Falkenhausen that in view of the large German armament orders placed in France the labor question is of primary interest to the Paris Embassy and that we must therefore pay the closest attention to the frame of mind of the workers and the strike movements in the neighboring industrial areas of the Military Administration in Belgium and northern France.

3. After having had a conversation with Herr von Barga⁴ I would advise postponing for a while the reception for Degrelle intended by the Führer. Degrelle had been informed by me of the intended reception, but I enjoined him not to mention it to anyone before the date had been fixed. Nevertheless the news reached Brussels and gave rise to rumors that the Führer would entrust Degrelle with the formation of a Belgian government. Degrelle denies having committed any indiscretions concerning his being received. It is to be feared, however, that the rumors in circulation would find renewed support if the reception took place soon. It might be well therefore to plan the reception for a later date.

ABETZ

⁴ Barga recorded this conversation in a memorandum of Mar. 24 (141/126744-45).

No. 194

2548/523317-18

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 256 of March 22

BELGRADE, March 22, 1941—10:30 p. m.

Received March 22—10:40 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 320 of March 22.¹

I. I called on the Foreign Minister, the Minister President, the Prince Regent, and also the Croatian leader, Maček, as well as the Slovene leader, Kulovec, and presented the situation to them with great insistence in accordance with the telegram referred to above.

I had the impression, above all, that there was actually a firm decision to accede to the Tripartite Pact, despite all difficulties, and that the possibility of meeting the final deadline which we have set for the act of accession, is viewed with confidence.

¹ Document No. 192.

The Minister President told me that he firmly expected to be able to achieve the completion of the Cabinet tomorrow at the latest. He was, to be sure, encountering many difficulties, but he was especially anxious that there should be no vacancies in the Cabinet, especially in the Serbian part, at the time of accession.

Maček and Kulovec assured me that the final settlement of German-Yugoslav relations would be sincerely welcomed by the Croatian and Slovene population, with the exception of numerically small chauvinistic circles, and that they had therefore vigorously advocated this settlement in the deliberations from the beginning. Neither seemed to doubt that, despite the difficulties that had arisen, the date of accession desired by us could be kept.

The conversation with the Prince Regent took place in a decidedly friendly atmosphere. He, too, stated that, despite all the opposition, which he found mainly in Serbian circles, he would stick to his decision, since he was firmly convinced that it was in accordance with the true interests of Yugoslavia. From his conversations with the Führer,² he had gained the conviction that Germany regarded the safeguarding of Yugoslavia's future as being in her own interest. That was the best basis for a lasting cooperation, and this realization would more and more prevail here, too. The difficulties that had arisen would presumably be surmounted in good time.

II. Negotiations with the Minister President for the purpose of completing the Cabinet (group missing) still actively in progress this evening. It is expected that they will be successfully concluded tomorrow at the latest.

HEEREN

² See document No. 130 and footnote 2.

No. 195

M176/M005647-55

Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, March 22, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

High Command of the Wehrmacht

No. 44326/41 g.K.Chefs., WFSt/L (I Op.)

By officer only

The Führer has ordered the following regarding the coming operations:

I. Operation *Marita*

1. In consideration of the present political attitude of Greece and on account of the arrival of English forces on the Greek mainland,

it will be necessary to envisage as the objective of Operation *Marita* the capture of the entire Greek mainland including the Peloponnesus (Directive No. 20, point 2a and 4b).¹

2. A further task of the Army is the occupation of the islands of *Thasos* and *Samothrace* off the Aegean coast. In the event that no suitable vessels are obtainable along the Greek coast, the Navy is checking whether suitable ship tonnage can be kept ready in Bulgarian ports, which if necessary can be brought up to the Greek ports of embarkation (mainly Alexandroupolis) through the Straits, with the destination camouflaged.

Regarding preparations against Lemnos and the Cyclades see OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) No. 44 309/41 g.K.Chefs. of March 16, 1941.²

The available tonnage is to be employed in such a manner, in accordance with instructions of Twelfth Army Headquarters, that after occupation of Lemnos communication will first be established with this island and over and above this obtainable ships will be made available for the occupation of Thasos and Samothrace.

3. The Commander in Chief of the Army is authorized to *build up* the *attack forces* which are now in Bulgaria by drawing on the third assembly echelon to the extent considered necessary. Steps are to be taken to accelerate the bringing up of the 4th Mountain Division.

The armored divisions assembled as support against Turkey will be available for other employment shortly after the start of the attack.

4. Influence on the *Italian Army Group, Albania* is to be assured in this fashion that in agreement with the Italian High Command the liaison staffs required by the situation will be exchanged. The moment for this and the composition of the German liaison staff will be left to the OKH. The Navy and the Luftwaffe will detail officers to the German liaison staff in Albania in so far and as soon as they consider it necessary.

Until the collapse of the entire Greek front the initiative will probably lie in the main with the *German* units, without this finding expression in a German command over the joint forces. When the Greek resistance has been broken, the further mopping up and security tasks will be left in the main to the Italians.

Directives on this will follow.

The delimitation of the operational areas of the air forces will be regulated by the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe.

¹ There is a typographical error in the original. The relevant points of Directive No. 20 are 2b) and 4a). Cf. vol. XI of this series, document No. 511.

² Not printed (M275/M011445-46).

5. The advance of *Bulgarian units* toward Thrace is undesirable as long as the enemy undertakes no actions across or against Bulgarian territory. If that happens, however, it is left to the Twelfth Army Headquarters to determine according to purely military considerations the moment when the defense of the coast between the deltas of the Strymon and the Maritsa can be taken over by Bulgarian troops.

It cannot be predicted as yet whether a movement of *Yugoslav troops* toward Salonika is to be expected later on.

6. As a *gesture toward Turkey*, German and Bulgarian troop movements in the outpost area of Edirne eastward of the line Svilengrad-Didymoteikhon are to be avoided.

7. The *Twelfth Army Headquarters* will remain with the troops required by the situation in the southeast even after the conclusion of the operations.

Directions for its later tasks will be issued in due time.

The commanders in chief are requested to inform the OKW of the measures changed on the basis of these orders of the Führer.

The beginning of the operations by April 1 is desired. The OKH is requested to report the definitive time to the OKW as soon as possible.

II. Operation *Barbarossa* (overlay sheets for Directive 21, see enclosure).

1. Considering on the one hand the involvement of the Twelfth Army in the expanded tasks for *Marita*, and on the other the difficult circumstances for attack on the extreme right wing—Prut, Dniester, probably superior enemy forces—an attack looking toward a decision and the employment of armored divisions from Rumania are to be waived.

Accordingly, the following missions devolve on the German-Rumanian task force.

a. To protect the Rumanian area and thereby the southern wing of the whole operation;

b. In the course of the attack along the northern wing of Army Group, South to pin down the opposing enemy forces, and with the progressive development of the situation, together with the Luftwaffe, to prevent by counterthrust their orderly retreat across the Dniester.

It is the mission of the Luftwaffe to support effectively the advance of the left wing of Army Group, South toward Kiev, and on the right wing, in accordance with the mission of Task Force Rumania, to prevent the retreat of the enemy across the Dniester by destroying the crossings, as well as to support our own later advance across the Prut and the Dniester.

Especially important is the fighter and antiaircraft protection of the petroleum areas of Ploesti and the tank installations at Constanta against enemy air attacks.

In addition the Russian Black Sea ports are to be mined.

The Rumanians are to be given no knowledge of the preparations for *Barbarossa* until further notice.

2. The forces thereby released will serve to reinforce the main group of Army Group, South breaking out of the Lublin area south of the Pripet Marshes. Their task is to advance quickly with strong armored forces in the general direction of Kiev deep in the flank and rear of the Russian forces and then to roll them up along the Dnieper.

3. Guiding principles for reinforcing the defense of the *petroleum area* will follow. The Wehrmacht mission in Rumania remains responsible for the time being for this task. The Führer will decide whether this staff can later be pulled out and made available to the OKH.

4. *Hungary*, in the period of preparation for *Barbarossa*, is not to be counted as an ally beyond the present status. Since even during the campaign German troops are neither to be unloaded nor to pass through there, the development of the road network is not especially urgent. The Hungarian ground organization is not available to the Luftwaffe. There are to be no preparatory discussions which give indications of *Barbarossa*.

On the other hand, the area of *Slovakia* will be available in due time for the strategic assembly and the establishment of a supply and air base. The OKW will determine the time.

5. The wide separation of the operations by the *Pripet Marshes* and the danger that Russian forces may dig in there—systematically or after having been split off—make special measures and the careful attention to this area necessary, if only in the interest of the rear communications of our inner wings (cooperation between the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe).

6. The more unmasking proceeds in the last weeks before the eastern campaign, the more must one reckon with Russian preventive measures. Besides thrusts into the assembly area there are possible:

- thrusts against the Rumanian petroleum area;
- against Rumanian or Bulgarian ports;
- in the Petsamo area;
- in the Baltic Sea.

Increased defensive preparedness on the part of the responsible commanders against such intentions is therefore called for. In par-

ticular, all preparations must be made in Norway for the rapid securing of the Petsamo area, even before the start of the operations connected with *Barbarossa*.

7. Changes which occur in the plans for *Barbarossa* on the basis of the foregoing Führer orders are to be reported to the OKW by the High Commands.

III. Operation *Sonnenblume*

No appreciable reinforcement of the "German Africa Corps" after the 15th Armored Division has been brought up is intended for the time being.

However, the Commander of the German troops in Libya is to be ordered to urge the Italian Commander in Chief in Tripoli even at this time to prepare an offensive against the English task force in North Africa. In any case, this will tie down strong English forces in North Africa. Whether we work for such an offensive with a limited objective after arrival of the 15th Armored Division, or whether in the autumn after further reinforcements we strive for an offensive with far-reaching objectives, will depend upon the development of the situation in the coming weeks.

*The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht*
KEITEL

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET MILITARY

CHEFSACHE

Annex to OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) No. 44326/41 g.K.Chefs.

By officer only

OVERLAY SHEETS FOR DIRECTIVE 21³

1. Page 4, point II, paragraph 2 is to be replaced by the following text:

Rumania's task will be, together with the task force concentrating there, to tie down the opposing enemy and otherwise to render auxiliary service in the rear area.

2. Page 6, fourth paragraph is to be replaced by the following new version:

With the army group employed south of the Pripet Marshes, the main effort is to be made in the Lublin area in the general direction of Kiev, in order to advance rapidly with strong armored forces in the deep flank and rear of the Russian forces and then to roll them up along the Dnieper.

The German-Rumanian task force on the right wing has the missions:

³ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 532 and footnote 1.

a) to protect the Rumanian area and thus the southern wing of the whole operation;

b) in the course of the attacks along the northern wing of Army Group, South to tie down the opposing enemy forces, and as the situation develops, together with the Luftwaffe to prevent by a counterthrust their orderly retreat across the Dniester.

No. 196

129/121045-46

The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 571 of March 23

LISBON, March 23, 1941—3:25 p. m.

Received March 24—5:30 a. m.

1. The Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry¹ stated to me today in a lengthy conversation dealing with the many rumors circulating about English or American territorial demands that he could give me positive assurance that neither England nor the United States had made demands for the granting of bases or leasing of the islands or permitting any kind of control in the ports. Specifically, Donovan had not touched upon any questions of this kind during his several calls on Minister President Salazar.² Any rumors about supposed proposals made to Salazar that in the event of a threat to the country, he should go to Madeira and carry on the Government from there were of course ridiculous.

2. In order to test the accuracy of the above statement I asked the Spanish Ambassador, Franco, for his opinion. The latter confirmed to me that the Secretary General had told him the same. A few days ago he, Franco, referring to the terms of the Spanish-Portuguese treaty of friendship, had asked the Secretary General whether England or the United States had made any demands on Portugal for granting of territorial concessions or whether there were any signs indicating that such demands may be forthcoming. M. Sampaio had flatly denied both questions, adding that the Portuguese Government was aware of its obligation under the existing treaty provisions to pass on to its treaty partner any observation of this kind. When Franco had inquired what attitude the Portuguese Government would take in the event of an attack against the mainland or the islands, the Secretary General had replied (one group missing here in the clear text) Portugal would defend herself against any attack no matter from what side it came. The Ambassador supplemented his remarks by saying that he fully accepted the above

¹ J. Teixeira de Sampaio.

² See document No. 171.

statements of the Secretary General as being true and that he did not believe, in particular, that either Donovan or Hoare had made any demands of this kind. Franco explained the current flood of various rumors by English propaganda which liked to create uneasiness and to inveigle the Axis Powers into undertaking some premature action.

HUENE

No. 197

1711/398757-60

*Memorandum by Minister Hencke*¹

SECRET

COPENHAGEN, March 23, 1941.

At the suggestion of the Protocol [Section] of the Danish Foreign Ministry and of Royal Cabinet Secretary von Bardenfleth, I requested an audience with the King, which was set for the morning of March 20.

The King introduced the conversation by asking whether I had already penetrated somewhat into the not entirely simple mentality of the Danes. I replied that I had tried to do so since a knowledge of the mentality of the guest [*host?*] nation seemed to me to be among the most important duties of every diplomat.

The King then observed that Denmark was in a situation that was neither easy nor pleasant. The mother country was occupied by Germany, Iceland and the Faroes by England, and finally Greenland by America (the latter statement was corrected in the course of the conversation). In addition to this was the fact that the promises made by Germany on April 9, 1940,² were not always kept; such as, for example, through interference in the internal affairs of Denmark and through the demand for the Danish torpedo boats.³

I replied that I understood Denmark's difficulties, which had resulted inevitably from the war. But it would be well if the emotional considerations of the Danish people would yield to the realization that the future of the country lay solely in a close collaboration with Germany. The Reich was the trailblazer of an essentially new order in Europe, from which nobody could permanently stand aloof.

¹ This memorandum is unsigned. Minister Hencke, whose name is written at the head of this document, had been attached to the German Legation in Copenhagen and placed in charge of liaison with the Danish Foreign Ministry after the German occupation of Denmark. Even though Hencke went to Denmark only occasionally on special missions following his appointment to the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden in June 1940, he retained his official assignment to Copenhagen until the spring of 1941. See also documents Nos. 314 and 315.

² See vol. ix of this series, documents Nos. 53, 66, and 125.

³ See document No. 101, footnote 2.

As far as the King's remark concerning German interference in the internal affairs was concerned, I had to state that there had never been any. We had only shown an interest, that was advantageous to Denmark, in certain internal political developments in the country in so far as they also concerned us.

The King interjected here that "interference" was perhaps too strong a term on his part. The country should be left alone, however. A change would then in time come about by itself. I replied that Germany, too, was not in favor of any violent developments in the country. We were firmly convinced, however, that the Danish people, too, would undergo a spiritual regeneration from which one should not stand aloof.

On the question of the torpedo boats I replied that the report had surely reached the King that we had recently returned two torpedo boats. He might gather from this that we wished to claim only what was absolutely necessary for us. The King observed that this was naturally better than nothing. Nevertheless it had been very difficult for him and the Danish people—in particular, however, the Danish Navy—to make the sacrifice required by us. He had had to use his personal influence with his officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted personnel, who had felt that their honor was assailed. I replied to the effect that the German Navy had handled the matter with great tact and understanding for Danish sensibilities. There had been no affront whatsoever to the sense of honor of the Danish Navy.

The King then spoke of the duration of the war, which he estimated would last at least a year and a half longer. I expressed the conviction, on the other hand, that the war would be decided this very year by a German victory. The King said it was better to be less optimistic in order to spare oneself disappointments. In my reply I stated that we did not need to fear such a disappointment.

The King then mentioned the events of April 9. There had been a nonaggression pact between Germany and Denmark.⁴ He had therefore had no reason to think that Denmark would be attacked by Germany. I protested against his reference to the German operation as an "attack," which in view of the behavior of the British had become necessary for the protection of Danish neutrality. This was by no means the case, as was also shown by the attitude of the German troops. The Danish people ought to be eternally grateful to their King for the decision of April 9. In the history of Denmark it would one day be called a great deed. Here the King agreed and stated that the fact that he had the backing of the people and the Rigsdag gave him the moral strength to continue to fill his diffi-

⁴ See vol. VI of this series, document No. 461.

cult office—he seemed to himself like the helmsman of a storm-tossed ship.

The King further expressed anxieties on the score of the economic situation of Denmark. He said I should have seen the harbor of Copenhagen in peace times. A lively trade had connected the Danish capital with all parts of the earth. The great powers had, to be sure, left to Denmark only the trade in those commodities that had not been interesting enough to them. For Denmark, however, this had always been ample. Now there was unemployment and a shortage of goods. Foreign trade had become very difficult. Worst of all was the coal shortage. I replied that Germany was doing everything conceivably possible in order to help the Danes economically. I had to tell him as my personal impression that actually things still looked quite good here. I did not doubt, moreover, that after the war Denmark would experience a powerful expansion of her shipping.

The heavy cuttings in the Danish forests, as a result of which decades of reforestation work were being undone, seemed to cause the King especial anxiety.

The conversation lasted about half an hour. The King, with whom I also had, at the end, a discussion about Russian history, became almost cordial toward the end of the audience. At any rate, when I was taking my leave, he shook hands with me several times. Personally I had the impression that I had established a very good contact with him.

Respectfully submitted to the Minister after his return.

No. 198

8748/E040485

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 958 of March 24

PARIS, March 24, 1941—2:04 p. m.
zu K.I.P.D. No. 976.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 779 of March 7.¹

In the last few weeks the French Government has detailed Aryan commissioners to most of the Jewish business enterprises. Further-

¹ K.I.P.D. No. 976: Berlin telegram No. 779 of Mar. 7 (8748/E040484). This telegram requested regular reporting by the Embassy regarding anti-Jewish measures by the Vichy Government. Such reports would then be disseminated in America "in order to show that the French Government likewise has to take action against the Jews."

more, a central Office for Jewish Affairs with headquarters in Paris will be set up in the immediate future, which is to take a census of all the Jews living in France. A full report about the other duties of the Office for Jewish Affairs will be rendered after its establishment.²

The French Government has also taken in hand the placing of alien Jews in concentration camps in the unoccupied zone; the French Jews are to follow later. So far about 45,000 Jews have been interned in this manner all of whom, however, belong to the poorer classes. The internments continue. Parallel measures are to be taken in the occupied zone as soon as the necessary camps have been prepared.

In the dissemination of reports on French anti-Jewish measures in the American press it should be borne in mind that an American campaign might induce the Vichy Government to yield in the Jewish question.³ I recommend therefore to publish only reports on measures already taken, but not on plans for the future.

SCHLEIER

² See document No. 254.

³ For an account of the attitude of the United States Government concerning the persecution of Jews in France, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 503 ff.

No. 199

534/239782-83

The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

ROME (Vatican), March 24, 1941—8:30 p. m.

No. 19 of March 24

Received March 14 [24]—9:15 p. m.

Influential Italian friends are constantly and most urgently calling my attention to rumors making the rounds here, allegedly utilized by the London radio, according to which inmates of insane asylums and homes for the aged in Germany have been eliminated by being put to sleep or by restriction of food rations, and have been made the subjects of experimentation with poison gas. Their families have received either their ashes or else sentimental letters to the effect that every care and medical art had unfortunately not been able to save the patient. The number of victims so far amounts to many thousands.

As early as November of last year I heard from a confidential informant that no report out of Germany and the occupied areas had so shaken and grievously moved the Pope as this; he had had masses read for those persons whose names had been given to him.

I have rejected the rumors at once as figments of the imagination of enemy propaganda.

At the beginning of December 1940 the Holy Office published the decision reported in dispatch A. 848 of December 6, 1940,¹ according to which it is not permitted "by order of the government to kill persons who—are judged to be a burden to the congregation and a hindrance to its strength and power." It was obviously brought about by the alleged procedures in Germany.

While registering a protest to a Vatican radio program² I noted a remark dropped at the responsible office that there were much more grave reports which, out of consideration for Germany, had not been published either in the Vatican press or on the Vatican radio.

I should like to suggest that these enemy propaganda rumors, that are exceedingly damaging to us in public opinion here, be emphatically countered at some opportunity.³

BERGEN

¹ Not found.

² In telegram No. 684 of Mar. 14 (584/239744) Thomsen reported from Washington a news item in the Catholic paper, *The Register*, which, based on a Vatican radio broadcast, stated that the German Government intended to exterminate all insane persons and that 100,000 had already been killed.

³ Marginal note initialed by Weizsäcker: "What has been done about this?" No further document on this subject has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

No. 200

174/138700

Memorandum by the State Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

MARCH 24, 1941.

Regarding the memoranda concerning Matsuoka's visit¹ I note the following:

1. The most important topic is naturally the time of *Japan's entry into the war against England*.

In order to expedite this decision we still have valuable concessions in our hands.

- (a) Our renunciation of claims to the Netherlands East Indies;
- (b) Our renunciation of claims to our former possessions in the South Pacific, including those under British mandate;
- (c) Increased support of Japan's policy in China (either attempts at mediation, or the recognition of Wang Ching-wei).

¹ The memoranda drawn up by the various departments of the Foreign Ministry in preparation for the visit of Matsuoka were submitted to Weizsäcker by Woermann with a covering memorandum of Mar. 22 (174/136701-31). None have been printed here with the exception of that prepared by the Economic Policy Department, which appears as document No. 190.

But I have the impression that Japan's entry into war against England depends basically on our further successes against England, and that the above-mentioned concessions would not play any great part in it.

2. Matsuoka is still following the line of an understanding with *Russia* and claims German encouragement for this. A clear statement as to which course our relations to *Russia* may take is unavoidable in order to protect him from surprises, and in order to control Japanese policy through him after his European journey.

Private conversations on this theme with other Japanese sources should be deferred.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 201

449/223121

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division I M

BERLIN, March 24, 1941.

Pol. I M 759 g. Rs. II.

The OKW has given the Military Attaché in Washington the following instructions for his guidance in conversations:

"The English have, in our opinion, at present 30,000 to 40,000 men in Greece, including, besides security troops guarding air force ground installations, one to two divisions (Australians and New Zealanders). The intention of the English is presumably to intercept the German thrust at the mountain barrier that extends from Olympus to the northwest.

"It is desirable that in the United States the English military effort in Greece should appear to be as large as possible and that these tendentious English reports, therefore, should find credence in America. The more bragging the English have done here, the more effective will be their defeat from the standpoint of propaganda.

"It is desirable, moreover, to strengthen the view that we would not attack before the beginning of May, if only for meteorological reasons, and in view of the strength of the English."

KRAMARZ

No. 202

1053/312119-20

The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

RIO DE JANEIRO, March 25, 1941—12:08 a. m.

No. 434 of March 24

Received March 25—12:45 p. m.

Ha. Pol. IX b 832.

With reference to your telegram No. 261 of March 14.¹

The Brazilian-Argentine commercial treaty of January 23, 1940,² has not yet been ratified. In so far as is known, the present negotiations pending between Brazil and Argentina are keeping within the framework of the joint Brazilian-Argentine declaration issued in Rio de Janeiro on October 6, 1940.³ The following is supposedly awaiting signature:

1. Agreement on the mutual exchange of surplus products, in connection with the mutual awarding of large-scale credits.

2. Agreement on a large import quota for Argentine wheat to be granted by Brazil, and repeal of the Brazilian legislation regarding mixed-grain bread in return for the concession of large Argentine import quotas for Brazilian textile products.

3. An agreement is to be negotiated on the mutual exemption from customs for industrial products the manufacture of which has been newly undertaken (cf. part I of the joint statement of October 6, 1940).

The conclusion of the agreement under 3, which could be considered as the "first stage" in the sense of the Argentine note, is termed a certainty.

The impression exists here that the Argentine note perhaps represented the preparatory step for the La Plata Conference held in January, which was accepted by Argentina evidently as a suitable forum for a regional arrangement in the sense of the note. In contrast to Argentina, the Brazilian representatives at the La Plata Conference were very reserved, probably in consideration of the United States of America. In accordance with this attitude the Brazilian Foreign Minister also minimized the significance of the Conference in conversations at the time.⁴

The Brazilian Government would probably welcome regional economic agreements as a counterweight to North America, but during the present state of dependence on the U.S.A. it would probably hardly dare to disregard American objections and pursue such plans

¹ Document No. 166.

² For text see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1940-1942*, vol. CXLIV, pp. 209-220.

³ For a summary see *La Prensa* (New York), Oct. 7, 1940, p. 2.

⁴ No record of this conversation has been found.

actively. Thus if Argentina should continue efforts for a realization of the customs union idea one can presumably expect only the gradual and hesitant participation of Brazil. The Brazilian-Argentine rivalry constitutes a further obstacle in this respect.

PRÜFER

No. 203

104/113215-16

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, March 25, 1941—3:05 a. m.

SECRET

Received March 25—5:45 a. m.¹

No. 680 of March 24

For the Foreign Minister personally.

The Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, who left Moscow for Berlin this evening in accordance with his itinerary, paid a visit to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, this afternoon, accompanied by the Japanese Ambassador here.² In the ensuing conversation, which lasted 2 hours altogether, I hear that Stalin later also took part at Matsuoka's expressed desire. Matsuoka tells me he presented to Molotov and Stalin the "fundamental problems" pending between Japan and the Soviet Union with the thought of eliminating existing differences. When Molotov and Stalin wished to reply, he asked them to withhold comment at this time, but instead to consider the subjects broached, and to continue the conversation upon his return to Moscow. He had gained a strong impression of the personality of Stalin. He would communicate to the Reich Foreign Minister personally all details of the conversation.

Since the conversation with Molotov and Stalin lasted 2 hours altogether, the discussion would seem, nevertheless, to have been a thorough one.

Matsuoka explained to me and the Italian Ambassador³ that he had for 30 years been of the opinion that relations between Japan and the Soviet Union should be good. His further pursuit of this policy, therefore, was nothing new.

Matsuoka with the greatest willingness received the Chiefs of Mission here (among them also the American and French Ambassadors,⁴ whom he knew from earlier days—but not English

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 1085 to the Special Train, Mar. 25, 8:00 a.m."

² Lt. Gen. Yoshitsugu Tatekawa.

³ Augusto Rosso.

⁴ Eric Laboune.

Ambassador Cripps), as well as representatives of the press. In all his talks, Matsuoka expressed himself very positively on Japan's attitude to the Axis, in which connection he emphasized that he had personally striven for the consummation of the Tripartite Pact. With regard to his trip, he repeatedly stressed the importance of a personal meeting with Germany's great Führer, the Reich Foreign Minister, and Mussolini. In the most emphatic manner he expressed the conviction that victory was assured to Germany and Italy.⁵

SCHULENBURG

⁵ In an instruction of Mar. 26 to the Embassy in Italy (2281/482190) the Foreign Ministry indicated that it did not wish press comments emphasizing either the significance or the cordiality of Matsuoka's reception in Moscow.

No. 204

B19/B004101

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, March 25, 1941—7:00 p. m.

No. 685 of March 25

Received March 25—12:00 midnight.

With reference to our telegram No. 539 of March 11.¹

Yesterday Vyshinsky handed me the written reply to our memorandum of March 11 in the Petsamo matter. The precise text of the reply, in German translation, will go off by courier tomorrow.² Its essential content reads as follows:

1. The Soviet Government insists on its interpretation, as set forth in point 1 of its memorandum of February 28,³ concerning the terminability of the contract between I. G. Farben and the Petsamo Nickel company. It declares itself ready, however, to consider the governmental agreements of July 24, 1940, and of September 16, 1940, in studying the question of the extension of the obligations to I. G. Farben beyond December 1, 1947.

2. The Soviet Government considers unfounded the assumption that the establishment of the mixed company will hamper the fulfillment of the obligations concerning the delivery of nickel ore.

3. The obligations taken over from the contract of February 19, 1941,⁴ concerning the delivery of nickel matte are being made contingent by the Soviet Government on a special study of this contract, with a view to supplementary contractual agreements between the concession company and I. G. Farben concerning the delivery of nickel matte.

SCHULENBURG

¹ In this telegram (B19/B004070-71) Schulenburg reported that the essential points of the instruction of Mar. 8 (document No. 139) had been explained orally to Molotov.

² Moscow Report No. Dg. 48 of Mar. 25 (260/169942-44).

³ Text printed in document No. 109.

⁴ Not found.

No. 205

F11/0070

*The Reich Foreign Minister to the Yugoslav Minister President*¹

VIENNA, March 25, 1941.

DEAR M. MINISTER PRESIDENT: With reference to the discussions which have taken place in connection with Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact today,² I have the honor to confirm to Your Excellency herewith, in the name of the Reich Government, the agreement between the Governments of the Axis Powers and the Royal Yugoslav Government on the following:

In the new settlement of the frontiers in the Balkans the interests of Yugoslavia in a territorial connection with the Aegean Sea, through the extension of her sovereignty to the city and harbor of Salonika, are to be taken into account.

With the request that you treat the foregoing communications as strictly secret and make them public only in agreement with the Governments of the Axis Powers, I take this opportunity, M. Minister President, to renew the expression of my highest esteem.

¹ Ribbentrop's signature does not appear on the file copy of this note. A note in Italian (F11/0071) containing identical assurances in the name of the Italian Government and likewise unsigned is also in the files. This Italian text is identical with the one published in the article "Tajna Nota o Solunu," *Poruka* (London, March 1954), p. 15.

Several drafts of the German note are filmed on F11/0072-78.

² For a text of the protocol of accession see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, April 1941, pp. 340-341. For an English translation, see German White Book No. 7, *Documents relating to the conflict with Yugoslavia and Greece*, p. 127. See, further, document No. 206.

No. 206

F11/0069

*The Yugoslav Minister President to the Reich Foreign Minister*¹

VIENNA, March 25, 1941.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you that the Royal Yugoslav Government will regard as strictly secret all the statements which it received in writing from the Governments of the Axis Powers on the occasion of Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite

¹ This document is in Serbo-Croatian and bears the signature of Minister President Cvetković. The German copy of the note is filmed on F11/0068.

Pact² and that it will publish them only in agreement with the Governments of the Axis Powers with the exception of the statement respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and of the statement that no demand will be addressed to it [the Yugoslav Government] concerning the passage or transportation of troops.³

Yours, etc.

DRAGIŠA CVETKOVIĆ

² This refers to the secret note concerning Salonika, printed as document No. 205, and to the secret note concerning military assistance, the text of which is printed along with that of the other notes in document No. 178. An unsigned German text of the latter note, as well as an Italian text with Ciano's typed signature, both dated Mar. 25, are in the files (F19/210-12). Various drafts of this note are filed on F19/188-203.

The secret note on military assistance was eventually published in German White Book No. 7. For an English text, see *Documents relating to the conflict with Yugoslavia and Greece*, p. 129.

³ See footnote 2. For a published German text of these two notes, see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, April 1941, p. 341.

No. 207

67/47456-84

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

VIENNA, March 25, 1941.

Füh. 12 b.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND YUGOSLAV MINISTER PRESIDENT CVETKOVIĆ IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER CINCARKOVIĆ IN VIENNA IN THE HOTEL IMPERIAL ON MARCH 25, 1941

The Führer first expressed his satisfaction at the accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact.¹ Apart from all the factors of feeling, sentimentality and hostility, in the long run Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact would be of great advantage to the Yugoslav people. He understood the feelings which had perhaps stood in the way of this decision all the more since he himself was not entirely free from such feeling in this respect. But reason of state had to win out over all human and personal feelings. He therefore welcomed it that in this hour Yugoslavia by her accession to the Tripartite Pact had placed herself at the side of those who would bring about the new order, i.e., which comprises the new territorial order. He was absolutely convinced that Continental Europe would in the end be victorious over all opponents. To be sure, he understood the attitude of those Yugoslavs who had said that their country would still come in time to register its claims. But whoever

¹ See document No. 205, footnote 2.

had joined while the new coalition was in the making would thereby gain a better claim to the later fulfillment of his wishes.

Personally he (the Führer) had always pursued a policy of friendship toward Yugoslavia. His present attitude was therefore conditioned neither by the successes nor by the cares of the past. It was merely the effluence of realistic thinking.

He was especially happy that Yugoslavia had now joined the league of the new Europe because this accession made it possible for Germany to throw her vote and her weight into the scales in favor of Yugoslavia's development in the future. For the very reason that Germany had no political or territorial interests of any sort in southeast Europe, whereas on the other hand she was allied with Italy, it was most welcome to him that Germany now, through Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact, gained the moral right to have a say in the coming organization of the southeastern [European] area, not for reasons of selfish political or territorial interests, but on the basis of the new treaty of alliance.

The Führer emphasized in the further course of the conversation that he had always been a sincere and honest friend of Yugoslavia. He assured Cvetković that, if Yugoslavia should ever get into a precarious situation or ever believe that she had reason for complaint she would always find in the Führer an honest, loyal mediator, broker, and friend. The Führer asked Cvetković to pass on this assurance to Prince Regent Paul, and added that he understood very well the attitude of many Yugoslavs and also of Prince Regent Paul on certain matters, all the more since he, too, was himself not free of sentiment in this respect. Reason of state and the interests of the people had precedence, to be sure, just as he (the Führer), after cool consideration, often had to take steps of a military nature which were not pleasant for him from the human point of view; he also imagined that certain decisions in the last few days had been difficult. However, in the development as a whole it would certainly prove to have been correct that precedence had been given to reason.

In particular the acquisition of access to the Aegean Sea would probably be considered the most successful act of Yugoslav foreign policy and would go down in history as a kind of vindication [*Freispruch*] for those who today had to reach difficult decisions which were not understood or were felt to be painful by some Yugoslavs.

Subsequently the Führer came to speak of economic policy. The problems in the life of nations to be solved in this respect had not become smaller. The factors which had to be reckoned with in the economic sphere were the same as before: hunger, need for raw materials, food, and industrial products. With regard to the devel-

opment of a reasonable European economy, too, a great step forward had been taken by today's accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact, although perhaps the youth did not everywhere understand the realistic decisions of the statesmen.

By way of the Tripartite Pact an objective was also attained for which he (the Führer) had always worked: the strengthening of the friendly relations between Yugoslavia and Germany. Once more the Führer assured the Yugoslav Minister President explicitly that Germany had no territorial or political interests in the Balkans and that on the day when the war had ended or when the external danger to the Balkans had ceased the last German soldier would be withdrawn from this area. The possibility for a close friendship resulted from this. Even with respect toward her ally Germany could cultivate this friendship with Yugoslavia without injury to the obligations of the alliance.

Cvetković thanked the Führer for his words. The Yugoslav people knew that the Führer had always been friendly to them. He (Cvetković) gathered from his words that he correctly evaluated the Yugoslavs as an honest and courageous nation that would be ready to cooperate with Germany in every way, especially in the economic field. In this connection he especially expressed the wish to share in Germany's economic experience in order to be able to attain the goals indicated today. Yugoslavia was ready to cooperate with the new Europe. It must become a Europe that would bring greater justice to all the nations than the old had done. If she should encounter difficulties Yugoslavia would always appeal to Germany's friendly feelings toward her, of which the Führer had just spoken.

Then Cvetković, too, turned to economic questions and stressed the necessity of placing trade between the two countries upon a firm basis, again expressing the hope of utilizing the great technical experiences of the German people for Yugoslavia. It was not only a question of increasing Yugoslav production, but also of employing all forces of the nation for the attainment of the economic goal.

Moreover, Yugoslavia knew very well that Germany, especially the Führer's Germany, had never carried on a policy of revisionism toward Yugoslavia. In this connection he pointed to with the German minority.²

In the further course of the conversation he came to speak of the difficulties which had to be overcome within the country itself prior to Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact. These difficulties had been eliminated. The clear and unequivocal statements which

² This sentence is garbled in the original: "In diesem Zusammenhang wies er auf die mit der deutschen Minderheit hin."

had been made today³ made it possible to clear away even the last difficulties of this kind.

Just as after his visit to Berchtesgaden,⁴ he would today again leave Germany with the very strongest impressions and thus work with new courage and new determination toward the objectives indicated by the Führer.

Prince Regent Paul had contributed greatly to bringing about the accession and through his advice had provided the possibility for the great act of today.

In conclusion, Cvetković thanked the Führer once more in the name of the whole Yugoslav people for the sincere and clear words which he had spoken about that country. Yugoslavia would try to repay this attitude with feelings of loyalty and devotion toward Germany.

Finally, the Führer asked Cvetković to transmit to Prince Regent Paul his personal greetings and to assure him how great was the Führer's understanding for his inner feelings and how happy he was that reason of state had prevailed in the end over all of these factors.

SCHMIDT

³ See document No. 206 and footnote 2.

⁴ See document No. 48.

No. 208

67/47445-55

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Fü. 12c

VIENNA, March 25, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND COUNT CIANO IN THE PRESENCE OF AMBASSADORS VON MACKENSEN AND ALFIERI IN THE HOTEL IMPERIAL IN VIENNA ON MARCH 25, 1941

The Führer first expressed his satisfaction over the accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact and the consequent definition of her position.¹ This was especially important in view of the military action contemplated against Greece; for, if one considered that the important connecting line through Bulgaria ran for about 350 to 400 kilometers only 20 kilometers from the Yugoslav border, one could understand that a military operation against Greece would have been an exceedingly irresponsible undertaking militarily if Yugoslavia's attitude had been uncertain.

Count Ciano mentioned thereupon that he had had a meeting with the Duce in Bari, in the course of which the latter commissioned him with some questions for the Führer.

¹ See document No. 205.

Count Ciano, who read off some of his statements from notes written by the Duce himself, said regarding the military situation in Albania that we were doubtless acquainted with the course of events there. He could not report further in detail about military particulars, since they went beyond the scope of his department. He wanted only to state that the front was quiet and the situation was stabilized.

Politically the Duce held the standpoint that after looking back at past events in the Balkans one could regard the Italo-Greek war as a logical event desired by Providence, because it had clarified the entire Balkan situation in favor of the Axis. It was to be ascribed purely to the prospect of Greek booty that Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had joined up unequivocally with the Axis, whereas they would otherwise have persisted in their ambiguous positions and would have represented a danger for the Axis.

The Duce, continued Count Ciano, reading from the memorandum, called to mind one of his first letters to the Führer, in which he had expressed the opinion that the entire Danube Basin had to be liberated from Franco-British influence.² Without the Italo-Greek war this liberation would never have occurred, or would have occurred only very much later.

Furthermore, the Duce pointed out that the liquidation of Greece, which was to be accomplished shortly, opened up important strategic possibilities in the aerial and naval war.

As regards the offensive in Albania the Duce stated that it had not been a matter of a "powerfully developed" offensive, but rather of a kind of reconnaissance in force. This was evident, for example, from the fact that of the 60 regiments deployed in Albania only 6 had been utilized for this offensive.

For the rest, a new offensive was in preparation for the end of the month, which would occur at the central part of the Albanian front (Këlcyrë). Owing to the ■ meters of snow such operations were impossible on the left flank, i.e., at Lake Okhrida, and near Pogradec, i.e., in the area of the Ninth Army.

Concluding his presentation, Count Ciano said that he was instructed by the Duce to ask the Führer about his opinion on Spain, France, Russia, and Turkey, and to suggest a new meeting between the Führer and the Duce such as had been considered at Berchtesgaden.³

² No letter from Mussolini to Hitler containing this phrase has been found. See, however, vol. IX of this series, document No. 92.

³ Hitler and Mussolini had met at Berchtesgaden on Jan. 19 and 20. The record of their conversations (vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 672 and 679) does not mention any suggestions for further meetings, however.

In his reply the Führer stressed that after today he was much more reassured as regards further developments in the Balkans. An uncertain attitude on the part of Yugoslavia would have created a rather precarious situation for the German military forces considering the great distance from their bases. This was now clarified, in so far as this was humanly possible; the internal conditions in Yugoslavia could become more complicated in spite of everything.

Toward the end of March Germany would have completed her troop concentration at the Greek front. She would then only wait for good weather, since with rain she could not employ three of her most important weapons: 1) the Luftwaffe, especially not in mountainous regions, 2) the heavy technical weapons that could not advance over soft ground, and 3) speed, essential for the immediate follow-up with armored and motorized units of penetrations of the front. Beginning with the end of the month, Germany would therefore wait only for fine weather before opening the attack.

The English tied themselves up [*verkrampften sich*] more and more. The naval and aerial warfare, however, inflicted on them constantly heavier losses in ships, so that within foreseeable time the situation would become unbearable for them.

As regards Spain the Führer pointed out that Franco had practically denounced the Hendaye agreement in a recent letter to him.⁴ Under a flood of assurances and fine phrases Franco stated that he did not intend to carry on war against England. One could not draw any conclusions from this attitude; one simply had to accept it, since there was an interest in at least maintaining the appearance of good relations. The Führer would reply to Franco's letter and then send the Duce his correspondence with the Caudillo for his information.⁵

As far as France was concerned, he (the Führer) was still very distrustful toward the Vichy Government. He saw no possibility of doing anything at all, however. It was a question of avoiding as long as possible anything that could lead to North Africa's being detached from metropolitan France. This position was advisable at least as long as there were no strong forces in Tripoli.

Regarding the Turkish question the Führer remarked that he was about to try very carefully to bring about a certain rapprochement between Germany and Turkey. He had to proceed very cautiously, since the chances of success were not very great, but with patience—and in the last few days the Foreign Minister had again proved his great patience in handling political questions—it would perhaps be possible to loosen somewhat the position of Turkey. A

⁴ Of Feb. 26, document No. 95.

⁵ No such letter from Hitler to Franco has been found.

certain success had been attained regarding this country and had been reinforced by today's accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact inasmuch as Turkey would no longer consider a German advance against Greece to be a threat against herself. Nevertheless several armored divisions had been placed as security against Turkey and would remain there on the spot.

Russia had become very unfriendly of late. The Führer ascribed this attitude of the Soviet Union to the fact that Germany had not been willing to sacrifice Finland, just as she did not want to sacrifice Bulgaria, and could not have afforded to do so because of the operations against Greece. Moreover, [Germany] had not been cooperative concerning the Russian wishes in the question of the Dardanelles, and finally the Soviet Union had been very angry about the guarantee to Rumania.⁶ Stalin had now countered by giving Turkey the assurance that she would not be attacked by Soviet Russia if she should become involved in a war with another country.⁷ The Führer called this assurance an absolute lie, for naturally Soviet Russia would immediately utilize any Turkish predicament in order to annex Turkish territory. This had been another demonstration of the old Russian tactics, consisting of encouraging all possible countries and in intervening in conflicts in the conclusion of which Russia was not interested but which she rather wished to have continued for a long time. Considering the very unfriendly attitude of the Soviet Union, the Führer stressed that he relied more on his divisions than on the treaties with Russia. He did not believe, however, that Soviet Russia would proceed beyond unfriendly gestures. Nevertheless Germany naturally had to cover her rear to the east whenever she undertook something in the west, and in the Greek operation, too, she had to be protected against any surprise from the north, especially in Rumania.

From October till March Germany was more or less defenseless against any Russian extortion. Stalin knew that very well. Therefore summer was also the season of Russian courtesy, whereas in the winter the Russian attitude changed to the opposite.

When Ciano asked about the probable length of the Greek campaign the Führer replied that with favorable weather conditions he would bring about the decision in a few days. However, the assembly of troops posed great technical and organizational problems. More than a million and a half men had to be provided with supplies, and every additional division that was brought to Bulgaria

⁶ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 328.

⁷ See Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, p. 484.

delayed the supply of the others again for a few days, because there were only a few railroads available.

In regard to Greece the Führer assumed that the Greeks would defend themselves along the entire front in Thrace. Strategically this would be a mistake from their standpoint, but Germany would welcome it, since she would rather fight the unavoidable battle sooner than later. As for the English, whose strength he estimated at only 20,000 to 40,000 men, he assumed that they would try to make a stand at the narrow position between the mountains and the Aegean Sea west of Salonika. Since the region here was in part swampy, nothing could be done against them in case of bad weather. With good weather, however, the Australian, South African, and New Zealand troops would hardly be able to withstand the attack of the dive bombers, artillery, and tanks for a day, since they had never experienced anything like it before.

The Führer stressed that he would welcome the landing of additional English troops, because they would force the English to bring up large amounts of supplies by convoy and thereby provide the possibility of destroying English tonnage. It did not matter where English ships were destroyed. In any case the loss would hit England in one way or another.

The Führer replied to the question of another meeting with the Duce that this could be considered after Matsuoka's visit.⁸

Count Ciano replied that in his opinion the time after Matsuoka's visit in Rome, i.e., after April 4, could be considered, but that the Duce did not want to press the Führer in any way.

The Führer replied that he, too, had the desire for his part to talk things over with the Duce once more and always liked to meet with him.

SCHMIDT

⁸ Matsuoka visited Germany from Mar. 26 to Apr. 6.

No. 209

174/138696-89

Memorandum by Ambassador Ott

IN THE TRAIN, March 25, 1941.

NOTES ON THE SITUATION OF JAPAN FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER

According to inquiries made with the Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral Kondo, the Navy is vigorously preparing for an attack on Singapore. Preparations were expected to be concluded

by the end of May. He expressed misgivings regarding:

a) American guerrilla warfare by means of submarines and aircraft from the Philippine Archipelago against the long route for raw materials from the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay States to Japan;

b) The threat of a two-fleet war, should the English fleet be able to transfer from the Mediterranean to the Pacific.

According to inquiries made with Chief of the General Staff, General Sugiyama, the Army was also making preparations for an attack. Conclusion presumably also end of May.

The condition for executing this is a free rear toward Russia.

Ambassador Shiratori stressed also the necessity of tying down the English fleet.

Summarizing: The will to attack is present in the Army and Navy; preparations for the attack are in progress; accomplishment is possible if the Army's and Navy's objections can be eliminated. Military prospects favorable. Type of attack was not by a naval attack from the sea, but by creation of a base on shore, from where the air forces could smoke out [*ausräuchern*] Singapore. In this way a first, quick result can be achieved. Then the time needed for the actual capture of the fortress would play a minor part. The effectiveness of the air force is to be enhanced by the allocation of a few experienced German dive bomber specialists to the Japanese naval air force. The need for her rear to be left free by Russia plays a decisive part in the Japanese considerations and was being striven for by a reconciliation with Russia. The possibility of creating this free rear by other means is to be suggested to Matsuoka. By this means the possibility could be avoided that the decision for an action against Singapore might be put in the background, and that prominence be given to the Russian question. As the rapprochement with Russia is also sought in the interest of new creation of commercial relations with Germany, the dispatch of the economic mission of Wohlthat should be carried out quickly, in order to show Germany's good will in economic relations.¹

Apart from this it might be recommended that German specialists be made available to Japan for putting in working order enterprises connected with war economy in conquered areas, in order to maintain uninterrupted the supply of raw materials from the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay States, should Japan occupy these areas.

¹ See document 429.

No. 210

8589/E602831

*Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht*¹

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, March 25, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

High Command of the Wehrmacht

WFSt/Abt. L (I K Op.) 44363/41 g. K. Chefs.

By officer only

Regarding the Siege of England

1) As a countermeasure against the expected effects of the aid to England law of the U.S.A. as well as to keep pace with the shift to the north of British import traffic the hitherto existing area of operations in the Atlantic and in the North Sea is extended.² The operational area will therefore be bounded by the following points:

From a point 3° East on the Belgian coast along the meridian to 62° North, from there to 68° North 10° West. Thence west along the 68th parallel to the 3-mile zone of Greenland, then south along the 3-mile zone to a point at 65°24' North, 38° West. From there south to a point 58°50' North, 38° West. From there to 45° North, 20° West; then along the 45th parallel . . . east to a point 45° North 5° West; from there . . . French coast 47°30' North 2°40' West.

2) In this operational area the naval and air [forces] are . . . the full, unrestricted use of their weapons.

3) In the [area] extended beyond the present limits this authorization becomes effective April 1, 1941.³

4) Regulations providing safe transit through this area for Russian, Swedish, and . . . ships, will be issued, if at all necessary, later on.

The Chief of the High Command

of the Wehrmacht

By order:

JODL

¹ This document is partly damaged. As a result, some passages are illogical or incomplete. These are indicated by dots, except in those cases where the presumable text could be re-established with reasonable certainty. These insertions have been enclosed within brackets.

² For delimitation of this area, see vol. x of this series, document No. 291.

³ See document No. 244.

No. 211

230/152596

The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 266 of March 25

BELGRADE, March 26, 1941—1:25 a. m.

Received March 26—6:15 a. m.

[Pol. IV 875.]¹

The first impression of the effect of the accession to the Tripartite Pact on the public here is that the population was surprised and universally most deeply impressed. Since the Government had hardly prepared the people in advance and up to a short while ago had declared itself in favor of the policy of neutrality, the masses, especially in the Serbian territory, need time to make an adjustment. During the first moment a large number probably do not yet understand what opportunities are being offered to Yugoslavia. On the other hand, it can be noted that politically educated circles are beginning to realize these things. I refer particularly to today's editorial by Minister Spalajković in *Politika*, to which much attention is being paid.

The Government is entirely master of the situation; it has taken all necessary measures, and has quickly suppressed demonstrations, particularly in Cetinje and in the Šumadija.

The State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, to whom I spoke this evening, mentioned the radio reports about the resignation of the Yugoslav Ministers in London² and Washington,³ and remarked that so far no offers of resignation had been received in the Foreign Ministry.

FEINE

¹ The file number is supplied from another copy (3569/E023710).

² Ivan Subotić.

³ Konstantin Fotić.

No. 212

589/244312-14

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 802 of March 25

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1941—2:46 a. m.

Received March 26—3:20 p. m.

For Chief of General Staff of the Army, Attaché Branch; Chief of Operations Staff of the Luftwaffe through Attaché Group; Chief, OKW Ausland.

At the passage of the Authorization Law¹ it was announced to the world with a great propaganda fanfare that President Roosevelt had placed his signature under the Law a few minutes after it was passed by Congress, and had therefore taken the decisive step for the support of England and the victory of the cause of the democracies. A similar hullabaloo accompanied the radio announcement on March 25 to the effect that after passage of the bill for 7 billions for the implementation of the Authorization Law an airplane is to fly to the Caribbean Sea and in the shortest possible time obtain the signature of the President, who is sojourning there.

They want to arouse the impression in the world that American aid will also immediately begin with the greatest impetus, in accordance with the speed in taking care of the legal measures. They hope not only thereby to impress England, China, Greece, and Turkey, but also particularly to influence the Russian and Japanese decisions.

With this propaganda measure they conceal the simple fact that the United States is today not yet capable of giving help that could decisively influence the course of the war, thus covering America's actual weakness with a large gesture. I consider the propagandistic, theatrical measures at the passage of the Authorization Law and the accompanying bill involving 7 billions not a sign of strength but an admission of a weakness still in existence for the time being. They wish to conceal the fact, repeatedly reported from here and so far very imperfectly known to the public, that the appropriation of the 7 billions cannot take effect before the end of next year; that the production of the air industry for 1941 cannot be increased beyond the amount reported from here even by the appropriation of funds; that the construction of 200 new freighters can, in the most favorable circumstances, only be completed at the end of next year; that the first ship will not be finished before the end of this year; that other production of war material cannot be increased essentially before the middle of this year; that this has caused friction and difficulties in the meantime which could delay the start of operations of the armament plants even further.

I have the impression that the foreign representatives here do not by any means see through these interrelated facts, and that the military advisers of the Russian Ambassador and of the Japanese Ambassador allow themselves to be strongly influenced by the publicity described and by the accompanying press and word-of-mouth propaganda. One realizes time and again in conversations with the Russians and the Japanese that they do not thoroughly examine the relations between the American war industry and military possi-

¹ See document No. 146 and footnote 1.

bilities, but that they are influenced from day to day by the satire [sic] of clever propaganda and report to Moscow and Tokyo accordingly. They are often well-informed regarding partial sectors, but lack the over-all view, which alone makes it possible to discern weakness. It is often astonishing, for example, what questions these gentlemen ask in the field of airplane construction and how, in spite of all efforts to show them the actual facts, they are time and again guided by other influences from American quarters. Particularly dangerous in this connection is the very skillful propaganda that emanates from so-called top American experts by [which] many observers of America are constantly being influenced.

A problem with which the Japanese and Russians are particularly concerned at this time is the matter of the Americans providing convoy protection in the Atlantic. They really approach this question with a nervous tenseness, as if the providing of convoy ships by the Americans could influence the outcome of the war. They do not realize in evaluating the convoy question that such American measures would actually be the last conceivable effort to save England, and that they would not be a sign of American strength but an expression of England's supreme emergency.

With the Japanese and Russians the idea that America must feel tremendously strong if she can afford to use for such special purposes naval forces from the Pacific or from her Atlantic fleet also plays a certain role.

Finally, it can be noted once more that the foreign representatives of the United States, as well as the local press and word-of-mouth propaganda, evidently by special instruction, speak of the possibility or even the probability of an early American entry into the war; this is to create the impression that America's entry into the war will bring about a repetition of the events of 1918, and thus a decision against Germany.

I reported in telegram No. 683 of March 13² and No. 505 of February 25³ concerning the possible effect of the Authorization Law together with the appropriation of 7 billions, and in telegram No. 350 of February 7⁴ on the production of the airplane industry in 1941.

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

² Not printed (589/244255-57).

³ Document No. 88.

⁴ Not printed (589/244047-49).

No. 213

1003/308814-15

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Chairman
of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With the German
Armistice Commission*

Teletype Message

SECRET

BERLIN, March 26, 1941.
Ha. Pol. Frie. 350.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Dumont.

With reference to your telegram Del. W 128 of March 18.¹

I request that you now proceed in accordance with the decisions of the Commercial Policy Committee of January 21² and February 4,³ taking into consideration the letters of the Ministry of Finance—Ha. Pol. Frie. 100 of January 31⁴—and of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan—Ha. Pol. Frie. 166 of March 15.⁴ The idea of reducing the installment payments on occupation costs could be entertained only on the following conditions:

1. The maximum that could be considered would be a reduction to 15 million reichsmarks. Of this, 10 million reichsmarks would be payable, as before, to the account at the Bank of France, while the balance of 5 million reichsmarks would be remitted, in our option, either in transferable values or francs.

2. Our demands concerning the setting up of controls on the outer borders and appointment of commissioners shall be met.⁵

3. Now that the demand for the transfer in trust of the majority stock holdings of the French Government in French aircraft factories has been dropped, its place must be taken by a demand that the aircraft program be fulfilled.⁶

4. The French Government shall waive, with respect to Germany, the application of the legal provisions which subject the validity of the sale of securities to foreign countries to its approval.

5. The French Government consents to the dispatch of workers to Germany waiving the requirement of Government approval prescribed by statute.

¹ This is a German translation of a French note of Mar. 18 (378/209500-512), requesting a reduction of the payments toward occupation costs and changes in the method of payment; for text, see *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. iv, pp. 220-222.

² Not printed (1002/306215-22).

³ Not printed (1002/306162-68).

⁴ Not found.

⁵ See vol. xi of this series, document No. 712.

⁶ On the demand for the transfer in trust of the majority stock holdings of the French Government in French aircraft factories, see *ibid.*, documents Nos. 654 and footnote 7, 689, and 712, footnote 3.

6. Consent to a satisfactory regulation of the question of export prices.
7. Compliance with our demands concerning the French and Polish gold.⁷
8. Redemption of the requisition vouchers issued prior to June 25.
9. Settlement of requisition vouchers from French troops held by Alsatians and Lorrainers.
10. Compensation for damages caused by German troops since the armistice.
11. Compensation of the owners of merchandise seized by our Navy in French ports.

I also request that in your discussions you give due weight to the wishes of the OKW (cf. instruction Ha. Pol. Frie. 349 of March 26^a).

I have notified the various ministries of the rejection of the French suggestion regarding the postponement of further installment payments on the occupation costs.

WIEHL

⁷ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 45, footnote 4, and document No. 114.

⁸ Not found.

No. 214

3569/E023714

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 270 of March 27

BELGRADE, March 27, 1941.
Received March 27—11:55 a. m.
Pol. IV 887.

Last night the Government quarter was occupied by troops. This morning a proclamation by King Peter was read over the radio according to which he has ascended the throne and has appointed General Dušan Simović as Head of the Government. The population is being requested to keep calm.

Large demonstrations in favor of the King and the Army are taking place in the city which at the same time are explicitly directed against the accession to the Tripartite Pact. There are rumors that the members of the former Government have been arrested.¹

HEEREN

¹ In telegram No. 275 of the same day (230/152613-14), which was received in Berlin between 4:30 and 6:25 p.m., Heeren gave a more detailed account of the events in Belgrade and of the membership of the new Cabinet. Cf. *A King's Heritage: The Memoirs of King Peter II of Yugoslavia* (London, 1955), pp. 62-71.

No. 215

F4/0288-83

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, March 28, 1941.

Fü. 15

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND HUNGARIAN MINISTER SZTÓJAY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, ON MARCH 27, 1941, FROM 1:10 TO 1:25 P. M.

The Führer began by saying that he had already expressed to the Minister and also to the Hungarian Foreign Minister his conviction that however difficult Hungary's renunciation for the sake of peace in the Balkans had been, the problem of revision had not yet been settled and that history was further taking its course.

"Whom the gods would destroy they first strike blind." Thus spoke the Führer in regard to events in Yugoslavia. Germany would watch developments in Yugoslavia and take measures. The whole thing was a matter of a few days and Hungary would have to realize what the situation was. Germany was making her military preparations rapidly and it was not impossible that if we had to occupy the Banat, Hungary would be faced with further decisions.

He, the Führer, considered it . . .¹ that Sztójay himself go immediately to . . . in order to speak with the Regent personally. The Führer gave him the following points to take along:

1. Germany would in any event prevent establishment of any base that was directed against Germany.
2. In the event of a conflict, Germany would place no restrictions on Hungary's revisionist desires.
3. The Führer considers it tactically correct to give the Croats autonomy.
4. In the circumstances it would be appropriate if Hungary took certain military measures.

This conversation was a sort of advance notice; the rest would first have to be discussed between the German and the Hungarian military.² The Führer pointed out to the Minister the need for maintaining the strictest secrecy as to this conversation.

¹ This passage and subsequent passages marked by dots are illegible on the original of this document.

² The following passage is found in the Halder Diary, entry for Mar. 28, which records a conference with Hitler at 12:30 p.m. that day, attended also by General Paulus and Colonel Heusinger: "Negotiations with Hungary are being permitted. Consequently, I am having Paulus proceed to Budapest at once."

At the Nuremberg trials Paulus testified that he was sent to Budapest for the purpose of reaching an understanding with the Hungarians "on the deployment of German troops on Hungarian territory and the participation of Hungarian troops in the attack on Yugoslavia." Paulus arrived in Budapest on Mar. 30 and had conferences with the Hungarian Chief of Staff, General

The situation offered a unique opportunity for Hungary to obtain revisions for which she would perhaps otherwise have had to wait for many years. And in this case she would carry through these revisions with the armed assistance of Germany. "You can believe me that I am not fibbing [*dass ich nicht flunkere*], for I am not saying more than I can be answerable for."

The Führer said that he considered developments in Yugoslavia an unspeakable misfortune for that country. The King, at the age of 17½ years, was a child, a prisoner, and a puppet of the most divergent forces. Germany had no territorial or political interests of any kind down there, except for Carinthia and southern Styria, the regions which she had lost at that time.³ For reasons of national policy, Germany did not desire an outlet to the Adriatic. The German people were now oriented toward the Baltic and North Seas, and he would not like to jeopardize this uniform orientation by an interest of the southern sections of the Reich in southern seas. Hungarian desires for an outlet to the Adriatic, which presumably were especially close to the heart of the Regent, were a somewhat ticklish problem with respect to the Italians, but Germany would back Hungary's ambitions. If it came to a fight, Yugoslavia would be liquidated; and there would be a fight as soon as developments in Yugoslavia were directed against Germany. Militarily, Yugoslavia was no problem. Russia would remain quiet. In reply to a question from Sztójay as to whether the Führer contemplated a completely independent Croatia or an autonomous Croatia within the framework of the Yugoslav State, the Führer said that Croatia was to be independent, possibly in alignment with the Hungarian State, but that there must never again be a Yugoslavia. We were not interested in Croatia, only in Carinthia and southern Styria. Sztójay attributed the coup d'état in Yugoslavia to a Pan-Slavic cabal of officers and spoke of their anti-German attitude. Yugoslavia had no solidity because of her heterogeneous structure and once she received a heavy blow, she would disintegrate. The Führer was of

(Footnote 2—Continued)

Werth, and the Chief of the Operations Group of the General Staff, Colonel László. See *Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuremberg, 1947), vol. VII, p. 257.

According to additional testimony presented at Nuremberg, there was also an exchange of letters on the same matter between the Chief of the German Army General Staff and the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff (*ibid.*, pp. 332-333). No account of these Staff talks has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry; however, in telegram No. 337 of Apr. 3 (73/53175-76), Erdmannsdorff mentioned the fact that in a telegram to General Werth, Halder had expressed his satisfaction "over the latter's accommodating attitude in the discussions which took place here on Mar. 30 and had confirmed the substance of the discussion." See also document No. 267.

³ Parts of the Austrian provinces of Carinthia and Styria were ceded to Yugoslavia in consequence of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Sept. 10, 1919.

the same opinion and added that Yugoslavia would be quickly disposed of. It was a matter of 2 hours for our Luftwaffe. We were very well informed about the Yugoslav Army and also knew that it had no antitank weapons. Sztójay expressed the hope that the situation in Yugoslavia might still improve but was convinced that Hungary would take part if there should be a conflict.

The Führer continued: Developments in Yugoslavia did not make matters more difficult for Germany but rather easier. As stated, we had no further political or territorial ambitions there except the wish that there should no longer be a strong Yugoslavia. Events only favored our concentration of troops against Greece. Technically the question of Yugoslavia was as good as solved. There was a saying in Germany: "When the donkey is getting along too well, he goes dancing on the ice." He, the Führer, had always been prepared for peace, but had been pushed into this war step by step. In the Balkans, too, he had never wanted to wage war. The clique that was responsible for the coup d'état in Yugoslavia had misjudged the military . . . and gone mad. In reply to a question by . . ., the Führer said that a . . . of events was no longer possible and . . . a few additional remarks about the . . . of placing a child 17½ years of age at . . . of a state. Sztójay said never . . . and if the situation became critical he would act with lightning speed and deal such a blow that the problem would be solved at once. After deducting the 50 divisions that he needed for France, he had over 200 divisions that were only waiting to be assigned a task.

HEWEL

No. 216

F4/0281-82

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff ¹

TOP SECRET

BERLIN [March 28], 1941.

Fü. 16 g. Rs.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE FÜHRER WITH THE BULGARIAN MINISTER IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER ON MARCH 27, 1941, FROM 2:15 P. M. TO 2:20 P. M.

The Führer began the conversation by telling the Minister with reference to the reports from Yugoslavia that he viewed the events as a relief. The everlasting uncertainty down there was over. Draganov replied that he had often expressed his misgivings con-

¹ Large parts of the original German film of this document are illegible. Passages where the text can be established are marked in brackets. Dots indicate places where the text cannot be restored.

cerning Yugoslavia. He was familiar with that country and knew the influences and fluctuations to which it was subject. The Führer stated that he would make all the preparations necessary in order to be prepared to take the necessary measures. He had called him here *in order to tell him that this had settled the question of Macedonia.* After those present had risen, Draganov asked whether this communication was secret or whether he could also inform Sofia. The Führer agreed that he could report it to Sofia in a suitable form, but so that it would become known to only a very restricted group.

The storm would burst over Yugoslavia with a rapidity that would dumbfound those gentlemen. Draganov hopes that this solution . . . advantage and . . . not only for Bulgaria but for the Balkans as a whole. Germany had a great . . . to attain this goal. . . [Yugo]slavs did not [want] to understand this. [The Führer] mentions that after deducting [the divisions] stationed in France he had . . . divisions in the field for which he had no. . . The Yugoslavs . . . crazy. [Even] if the Yugoslavs should make loyal . . . this [would not] change the situation [in any way], for [confidence] was no longer there. The mere fact that a 17½ year old boy was placed [at the Head] of the State invalidated any [confidence] in the continuity of a political . . .

Draganov took leave of the Führer . . . expressing pleasure and satisfaction over the development of the situation.

HEWEL

No. 217

Nuremberg document 1746-PS
Exhibit GB-120

*Minutes of a Conference Regarding the Situation in Yugoslavia*¹

WFSt.

BERLIN, March 27, 1941.

Present:

Führer
Reichsmarschall
Chief OKW
Chief WFSt.
Lieutenant General Bodenschatz
Colonel Schmudt
Commander von Puttkamer
Lieutenant Colonel Scherff
Major von Below
Major Christian

¹ This document is from the files of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. The minutes of this conference were drawn up by Maj. Eckhard Julius Christian, an aide to General Jodl. According to the *Halder Diary*, entry for Mar. 27, 1941, the conference took place between 1:00 and 2:30 p.m. at the Reich Chancellery.

Later on the following were called in:

Commander in Chief of the Army
Chief of the General Staff of the Army
Colonel Heusinger
Lieutenant Colonel Sieverth
Reich Foreign Minister
Minister Hewel
Major General von Waldau
Colonel Schmidt
Major General von Rintelen

The Führer describes Yugoslavia's situation after the coup d'état. States that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor with respect to the coming *Marita* action and even more in regard to the *Barbarossa* Operation later on. Serbs and Slovenes have never been pro-German. The governments never sit securely in the saddle because of the nationality problem and the officers' camarilla, which is always inclined toward a coup d'état. In recent times, the country had only one strong man, namely Stojadinović, and Prince Regent Paul, to his own disadvantage, had him overthrown.

The moment for realizing the actual situation in the country and its attitude toward us is favorable to us both for political as well as for military reasons. If the overthrow of the Government were to have taken place during the *Barbarossa* action, the consequences for us would have been much more serious.

The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new Government, to make all preparations in order to smash Yugoslavia militarily and as a state. No inquiries regarding foreign policy will be made or ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav Government which cannot be trusted anyhow in the future will be taken note of. The attack will begin as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready.

It is important that action be taken as fast as possible. We will try to get the neighboring states to participate in a suitable way. Actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be asked of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of Bulgaria too. Rumania's principal task is to provide cover against Russia. The Hungarian and Bulgarian Ministers have already been notified.² Within the course of the day, a message will be addressed to the Duce.³

Politically, it is especially important that the blow against Yugoslavia be carried out with inexorable severity and that the military destruction be carried out in a lightning-like operation. In this way, Turkey would presumably be sufficiently deterred and the subsequent campaign against Greece would be influenced in a favorable way. It is to be expected that the Croats will take our side

² See documents Nos. 215 and 216.

³ Text printed in document No. 224.

when we attack. They will be assured of political treatment (autonomy later on) in accordance with this. The war against Yugoslavia presumably will be very popular in Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria, as these states are to be promised territorial acquisitions; the Adriatic coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria.

This plan presupposes that we speed up the schedule of all preparations and employ such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest time.

In this connection, the beginning of Operation Barbarossa will have to be postponed up to 4 weeks.

The military operations are to be conducted in the following way:

1) Beginning of Operation *Marita* as early as possible with the limited objective of capturing Greek Thrace and the basin of Salonika and to win the high ground of Edessa; for that purpose, a lunge across Yugoslav territory.

2) Thrust from the region south of Sofia in the direction of Skoplje in order to relieve the flank of the Italian front in Albania.

3) Thrust with stronger forces from the area around Sofia in the direction of Niš, then of Belgrade, in cooperation with

4) stronger German forces penetrating from the area around Graz and Klagenfurt in a southeastern direction with the aim of destroying the Yugoslav Army.

Regarding 2) and 3), the forces of the cover group placed in readiness against Turkey, supernumerary units of the southern front and the Army reserves are to be employed also. The cover against the east must be provided on the one hand by Bulgarian forces, reinforced by an armored division which is to be pulled out of Rumania and on the other hand by Rumanian forces which are to be left with one armored division only.

Regarding 4), forces may be taken from the concentration echelon for *Barbarossa* (in this connection, speed is most important). The forces must be sufficiently strong.

The principal task assigned to the Italians is to cease offensive operations against Greece for the time being, to maintain adequate cover toward the Yugoslav frontier and to operate with the Army of the Po from the direction of Istria for the protection of the German right flank.

5) The principal task of the Luftwaffe is to start as early as possible with the destruction of the Yugoslav Air Force ground organization and to destroy the capital, Belgrade, in attacks by waves; and along with this to support the advance of the Army.

For this purpose, it is possible to make use of the Hungarian ground organization.

Commander in Chief of the Army:

The operational plan of the Führer coincides with the ideas which he himself had been thinking about. The date of April 1 can be maintained for the beginning of *Marita* depending on the weather. Start for the rest of the assault groups possible between April 3 and 10, depending on the concentration.

To the question whether the southern assault groups, if they should advance fast will have freedom of action in the further conduct of Operation *Marita*, the Führer gives a reply which is affirmative in principle; he demands, however, that the operations not be allowed to get out of hand but that they be led with a firm hand.

The Commander in Chief of the Army will submit plans before 3:00 a.m.

The Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe reports that aerial attacks from Bulgaria by the VIII Air Corps could start immediately but that the Luftwaffe would need 2-3 days' time for a larger concentration of air forces. It is intended to bring up rather strong units of fighters and dive bombers into the area of Vienna, Graz, and Hungary. If necessary, to bring up units of the X Air Corps to jump-off bases in southern Italy.

Care will be taken to reinforce the antiaircraft defenses of Vienna, Carinthia, and Styria.

The Führer orders the immediate start of all preparations. He expects the plans of the branches of the Wehrmacht in the course of the evening of March 27.⁴ General von Rintelen has orders to fetch the message and oral instructions from the Führer during the night of March 27.⁵

CH[RISTIAN]

⁴ See document No. 223.

⁵ Rintelen, who happened to be in Berlin to receive OKW directives for the operation against Greece, was called into the conference dealing with Yugoslavia in order to learn about the tasks assigned to the Italians in the operation. He was handed written instructions regarding this in the early morning hours and left by plane for Rome on the morning of Mar. 28. See Enno von Rintelen, *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse*, pp. 136-137.

These instructions, handed to Rintelen at 4:00 a.m. on Mar. 28, were in the nature of a "Proposal for harmonizing the German and Italian operations against Yugoslavia," drawn up by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. For text, see *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxviii, document No. 1746-PS (G. B. Exhibit 120), pp. 33-34. See also document No. 224.

No. 218

67/47400-17

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*TOP SECRET
RAM 14

BERLIN, March 31, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN THE PRESENCE OF AMBASSADORS OTT AND OSHIMA AT BERLIN ON MARCH 27, 1941

The Reich Foreign Minister welcomed Matsuoka cordially as a man who had shown by word and deed that he took the same attitude with regard to the problems of his country as the Führer and his co-workers had been forced to take for Germany and who, as the responsible Foreign Minister of his country, had made possible the conclusion of the Pact with Japan. The Tripartite Pact was a very significant instrument for the future of the three countries and represented the basis upon which the future of the three nations could be secured in a form such as the German and Japanese patriots had always envisaged.

Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister gave a summary of the situation as seen from the German point of view.

With regard to the military situation he pointed out that Germany today was in the final phase of its battle against England. During the past winter the Führer had made all necessary preparations, so that Germany stood completely ready today to meet England everywhere. The Führer had at his disposal at the moment perhaps the strongest military power that had ever existed in the world. Germany had 240 combat divisions, 186 of which were first-class assault divisions of young soldiers. Of these 24 were Panzer divisions, supplemented by other motorized brigades.

The Luftwaffe had grown greatly and introduced new models, so that it was a match in the future, as it had been in the past, for competition of any kind; that is, Germany was not only a match for England and America in this field, but was definitely superior to them.

The German Navy, at the outbreak of the war, had had only a relatively small number of battleships. Nevertheless, the battleships under construction had been completed, so that the last of them would shortly be put in service. In contrast to the World War, the German Navy this time did not stay in port, but from the first day of the war had been employed against the foe. Matsuoka probably gathered from the reports of the past few weeks that large German battle units had interrupted the supply lines between England and America with extraordinary success.

The number of submarines heretofore employed was very small. There had been at most eight or nine boats in service against the enemy at any one time. Nevertheless even these few U-boats, in conjunction with the Luftwaffe, had sunk 750,000 tons per month in January and February, and Germany could furnish accurate proof of this at any time. This number, moreover, did not include the great additional losses that England had sustained through floating and magnetic mines. At the beginning of April the number of submarines would increase eight to tenfold so that 60 to 80 U-boats could then be continuously employed against the enemy. The Führer had pursued the tactics of at first employing only a few U-boats and using the rest to train the personnel necessary for a larger fleet, in order then to proceed to a knockout blow against the enemy with a greater number of units. Therefore the figure of tonnage sunk by the German U-boats could be expected in the future greatly to exceed what had already been accomplished. In these circumstances, the U-boat alone could be designated as absolutely deadly.

Passing on to the subject of the military situation on the Continent of Europe, the Reich Foreign Minister observed that through the overthrow of the continental countries Germany had practically no foe of any consequence other than the small English forces that remained in Greece. Germany would fight off any attempt of England to land on the Continent or entrench herself there. She would not, therefore, tolerate England's staying in Greece. From the military point of view, the Greek question was of secondary importance. The only practical significance was the fact that in the thrust toward Greece, which would probably be necessary, dominant positions in the eastern Mediterranean would be won that would be of considerable significance for the development of further operations in these areas.

In Africa the Italians had had bad luck in recent months because the Italian troops there were not familiar with modern tank warfare and were not prepared for antitank defense, so that it was relatively easy for the English armored divisions to capture the not very important Italian positions. Any further advance of the English had been definitely blocked. The Führer had dispatched one of the most able of German officers, General Rommel, to Tripoli with sufficient German forces.¹ The hope that General Wavell would attack had, unfortunately, not been realized. The English had come upon the Germans in some skirmishes at an outpost and had thereupon abandoned any further intention of attacking. Should they by chance attempt another attack upon Tripoli, they would court annihilating

¹ See document No. 35 and footnote 3.

defeat. Here, too, the tables would be turned some day, and the English would disappear from North Africa, perhaps even more quickly than they had come.

In the Mediterranean area, the German Luftwaffe had been doing good work for 2 months now and had inflicted heavy shipping losses on the English, who were holding on tenaciously. The Suez Canal had been blocked for a long time and would be blocked again after the removal of the obstacles. It was no longer any fun for the English to hold out in the Mediterranean. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) believed that even before the year's end the Mediterranean would be sealed off so effectively that the English would represent practically no further danger. Their fleet would have to protect their position in Africa.

If, then, we summed up the military situation in Europe, we would come to the conclusion that, practically, in the military sphere the Axis was completely master of the situation in the whole of continental Europe. A huge army, which was practically idle, was at Germany's command and could be employed at any time and at any place the Führer considered necessary.

The political situation was characterized by the adherence of almost the whole of the Balkans to the Tripartite Pact. This morning, to be sure, news of a Putsch and the formation of a new government had come from Belgrade, but further details were still lacking.² The political situation in Europe and in the whole world had also contributed to the strengthening of the three Powers of the Pact. Germany was also still endeavoring to win over to the cause of the three Powers one or another of the last countries which still remained outside the Pact. Confidentially he (the Reich Foreign Minister) could inform Matsuoka that Spain, in spirit at least, was with the Tripartite Pact. Of the two or three countries yet remaining, Sweden and Turkey were of particular interest. He could state confidentially to Matsuoka that here, too, the attempt would be made to win these countries over to the Tripartite Pact.

Certain feelers had already been put out in the direction of Turkey. Even if formally that country had an alliance with England, it was nevertheless at least not entirely impossible that Turkey would in the future move closer and closer to the Tripartite Pact.

With Russia, Germany had concluded the well-known treaties. Ambassador Oshima knew how these treaties had come about. Germany, at that time, had the desire to conclude an alliance with Japan. In view of the situation in Japan, it had not been possible to translate this desire into fact. On the other hand, the war clouds in Europe had become more and more threatening. At the Führer's

² See document No. 214.

instruction, the Reich Foreign Minister had been prepared for the 6 months preceding to sign the Italo-Japanese-German alliance. This Ambassador Oshima knew. Since the alliance was unfortunately not possible in that time, Germany, in view of the coming war, had to resolve on the pact with Russia.

Confidentially, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) could inform Matsuoka that present relations with Russia were correct, to be sure, but not very friendly. After Molotov's visit, during which accession to the Tripartite Pact was offered, Russia had made conditions that were unacceptable.³ They involved the sacrifice of German interests in Finland, the granting of bases on the Dardanelles, and a strong influence on conditions in the Balkans, particularly in Bulgaria. The Führer had not concurred because he had been of the opinion that Germany could not permanently subscribe to such a Russian policy. Germany needed the Balkan Peninsula above all for her own economy and had not been inclined to let it come under Russian domination. For this reason she had given Rumania a guarantee. It was this latter action, particularly, that the Russians had taken amiss. Germany had further been obliged to enter into a closer relationship with Bulgaria in order to obtain a vantage point from which to expel the English from Greece. Germany had had to decide on this course because this campaign would otherwise not have been possible. This, too, the Russians had not liked at all.

In these circumstances, relations with Russia were externally normal and correct. The Russians, however, had for some time demonstrated their unfriendliness to Germany wherever they could. The declaration made to Turkey within the last few days⁴ was an example of this. Germany felt plainly that since Sir Stafford Cripps became Ambassador to Moscow (he had recently met Eden at Ankara) ties between Russia and England were being cultivated in secret and, at times, even relatively openly. Germany was watching these proceedings carefully. He (the Reich Foreign Minister), who knew Stalin personally, did not assume that the latter was inclined toward adventure, but it was impossible to be sure. The German armies in the east were prepared at any time. Should Russia some day take a stand that could be interpreted as a threat to Germany, the Führer would crush Russia. Germany was certain that a campaign against Russia would end in the absolute victory of German arms and the total crushing of the Russian Army and the Russian state. The Führer was convinced that, in case of action

³ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 404.

⁴ Text of the joint Soviet-Turkish statement of Mar. 25 on neutrality printed in Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, p. 484.

against the Soviet Union, there would in a few months be no more Great Power of Russia. The Reich Foreign Minister stressed the fact, however, that he did not believe that Stalin would pursue an unwise policy. In any case, the Führer was not counting on the treaties with Russia alone, but was relying, first of all, on his Wehrmacht.

It must also not be overlooked that the Soviet Union, in spite of all protestations to the contrary, was still carrying on communistic propaganda abroad. It was attempting not only in Germany, but also in the occupied areas of France, Holland, and Belgium, to continue its misleading propagandist activity. For Germany, this propaganda naturally constituted no danger. But what it had unfortunately led to in other countries, Matsuoaka well knew. As an example, the Reich Foreign Minister cited the Baltic States, in which today, 1 year after the occupation by the Russians, the entire intelligentsia had been wiped out and really terrible conditions prevailed. Germany was on guard, and would never suffer the slightest danger from Russia to threaten Germany.

Further, there was the fact that Germany had to be protected in the rear for her final battle against England. She would, therefore, not put up with any threat from Russia if such a threat should some day be considered serious. Germany wanted to conquer England as rapidly as possible and would not let anything deter her from doing so.

In the further course of the conversation, the Reich Foreign Minister spoke of the economic and food situation. It was possible, to be sure, that certain foodstuffs were temporarily in short supply; but he could state definitely that no matter how long the war lasted, food supply difficulties would not occur in Germany. Germany had space enough to produce the necessary foods in her own territory for the duration of the war.

With regard to raw materials, there were certain bottlenecks, as evidenced, for example, by the rubber negotiations with Japan.⁵ Here too, however, it might be stated generally that a serious danger to the Reich was entirely out of the question. The Führer had accumulated such vast stockpiles of war materials that the German economy was due for a conversion. The German munitions stores were so great that for years to come not the slightest shortage would be experienced. In the next few months, therefore, a great process of conversion would take place in the economy, and the effort of the German war potential would be utilized for U-boat and airplane production. Since the German Army had practically no opponents left on the Continent with the possible exception of Russia, a high

⁵ See document No. 190.

percentage of German production capacity could be used for these two arms.

In summing up, the Reich Foreign Minister declared that the war had already been definitely won for the Axis. It could, in any case, no longer be lost. It was now only a question of time until England would admit to having lost the war. When this would take place, he could of course not predict. This might be very soon, however, in certain circumstances. It would depend upon events of the next 3 or 4 months. It was highly probable, however, that England would capitulate in the course of this year.

Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister spoke of America. There was no doubt that the English would long since have abandoned the war if Roosevelt had not always given Churchill new hope. Germany had clear and precise information from England to this effect. What Roosevelt's intention was in the long run, it was difficult to say. It was not clear whether he wished to enter the war or not. It was only certain that the aid promised England in the form of American munitions could not be conjured up from the soil. It would be a long time before this help would really be effective. But even then the question of quality would be very problematical, especially in the sphere of airplane deliveries. At the present stage of development the various models became obsolete very rapidly. From month to month, on the basis of daily experience at the front, improvements were being undertaken on German models, and it was doubtful whether a country far from the war could turn out the highest quality aircraft. What the German fliers had thus far encountered in the way of American machines, they described, at any rate, as "junk." He (the Reich Foreign Minister) therefore believed that quite a considerable time would elapse before American aid to England could make any difference. Germany was endeavoring, in any case, to end the war as soon as possible, in the interest also of its allies and friends.

The Tripartite Pact had above all the goal of frightening America into abandoning the course she had chosen and of keeping her out of the war. This goal was entirely clear and desirable. The Tripartite Pact was further to serve the purpose of assuring the future collaboration of the Treaty partners in the new order that Germany and Italy wished to establish in Europe, and Japan in East Asia. The principal enemy encountered in the establishment of the new order was England. The latter was as much the enemy of Japan as of the Axis Powers. America had to be prevented by all possible means from taking an active part in the war and from making its aid to England too effective.

In examining the possibilities that existed for further collaboration between Germany and Japan, the question had repeatedly come

up in the talks with the Führer as to whether, in relation to the new order—that is, the overthrow of England, which was necessary to the establishment of this new order—active participation in the war on the part of Japan might not be useful. The Führer had carefully considered this question and believed that it would actually be very advantageous if Japan would decide as soon as possible to take an active part in the war upon England. Germany believed, for instance, that a quick attack upon Singapore would be a very decisive factor in the speedy overthrow of England. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) believed that from there it would be possible to work much more closely with Japan in naval and other matters. It was also certain that the capture of Singapore would be a very serious blow to England. This was of great importance, particularly in view of the rather bad morale already prevailing in the British Isles. He also believed that the capture of Singapore would perhaps be most likely to keep America out of the war, because the United States could scarcely risk sending its fleet into Japanese waters. If today, in a war against England, Japan were to succeed with one decisive stroke, such as the attack on Singapore, Roosevelt would be in a very difficult position. It would be difficult for him to take any effective action against Japan. If he did so, nevertheless, and declared war upon Japan, then he must expect that the Philippine question, for example, would be resolved in favor of Japan. This would mean a serious loss of prestige for the President, so that he would probably reflect for a long time before taking any action against Japan.

On the other hand, Japan, through the conquest of Singapore, would be in a position to operate quite differently in East Asia from formerly, since she would then command the absolutely dominant position in this part of East Asia. Germany believed, therefore, that if Japan could decide on such a move it would amount to cutting the Gordian knot in East Asia.

Summing up, the Reich Foreign Minister declared that in case Japan adopted such a course the war upon English tonnage could be waged more intensively in East Asia; America would probably be kept out of the war by Japan's bold step; and Japan could secure those positions in East Asia which, in the German view, she must eventually have for the new order in Greater East Asia. In this connection a number of other questions would surely arise, for the discussion of which he was available at all times.

In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister declared that the Tripartite Pact could best accomplish its true purpose—that is, to prevent the extension of the war, or, in other words, the entry of the United States into the war—if at the proper time the Treaty partners made joint arrangements for the final defeat of England, over

and above what had already been agreed upon. In this way the meaning of the Pact could be most effectively demonstrated by all its adherents.

At this moment the Reich Foreign Minister was summoned to the Reich Chancellery.* Contrary to his original assumption that this would mean only a short absence, the discussion there lasted quite a while, so that the conversation with Matsuoka could not be continued before lunch.

Thereupon the lunch which was on the program was held in a very intimate circle, at first without the Reich Foreign Minister, who did not appear until later.

SCHMIDT

* See document No. 217.

No. 219

230/152612

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BELGRADE, March 27, 1941.

No. 273 of March 27

Received March 27—2:00 p. m.

The new Foreign Minister, Momčilo Ninčić, who in place of Minister President General Simović received me, told me in regard to the situation that the overthrow was the result of the small support which the Prince Regent and the Cvetković Cabinet had had among the Serbian people. His person guaranteed the continued cooperation with the Axis Powers, particularly with Germany. This would also be expressed in the statement which was to be expected this noon after the swearing in of the Simović Cabinet. All Serbian parties were represented in the new Government, so that it would have the whole nation behind it.

When I asked what position the new Government would take toward the Tripartite Pact, the Foreign Minister said he could not say as yet. However, he would personally work to see that those obligations which had been assumed would also be observed.

I pointed out to the Foreign Minister, with whom I have been friends for years, the real gravity of the situation and left him in no doubt about the consequences which would necessarily result from a change in Yugoslav foreign policy or even from serious incidents involving Reich Germans or Volksdeutsche.¹

¹ In a subsequent telegram, No. 274 of the same day (230/152607), Heeren reported that an assistant to the German Military Attaché had been attacked on the street and slightly injured and that the windows in the German Travel Bureau had been smashed. An apology was promptly rendered by the Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Foreign Minister told me that he was very much aware of the situation and had found that this was also the case with all the important men in the new Cabinet. Instructions had gone to police authorities in the country to prevent by every possible means demonstrations or actions relating to foreign policy—including those directed against the Tripartite Pact. The upheaval doubtless results from the unpopularity of the Prince Regent and the Cvetković Cabinet with the Army, but was set off by the violent reaction of chauvinist Serbian circles against the accession to the Tripartite Pact. The new Government will probably try to maintain friendly relations with the Axis, but at the same time return as far as possible to a policy of neutrality.

HEEREN

No. 220

265/172714-15

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 289 of March 27

ANKARA, March 27, 1941.

Received March 27—6:40 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Saracoglu just summoned me by instruction of the State President. He asked whether I was informed about the outcome of the Führer's conversation with the Turkish Ambassador,¹ which I answered in the negative. Thereupon he read aloud Gereade's report which was 12 typewritten pages long. This report depicts the Führer-Gereade conversation in great detail. Evidently the greatest impression was made by the Führer's statements that Russia had demanded the right to intervene [*Ingerenz*] at the Straits as a condition for accession to the Tripartite Pact, which the Führer had absolutely refused. Likewise the Russian demands on Bulgaria, which had been refused;² regarding these there had been agreement between the King and the Führer. The Foreign Minister added that Turkey had always feared such demands; she had always received a negative reply to repeated inquiries in Moscow whether there had been negotiations regarding Turkey during the Molotov

¹ See document No. 177.

² See vol. XI of this series, document No. 430.

visit. By direction of the State President he (the Foreign Minister) asked me to express to the Führer the special satisfaction of the State President at this attitude adopted in the interest of Turkey. If it were not impolite he would like to add that this conversation had contributed even more strongly than the exchange of views between the Heads of State through their exchange of letters toward placing the German-Turkish relations on a new basis of trust. I gained the impression that this conversation represents a historical turning point in our relations. A written report will follow.⁸

[It was said that] the coup in Yugoslavia had been expected here, but it could have no influence whatever on Turkey's decisions.

PAPEN

⁸ Report of Mar. 27 (2361/488462-65).

No. 221

230/152615

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BELGRADE, March 27, 1941.

No. 275 of March 27¹

Received March 27—8:20 p. m.

The composition of the new Cabinet with respect to its personnel is a guarantee that it will find strong support also in Serbian circles. It would have the strength to adhere to a foreign policy line even if it should be unpopular. An understanding with this Cabinet would therefore establish a clear situation. The person of the Foreign Minister and the cooperation of the Croatian wing² is a guarantee of a basic tendency to avoid a conflict with the Axis. Since on the other hand the Serbian Cabinet members are fundamentally opposed to accession to the Tripartite Pact, a tendency at least toward the loosening of the ties is to be expected.

HEEREN

¹ The telegram number is apparently erroneous, since 275 was the number given to an earlier telegram of the same day. Cf. document No. 214, footnote 1.

² The leader of the Croatian Peasant party, Maček, was a Deputy Minister President in the new Cabinet.

No. 222

67/47418-44

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Fü. 13

BERLIN, April 1, 1941.

RECORD OF THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND AMBASSADORS OTT AND OSHIMA, MARCH 27, 1941

After some words of welcome the Führer inquired how Matsuoka had found the long, tiresome journey from Japan to Germany. Matsuoka replied that he had stood the trip very well, since especially on the journey across Siberia he had been completely cut off from the outer world and had only been able to see from time to time a small Siberian provincial newspaper, in which practically no reports on current events appeared. It had been therefore much like being away on a holiday trip.

Then the Führer gave a review of the general situation. Germany had been forced into the war. She had not, however, been surprised by the war; for she had had the chance to observe for years the campaign of hate carried on by certain English, French, and American circles, and was accordingly prepared for anything. In spite of this basic preparation the outbreak of war had not been one of the goals of her policy. Germany had had political claims; she had hoped, however, to be able to satisfy them by reasonable methods. In the year 1939 the previously successful methods of securing a peaceful revision of intolerable conditions had been interrupted by the resistance of Poland and the consequences which arose therefrom.

If a person considered the present situation carefully and without illusions, he would have to concede that when the war began in the year 1939, there were in existence on the side of the opposition 60 Polish, 6 Norwegian, 18 Dutch, 22 Belgian, and 138 French divisions. In addition there were 12 or 13 British divisions on the Continent. Yet in scarcely a year and a half 60 Polish divisions had been eliminated with the occupation of Poland, 6 Norwegian divisions with the occupation of Norway, 18 Dutch divisions with the occupation of Holland, and 22 Belgian divisions with the occupation of Belgium, and of the 138 French divisions there remained only 3 weak brigades. All of the English units had been routed and driven out. These were losses which could not be recouped and the position of England was no longer recoverable. Thus the war had been decided, and the Axis Powers had become the dominant combination. Resistance to their will had become impossible.

As Matsuoka knew, Germany had only at the beginning of the war set out to construct a navy. Nevertheless all of the military operations which had necessitated the use of water routes, especially those in Norway, had been carried out without successful opposition by the English. The German U-boats, as well as the surface craft (auxiliary cruisers and battleships), had, in cooperation with the Luftwaffe, caused England losses which amounted in tonnage almost to three-quarters of the English and Allied losses during the World War. At first Germany had produced few U-boats. By far the greater number of them had therefore been used to train new crews for the numerous units which were being constructed by mass production. The real U-boat warfare was just beginning in the present and coming months. England would be damaged to an extent far surpassing her present rate of losses and would no longer be able to threaten the German coasts and shipping routes in any way. Besides, Germany was tying down an increasing percentage of the English fleet in the North Sea and in the Atlantic. The same was being done by the Italian fleet and the German Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean.

In the air Germany had absolute supremacy, in spite of all the claims of the English to success. Matsuoka could test this assertion if he looked about in Berlin and compared present-day Berlin with present-day London. The attacks of the Luftwaffe in the coming months would actually grow much stronger. England would suffer even more severe losses in tonnage; and the effectiveness of the German blockade was demonstrated by the fact that in England rationing was much more severe than in Germany. In the meantime the war would go on in preparation for the final stroke against England.

The Führer then took up the situation in the Mediterranean and declared that Italy had had bad luck in North Africa because the necessary antitank guns had not been available against the British armored forces. Now the danger had been eliminated with the arrival of the first Panzer division in Tripolitania, which would soon be followed by a second division. A further British advance would be impossible; on the contrary, the Axis would in a short time pass over to a counterattack.

Unfavorable weather conditions had hindered Italian operations in the Balkans. In the next few days, however, the joint advance of Germany and Italy would eliminate all difficulties there. There was no military problem since Germany had at her disposal 240 "unemployed" divisions, of which 186 were first-class combat divisions. The losses in personnel and material which had been suffered in the years 1939 and 1940 were very slight, so that in spite of the

campaigns just past, Germany was stronger in every respect than in 1939.

The Führer then spoke of his conviction that England had already lost the war. It was only a matter of having the intelligence to admit it. Then would occur the collapse of the individuals and of the Government which had been responsible for the insane policy of England.

In her present critical situation England was looking for any straw to grasp. She was relying principally on two hopes:

First, on American help. Germany, however, had taken such help into her calculations in advance. It could appear in tangible form only in the year 1942 at the earliest, but even then the extent of such help would bear no relation to the increased productive capacity of Germany.

The second hope of England was Russia. Both the British Empire and the United States hoped that in spite of everything they would be able to bring Russia in on the side of England. They believed that they could attain this goal, if not this year, perhaps next, and thus produce a new balance of power in Europe.

In this connection it should be noted that Germany had concluded well-known treaties with Russia, but much weightier than this was the fact that Germany had at her disposal in case of necessity some 160 to 180 divisions for defense against Russia. She therefore did not fear such a possibility in the slightest and would not hesitate a second to take the necessary steps in case of danger. He (the Führer) believed, however, that this danger would not arise.

Concerning the German war aims in Europe, the Führer said that in any circumstances British hegemony would be destroyed, British influence would be excluded from Europe, and any attempt at American interference in Europe would be beaten back. In addition, an indispensable element of the new order on the European Continent would be the limitation of rights and duties to those who lived on the Continent, and the exclusion of all countries who wished only to interfere from the outside, especially England and America.

In the present conflict the Axis Powers were being supported spiritually, morally, and, in part, materially by Japan. The Tripartite Pact had through the cooperation of Japan made possible, for example, the supplying of German auxiliary cruisers in East Asia. Most important of all, it had had the effect of making America hesitate to enter the war officially. On the other hand, through her effort in the conflict, Germany had brought her Japanese partner appreciable assistance for Japan's own future.

Few situations could be envisaged which offered greater facilities for the realization of Japanese aims and larger possibility of success. England was completely engaged at sea, in the air, and on

land. Increasingly powerful English forces were being pinned down in the Mediterranean. Also on the ocean more powerful units were being required for convoy service. Cruisers and destroyers were often found to be no longer sufficient, since these convoys were being attacked by the Germans with battleships. For in contrast with the World War, Germany possessed today on the long front from Narvik to the Spanish-French frontier numerous bases from which she could attack England and her approaches with naval forces. Thus England was tied down in Europe; the objective was the destruction of the British world empire.

America was confronted by three possibilities: She could arm herself, she could assist England, or she could wage war on another front. If she helped England, she could not arm herself. If she abandoned England, the latter would be destroyed and America would then find herself confronting the Powers of the Tripartite Pact alone. In no case, however, could America wage war on another front.

Thus there could never in human imagination be a better condition for a joint effort of the Tripartite Pact countries than the one which had now been produced. On the other hand it was also clear to him that in any historic act some risk had to be taken in the bargain. Seldom in history, however, had a risk been smaller than at present: While war was being fought in Europe and England was occupied there, and while America was only in the initial stages of her own armament, Japan was the strongest power in the East Asia area and Russia could not intervene, since on her western border stood 150 German divisions. Such a moment would never return. It was unique in history. The Führer admitted that there was a certain amount of risk, but it was extraordinarily slight at a moment in which Russia and England were eliminated and America was not yet ready. If this favorable moment passed by and the European conflict ended in some fashion with a compromise, France and England after a few years would recover. America would join them as a third enemy of Japan and Japan sooner or later would be confronted with the necessity of undertaking the defense of her Lebensraum in a struggle against these three Powers.

Even from the military point of view there had probably never in the memory of man been a situation so relatively favorable as at present, even though the military difficulties presented by a combined advance should not be underestimated.

It was especially favorable since between Japan and her allies there were no conflicts of interest. Germany, who would satisfy her own colonial claims in Africa, was as little interested in East Asia as Japan was in Europe. This was the best sort of preliminary

condition for the collaboration of a Japanese East Asia and a German-Italian Europe.

Collaboration with the Anglo-Saxons, on the contrary, never represented actual cooperation, but only a playing off of one against the other. Just as England never tolerated the hegemony of one state in Europe, so in East Asia she played off Japan, China, and Russia against each other, to further the interests of her own world empire. Just as had England, so would the United States conduct herself, if she inherited the world empire and set up American imperialism in place of British imperialism.

Also on personal grounds a better situation for joint action would scarcely occur again. He (the Führer) had complete confidence in himself, and the German nation stood united behind him as it had been behind no one in its previous history. He had the necessary power of decision in critical situations, and, finally, Germany had had an unparalleled series of successes such as occurred only once in world history and was unlikely to occur again.

In conclusion the Führer declared that his attitude toward Japan had not been adopted in the year 1941. He had always been in favor of collaboration with that country. Ambassador Oshima knew that he (the Führer) had worked resolutely for many years to that end. He was determined not to depart from that line in the future. Especially favorable for collaboration, as he had said, was the fact that there were no conflicts of interest between Japan and Germany. For, in the long run, interests were stronger than personalities and the will of a leader, and could always endanger anew the cooperation of countries in case their interests were contradictory. In the case of Germany and Japan, because of the nonexistence of such contradictions, one could make long-term plans. This had been his firm conviction since his earliest youth. The Japanese, German, and Italian peoples would achieve great successes if they drew the necessary conclusions from the present unique situation.

Matsuoka thanked the Führer for his frank presentation, which seemed to him to put the whole situation in a clearer light. He would think over once more most carefully the arguments which the Führer had advanced, although he had already deliberated at length on these subjects.

On the whole he agreed with the views expressed by the Führer. He was especially of the opinion that any action which was determined upon always carried with it a certain risk. Matsuoka declared—after referring to the reports of Ambassador Ott and the Reich Foreign Minister, through which the Führer would certainly be informed about the current situation in Japan—that he would personally set forth the situation in the frankest fashion. There were in Japan, as in other countries, certain intellectual circles

which only a powerful individual could hold firmly under control. He meant by that the sort of person who would like to capture the tiger cub, but who was not prepared to go into the den and take it away from its mother. He had used this line of thought in making the same point in the presence of two princes of the Imperial Family in a conference at headquarters. It was regrettable that Japan had not yet eliminated those elements and that some of these people were even occupying influential positions. Confidentially, he could state that in the interview at headquarters, after an earnest discussion, his point of view had prevailed. Japan would take action, and in a decisive form, if she had the feeling that otherwise she would lose a chance which could only occur once in a thousand years; and in fact Japan would act without consideration of the state of her preparations, since there were always some people who claimed that preparations were insufficient. Matsuoka had also made this point with the two princes. The hesitant politicians in Japan would always delay and act partly from a pro-British or pro-American attitude.

Matsuoka declared that he had come out for the alliance long before the outbreak of the European war. He had been very active at that time to this end, but unfortunately he had had no success. After the outbreak of the European war he personally had held the opinion that Japan should first attack Singapore and bring to an end the British influence in that area and should then join the Tripartite Pact, since he did not favor the idea that Japan should join the alliance without having made some contribution toward bringing about the collapse of England. While Germany had been engaged in a titanic struggle against England for a year, Japan, up to the conclusion of the alliance, had contributed nothing. He had therefore come out very strongly for the plan of an attack on Singapore, but he had not prevailed and, under the force of events, had then reversed his program and had come around to the entry into the alliance first.

He had not the slightest doubt that the South Sea problem could not be solved by Japan without the capture of Singapore. They would have to press into the tiger's den and drag out the young by force.

It was only a question of the time when Japan would attack. According to his idea the attack should come as soon as possible. Unfortunately he did not control Japan, but had to bring those who were in control around to his point of view. He would certainly be successful in this some day. But at the present moment he could in these circumstances make no pledge on behalf of the Japanese empire that it would take action.

He would, after his interviews with the Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister, and after he had examined the situation in Eu-

rope, give his closest attention to these matters on his return. He could make no definite commitment, but he would promise that he personally would do his utmost for the ends that had been mentioned.

Matsuoka then requested urgently that the representations which he had made be treated as strictly confidential, since, if they became known in Japan, those among his Cabinet colleagues who thought differently from him would probably become alarmed and would seek to get him out of office.

In connection with his efforts to bring about the treaty of alliance he had maintained strict secrecy up to the last minute and in order to deceive his opponents he had oftentimes intentionally given the impression of having a pro-American or pro-British attitude.

Shortly before the conclusion of the treaty of alliance it had been reported to him that the British Ambassador¹ was conducting a strong propaganda campaign among the Japanese to the effect that Japan was taking a very risky step in adhering to the Tripartite Pact. The American Ambassador² also had been active in the same direction. A few days after the conclusion of the treaty of alliance he had asked the American Ambassador whether the reports about these propaganda activities were correct. The latter had admitted everything and had stated as well that every Japanese whom he had met, since the adherence to the treaty of alliance had become known, had expressed the opinion that Germany would win the war. In the opinion of the American Ambassador that was false; Germany had no chance to win the war and therefore in the Ambassador's opinion it actually was a very risky step for Japan if the alliance had been concluded in the expectation of a possible German victory.

Matsuoka continued that he had answered the American Ambassador that only the good God knew who would finally win the war. He (Matsuoka) had, however, not concluded the alliance on the basis of the victory of this or the other power, but he had based his action on his vision of the new order. He had heard with interest the statements of the Führer on the subject of the new order and had been fully and completely convinced by them. If, however, he assumed entirely hypothetically that the fortune of war at some period would turn against Germany, he must tell the American Ambassador that in such a case Japan would come at once to the assistance of her ally.

His vision of the new order had been set forth in the preamble to the Tripartite Pact. There was at stake an ideal, which had been handed down from one generation to another from time immemorial. For him personally the realization of this ideal was his

¹ Sir Robert L. Craigie.

² Joseph C. Grew.

life's aim, to which up to the present day he had dedicated his fullest efforts, in order to make on his own part a slight contribution toward its realization. The Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Tripartite Pact was also a contribution to such a realization. The consummation of this idea, so Matsuoka went on, would be realized under the slogan: "No conquest, no oppression, and no spoliation." This would not be understood in all quarters in Japan. If, however, Japan seemed likely to depart from this line he would be the first to attempt to prevent it.

In this connection, Matsuoka referred to still another principle of the preamble to the Tripartite Pact, according to which every people must assume the place it deserved. Although if it were necessary, Japan, in the creation of the new order, would proceed by force, and although she must sometimes lead with a strong hand the peoples who would be affected by this new order, nevertheless she had always before her the slogan which he had previously quoted: "No conquest, no oppression, no spoliation."

In the further course of the conversation, Matsuoka referred to his conference with Stalin in Moscow. As an ally he owed an explanation on that subject to the Reich Foreign Minister and he would have given it in the course of the morning's conversation if the Reich Foreign Minister had not been called away early.³ Now he would give this information to the Führer.

He had first only wanted to make a courtesy call on Molotov on passing through Moscow. After some consideration, however, he had decided to instruct the Japanese Ambassador to make discreet inquiry of the Soviet Government whether the latter would be interested in an interview between Stalin and himself. However, before the Japanese Ambassador had been able to carry out his instructions with the Soviet Government, a proposal was made by the Russian Government itself for a meeting between Stalin, Molotov, and Matsuoka. He had spoken with Molotov for about 30 minutes and with Stalin for an hour, so that, taking into account the necessary translations, he had conversed with Molotov for perhaps 10 minutes and with Stalin for 25 minutes.

He had told Stalin that the Japanese were moral Communists. This ideal had been handed down from father to son from time immemorial. At the same time, however, he had said that he did not believe in political and economic communism, and he rather assumed that his Japanese ancestors had much earlier given up any attempt in that direction and had turned to moral communism.

In connection with what he called moral communism, Matsuoka cited several examples from his own family. This Japanese ideal

³ See document No. 218.

of moral communism had been overthrown by the liberalism, individualism, and egoism introduced from the West. At the moment the situation in Japan in this field was extraordinarily confused. However, there was a minority which was strong enough to fight successfully for the restoration of the "Old Ego" [*alten Ichs*] of the Japanese. This ideological struggle in Japan was extremely bitter. But those who were fighting for the restoration of the old ideals were convinced that they would finally be victorious. The Anglo-Saxons were basically responsible for the entry of the new philosophy which he had mentioned, and, in order to restore the old traditional Japanese ideals, Japan was compelled to fight against the Anglo-Saxons, just as in China they were not fighting against the Chinese but only against Great Britain in China and capitalism in China.

Matsuoka then continued that he had discussed with Stalin his ideas about the new order and had stated that the Anglo-Saxons represented the greatest hindrance to the establishment of this order and that Japan therefore was compelled to fight against them. He had told Stalin that the Soviets on their part also were coming out for something new and that he believed that after the collapse of the British Empire the difficulties between Japan and Russia could be eliminated. He had represented the Anglo-Saxons as the common foe of Japan, Germany, and Soviet Russia.

Stalin had arranged to give him an answer when he passed through Moscow again on his return journey to Japan; he had, however, after some reflection stated that Soviet Russia had never gotten along well with Great Britain and never would.

Matsuoka in the further course of the conversation made several remarks about the status of the Tenno. The Tenno was the State, and the life and the property of every Japanese belonged to the Tenno, that is, to the State. That was, in a way, the Japanese version of the idea of the totalitarian state.

Further, Matsuoka expressed himself as marvelling over the way in which the Führer with decisiveness and power was leading the German people, who stood completely united behind him through this great period of upheaval, a period without parallel in previous history. A people found such a Führer once in a thousand years. The Japanese people had not yet found their Führer. He would, however, certainly appear in time of need and with determination take over the leadership of the people.

SCHMIDT
Minister

No. 223

Nuremberg document 1746-PS
Exhibit GB-120.

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, March 27, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) No. 44379 g.K.Chefs.
By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 25¹

1. The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has changed the political situation in the Balkans. Even if Yugoslavia at first should give declarations of loyalty, she must be considered as a foe and therefore must be destroyed as quickly as possible.

2. It is my intention to break into Yugoslavia in the general direction of Belgrade and southward by a concentric operation from the area of Rijeka-Graz on the one side and from the area around Sofia on the other and to give the Yugoslav armed forces an annihilating blow. In addition I intend to cut off the extreme southern part of Yugoslavia from the rest of the country and seize it as a base for the continuance of the German-Italian offensive against Greece.

The early opening up of the Danube traffic and occupation of the copper mines of Bor are important for reasons of military economy.

The attempt will be made to win over Hungary and Bulgaria for participation in the operations through the prospect of winning back the Banat and Macedonia.

The domestic political tension in Yugoslavia will be sharpened by political assurances to the Croats.

3. In detail I order the following:

a) As soon as sufficient forces stand ready and the weather situation permits, the ground organization of the Yugoslav Air Force and Belgrade are to be destroyed by continuous day and night attacks of the Luftwaffe.

b) *Operation Marita* is to begin as closely at the same time as possible but in no case earlier. For the time being it is to have the limited aim of occupying the basin of Salonika in order to get a foothold on the high ground of Edessa. For this purpose the XVIII Army Corps can jump off from Yugoslav territory.

Favorable opportunities are to be exploited for preventing the systematic formation of a front between Olympus and the high ground of Edessa.

¹ For the background of this directive, see document No. 217.

c) All the forces still available in Bulgaria and Rumania may be enlisted in the attacks which are to be conducted from the area around Sofia in a northwesterly direction and from the area Kyustendil-Gorna Džumaja in a westerly direction, with the stipulation that forces in the strength of about one division along with air defense forces must remain in the Rumanian oil region for the protection of the latter.

The protection along the Turkish frontier is provisionally to be left to the Bulgarians. A German formation, an armored division if possible, is to be newly assembled in back of them for support.

d) The thrust from the general direction of Graz aiming toward the southeast is to be conducted as soon as the forces necessary for it are assembled. It is left to the Army whether or not they should lunge across Hungarian territory in order to open up the frontier.

The guard along the Yugoslav frontier is to be reinforced immediately.

Just as on the Bulgarian border important objects can be occupied simultaneously with the aerial attack on Belgrade, even before the general attack.

e) The Luftwaffe with two attack groups is to support the operations of the Twelfth Army and those of the new assault group to be formed in the area around Graz. It will make the main effort in this connection, depending on the time needed for the progress of the operations of the Army. The Hungarian ground organization can be used for the concentration and commitment.

It is to be examined whether the X Air Corps is to be drawn in for commitment from Italian territory. Nevertheless the convoy protection of the transport to Africa must remain assured.

The preparations for the seizure of the island of Lemnos are to be continued, but I reserve to myself the decisions as to the execution.

Provision is to be made for sufficient antiaircraft protection of Graz, Klagenfurt, Villach, and Leoben, and for Vienna besides.

4. The basic agreements with Italy will first of all be made by the OKW.

Liaison staffs with the Italian Second Army and with the Hungarians are to be provided by the Army.

As regards the delimitation of aerial operational areas respecting the Italian and Hungarian flying personnel the Luftwaffe is authorized to reach agreements even at this time with the High Commands of the states concerned. The supplying of the Hungarian ground organization can begin immediately.

5. The Commanders in Chief are to report to me through the OKW regarding the intended conduct of the operations and the related questions.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 224

F1/0458-61

*An Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff to the
Embassy in Italy*

Closed Circuit Secret Teletype

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, March 27, 1941—12:00 midnight.¹No. 678²

For the Ambassador.

The Führer and the Foreign Minister request that you transmit to the Duce immediately upon receipt the following letter from the Führer to the Duce. Please report when you have done so.³

"Duce: Events compel me, Duce, to communicate to you by this, the most direct way, my views of the situation and the decisions resulting therefrom.

1. From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as the most dangerous factor in the conflict with Greece. From the purely military standpoint German intervention against Thrace could indeed hardly have been justified at all so long as Yugoslavia's attitude was equivocal and she thus could menace the left flank of the advancing columns at our enormous front.

2. For this reason I did everything and honestly tried to include Yugoslavia in our community of interests. These efforts were unfortunately unavailing, and they were also begun too late to assure success. Today's reports leave no more doubt about the impending reversal of Yugoslavia's foreign policy.

3. Now I do not regard this situation as disastrous, to be sure, but nevertheless as one which is so difficult that we, for our part, must avoid making any mistakes if we do not want ultimately to imperil our entire position.

4. I have therefore already taken all the necessary measures in order to be able to meet any developing crisis with the necessary military means. Instructions to change our marching orders in Bulgaria, too, have already gone out.

I now urgently request you, Duce, not to carry out any further operations in Albania for the next few days. I consider it necessary that you undertake with all available forces to cover and protect the most important passes from Yugoslavia to Albania. It is not a question of measures which need to remain in effect for a long time, but of emergency measures meant to prevent the development of a crisis in the next 2 to 3 weeks.

I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you strengthen your forces on the Italo-Yugoslav front with all the means at your command and as speedily as possible.

¹ This is the time of dispatch from the Foreign Minister's Secretariat. According to the copy in Mackensen's file (100/65242-45) the message was dispatched at 12:05 a. m. and was received at 12:15 a.m. on Mar. 28.

² According to the copy in Mackensen's file (see footnote 1) the telegram was sent to Rome as No. 375.

³ Document No. 226.

5. I further consider it necessary, Duce, that *absolute secrecy* be maintained regarding everything that we now do and order done, and that only those persons should be informed who absolutely have to know something about it. Divulging our preventive measures would necessarily render them completely worthless.

6. Today I summoned the Bulgarian⁴ and the Hungarian⁵ Ministers and acquainted them in broad outline with my misgivings about the situation and endeavored to arouse their interest through a description of the negative and positive results that might arise for them in the event of military complications. For, Duce, without the assistance of Hungary and Bulgaria, it would surely be impossible to conduct operations with the swiftness which the events might make necessary in some circumstances.

I shall inform you about this, Duce, in greater detail some time tomorrow, if possible.

7. General von Rintelen, provided he can take the plane, will accordingly report to you tomorrow, Duce, and communicate to you the detailed military measures taken by us, which are being completed during the night.⁶

If secrecy is maintained, Duce, regarding these measures of ours, in the event that we have to act I do not doubt that the two of us will go forward to a success that will not be less than that in Norway a year ago.

This is my unshakable conviction.

Please accept my warmest comradely greetings.

Yours, Adolf Hitler."

End of letter—Secretariat of the Foreign Minister.

With the instruction that Ambassador v. Mackensen deliver this letter to the Duce *this evening*.

HEWEL

⁴ See document No. 216.

⁵ See document No. 215.

⁶ See document No. 217 and footnote 5.

No. 225

230/152629

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 283 of March 27

BELGRADE, March 28, 1941.

Received March 28—1:14 a. m.

Minister President General Simović received me today at 9:00 p.m. during a Cabinet meeting. He told me at once of his regret about the incidents of this morning,¹ which would in no case be repeated. The revolution had internal political causes. The Prince Regent had not understood how to surround himself with persons

¹ See document No. 219, footnote 1.

respected by the people. He had always been a friend of Germany, and was proud of his acquaintance with the Reichsmarschall and with Field Marshal Milch, and he requested that his regards be conveyed to them. He would see to it that the situation in the country calmed down completely within a short time.

HEEREN

No. 226

FI/0455-57

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Teletype

TOP SECRET

ROME, March 28, 1941—4:00 a. m.

[No. 698 of March 28]¹

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to No. 375 of today's date.²

The Duce received me alone at 2:00 o'clock in the morning. He first read the Führer's letter, which I had delivered to him and which for the sake of secrecy I had transcribed myself. He then read it back to me in Italian in order to be sure that he had understood everything correctly. Next, he commented in detail on the individual points, and then, summarizing this comment, dictated to me in Italian the letter of reply to the Führer,³ which follows herewith in German translation:

"Führer: Ambassador von Mackensen has delivered to me your letter relating to the situation that has arisen in Yugoslavia in consequence of the coup d'état. I want to tell you that I view what has happened with calm because it did not surprise me in the least, the less so after I had seen that Stojadinović was handed over to England on the eve of the signing at Vienna.⁴ It is my conviction that the coup d'état was decided upon in complete agreement with the Regent even before the signing. As to the measures made necessary by the situation I would inform you as follows:

1. I have already personally ordered General Cavallero to call off the offensive which was about to be launched. (In the conversation the Duce mentioned to me March 31 as the date contemplated for the start of the offensive.)

¹ The number is supplied from the copy in Mackensen's file (100/65246-48).

² Document No. 224 and footnote 2.

³ An Italian text is also in Mackensen's file (100/65249-51). For a published Italian text see, *Hitler e Mussolini: lettere e documenti* (Rome-Milan, 1946), pp. 95-96.

⁴ On Mar. 20 it was announced in Belgrade that Stojadinović had been released from internment and escorted to the Greek frontier. On Mar. 22 an announcement from Cairo stated that Greece had handed him over to British authorities who would keep him detained. Prior to the latter announcement, Ribbentrop by telegram No. 193 of Mar. 22 from Munich (230/152584) had instructed the German Legation in Greece to examine how Germany could assist Stojadinović without, however, taking any official steps.

2. Infantry units are already moving to the northern front in Albania and are taking up positions on the three approach routes of a possible Yugoslav attack.

3. Orders have already been given to move to our eastern Alpine front 7 divisions, which will be combined with the other 6 divisions now there and the 15,000 men of the frontier guard, which has already been alerted.

4. All these preparations will be carried out with the greatest possible dispatch and under absolute secrecy.

5. In the same zone the 2nd Air Wing is ready to go into action.

6. Apart from Bulgarian and, above all, Hungarian cooperation, account must also be taken of the separatist tendencies of the Croats, represented by Dr. Pavelić, who is living near Rome (and whom the Duce, as he told me, had summoned to see him this morning). I also want to tell you, Führer, that the war, if unavoidable, will be very popular in Italy. For this latter reason, too, I share your conviction that the present crisis will lead to a complete and decisive success for the Axis. Please accept, Führer, the expression of my heartfelt comradeship and my friendly greetings. Mussolini."

The Duce will have the text of the letter transmitted also to Alfieri early this morning. The Duce, who gave the impression of the greatest vigor and imperturbable calm, seemed rather to welcome the turn of events in Yugoslavia, with a view to the general settlement later on, since it offered an opportunity for making a clean sweep of this last of the artificial states created at Versailles under Wilson's sponsorship. The present attitude of Yugoslavia—unprecedented in world history—was to him a replica of Sarajevo, acted out by the very same incorrigible elements.

MACKENSEN

No. 227

F5/0271;
F5/0268

*The Regent of Hungary to Adolf Hitler*¹

BUDAPEST, March 28, 1941.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: I should like to express my thanks most sincerely for the extremely important message transmitted through Minister Sztójay.² I feel fully and wholly united with Germany.

The Hungarian nation has in the past always stood at the side of the German Reich, and so today, too, it is firmly resolved—conscious that our destinies are linked—to follow the same political course and stand by the German Reich in unalterable loyalty and to the extent of its strength.

¹ For the transmission of this letter, see document No. 228. Cf. O. A. Macartney, *A History of Hungary, 1929-1945*, vol. 1, pp. 475-476.

² See document No. 215.

The territorial claims to which Your Excellency was kind enough to refer in your message exist and await their fulfillment.

Moreover, my Government, in carrying into effect the rapprochement with Yugoslavia, suggested to us by Your Excellency, has never concealed these claims from the Yugoslav Government, and even reserved for itself this possibility in article 2 of the Treaty of Friendship.³

Your Excellency had the kindness to promise Minister Sztójay that the High Command of the Wehrmacht would establish contact with the Hungarian Army Command.⁴ I look forward with sincere satisfaction to the establishment of this contact.

Observation of the events that have taken place in Yugoslavia in the last few days lead to the conclusion that Yugoslavia would hardly have permitted herself to be inveigled into taking this step if it had not been for certain Soviet Russian influences. The situation resulting from this reveals the outlines of the Russian aims, which make use of the common Slavic background. Besides, we must, of course, also take into account the constantly hostile attitude of the leadership of the Rumanian State.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the expression of my highest esteem.

With cordial greetings,

Your devoted friend,

HORTHY

³ Article III of the Hungarian-Yugoslav Treaty of Friendship, signed Dec. 12, 1940, provided for consultation by both parties concerning "every question which they shall deem likely to affect their mutual relations."

For a French text of this Treaty, see *Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*, vol. x (1940-41), pp. 876-877.

⁴ See document No. 215, footnote 2.

No. 228

F4/0280-273

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

BERLIN, March 29, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE F[ÜHRER] AND
[HUNG]ARIAN MINISTER SZTÓJAY . . . 7:45 TO 8:05 P. M.¹

Count Sztójay handed . . . letter of the Regent² . . . [which] the latter had given the Minister to take along in answer to the . . . of the Führer . . .

¹ This document survives only on the German film which is badly damaged so that some parts are barely legible and other parts are completely illegible. Passages where the text can be established are marked in brackets. Dots indicate those places where it is impossible to restore the text. A line space indicates that a paragraph or so is missing. Although the day of the conversation cannot be made out on the heading of the document, it can be assumed with certainty that it took place on Mar. 28.

² Of Mar. 28, document No. 227.

... How glad he would have been to spare Europe the great sacrifices in blood. Before his people he could assume the responsibility for that which would now happen. How moderate had been his demands on Poland; there was no comparison between them and the blackmail by the enemies at the end of the World War. Nor had he wanted Norway. Events in the southeast had developed against his will; he had no responsibility whatsoever for the Italian-Greek war. To be sure, the Greeks had not been neutral. He had documents in his possession³ which he had not shown even to the Italians because otherwise the conflict would have broken out even earlier. The Greek Government had early adopted an English orientation and had made available to our enemies almost its entire ship tonnage. With respect to all the revisions his attitude had been [determined] by the desire to preserve peace in the Balkans. But evidently everything had been in vain.

The situation in Yugoslavia had been most unpleasant for ... since he knew ... and the attitude of this ... Nevertheless he had made himself [available] as [mediator] between Italy and Yugoslavia, even though he had always had ... that the solution would not last in the long run. He had done this unselfishly in order to prevent any crisis, realizing that Soviet Russia had her hand in everything ...

... the destructive forces in the Balkans. England and Russia were working together there. His attempts to find a compromise had been without result. However, he would not be the man he was if he had not drawn stern consequences from this realization.

The Führer describes the excesses against Germans in Belgrade and concludes that he saw from that that things just couldn't go on. However, he said the situation was not such that Germany had to put up with this. The responsible politicians were affected by almost incredible blindness. Merely because Italy had carried out a few wrong operations they now believed that the Axis was finished. Actually it would have been a miracle if the Italians had been successful as their operations had been planned very frivolously. In North Africa it had been a question of tanks; now that German tanks had appeared in Libya the pleasure driving [*Spazieren-fahrerei*] of the English was finished once and for all. It was absolute madness to conclude from the few defeats of the Italians that the Axis was breaking up on account of that. He simply didn't stand for that. We have no ambitions in the Balkans, but he had two friends in the Balkans—Hungary and Bulgaria—and he did not

³ Presumably the documents from captured French archives which were subsequently included in German White Book No. 7, *Documents relating to the conflict with Yugoslavia and Greece*.

see why both of these friends should not be definitely restored to prosperity [*saniert*] by the development of the situation. He gave Sztójay once more the assurances he had given him earlier that Hungary would not encounter German objections with regard to revisions, in case there should be a conflict. And as for Hungary's ideals and wishes regarding an outlet to the Adriatic, this, to be sure, fell into Italy's sphere of competence but Germany would support Hungary's wishes. He would burn out for good the festering sore in the Balkans.

The Bulgarians had always been so decent that it had frequently caused him pain to have repeatedly to impose restrictions on them for the sake of peace.

He, the Führer, was sincerely pleased with the Regent's reply. Now at last there would be redress for injustice. Historically, Germany and Hungary did belong together, after all. Both were confronted by a tremendous Slavic wave. This friendship with Hungary did not depend upon him; rather, it had lasted through all systems of government, sometimes more and sometimes less, depending on the possibilities of the political and military situation. . . .

Then the Führer speaks at some length about the German armaments, comparing them with the possibilities of armaments in America.

When he reflected on all this he came to believe more and more in a higher justice and he was filled with awe of Providence. Thinking about his past course and the past proposals, he became convinced that Providence had arranged everything in this manner; for, if that which he had striven for originally had been obtained by peaceful means it would always have been merely a halfway solution which one day would have caused a new struggle. He had only one special wish, namely that our relationship with Turkey would improve. Perhaps this would be advanced by coming events. He could not visualize a more desirable guardian of the Dardanelles than Turkey. We didn't wish to go there, and the Turks were better guarantors of the Straits than any great power which would act arbitrarily there. He very much hoped for a greater discernment on the part of Turkey.

He wished that Hungary would be satisfied at the end of this conflict and be restored in her position as a state by a great revision. These acquisitions would have effects for Hungary, especially in the economic sphere.

Sztójay tells the Führer that Hungary is not interested in Croatia and does not want to incorporate that country within her frontiers. The Führer is of the opinion that Croatia must no longer belong to Yugoslavia in any circumstances and says that a way out can surely be found, for instance, by a friendly and economic alignment with

Hungary. Germany was not interested at all in that. Sztójay confirms that Hungary does not wish anything else with respect to Croatia, but a good, friendly, neighborly relationship.

Sztójay then takes up the subject of an outlet to the sea and says that it is presumably possible to arrive at an agreement with Croatia regarding a corridor to the Adriatic near Zagreb. This was Hungary's only wish with respect to Croatia. He was convinced that Hungary could live on friendly terms with Croatia; for the tension between Croatia and Hungary was caused simply and solely by the incendiary agitation of Belgrade. After all, Hungary didn't want anything of Croatia.

At the close, the Führer made some statements about his alliance policy and expresses the view that with regard to the postwar period, he was seeking alliances and friends on a long-range basis; for, sometime there would be peace again and only a close, trusting co-operation among the nations could guarantee the rise of Europe and the peace for a long time.

HEWEL

No. 229

277/178817

Under State Secretary Woermann to Ambassador Schulenburg

PERSONAL

BERLIN, March 28, 1941.

DEAR COUNT SCHULENBURG: You will receive by the same courier the rather long instruction Pol. V 1664 of March 28.¹ I should like to add only a brief word of commentary on it to you personally. The purpose of our rather involved procedure is to prevent a boundary commission with Soviet participation from working on German territory in the immediate future.² The negotiations must therefore be conducted dilatorily, so that in any case the commission will not set out in the near future.³

I am happy that you have now finally obtained leave and hope to see you again soon.⁴

With cordial greetings and

Heil Hitler!

Faithfully yours,

WOERMANN

¹ Not found.

² See documents Nos. 132, 163, 176, and 181.

³ Schulenburg replied on Apr. 1 (277/178818) that it would be easy to delay because the Russians also seemed to be in no hurry.

⁴ See document No. 4 and footnotes 2 and 3.

No. 230

67/47376-89

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

RAM 18

BERLIN, March 31, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA ON MARCH 28, 1941

The Reich Foreign Minister expressed his gratification at being able to speak with Matsuoka a second time. The Führer would have liked to define his attitude even more fully with respect to the questions under consideration, but his time had been very much taken up by developments in Yugoslavia. The details, however, were not so important. The essential thing was the question of the possibilities and prospects of a closer cooperation between Japan and Germany, that is, the transition from a passive to an active collaboration of Japan in the common cause. It was with great satisfaction that the Germans had heard of the spirit in which Matsuoka was approaching these matters. It was a question of the greatest opportunity that had ever existed for the attainment of Japanese aims, and it would be well to make use of this opportunity before it was lost. The Tripartite Pact was a most important treaty and formed a basis for relations between Japan and Germany for hundreds of years. There existed no conflicts of interest.

The situation was such that a new order could be established only when Great Britain was completely defeated. This applied with even greater force to Japan than to Germany, who at present already dominated the European Continent and by the end of this year would also bring the Mediterranean region and Africa, to the extent that Germany was interested in them, under her domination. Germany, then, had everything that she needed. She was not striving for world domination, as Roosevelt falsely asserted. The Führer wished to end the war as soon as possible in order to devote himself again to his constructive task. The goal that he had set for himself—that is, to provide the maximum security for the Reich—had, essentially, already been attained.

On the other hand, the new order in the Greater East Asian sphere could be established only if Japan also dominated the South. For this, however, the capture of Singapore was necessary.

With reference to Russia the Reich Foreign Minister stated that the Germans did not know how matters would develop in this direction. It was possible that Russia would set out upon the wrong

¹ The document is from the files of Minister Paul Schmidt of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

road, although he did not really expect this from Stalin. But one could not know. In any case Germany would immediately strike if Russia should undertake anything against Japan, and thereby keep Japan free in the rear with respect to Russia. In this way one of the misgivings of Japanese statesmen, but especially of the Japanese Army, reported by Ambassador Ott,² would be eliminated with the help of the German Army. The second misgiving with reference to the English home fleet and the English Mediterranean fleet, which had been voiced particularly by the Japanese Navy, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) could answer by the fact that both of these English fleets would be tied down by Germany in European and Mediterranean waters. Finally, the Japanese had also expressed concern on account of America. The United States, however, would not risk its fleet against Japan and would not send it beyond the Hawaiian Islands. A great Japanese success at Singapore would, on the contrary, strengthen American neutrality. Roosevelt would then hesitate to undertake anything rash.

Although he (the Reich Foreign Minister) fully understood the situation in Japan, which Matsuoka had illustrated by his story about the tiger and her cubs, he nevertheless had to point out again that two of the strongest countries in the world, which possessed a youthful, strong, and fearless spirit, were now offered a chance by Providence which probably occurred only once in a thousand years. Germany's great opportunity was the Führer, whose co-workers carried out his will only as his instruments. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) had repeatedly declared to the Ambassadors of England and France that they should not fall into the error of confusing present-day Germany with that of 1914-1918. Even then the Reich had held out for 4 years against a world of enemies; only because of its disunity and its internal weakness had it lost the war. Now, however, it was united and consequently had twice the strength—which was again increased twofold by the genius of Adolf Hitler's leadership, so that henceforth one would have to reckon with a Germany which was four times as strong as in the World War. The Ambassadors had disregarded these warnings. The predictions had, however, come true, and nothing in the world would prevent Germany and Italy from dominating the European-African hemisphere absolutely. When in such circumstances an opportunity was offered Japan, she ought to weigh matters very carefully and not let the opportunity slip out of her hand.

When the present conflict would end could not, of course, be predicted with certainty; he (the Reich Foreign Minister) had the feeling, however, that England might perhaps collapse sooner than

² See document No. 209.

was generally expected. If the English should suddenly ask for peace, it would be very desirable if Germany and Japan could establish this peace jointly.

The Reich Foreign Minister then spoke about his family traditions, which had always been pro-Japanese. Moreover, he had had an important conversation with the Führer as early as 1934 on German-Japanese collaboration. The Führer's high esteem for Japan had begun with the Russo-Japanese war. Now the most important thing was not to lose the common opportunity which presented itself in the year 1941.

Matsuoka replied that he was of the same opinion. For logical reasons, as well as from an inner feeling, he also believed that 1941 would go down in history as a fateful year. In it the greatest tragedy, the fall of the British Empire, would be consummated. The German nation in Europe and the Japanese in the Far East were, he felt, acting almost under a divine command to break up the British Empire and establish a new order.

Matsuoka then asked what attitude Germany would take toward the United States if England should be brought to her knees during the summer but America was not yet in the war.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that this would depend on the attitude of the United States. The possibility of an occupation of the British Isles required, to be sure, a period of good weather, and the English would possibly try to set up a new government in the United States. But in his opinion this could not be done.

Matsuoka then made his question specific as follows: When England was crushed, the United States in his opinion would not continue to support the British Empire. Canada would simply be more or less annexed. Would Germany in these circumstances leave the United States in peace? The Reich Foreign Minister replied that Germany did not have the slightest interest in a war against the United States. Matsuoka noted this with satisfaction, remarking that one had to reckon with the Anglo-Saxons as a whole; if it should not be possible to convert America to our way of thinking, no new order could be established. The Reich Foreign Minister replied that each would exercise dominion in her own sphere. Germany, together with Italy, would do this in the European-African sphere; the United States would have to limit herself to the American Continent; and the Far East was reserved for Japan. As far as Russia was concerned, she would be very carefully watched and would in no case be permitted any kind of subversive propaganda. In the future only the three aforesaid spheres of interest would remain as great centers of power. The British Empire would disappear.

Matsuoka replied that the only big problem still remaining would then be Russia. Japan was prepared to permit Russia an ice-free outlet to the sea by way of India or Iran, but would not tolerate the Russians on the Chinese coast. Matsuoka then asked whether the Führer had ever considered the possibility of a Russian-Japanese-German alliance. The Reich Foreign Minister denied this and said that a closer collaboration with Russia was an absolute impossibility, since the ideological bases of the Army, as well as of the rest of the nation, were completely incompatible. The Soviet Union was still internationally minded while Japan and Germany thought nationally. Russia was undermining the family; Germany championed it. A union was just as impossible here as between fire and water. Stalin was very clever and had therefore concluded the pact with Germany in the circumstances then prevailing. Russia would also have joined the Tripartite Pact, but her conditions could not be met. The whole matter was now being handled in a quite dilatory manner by Germany, as he could inform Matsuoka confidentially. Moreover, Germany was watching the Soviet Union closely, and—this Matsuoka should realize clearly—she was prepared for any eventuality. Germany would not provoke Russia; but if the policy of Stalin was not in harmony with what the Führer considered to be right, he would crush Russia. Matsuoka replied that Japan was now taking pains not to provoke Russia. Japan was waiting for the completion of the German victory in the Balkans. Without the good offices of Germany and without her strength there was no chance for Japan to mend Russo-Japanese relations completely.

Matsuoka also spoke of the long-term trade agreement which would be concluded with Russia. He then asked the Reich Foreign Minister whether on his return trip he should remain in Moscow for a somewhat longer period in order to negotiate with the Russians on the nonaggression pact or the treaty of neutrality. He emphasized in this connection that direct acceptance of Russia into the Tripartite Pact would not be countenanced by the Japanese people. It would on the contrary call forth a unanimous cry of indignation all over Japan. The Reich Foreign Minister replied that such an adherence of Russia to the Pact was out of the question and, moreover, recommended that Matsuoka, if possible, should not bring up the above-mentioned questions in Moscow, since this probably would not altogether fit into the framework of the present situation.

In reply to a further remark by Matsuoka that the conclusion of a fishing and of a trade agreement would improve the feeling between Russia and Japan, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that

there were no objections to the conclusion of such purely commercial agreements. Matsuoka mentioned in this connection that America was observing Japanese-Russian relations closely and was trying on her part to conclude an agreement with Russia against Japan.

Matsuoka then began to speak of Singapore again. The Japanese were not worried on account of the British Navy. But there were Japanese circles which viewed a conflict with America with great misgivings, since they assumed that this would involve a 5- or 10-year war with the United States. He would readily admit that America would not risk its fleet in a war against Japan, but for that very reason these Japanese circles were worried, because in these circumstances the war would last for years. The Reich Foreign Minister replied that in his opinion Roosevelt would not let it come to war since he was well aware of the impossibility of any action against Japan. Japan, on the other hand, could occupy the Philippines and in this way deal a severe blow to Roosevelt's prestige. If Japan captured Singapore, the greater part of the world would have come under the control of the Tripartite Powers, and America would find herself in an isolated position.

Matsuoka expressed himself as personally very strongly in favor of the Reich Foreign Minister's line of reasoning. If Japan did not assume the risk connected with the capture of Singapore, he was of the opinion that she would thereby become a third-rate power. The blow would therefore have to come some day in any event. If he could succeed in keeping the United States quiet for 6 months, all difficulties would be overcome. A nation which continued to hesitate in a matter of such fundamental national importance thereby only showed that it lacked the most important quality, power of decision.

No. 231

3613/E027084-37

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Turkey

TOP SECRET

ANKARA, March 28, 1941.

Special Security Handling

I went to see Numan today about another matter and tried to find out his opinion regarding the conversation of the Führer with Ambassador Gereide.¹

After a few general remarks in which he expressed the great satisfaction of the Turkish Government with the statements made by the Führer, I for my part proceeded to explain to him the importance of these statements. I pointed out how much it should be

¹ See document No. 177.

appreciated that the Führer had flatly rejected the Russian preliminary condition for accession to the Tripartite Pact, in so far as it involved the right to intervene at the Straits. Since at the beginning of the war Turkey had gone over to the enemy camp, there would as such not have been any reason to apply criteria apart from our own advantage with regard to the Straits and other interests affecting Turkey. The possibility of a tripartite pact with Russia, or rather a quadripartite pact, which was indicated in the Führer's statements, certainly had extraordinary significance for Germany. Perhaps one could even assume that if this connection had come about in December, America's attitude toward the English problem would have developed differently. However, it was evident from the Führer's remarks that in his choice of an option between Russia and Turkey he had not hesitated a moment to affirm again the German standpoint held for the past century: to have the Straits in the hands of a strong and independent power outside the rival great Powers. The significance of the Führer's communication consisted in the fact that now German policy toward Turkey was not based on assurances, the value of which Turkey had always termed problematical. Rather it was based on the proof of the option made. In this way it was again demonstrated before history that Germany was disinterested politically and territorially in the Balkans. Thus Turkish thinking must get rid of the suspicion that we were trying to encircle Turkey by way of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece.

All of these statements must now, in my opinion, have their consequences also for the Turkish attitude toward us.

Numan in all of his statements—as I wish to emphasize at once—took a much more realistic and waiting attitude than that of the Foreign Minister yesterday when he expressed his pleasure at the Führer's statements.² He said: "In politics, let us not speak of sentiment, old friendships, and brotherhoods in arms, but of the actual interests which determine the policy of the Reich and of Turkey. We Turks have, of course, assumed that in the negotiations with Russia, Turkey was a subject of bargaining. In our thinking about the situation we have considered every one of these possibilities. But even then I expressed the view that if Germany opts for Russia and wants to pay for this option with the Straits, then the prospects for a German victory must be very bad. The option would mean that Russia would reach the Straits and the Mediterranean through Rumania and Bulgaria, i.e., that Germany would be encircled from the south. If the Germans are willing to pay this high price, then they will presumably lose the war and we

² See document No. 220.

Turks will profit in a different way. The Führer's decision not to let the Russians get to the Straits is therefore very wise and is in the German interest. We are exceedingly glad and appreciate it very much that the Führer has spoken to us with such candor about his ideas. Being adherents to the old diplomacy we shall keep this wisdom to ourselves. But one must not draw the conclusion from this very desirable clarification of German-Turkish relations that our political position could change in its essentials. The basic principle of our policy has always been to have a strong Germany in the center of Europe. We therefore wish this war not to end with a total defeat either on the one side or on the other. I told Mr. Eden: 'If you win the war and want to destroy Germany, then a tremendous abyss will open in Europe, a whirlpool into which we, Turkey, will also be swept.' Thus, Turkey's interest is in the direction of a negotiated peace. The English know this; for we have proved by our policy that although we are allied we will not let ourselves be misused in any way for the advantage of any third power. We are egoists and fight exclusively for ourselves. But from the Führer's statements and the exchange of letters between the Heads of State it is evident that we have completely corresponding interests in the Balkans and the Near East."

I went on to explain to M. Numan that if Turkey desired a compromise peace in Europe this was without doubt not expressed in the slightest way in her public opinion. The press demanded the total victory of England and did not have the slightest understanding for the German efforts toward a new order. Thus public opinion was evidently in contradiction to his statements.

"Certainly," said Numan, "we do not want much to do with the new order. For us, every state has its right to independence and its own existence. Too little is known about the aims of the new order propagated by the Axis. One would be better able to judge it if one knew in outline the terms which Germany is willing to grant to the conquered and occupied areas."

In regard to my repeated remarks that something had to be done by the Turkish Government in order to put German-Turkish relations on a basis of greater trust, he only repeated: "You know that we are allied with England. We want to keep honorably the few obligations which we have, and if you, Herr von Papen, now expect a kind of 'benevolent neutrality' on the part of Turkey, then I must tell you that such political acrobatics appear hardly possible to me. It is better for us to stay on the basis of actual facts and reach an understanding in each individual case regarding every question that could come up between us within the framework of the position which has now been defined on both sides."

The conversation turned to Yugoslavia; in this connection M. Numan remarked that the reports so far in no way permitted any sort of conclusions concerning the future political attitude of Yugoslavia. Probably the new Government would allow some time to pass before deciding about its position regarding foreign policy.

The talk with Numan confirmed my impression that this clear and calculating mind gladly accepts the advantages of the Berlin conversation, but without drawing from it any conclusions with respect to the Turkish position. It was noteworthy that he characterized the attitude of Turkey as the determining pattern for the Near East, i.e., for the independent position of Iran and Iraq. He said: "One does not know what turns the war will take, and whether such objects as the oil wells of Mosul will not suddenly become interesting for the belligerents. In that case it would be useful to know that we and others in the Near East are ready to fight for our independence."

One cannot today predict what stand Turkey will take in a question that does not affect her immediate security. Perhaps it would have been more expedient not to let the option in favor of Turkey become known and to use the question of the option as a means of pressure in any difficulties that may arise.

P[APEN]

No. 232

230/152644

The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Legation in Yugoslavia

No. 374

BERLIN, March 29, 1941.

RAM 82

For the Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 299 of March 28.¹

In conformity with the instruction that you should observe complete reserve the Foreign Minister asks you not to attend any official functions whatsoever and to avoid being present at such events, if necessary giving illness as the reason and not to send anybody to represent you. A representative should be sent only if the Government at your post summons you to receive official communications and you are unable to comply in order to preserve the fiction of your illness.

RINTELEN

¹ In this telegram (230/152639) Heeren had reported that the crowds in the streets booed him when he returned in his automobile from the solemn religious service on Mar. 28.

No. 233

67/47357-75

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

RAM 19

BERLIN, March 31, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON MARCH 29, 1941

The Reich Foreign Minister referred to the earlier discussion with Matsuoka concerning the latter's impending conversations with the Russians in Moscow. He expressed the opinion that in view of the general situation it might be best not to go into things too deeply with the Russians. He did not know how the situation would develop. But one thing was certain: If Russia should ever attack Japan, Germany would strike immediately. He could give this firm assurance to Matsuoka, so that Japan could push southward toward Singapore without fear of any complications with Russia. As it was, the greater part of the German Army was on the eastern boundary of the Reich and was ready to attack at any time. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) believed, however, that Russia would not occasion any military action. But if Germany should become involved in a conflict with Russia, the Soviet Union would be finished within a few months. In that case, Japan would, of course, not have anything at all to fear, if she wanted to advance toward Singapore. So, in any case, she need not be kept from that undertaking by any fear of Russia.

Of course, we could not tell how matters would develop with Russia. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would accentuate his present policy of unfriendliness toward Germany. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) in any event wanted to point out to Matsuoka that a conflict with Russia was always within the realm of possibility. At any rate, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor, upon his return, that a conflict between Germany and Russia was inconceivable. On the contrary, as matters stood, such a conflict, though not probable, still would have to be designated as possible.

With regard to Russian adherence to the Tripartite Pact, as had been offered to Molotov by Germany, the Reich Foreign Minister remarked that there had been no question of the direct admission of Russia into the Pact, but rather of a different grouping. As already stated, however, the Russians had set conditions for their

¹ The document is from the files of Minister Paul Schmidt of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

adherence which Germany could not accept, so that matters were now in suspense.²

In reply to a question interpolated by Matsuoka, whether that meant that Germany would perhaps again seek, after the lapse of some time, to get Russia to adhere to the Tripartite Pact, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that an attempt of that kind would probably not be made for some time, since the conditions submitted by Russia were irreconcilable with the German view, particularly those concerning Finland and Turkey.

In reply to an inquiry by Matsuoka for further details on the Russian conditions, the Reich Foreign Minister responded that German resistance to the Soviet demands with respect to Finland was based on economic considerations, and also on sentiment. Germany had fought on the side of the Finns in the World War. Matsuoka put in here that the Finns apparently laid great stress on being considered as belonging on the German side. The Japanese Minister in Helsinki, whom he had recalled in connection with the recent shifting of diplomats,³ told a newspaperman at Manchuli on the trip homeward that Finland now appeared to have placed herself on Russia's side. Some time later, the Finnish Minister in Tokyo⁴ protested officially to Matsuoka against that statement and declared that Finland would never place herself on Russia's side.

The Reich Foreign Minister pointed out that the Social Democratic governments in Finland had always been against the Führer, so that there was no reason for Germany to help them during the Russo-Finnish war. Besides, Germany had to assume an absolutely neutral position, because in the conversations with Molotov and Stalin, Finland had been designated as not lying within the German sphere of interest. But when the Finns defended themselves so valiantly against the Russians, strong feeling for them sprang up in Germany, so that it was now impossible to give up Finland, since an occupation by Russia would lead to complete destruction of the country, as was shown by the example of the Baltic States.

The second Russian condition dealt with the guarantee to Bulgaria, together with occupation of the country by Russian troops, concerning which he had already been informed in detail in the earlier conversations.

The third condition had as its subject the establishment of bases on the Dardanelles. Matsuoka was already informed on that point too. At any rate, Germany preferred the Dardanelles to remain in the hands of the Turks. Besides, she could not permit a penetra-

² See document No. 218.

³ In November 1940, Y. Sugishita was replaced by Tadaski Sakaya as Japanese Minister in Finland.

⁴ Charles Gustave Idman.

tion of the Russians into the Balkans. However, Russia kept trying to push forward in that direction. Thus, in connection with recent happenings in Yugoslavia, activity was now increasing partly with the aid of the Sokol organization or through direct Communist influence. At any rate, the discussions with the Russians on those conditions had not been taken up again. We had merely told the Soviet Union that Germany could not allow any new conflict in Finland or the Balkans. Since then all these questions were, as stated, in suspense, and no favorable development was to be expected.

During the further course of the conversation, the Reich Foreign Minister imparted to the Japanese Foreign Minister, in confidence, his view of the true Russian interest. The Soviet Union wanted the war to last as long as possible. It knew that it could not itself gain anything by military attacks. Therefore, the exceedingly rapid defeat of France did not suit that sly politician Stalin very well. He wanted a long war that would tire out the peoples and make them ripe for Bolshevik influence. That was the true aim of Russian policy, which should never be lost sight of.

Matsuoka agreed with these ideas and cited the situation in China as an example. Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he was in personal touch, who knew him and trusted him, was greatly alarmed as to the further increase of the influence of the Red Army in China.

The Reich Foreign Minister said that it was entirely possible that the conditions previously described would lead rather rapidly to a conflict between Germany and Russia. If Germany should feel herself endangered, she would immediately attack and put an end to Bolshevism.

To a suggestion by Matsuoka not to allow the Anti-Comintern Pact to expire, but to renew it, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that he could not take a definitive position on the matter yet, since the situation as it would appear in the autumn, at the expiration of the Pact, could not be foreseen at the present time. As a matter of principle, however, Germany's stand was always in the sense of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

When Matsuoka asked the Reich Foreign Minister to inform him in good time, before the expiration of the Anti-Comintern Pact, regarding the German stand with respect to a possible extension of the Pact, the Reich Foreign Minister rejoined that by October the situation would certainly have been clarified to such an extent that a definite stand by Germany would be possible.

Thereupon the Reich Foreign Minister spoke once more of the question of Singapore. In view of the fears expressed by Japan of possible submarine attacks from the Philippines and of the intervention of the British Mediterranean fleet and home fleet, he had

discussed the situation once again with Admiral Raeder. The latter had told him that the British fleet would be so fully occupied this year in British home waters and in the Mediterranean that it could not send a single ship to the Far East. The American submarines were designated by Admiral Raeder as so poor that Japan need not concern herself about them at all.

Matsuoka at once rejoined that the Japanese Navy considered the danger from the English Navy as very slight, and was also of the opinion that in case of a clash with the American Navy it could destroy the latter without trouble. It did fear, however, that the Americans would not give battle with their fleet, and that in that way the conflict with the United States would perhaps last for 5 years. They were very uneasy over that in Japan.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that America could not do anything at all against Japan in case of the capture of Singapore. For that very reason Roosevelt would perhaps think twice before deciding actually to move against Japan. For while he could not do anything against Japan, there was the probability that the Philippines would be taken by Japan; this would naturally entail great loss of prestige for the American President, since, as a result of insufficient American military preparation, he could not retaliate.

Matsuoka pointed out in this connection that he was doing everything to soothe the British with regard to Singapore. He was acting as if Japan had no designs whatsoever on this key point of England in the East. It might therefore be that in his words and acts he would assume a friendly manner toward the English. But Germany should not be misled by that. He was assuming that manner not only in order to soothe the British, but to mislead the pro-British and pro-American elements in Japan, until he should one day suddenly attack Singapore.

With regard to this, the Reich Foreign Minister stated that in his opinion the declaration of war by Japan against England should follow from an attack on Singapore.

Matsuoka remarked in this connection that his tactics were based upon the safe assumption that the whole Japanese nation would be united at one stroke by the sudden attack on Singapore. ("Nothing succeeds like success," the Reich Foreign Minister interjected here.) He (Matsuoka) was here following the words of a famous Japanese statesman addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: "Open fire, and the nation will then be united." The Japanese had to be shaken up to rouse them. Lastly, as an Oriental he also believed in fate, which comes whether we want it or not.

As the conversation went on, it turned to the question of rubber shipments. The Reich Foreign Minister asked Matsuoka to test the

practicability of shipment to Lisbon or France by one or two Japanese auxiliary cruisers.

Matsuoka agreed to this and said that immediately after the step taken by Ambassador Ott with respect to the rubber question,⁵ he had proposed having Japan provide certain amounts for Germany from her own rubber stocks and later filling up the resulting gaps with rubber from Indochina.

In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister pointed out that traffic over the Siberian railway was not adequate and that, besides, 18,000 tons of French rubber from Indochina would be delivered to Japan through the mediation of Germany. In this connection also he inquired as to the size of the auxiliary cruisers that might be available for the rubber shipments. Matsuoka, who said that he was not accurately informed, estimated the size at 10,000 tons.

In addition, referring to the discussion with Reich Minister Funk, the Reich Foreign Minister turned the conversation to future trade relations between Japan and Germany. He explained that the trade between the great economic areas of the future, that is, Europe and Africa on the one side and the Far East on the other side, would have to be developed on a relatively free basis, while the American hemisphere, at any rate as far as the United States was concerned, would remain more to itself, as it had everything that it needed in its own territory and therefore was not to be considered for interchange with other economic areas. In South America, however, things were different. Possibilities of exchange with other economic areas actually presented themselves there.

Matsuoka replied that, for her own reconstruction and for the development of China, Japan needed cooperation with Germany. Some time before, he had given written instructions to the Japanese Missions in China to grant preferred treatment to German and Italian economic interests, as had already been done in Manchukuo and North China. Japan was not in a position to develop the gigantic territories of China without the assistance of German technical skill and German enterprise. Outwardly, of course, Japan would declare the open-door policy, but in reality would grant preferential treatment to Germany and Italy.

Besides, he had to admit openly that Japanese business circles were afraid of their German competitors, whom they considered very clever, while they only smiled at British and American competition. German business circles probably took a similar stand with regard to the Japanese, and therefore complaints came from both sides. He was of the opinion, however, that the reciprocal in-

⁵ Wiehl's memorandum of Feb. 22 (174/136580-81) records that Ambassador Ott at the end of January appealed to Matsuoka on the basis of the Tripartite Pact and requested his help in providing transportation for the rubber which Germany had bought in French Indochina.

terests could be brought into harmony, and he told Japanese business men that they should not be afraid of German competition, but should endeavor to grapple with the problem with equal cleverness. At any rate the Japanese Government would do everything to equalize the interest of the two sides.

Then the Reich Foreign Minister went on to speak of Matsuoka's possible trip to Vichy, which was being considered. In this connection he said that of course he left it entirely to Matsuoka to decide whether he wanted to go to Vichy or not. If he considered this trip advisable, the German Government would not have anything against it. It would by no means stand in his way if, for instance, he wanted to talk to the French about Indochina.

Matsuoka replied that above all else the respect which he felt for old Marshal Pétain had given him the idea of going to Vichy. The Emperor, who as Crown Prince had once been a guest of Pétain, was also among the admirers of the Marshal. Besides, he (Matsuoka) would like to go to Paris, and in that case a visit to Vichy would probably be unavoidable. However, in view of the extraordinary tension between Italy and France, he hesitated a great deal to undertake this visit, and in any event he wanted to ask the Duce and Count Ciano beforehand. He was certain that in her position of power Germany would have nothing against such a visit, but he did not know if he would hurt Italian feelings by going.

Continuing, Matsuoka again spoke of Japanese-Russian relations. He pointed out that he had proposed a nonaggression pact to the Russians, to which Molotov had replied with the proposal of a neutrality agreement. During his stay in Moscow he, as the one who had made the original nonaggression proposal, would be forced to take a stand in some way with respect to these matters. On that occasion he also intended to attempt to get the Russians to give up the northern half of the Sakhalin peninsula [sic]. There were important oil deposits there, the exploitation of which was hampered in every conceivable way by the Russians. In all, Matsuoka calculated the maximum amount to be procured from these oil deposits at 2 million tons. He would propose to the Russians acquiring northern Sakhalin by purchase.

In reply to a question by the Reich Foreign Minister, as to whether the Russians would be ready to sell these regions, Matsuoka answered that it was extremely doubtful. At a hint to the same effect, Molotov had asked the Japanese Ambassador whether "that was meant for a joke." At any rate Japan was ready in return to

replace the treaties of Portsmouth⁶ and Peiping⁷ by other agreements and also to give up her fishing rights. In any event he would have to take up these matters and, in particular, the question of the nonaggression pact during his stay in Moscow. He asked the Reich Foreign Minister whether he should go very deeply into these questions or treat them only superficially.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that in his opinion only a purely formal, superficial handling of these points was advisable. The question mentioned by Matsuoka with regard to Sakhalin could also be settled later. Further, if the Russians should pursue a foolish policy and force Germany to strike, he would—knowing the sentiments of the Japanese Army in China—consider it proper if that Army were prevented from attacking Russia. Japan would best help the common cause if she did not allow herself to be diverted by anything from the attack on Singapore. With a common victory, the fulfillment of the wishes named above would, so to speak, fall into Japan's lap like ripe fruit.

Matsuoka went on to speak of German help in the blow against Singapore, regarding which he had received repeated assurances, and in that connection he mentioned the offer of a written promise of German help.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he had already discussed these things with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to supply maps of Singapore, so that the Führer, who certainly must be considered the greatest expert of modern times on military matters, could advise Japan as to the best method for the attack on Singapore. German aviation experts would also be available and, on the basis of experience gained in Europe, could advise the Japanese regarding the use of dive bombers against the British fleet in Singapore from air bases nearby. The British fleet would then be compelled to disappear from Singapore at once.

Matsuoka interjected here that Japan was less concerned about the British fleet than about the capture of the fortifications.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that here too the Führer had developed new methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions, such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben Emael, which he could place at the disposal of the Japanese.

Matsuoka replied, in this connection, that some junior naval officers who were experts on such matters and who were good friends of his were of the opinion that it would take 3 months for the Japa-

⁶ Between Russia and Japan, signed Sept. 5, 1905; text printed in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1906), p. 824.

⁷ Between Japan and China, signed Dec. 22, 1905; text printed in *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1894-1919*, compiled and edited by John V. A. MacMurray (New York, Oxford University Press, 1921), vol. 1, pp. 549-553.

nese forces to capture Singapore. As a cautious Minister of Foreign Affairs, he had doubled that time. He believed that for 6 months they could ward off any danger threatening from America. But if the capture of Singapore should take still longer and were perhaps protracted for as long as a year, an extremely critical situation with America would develop, which he did not yet know how to meet.

If it could somehow be avoided, he would not touch the Dutch East Indies, as he feared that in case of a Japanese attack on those regions the oil fields would be set on fire. Then they could not be brought into production again for 1 or 2 years.

The Reich Foreign Minister remarked on that point that with the capture of Singapore, Japan would also gain control of the Dutch East Indies at the same time.

Matsuoka then mentioned also that the desire for air bases in French Indochina and Thailand had been expressed among Japanese officers. He had rejected this, however, since he was by no means willing to undertake anything that might betray Japanese intentions with regard to Singapore.

In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister took up once more the question of Germany's assistance to Japan. Something could perhaps be done in that field also. Japan had to understand, however, that in this way the heaviest burden was resting on Germany's shoulders. The Reich was fighting against the island of Great Britain and was tying up the British Mediterranean fleet. Japan, on the other hand, was fighting only on the periphery. Besides, the main Russian forces were on the European side. The chivalrous Japanese nation would surely recognize this state of affairs.

Matsuoka agreed to these ideas, in closing, and gave the assurance that Japan would always be a loyal ally, which would devote its efforts fully and entirely to the common cause and not merely in a halfhearted way.⁸

⁸ On Mar. 29 Matsuoka also had a conference with Göring at Karinball, at which Ambassador Ott was present. Schmidt's memorandum of this conference is not printed (67/47348-56).

No. 234

230/152857

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 206

MARCH 29, 1941.

The Yugoslav Minister called on me today to take leave, as he is going to Belgrade for a very few days for the purpose of reporting and consultation.

M. Andrić told me that as yet he could not communicate anything to me about the position of the new Government, since it is only today that it convenes in a real sense. The new situation in Yugoslavia, he said, comprised aspects of both domestic and foreign policy, not quite separable from each other. It was a case of an internal revolution. That is why he, the Minister, was hoping that Belgrade would act quickly and that Berlin would have patience. He said that in Belgrade he would see to it that his Government formulated a clear policy toward us soon. Andrić claimed to have information that the Government had restored order to the point where henceforth any violent anti-German manifestations would be averted.

I listened to the Minister's explanations in silence, merely remarking that I was in no position to give an opinion about the situation which now has arisen between us. As far as order was concerned, I said that my latest information was that the German Minister had been treated to public demonstrations of ill-feeling.¹

The Minister is planning to be back here around Wednesday, April 2.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 232, footnote 1.

No. 235

230/152685-86

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 317 of March 30

BELGRADE, March 30, 1941.

Received March 30—4:48 p. m.

I. The Foreign Minister, who had sent for me for 11:00 a.m. today, told me that he could make the following statements on behalf of the Government: "The present Royal Yugoslav Government remains true to the principle of respect for international treaties which have been concluded, among which the Protocol signed on the 25th of this month at Vienna belongs.¹ It will insist in the most determined fashion on not being drawn into the present conflict. Its chief attention will be devoted to the maintenance of good and friendly relations with its neighbors the German Reich and the kingdom of Italy.

"The Royal Government is particularly interested in the manner of applying the Protocol mentioned; in connection with this it is mind-

¹ See document No. 205, footnote 2.

ful of safeguarding all the essential interests of the Yugoslav State and people."

II. Subsequently the Foreign Minister told me that he was pleased to have achieved his first objective, namely the recognition by the new Government of the already accomplished accession to the Tripartite Pact. They now needed only to gain some time and then the new Government would be in a position to guarantee much better than the old Government could have ever done, the continuance and dependability of the policy of genuine friendship with Germany that had been initiated.

I told the Foreign Minister that I was merely able to take note of his statement, but I asked him, however, for an explanation of how this governmental declaration could be reconciled with the views which the Minister President had expressed to the Italian Minister last night.²

The Foreign Minister, who evidently had not yet heard anything about these statements, was visibly disturbed and assured me that the Minister President could not in any case have spoken on behalf of the Government.

I learned of telegram No. 384³ only after my return.

HEEREN

² In telegram No. 311 of Mar. 29 (230/152682), Heeren reported that General Simović had told the Italian Minister that Yugoslavia could not permit herself to be encircled by German troops and thus forced to capitulate. If the zone of Salonika were occupied by German troops, Yugoslavia would have to gain elbow room in Albania.

In a subsequent telegram, No. 315 of Mar. 30 (230/152683), Heeren explained that this view was at best shared by a few Serbs but not by Croats, Slovenes, and Moslems. He had learned also that a majority of the Cabinet had come out in favor of unconditional recognition of the accession to the Tripartite Pact.

³ This was an instruction of Mar. 30 from Ribbentrop (510/235487) directing Heeren to avoid all official functions and all contacts with the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry. Not even a deputy was to be sent in case of an invitation to discuss matters.

No. 236

230/152699

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, March 30, 1941.

No. 389

For the Minister personally.

I request that you:

(1) Come at once to Berlin for the purpose of reporting.

(2) After your departure, the Chargé d'Affaires is to maintain complete reserve. If the Government at your post should wish to make any communications to the Legation, the Chargé d'Affaires should merely send one of the junior officers of the Legation to receive them. He shall confine himself to taking note of the communications without expressing any comment in the matter.

RIBBENTROP

No. 237

230/152709

Memorandum by the Dirigent in the Political Department

RECORD OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND COUNT CIANO AT 9:30 P. M. ON MARCH 30, 1941, CONCERNING THE COMMUNICATION MADE BY THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT TO THE ITALIAN MINISTER AND TO HERR VON HEEREN¹

"(1) Germany will not reply to this communication, nor will Germany make this communication public.

"(2) The value of this statement can be judged by comparing it with the reply of the Yugoslav Minister President to the Italian Minister at Belgrade of which we know (telephone conversation of the State Secretary with v. Heeren of March 29, 11:50 p.m.²).

"(3) Our view remains the same as that laid down by the Führer in his letter to the Duce.³

"(4) We have just received fresh news of acts of violence against Germans said to involve the slaying of 11 Germans.

"(5) We are continuing to watch the situation very closely and we have recalled Herr von Heeren to Berlin to report.⁴

"(6) As soon as any new development emerges, Count Ciano or the Duce, as the case may be, will immediately be informed by me."

R[INTELEN]

¹ See document No. 235. In Weizsäcker's file there is a French and a German text of the Yugoslav statement as reported by Heeren. The German text (230/152707) has the following heading in handwriting: "Yugoslav statement to the Italian Minister in Belgrade."

² See document No. 235, footnote 2. No record of such a telephone conversation has been found.

³ Text printed in document No. 224.

⁴ See document No. 236.

No. 238

230/152728-28/1

The Foreign Minister to the Consulate General at Zagreb

Telegram

By Special Radio Message

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, March 31, 1941.

PRIORITY

No. 72

In reply to Dr. Maček's inquiries for our advice which have reached us through various routes,¹ please inform him, through channels which you deem appropriate but which must be of a strictly confidential nature, as follows:

We urgently advise him and the other Croatian leaders against cooperating in any manner with the present Belgrade Government. It goes without saying that when we give such advice, it must be kept in strictest secrecy. Should he follow our advice, we would wish to maintain contact with him. For his part, he must ensure this contact through suitable intermediaries.

For your information:

Maček made efforts to contact us on March 28 through Herr Derfler, an engineer from Vienna.² Derfler was here on March 29 and wanted to return on March 30. If he has done so I would suggest that you use him as intermediary. Here, Derfler was merely told that he could inform Maček that he [Derfler] had the impression that Dr. Maček would hear something further from us.³

Please confirm receipt of this telegram at once. Report by telegram on having carried it out.⁴

RIBBENTROP

¹ A message of the Foreign Intelligence Department of the OKW of Mar. 27 (510/235486) transmitted to the Foreign Ministry an inquiry from Maček through Abwehr channels regarding Germany's attitude toward the new Yugoslav Government. See also footnote 2.

² Heinburg's memorandum of Mar. 29 (230/152671-73) records that Derfler called at the Foreign Ministry and told of his conversations with Maček. He stated as the purpose of his visit "to forward Maček's request that he, Maček, be supplied with information by the German Government by which he could be guided in taking a position toward the events in Belgrade as he had not yet done so in a definitive way."

³ The first two paragraphs of this instruction were repeated to Belgrade in telegram No. 405 of Apr. 1 (230/152761). If the report that Maček had arrived in Belgrade were to be verified, then the Chargé d'Affaires was directed to inform Maček through appropriate channels.

⁴ See document No. 241.

No. 239

230/152729

The Foreign Minister to the Consulate General at Zagreb

Telegram
By Special Radio Message

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, March 31, 1941.

No. 76

RAM No. 88

Please inform the Croatian leaders confidentially through suitable intermediaries that we would provide for an independent Croatia within the framework of the new order for Europe, should the Yugoslav State collapse through its own mistakes. They could promote this goal most effectively by completely abstaining from further cooperation with Belgrade.

RIBBENTROP

No. 240

3569/E023747

*Circular of the State Secretary*¹

Telegram

Multex No. 202

BERLIN, March 31, 1941.

Sent April 1—3:00 a. m.

Pol. IV 957 Ang. I.

Excesses against Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche in Yugoslavia continue. The German colony and the wives and children of the German Legation have been instructed to make their departure.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ This circular was sent to all Missions except those with closed circuit teletype systems. An identical circular was dispatched to the latter Missions as Multex No. 203, Mar. 31, 8:10 p.m. (3569/E023748).

No. 241

230/152733

The Consul General at Zagreb to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 23 of April 1

ZAGREB, April 1, 1941.

Received April 1—12:20 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 72 of March 31.¹

Maček was informed by a member of the Consulate General in accordance with instructions. He reported that, through Košutić,

¹ Document No. 238.

the Vice President of the Peasants' party, who had been sent to Belgrade, he had laid down the following conditions to the Belgrade Government:

Recognition of the Tripartite Pact and implementation in the spirit of the Treaty; the appointment of two co-regents for the King, one of whom is to be a Croat; the resignation of the Minister of War,² and the withdrawal of the military from all politics. Maček considers the resignation of the Croatian ministers tactically inexpedient. He would refrain on principle, in the present situation, from entering the Government. He would do this only if war could thereby be averted. Maček promised to observe the strictest secrecy concerning the advice given. He had appointed Košutić as his liaison. I still have no contact with Derfler. I suggest that the Legation in Belgrade be informed.

FREUNDT

² Gen. Bogoljub IIIć.

No. 242

230/152763-64

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, April 1, 1941—9:59 p. m.

SECRET

Received April 2—12:20 a. m.

No. 761 of April 1

I. The Yugoslav Minister, Gavrilović, here, who is at the same time Minister without Portfolio in the present Yugoslav Cabinet, wanted to fly to Belgrade as early as 2 days ago, was delayed by bad weather, and has now received instructions to stay in Moscow a few more days. At his express desire, Gavrilović today called on my Italian colleague and me. Gavrilović was very agitated and worried. He gave me a rather long report, of which the following is the essence. He stated that a German-Italian-Yugoslav war would be a misfortune for all concerned; that Jovanović, the Deputy President of the Belgrade Cabinet, was en route to Rome to seek a solution, and that, according to a telegram which was received here this noon, the Belgrade Cabinet had decided to recognize the accession to the Tripartite Pact. In these circumstances it surely must be possible to avert this unfortunate war. Gavrilović asked me in this connection to do everything that was in my power.

I replied to Gavrilović that we had manifestly never intended a war against Yugoslavia; that, if a serious situation had arisen, the new men in Yugoslavia alone were to blame, and that it was therefore up to them to set the situation right again.

M. Gavrilović expressed himself to the Italian Ambassador in a manner similar to that with me.

II. M. Gavrilović did not say a word to me about any interference of the Soviet Government in the matter. This fact, today's sharp official denial in *Pravda* regarding the alleged Soviet telegram of congratulations to Yugoslavia (see telegram No. 753 of April 1¹), the attitude which the Soviet Government has heretofore taken with regard to matters in Rumania and Bulgaria that are of much greater interest to it, as well as the extreme improbability of an offer of delivery of munitions to Yugoslavia, make it a certainty that the Yugoslav Military Attaché told our Naval Attaché a plain falsehood in order to start an "evil intrigue" (see telegram No. 748 of March 31 from the Naval Attaché²).

SCHULENBURG

¹ Not printed (230/152736).

² This telegram (230/152718-19) reported various statements made by the Yugoslav Military Attaché, Colonel Popović, in the course of a conversation with the German Naval Attaché, Capt. Norbert Baumbach. Popović was quoted as saying that the Soviet authorities "had summoned him and offered to deliver war material to Yugoslavia; he, however, had turned this down emphatically."

No. 243

230/152760

The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Consulate General at Zagreb

Telegram

By Special Radio Message

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, April 1, 1941.

No. 79

RAM 91

The Foreign Minister asks that he be kept informed through telegraphic reports about further developments in the situation. Any news of importance is to be reported here at once. It is especially important for us to be informed as speedily as possible concerning decisions of Croatian leaders and to know where they are at any specific moment (for example, trips to Belgrade). In so far as you have reliable informants at your disposal for the gathering of such information, you should keep in constant touch with them.

Herr Malletke, of the Office of Reichsleiter Rosenberg, as well as SS-Standartenführer Veessenmayer, is leaving here today for the purpose of establishing contact with influential Croatians and they will call on you. Both have instructions to exert influence there in

accordance with the telegrams sent to you yesterday.¹ The Foreign Minister asks that you inform the Croatian leaders in question in an appropriate manner that Herr Veessenmayer is to be regarded as a trusted representative of the Foreign Minister.

RINTELEN

¹ Documents Nos. 238 and 239.

No. 244

51/34371

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, April 1, 1941.

Pol. I M 831 g. Rs.

The naval and air force units assigned to duty in the *extended area of operations* around England¹ must now be given orders on what measures they should pursue in the extended area of operations with respect to possible American warships.

The Naval War Staff and the Luftwaffe propose to issue the following orders:

"Within the extended zone of blockade immediate offensive action shall be permissible against *all merchant vessels*, even when being convoyed by neutral warships. Offensive action shall be permitted against *convoying neutral warships* where this is necessary to overcome any resistance from convoying neutral warships to attacks upon merchant ships proceeding in convoy. Neutral warships proceeding singly must not be attacked."

This draft is being submitted by the Naval War Staff for review and approval. My recommendation is that the draft be approved. It expresses in the form of an order what was contemplated in principle in general form and approved by the Führer when the zone of operations was extended.²

RITTER

¹ See documents Nos. 167 and 210.

² In a note to Weissäcker of Apr. 1 (51/34370) Woermann wrote: "This is doubtless a decision of the greatest significance. I suggest that the matter be discussed tomorrow once more in consultation with Ambassador Dieckhoff."

By a directive of Apr. 16 (8589/E602849-50) the OKW informed the High Command of the Navy that "the Führer has decided on Apr. 15 in the presence of the Foreign Minister that in the operational area around England and Iceland no restriction whatever should be imposed on any of our combat forces with regard to the use of their weapons"; consequently, point II of the directive of Mar. 25 (document No. 210) would "remain in effect without any restrictions."

No. 245

274/177849-50

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*CONFIDENTIAL
St.S. No. 217

BERLIN, April 1, 1941.

Today the Bulgarian Minister brought up, upon instruction from Sofia, the same subject about which Herr von Richthofen had already reported by telegram No. 363.¹ It involves the Bulgarian wish that, in connection with the German advance on Thrace, the familiar northeastern tip (the glaxis of Edirne)² also be occupied by German troops. Draganov intimated that from the fact that this area was not occupied it would be inferred that certain German promises had been made to the Turks. Consideration for the Turks would not be understood in Bulgaria and it would at the same time complicate and prejudice the territorial settlement there with respect to frontiers. Turkey certainly had the objectionable desire to make Edirne again a great fortress.

I told the Minister that we really did not want now to take up between us again the subject of the future determination of frontiers. I had to remind him of our earlier talks on this subject. They had, as we knew, come to a conclusion in the secret exchange of notes.³

When Draganov proceeded to take up the technical aspect of the problem and to speak of the significance of the frontier railroad of which you have knowledge,⁴ as well as to interest himself in the subject of who should take over the administration of this area, which would then not be occupied by us, I replied that he should let us worry about that. Field Marshal List would surely already have given thought to the matter of how to protect his supply line.

When the Minister further insisted, I told him that neither from the territorial nor from the technical point of view did I see any basis for our conversation. Nor did I know what plans our troops had regarding an advance. Should they actually, however, leave the northeastern tip of Thrace, mentioned by Draganov, free, I thought that such gentle treatment of this sore spot for the Turks might make good sense. We knew that Draganov himself had always dinned into my ears how dangerous Turkey was at her European frontier. Thanks to our policy, Turkey's attitude had gradually improved. If one now wanted to spare Turkish sensibilities at this frontier point, I could well understand it.

¹ Of Mar. 30 (274/177845-46).

² See vol. XI of this series, document No. 594, document No. 649 and footnote 7, and document No. 656.

³ See document No. 114.

⁴ See document No. 303.

The Minister closed the conversation by saying that he had merely wanted to acquaint me with the ideas and apprehensions of his Government.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 246

230/152777

The Consul General at Zagreb to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 26 of April 2

ZAGREB, April 2, 1941.

Received April 2—8:00 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 76 of March 31.¹

As a result of today's conversations, Maček informed a go-between that Košutić was going to Belgrade in order to obtain a guarantee for the acceptance of the conditions named,² to which he had added the demand that Germany be given satisfaction. A telegram of greetings to Reichsmarschall Göring was evidence to him of the willingness to yield.

After acceptance of the terms, he himself would go to Belgrade. He thought that he could also better serve the interests of the German Reich there. He still enjoyed the complete confidence of the Croatian peasants and he even thought that he enjoyed the confidence of the Serbian peasants more than did many a Serbian Minister. He then intended to go from Belgrade to Berlin on behalf of the Government. If he went to Berlin now, it would be an open affront to Belgrade. The present mobilization³ no longer permitted the sending of a representative to Germany. According to his information, the Minister President had already reprimanded some of the younger officers who had taken part in the coup. The Government was proceeding with severity against Communists.

Maček added that, contrary to the report of the German radio, Eden was not in Belgrade, and that Belgrade had discouraged him from coming.

Maček's statements betrayed a noticeable lack of determination. His efforts are apparently directed equally toward the preservation of peace with Germany and the continued existence of Yugoslavia.⁴

FREUNDT

¹ Document No. 239.

² See document No. 241.

³ Grote's memorandum of Apr. 2 (230/152780) recorded an Abwehr report of Apr. 1 from Vienna that general mobilization had been ordered.

⁴ In Zagreb telegram No. 28 of Apr. 2 (230/152802) Freundt reported having been informed by Maček through an intermediary that he had decided to break with Belgrade.

No. 247

230/152797

The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 347 of April 2

BELGRADE, April 2, 1941.

Received April 2—6:37 p. m.

I. Morale among the population is low. A change with respect to the first days of the revolution can clearly be sensed. In the Army, too, the first signs are discernible that, particularly in the case of the old officers, second thoughts are setting in. The Government would now presumably be ready to make concessions in order to avoid war. It is indicating more than clearly a willingness to negotiate.¹ How far concessions would go, it is, to be sure, impossible to judge.

II. In negotiations this morning with the Croats, whose spokesman is chiefly Košutić (not Ban Subašić), progress is supposed to have been made. It seems possible that an agreement will be reached.

FEINE

¹ In telegram No. 345 of the same day (230/152792) Feine reported conciliatory statements made by Bogoljub Jeftić, Minister of Transport in the Simović Cabinet and former Minister President, in a conversation with an informant of the Legation. Jeftić had assured the informant that the Yugoslav Government could guarantee a domestic and foreign policy satisfactory to Germany and observance of the Tripartite Pact.

No. 248

230/152806-08

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia

Telegram

TOP SECRET

MOST URGENT

No. 421

BERLIN, April 2, 1941.

For the Chargé d'Affaires personally.

1) In the course of Thursday, April 3, the staff of your Legation is to be reduced to four or five men. Only you personally, one radio operator, one code clerk, and, if necessary, one chauffeur, as well as one Attaché, are to remain in Belgrade.

For the Attachés of the Wehrmacht, the OKW, in agreement with the Commanders in Chief of the Luftwaffe and of the Army, has given the following orders: The Air Attaché, together with his staff, must leave Yugoslavia. The same applies to personnel of the Mili-

tary Attaché that can be spared. Colonel Toussaint, with the personnel indispensable to him, will remain there. The same applies to him as applies to the staff of the Legation remaining there, particularly item 4.

All other members of the Legation and of other Reich German offices, who are still there, must leave Belgrade in the course of Thursday and be directed at once for Germany or neutral territory.

The rest of the staff must remain together with you at the Legation. A car is to be kept at your disposal.

Secret material, all coding and radio instructions, as well as codes must be destroyed, except for Coding Manual No. 2980-2999 and Decoding Manual 3000-3099, as well as German code book No. 3, and radio operating instructions. Special note must be taken of the conversion table contained in section C of the enclosure to instruction Pers. ZB 387 g. Rs./39.¹

2) The German Consulates in Yugoslavia, except for the Consulate at Zagreb, must close in the course of Thursday, April 3. The personnel must leave Yugoslav territory after destroying all secret material. Wherever this is impossible, the personnel will remain at the official seat of the Consulate in the building of the Consulate. The shield of the Consulate is to be retained everywhere. Please instruct the Consulates at once accordingly, in so far as this is possible through secret channels. Zagreb will receive special instructions from here.

3) In the course of Thursday, April 3, the Ministers or Chargés d'Affaires of Italy, Japan, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Spain, and Slovakia are to be informed personally and orally through a reliable member of the Legation that in view of the ever-increasing tension in the situation, you have received the order gradually to reduce the activity of the Legation. You were advising your colleagues to do the same. This information must be conveyed in such a way that it is not in the nature of an official communication, but merely of information from a colleague.

4) As soon as you receive from here the code word "Tripartite Pact" you are to destroy at once all secret material, conceal the radio under the coal pile or the like, and, with the remaining staff of the Legation, leave the city limits of Belgrade, if possible. I leave it to you to select a suitable place to stay. Please maintain the strictest secrecy regarding this point 4.

5) The receipt of this instruction is to be acknowledged at once.²

RIBBENTROP

¹ Not filmed.

² Acknowledgment was made by telegram No. 353 of Apr. 3 (230/152824).

No. 249

1126/321769

*The Wehrmacht Operations Staff to the Chief of the
Wehrmacht Mission in Bucharest*Draft Teletype¹

CHEFSACHE

OKW/WFSt.

OKW Ausland 92/41

BERLIN, April . . . , 1941.

The consequences of the tension existing between the Axis Powers and the present Yugoslav Government cannot yet be foreseen. It may, however, also affect the attitude of Russia.

The Führer therefore considers it necessary to suggest to General Antonescu increased preparations for defense on the Russian border without arousing the suspicion of the Russians through a general mobilization.

One cannot be serious enough in drawing attention to [the need for] carefully organizing the protection of the oil region around Ploesti both against air raids and against the dropping of demolition teams with parachutes by night.

The Göring regiment is being made available for this purpose.

The other forces in Rumania or en route to Rumania have to be assembled in such a way that in case of need, they may constitute the necessary support for the Rumanian eastern front.

Rumania's intentions and your own are to be reported.

¹ This draft is not signed.

The following marginal note is found at the head of this document: "To Ambassador Ritter. Hand-carried by officer. Bürkner, Apr. 2."

No. 250

1448/365837-40

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

No. 58

HELSINKI, April 2, 1941.

Pol. VI 1563 g.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Policy of the Finnish Foreign Minister.

M. Witting, the Finnish Foreign Minister, stated to me recently that, as a small country, Finland could at present pursue no policy of her own choice, but had to adapt herself to circumstances. The question arises as to what this means in practice.

All circles in Finland feel clearly the dangers to which the small countries are exposed through the political earthquake that is shaking Europe. They are just as united in the conviction that the chief source of danger for Finland lies in Russia. This conviction has gained ground especially since the Baltic countries have become the victims of Russia. A Finnish diplomat in a conversation with me recently compared the situation of Finland with respect to Russia with that of a person who is lying beside a giant snake and must expect at any moment to be devoured by it.

The Finnish-Russian war has shown that Finland cannot defend herself alone against the big neighbor; that the Swedish help at the time was inadequate and that help from England is out of the question. The only country that can really protect Finland against Russia, according to the view that is generally entertained throughout the country, is Germany.

The Finnish Foreign Minister has drawn his conclusions from this. He is trying to interest German capital in his country. In the Petsamo nickel question he is trying to obtain for Germany a decisive share in the production of this richest nickel deposit in Europe at the expense of British rights and Russian pretensions. He is striving to strengthen German-Finnish trade in all sectors and to increase the cultural bonds between the two peoples. He has complied without hesitation with our wish for the establishment of a German line of communications through Finland to northern Norway¹ and has taken the stand that the presence of German troops in Finland represents a security factor for the country.

As a corollary of this attitude, the Finnish Foreign Minister has pursued with respect to Russia a policy that was dilatory in all important questions, but which never permitted things to come to an open breach. This applies primarily to the blustering demand of the Russians that they obtain the management of the Petsamo mines, and likewise to the constantly reiterated requests with which the Russians wished to improve their position in Hangö and on the Russian line of communications to that place as well as in the Åland Islands.

The triangle Finland-Germany-Russia is the figure on which the fate of Finland will be decided. But the Finnish Foreign Minister must also reckon with forces that lie outside this triangle. The shortage of food which makes it impossible for Finland to subsist on her own stores until the next harvest, and the lack of indispensable raw materials cast black shadows on the desk of the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister must therefore keep up relations with England so that he receives the necessary navicerts from there

¹ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 88.

and likewise he cannot allow the relations with North America, which are rooted in the consciousness of the people, to cool off for material and other reasons.

The relations of Finland to the rest of the North have in the policy of the Foreign Minister undergone a corresponding adjustment to the change in the situation. Since two of the four countries have been occupied by German troops, the North is no longer the same political factor as that to which in prewar times Finnish policy looked for support. Nevertheless efforts are still being made in Finland to continue the so-called Nordic policy in a form as unchanged as possible. The Foreign Minister abstains from this and takes the newly created conditions into account. He handles relations with Denmark and Norway so cautiously that he does not thereby come into conflict with German interests. With Sweden as the only unoccupied Scandinavian country, he has broader operational possibilities. For geographic, historic, political, and economic reasons Sweden remains a noteworthy factor in all of Finland's calculations. Particularly in the present situation, Finland expects Sweden to make up a certain portion of the deficit of the food supply. Finland hopes, moreover, in the event of a conflict with Russia, to find in Sweden support of such scope as is not to be overlooked. In his relations with Sweden, however, the Foreign Minister always manages to see things in their right proportions and never neglects to consider the effect of his Swedish policy on the two great Baltic Powers, Germany and Russia, and in so doing in general gives priority to the considerations for Germany.

The esoteric² portion of the policy of the Foreign Minister faces a dilemma which awaits solution. Germany and Russia are not antithetic powers in world politics, but in Finland both Great Powers are going their separate ways which may sooner or later cross. The time has not yet come for the Foreign Minister to opt openly for either of the two Great Powers. But when this time comes, it is my personal impression that the Foreign Minister would like to lead his country into the arms of the Tripartite Pact. He would, in my opinion, take into the bargain the danger of a strangulation by England and North America if he exchanged for this the certainty of liberating his country from the perpetual Russian menace.³

VON BLÜCHER

² Unsigned marginal note: "Intended for the initiates, secret."

³ On Apr. 16 copies of this dispatch were sent to the Embassy in Moscow and to the Legations in Copenhagen and Stockholm (1448/365336).

No. 251

230/152833

The Consul General at Zagreb to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 31 of April 3

ZAGREB, April 3, 1941.

Received April 3—3:04 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 80 of April 1.¹

Veesenmayer has arrived in Zagreb.²

The present situation and the impossibility of enlightening the Croatian people make it appear that a timely leaflet propaganda campaign is urgently necessary. Draft leaflets will be prepared here and sent by the fastest means.³ They should be dropped over towns and rural areas, and especially over troops with Croatian units. Fifth Army headquarters at Niš is especially full of Croats.

Košutić returned here this morning. Evidently Belgrade will comply with Maček's demands. The attempt is being made to induce Maček to make more extensive demands.

The German radio stations Donau and Alpen are especially important for Croatia. Exaggerations in reporting persecution of Volksdeutsche are harmful as facts to the contrary are easy to check on. On the other hand, [there ought to be] gradually increasing references to the antagonisms between the Croats and the Serbs, with emphasis on German sympathy and increased understanding for Croatian interests, and at the appropriate moment emphasis on the comradeship in arms in the World War.

FREUNDT

¹ Not found.

² See document No. 243.

³ Two drafts for such leaflets were transmitted by Freundt in Zagreb telegram No. 35 of Apr. 4 (230/152855-56).

No. 252

230/152826

The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 356 of April 3

BELGRADE, April 3, 1941.

Received April 3—3:40 p. m.

The Foreign Minister wanted to speak with me this morning. I replied in accordance with telegram No. 389 of March 30¹ that I would send a member of the Legation to receive his communication.

¹ Document No. 236.

He did not agree to this, but asked the DNB representative to see him and told him the following:

The Italians had invited him to Rome in order to discuss the situation.² He considered it to be more correct, however, for him to negotiate directly with Berlin. He was ready at any time to come to Berlin by the speediest possible means in order to speak with the Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister.

The DNB representative remarked that Ninčić gave the impression of being practically prostrate.

FEINE

² See document No. 253.

No. 253

230/152828

The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 357 of April 3

BELGRADE, April 3, 1941.

Received April 3—5:05 p. m.

The Italian Minister told me that by instruction of his Government he would inform Foreign Minister Ninčić this noon that the visit of two Yugoslav Ministers in Rome¹ which had been suggested by Belgrade would make sense only if an adequate basis for negotiations were assured beforehand. Otherwise, the journey would not only be useless, but possibly dangerous.

FEINE

¹ The idea of Yugoslav-Italian negotiations is also referred to in Zagreb telegram No. 25 of Apr. 2 (230/152772) which cited a statement by Maček that "Jovanović, the Second Vice President of the Government, was on the way to Rome in order to call on the Italian Government for mediation." Cf. the account of this episode given by Jovanović in Radoje L. Knežević, "Slobodan Jovanović u politici: U svetlosti dokumenata," *Poruka* (London, January-March 1959), pp. 26-41.

No. 254

221/149195-96

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1068

PARIS, April 3, 1941—6:15 p. m.

Received April 3—6:35 p. m.

This morning the Commissioner for Jewish Questions, Xavier Vallat, newly appointed by the French Government, presented himself at the Embassy. He is a disabled veteran from the World War,

and as a member of the Chamber of Deputies for many years he has engaged in anti-Semitism, particularly in the controversy against Léon Blum.

The tasks of Xavier Vallat are threefold:

1. Supervision of the execution of the laws regarding Jews already passed by the French Government;¹
2. Harmonizing of the laws regarding Jews passed by the French Government for all of France with the regulations regarding Jews passed by the Military Commander in France for the occupied area as suggested by the Embassy;²
3. Preparation of further French laws regarding Jews.

Since Darlan was able to have a Commissioner for Jews appointed only in the face of strong opposition by Pétain, and the opposition to the Commissioner's activity will certainly continue as a result of American pressure,³ it is advisable for Vallat to proceed in stages in the third task listed so as not to place himself immediately in open opposition to Pétain's views.

The measures regarding Jews passed so far are concerned with the removal of foreign and French Jews from higher positions in the Government, the Army, and from all areas of activity in the press, radio, theater, and films.

The laws still to be drawn up by Vallat are to force as large a portion as possible of the Jews residing in France from the remaining liberal professions, from industry and commerce, as well, and prepare the way for their emigration.

If these laws treat the "old established" French Jews in exactly the same way as the foreign and newly naturalized ones, it can be expected that they will have numerous loopholes.

If they do not contradict too strongly the tendency clearly noted in Vichy to differentiate between the "old established" French Jews and the foreign and newly naturalized Jews, the laws left for Vallat to prepare can be formulated very severely, and this would be more important at present.

However, in order that the "old established" ones may also at a later stage be included under the same measures which apply to the foreign and newly naturalized Jews, a law is necessary even at this time authorizing the French Commissioner for Jews to declare "old established" Jews who have acted contrary to the social and national interests of the French nation to be "foreign."

¹ A statute defining the status of Jews was issued by the Vichy Government on Oct. 18, 1940. For the text, see *Journal Officiel de la République Française: Lois et Décrets*, 1940, No. 266, p. 5323.

² On the regulations regarding Jews passed by the Military Commander in France for the occupied area, see vol. XI of this series, document No. 165.

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1940* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1959), vol. II, pp. 565 ff., and *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 503 ff.

With the aid of such a law the entire "old established" Jewry, which represents about one fifth of all the Jews living in France today, can also gradually be induced to leave France.

I have advised Xavier Vallat to propose such a law to Vichy, and have so informed the competent specialist at the Paris office of the SD, whom I brought together with Vallat.

The Embassy has assigned Counselor of Legation Zeitschel as liaison to the French Commissioner for Jews and the specialist for Jews of the Security Service in Paris.

ABETZ

No. 255

205/142651

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

STOCKHOLM, April 3, 1941—11:40 p. m.

No. 347 of April 3

Received April 4—4:30 a. m.

In the course of my visit with the Foreign Minister today I had the opportunity to discuss the attitude of Sweden in recent weeks. In reply to my critical remark concerning the frequent emphasis on Sweden's neutrality in the recent speeches of a number of ministers, Günther stated that these were not aimed at anything in the field of foreign policy. Rather they had been directed at certain newspapers which had reproached the Government for its unneutral attitude. To this I pointed out that the fact that Sweden (clear text evidently missing) [*had published?*] the figures on these transports of men on leave with exaggerated exactitude had made an unpleasant impression in Berlin. In my opinion Sweden's attitude in the last few weeks indicated increased pressure on the part of England. To this the Foreign Minister replied that 3 or 4 weeks ago the British Minister¹ had indicated informally that the transit traffic of men on leave was not compatible with Swedish neutrality. England would not enter any objections, however, as long as there were no military operations in Norway. The British Minister had not said anything about a combination of circumstances in the military and political spheres which could bring about military operations. Aside from this there had been no English pressure of any kind. The Minister had only recently asked whether Swedish-Finnish negotiations had taken place regarding political ties. Günther had replied in the negative, but he believed he understood from the putting of the question that England would be likely to welcome such negotia-

¹ Victor Mallet.

tions. Upon my asking him the Foreign Minister repeated once more that the recent calling up of Swedes liable for military service was not connected with the increased transit traffic of German soldiers on leave (cf. telegraphic report No. 287 of March 21²).

WIED

² Not printed (205/142643).

No. 256

8589/E602836-40

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, April 3, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

OKW/WFSt/Abt. L No. 44895/41 g. K. Chefs.

By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 26

Cooperation with our allies in the Balkans

1) The military tasks intended for the *southeastern European states* in the campaign against Yugoslavia result from the political objectives:

Hungary, to whom the Banat will fall, will mainly have to occupy that area, but has declared herself in addition ready to cooperate in the destruction of the enemy.

Bulgaria should get back Macedonia and is therefore principally to be interested in an attack in this direction, but without particular pressure being exerted from the German side. Furthermore the Bulgarians, supported by a German armored unit, will provide the rear cover against Turkey. For that purpose Bulgaria will also employ the three divisions stationed on the Greek border.

Rumania, in her own as well as in the German interest will have to limit her mission to protecting the frontier against Yugoslavia and against Russia. Through the chief of the Wehrmacht mission we should seek to achieve an increase in Rumania's defensive preparedness against Russia. [and if possible the shifting further to the east of the Rumanian forces around Timisoara (1 infantry division and 1 cavalry brigade) in order not to disturb the communications between the Hungarian Second Army and the German XXXXI Army Corps.]¹ At the very least two-way communications across the Rumanian-Hungarian boundary must proceed between Hungarian and German liaison headquarters without hindrance.

¹ OKW directive of Apr. 5 (8589/E602841), stipulated that the passage which is in brackets be deleted. It stated, however, that the employment of Hungarian forces east of the Tisza river was not desired.

2) The following guiding principles will apply for the *military cooperation* and the organization of command in the coming operations:

I reserve to myself the unified command of this campaign, in so far as the operational objectives of the Italian and Hungarian forces within the framework of the whole operation are concerned. It must be carried on in a way that takes into account the sensibilities of our allies and leaves to the Chiefs of State of Italy and Hungary the possibility of appearing to their peoples and armed forces as sovereign military leaders.

I shall therefore pass on the military demands for the coordination of operations, which are to be transmitted to me by the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe as proposals and wishes, in the form of personal letters to the Duce² and Regent Horthy.³

The same procedure is to be followed by the Commander in Chief of the Twelfth Army toward the Bulgarian governmental and military authorities.

If single Bulgarian divisions participate in the operations against Yugoslavia, they must be subordinate to the German commanding officers of the given areas.

3) In Hungary a headquarters named "The German General with the High Command of the Hungarian Armed Forces" shall be set up, to whose staff a liaison staff of the Luftwaffe shall also be attached.

This headquarters will serve both my liaison with the Regent, as well as the liaison of the Wehrmacht branches with the Hungarian High Command.

All details of the cooperation with the Italian and Hungarian forces are to be settled by the Wehrmacht branches and by liaison staffs to be exchanged between adjoining armies and air fleets.

4) The *air defense forces* of Rumania and Bulgaria remain integrated in the German air defense of these countries, in so far as they are not employed in the areas of their own armies. Hungary will defend her territory herself, provided that German units operating there, and the buildings essential to them, are protected by the German Wehrmacht.

5) Apart from the new arrangement regarding the unified command, the agreements with Hungary⁴ remain in effect. The Second Italian Army will gain freedom of movement only after the attack of the German Second Army and the motorized group of the XLVI Army Corps begin to take effect. To this end it may become neces-

² Document No. 281.

³ See document No. 282 and footnotes ■ and 3, and document No. 334.

⁴ See document No. 215, footnote 2.

sary that at first it be made more in a southern than southeastern direction. Limiting the Italian Air Force to protection of the flank and the rear of the front in Albania, to attacks on the Mostar airfield and coastal airports, and to cooperation along the front of the Second Italian Army as soon as it advances to the attack, will be arranged by the OKW.

6) I shall later regulate the *tasks in the occupation* devolving upon the various countries after the campaign. In the manner of the cooperation with the allies even during the operations the brotherhood in arms for the achievement of a common political goal must be stressed in every possible way.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 257

195/139127-29

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

U. St.S. Pol. No. 259

BERLIN, April 3, 1941.

The well-known Indian nationalist, Subhas Bose, arrived in Berlin yesterday and called on me today.¹

We discussed in a noncommittal way the organization of the program for the immediate future. M. Bose wants to remain in Berlin for a while at first, then go to Rome and later return to Germany.

Bose's arrival in Germany could be announced by the German press and radio at the beginning of next week with appropriate ceremony; a proposal for this will follow via the Press Department.² Then the next day M. Bose would make his first radio speech in Hindustani, the text of which would have to be submitted and approved in advance. This would then be followed by additional radio speeches, including some in the English language.

M. Bose then briefly described his political program; its main point is that he wants to set up an Indian government in Germany, visualizing as a model the Polish, etc., governments in exile. To form his government, he expects certain promises from the Axis Powers, which he wants to formulate in detail. Besides propaganda actions the program furthermore includes the instigation of uprisings in India. As a final objective he has in mind the entry by the Axis Powers into India, in regard to which he cited the following figures: The Anglo-Indian Army consisted of only 300,000 men, of which at most 70,000 were Englishmen. The major portion of the Indian elements was willing to defect at any time. An army of 100,000 men with modern equipment would be adequate to free

¹ See document No. 36.

² Not found.

India from English rule. I maintained a purely noncommittal attitude on this point. It would perhaps be useful if M. Bose is received by the Foreign Minister only after he has worked out his program, which he intends to do in the next few days. He will then submit it in written form.³

I introduced M. Bose to Minister Cosmelli, as this developed informally owing to the order of the visitors. M. Bose intends to call also on the State Secretary and Ambassador Alfieri in the next few days.

Secretary of Legation Schlobies has been assigned to look after M. Bose.

The smaller amounts of money required for the time being have already been made available by the Personnel Department. A proposal will be submitted concerning the later arrangement of the financial side of the question.⁴

M. Bose's presence in Afghanistan did not become known to the Afghan Government, and is to continue a secret. From this it follows that the route of travel through the Soviet Union cannot be made public either.⁵

A memorandum regarding Bose's person is again enclosed.⁶

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request that such a procedure be approved.

WOERMANN

³ See document No. 300.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ See document No. 36.

⁶ Unsigned memorandum of Feb. 2 (195/130130-31).

No. 258

222/149465-66

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 223

BERLIN, April 3, 1941.

The enclosed letter was received today by the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

SECRET

BERLIN, April 2, 1941.

The Chief of the Personal Staff
of the Reichsführer SS

TGB. No. AR/846/13

DEAR RIBBENTROP: After the conclusion of today's discussions with State Secretary von Weizsäcker and the other gentlemen of the

Foreign Ministry I informed the Reichsführer SS in detail about the content of our negotiations.¹

The Reichsführer SS, who is at the moment ill in bed, instructed me to inform you that, considering the difficult questions of a technical nature, he regards it as necessary after he has regained his health to discuss with you personally the problem of the police attachés and the Security Service as soon as there is an opportunity to do this quietly.

Since I gained the impression from my conversation with you and your deputies that on the one hand the speedy return of Minister von Killinger to Rumania is urgently necessary, but that on the other hand you do not consider this return possible before the question of the police attachés is settled, I have pointed out this state of affairs to the Reichsführer SS.² The Reichsführer SS by no means wishes your decision regarding the return of Minister von Killinger to Rumania to be affected by the divergence in our views in the matter of the police attachés and of the intelligence service abroad. Therefore—regardless of your decision regarding Killinger—he has ordered the immediate recall of all SS and police deputies from Rumania at all events.³

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

WOLFF

¹ No record of such discussions has been found. However, there is in the files an unsigned State Secretary memorandum of Mar. 31 (201/89562-63) recording information received from Wolff regarding Himmler's view of certain controversies with the Foreign Ministry, some of which are mentioned in the document printed.

² The memorandum referred to in footnote 1 contains the following passage with respect to Killinger's conflict with the SD:

"Certain differences of a personal nature which had developed between the Reichsführer SS and Gruppenführer Heydrich on one hand and Minister von Killinger on the other have been settled by a talk of the parties concerned which took place in the meantime." See document No. 129, footnote 1.

³ In a letter of Apr. 25 (5122/E295726) Heydrich informed Weizsäcker that he had recalled his deputies for police matters and his SD deputy together with their staffs and that no member of these two offices had been in Rumania since Apr. 6.

No. 259

220/152918-20

Memorandum by the Minister to Yugoslavia

BERLIN, April 3, 1941.

Regarding the Events in Belgrade.

I. The revolution in Belgrade was a typically Serbian military Putsch. It was not exactly the Army as such or even simply the Serbian officer corps that backed it, but 29 conspirators in all—mostly young Air Force officers—that engineered the Putsch. The

motive was, aside from the ordinary spirit of adventure, the violent aversion to the "foreigner" Prince Paul and the "gypsy" Cvetković, by whom fanatical Serbian patriots believed they have been betrayed in Vienna. Enemy propaganda had circulated reports that secret clauses had been signed in Vienna, in which Yugoslavia had had to humble herself before Germany and, even worse, before Italy. The people of Belgrade did not participate in the Putsch in any way. If in the first 2 days they gave vigorous expression to their joy over the Putsch, it was joy at the ascension to the throne of the young King and the entry of respected and popular Serbian politicians into the government. The excesses that occurred in Belgrade on the first day were organized by Communist students and Jews and undoubtedly occurred against the will of the Government and also against the will of the mass of the population at large. Actually no further excesses have occurred, and even on the first day, patriotic demonstrations filed directly by in front of the windows of the German Legation, without so much as a stone being thrown at the windows. In the following days many Belgrade Serbs, including Serbian reserve officers, came to me, showed full understanding for our attitude, realized that through the tragedy of fate the conflict had probably become inevitable, and left with the assurance that, even in the event of conflict, they wished to adhere to their friendship for Germany. At this very moment I could again satisfy myself that we have many more friends in Belgrade than the turmoil in the streets would lead one to believe at certain moments.

II. Meanwhile complete disillusionment has set in in Belgrade. There is willingness to fight, but one is aware of the folly of this fighting, since among the broad masses there is hatred of Italy, but not of Germany. Except for a small chauvinistic stratum, respect for German efficiency and integrity is general among the people of Belgrade. There are many provincial towns in Serbian territory where the population, to a far greater extent than in Belgrade, has been stirred up against us.

III. In these circumstances, punitive action against Belgrade would not be understood and would be felt to be unjust even in Yugoslav circles which are friendly to us. All the advantages of today's definitely antiwar sentiment in the Serbian peasant and middle classes would change into the fanatical determination to resist which we encountered in the World War. Even the Croatian population, whose feeling of solidarity with the Serbs must not be underestimated, despite all violent disputes, might be unfavorably influenced in a politically very undesirable way by an action felt to be unjust and brutal. If, moreover, Croatian ministers, or even Dr. Maček, the leader of the Croats, himself, should be harmed in

the process, the political consequences, as far as the attitude of the Croats is concerned, could not be foreseen.

That Germany is forced to clarify the situation in Yugoslavia quickly and completely is very widely realized in Yugoslavia. But just as general is the conviction that, in the waging of her battle, Germany is not to be guided by impulses, but only by compelling military necessities. It would be a serious loss of prestige for Germany in Yugoslavia if enemy propaganda were offered an opportunity to succeed in casting doubt on the chivalrousness of German warfare.¹

V. HEEREN

German Minister

¹ Marginal note: "In agreement with Herr Heeren not submitted to the Foreign Minister because Heeren wanted to present the matter orally today. W[eizsäcker], Apr. 5."

No. 260

1448/365357-58

*The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Commander in Chief of the Army to the Foreign Ministry*¹

208/41

HEADQUARTERS, April 3, 1941.
Pol. V 1495 g.

The OKH has received reports according to which rumors are being spread among Reich Germans residing in the Soviet Union by travelers from Germany, that a German-Russian military clash is imminent. The foreign diplomats in Moscow also are said to be alarmed by these rumors. Thus the (Jewish) wife of the American Ambassador, Steinhardt, remarked that she would like to be out of Moscow before the German troops entered it.² The OKH feels that such rumor mongering is very detrimental to the further peaceful development of German-Russian relations. It therefore requests the Foreign Ministry to make sure that Germans traveling to or through Russia (e.g., the Wohlthat mission³) are expressly enjoined not only to refrain from spreading any rumors of the order mentioned, but also to deny such rumors in the most forceful terms.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Ministry—Pol. V—Berlin, with request for appropriate action.

By order:
VON SCHMIEDEN

¹ Copies of this report were sent for information to the Embassies in Moscow and Tokyo on Apr. 16.

² See document No. 160.

³ See documents Nos. 78 and 190.

No. 261

F5/0273-72;
F5/0270*The Regent of Hungary to Adolf Hitler*¹

BUDAPEST, April 3, 1941.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: Minister President Count Teleki shot himself last night. He was the symbol of exaggerated correctness, of purity, of devotion to duty; a highly educated, talented statesman and scholar, who as a result of overwork and under the burden of weighty events no longer knew any other way out.

He left me a letter,² in which he wrote that he felt conscience-stricken because at the Council of Ministers over which I presided night before last and at which the Chief of the General Staff was present he did not sufficiently protest against the fact that, although obligated to Yugoslavia by the Friendship Pact recently concluded,³ we were nevertheless taking advantage of the present opportunity to become despoilers of corpses. He also felt that the great danger for us came from the side of the Russians and the Rumanians. He knew that in order to be able to cope with this danger the Hungarian nation must be extremely sparing of its human resources and war material, especially in view of the very bad food situation caused by damage from the elements.

At this meeting, I myself was of the opinion that, in view of the pact of friendship recently concluded, we had to try to save face. In the end, however, we were of the same opinion that, after the entry of the German troops, Croatia would probably secede from the Yugoslav body politic and that thereby the treaty partner, the kingdom of Yugoslavia, would cease to exist as such.

Count Teleki felt the victim of a conflict of conscience which is felt also by the entire nation.

I do not doubt that Your Excellency will understand that this tragic case, unique in recent history, has deeply shaken me and with me the entire nation.

In accordance with my letter of March 28,⁴ we have already taken military measures. But the conflict of conscience confronting us to the magnitude of which nothing attests more clearly than the suicide of the Prime Minister, compels us to request that the German Army Command assign to our troops only such tasks as are reconcilable with our conscience.

¹ According to Woermann's memorandum of Apr. 3 (73/53180) Sztójay told him that evening that Hungarian Minister of Defense Bartha would arrive in Berlin by plane the next morning (Apr. 4) bringing a letter from Horthy to Hitler.

See, further, document No. 264.

² For the problem of establishing a text of the Teleki letter, see C. A. Macartney, *A History of Hungary, 1929-1945*, vol. I, pp. 488-489.

³ See document No. 227, footnote 3.

⁴ Document No. 227.

I do not need again to repeat that I remain always the same in unity with you.

Yours, etc.

HORTHY

No. 262

230/152844-45

The Consul General at Zagreb to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 33 of April ■

ZAGREB, April 4, 1941.

Received April 4—2: 05 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

This noon Malletke had a conversation with Maček.¹ The latter stated:

1. He categorically rejected any discussion about an independent Greater Croatia.
2. The statement on the Tripartite Pact would confirm anew the Serbian good will.
3. Maček realizes that Yugoslavia must give the German Reich satisfaction.
4. If Berlin agrees, Maček wishes to offer to the Serbian Government personally to take over the negotiations with the German Reich regarding renewed acknowledgment of the Tripartite Pact and in reference to bringing about adequate satisfaction.
5. Two persons with exclusive full powers are to step in alongside the King, whose importance is practically eliminated.
6. The idea of detaching Slovenia can not be discussed. The same applies to its partition.

Maček was entirely negative with respect to all of Malletke's objections and attempts at influencing him.² He believes in his mission for preservation of peace and in its success, and requested that he be informed as to whether Berlin were in agreement with his willingness to conduct the negotiations himself as mentioned.

Maček is obviously proud and is carried along by the supposed success of his policy.³ However, he could not make any convincing statement concerning practical possibilities of carrying it out in Belgrade.

The substance of Maček's press statement just issued is as follows:

¹ See document No. 243.

² In telegram No. 34 of Apr. 3 (230/152846) Veessenmayer and Freundt reported that it seemed hopeless to try to persuade Maček from going to Belgrade because he had already committed himself through the press. They suggested that the Croatian people would regard him as a traitor which was the way that he might be represented in German propaganda.

³ Heinburg's memorandum of Apr. ■ (3569/E023755) records that at 3:55 p.m. that day Feine telephoned from Belgrade that Maček had accepted the post of Deputy Minister President in the Yugoslav Cabinet and would arrive in Belgrade next day.

I am a Christian and mindful of the words of Christ: Blessed are they who build, for they shall be called sons of God [*Seelig sind die da bauen, denn sie werden Söhne Gottes heissen*]. The sense of responsibility toward the people, who have already given me their trust for more than 9 years, impels me to try everything to save the peace, the highest good of mankind, for this people.

I am deeply convinced that the present leaders of Serbia, too, are just as sincere as I myself.

I am aware that in spite of all the difficulties of recent times we will preserve the peace through joint cooperation and will bear the difficulties that arise more easily. Furthermore assurance has been gained that through this cooperation the rights which Croatia has gained will not only be preserved and consolidated, but also strengthened.

It emerged from Veesenmayer's consultation with radical nationalist circles that Maček is being rejected and unequivocally characterized as a traitor, although at that time the aforementioned fact was not yet known. The radical nationalists again stress, however, that their ranks have been considerably decimated by arrests, by flight, and induction in the Army. Since in addition the armament is entirely inadequate, it is not possible for them to enter into action. They consider the entry of German troops the sole solution.

I request instructions at once, since Maček is willing to make his statement in Belgrade concerning his stepping in personally to conduct negotiations with the Reich dependent upon the attitude of the German Government.

The general mobilization is continuing.

Malletke requests that the outcome of his discussion with Maček⁴ also be transmitted to Reichsleiter Rosenberg.⁵

FREUNDT

⁴ For Maček's account of this discussion, see *In the Struggle for Freedom*, pp. 220-221.

⁵ Malletke's detailed report on his activities in Zagreb was submitted to Rosenberg who forwarded it, together with a supplementary note, to Lammers on Apr. 18. In this note Rosenberg complained that Ribbentrop and the Foreign Ministry had failed to keep him informed about the Zagreb negotiations. Lammers declined to submit the papers to Hitler (2349/487531-39).

No. 263

230/152862

The Consul General at Zagreb to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 37 of April 4

ZAGREB, April 4, 1941.

Received April 4—6:32 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Veesenmayer is working toward uniting all the important groups, including the Peasant party, which reject Maček's way of acting.

He views the prospect of success positively, provided there is still sufficient time.

Rejection of Maček is growing.

Veesenmayer urgently requests instructions as to whether the Foreign Minister approves this effort.¹

FREUNDT

¹ In telegram No. 89 of Apr. 5 (116/86707) Altenburg notified the Zagreb Consulate of Ribbentrop's approval of Veesenmayer's effort.

No. 264

73/53182-83

Memorandum by the State Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, April 4, 1941.

St.S. No. 227

This afternoon the Hungarian Minister had wanted to call on the Foreign Minister to give him information about the audience of the Hungarian [Defense] Minister, Bartha, with the Führer;¹ in Sztójay's opinion, however, this information was presumably out-of-date, because the Führer would surely have informed the Foreign Minister in the meantime.

The core of the information sent by the Regent to the Führer through Bartha was that M. de Horthy would like to be released in some generally comprehensible manner from the moral obligation contained in the Hungarian-Yugoslav Pact concluded only recently. M. de Horthy therefore was attaching importance to having a manifest occasion for the war created. Such an occasion could consist either in an attack or at least an encroachment of the Yugoslavs with respect to Hungary or in a declaration of independence by Croatia. Either of these two developments would relieve the Regent's conscience and appear to be an adequate cause of conflict between Hungary and Yugoslavia.

The Führer, however, had told Bartha that the revolution which had taken place in Belgrade, as well as the treatment of the Volksdeutsche, was already sufficient grounds for war; nevertheless, he had agreed to think over the anxieties of the Regent and to give M. de Horthy a reply.

Toward the end of the conversation, M. Sztójay drew the Führer's attention to the person of a retired Lieutenant Colonel, Ivo Perčić²

¹ See document No. 261, footnote 1.

² Possibly ■ reference to Ivan Perčević, Lieutenant Colonel in the Imperial Austrian Army, a leader of Croatian exiles in Vienna in the period between the wars.

(Schwerin), who sympathized and agreed with Pavelić, the nationalist, and who was especially suitable for carrying on agitation in Croatia.³

In conclusion, the Hungarian Minister also remarked about the fact that with respect to the audience of Minister Bartha with the Führer, he had gone through the regular channels of the Foreign Ministry. The fact that M. Bartha got to the Führer through assistance from another German quarter (apparently through Field Marshal Keitel) without participation of the Foreign Ministry was something in which he—Sztójay—had no part.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

³ For an account of Hitler's conversation with Bartha and Sztójay based on Hungarian sources, see C. A. Macartney, *A History of Hungary, 1929-1945*, vol. II, pp. 4-6.

No. 265

104/113240-41

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, April 4, 1941—10:28 p. m.

SECRET

Received April 5—12:55 a. m.

No. 796 of April 4

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Molotov just summoned me to the Kremlin to inform me of the following, in accordance with the agreement to consult existing between Germany and the Soviet Union:¹

The Yugoslav Government had proposed to the Soviet Government the negotiation of a treaty of friendship and nonaggression, and the Soviet Government had accepted the proposal. This agreement would be signed today or tomorrow.² In its decision to accede to the proposal of the Yugoslav Government, the Soviet Government had been actuated solely by the desire to preserve peace. It knew that in this desire it was in harmony with the Reich Government, which was likewise opposed to an extension of the war. The Soviet Government therefore hoped that the German Government, too, in its present relations to Yugoslavia, would do everything to maintain peace. The agreement between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was analogous to the Turko-Soviet Agreement of 1925,³ and relations of the Soviet Union to other countries were not

¹ See vol. VII of this series, document No. 228, articles III and V.

² Text in Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, pp. 484-485.

³ Text in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLVII, p. 353.

affected by the agreement with Yugoslavia. The Soviet-Yugoslav agreement was directed against no one and was not aimed at any other state.

I replied to Molotov that in my estimation the moment chosen by the Soviet Union for the negotiation of such a treaty had been very unfortunate, and the very signing would create an undesirable impression in the world. The policy of the Yugoslav Government was entirely unclear, and its attitude, as well as the behavior of the Yugoslav public toward Germany, was challenging.

Molotov replied that Yugoslavia had concluded a treaty with Germany regarding accession to the Tripartite Pact, and the Yugoslav Minister here, who was at the same time a member of the new Cabinet,⁴ had assured the Soviet Government that the new Yugoslav Government was observing this treaty. In these circumstances, the Soviet Government had thought that it could, for its part, conclude an agreement with Yugoslavia that was not even so far-reaching as the German-Yugoslav Treaty.

To my objection that, to my knowledge, we had thus far received no statement from the Yugoslav Government regarding the observance of its accession to the Tripartite Pact and had been given every reason to doubt its good will, Molotov countered with the assertion that he was convinced of the peaceful intentions of the Yugoslav Government. The latter had restored peace and order to its country and strove to create good relations with all its neighbors.

At my objection that the behavior of the new Yugoslav Government actually revealed no striving toward good relations with Germany—and despite all my efforts to obtain from Molotov the promise that the Soviet Government might reconsider the matter—Molotov repeatedly stated that the Soviet Government had reached its decision after mature deliberation. It was convinced that the step it had taken was a positive contribution to peace, which was also desired by Germany. To this Molotov added the repeated and urgent request that Germany also do all she could to preserve peace in the Balkans.

SCHULENBURG

⁴Milan Gavrilović, Minister without Portfolio in the Cabinet of General Dušan Simović.

No. 266

67/47334-47

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Füh. 20

BERLIN, April 4, 1941.

RECORD OF THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND MINISTER OF STATE MEISSNER AT BERLIN, APRIL 4, 1941

Matsuoka first thanked the Führer for the gifts which had been presented to him in the Führer's name, which he said he would treasure forever in an honored place as a perpetual remembrance of his stay in Berlin. At the same time he expressed his thanks for the friendly reception which he had received in Germany from the Führer, the Reich Foreign Minister, and the whole German people. As long as he lived he would never forget the sympathy which had been displayed toward him here on all sides. On his return to Japan he would exert himself with all his power to convince the Japanese people of the sincere friendship and esteem in which they were held by the German people.

Next Matsuoka reported concerning his conversations with the Duce and the Pope.

With the Duce he had discussed the European situation in general and the state of the war, as well as the relationship of Italy to Germany and the future course of world development. The Duce had informed him (Matsuoka) of his views of the situation of the war in Greece, Yugoslavia, and North Africa and of the part which Italy herself had in these events. Finally the Chief of the Italian Government had spoken of Soviet Russia and America. He had said that one must have a clear notion of the importance of one's opponents. The enemy No. 1 was America, and Soviet Russia came only in second place. By these remarks the Duce had given him to understand that America as enemy No. 1 would have to be very carefully observed, but should not be provoked. On the other hand one must be thoroughly prepared for all eventualities. Matsuoka had agreed in this line of thought.

With regard to Soviet Russia the Duce had spoken only briefly and to the same effect as had the Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister. In that connection also Matsuoka had agreed with him.

As the deepest impression which he was bringing back from his conversation with the Duce, Matsuoka mentioned the sense of complete unity between Italy and Germany, whose relations, in his opinion, could never be disturbed. Both countries were as one and

firmly determined not to let this position be shaken. Matsuoka had felt this previously, but his conviction after his conversation with the Duce was stronger than ever. On his return to Japan he would try to drive home this fact, especially with those Japanese who continued to believe that Italy could be persuaded by Great Britain, perhaps not to become detached from Germany completely, but at least to cease to fight with her whole heart for the common cause.

Count Ciano, with whom he was personally friendly, had informed him that he did not always completely understand the policy of the Führer, but that nevertheless he had implicit confidence in him and his decisions.

With the Pope he had had an open and friendly conversation lasting for an hour and a quarter, which was concerned in a more theoretical fashion with the present situation and the future development of civilization. They had not spoken of the war, so that it would be hardly useful to describe the conversation any further to the Führer. At his departure Matsuoka had asked the Pope whether or not the latter perceived any opportunity or chance for bringing about peace. After brief consideration the Pope had said "No," and on his part asked Matsuoka whether or not he discerned any possibilities of peace. Matsuoka had also replied in the negative. The Pope had added only that nevertheless he prayed daily for peace and he requested Matsuoka to do the same, which the latter promised to do. In addition the Pope declared that if Japan saw any possibility of peace he would be glad to give his assistance.

Matsuoka further reported that he had told the Pope that during the World War he had served in the Foreign Office in Tokyo as private secretary to the then Prime Minister, and that, in that capacity, he had sought to persuade the Prime Minister and Field Marshal Yamagata to establish communication with the Vatican for the purpose of bringing about peace. Both had been favorable in principle but they had not had the boldness to put the idea into actual operation.

Matsuoka added that he had been led to undertake these peace efforts principally in view of the personality of Cardinal Gaspari.

Further, he had sought to convince the Pope that the United States and especially the American President were prolonging the war in Europe and in China. It was not a matter of proving whether America and her President were right or wrong. They would certainly have definite grounds for their policy. Entirely apart from the question of right or wrong, the fact would have to be recognized that they were prolonging the war in Europe and in China. In connection with China he had sought to convince the Pope that Japan was not fighting against the Chinese or China herself, but only against Bolshevism, which was threatening to

spread over China and the whole Far East. It was regrettable that America and England stood on the side of Bolshevism.

The Führer here interjected that both countries had stood on the side of Bolshevism in Spain as well.

Matsuoka then advanced the request that the Führer should instruct the appropriate authorities in Germany to meet the desires of the Japanese Military Commission as fully as possible. Especially in the field of U-boat warfare, Japan required German help in the way of furnishing the latest operational experience and the newest technical improvements and discoveries. Japan would do everything in her power to avoid a war with the United States. In case his country determined on a stroke against Singapore, the Japanese Navy must, of course, also make preparations against the United States, for in such a case America might possibly come out on the side of Great Britain. Personally, he (Matsuoka) believed that he could by diplomatic means prevent the entry of the United States into the war on the side of Great Britain. The Army and Navy must, however, prepare for the worst, i.e., for a war against America. They believed that such a war might last over 5 years and would be fought out as a guerrilla war in the Pacific Ocean and South Seas. For this reason the experience derived by Germany in her guerrilla war would be most important for Japan. It was a matter of how such a war could best be carried on and how all the technical improvements of the U-boats, down to individual parts, such as periscopes and the like, could be made useful by Japan.

Summing up, Matsuoka asked the Führer to see to it that the improvements and discoveries in the naval and military fields should be made available to the Japanese by the competent German authorities.

The Führer agreed to this and added that Germany also considered a war with the United States to be undesirable, but that it had already been included in his calculations. In Germany the viewpoint was that America's performance depended upon her transport capabilities, which in turn would be limited by the tonnage available. Germany's warfare against shipping tonnage represented an appreciable weakening not only of England but of America also. Germany had made her preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She would wage a vigorous war against America with the U-boats and the Luftwaffe, and with her greater experience, which the United States had still to achieve, would be more than a match for America, entirely apart from the fact that the German soldiers were, obviously, far superior to the Americans.

In the further course of the conversation the Führer declared that if Japan got into a conflict with the United States, Germany on her part would take the necessary steps at once. It made no difference

with whom the United States first came into conflict, whether it was with Germany or with Japan. They would always be intent upon disposing of one country first, not with the idea of then coming to an agreement with the other country, but with the idea of disposing of it next. Therefore Germany would, as he had said, promptly take part in case of a conflict between Japan and America, for the strength of the allies in the Tripartite Pact lay in their acting in common. Their weakness would be in allowing themselves to be defeated separately.

Matsuoka again repeated his request that the Führer should give the necessary instructions, so that the competent German authorities would make available to the Japanese the latest inventions and improvements of interest to them, for the Japanese Navy must make preparations at once for a conflict with the United States.

With regard to Japanese-American relations Matsuoka continued that in his own country he had always declared that if Japan continued in the same fashion as at present, a war with the United States sooner or later would be unavoidable. In his view this conflict might better occur sooner than later. Accordingly, so his argument had run, should not Japan decide to act with determination at the proper moment and take the risk of a war against America? Exactly by such means the war might perhaps be postponed for generations, especially if Japan secured domination in the South Seas. In Japan, however, many people refused to follow this line of thought. In those circles Matsuoka was considered to be a dangerous man with dangerous ideas. He declared, however, that if Japan proceeded further along the present course she would some day have to fight and that this might happen under more unfavorable circumstances than at present.

The Führer replied that he had much sympathy for Matsuoka's position, since he had found himself in similar situations (the occupation of the Rhineland, and the resumption of full military independence). He had also come to the conclusion that in a period when he was still young and vigorous he should make use of favorable circumstances and take upon himself the risk of a war which was eventually unavoidable. That he had been right in taking this position had been demonstrated by events. Europe was now free. He would not hesitate a moment to reply at once to any extension of the war, whether by Russia or by America. Providence favored those who did not let perils overtake them, but who confronted them courageously.

Matsuoka replied that the United States, or rather the statesmen who were in control there, had lately undertaken a last maneuver with respect to Japan, in which they declared that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Pacific, on con-

dition that Japan should permit shipments of rubber and tin from these areas to proceed unhindered to their points of destination in America. America would, however, fight Japan the moment she felt that Japan intended to enter the war with the intention of assisting in the destruction of Great Britain. With the English-oriented education which many Japanese had received, this sort of argument naturally was not without effect on the Japanese.

The Führer declared in this connection that this attitude of America meant no more than that as long as the British Empire remained, the United States would cherish the hope of one day being able to proceed together with Great Britain against Japan, while with the collapse of the Empire they would be completely isolated as against Japan and could accomplish nothing against her.

The Reich Foreign Minister here interjected that the Americans in any circumstances would seek to uphold the English power position in East Asia; that, however, this attitude showed how much they feared joint action on the part of Japan and Germany.

Matsuoka continued that it seemed important to him to give the Führer the true story about the actual situation in Japan. Therefore he must inform him of the regrettable circumstances that he (Matsuoka), as Japanese Foreign Minister, in Japan itself did not dare to say a word about the plans which he had set forth to the Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister. In political and financial circles it would do him much harm. He had once, previously, before he had become Japanese Foreign Minister, made the mistake of telling a close friend something about his intentions. The latter had apparently spread the matter about, so that every kind of rumor arose, which, although he always otherwise spoke the truth, as Foreign Minister he was bound energetically to contradict. Also, in these circumstances, he could not state how soon he would be able to hold a conference with the Japanese Prime Minister or with the Emperor about the questions which had been discussed. He would first have to go into developments in Japan closely and carefully, in order to determine a favorable occasion on which to give Prince Konoye and the Emperor the true picture about his real plans. The decision would then have to follow in a few days, for otherwise the problems would be talked to pieces. If he were not able to put through his plans, it would be an indication that he lacked sufficient influence, power of persuasion, and tactical ability. But if he could put them through, it would show that he had attained great influence in Japan. He personally believed that he would be able to put them through.

On his return he would admit to the Emperor, the Prime Minister, and the Navy and War Ministers, if they asked, that the mat-

ter of Singapore had been discussed. He would, however, declare that this had been done only in a hypothetical way.

In addition Matsuoka expressly requested that nothing be cabled on the subject of Singapore, since he feared that by use of telegrams something might slip out. In case of necessity, he would send a courier.

The Führer agreed and assured him that he could rely fully and completely on German discretion.

Matsuoka replied that he had confidence in German discretion, but he could not, unfortunately, say the same thing for Japan.

After some personal farewell greetings the conversation came to a close.

SCHMIDT

No. 267

73/53186-87

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUDAPEST, April 5, 1941—12:52 a. m.

No. 351 of April 4

Received April 5—4:20 a. m.

All sorts of rumors are circulating here about the motive for Teleki's suicide:¹

Leftist circles claim that he had wished to protest in this way against excessive German demands injurious to Hungarian sovereignty. The evidence in support of these senseless rumors is the fact that yesterday, the day after his suicide, a motorized German troop unit happened to drive through Budapest for the first time. The Arrow Cross adherents assert, on the other hand, that in a conversation on the evening before his death, when the Regent raised objections to the operation against Yugoslavia, Teleki had suggested to the Chief of State that he resign; this, the latter had characterized as high treason. Regarding this it can be stated that on the day before his death Teleki did not see the Regent at all and that furthermore such a conversation did not occur. Bárdossy, on whom I made my initial call today in his capacity as Minister President, told me that as already reported² Teleki had, to be sure, not made any difficulties in regard to the dispatch of the Regent's letter to the Führer³ which the Hungarian Minister in Berlin had taken along. However, after matters had taken the present course he had reproached himself severely that he had not at that time

¹ See document No. 261.

² In telegram No. 337 of Apr. 3 (73/53175-76).

³ Of Mar. 28, document No. 227.

prevented the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship with Yugoslavia which had been brought about in response to German suggestions⁴ at the end of last year. Perhaps the Hungarians, who respected the Serbs in contrast to the Czechs and Rumanians, had taken the Treaty too seriously and had feted the Yugoslav Foreign Minister too much only ■ weeks ago.⁵ At any rate the Hungarian soldier was not psychologically prepared suddenly now to attack Yugoslavia. Whereas in the Führer's discussion with Sztójay it was supposedly only said that Hungary should march into Yugoslavia in case that country should disintegrate, and that Croatia was expressly excluded from the Hungarian military operation, the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, during his discussion here on March 30 with the representative of the Chief of the German General Staff,⁶ promised without the knowledge of the Minister President and the Foreign Minister, but possibly under a blanket authority from the Regent, extensive Hungarian mobilization as well as an attack on part of the Croatian territory. Teleki had suffered greatly from this dilemma; he had said this on the very evening before his death and had expressed it in a short letter of farewell to the Regent.⁷ Furthermore he was oppressed by the fact that the mobilization just at this time during spring planting would further endanger the harvest prospects which were bad anyway. Moreover the Rumanian revisionism had caused him grave concern, since there had been no German reaction to General Antonescu's demands before representatives of the press on March 27 when he had stated that Transylvania had already once cost Rumania 800,000 men, and that she was ready to sacrifice another 800,000 men to win it back. In addition, the new Hungarian border with Rumania, which was difficult to defend, was entirely unprotected. Moreover, serious family troubles and overwork had gravely oppressed the neurasthenic Teleki.

The Regent and the new Government had yesterday ordered for the time being only the mobilization of mobile corps and the army corps of Pécs and Szeged located close to the Yugoslav border; one could still justify this before the outside world as a defensive measure and it would not saddle Hungary with the onus of preparing unprovoked attacks on Yugoslavia, such as the more extensive mobilization measures planned by the Chief of the General Staff would have represented. The Minister of Defense was today to have given

⁴ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 478, footnote 1.

⁵ In telegram No. 212 of Feb. 28 (73/53108-09) Erdmannsdorff reported that Cincar-Marković, who had come to Budapest on Feb. 27 for the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the Hungarian-Yugoslav Pact, had discussed economic and cultural aspects of the relations of the two countries with Teleki and Bárdossy.

⁶ See document No. 215, footnote 2.

⁷ See document No. 261 and footnote 2.

a letter to this effect from the Regent to the Führer² and was to have stood by for possible questioning.

Bárdossy, who at first had wanted to go to Berlin himself, but had preferred to leave this to a military expert, expressed the hope that the Hungarian position would be understood in Germany.

ERDMANNSDORFF

² Of Apr. 3, document No. 261; see also document No. 264.

No. 268

3883/E048156-57

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 248 of April 4

BERLIN, April 5, 1941—10:30 a. m.

Received April 5—11:00 a. m.

[Pol. II 159 g.Rs.]¹

With reference to your telegram No. 221 of March 8.²

In a conversation with you on March 8 the Turkish Foreign Minister expressed the wish to obtain the same assurance regarding the Turkish-Greek frontier as the one regarding the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier with respect to the German troops keeping at a distance from the frontier. With reference to this wish please explain to the Turkish Foreign Minister presently on my instruction in strict confidence that the Reich Government has examined this wish in an accommodating spirit. If the Reich Government should feel compelled to send troops into Greece, the German troops would receive the order in any case to keep at a distance from the frontier, away from the glaxis of Edirne east of the line Svilengrad-Didymoteikhon. The Reich Government assumed that in presenting this request the Turkish Foreign Minister was primarily concerned with this area. In case the orderly administration of the area which is to be kept free of troops should require the services of several administrative officials, customs administration, etc., reservations to this effect would, to be sure, have to be made. If necessary, the administrative officials would have to wear uniforms.

It was not yet certain whether it would be possible to give the same order to the German troops regarding the adjacent southern section of the Greek-Turkish frontier. Perhaps because of the road network and the road conditions it was unavoidable that German troops should use the Mandra-Alexandroupolis road for the passage of troops and supplies. In case this should be unavoidable the German

¹ The file number is supplied from a draft of this telegram (265/172777-78) which varies slightly from the text printed here, and from a clerical notation on the reply, document No. 289.

² Document No. 187.

troops would receive the order to keep the longest possible distance from the Turkish-Greek frontier and to avoid any incident. It would be advisable if the Turkish Government, in any case, issued the same order to the Turkish troops and frontier authorities.³

RIBBENTROP

³ In telegram No. 320 of Apr. 4 (265/172733) Papen asked for authorization to state at the beginning of the offensive that German troops would keep a distance back from the Greek-Turkish frontier as well as from the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier. A notation by Siegfried on the deciphered copy of this telegram indicates that the reply to Papen was approved by Hitler before being sent.

No. 269

265/172734

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ANKARA, April 5, 1941.

No. 330 of April 5

Received April 5—2:25 p. m.

I have just conveyed to the Turkish Foreign Minister the instruction in telegram No. 248 of April 4.¹ He was very pleased at the accommodating attitude regarding the glaxis of Edirne. He expressed the wish in all circumstances to keep the railroad line in operation, since it is Turkey's sole European connection. I repeat my suggestion that the Turks be allowed to participate in the management of this line;² this would certainly make an excellent political impression.

Regarding secrecy, the Foreign Minister said that no one had been spoken to so far concerning the Bulgarian-Turkish border agreement either. He confirmed that a visit by Eden was not expected.

PAPEN

¹ Document No. 268.

² See document No. 137.

No. 270

116/66702

The Consulate General at Zagreb to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 41 of April 5

ZAGREB, April 5, 1941.

Received April 5—2:40 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

I negotiated with Kvaternik¹ personally today. Under my influence the union of national groups, including the right wing of

¹ Slavko Kvaternik, leading member of the radical nationalist Ustaša move-

the Peasants party, was achieved and was put down in writing in unexceptionable form. To be sure, [they are] not yet [in favor of] an appeal to the Reich Government for protection and help on the foregoing basis as strengthened. The text follows.² The collecting of signatures is in progress. I hope to be through by this evening. The following will sign: Kaas, the father, Lorković, Dujmčić, Tortić, Kosak, Debelasić, Lamečić.

All names are those of decent people with prestige and a following. Budak³ is still sick and bedridden. His signature, therefore, must be dispensed with, since his life would otherwise be endangered. Kvaternik gave me his word of honor that he was fully authorized to speak for Budak. Please inform me in time, at least 6 hours in advance, when publication will take place at your end, in order that the signers may go underground.

VEESENMAYER
FREUNDT

² Zagreb telegram No. 43 of Apr. ■ (116/66704-05). This manifesto issuing from the assembly of Mar. 31, proclaimed the end of Yugoslavia and the establishment of a "free, independent Croatian State" which would include "the areas that are Croatian from the historic and ethnic point of view."

³ Mile Budak, a leader of the Croatian Ustaša organization.

No. 271

230/152906

The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 383 of April 5

BELGRADE, April 5, 1941.

Received April 5—3:40 p. m.

Minister Ninčić appeared at the Legation at 1:00 p. m., Yugoslav time, and informed me on behalf of his brother, the Foreign Minister, as follows:

It was the desire of the Yugoslav Government to negotiate directly with the German Government. It had thus far protracted the negotiations with Minister Mameli, since it was awaiting a reply, or the return of Gruber, the DNB representative (cf. telegram of April 3¹), to whom it had expressed the desire for negotiations. The Foreign Minister was prepared to go to Berlin at once. He wished to know whether there was a chance that Dr. Gruber would return to Belgrade with a reply by this evening, or whether there was any other chance of beginning a direct conversation between the German and Yugoslav Governments this evening.

¹ Document No. 252.

I promised Minister Ninčić that I would transmit this inquiry to Berlin at once.

FEINE

No. 272

230/152922-23

The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BELGRADE, April 5, 1941.

No. 384 of April 5

Received April 5—5:45 p. m.

Minister Ninčić appeared at the Legation again at 2:30 p. m., Yugoslav time, in order (group garbled) the following communications from Foreign Minister Ninčić.

1. The entire Government agreed that the Foreign Minister should go to Berlin.
2. The Foreign Minister was indignant over the fact that, without his being told anything about it, the initiative had been taken for a conversation with the Soviet Government (see telegram No. 375 of April 4¹ on this subject); this had occurred in the excitement after the coup of March 27, and those concerned were already thinking differently today. Ninčić did not want an understanding with Moscow, but one with Berlin. He was determined to assert himself vigorously in the government in the future.
3. The present standpoint of the Yugoslav Government, which the Foreign Minister would set forth in Berlin, would alone represent his view.
4. The Foreign Minister had the large majority of the Cabinet behind him. It would accept what he proposed.
5. The forming of the government and the Foreign Minister's physical weakness after his illness had thus far made it difficult for him to assert himself vigorously. This would change now.
6. There is talk of an understanding among the three, Belgrade, Moscow, and Ankara. This is obsolete and the Foreign Minister would not permit the realization of such a plan. Without the Foreign Minister, however, such a plan could not be carried out.
7. The Foreign Minister was simply and solely a supporter of the Protocol (Tripartite Pact), which was signed in Vienna.
8. Yugoslavia had received many suggestions from abroad, but the Foreign Minister would accept only the proposals that he might receive in Berlin.

FEINE

¹ This telegram (230/152870) reported statements by the Bulgarian Chargé d'Affaires based on information from the Turkish Ambassador to the effect that a Yugoslav military delegation had flown to Ankara and another Yugoslav delegation was in Moscow.

No. 273

230/152924

The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 385 of April 5

BELGRADE, April 5, 1941.

Received April 5—7:30 p. m.

The Slovak Chargé d'Affaires,¹ who had at noon today spoken with the Slovene leaders, Kulovec and Krek, called on me and stated:

The Slovene leaders regarded the war as inevitable. It would bring about the end of Yugoslavia. If no separate solution could be found for Slovenia, the Slovenes, like the Croats, would have to die with the Serbs. Since, however, their country was more important to them than the Yugoslav State, they were seeking another way out. This had, in any case, to be found in the cooperation with Germany. There were two possibilities:

1. An independent Slovenia.
2. A state consisting of Slovenia and Croatia.

In Slovenia there was fear, however, that Germany had other plans, which would amount to a partition of Slovenia. It would be worth while knowing definitely the position of the Reich Government on this matter. Unfortunately here in Belgrade the Slovene leaders, because of Serbian vigilance, had no opportunity to establish direct contact with officials of the Reich. If it became known here what they were contemplating, they would certainly be killed.

FEINE

¹ Ivan Milec.

No. 274

142/127434-35

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Greece

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 234

RAM 103

BERLIN, April 5, 1941—9:05 p. m.

For the Minister personally.

I request that on Sunday, April 6, at 5:20 a.m., German summer time, you inform the Foreign Minister at your post that you have to transmit to him an urgent communication and that therefore you want to call on him without delay. Immediately following I

request that you make the following statement to the Foreign Minister:

"At this very hour the Greek Minister in Berlin is being handed by the Reich Foreign Minister a note with an enclosed memorandum.¹ These documents point out that the Greek Government—concerning whose unneutral conduct since the beginning of the war numerous documentary proofs are in the hands of the Reich Government as a result of discovery of the files of the French General Staff in La Charité²—by permitting strong English forces to enter its country has itself brought about a situation toward which Germany can no longer remain inactive. The Reich Government has therefore now ordered its troops to expel the British forces from Greek soil. Any resistance offered to the Wehrmacht will be ruthlessly crushed. In the note it is emphasized that the German troops do not come as enemies of the Greek people and that the German people have no intention of fighting or destroying the Greek people as such. Rather the blow which Germany is compelled to strike on Greek territory is aimed at England."

Please do not enter into any discussion of this communication. It is the responsibility of the Greek Government to attend to the personal safety of the personnel of the Legation.

Receipt of this telegram is to be acknowledged at once; subsequently the entire secret material which is still there is to be destroyed. The radio transmitter is to be rendered useless and if possible to be hidden under coal or in a similar manner.

RIBBENTROP

¹ For an English text of the note and memorandum, see German White Book No. 7, *Documents relating to the conflict with Yugoslavia and Greece*, pp. 33-40.

² See vol. XI of this series, document No. 11.

No. 275

230/152958-61

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 761

RAM 104

BERLIN, April 5, 1941—[10:45 p. m.] ¹

[Received April 5—11:30 p. m.]

For the Ambassador personally.

Please inform Anfuso at once in strict confidence the following:

Simultaneously with the start of the action against Yugoslavia and Greece, which is imminent, the Reich Government will publish an official statement which will explain to world opinion the reasons

¹ The times of dispatch and receipt are supplied from another copy (4865/-E249007-10).

for the action against Yugoslavia.² The content of this statement in broad outline is as follows:

The Balkans are the objective of the latest English attempt to establish a front against Germany. After Greece has already fallen victim to this policy, England now sees in Yugoslavia a willing tool for her objective. On the other hand it has always been Germany's aim to spare the Balkan countries from the war. Since his assumption of power the Führer has worked for a policy of friendship and cooperation with Yugoslavia, while at the same time the Duce, too, placed the Italo-Yugoslav relationship on a new basis of friendship. But as early as after the fall of the Stojadinović Cabinet it was evident that forces were at work in Yugoslavia aiming at abandoning the path of compromise and friendship. The documents found in La Charité³ prove that since the summer of 1939 Yugoslavia carried on a policy unequivocally directed against Germany. They clearly show the constantly closer contacts between the Yugoslav General Staff and the General Staffs of the Allies.

Despite her knowledge of these things, Germany continued the policy of understanding with Yugoslavia, and in this went as far as the Vienna agreements of March 25, which promised Yugoslavia recognition of her sovereignty and integrity, exemption from the transit or transshipment of troops, and other military assistance as well as the future acquisition of the city and harbor of Salonika, in return for which Yugoslavia had to assume merely the obligation of loyal cooperation in the new organization of the Continent. In this matter, Germany and Italy were exclusively guided by the wish to win Yugoslavia over to loyal cooperation and to secure for her a definitive position in Europe.

To this historically unique chance the clique of conspirators in Belgrade has now given an answer that is as stupid as it is criminal; the same clique is involved here which in the past did not shrink from regicide, and by the Sarajevo murder unleashed the World War. With this Belgrade has let drop the mask once and for all. Ministers who had signed the Tripartite Pact were arrested; all over Yugoslavia outrageous acts of terror against members of the Axis Powers were unleashed; General Simović threatened the Italian Minister with war; mobilization was ordered; contact was established with the English and Greek General Staffs; and an appeal for assistance was made to England and America. Thus Yugoslavia has finally decided to make common cause with Germany's enemies and to make herself available to England as an assembly area against Germany. The Reich Government does not intend to watch these activities any longer and to permit Yugoslavia to become, like Greece, the battleground for English mercenaries alien to the Continent. It has therefore given orders to German troops to restore

² This official statement of the Reich Government, together with a supplementary memorandum, was published in the German press on Apr. 6. For text, see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, April 1941, pp. 356-368.

³ Large amounts of French diplomatic and military documents had been found by German troops advancing in France at the railroad station of La Charité. These captured documents served as the basis for German White Books No. 6 (see vol. x of this series, Editor's Note, p. 124) and No. 7, *Documents relating to the conflict with Yugoslavia and Greece*.

peace and security in this part of Europe, too, by every possible military means.

End of the content of the official statement.

No diplomatic steps with the Yugoslav Government either here or in Belgrade will be taken at the start of the action.

We propose to the Italian Government that it proceed in the same manner and likewise make public an official statement along the lines of ours.

As far as our action against Greece is concerned, the Greek Minister here will be handed a note which in the first place puts on record Greece's unneutral conduct since the outbreak of the war (likewise with reference made to the documents found at La Charité) and then states that in spite of all warnings Greece nevertheless let herself be used for the establishment of a new English front against Germany. The Reich Government had now ordered its troops to expel the British forces from Greek soil and to break ruthlessly any resistance offered to the German Wehrmacht. At the same time as this note is handed over in Berlin a brief démarche will be made by our Minister in Athens.

Please inform Anfuso of this, too, in confidence. You will yet be notified of the time of the start of the operation;⁴ however, it is so imminent that we would be grateful to the Italian Government if it would begin at once to prepare the statement.⁵

RIBBENTROP

⁴ In telegram No. 767, Apr. 6, 4:00 a.m., Ribbentrop informed the Embassy in Rome that the operation would start that morning. Identical telegrams were sent to Budapest as No. 583, to Bucharest as No. 927, and to Sofia as No. 466 (230/152970).

⁵ Telegrams No. 579 to Budapest (230/152952-55) and No. 465 to Sofia (230/152962-65), dispatched Apr. 6, 1:05 a.m., contained similar instructions that the Foreign Ministers of Hungary and Bulgaria be informed of the substance of the official statement to be issued by the German Government.

No. 276

230/152956-57

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, April 5, 1941—11:30 p. m.

TOP SECRET

No. 922

RAM 106

For the Chargé d'Affaires personally.

Please inform General Antonescu personally in strict confidence early in the morning of April 6th, as follows:

The German operation against Yugoslavia and Greece will begin Sunday morning, April 6. Simultaneously with the commencement

of the operation, the Reich Government will publish an official statement explaining to world public opinion the reasons for the action against Yugoslavia. You were authorized to inform the Rumanian Chief of State about this.

For your information, I would add the following:

The Rumanian Minister called on me yesterday¹ by direction of General Antonescu in order to communicate to me the wish of the Rumanian Government to enter the Banat with Rumanian troops in the event that Hungarian troops should move in there and the political structure of that country should change in the future. The Banat, in which 100,000 Rumanians and hardly any Hungarians live, must not be handed over to Hungary, lest general indignation be aroused in Rumania. He wished, therefore, to apprise the Reich Government of his wish for intervention in the Banat by Rumanian troops, and he asked for a decision. I sent word to the Minister today that this wish was based on false premises, for an entry of Hungarian troops into the Banat was not contemplated.² Only German troops would move in here.

Should Antonescu revert to this matter in speaking to you, please reply in the same sense.

RIBBENTROP

¹ No record found.

² See document No. 277.

No. 277

230/152950

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, April 5, 1941.

e. o. Pol. I M 885 g. Rs.

This evening I informed the Rumanian Minister,¹ on instructions of the Foreign Minister and with reference to his visit with the Foreign Minister yesterday,² that in case of possible military operations and the participation of Hungarian troops, the Hungarian troops will remain west of the Tisza river. Thus, the territory east of the Tisza river, the so-called Serbian Banat, will be free of Hungarian troops.³ With the help of a map we have precisely established what territory is involved, so that any doubt regarding the contents of the statement is out of the question.⁴

¹ Raoul Bossy.

² No record found.

³ See document No. 256 and footnote 1.

⁴ Marginal note: "I have informed the German Legation in Bucharest by telegraph. R[itter]."

The Rumanian Minister has asked that his special thanks for this information be conveyed to the Foreign Minister. He will inform General Antonescu at once.

RITTER

No. 278

67/47321-33

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RAM 21

BERLIN, April 7, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON APRIL 5, 1941

The Reich Foreign Minister first expressed the hope that Matsuoka's visit—the first ever paid by a Japanese Foreign Minister to Germany—would have a good general effect. Matsuoka had been thoroughly informed of the German point of view. He would certainly have gained the impression that Germany was full of vitality and absolutely certain of her victory. The Reich Foreign Minister expressed the hope that their Japanese friends would draw the conclusions from this clearly recognized situation and thus participate in our victory.

Matsuoka replied that he had been more than rewarded for his long journey to Europe by getting into personal touch with the German and Italian statesmen. What he had seen in Germany and Italy had far exceeded his expectations. It was really hard for him to take his departure.

Although he had had no doubt about it before, he was now thoroughly convinced after his journey to Germany and Italy that these two countries were united and would always remain so.

Matsuoka then spoke of the general high morale in Germany, referring to the happy faces he had seen everywhere among the workers during his recent visit to the Borsig Works. He expressed his regret that developments in Japan had not as yet advanced so far as in Germany and that in his country the intellectuals still exercised considerable influence.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which had realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of intellectuals, most of whom are parasites anyhow. A nation, however, which has to fight for a place in the sun must part with them. The intellectuals ruined France; in Germany they had already started

their pernicious activities, when National Socialism put a stop to these doings. They will surely be the cause of the downfall of Britain, which is to be expected with certainty.

In answer to a remark by Matsuoka that Japan was now awakening and, according to the Japanese character, would take action quickly after the previous lengthy deliberations, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of course, to accept a [certain] risk in this connection, just as the Führer had done so successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland, with the proclamation of sovereignty in respect to armament, and with the withdrawal from the League of Nations.

Answering a question by Matsuoka as to how Germany conceived of the future of France, the Foreign Minister said that France was to have the place due her in Europe and then described to Matsuoka the Führer's efforts to bring about a true collaboration with France. He mentioned in this connection the meeting at Montoire¹ and the gesture which the Führer made to France by sending her the ashes of the Duke of Reichstadt. Yet, in the letter in which Marshal Pétain thanked the Führer for this gesture, he simultaneously announced the dismissal of Laval.² This had naturally made a very bad impression in Germany since Laval, together with Pétain, had advocated the Montoire policy, i.e. France's collaboration with Germany.

Furthermore, Germany had learned that Pétain, when he received an invitation to come to Paris for the interment in the Invalides of the ashes of the Duke of Reichstadt, is supposed to have said that he would not come because he did not wish to be arrested by the Germans.³ This attitude had moved the Führer to consider the chapter of collaboration with France as closed, for there could naturally be no trustful relationship with Marshal Pétain who could suspect the Führer of wishing to lure him to Paris so soon after the Montoire meeting in order to arrest him there.

Matsuoka was visibly impressed by this information. He said several times that he could not at all imagine such an action on the part of Pétain.

The Foreign Minister replied that the entire matter was all the more regrettable since the Germans had gained a very favorable impression of Pétain at the Montoire talks. Pétain was, even if physically healthy, certainly no longer quite at his peak mentally and was surrounded by bad advisers. Furthermore he, too, was probably a good example of the saying that a good general was usually a poor politician.

¹ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 207.

² See *ibid.*, document No. 510.

³ See *ibid.*, document No. 531.

In reply to a question by Matsuoka about the fighting in Yugoslavia and Greece the Foreign Minister replied that the English had landed considerable numbers of troops in Greece and that by this time they were being thrown back into the Mediterranean by German forces.

Matsuoka asked whether the situation had improved with respect to Yugoslavia. The Foreign Minister said that it had not and added that Yugoslavia came under the same heading.

Matsuoka mentioned in this connection that the Duce and Count Ciano were of the opinion that Yugoslavia was mainly under the influence of Great Britain and less under that of Russia.

The Foreign Minister alluded to the influence of the "Black Hand" in the political events in Yugoslavia and recapitulated the agreements made with Yugoslavia on the occasion of her accession to the Tripartite Pact, i.e. (1) to respect the Yugoslav frontiers; (2) to refrain from transporting troops through Yugoslavia during the war; (3) to refrain from accepting military help from Yugoslavia during the war since this would not have been anything substantial anyway; (4) to assure her an outlet to the Aegean Sea. The Yugoslavs, he said, asked for Salonika and Germany had stated her agreement with that. In return, all that had been asked of Yugoslavia was loyal cooperation with the Axis; the country could have even kept its friendly relations with other countries. Today, in Yugoslavia, there were signs of a certain disillusionment [*Katzenjammer*] about this. On top of this, the Führer was being insulted, German officers were being assaulted, Volksdeutsche killed, and contacts were made with the English. The Führer was not going to tolerate this much longer. To Matsuoka's question as to how many divisions the Yugoslav Army comprised, the Foreign Minister replied that there were not many of them. He added that many of the decisions to be made were perhaps difficult from the human point of view. In a time, however, in which the fate of the German people was being decided for centuries to come, the Führer and his advisers had no right to take their personal feelings into consideration. They had to look to the future and do what the laws of war prescribed. If Great Britain were victorious, she would destroy Germany forever. Germany thus had to do everything in order to bring Great Britain to her knees. Germany had nothing against the Greeks, but was only attacking the English. The Greeks certainly were a decent people but action against them could not be averted.

Everything possible, he said, had been done by Germany with respect to Yugoslavia in order to harmonize the latter's attitude with that of the Axis. Yugoslavia had, however, turned against the Axis without the slightest necessity.

In answer to a question by Matsuoka regarding the Führer's intentions concerning the smaller states, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that the smaller states would be incorporated in the European whole; they would have their independence and would undoubtedly live more happily under the new order than formerly. England, however, would never again be allowed to meddle in the affairs of the small states, whilst the latter would never be allowed to take part in any military alliance against Germany. They would be absolutely independent, it is true, and even allowed to maintain small armies and police forces, but their protection and their general policy in the sense of the European Continent would be looked after by Germany.

In this connection Matsuoka repeated the explanations he had already given the Reich Minister of Economics⁴ as regards the cause of the present difficulties. He attributed them to the clash between old traditions and the conditions of living brought about by modern inventions. One of the basic mistakes of Versailles was to increase the number of European states, whereas they should have been decreased in consequence of the new conditions of life caused by the development of technology. The great problem was to co-ordinate conditions created by modern inventions and old traditions, but taking care to leave a certain place for old traditions.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich would actually be built upon the basis of the ancient traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which in its time was the only ruling power on the European Continent.

In conclusion the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him from his trip:

1) Germany had already won the war. By the end of this year the world would also realize this. Also England would have to concede it, if she had not already collapsed before then, and America would also have to resign herself to this fact.

2) There were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated in the long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa.

3) Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity which would hardly ever recur for the fulfillment of the national objectives of Japan, a chance which would make it possible for her to play a really leading role in Eastern Asia.

⁴ Walther Funk.

Matsuoka replied that he himself could only repeat that he had long been of the opinion that every nation was offered an opportunity only once in a thousand years. Japan was confronting such an opportunity and she would have to assume the risk connected with it. She would have to act decisively at the right moment in order to take advantage of this unique opportunity.

In this connection he asked about the Führer's intentions as to the conclusion of peace. Would a general peace conference take place or did Germany intend to negotiate peace terms with each of her opponents separately?

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he did not know anything about that. The whole matter appeared to him to depend upon the manner in which Great Britain collapsed. In any case, there could be no question of anything but a peace by capitulation, if a new English government came into being.

Matsuoka replied to this that it meant there could be no peace based on compromise.

He then requested the Reich Foreign Minister to assist on his part the Tripartite Pact Committees, and especially the Economic Committee in which he (Matsuoka) was chiefly interested.⁵

The Reich Foreign Minister took the occasion to stress the fact that the military subcommittees were no special institutions; they had to be subject in all matters to the Chief Committee.

Matsuoka then added that the Japanese officers who were at present in Germany were very pleased indeed with the assistance they had received from the German officials. He thanked the Reich Foreign Minister for this attitude of the German authorities.

Later, Matsuoka spoke about the conference of the Japanese Heads of Missions in Europe, which he had called to Berlin. Unfortunately the Ambassador to London had not appeared, owing to difficulties in flying; he certainly would have brought some interesting news.⁶ Matsuoka emphasized that he had told the Japanese diplomats they would suffer no disadvantages if they were against the conclusion of a pact of alliance, in case they had been so before Japan adhered. Now that a decision had been made he would unhesitatingly recall any Japanese diplomat who did not work loyally with the new policy and cooperate to the closest extent with the German and Italian representatives.

Furthermore, he had told them they must be prepared for some critical moments which were close at hand. Japan was face to face with a serious situation.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that there had also been diplomats in Germany who had taken a different attitude to certain

⁵ See document No. 304.

⁶ See document No. 447 and footnote 2.

questions. It was in fact characteristic of great times that they were not understood by many.

Directly after this interview Matsuoka was given a sound film apparatus as a present, and a luncheon party was held for a small group of people.

SCHMIDT

No. 279

230/152912

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

U. St.S. Pol. 277

BERLIN, April 5, 1941.

Counselor Zamboni today told me the following confidentially:

The Yugoslav Minister called on the Italian Ambassador yesterday. Signor Alfieri has summarized the statements of the Minister yesterday evening in a letter to the Reich Foreign Minister.¹ According to what Zamboni told, the Yugoslav Minister substantially had said the following:

1. General regret about the situation that had developed.
2. A solution is still entirely possible and the Yugoslav Government is ready for such.
3. The German reports about atrocities and so forth were greatly exaggerated.
4. The Minister spoke about the wish of his Government to send two Ministers to Rome² but was not informed about the further progress of the matter.³

WOERMANN

¹ Not found.

² See document No. 253, footnote 1.

³ A note by Weizsäcker of Apr. 5 (230/152917) records that the Yugoslav Minister tried three times to see him but was put off.

No. 280

104/113249-50

Memorandum by Minister Schnurre

BERLIN, April 5, 1941.

THE PRESENT STATUS OF SOVIET DELIVERIES OF RAW MATERIALS TO GERMANY

1) After the conclusion of the German-Soviet Economic Agreement of January 10, 1941,¹ there could at first be observed on the Soviet side a noticeable restraint with regard to the practical carrying out of the Soviet deliveries, which was probably attributable in part to the cooling off of political relations with the Reich. The

¹ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 637.

conclusion of the individual commercial contracts also—as usual—caused great difficulties. In consequence, imports of raw materials from the USSR remained relatively slight in January and February (17 million reichsmarks and 11 million reichsmarks; including, to be sure, as the largest and most important item, 200,000 tons of Bes-sarabian grain).²

2) A change took place in this respect in the month of March. Deliveries in March rose by leaps and bounds, especially in grains, petroleum, manganese ore, and the nonferrous and precious metals. The grain contract, which we had struggled so hard to get, was closed in the amount of 1.4 million tons of grain, at relatively favorable prices, for delivery by September of this year. The Soviets have already made available 110,000 tons of grain on this contract and have promised firmly to deliver 170,000 to 200,000 tons of grain in April.

3) The situation as regards the German counterdeliveries is favorable in this quarter, since, in accordance with the provisions of the contracts, we only have to deliver in this quarter the balances due on the first year of the contract. It will not be possible to adhere to the later German delivery periods because of a shortage of labor and priority of the military programs.

4) Transit traffic through Siberia is proceeding favorably as usual. At our request, the Soviet Government even put a special freight train for rubber at our disposal at the Manchurian border. Negotiations are now in progress in Moscow regarding the increase in Soviet tariff rates.

To sum up, it may be said that after an initial lag Russian deliveries at the moment are quite considerable, and the Economic Agreement of January 10 of this year is being observed on the Russian side.

SCHNURRE

² See documents Nos. 13 and 157.

No. 281

100/65260-85

*Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini*¹

BERLIN, April 5, 1941.

DUCE: I am sending you these lines in the haste that is necessary at this hour.

¹ This message was transmitted as teletype No. 765 to Ambassador Mackensen, Apr. 6, 12:20 a.m.

In my first letters I explained the unpleasantness of a military situation that forces us to wage a difficult battle in a distant theater of war with a long and unprotected flank. It was therefore my endeavor—as I also explained in my last letter²—to bring Yugoslavia, if at all possible, into friendly relations with us, at least by means of a treaty. I believed that no sacrifice should be considered too great for this.

The recent events have frustrated this plan. But what is even worse, they showed at one stroke the tremendous danger that would always attend our operations in view of such an unpredictable neighbor. The gradual mobilization in Yugoslavia would necessarily always make it possible for that country to give expression to its true feelings at some time or other inconvenient to us.

In view of the form taken by the latest Yugoslav acts, a form which offended the German Reich deeply and was therefore intolerable for us as a great power, I decided, with a heavy heart, to effect a general settlement of the military situation in this area. I was further strengthened in this decision by the landings of English troops in Greece, which were meanwhile taking place on a large scale.

Our Ambassador in Moscow was, moreover, informed yesterday that Russia was on the point of concluding a pact of friendship with Yugoslavia or else had already concluded it.³

In these circumstances, I see no possibility of delaying any longer but shall have the German units launch the attack tomorrow morning.

These units will be put into action successively at short intervals.

I realize that this will be a hard struggle against an extremely tough and brave opponent, and that the terrain of the country is very much in his favor. In addition, Germany is not only compelled to maintain a very strong army in the West, but also to be fully prepared in the East. Nevertheless we shall surely solve all these problems in the military field, under one condition, to be sure, Duce, that we always commit our forces according to clear and well-considered plans which have been jointly coordinated.

Above all, Duce, I consider *one* thing important: *Your front must in no case give way in Albania.* I would therefore most sincerely advise you primarily to employ also that force whose mobility permits it to be committed the fastest at the critical spots, namely, the Air Force.

Duce! In the next 8 or 10 days it is entirely immaterial what operations your air force engages in on the Italian-Yugoslav border.

² Of Mar. 27, text printed in document No. 224.

³ See document No. 265.

The only important thing is that—if necessary—it attempt in constant mass operations to intercept any Serbian attack upon your position in Albania, if possible even in the initial stages, to wear it down, and finally to crush and repel it.

The closest cooperation between our air forces will here be a prerequisite for success. This cooperation is rendered more difficult by the fact that Yugoslavia possesses both German and Italian airplane models. This requires, on the one hand, that both sides inform each other in the greatest detail regarding operations, that they co-ordinate these operations and carry out such measures as seem appropriate for distinguishing the planes from each other and keeping them apart and, above all, marking them out clearly for the defense forces.

Duce! I would gladly have waited from 6 to 8 days longer in order the more thoroughly to go into the necessary preparations for this new operation. But in view of the developments of the past 48 hours I believed that I could no longer assume such a responsibility.

In order to assure a uniform manner of carrying out the operations, I would ask you, Duce, to accept my view as I shall present it in the following points. This is being done in the interest of our common victory and with the aim of best complying with the just wishes of everybody concerned. I have submitted exactly the same proposal to Regent Horthy:*

1. The success—particularly the rapid success—of the campaign against Yugoslavia depends on a superior team play of all forces. They must, therefore, at least in a large outline, operate according to uniform considerations.

2. In the present circumstances the German Wehrmacht is numerically the strongest force involved in these operations against Yugoslavia both on the ground and in the air; and besides, in view of its present deployment, too, it is best adapted for a concentric commitment of forces.

3. Nevertheless it is desirable that the allied armies—although pursuing a joint objective based on broad general considerations—should so far as possible operate as independent bodies, in order to serve the purpose of destroying the common enemy by fulfilling their specially appointed tasks.

4. I would therefore suggest, Duce, an arrangement whereby you would permit me to communicate to you personally in the form of "recommendations" and "wishes" the general considerations necessary for joint operations and the instructions resulting from them. As Supreme Commander of the Italian Armed Forces you, Duce, would then give the necessary instructions to this effect and issue

* See document No. 215.

the required orders. The establishment of any outwardly apparently supreme command can thus be dispensed with and the execution of the operations according to a joint objective nevertheless be guaranteed. The further arrangements for execution would then be agreed upon between the army commands or the armies in each individual case.

Please, Duce, examine this proposal. It represents only an arrangement between the two of us and will not become known to the world. My aim is only to achieve joint victory, and that, moreover, quickly and surely, for, especially in view of the perpetual uncertainty of the situation in the East, it is understandable that I shall be glad when I will be able to release the German units as rapidly as possible from the task now confronting them, withdraw them, and hold them in readiness. I hope, Duce, that it will be possible soon again to discuss all other questions with you personally.

For the rest, I am entering this fight with fanatic determination, for, come what may, victory will be on our side in the end.

In sincere comradeship and most faithfully,

Yours,

ADOLF HITLER

No. 282

230/152936

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 352 of April 6

BUDAPEST, April 6, 1941.

Received April 6—1:25 a. m.

The Defense Minister called on me and told me of his conversations yesterday with the Führer,¹ Field Marshal Keitel, and Lieutenant General Paulus,² who represented the Chief of the General Staff. He was particularly impressed by the Führer's spontaneously expressed renunciation of the exercise of the supreme command by Germany, as well as by the Führer's generous territorial promises, including those regarding Croatia and access to the Adriatic. The

¹ See document No. 284.

² The Halder Diary entry for Apr. 4 records that Paulus, acting as Halder's representative, saw Hungarian Defense Minister Bartha that day and was informed of Horthy's letter to Hitler and the Hungarian mobilization measures. The account of the Paulus-Halder conversations contains the following passage:

"Prior to the discussion, Paulus had received instructions from the Führer and learned of the arguments which the Führer wanted to use in dealing with Horthy. With the help of these arguments and by referring to the agreements concluded in Budapest, he apparently drove Bartha into a tight corner. One will have to wait for the result."

Führer's stirring and cordial letter of reply³ to the Regent had pleased the latter greatly and had helped to allay his scruples with regard to the action against Yugoslavia which arose from Teleki's suicide. Mobilization of two additional army corps, making five in all, had now been ordered to be completed entirely by April 15, and in part earlier. This disposed of the reason for the request for resignation submitted day before yesterday by the Chief of the General Staff⁴ on account of what was in his opinion and that of the German military at first an inadequate mobilization; therefore his request had not been accepted.

ERDMANNSDORFF

³ Not found; cf. C. A. Macartney, *A History of Hungary, 1929-1945*, vol. II, p. 6.

⁴ Gen. Henrik Werth.

No. 283

230/152967

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Yugoslavia

Telegram

By Radio

WITH PRIORITY

BERLIN, April 6, 1941—4:00 a. m.

No. 440

RAM 109

"Tripartite Pact".¹ Acknowledge receipt.

RIBBENTROP

¹ See document No. 248.

No. 284

1448/365281-82

*The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union*¹

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, April 6, 1941—4:30 a. m.

No. 703 of April 6

Received April 6—9:35 a. m.

[RAM 113]²

Top Secret. To be decoded only by the officer in charge of top secret documents. To be submitted at once to the Chief of Mission personally. Reply by courier or secret code.

¹ The copy here printed is from the Moscow Embassy files. It bears the marginal note at the top: "Communicated to M. Molotov on Apr. 6. Hi[nger], Apr. 6."

² The file number is supplied from another copy (230/152973-74).

For the Ambassador personally.

Please call on M. Molotov early Sunday morning, April 6, and tell him that the Government of the Reich had felt itself compelled to proceed to a military action in Greece and Yugoslavia. The Government of the Reich had been forced to take this step because of the arrival of British military forces on the Greek mainland in ever-increasing numbers, and because of the fact that the Yugoslav Government which had come to power illegally by the coup d'état of March 27 had made common cause with England and Greece. The Reich Government had accurate information for several days to the effect that the Yugoslav General Staff, in conjunction with the Greek General Staff and the High Command of the English Expeditionary Army that had landed in Greece, had prepared for joint operations against Germany and Italy, which were on the verge of being carried out. Moreover, the constantly increasing number of reports on excesses against Germans in Yugoslavia had made it impossible for the Government of the Reich to remain inactive further in the face of such developments. The new Yugoslav Government had taken this course contrary to all law and reason, after Germany had for years pursued a policy of friendship with that country, which was to have reached its culmination in the recent accession to the Tripartite Pact. Moreover, I would ask you in this connection to refer to the communications made to M. Molotov on various occasions, which you had already made to the Soviet Government, regarding the aims and intentions of the German Government in the Balkan Peninsula: that is, that German activity in this area is directed solely to prevent England from gaining another foothold on the Continent; that Germany has absolutely no political or territorial interests in this area; and that German troops would be withdrawn when their tasks in the Balkans are finished. Please make these statements without any special emphasis, in an objective and dispassionate manner.

Please do not on this occasion mention the communication made to you by Molotov regarding the conclusion of a Soviet-Yugoslav friendship pact.³ Should Molotov, on his part, speak of it, then please confine yourself to the comment that you have transmitted his communication to Berlin, but have not yet received any reply.

Send telegraphic report on execution hereof.⁴

RIBBENTROP

³ See document No. 265.

⁴ See document No. 288.

No. 285

3883/E048151-52

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

Special Security Handling
No. 260 of April 6

BERLIN, April 6 [1941]—6:15 a. m.
Received April 6—6:35 a. m.

For the Ambassador personally.

I request that you call on M. Saracoglu early in the morning on Sunday, April 6, and inform him that the Government of the Reich has felt compelled to take military action in Greece and Yugoslavia. The Government of the Reich has been forced to do this, first, by the steadily growing number of British forces landing in Greece, and secondly, by the fact that the Yugoslav Government, which came to power illegally through the coup d'état of March 27, made common cause with England and Greece. For several days the Government of the Reich has had most reliable information that the Yugoslav General Staff, together with the Greek General Staff and the High Command of the English Expeditionary Force that landed in Greece, has prepared joint operations against Germany and Italy, which were shortly to be carried out. Moreover, constantly increasing reports about outrages committed against Germans in Yugoslavia made it impossible for the Government of the Reich to remain passive in the face of this development. The new Yugoslav Government, without any justification or reason, has chosen this course of action after Germany for years pursued a policy of friendship with this state, which was to have reached its climax in the recent accession to the Tripartite Pact. In this connection I request also that you refer to the various statements made to M. Saracoglu which you have already given to the Turkish Government regarding the aims and intentions of the German Government in the Balkan Peninsula—that is, that the action taken by Germany in this area is directed exclusively against England's again getting a foothold on the Continent; that Germany has no political or territorial interest whatever in these areas; that the German troops, having completed their mission in the Balkans, will be withdrawn again; and that they have been instructed to respect absolutely the Turkish frontier. I ask that you make these statements without particular eagerness, in an objective and calm manner.

Please report by telegram about having carried out this instruction.¹

RIBBENTROP

¹ Reported by Papen in telegram No. 332 of Apr. 6 (265/172739).

No. 286

230/152975-76

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, April 6, 1941—7:00 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received April 6—7:25 a. m.

Special Security Handling

No. 756 of April 6

With reference to your telegram No. 765 of April 6.¹

The Duce received me at 2:00 o'clock this morning for a conversation that lasted an hour and a quarter, in which Anfuso also participated. He first read the Führer's letter to himself and then translated it into Italian for us. As the most important point in his subsequent long statements, which I assume will reappear in the letter of reply which he is going to draft in the early hours of the morning and transmit by teletype to Berlin,² I would emphasize that he not only at once and without any hesitation declared himself in agreement with point 4 of the proposal, but called it, as matters stood, actually the only conceivable solution of the command situation because it was the logical one. He added that he personally had not the slightest objection to letting the world know about this proposal, presented to him by the Führer in so "extremely delicate" a manner. A strong unified leadership was the indispensable condition for success. The greatness of the Duce was again fully demonstrated in the way in which he enlarged upon the matter.

I should like further to stress the following points: the determination to hold out in Albania until relief came was irrevocable. He had given Draconian orders in this respect. His southern front caused him no anxiety of any kind. More difficult were things in the North where he also hoped to be able to hold with the 70,000 (seventy thousand) men who were assembled there. Above all he was determined not to be diverted by prestige reasons into holding Scutari at all costs, for it was hard to defend. He has ordered that the main line of defense be taken south of the Bojana. (I had the impression that this decision is to be regarded as the result of yesterday's trip to Albania by General von Rintelen.³)

With regard to the employment of the Air Force in constant mass formation for continued interference with enemy attacks, he shares entirely the view of the Führer. He had for this purpose already shifted the entire 2nd Wing under General Tedeschini to

¹ See document No. 281 and footnote 1.

² See document No. 289.

³ Cf. Enno von Rintelen, *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse*, p. 138.

Apulia, as a result of which the craft already there would be increased from about 400 to 700. The danger of a confusion of the planes of the two sides should not be considered too great, because the Italian planes in general are of a more recent model than those given to the Yugoslavs. Reichsmarschall Göring would, moreover, finish off the Yugoslav Air Force, which has only 300 planes which are really usable at the front, just as rapidly as he did at the time the Polish Air Force.

The Duce then also spoke at length of the brilliant planning of the impending German operations, and he closed with the assurance that he did not doubt for one moment that the impending campaign would with the same rapidity and precision result in the destruction of the Yugoslav armed forces as did the campaign against Poland, and the Norwegian operation, which was attended by a far greater risk.

MACKENSEN

No. 287

73/53189-90

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUDAPEST, April 6, 1941.

No. 355 of April 6

Received April 6—6:45 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 579 of April 5, 1941.¹

Instruction carried out. The Foreign Minister expressed his thanks for the information.

He added, however,² that the English Minister³ had spoken to him day before yesterday in an excited and threatening tone about the catastrophic consequences which any Hungarian attacks on Yugoslavia would have for Hungary, because England would certainly win the war, though perhaps only after several years. It would be infamy for Hungary to stab her Yugoslav friend in the back. Bárdossy had replied that the future Hungarian attitude toward Yugoslavia was not yet defined; in any case he had to reject the English threat and remark that Hungary had refrained from much more justified criticism of the shameful English conduct toward her French ally. Cadogan had informed the Hungarian Minister in London⁴ that the English Legation would leave

¹ See document No. 275, footnote 5.

² Erdmannsdorff's subsequent telegram No. 367 of Apr. 8 (73/53195) stated that the word "aber" had not been in the original text as sent by him and had gotten there by mistake.

³ Sir Owen St. Clair O'Malley.

⁴ George Barcza.

Budapest if Hungary continued to permit German troops to pass through the country into Yugoslavia. If Hungary herself should take action against Yugoslavia, England would declare war and drop bombs on Hungarian territory. Bárdossy remarked further that Hungary did not make any claim to Croatia, since the Croats were unreliable people who had come to terms with Vienna in the past and now with Belgrade. A loose affiliation with Hungary could be considered only if the Croats desired it. On the other hand the Hungarians did desire access to the Adriatic Sea; with respect to that one could come to an agreement also even with an independent Croatian state if there should be one.

ERDMANNSDORFF

No. 288

104/118266

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, April 6, 1941—7:00 p. m.

No. 818 of April 6

Received April 6—10:25 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 703 of April 5 [6].¹

Since Molotov always spends Sunday out of town, I was able to speak with him only this afternoon at 4:00 o'clock. Molotov came to Moscow expressly for this purpose.

After I had made to Molotov the communications prescribed, he repeated several times that it was extremely deplorable that an extension of the war had thus proved inevitable after all.

Molotov did not on this occasion mention the negotiation of the Soviet-Yugoslav Pact.² Therefore I, too, as instructed, did not revert to this subject.³

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 284.

² See document No. 265.

³ See document No. 284.

No. 289

100/85289-70

*Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler*¹

Rome, April 6, 1941/XIX.

FÜHRER: I received your letter.² All that has happened since March 25 at Belgrade admits henceforth no other solution than that which you have chosen: the solution of arms. Yugoslavia is the most authentic creation of Versailles and deserves her fate. That the Serbian soldier is brave and tough, there is no doubt, but as a mass they are probably less strong, in view of the ethnic composition and the cultural differences. The struggle will be hard, but as to the victorious result, my certainty, like yours, is absolute. I turn to speak to you now of the Italian strategic situation. I have provided for the evacuation of the civilian population in the cities of Rijeka, Zara, Scutari. A painful but inevitable provision. While I do not have excessive anxieties for the eastern frontier and believe that the 14 divisions concentrated there are in a position to repel any attempt at an offensive, the situation in Albania is different. I do not believe that the Greeks, already tried by 5 months of war, can take the initiative on a large scale and, anyway, I consider the forces located there sufficient. But the most delicate situation is that of the northern frontier. There I have concentrated from 70 to 80 thousand men and I have given them the categorical order to resist to the bitter end,³ in the expectation that the German pincer movement coming from the east would make itself felt in back of the Yugoslavs. I agree with you fully that the Air Force has a fundamental task here and I have therefore had the 2nd Air Squadron transferred from Venetia to Apulia with the order to remain in the air over the zone of operations. The two Air Staffs must take all measures to make the collaboration of the respective Air Forces as efficient as possible. I also agree with you fully as far as the joint conduct of the operations is concerned in accordance with the formula that you propose in point 4. As for the operational details, they will be determined by the General Staffs. I am convinced that the present difficulty, too, will be rapidly surmounted by the forces of the Axis, and in this conviction I ask you, Führer, to accept my most cordial, comradely greetings.

MUSSOLINI

¹ Translated from the official Italian text which was received in Berlin together with a German translation (F20/001; F1/0454). See document No. 290. A copy of the German translation was also sent to Weizsäcker by Alfieri on Apr. 11 (230/153001-003).

² Of Apr. 5, document No. 281.

³ For the text of Mussolini's order see Vojnoistoriski Institut Jugoslovenske Narodne Armije (Institute of Military History of the Yugoslav Army), *Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu jugoslovenskih naroda* (Belgrade, 1954), tome II, vol. 2, p. 527.

No. 290

4691/E46779-81

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Füh. 22

BERLIN, April 7, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND
ITALIAN AMBASSADOR ALFIERI IN BERLIN, APRIL 6, 1941

Alfieri first presented a letter of the Duce¹ and stated, after the Führer had read it, that on instruction of the Duce he was to receive the Führer's comments or his suggestions regarding certain points. The Führer replied that the Serbs would be a stubborn and brave opponent, whose resistance would be extraordinarily favored by the mountainous terrain of the country. If Yugoslavia were a flat country the German armored units would break any resistance within 2 to 3 weeks. In fact, however, a very difficult terrain was involved where armor could be used only under certain conditions.

The Führer stated that the first task was to establish as quickly as possible by every means a connection between the German Army and Italian Army. Germany was therefore advancing on a rather wide front north of the Yugoslav lake region, in order to discover first at which point a breakthrough could be carried out most easily, and then to advance there with the armored units as quickly as possible.

The Führer then informed Alfieri that by noontime 26 enemy fighters had already been shot down and that 20 Do-17's which the Yugoslavs bought from Germany, as well as 20 to 25 other aircraft, had been destroyed on the ground, so that altogether approximately 70 enemy aircraft had been lost. Our own losses amounted to 3.

Belgrade had to sustain tremendously strong aerial attacks. The citadel was burning, the armories had been destroyed, and so had been, unfortunately, the royal castle and the royal villa too. The harbor of Belgrade had likewise been destroyed.

The German mountain and infantry divisions had reached the objectives according to instructions by noon. One German division was already within 60 km. of Skoplje, so that everything had gone according to plan. Germany, however, realized that vigorous resistance was to be expected in central Serbia; this natural fortress with which Germany was very well acquainted from the World War was exceedingly suitable for that.

In the further course of the conversation the Führer expressed his pleasure about the fact that Germany and Italy would very shortly conduct joint operations and would entirely liquidate the British positions in southeast Europe in order to continue from there most

¹ Of Apr. 6, document No. 289.

vigorously aerial warfare in the Mediterranean, especially against English transports by sea. He was very glad about the letter of the Duce and believed that the Duce and he (the Führer) would do their jobs well.

Alfieri who noted down the Führer's statements in part thanked the Führer in his concluding remarks and emphasized especially the efforts which Yugoslavia had undertaken in the last few days in order to gain time.

SCHMIDT

No. 291

833/280708

Unsigned Memorandum

[APRIL 6, 1941.]¹

Enclosure 2 of OKW/WFSt/L IV Qu No. 44434/41 g. K. Chefs²

GENERAL PLANS FOR THE LATER ORGANIZATION OF THE
ADMINISTRATION IN THE YUGOSLAVIA AREA

The Führer has given the following guiding principles for the later organization of the administration of the Yugoslav area:

1. The parts which were formerly Austrian and which border on the Gaue of Carinthia and Styria to the south, will to an extent still to be determined be annexed to these Gaue and thus to the territory of the German Reich.

2. Croatia will become an *autonomous* state, probably under Hungarian influence.

3. The coastal area in northwestern Yugoslavia, Dalmatia, and Montenegro, will fall to Italy.

4. Macedonia is to fall to Bulgaria.

5. The part (up to the Danube), formerly Hungarian, which borders on Hungary, will fall to Hungary.

6. Only Old Serbia (without Macedonia) is for the time being to be made an area under German *military* administration.³

¹ This document is without date. It was initialed by Ritter and Woermann on Apr. 6.

² Not found.

³ Cf. Hitler's directives for the partition of Yugoslavia transmitted in a directive of Apr. 12 signed by Keitel which is published in *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxvii, document No. 1195-PS (G.B. Exhibit 144), pp. 60-62.

No. 292

610/248587

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Slovakia

Telegram

No. 374

BERLIN, April 8, 1941.

With reference to your telegram No. 359 of April 6.¹

Please suggest to the Government at your post, in answer to its inquiry, that Slovak-Yugoslav diplomatic relations now be broken off. You may add that we were suggesting to the Governments in Budapest and Sofia, too, that similar action be taken.² To justify this action the Slovak Government could point out that immediately after signing the accession to the Tripartite Pact Yugoslavia went over to the camp of Germany's enemies by way of a coup d'état, thus placing herself in open opposition to the countries which had joined the Tripartite Pact. The question of breaking off relations with Greece will not arise at your post, since as far as is known here there are no diplomatic or consular relations between Slovakia and Greece.

Report by wire.³

RIBBENTROP

¹ This telegram (610/248586) reported that the Slovak Foreign Ministry had raised the question of Slovak-Yugoslav relations in view of the outbreak of the war between Germany and Yugoslavia.

² See documents Nos. 296 and 312.

³ Counselor of Legation Endroes reported in telegram No. 365 of Apr. 9 (230/153027) that he had talked with Minister President Tuka in accordance with this instruction; in telegram No. 366 of Apr. 9 (610/248589) Endroes reported that the Yugoslav representative in Bratislava had been handed a Slovak note verbale announcing that Slovakia was breaking off relations.

No. 293

2361/488485-87/1

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Turkey

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, April 8, 1941.

Pol. VII 188 g. Rs.

Enclosed is the letter of reply from State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker to the letter from the Grand Mufti to the Führer.¹ It is requested that it be sent through the intermediary of the Iraq Legation at your post, sealed and by a safe route, to its destination.

A copy of the Grand Mufti's letter and a copy of the reply are enclosed for your information. An Arabic translation of the letter of reply from the State Secretary will follow by next courier.

By order:
WOERMANN

¹ Vol. XI of this series, document No. 680.

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, April 8, 1941.

To His Eminence,
The Grand Mufti,
M. Haj Amin al Husayni
Baghdad

YOUR EMINENCE: The Führer has received the letter of January 20, which you sent him through your private secretary. He has noted with great interest and sympathy your statements about the national struggle of the Arabs and has been pleased with the friendly words that you addressed to him on behalf of Arab nationalism and on your own behalf. Through Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop he sends his regards and his thanks and best wishes for the continued success of the Arab cause.

Your private secretary has entered upon the conversations here mentioned in your letter.² In accordance with the wish conveyed by him that German policy with respect to the Arabs be clarified, I am authorized to inform you as follows:

Germany, which has never possessed Arab territories, has no territorial aims in the Arab area. She is of the opinion that the Arabs, a people with an old civilization, who have demonstrated their competence for administrative activity and their military virtues, are entirely capable of governing themselves. Germany therefore recognizes the complete independence of the Arab states, or where this has not yet been achieved, the claim to win it.

Germans and Arabs have common enemies in the English and the Jews and are united in the struggle against them. In Germany's traditional friendship for the Arabs and, in accordance with the wish which you communicated through your private secretary, she is glad to cooperate in a friendly manner with the Arabs and, if they are forced to fight England in order to achieve their national aims, to grant them military and financial assistance in so far as is possible. In order to assist the Arabs in their preparations for a possible struggle against England, Germany is also prepared to supply them with war material at once, in so far as a route for transporting it can be found.

I would like to suggest that for further discussion of the details of the contemplated friendly collaboration, you send back your private secretary or, should he be prevented from coming, that you send another negotiator here.

Please keep this letter secret. The Italian Government is informed as to its contents and is in agreement.

Your private secretary will, I do not doubt, confirm to you from the impressions he received in Germany that the victory of the Axis Powers is certain and that England's defeat is sealed.

² See document No. 92.

With best wishes for your personal well-being and for further success in your courageous championship of the Arab cause.³

Yours, etc.

WEIZSÄCKER

³ Marginal note: "Letter [handed] to de Máriássy on Apr. 16. P[apen], Apr. 16."

The Hungarian Legation in Ankara, headed by Zoltan de Máriássy, earlier had acted as intermediary for German communications addressed to the Iraq Legation in Ankara; see vol. XI of this series, document No. 596.

No. 294

230/153008-09

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 237

BERLIN, April 8, 1941.

The Russian Ambassador came to see me today to discuss current matters of secondary importance.

After these were taken care of Dekanozov, referring to the map lying before us, asked me whether I could tell him anything about the military situation in the Balkans.

I described the progress of military operations. The fact that our troops have already reached Skoplje and, at one place even the Aegean Sea, seemed to make a special impression on the Ambassador. I explained to the Ambassador that our operations were proceeding according to schedule and that we were not concerned with Yugoslavia or Greece as such, since our sole aim was to expel the English whom we could not tolerate on the Continent. This would certainly be accomplished.

The Ambassador inquired especially about the situation on the Italian-Yugoslav border. I described this as being of little consequence. As far as I knew, I said, no fighting whatsoever had been reported from there.

In the course of this talk I should have very much expected Dekanozov to say something about the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Yugoslavia or also about the Soviet-Yugoslav Neutrality and Friendship Pact.¹ Nothing of the kind occurred. Dekanozov did mention the official statements of the Reich Government which he had read but did not make one word of criticism of our intervention in Yugoslavia. I then recommended to Dekanozov that he read, besides the official statements, also today's *Diplomatische Korrespondenz* and the enemy documents found by us in France.²

The Ambassador then asked me about the attitude of Turkey. In reply I said that no problem existed between us and Turkey. Tur-

¹ See document No. 265 and footnote 2.

² See document No. 275, footnote 3.

key knew that we wanted just as little from her as we did from the Balkans and that certainly we had no territorial plans there. As long as Turkey did not imitate Greece in being so imprudent as to allow English forces in the country, she was not in danger.

With this the discussion of the war in the Balkans was at an end.

The Ambassador then wanted to hear something about Matsuoka's visit and was satisfied with my comment that the visit, as was to be expected, confirmed our close cooperation and did so in the spirit of the Tripartite Pact which has as its purpose to prevent the war from spreading.

The conversation ended with a final word about our relations with the United States, about which Dekanozov inquired.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 295

124/123064-67

Ambassador Papen to State Secretary Weizsäcker

SECRET

ANKARA, April 8, 1941.

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: On the assumption that the Foreign Minister is very busy during these days when the war is entering a new, decisive phase, I would like to discuss with you an idea which concerns our further political activity in Turkey.

The instructions which I received last November from the Führer and the Foreign Minister,¹ and which aimed at bringing about a closer, more confidential relationship with Turkey, were stopped—shortly after I had started to carry them out; in this connection it was pointed out that it was inadvisable at that time to make an option between Turkey or Soviet Russia.² With the talk which the Führer had with Ambassador Gereke on the occasion of the delivery of the letter from the State President,³ this option has now been made. I believe that it was made very much at the proper time. Turkey, which like all other countries attaches no value to paper promises, would possibly not have been able to withstand the present pressure toward establishment of a solid Balkan front if she had not received through this talk "proof" of the sincerity of our assurances. Of course, even without instructions to this effect from Berlin I have tried as much as I could to exploit this trump card that has now been played. In a talk with Numan along these lines I had to discover, however, that outwardly there will be no change in

¹ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 386, footnote 1.

² See *ibid.*, documents Nos. 454 and 548.

³ See document No. 177.

the very cautious and waiting attitude of Turkey in spite of our mutual confidence.⁴ Numan, who always sees the political realities much more clearly than his Foreign Minister, told me when I pointed out the value of this "option": "Of course, we expected to be the subject of your talk with the Russians. However, I never assumed that you would sell us or the Straits to the Russians. If you had done so, then I would characterize Germany's chance for victory as being exceedingly poor. For an option in favor of Russia would mean for Germany's future an encirclement of her southern flank by way of Rumania and Bulgaria as far as the Straits. No German statesman would state his willingness to make such a sacrifice unless the chances for Germany's victory were very poor."

With this statement Numan of course wanted to detract from the value of the "option" and demonstrate that it did not commit Turkey to any special service in return; for he added: "The basis of our policy remains unchanged. We have no use for either a total English or a total German victory, because for us the existence of a stabilized Central Europe remains a basic prerequisite."

Now if I take for granted the success of the campaign just begun, in the hope that it will quickly be possible to defeat Yugoslavia and drive the English out of the Greek area of concentration, then this situation would confront Turkey anew with the danger that Germany will not, to be sure, opt in favor of Russia, but will now herself assume control of the Straits and their approaches. This situation could at one blow improve the till then dubious and hardly trusting relationship between the Soviets and the Turks.

It seems to me that this danger must be avoided from the very outset. One could imagine that the guarantee of the status quo might perhaps not be accepted by Turkey in a unilateral guarantee promise, but that she would be willing—in addition to her commitments to the English—to sign a German-Turkish nonaggression pact or a similar instrument under certain conditions. An instrument in which it should also be particularly expressed that the Axis Powers will not ask anything of Turkey during and after the war that is contradictory to her independence or her obligations.⁵

It will perhaps be expedient that I come to Berlin at the end of April for a discussion of the entire political situation. In any case, I have two personal appointments in Berlin on April 29 and 30 which I would like to take care of, and I shall ask the Foreign

⁴ See document No. 231.

⁵ In teletype No. 1258 of Apr. 17 (124/123063) Weizsäcker forwarded the text of this letter up to this point, except for the introductory paragraph, to Ribbentrop on the Special Train.

Minister to permit me to depart from here in the week between April 20 and 26.²

I am sending you enclosed the copy of a letter³ from an old Turk addressed to me which is characteristic of the view held in these circles and which speaks for itself.

Heil Hitler,

Yours, etc.

FRANZ V. PAPEN

P. S. Our successes which were reported yesterday are truly fabulous. But the excitement here is even bigger because many people believe that it will now be Turkey's turn.

Do send Hentig to Syria soon—it is so necessary to give backing to the Arabs now.

² Actually, on Apr. 15 Papen was summoned by the Foreign Minister and informed that a plane would be sent from Vienna to fetch him (Steengracht telegram No. 224 from the Special Train, forwarded to Ankara as No. 305 of Apr. 15: 265/172762). According to an unnumbered Ankara telegram of Apr. 18 (265/172788) Papen had left Ankara that morning. No document has been found stating the reasons for this summons; however, cf. document No. 362, footnote 2.

³ Of Apr. ■ (124/123070-74).

No. 296

73/53197-99

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUDAPEST, April 9, 1941—8:17 p. m.

No. 368 of April 9

Received April 10—12:20 a. m.

In accordance with my Berlin discussions¹ I today suggested to the Minister President an early break of Hungary's relations first with Yugoslavia and later also with Greece. The Minister President gave the following picture of the situation:

Hungarian mobilization to the extent discussed with us was in full swing. However, as already mentioned earlier, the political prerequisite for active Hungarian participation in the military operations was dissolution of the Yugoslav State. This would be accepted here as having occurred as soon as a declaration of Croatia's independence was issued, if possible from Zagreb but at any rate from Croatian ground, something which he counted on within a few days. Then the Hungarian Government would address a manifesto to the Croatians in which it would be pointed out that Hungary did not harbor any hostility toward the Croatian people, with whom she had formerly been joined in a constitutional union for 1,000 years, but that in view of the dissolution of the Yugoslav State she

¹ No record found.

had to take possession of the latter's territory that was formerly Hungarian. The Minister President added that in order to prepare public opinion he had in press and radio given much prominence to the Yugoslav air attacks on Hungarian soil. And to the Hungarian Minister in Belgrade, regarding whose whereabouts there had been no reports of any kind for days, he had three times sent openly by radio instructions to protest.

The Chief of the General Staff, who knew about my being with the Minister President, telephoned the latter during our discussion and asked him to inform me at once that recently the presence of strong Russian troop concentrations had been established in the Carpathian area along the Hungarian-Russian border and that this made caution imperative. The Military Attaché has reported particulars on this by telephone to the OKH. Also conspicuous in this connection was the sudden departure yesterday, without any reason, of the Russian Minister here with his family and three other female members of the Legation. According to police reports the rest of the Russian Legation were preparing their departure for April 12.

The Rumanian attitude was also disturbing, since Bárdossy had learned that Rumania was making entirely unjustified claims to present Yugoslav territory which had formerly been Hungarian, but never Rumanian.

These claims made little impression on him, since after all this area had been promised to Hungary by the Führer and Reich Chancellor. Nevertheless one had to expect Rumanian attacks along the new Hungarian-Rumanian border in Transylvania as soon as the Hungarian Army was engaged in fighting. I replied to the Minister President that I could not believe there could be any Russian intentions to attack Hungary, particularly because the Russian Army would therewith expose itself to an annihilating German flank attack from Poland. Moreover, in my opinion we would not permit an armed action by Rumania against Hungary which, as matters stood, was almost certainly out of the question even in case Antonescu should fall, something which Bárdossy believes possible.

Bárdossy added that he had ordered a general requirement of exit visas for all persons including diplomats, in order to prevent, for example, the Yugoslav Legation from leaving Hungary before the Hungarian Minister in Belgrade was on safe ground. He also wanted to check on the travel of Russian diplomats, etc., in that way.

The personnel of the English Legation is leaving via Moscow, the Belgian Minister via Moscow probably for the United States of America, the Dutch Chargé d'Affaires will probably join them in the

next few days. As a reason for the rupture of diplomatic relations,² the English Minister asserted that Hungary was permitting attacks by German troops on Yugoslavia from Hungarian territory. By explicit instruction of Hull the American Chargé d'Affaires³ warned the Hungarian Government against attacking Yugoslavia and emphasized that the Yugoslav air attacks on Hungarian territory were not directed against Hungary but against German troops.⁴ Bárdossy had not accepted this explanation and left open the question of a later Hungarian action against Yugoslavia.

I suggest that on your instruction I be authorized to repeat my reassuring statements regarding the case of a Russian or Rumanian attack on Hungary.⁵

ERDMANNSDORFF

² In telegram No. 361 of Apr. 7 (73/53192) Counselor of Legation Werkmeister reported having been informed by the Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister of the step taken by the British Minister announcing that Great Britain was breaking off relations with Hungary.

³ Howard K. Travers.

⁴ Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 302-303.

⁵ In telegram No. 612 of Apr. 11 (73/53206) Ribbentrop, referring to this passage, instructed Erdmannsdorff to tell the Hungarian Government "that the Russians had no intention of taking any action against Hungary."

No. 297

177/84963-64

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, April 9, 1941—9:03 p. m.

SECRET

Received April 9—11:05 p. m.

No. 843 of April ■

With reference to my telegram No. 832 of April 7 (in Pol. VIII).¹

Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka will have a further conversation with Molotov this afternoon in the Kremlin. After the dinner which Molotov arranged for him this evening, Matsuoka will leave for Leningrad and spend Thursday² there. Matsuoka has delayed his departure till Sunday. I have had several conversations with Matsuoka, but have not yet been able to obtain any straightforward statement from him regarding his conversations with Molotov and their concrete results. According to my impression Matsuoka went very much into detail in the conversations with Molotov, and it might well depend now essentially on the Soviet Government whether there will be any written agreements. Matsuoka promised to inform me before his departure for Tokyo.

¹ Not found.

² i.e., Apr. 10.

Matsuoka also related the following: At a luncheon which Steinhardt, the American Ambassador here, gave for Matsuoka by reason of his previous personal relations with him, Steinhardt tried time and again to find out from him whether a Japanese attack on America had been decided upon in Berlin.³ Matsuoka added that he had the impression that Steinhardt had been directly requested by Roosevelt to do this. Naturally he had replied that this was entirely out of the question.

SCHULENBERG

³ Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. iv, pp. 932-934.

No. 298

233/156481

The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

BUENOS AIRES, April 9, 1941—9:20 p. m.

No. 521 of April 9

Received April 10—7:40 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

In accordance with the instructions received¹ I have made preparations for the founding of a society for the purpose of influencing Argentine policy more effectively, which is to have important Argentine politicians, parliamentarians, and businessmen as members. The official purpose of the society to be established will be the preparation of German-Argentine exports and imports on the broadest possible basis.

The necessary corporation capital is 100,000 pesos; in addition, 15,000 pesos for each of the 8 months of this calendar year, a total of 135,000 pesos, should be guaranteed somehow. There is also the single payment of about 15,000 pesos for the costs of registration, lawyer fees, etc. Thus a total of 250,000 pesos (which equals approximately 155,000 reichsmarks), and of this 130,000 pesos (one hundred thirty thousand) are needed at once.

Please wire authorization² to carry through the founding of this society and instructions whether the amount needed at once and the later monthly sums may be taken from deposit M in accordance with your telegram No. 502 of July 14, 1940,¹ or should be charged as payments on instruction. Deposit M contains about 1½ (one-half) million pesos.

THERMANN

¹ Not found.

² No such authorization has been found.

No. 299

71/50841-44

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

U. St.S. Pol. 288

BERLIN, April 9, 1941.

I

I reported to the Foreign Minister today at his request on the situation in Iraq.¹ I explained with regard to it that after the repeated, well-known vacillations, there was now in Iraq a Cabinet which was to be considered the most nationalist and pro-Axis thus far, and that according to available reports this Cabinet had the full support of the Iraq Army. This Cabinet was putting up stiff resistance to the English wishes for the stationing of English troops in Iraq and a more or less unrestricted right of passage.

I also informed the Foreign Minister that in the political sphere the State Secretary's letter to the Grand Mufti, which had been approved by the Führer, had just been sent to Baghdad via Ankara.² The question of arms aid had been repeatedly and earnestly discussed with Ambassador Oshima, also by Ambassador Stahmer—recently again after the Cabinet change in Iraq. As yet no positive result had been achieved. On the other hand Herr Ripken had got in touch with the Afghan Minister of Commerce here about Afghanistan's helping us so that camouflaged arms shipments may reach Iraq by a special route.³ There were still difficulties, on the other hand, in the question of what we could deliver. If good material was somehow to be delivered, a decision by the Führer was necessary.⁴

The Foreign Minister thereupon authorized me, subject to fundamental policy decisions, to proceed on my own with the handling of this problem and all others connected with it and to push them vigorously. In so far as a decision by the Führer was necessary, he would obtain it.

II

The Foreign Minister pointed out, moreover, that in case no decision against England was obtained this year, the questions of the

¹ A military coup in Baghdad led to the resignation of Minister President Taha al-Hashimi on Apr. 1 and to the flight of the Regent, Abd-al-Ilah, from Baghdad. A Government of National Defense was formed by Rashid Ali al-Gaylani on Apr. 3.

² Document No. 298, enclosure.

³ See document No. 133 and footnote 23.

⁴ Woermann's memorandum of Apr. 10 (83/61566) records that Ribbentrop presented the matter to Hitler who decided that arms of all sorts were to be made available.

Middle East might become of decisive importance perhaps beginning with this autumn, and he instructed me to take particular care of these questions, namely with regard to the areas of the Middle East extending from Afghanistan and India on the one side to North Africa on the other side.

I called the Foreign Minister's attention on this occasion to the proposal already submitted to him regarding the activity of the Abwehr in the Middle East,⁵ which he had shelved. The Foreign Minister thereupon made the decision that the Abwehr could be authorized:

1. To organize an intelligence service in the Middle East, which would have to be confined to purely military matters. A political intelligence service was a matter for the Foreign Ministry.

2. To organize sabotage in Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq; the Foreign Minister wished to be kept constantly informed of the individual projects.

3. The plotting of insurrections was not to be organized by the Abwehr but, if there should be any occasion for it, was to be a matter for the Foreign Ministry.

III

In discussing the matter of the Abwehr being confined to purely military intelligence from the countries concerned, I informed the Foreign Minister that the private secretary of the Grand Mufti was to be supplied by us with a radio transmitter so that the Foreign Ministry could receive political intelligence from Iraq independently of the Abwehr Service. This equipment, which, like the cipher material which went with it, did not reveal its Foreign Ministry origin, was at the moment on its way to Ankara. A proposal to that effect had just been prepared.

The Foreign Minister expressed his approval and instructed me in addition immediately to organize for the Foreign Ministry an intelligence service of its own in North Africa and the Middle East, independent of the Abwehr and of the SD Service. For that purpose he made available every possible financial assistance, both in gold and in foreign exchange, and said that he intended to direct Minister Luther to provide all the most modern technical aids necessary, such as radio equipment, etc. This Service was later to be incorporated into a new intelligence service to be organized by the Foreign Minister that would be independent of other departments.

The Foreign Minister authorized me further to take the necessary action also with respect to personnel; in this connection he wished to be informed in advance when people were sent abroad.

⁵ See document No. 188, footnote 4.

IV

In conclusion the Foreign Minister requested that all of our work in the area mentioned be immediately and rapidly activated. Specifically, the Foreign Minister mentioned in that connection, besides the countries of the Middle East, all of Africa, especially French Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, to be considered also in conjunction with Spain and Portugal. He would like to have reports from time to time on the action taken.

Herewith submitted to the State Secretary.

WOERMANN

No. 300

195/189137-43

Memorandum by Subhas Chandra Bose¹

BERLIN, April 9, 1941.

Subject: Plan for cooperation between the Axis Powers and India.

As in the World War, England in the present war again attempted to exploit India for her war aims. Since the beginning of the war England has not relaxed either her political or her economic pressures on India, despite the numerous defeats inflicted on her by Germany. To us in India it is therefore quite plain that England, even though she is gradually collapsing, will increasingly tighten her stranglehold upon India, up to the very last. It is just as evident from England's present policy in India that if she should survive the war, England will try to restore her power by the exploitation of India's rich resources, in order to resume the fight against the new order a few years later.

India is naturally interested in seeing England totally defeated in this war and the British Empire completely broken up so that India would recover her freedom as a nation. The British Empire is the greatest obstacle, not merely to India's advance toward her freedom as a nation but also in the path of human progress.

As the Indian people's attitude toward Britain is very hostile in the present war, it is able to render material assistance to bring about Great Britain's downfall.

To achieve full cooperation between the Axis Powers and India for the achievement of the common aim, the destruction of Great Britain, I am proposing the following plan. It will involve work

¹According to a minute by Woermann of Apr. 11 (195/189135-36) Bose submitted his memorandum in English. This document has not been found; the original of the document printed is a German translation prepared in the Foreign Ministry. For Woermann's comments on Bose's suggestions, see document No. 323.

in Europe, in Afghanistan, in the tribal area (independent zone) situated between Afghanistan and India, and last but not least, in India itself.

I. Work in Europe

1) A free India government should be established in Europe, if possible in Berlin.

2) A treaty between the Axis Powers and the free India government should be drawn up which, among other things, would provide for India's liberation in the event of an Axis victory. Special privileges for the Axis Powers in India when a free government takes over, etc., etc.

3) Establishment of Legations of the free India government with, as far as possible, all the friendly countries in Europe. (nota bene: The steps mentioned above will convince the Indian people that in the event of an Axis victory its freedom would be guaranteed by the Axis Powers and that the fact of India's independence is already being recognized.)

4) Thereafter propaganda should be started, especially over the radio, calling on the Indian people to rise up for their freedom and launch a revolt against the British authorities. The broadcasts would have to be made in the name of Radio Free India.

5) Arrangements should be made for sending the necessary materials via Afghanistan to India in support of the rebellion.

II.² Work in Afghanistan (Kabul)

1) In Kabul a headquarters should be set up to maintain communications between Europe and India. The existing Legations could be expanded to cope with the work; or special committees would have to be set up to do the necessary work.

2) These headquarters should have the necessary equipment, automobiles, trucks, couriers, etc., to maintain communications between India and Europe.

III. Work in the Independent Zone

1) Our agents are already at work in this independent zone, which is situated between Afghanistan and India. Their activity would have to be coordinated and a plan drawn up for large-scale raids on British military bases. Offensive action by isolated anti-British elements, such as the Fakir of Ipi,³ could be integrated into this big plan.

² A mistake in numbering the paragraphs had been made in the German translation—paragraph III followed I—and Woermann noted this in his memorandum. See document No. 323.

³ The Fakir of Ipi, religious leader of the Waziri tribe which lived in the "independent zone" between India and Afghanistan. See also document No. 511.

2) A few military experts would have to be dispatched from Europe to this region.

3) A powerful center of propaganda should also be set up in this zone and the necessary equipment for a printing shop should be procured.

4) Arrangements should also be made to set up a radio transmitter in this region.⁴

5) Agents from the independent zone should be recruited who would select the necessary scouts from the [Northwest] Frontier Province. (This is the province adjoining the independent zone.)

IV. The activity in India

1) Broadcasts to India ought to be made in grand style. At first they could be transmitted from a station in Europe, later from transmitters in the independent zone.

2) The printing shops in the independent zone will have to turn out the propaganda material for India as well.

3) Our agents and party members in the various Indian provinces will have to be instructed to hamper the activities of the British authorities in India as much as possible. They should work along the following lines:

(a) Intensive propaganda among the Indian population against service in the Army and payment of even a single rupee in taxes;

(b) Inducing the civilian population by propaganda to refrain from paying taxes to the authorities or obeying the laws of the British Government, etc.

(c) Secret action among the Indian units of the Army toward inducing the Indian soldiers to engage in a military rebellion.

(d) Organizing strikes in those factories which support the British war effort.

(e) Acts of sabotage against strategic railway lines, bridges, factories, etc. The required material for this would have to be shipped to India.

(f) Organizing insurrections among the civilian population in various parts of the country, which could then be used as a spring-board for the revolution of the masses.

V. Financial matters

The funds required for the aforementioned activities would have to be provided by the Axis Powers in the form of a loan to the free India government, which has its seat in Europe. After the termination of the war, when an independent government has been installed in India, this loan would be repaid in full.

For disbursements in Europe the mark currency might be used. For expenditures incurred in Afghanistan marks can be converted into afghanis. For payments in India afghanis can be converted into

⁴ See document No. 598.

rupees, although this might encounter some difficulties at this time. But it might be considered whether 10-rupee notes could not be printed in Europe, in order to be taken to India through Afghanistan.

VI. Military Aid in the Annihilation of British Power in India

The British Government has in India a maximum of 70,000 British troops and auxiliary forces which are loyal to the Government. Therefore it will be difficult for England to hold India with British troops alone, if the Indian troops should rebel. If at that time a small contingent of 50,000 soldiers, equipped with the most up-to-date weapons, would be dispatched to India, the English could be completely driven out of India. The Axis Powers should in any event take this important fact into consideration.

No. 301

177/84967

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, April 10, 1941—12:25 a. m.

No. 851 of April 9

Received April 10—5:20 a. m.

This evening, shortly before his dinner with Molotov,¹ Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka sent Minister Nishi, First Counselor of Embassy at the Japanese Embassy here, who was likewise invited by Molotov, to give me the following information:

Today Matsuoka had again conferred for 3 hours with Molotov. The result was: Matsuoka waived the original Japanese demand for a nonaggression pact and the purchase by Japan of North Sakhalin; at present it was a question of concluding a neutrality pact, to include the following main points:

1. Friendship;
2. Respect for each other's territory;
3. Neutrality in case of war.

The Soviet Government was still insisting on the abandonment of Japanese concessions in North Sakhalin as the price of a neutrality pact, while the Japanese Government was proposing that this point be settled later. Should the Soviet Government persist in this viewpoint, Matsuoka would leave here without accomplishing anything. If the Soviet Government gave in, a neutrality pact would probably be concluded.

Matsuoka is leaving for Leningrad today; upon his return Friday the decision may be made known.

SCHULENBURG

¹ See document No. 297.

No. 302

274/177861

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

SOFIA, April 10, 1941.

No. 400 of April 10

Received April 10—2:15 p. m.

According to information from the Foreign Minister the Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry¹ yesterday informed the Bulgarian Minister² of the démarche of the Yugoslav Minister in Ankara, who on the basis of the assertion that Bulgarian troops were fighting against Yugoslavia had demanded fulfillment of Turkish obligations under the Balkan Pact.³ As M[enemencioğlu] asserted, he had replied to the Yugoslav Minister that the Bulgarian Minister had informed him officially that no Bulgarian troops were taking part in the German operations against Yugoslavia, and referred him to the statement to that effect made by the Bulgarian Minister President in the Parliament on April 8.

Subsequent to this communication M. pointed out to the Bulgarian Minister that further developments, however, could lead to fulfillment of the Turkish obligations. He was convinced of the sincerity of the Bulgarian statements, to be sure, but in the Turkish view the Bulgarians were no longer masters of the situation and of their decisions.⁴

RICHTHOFEN

¹ Numan Menemencioğlu.

² Sava Kirov.

³ Signed at Athens, Feb. 9, 1934, by Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLIII, p. 153.

⁴ In telegram No. 296 of Apr. 12 (3883/E048162) Woermann forwarded to Ankara the text of this Sofia telegram and requested a report regarding the remark attributed to Menemencioğlu in the last sentence. In his reply (telegram No. 373 of Apr. 13: 61/40067) Papen expressed agreement with Menemencioğlu's remark and stated that the Bulgarian Army should enter into action only when the Yugoslav campaign was over and when Turkey could no longer be blamed for not keeping her commitments under the alliance.

According to a minute appended to the document printed (274/177862) the following supplement to the telegram was forwarded on Apr. 11 to Minister Hewel at Hitler's residence in Munich:

"The Bulgarian Foreign Minister is a particularly sorry figure. If we do not need right away three Bulgarian divisions as occupation forces one might possibly wait a few days before using them. If we need them right away, no consideration ought to be given. Ribbentrop."

Regarding the use of Bulgarian divisions, see document No. 312.

No. 303

265/172748-50

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, April 10, 1941—2:25 p. m.

No. 285

RAM 118

For the Ambassador personally.

For your information.

On April 8 I asked the Turkish Ambassador to call on me in order to discuss with him the situation in connection with the German operation in the Balkans.¹ First I gave him the same assurances regarding the fact that German troops would keep out of the areas east of the line Svilengrad-Didymoteikhon and regarding respect for the Greek-Turkish border as you have already transmitted to the Turkish Government at your post.² At the same time I suggested that the Turkish Government should issue a similar instruction to the Turkish troops and authorities along the border. I expressed to Gerede my agreement in principle regarding the continued operation of the section of the Sofia-Istanbul railroad line passing through Greek territory, and the participation of Turkey in the management of this section. Details are to be arranged by you in Ankara on the basis of proposals from the offices concerned (instructions regarding this will follow³).

Furthermore I informed the Ambassador briefly about the status of the military operations (advance beyond Skoplje), pointing out that this Balkan campaign represented only an auxiliary operation being carried out by only a small part of the German field army.

After a few statements concerning the background of the coup d'état in Yugoslavia and the regrettable development in the attitude of Greece, I turned to the German-Turkish relationship, emphasizing that Germany could not imagine any better guardian of the Dardanelles than Turkey and that the Führer was actually willing to put this down in writing at the proper time. Germany had long striven for the policy of cooperation with Turkey, not from opportunism but on the basis of a long-term political concept of the situation as a whole. Germany did not have territorial interests

¹ Schmidt recorded this conversation in a memorandum of Apr. 9 (67/47305-17).

² See document No. 289.

³ In telegram No. 286, dispatched Apr. 11 (3883/E048159-60) Ritter instructed Papan to inform Saracoglu that Germany was prepared to enter into discussions with the Turkish Government regarding Turkish participation in the management of this line; at the time, however, this promise was to be given only in a general way.

with respect to Turkey, any more than she had any in the Balkans and she would immediately withdraw her troops from the Balkan countries at the conclusion of the peace.

On the other hand Germany had made sacrifices for the policy of rapprochement with Turkey. When after Molotov's visit Soviet Russia made the establishment of Russian bases on the Dardanelles the condition of her accession to the Tripartite Pact,⁴ Germany had not agreed. Russia was therefore not in the Tripartite Pact. The Führer also desired a closer relationship with Turkey in memory of the hard times experienced together. The Führer would welcome it if he could have all Germany's old allies at our side again at this time, too. All of the former allies who had found the way back to Germany had been put in position to satisfy their revisionist claims; this had been true of Hungary and Bulgaria in the past and would now again be taken into account in connection with the operations against Serbia and Greece.

Then I expressed my regret that the Turkish press and radio continued to be unfriendly toward Germany; one ought to try to bring about a change here. Gerede agreed and will himself also make efforts to bring this about.

Again referring to Germany's positive position regarding the question of the Edirne railroad and any wishes which the Turkish Government might perhaps have in the future in connection with these questions, I stressed in conclusion how much closer cooperation was of advantage to Turkey, who had an interest in having a strong friend in Europe. After a few remarks concerning England's short-sighted policy, which was now inescapably leading to her defeat, I told the Ambassador that political cooperation between Germany and Turkey must come about of necessity. Gerede took leave with the assurance that he would do everything to further this objective.⁵

RIBBENTROP

⁴ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 404.

⁵ In telegram No. 291 of Apr. 11 (265/172753) Ribbentrop authorized Papen to utilize the information transmitted in the document printed in his discussions with the Turkish Government. He also informed Papen of German plans to let Turkey recover the "glacis in front of Edirne" which she had ceded to Bulgaria in 1915 and which was given to Greece after World War I.

See document No. 450.

No. 304

5070/E292232-35

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassies in Italy and Japan

Telegram

- (1) To Rome No. 811
(2) To Tokyo No. 425

BERLIN, April 10, 1941.

Pol. VIII 1675 g.

I. On Wednesday Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop invited the Italian and Japanese Ambassadors for today, Thursday, to an initial constituent meeting of the main committee of the Tripartite Pact. The meeting took place today.¹ A short DNB communiqué on it has been published. This communiqué, at the wish of the Japanese and Italians, has been phrased in such a way that today's meeting does not appear to the public to be the initial start of the committee work, but as a phase of the committee work thus far, with the aim of intensifying and consolidating still more the work so far accomplished. At today's meeting it was decided that after the Foreign Minister's return in 10 to 12 days a plenary session of the main committee will be held together with the military and economic subcommittees.² At this plenary session the two subcommittees are to be given instructions on precisely what tasks they are to perform. In preparation of this plenary session the German members of the two subcommittees and likewise the Italian and Japanese members of the two subcommittees are each to compile separately the questions which they wish to advance for the work of the subcommittees. Then the Foreign Ministry will try before the plenary session to coordinate these separately compiled questions into a program of work. However, the national members of the subcommittees are expressly to refrain, at the present stage, from making inquiries of their governments and from receiving fully formulated commissions from them. Rather, the cooperation is to be kept quite loose and flexible.

The Italian and Japanese Ambassadors have been informed that it is expedient for the main committees in Rome and Tokyo to convene in the near future, too. At the same time the supposition was expressed that the main committee in Rome will perhaps be convened by the Duce, because of the absence of the Italian Foreign Minister.³ In Tokyo the main committee will probably be able to

¹ This meeting is recorded in Paul Otto Schmidt's memorandum of Apr. 10 (67/47299-304).

For earlier views regarding the committees, see vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 158 and 270.

² No record of such a meeting has been found.

³ Ciano joined his air group at Bari on Jan. 28 (see vol. XI of this series, document No. 731). Although he met Hitler on Mar. 1 (see document No. 117) and on Mar. 25 (see document No. 208), he did not resume his post until the latter part of April (see document No. 363).

meet only after the Japanese Foreign Minister returns to Tokyo. In this connection the opinion was also expressed that it will probably belong among the functions of the main committee in Berlin to coordinate the work of the three main committees in Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo, in so far as this proves necessary in the future.

II. For your information only. The short-term invitation to today's meeting became necessary because the Reich Foreign Minister will leave Berlin on Friday for some time, and because it was on the other hand the general desire that the political gesture of the convening of the main committee should not be postponed until a later time. It was also agreed that for propaganda reasons the meeting of the main committee should be brought into a time relationship with Matsuoka's now concluded visit and with the great German military successes of recent days. The committee has been convened in any case mainly for propaganda reasons. Please therefore see to it that this objective is pursued there, too, with every possible means.

The Italian and Japanese Ambassadors will themselves report to their Governments on today's meeting. It is therefore not necessary for the Government there to be officially informed by the German Embassy. It is desirable, however, for the Foreign Minister there to be informed of section I for his information, in order to be sure that the information there is correct in all points. I also request that the propaganda exploitation in the local press be arranged with the authorities there.

RITTER

No. 305

5112/E295449-51

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union*¹

Telegram

No. 738 of April 10

APRIL 10, 1941.

Ha. Pol. 2019 g.

With reference to your report—No. Dg. 48—of March 25, 1941.²

The emphasis of the Petsamo negotiations is being placed at present on the Finnish-Soviet negotiations, since we gave the Finnish Government the advice not to yield on the big question which is still open, namely, Soviet participation in the management of the future concession company. Therefore, we should properly handle the Petsamo question in a dilatory manner at the present time, in

¹ The document printed is an information copy sent to the Legation in Helsinki with a covering letter dated Apr. 21 (5112/E295448). No other copy has been found. The instruction to Schulenburg was largely based on a memorandum by Schnurre of Apr. 7 (260/169937-38).

² See document No. 204.

order so far as possible to await the next stage in the Finnish-Soviet negotiations. Please continue, accordingly, the conversation on the subject of Petsamo only if you are approached by the Soviet side about it. In that event, the following reply should be made, at first orally, to the Soviet memorandum of March 24 of this year:³

"In the memorandum of the German Embassy of March 11, 1941,⁴ the German Government expressed the wish to receive from the Soviet Government a general statement to the effect that it agrees that all private German-Finnish contracts be taken over and respected by the new concession company to be founded with the participation of the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet Government is prepared, for its part, to see to it that any complications are avoided in the implementation of the private contracts and the governmental agreements. The German Government received no such statement through the Soviet memorandum of March 24 of this year. The memoranda of the Soviet Government of February 28⁵ and March 24, 1941, contain, to be sure, a certain approximation to the German stand in the question of the duration of the German-Finnish agreements and the percentile German share of the output. On the other hand, the numerous other questions that are settled in the German-Finnish agreements, and whose future satisfactory disposition was to be assured by the general statement of the Soviet Government as requested by the German Government, still remain open. These include the agreements concerning prices, repayment of credits, quality, scheduling of deliveries, production plans, etc. Also, the nickel matte agreement, which is an important part of the German-Finnish agreements, is again to be subjected to special scrutiny, according to the statements of the Soviet memorandum and is to be supplemented by additional contractual provisions between the new concession company and the I. G. Farben Industrie. This is not in accordance with the intention of the German Government which would like to prevent obscurities from being introduced into the existing German-Finnish agreements through a Soviet participation in the concession company. The German Government therefore requests the Soviet Government to reconsider whether it is in a position to give the desired assurances in a clear and unreserved manner."

Please do not put the German reply in writing until you receive a further telegraphic instruction. If you can avoid any real elaboration of the subject by alluding to the forthcoming trip of the Ambassador to Berlin,⁶ please avail yourself of such an opportunity.

WEIZSÄCKER

³ See document No. 204.

⁴ See document No. 139 and document No. 204, footnote 1.

⁵ Text printed in document No. 109.

⁶ Ambassador Schulenburg was on home leave Apr. 15 to May 1. See document No. 6, footnote 2, and document No. 351, footnote 7.

No. 306

73/53207

The High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry

Amt Ausl./Abw.

BERLIN, April 10, 1941.

No. 124/41 g. Kdos. Chefs. Ausl. III Org.

Attention Ambassador Ritter.

The German General with the High Command of the Hungarian Armed Forces has wired on April 10, 1941:

"At noon I personally transmitted the Führer's letter of April 9 to the Regent.¹

"On the basis of the situation the Regent agreed to the proposal of the Chief of the General Staff to attack on April 12 with the bulk of the Third Hungarian Army, 4-6 brigades, 2 motorized brigades, and 1 cavalry brigade without waiting for a systematic assembly of forces. He added: If no complications occur—probably thinking of the Russian front. Consideration is now being given to carrying out a drive to Osijek with the 11th Brigade as early as April 11."

The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht
By order:
BÜCKNER

¹ Not found; cf. C. A. Macartney, *A History of Hungary, 1929-1945*, vol. II, p. 9.

No. 307

116/68716

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUDAPEST, April 11, 1941—2:20 a. m.

No. 383 of April 11

Received April 11—6:30 a. m.

The Minister President asked me to call on him at midnight in order to inform me of the following:

The Regent would issue today a manifesto with approximately the following content:

In 1918 many territories were wrested from Hungary without war and only on account of the revolution. He had hoped for a restitution without war, also with regard to the territory taken by Yugoslavia. In this sense the agreement of friendship had been concluded. The revolution in Belgrade had brought to the helm elements which had kindled [the fires of] war already in 1914. This time, too, they had wanted to bring about war with Germany and Italy, with whom Hungary was linked not only through friendship but also through the Tripartite Pact.

Since Croatia had declared her independence¹ he greeted the Croatian people with whom Hungary had been linked in friendship for a thousand years, and he sincerely wished them happiness.

Croatia's declaration of independence meant that Yugoslavia as such no longer existed as she was breaking up into her component parts.

It was therefore his duty to bring back the territories which Yugoslavia had taken from Hungary and to protect the Hungarian population living there. Therefore, he was ordering his Army to fulfill its duty.

As the Minister President told me, a special declaration of war or a break in relations prior to the military action is not intended.

ERDMANNSDORFF

¹ See document No. 313.

No. 308

159/82216-17

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 986 of April 10

WASHINGTON, April 11, 1941—12:10 p. m.

Received April 12—12:05 a. m.

The timing of the conclusion and especially of the publication of the Greenland agreement¹ leads one to infer that in all probability the American Government is trying—at a time when it is forced to watch the British defeat and its own defeat in the Balkans—to point to a success in the field of foreign policy designed to furnish proof of its willingness to help England, possibly by the safeguarding of convoys to Iceland; at the same time the aim is probably to reply to our blockade of Iceland. The agreement, which will doubtless be received with approval by the American public, is intended, moreover, to distract attention for a few days from less gratifying matters.

All soundings made thus far at the State Department have elicited the stereotyped reply that in the first place Greenland comes under the Monroe Doctrine and in the second place protective measures

¹ An agreement signed in Washington on Apr. 8 by United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the Danish Minister, Henrik Kauffmann, accompanied by an exchange of notes of Apr. 7 and 9, respectively, between Secretary Hull and Minister Kauffmann gave the United States the right to establish and operate defense facilities in Greenland. For the text of the agreement and of the notes exchanged, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 204, or U.S. Statutes at Large, 1941-1942, vol. 55 (pt. 2), p. 1245; also Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. iv, p. 445. For additional documentation on the Greenland agreement, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 35 ff. and *Beretning til Folketinget afgivet af den af tinget under 8. Januar 1948 nedsatte kommission i henhold til Grundlovens § 45* (Copenhagen, 1948), vol. v, *Bilag*, pp. 194-252, and *ibid.*, vol. XIII, *Bilag*, Bind 3, pp. 1025-1108.

were being taken in conformity with the Havana Act.² In order to harmonize the conclusion of the treaty with previous statements (cf. your telegrams No. 427 of March 24 and 391 of March 19³) the State Department is trying by the press statement of April 10,⁴ all essential points of which were given in the DNB report from Washington, to prove on flimsy grounds that Greenland is threatened. It asserts that in the summer of 1940 three ships from Norway with German crews appeared off the east coast of Greenland, one of which landed and temporarily put on shore weather observers for [the assistance of] the German military operations in the Atlantic Ocean; in the late autumn an observation plane appeared over the east coast. On March 27, 1940 [1941], a German bomber was supposed to have been seen over the east coast of Greenland and on March 28 another German airplane.

Simultaneously with the release there were published, in addition to the State Department's statement reported by DNB from Washington, a statement by the President (see telegram en clair No. 975⁵), the text of the treaty (see telegram en clair No. 977⁶), and an exchange of notes between Hull and the Danish Minister (see telegram en clair No. 978⁷).

The President's Secretary (group garbled) supplemented Roosevelt's statement with the oral comment that readiness for defense against attacks and for preservation of integrity, as in the case of Greenland, also applied to all other foreign possessions in the Western Hemisphere. In this connection he expressly mentioned Canada and Martinique.

There has obviously not been any prior contact between the Danish Minister and his Government. M. Kauffmann has apparently acted on his own responsibility. It is also probable that the assertion made in the exchange of letters between Hull and Kauffmann that long negotiations had taken place is by no means in accordance with the facts. The treaty was produced ad hoc with the greatest haste, for reasons of foreign policy. I should appreciate information about the intentions of the Danish Government in the face of this accomplished fact and in this connection wish to call attention especially to article X of the treaty, according to which consultation

² The Convention on Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas, concluded at Havana July 30, 1940; text in Department of State Treaty Series No. 977, or U. S. Statutes at Large, 1939-1941, vol. 54 (pt. 2), p. 2491. See also vol. x of this series, document No. 316.

³ Neither found.

⁴ See Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. iv, p. 443.

⁵ Of Apr. 10 (247/164311). For text of President Roosevelt's statement, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. iv, p. 443.

⁶ Of Apr. 10 (247/164335-39).

⁷ Of Apr. 10 (247/164340-43).

and denunciation of the treaty can take place only if the American and the Danish Governments agree that the present threat to America has been eliminated.

THOMSEN

No. 309

247/164317

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

U. St.S. Pol. No. 296

BERLIN, April 11, 1941.

At 1:15 p.m. Minister von Renthe-Fink made the following report by telephone on the subject of Greenland,¹ based on his discussions with the Danish Foreign Minister:²

1. The Danish Government will recall Minister de Kauffmann. Since this requires the consent of the King, the recall will presumably not take place till tomorrow.

2. The Danish Foreign Minister will summon the American Chargé d'Affaires³ tomorrow and hand him a note.⁴ The note disowns Minister de Kauffmann. It announces his recall. The agreement concluded by him is declared invalid and a protest is lodged against the American action.

3. A press release will be issued in Copenhagen tomorrow, probably even if the consent of the King should not yet have been formally obtained.

4. Moreover, Minister von Renthe-Fink is urging that Minister de Kauffmann be deprived of citizenship and that his property be confiscated.

5. In the matter of the Danish ships lying in American ports,⁵ Minister von Renthe-Fink is urging, in addition to the action already taken, a law under which the Danish sailors who go into service on these ships will be deprived of citizenship and their property confiscated.

A telegram from Herr von Renthe-Fink will follow.⁶

¹ See document No. 308 and footnote 1. This Washington telegram did not reach Berlin until early on Apr. 12, while Renthe-Fink's telegram No. 541 of Apr. 11 (159/82201) from Copenhagen reporting on the Greenland agreement on the basis of radio broadcasts from London was received early on Apr. 11. According to Renthe-Fink the news was causing the greatest concern in the Danish Foreign Ministry.

² Erik Scavenius.

³ Mahlon F. Perkins.

⁴ Text printed in document No. 318.

⁵ During the night of Mar. 29-30, the United States Coast Guard had taken control of 35 of the 41 Danish vessels lying in American ports. For documents on negotiations resulting from this action, see *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 74-87 and *Beretning til Folketinget* . . . vol. XIII, *Bilag*, Bind 3, pp. 1548-1563.

⁶ This was Copenhagen telegram No. 542 of Apr. 11 (247/164318-20) forwarding to Berlin the text in German translation of a telegram in which Minister Kauffmann explained his actions to his Government. For a German text, see *Beretning til Folketinget* . . . vol. XIII, *Bilag*, Bind 3, pp. 1068-1069.

The Washington Embassy has been informed and asked to report.⁷
WOERMANN

⁷This instruction has not been found. It may have been Berlin telegram No. 553 of Apr. 12, to which a reply was made in Washington telegram No. 1011 of Apr. 12 (247/164354). In this telegram Thomsen stated that he was unable to add anything to his previous reports on the background of the Greenland agreement. For a German text of telegram No. 1011, see *Beretning til Folketinget* . . . vol. XIII, *Bilag*, Bind 3, p. 1081.

No. 310

245/161727

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

ROME, April 11, 1941—3:00 p. m.

No. 806 of April 11

Received April 11—4:05 p. m.

According to information given to Bismarck by Anfuso this morning, Pavelić left Rome for Trieste, where he intends to try with 300 (three hundred) of his followers to get to Zagreb as soon as possible, either through the Italian or the German lines. Anfuso added that this morning the Duce had expressed himself very positively in regard to the proclamation of an independent Croatia under the leadership of Pavelić. Further developments in Croatia would have to be reserved for a later time.

On this occasion Anfuso touched on Italy's claim to Dalmatia, but added that the Croats for their part claimed Dalmatia for themselves. The solution of this question, too, would have to come at a later time.

MACKENSEN

No. 311

116/66710-11

SS-Standartenführer Veesenmayer to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No number

ZAGREB.

Received April 11, 1941—4:30 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Kvaternik just gave me the following message for the Führer with the request that it be transmitted at once:

To His Excellency the Führer and Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler.
"Führer: The Croatian people, who have been fighting through the centuries for their freedom, have risen as one man while Serbia was undergoing smashing blows by the Wehrmacht, in order themselves to shape their destiny and their life, which is possible and worth living only at the side of the German people.

"On Thursday, April 10, 1941, I took over in a legal manner from the hands of Dr. Vladko Maček, the former Vice President of the Yugoslav Government, all his powers of leadership. In accordance with the will of the Croatian people I have proclaimed the Independent State of Croatia. All the executive organs are under my orders. The administration is continuing to function smoothly. Tranquillity and order in the country are assured. The closest accord for cooperation and for all measures that become necessary has been established with the Wehrmacht Command.

"In the hour of liberation for which we Croats have fought so hard and suffered so much our joy is mixed with exultation at the appearance of your magnificent Wehrmacht. I thank you in the name of the Croatian people for the protection which the German Army is giving the Croatian national uprising, and request recognition of our Independent State of Croatia by the Greater German Reich.

"Hail to the Führer of the German people. Slavko Kvaternik."

The original of this message is in my hands.

The development of the last few days made my action necessary, regarding which a detailed report will follow as soon as cipher telegrams can be sent again.¹ I urgently request instructions concerning my further conduct and I shall in the meantime offer Kvaternik friendly support.²

VEESENMAYER

¹ Document No. 313.

² In telegram No. 91 sent to Zagreb on Apr. 12 (116/66721) Sonnleithner informed Veesenmayer that Ribbentrop wanted a detailed report and would then issue the instructions requested.

No. 312

274/177865-66

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 508

RAM 121

BERLIN, April 11, 1941—11:15 p. m.

For the Minister personally.

Minister Draganov, who departed from here by plane on April 8 but who will not arrive until today, was asked by me to discuss the following two questions with his Government.

1. Employment of Bulgarian divisions in southern Yugoslavia to secure the occupation of this area and to combat banditry. According to information from you, discussions about this have in the meantime resulted in an affirmative statement by the Bulgarian.

Government.¹ With reference to this please tell the Government at once that we still leave open the date for the employment of these divisions. A communication concerning this date will follow at the proper time.

2. The question of breaking off relations with Yugoslavia and Greece. Please get in touch at once with Draganov and then also with the Foreign Minister in order to make sure that in this question Bulgaria's action is harmonized with us before the break in relations with the two countries is carried out; for it appears advisable that in this matter likewise Bulgarian agreement in principle be brought about, but that prior to announcement of the break we be consulted once more and that the date be fixed jointly. We would then make the Bulgarian Government a proposal in this matter.²

RIBBENTROP

¹ In telegram No. 397 of Apr. 8 (274/177858) Richthofen reported having been told by Filov that three Bulgarian divisions would be made available for the tasks which had been discussed with Draganov in Berlin.

² In telegram No. 422 of Apr. 15 (2548/523286-87), sent in reply to this instruction, Richthofen reported having been informed by Foreign Minister Popov that Bulgaria could not delay any longer breaking off relations with Yugoslavia and that this step would be announced in the press the next day.

No. 313

116/66712-14

SS-Standartenführer Veesenmayer to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 50

ZAGREB, April 11, 1941.

[Received April 12—11:20 a. m.]¹

For the Foreign Minister.

In response to my radioed request for authorization² made through SD channels, I received only an interim answer yesterday, and it was only at 4:30 p. m. today, April 11, that concurrence arrived. Since, however, the situation had become threatening in the meantime, I had to act on my own initiative in order to prevent at all events a proclamation by Maček that would have set off the most serious internal conflicts and bloodshed. Furthermore, one had to reckon with the Serbian troop units being swept back, who would then have been capable of anything. I therefore assumed the initiative on the morning of April 10, brought about a conference with Kvaternik, arranged with him an exact plan for assumption of power, and asked that a state of immediate readiness be set up at once. I waited most eagerly until yesterday for leaflets to be dropped; this was not done, however, so that until today not a

¹ The time of receipt is supplied from another copy (245/161729-31).

² Not found.

single propaganda leaflet was dropped over Zagreb. The dropping of leaflets would have been for me a sign of the imminent arrival of German troops, and at the same time would have enabled me to fix the most favorable moment for striking. At noon on April 10 the first reliable reports reached me of the advance of German troops, for which reason I decided to act on my own without delay. At 3:00 p.m. there was another meeting with Kvaternik during which I informed him that now the hour had come and I had resolved to call on Maček in order to induce him to resign. Kvaternik was very pleased at this, because this matter was his greatest worry which he did not feel entirely able to cope with. From 3:30 to 4:00 p.m. the discussion between Maček and me took place which, after some struggling, resulted in his stating that he was willing to withdraw and to hand over the power of government to Kvaternik personally. Maček gave me his word of honor that he would carry out this decision. I went to Kvaternik without delay, informed him of this outcome, which occasioned tremendous rejoicing among the leadership of the nationalists and took him to Maček at once. There the statement of resignation and of the transmittal of power of government to Kvaternik was formulated and signed by Maček.³ The original text is in my hands. In order not to lose any time, and because I had to reckon with sabotage if this decision should become known too soon, I succeeded with great difficulty in getting Kvaternik now to go with me at once to the radio station, where the solemn announcement of the decision regarding resignation and assumption of government was made at about 5:45 p.m. Being an officer, Kvaternik wanted to go to meet the German troops in order to be the first to greet them. In the end, however, he did not reject my considerations of practical politics, and it was thus brought about that shortly before the entry of the first German troops the proclamation of a free, independent Croatia was made; this fact called forth tremendous rejoicing and immediate decoration of the city with flags. An upshot of this enthusiasm was the subsequent welcome for the German troops in a manner that would never have been considered possible, and which General Kühn characterized to me with the words that he had experienced something similar only in Linz.⁴ The initiative and execution during the hours described were exclusively in my hands. Thus it was possible entirely to avoid bloodshed, and at the same time because of Kvaternik's splendid preparatory work from the military point of view to spare the German troops [sacrifices of] time and blood. The faith and trust

³ For Maček's account of this step, see *In the Struggle for Freedom*, pp. 228-229.

⁴ Apparently a reference to the entry of German troops into Austria in March 1938.

of the entire Croatian people in the Führer and his Wehrmacht from the day of the start of the war against Serbia is moving. Since Kvaternik took over the Government I have been at his side constantly and I am assisting him inconspicuously. I intend to continue to do this so that existing elements of danger can be overcome more easily. However, I have not committed myself in any way as regards interpretation of the concept of freedom.

VEESENMAIER

No. 314

247/164324-25

The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Telegram (en clair)

SPECIAL TRAIN No. 1001, April 12, 1941—2:00 a. m.

Received April 12—2:50 a. m.

Please forward the following instruction from the Foreign Minister to the Legation in Copenhagen immediately:¹

Minister von Renthe-Fink must demand immediately:

(1) A formal statement from the Danish Government to him as to whether the King, to whom Minister de Kauffmann refers, or any member of the Danish Government knew anything about Minister de Kauffmann's agreement with the American Government² prior to its publication.

(2) Immediate delivery of a note to the American Chargé d'Affaires in Copenhagen which will expressly disown Minister de Kauffmann, announce his recall, declare the agreement concluded invalid, and protest against the American action. The text of the note is subsequently to be communicated to us.

(3) Immediate carrying into effect of the recall of Minister de Kauffmann by the King of Denmark.

(4) A press release by the Danish Government stating clearly that Minister de Kauffmann acted against the will of the King of Denmark and the Danish Government and without authorization, that he has been recalled, and that the Danish Government has declared the arrangements concluded to be invalid and has protested against the American action. The text of this press release should be communicated to us immediately, i.e., on April 12, and will require our approval.

(5) The Danish Government must immediately deprive Minister de Kauffmann of his citizenship and confiscate his property.

(6) Immediate enactment of a law punishing Danish seamen who accept employment on Danish ships lying in American ports by depriving them of citizenship and confiscating their property.³

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 408 to Copenhagen, Apr. 12."

² See document No. 308 and footnote 1.

³ See document No. 309 and footnote 5.

Furthermore, Minister v. Renthe-Fink must ascertain immediately whether Kauffmann had any full powers with respect to Greenland which he might invoke for his action.

Moreover, a report must be made at once as to who is now acting as Minister Hencke's⁴ representative in the Danish Foreign Ministry and whether it is made certain that he sees the outgoing instructions to the Danish Missions in advance and that the Danish Government does not send out any encoded telegrams that we do not know about.

End of instruction.

RINTELEN

⁴ See document No. 197 and footnote 1.

No. 315

247/164333-34

*The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark
to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

COPENHAGEN, April 12, 1941—8:35 a. m.

SECRET

Received April 12—9:45 a. m.

No. 546 of April 12

With reference to your telegram No. 408 of April 12, 1941.¹

1. From what has been ascertained thus far, Danish Minister Kauffmann acted entirely on his own responsibility. It is not likely that the Danish Government supported him in any way or had any knowledge [of the matter]. The concern of the King and the Government for the independence of Denmark and the fear of the regime for its existence are too great for that. Kauffmann had no full powers to negotiate about Greenland, just as he had no authority whatever beyond the normal functions of a Minister. He himself is aware of this weakness. For that reason he argues that in conducting business without special authorization he is acting in the name of the Danish Government and also seeks cover behind the person of the King.

2. The outgoing instructions to the Danish Missions are all examined in advance and subjected to the strictest control. The encoded telegrams are examined with the aid of the code. We are also informed about all the telephone conversations which the Foreign Ministry and its members have had with foreign countries. Since the departure of Minister Hencke the control over all incoming and outgoing foreign mail and telegrams has been exercised with the

¹ Document No. 314.

greatest care under my direction by his assistant, Attaché Dr. Mitis, who performed similar functions in Prague earlier.

3. It is the impression here that Kauffmann was subjected to strong pressure by the Americans and completely succumbed to their propaganda. Kauffmann is a very ambitious man, who is inclined to take matters into his own hands and, besides, felt secure because he knew that Roosevelt would not recognize a recall by the Danish Government. He saw, moreover, that he had no prospects for a career on Germany's side.

4. As soon as I learned of Kauffmann's action I let it be known here in the most decided manner that this incident could not be taken seriously enough and that Germany's confidence in Danish policy had been severely shaken. I left no doubt that the Danish Government would have to disown Kauffmann publicly, too, in the sharpest manner and take suitable measures against him. I shall demand the required statements from the Government today.

RENTHE-FINK

No. 316

2011/443236

The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister

(Teletype Message)

St.S. No. 250

BERLIN, April 12, 1941.

Grand Admiral Raeder, who could not reach the Foreign Minister by telephone this morning, turned therefore to me with the urgent request that the following two problems should be settled:¹

1. Permission for German naval forces to operate freely in the western portion of the Atlantic Ocean up to the customary international 3-mile zone.

2. Cancellation of the preferred position which the American merchant ships have enjoyed so far in the conduct of our naval warfare.

The Grand Admiral explained the urgency of his request under 1 with the necessity of having to issue the necessary orders to the submarines involved or else using them in another war theater, and under 2 with the expectation that American merchant ships would now also turn up with war material in the Red Sea.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 325 and footnotes 1, 2, and 3.

No. 317

116/66709

Memorandum by the Chief of Protocol

TELEGRAM TO THE FÜHRER, TRANSMITTED BY TELEPHONE BY
MINISTER HINRICHS,¹ APRIL 12, 1941

"Rome, April 11, 1941.

"To the Führer and Reich Chancellor, Berlin.

"At the moment of the entry of the glorious and invincible German troops into my homeland I take the liberty, Führer, of conveying to you my gratitude and devotion. Independent Croatia will tie her future to the new order in Europe which you, Führer, and the Duce have created. In this hour the Croatian people greet with all their hearts and rejoicing National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy. Dr. Ante Pavelić."

This telegram was passed on by Minister Hinrichs to the Führer and will be again submitted in writing.

DÖRNBERG

¹ Of the Presidial Chancellery.

No. 318

247/164348-51

*The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark
to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram (en clair)

MOST URGENT

SSD MDKP [COPENHAGEN], April 12, 1941—8:20 a. m.

No. 550 of April 12

Received April 12—9:10 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 408 of April 12, 1941,¹ and to my telegram No. 546 of April 12, 1941.²

The Danish Government has acceded to the demands that I handed to it this morning in the matter of the Danish Minister, Kauffmann.³

Regarding point 1

I received the following statement from the Foreign Minister:

"Herr Minister, with regard to the telegraphic reports received from the Danish Minister in Washington about his signing of an

¹ Document No. 314.

² Document No. 315.

³ According to a memorandum of Apr. 12 by Grundherr (247/164344-45), Renthe-Fink had made an interim report by telephone in the afternoon of Apr. 12, stating that Foreign Minister Scavenius personally agreed to demands 1-4 transmitted in document No. 314 though he anticipated some difficulties with regard to points 5 and 6 of that instruction. Renthe-Fink reported that he had insisted on compliance with Germany's demands and that the matter would be brought before the King that very afternoon.

agreement with the United States of America concerning the defense of Greenland, I have the honor to inform you herewith that neither His Majesty the King nor any member of the Royal Danish Government had any knowledge prior to its publication either of the agreement or the negotiations preceding it."

Regarding point 2

The following note was handed to the American Chargé d'Affaires this afternoon by the Foreign Minister:⁴

"Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires, pursuant to a report received from the Royal Danish Minister at Washington the Government of the United States of America has offered to take over the responsibility of the defense of Greenland and to enter into an agreement to this effect with the Danish Minister. On the part of the Government of the United States of America, it was—according to the said report—for military reasons demanded that the proposed agreement be not submitted to the Danish Government before being signed. The Minister has then, on his own account, signed the proposed agreement.

"The Royal Danish Government hereby begs to enter a definite protest against the Government of the United States of America in a question as to the exercise of Denmark's sovereign rights over Greenland, initiating negotiations and concluding an agreement with the Danish Minister at Washington without his being warranted to act on behalf of the Danish Government either *ex officio* or pursuant to special authorization from his Government. The Royal Danish Government moreover must beforehand protest against the Government of the United States of America realizing the plans mentioned in the agreement as to the establishment of military bases in Greenland and the execution of other measures.

"As the said agreement as mentioned above is signed by M. Kauffmann without his being authorized to do so, it goes without saying that it will not be binding on Denmark in point of international law.

"As M. Kauffmann thus has decidedly exceeded his powers; and, as his behavior, most emphatically, must be disapproved of, His Majesty the King has today decided to recall him from his post as Danish Minister at Washington and to instruct him to depute the management of the Legation to M. E. Blechingsberg, Counselor of Legation, as Chargé d'Affaires and without delay to proceed to Copenhagen.

"In asking you to be good enough to acquaint your Government with the contents of the above I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires, the assurance of my highest consideration."

Regarding point 3

The King has ordered that Kauffmann's recall be carried out immediately. Telegraphic instructions to that effect have already been sent.⁵

⁴ The text that follows has not been retranslated from German into English, but follows the English text of the original as given to the American Chargé d'Affaires in Copenhagen; see *Beretning til Folketinget* . . . vol. v, *Bilag*, p. 230.

⁵ Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 48-49.

Regarding point 4

The Danish Government has proposed the following press release, which has already been submitted in accordance with instructions to the Press Department of the [German] Foreign Ministry for study and approval:

"The Foreign Ministry announces:

"It is reported in telegrams from Washington that the United States of America, after extension of the German war zone to the waters of Greenland, has decided to take Greenland under its protection and establish naval and air bases there. According to a telegraphic report from the Danish Legation in Washington an agreement relating thereto has been concluded, signed by the American Secretary of State and the Danish Minister, M. de Kauffmann.

"The agreement concluded obviously has no validity under international law, since it came into being without the participation or knowledge of the King or of the legal Danish Government appointed by him.

"In a note of today's date the Foreign Minister has protested to the American Chargé d'Affaires here against the action of the American Government in negotiating in a matter concerning the exercise of Denmark's sovereign rights over Greenland with the Minister in Washington and concluding an agreement with him, without his being authorized to act for the Government by virtue of his office or by special authorization. In the same note the Foreign Minister protested from the outset against the action of the U.S.A. Government in carrying out the plans for the establishment of military bases in Greenland which are mentioned in the agreement.

"Finally, it is also pointed out in the note that the agreement which has been concluded is not binding for Denmark.

"Because of his conduct in this matter M. Kauffmann, by royal decision, was recalled from his post as Danish Minister in Washington and ordered to return to Copenhagen and turn over the direction of the Legation to Counselor of Legation Blechingberg as Chargé d'Affaires."

The Danish Foreign Ministry has sent the foregoing text by telegram to all Danish Legations for their information. It intends, furthermore, to publish the text of the agreement in order to show how irresponsibly Kauffmann has acted.

Regarding point 5

The Danish Government has promised the immediate introduction of a bill in the Rigsdag which will make breaches of duty by foreign service officials abroad punishable and will cover the Kauffmann case. The bill provides that Danish Chiefs of Mission abroad who commit breaches of duty as in the Kauffmann case will be deprived of citizenship and have their property confiscated. Seizure of property and suspension of civic rights may be ordered immediately upon initiation of proceedings if the defendant is abroad. In order to take legal steps against Kauffmann even before the new

law is passed, criminal proceedings will be initiated immediately on the basis of the law of January 18, 1941, which we pushed through at the time.⁶

Regarding point 5

The demand according to point 6 is not directly connected with the Kauffmann case. Since the Danish Government was willing to enact the special law according to point 5, by which this incident will be satisfactorily settled, I agreed to detaching and treating separately the question mentioned in point 6. We had also agreed earlier that the law requested did not have to be promulgated for the time being but should only be prepared to the extent that it could be put into force quickly at any time.

Foreign Minister Scavenius today again expressed his regret over the Kauffmann incident and said he hoped that the attitude of the Danish Government would convince us of the good faith of its policy and of its desire to retain our confidence.⁷

RENTHE-FINK

⁶This was the so-called Ørum law, concerning espionage and certain other offenses by Danish citizens against the occupying power. The law provided for trial of such cases by Danish courts. On the Ørum case and the negotiations between German and Danish authorities on the enactment of the law in December 1940 and January 1941, see vol. XI of this series, document No. 582, footnote 5.

In telegram No. 559 of Apr. 15 (247/164359-60) Renthe-Fink reported that proceedings against Kauffmann would be started in accordance with the Danish penal code and the special law of Jan. 18 and quoted the relevant passages of these laws which were being invoked.

⁷See document No. 327.

No. 319

245/161734-36

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division I M

BERLIN, April 12, 1941.

Pol. I M g.

The official on duty at Pol. I M, Dr. Schomberg, wrote down the following concerning the Croatian question upon inquiry:

The High Command of the Wehrmacht, Department Ausland, communicated the following through the duty officer at about 8:45 p.m.:

"O. Qu. IV, Army General [Staff] communicated at 8:15 p.m.:

Second Army Headquarters requests immediate clarification through the Foreign Ministry and the High Command of the Wehrmacht:

1. Who is to be the Croatian leader, Pavelić or Colonel Kvaternik?

2. Can a Croatian Legion be formed?

Clarification regarding 1 and 2 is requested by this evening."

This communication was immediately passed on to the State Secretary. The State Secretary gave instructions that this matter be first of all submitted to Under State Secretary Woermann at once.

It was found that Under State Secretary Woermann was at this time at the home of Counselor of Embassy Zamboni. The State Secretary was informed of this, and he then gave instructions that the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, as well as SS-Oberführer Stahl-ecker and Ambassador Ritter should be informed as regards further steps. Ambassador Ritter replied after he had been notified that he was not informed and therefore could not express an opinion on this. It was therefore necessary to request the Under State Secretary immediately to come to a place where a briefing on the matter was possible.

Under State Secretary Woermann was thereupon called by telephone at the home of Counselor of Embassy Zamboni and asked that he cut short his visit there if at all possible so that he could be informed about the case at issue. (This was done in order to avoid possible eavesdropping by the Italians on the telephone conversation.) Under State Secretary Woermann thereupon left Counselor of Embassy Zamboni's apartment at once and was informed of the matter when he telephoned.

Twenty minutes later (at about 10:00 p.m.), even before a telephone conversation between Ambassador Ritter and Under State Secretary Woermann was arranged, Under State Secretary Woermann was informed of the Führer's decision which had arrived in the meantime from the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

This decision was passed on by telephone by Colonel Lahousen, OKW, Foreign Department, to whom General Jodl had telephoned in the Special Train "Amerika."

The Führer's decision is as follows:

"Regarding point 1: No interference in the internal political affairs of Croatia. The Croats should choose the leader whom they wish.

"Regarding point 2: A Croatian Legion should be established within the framework of existing conditions."

Colonel Lahousen added to this communication that Second Army Headquarters would be immediately informed of this Führer decision.

Ambassador Ritter, the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, and the night duty officer of the Political Department were likewise informed by Pol. I M of the Führer decision.

Submitted *directly* to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat herewith as instructed.

KRAMARZ

No. 320

230/153050

*The Director of the Political Department to the Legation
in Hungary*

Telegram

No. 614

BERLIN, April 12, 1941.

According to a report from the Operations Staff of the Luftwaffe an American diplomat and a Military Attaché arrived in Szeged from Belgrade on April 11. Both are reported to be now at the American Legation in Budapest and to have important communications for the German Government from the Yugoslav Government and the Diplomatic Corps in Belgrade.¹

In case the Americans should approach the Legation in this matter please give them to understand that the Legation does not consider itself competent to mediate and that this does not seem to be a matter within the competence of the Americans. At the same time please see that the Hungarian Government and General Staff decidedly reject mediation in case they are approached by the Americans.²

For your information and use:

The desire of the neutral Chiefs of Mission in Belgrade for declaration of Belgrade as an open city and departure of the Diplomatic Corps is already known here through the good offices of the Swiss Legation.³

WOERMANN

¹ Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 976-977.

² By telegram of Apr. 13 (230/153070) Weizsäcker informed Benzler, the Foreign Ministry representative with Twelfth Army Headquarters, of the journey to Budapest of a member of the American Legation in Yugoslavia with proposals regarding making Belgrade an open city and the departure of the Diplomatic Corps. The instruction then continued as follows: "We do not concede to American diplomats or any other Americans any right whatever to such attempts at intervention. Please see also that the military authorities absolutely reject all American attempts of that kind."

³ Woermann's memorandum of Apr. 11 (230/153053-55) records receipt of a Swiss note on this matter.

No. 321

73/58211

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 252

BERLIN, April 12, 1941.

The Hungarian Minister called on me today and reverted once more to the fact that the Rumanian Chief of State had predicted to Field Marshal von Brauchitsch that there would be a clash with

Rumanian troops if the Hungarian military should move into the Banat.¹ Evidently this statement is based on the idea that Rumania is raising claim to parts of the Banat. On the other hand the Führer has told the Hungarians, namely Sztójay personally, that Hungary is to get back the areas ceded in 1918 explicitly mentioning the Banat (though excluding Croatia and Slavonia).

The Hungarian Foreign Minister therefore believes it would be desirable, in order to avoid further complications, for General Antonescu to be informed as a preventive measure that regarding the Banat arrangements had already been made in favor of the Hungarians.

I replied to Sztójay that the case allegedly mentioned by General Antonescu could, after all, not even occur for the time being, since the Hungarian troops would not cross the Tisza river toward the east under the existing agreements; consequently, they could not encounter Rumanian military forces in the Banat. However, I added, there were rumors that some lesser Hungarian military leader might perhaps not be so particular about the Tisza border. I had to warn decidedly against this.²

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister (by teletype).

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ According to Weizsäcker's memorandum of Apr. 11 (73/53203) Sztójay had that day spoken about this to Weizsäcker on the basis of a report from Bucharest received by the Hungarian Government.

² For the follow-up see documents Nos. 330 and 353.

No. 322

83/61567-68

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

U. St.S. Pol. 297

BERLIN, April 12, 1941.

Counselor of Embassy Zamboni informed me today that the Italian Government had agreed to our counterdraft of a declaration to be given the Iraq Government¹ and had already sent telegraphic instructions to that effect to the Italian Minister in Baghdad.² Signor Zamboni added that the Italian Government had considered dispatch by courier too slow.

The text of the declaration is enclosed here also.

WOERMANN

¹ Woermann's memorandum of Apr. 9 (83/61561-63) records his standpoint that a draft for an Italian declaration to be given to the Iraq Government, which had been submitted by the Italian Embassy, was too weak in view of the line proposed by the Foreign Minister, and it records also Woermann's proposed redraft.

A memorandum of the next day (83/61564) indicates that Woermann gave the redraft to Zamboni.

² Luigi Gabbriellini.

[Enclosure]

The Italian Minister in Baghdad is instructed to inform the Iraq Minister President:

1. That Italy and Germany follow his actions with the greatest sympathy;

2. That Italy and Germany advise armed resistance against England as soon as the relationship of the forces involved offers promise of success;

3. That Italy and Germany even at this time are actively preparing assistance in the form of arms and ammunition and hope to overcome the well-known difficulties with respect to the transport route. A further communication on this matter will follow. The Italian and German Governments are also prepared to give the Iraq Government financial support and would like to be informed of its present wishes in this respect.

No. 323

195/139132-34

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, April 12, 1941.

U. St.S. Pol. No. 299

To the Foreign Minister's Secretariat with the request that it be forwarded and submitted at once to the Foreign Minister. Foreign Minister's Secretariat, Special Train Heinrich, is requested to see to it that the Roman numerals of the individual sections in the German translation of the memorandum are corrected in accordance with the English text (for III, IV, V, VI, VII, substitute II, III, IV, V, VI).¹

Bose asked me today to refrain for the time being, from making an announcement of his stay in Germany in the press and from arranging radio speeches,² for the following reasons:

If it were possible to come to an agreement concerning the program of action he has submitted, he would remain in Germany during the war and carry on his fight from here. If, however, no agreement concerning his program could be arrived at, he intended to go to the Indian border area in order to fight from there. In this case it was not advisable that his stay in Germany became known, because it would make his fight on Indian territory more difficult. I believe that one should consider these misgivings of Bose's.

¹ See document No. 300, footnote 2.

² Woermann had made suggestions to this effect in a memorandum of Apr. 11 (195/139135-36).

The following is to be said with regard to Bose's memorandum:
Regarding point I: Work in Europe.

1. Compliance with Bose's plan would mean that we would announce the liberation of India from English rule as a war aim. It is doubtful whether the moment has arrived for doing this in an official form.

2. The establishment of a free Indian government in Berlin under Bose's leadership would mean that we make a certain political group, namely the leftist Forward Bloc, the exponent of India. This group is in opposition to other recognized Indian leaders such as Gandhi and Pandit Nehru. There would hardly be any direct political advantage for us in elevating Bose as chief of an Indian government, whereas this would meet with an unfavorable response in large parts of India ("Bose bought by the Axis Powers").

Regarding points II, III, and IV: Work in Afghanistan,³ the border area, and in India.

These plans should be further pursued with Bose.

Regarding point V: Financial questions.

Bose should be promised generous financial support.

Regarding point VI: German military expedition to India.

This subject should not be discussed with Bose at the present time. If the situation should really at some time develop in a way that would make a German operation in India possible, it would not have to be the subject of a discussion in advance.⁴

WOERMANN

³ This line was underlined by Weizsäcker. On the margin is the notation: "Please let me have this. W[eißsäcker], Apr. 12."

⁴ Resubmitted Apr. 15; done."

⁴ On May 4 (195/139150-52) Woermann noted that Bose had submitted a supplementary memorandum (195/139153-56) regarding the Indian question in relation to the recent events in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Iraq.

No. 324

245/161741-42

The Consulate General at Zagreb to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 56 of April 12

ZAGREB, April 12, 1941.

Received April 13—12:30 a. m.

Today Kvaternik addressed two requests to the Reich Government through the High Command of the Wehrmacht:

1. Recognition of the Independent Croatian State by the Reich Government. In case of a positive reply he would immediately start to form a government.

2. Request for agreement to the establishment of a Croatian armed force which is in the process of being formed and which has captured large quantities of valuable war material in the fighting against the Serbs. He requests that the Wehrmacht refrain from confiscating this material and leave it for the Croatian Army. Kvaternik promises immediate and unqualified comradeship in arms in every theater of war.

This step by Kvaternik best characterizes the present situation in Croatia. Trust in the Führer among the Croatian people is unlimited. The Italian and Hungarian military measures on Croatian territory are encountering growing distrust and are creating great unrest. The council of leaders under Kvaternik which was brought into existence today¹ guarantees at the moment entirely smooth co-operation between the Croats and the German military authorities as well as orderly administration with regard to the economy and cultivation of the fields. Consolidation of the Government is largely dependent upon recognition by the Axis Powers.

It would appear that effective propaganda is possible only with the following slogans:

The Axis Powers recognize free Croatia.

Germany has no territorial claims to Croatian territory.

Recognition of the contribution which the Croatian military has made by undermining and fighting the former Yugoslav armed forces.

Regard for the Croatian share in creating a new order in Europe.
The Jewish question.

It is important that an appeal be made by leaflets addressed to the Croatian peasant that they should immediately proceed with the cultivation of the fields to the largest possible extent, since the food situation is endangered as a result of the bad harvest of last year.

WOLFF

FREUNDT

¹ The establishment of a council of leaders in Zagreb "as a basis for a future Croatian people's government" had been reported in Zagreb telegram No. 11 of Apr. 12 (245/161732). A list of the members of the council was given in Zagreb telegram No. 53 of Apr. 12 (118/66724).

No. 325

589/244401

The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SPECIAL TRAIN, April 12, 1941.

No. 205 of April 12

Received Berlin, April 13—2:10 a.m.

Teletype to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat for Ambassador Ritter.

The Foreign Minister today discussed once more with the Führer your proposal¹ relating to employment of naval forces in the American security zone, etc., with the following result:

1. The Führer agrees that in the present acute case the two submarines should accompany the blockade-runner² and in case it should be attacked by English forces in the American security zone should, contrary to the conduct of naval warfare up to now, open hostilities against these English forces, even if this should still take place within the American security zone. The Führer does not wish to have another note dispatched in regard to the American security zone.³

2. The Führer still wants to speak personally with Grand Admiral Raeder regarding the question of the capture of neutral ships in accordance with prize regulations (in so far as these sail under a flag which we could not proceed against in the past, thus also including the American flag) both within the American security zone and also in the other world oceans outside of this zone and outside the German closed zone.⁴ The Foreign Minister is of the opinion that one should open this possibility to the Navy if a) everything is done in this connection to protect American lives, and b) the Navy is confident that even at the present time such a course of action will result in a really significant increase in the number of sinkings. The Führer seems to feel that the latter (point b) is not certain. The Foreign Minister requests you to inform Grand Admiral Raeder of the foregoing at once.⁵

RINTELEN

¹ In an undated memorandum (833/280853-64) Ritter stated that the Navy would like to get rid of two self-imposed restrictions hampering its operations: 1) The requirement that the American security zone (see vol. VIII of this series, document No. 306 and footnotes) be respected; 2) The exemption of United States merchant ships from measures in accordance with the laws of sea warfare and German prize regulations.

² In the memorandum referred to in footnote 1, Ritter pointed out that a speedy decision on the proposals suggested by the Navy was very urgent, in view of the fact that plans had already been made to have the blockade-runner *Lech* which was due to leave Rio on Apr. 15 escorted by two submarines.

³ A German note regarding the American security zone was handed to the Government of Panama on Dec. 28, 1940 (4669/E221443-44). A Panamanian reply was given to the German Chargé d'Affaires on Mar. 5 (4669/E221445-47). Two German draft replies to the Panamanian note are in the files of the German Foreign Ministry (4669/E221435-38).

⁴ See document No. 244 and footnote 2.

⁵ No record of such a communication has been found; see, however, documents Nos. 316 and 608; cf. U.S. Navy Department, ONI, "Führer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy, 1941," vol. I, pp. 55-61.

No. 326

65/45674-75

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

No. 218 of April 12

TEHRAN, April 13, 1941—12:03 a. m.

Received April 13—8:25 a. m.

[Pol. VII 1689 g.]¹

The Minister President² told me the following in the interview today:

1. According to reports from Moscow, a rumor is circulating there among the diplomatic corps that Matsuoka, in his talk with Molotov,³ with the approval of the German Government, has given the Soviet Union a free hand in regard to Iran.

2. Official Soviet sources, both at Moscow and Tehran, have recently gone to almost ridiculous lengths to blow up entirely meaningless incidents (group missing), for instance the jealousy-inspired exchange of blows between a Soviet Russian national and an Iranian national, and a trivial case of theft, so as to make major political affairs out of them. The Iranian Government was watchfully and suspiciously following these activities, which were apparently intended to furnish a pretext under which Soviet Russian designs on Iran could be carried out.

With regard to 1): I referred the Minister President *a*) to the reply given to the foreign press correspondents by the representative of the Foreign Ministry at the press conference, which denied that Matsuoka was negotiating at Moscow also on behalf of the German Government, and *b*) recalled to him the conciliatory statements of the Japanese Minister on the occasion of the presentation of his credentials, with which the Minister President was familiar (cf. telegram No. 210 of April 7⁴), which amply proved that the Moscow rumors could not be correct.

With regard to 2): The Minister President answered in the negative my question whether Iran had found any evidence of military preparations directed against Iran by the Russians.

3. The Minister President stated that neither Germany nor Japan could have any interest in having the Soviet Union overpower Iran too. There existed, on the contrary, a natural and logical interest on the part of the two Axis Powers, and Germany in particular,

¹ The file number is supplied from a copy of the document in the files of the Embassy in Moscow (1448/365349-50).

² Ali Mansour.

³ See document No. 332.

⁴ Not found.

that Iran should remain an independent state which would be in a position to defend itself successfully against Russian attacks.

4. The Minister President finally brought up the subject of Iranian oil, expressing in this connection again the view that the Iranian Government had the wish to rid itself of the British oil concessions at the appropriate moment in order itself to take over these greatest riches of the country. This would make possible an expansion of German-Iranian economic relations which could not yet be visualized.

As the Minister President will come back to all these questions in future conversations, I should like to request guidance for my conversations.⁵

ETTEL

⁵ No reply has been found.

No. 327

846/282842

The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

COPENHAGEN, April 13, 1941—12:35 a. m.

No. 551 of April 12

Received April 13—1:15 a. m.

Continuation of my telegram No. 550 of April 12.¹

To the Foreign Minister's assurance of the absolute good faith of the Danish Government I replied that what had happened was so grave and far-reaching, and imposed such a heavy liability on the political responsibility of the Danish Government that the situation could not simply be considered as having been repaired by the fact that the Danish Government hurried to issue the statements desired by us. Scavenius emphasized once more that he was honestly trying to conduct a sincere policy of cooperation and rapprochement with Germany and that in his opinion he could not be accused of any bad faith whatever. I told Scavenius that a great measure of responsibility was borne in any case by the passive and vacillating attitude of the Stauning Government with respect to which I had expressed warnings and criticism for a long time and which had caused me to make the well-known *démarche* with the King at the end of last year.² Kauffmann had undoubtedly been encouraged in his plans by the policy of half-measures of the present Government; for, this obviously had given him the belief that he could at least count upon tacit connivance in the leading circles of Denmark.

RENTHE-FINK

¹ Document No. 318.

² See vol. XI of this series, document No. 582.

No. 328

116/66722

The Foreign Minister to the Consulate General at Zagreb

Radio Telegram

No. 243 from the Train

ON THE TRAIN, April 12, 1941.

Received Berlin, April 13—1:45 a. m.

No. 93 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent April 13.

RAM 109/R

For Veessenmayer.

I have received your report¹ and am in agreement with the way you have acted. Please continue, as you yourself have proposed, to stay inconspicuously near Kvaternik. However, leave further measures entirely up to the Croats, and remain aloof yourself. In the further treatment of the Croatian question we now intend to let the Italians have precedence entirely.

For your information I also wish to remark that we agree in principle to a special treatment for Croatian prisoners of war; the Chief of the OKW has been charged with the further implementation of this.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Document No. 313.

No. 329

247/164352-53

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Denmark

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SPECIAL TRAIN, April 12, 1941.

Special Security Handling

Without number from the

Special Train

Received Berlin, April 13—3:45 a. m.

No. 413 of April 13 from the

Foreign Ministry

Sent April 13—5:55 a. m.

For the Minister personally.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 542 of April 11¹ and 546 of April 12.²

As you have conveyed our demands³ in connection with the agreement concluded by Minister Kauffmann in Washington to the Danish Government, I request that you do not for the present insist any

¹ See document No. 309, footnote 6.

² Document No. 315.

³ See document No. 314.

further on a complete acceptance of these demands but rather await the future decisions of that Government. We intend to leave it up to the Danish Government now to decide what further steps it will take as a result of the action of its Minister and reserve the right to inform it at the proper time that we cannot but state our dissatisfaction about the whole matter. We must reserve the right to inform it in an appropriate manner, should the occasion arise, that our suspicion that Kauffmann acted with the consent of the Danish Government has not been dispelled. The Danish Government will, of course, in any case remain responsible for the official acts of its Minister in Washington, whom it itself was very anxious previously to keep in this post, against our objections.⁴

For your personal information I wish to add that we now intend to treat this matter further in such a way that the Danish Government will remain responsible for the action of its Minister and the consequences arising from it.⁵ Please destroy this telegram upon receipt.

RIBBENTROP

⁴In telegram No. 651 of June 10, 1940 (247/164117-18) Renthe-Fink had reported having told the Danish Foreign Ministry that Kauffmann, in view of German complaints relating to his activities, should be recalled or at least be ordered to come home to report.

⁵For further negotiations resulting from the Greenland agreement, see the documentation cited in document No. 308, footnote 1.

No. 330

222/149501

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BADEN (Special Train), April 12, 1941 (no time indicated).

Received Berlin, April 13—3:45 a. m.

No. 933 from the

Foreign Ministry

Sent April 13—6:55 a. m.¹

In the event that General Antonescu or any other Rumanian should approach the Legation with requests that Rumania be given consideration in the occupation of parts of Yugoslav territory or in the distribution of former Yugoslav territory, please answer to this effect that from a military point of view nothing more was to be done; for the rest, however, the fate of the various areas belonging

¹Marginal note: "Earlier transmission was not possible on account of interrupted connections."

to Yugoslavia would not be definitely settled until later at the conclusion of the peace. Until then it was merely a question of provisional measures of military administration; with respect to anything definitive one would still have to wait for a considerable period of time.

RIBBENTROP

No. 331

116/66727

The Foreign Minister to the Consulate General at Zagreb

Telegram
Sent by Radio

MOST URGENT
No. 208 from Vienna

VIENNA, April 13, 1941—12:25 p. m.

[Received Berlin, April 13—12:30 p. m.]¹

No. 94 from the
Foreign Ministry
For Veesenmayer.

[Sent April 13—1:05 p. m.]

Pavelić has sent a telegram to the Führer.² We intend in the course of today to recognize an Independent Croatian State under the leadership of Pavelić. [We assume that Kvaternik considers himself merely as Pavelić's locum tenens, so that the recognition of Croatia under Pavelić's leadership disposes also of Kvaternik's request of April 11 for recognition.]³ I request an immediate reply [as to whether this assumption is correct, since recognition is to be granted today]⁴ by means of the code word "Pavelić" in case this is in order.⁵

RIBBENTROP

¹ The times of arrival in Berlin and dispatch from Berlin are supplied from another copy (116/66728).

² Document No. 317.

³ The words enclosed within brackets were deleted before the telegram was forwarded from Berlin.

⁴ Marginal note: "The Foreign Minister agrees to immediate dispatch. R[intelen], Apr. 13."

⁵ In his reply, telegram No. 61 which was sent Apr. 14 shortly after midnight (116/66748), Veesenmayer reported that the conversation with Pavelić had taken place at 9:00 p.m. and that "everything was entirely clear."

See, further, document No. 341.

No. 332

104/113299-300

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, April 13, 1941—6:31 p. m.

SECRET

Received April 13—8:00 p. m.¹

No. 883 of April 13

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Matsuoka has just visited me in order to make this farewell call. He stated to me that a Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact had been arranged at the last moment and, in all likelihood, would be signed this afternoon at 2:00 p.m. local time.² The Soviet Government had originally insisted that Japan should at the same time give up her concession in North Sakhalin, and that this be included in an annex to the treaty. Matsuoka absolutely rejected this demand. Last evening he had a conversation with Stalin, in which Stalin, at the conclusion, had given up the demand for the elimination of the Japanese concession. Stalin declared characteristically that Mr. Matsuoka was choking him and he made the appropriate gesture. Mr. Matsuoka on his part promised that he would do his best in Tokyo to bring the Japanese Government and Japanese public opinion around to giving up the concession. With regard to the episode, Mr. Matsuoka made the following additional remarks:

1) In Berlin he had told the Reich Foreign Minister that in Moscow he probably would not be able to avoid discussing the question, which had been pending for a long time, of a Japanese-Soviet non-aggression or neutrality pact. He would, of course, show no eagerness in the matter, but he would be compelled to do something in case the Russians were willing to agree to Japanese wishes. The Reich Foreign Minister had agreed in this point of view.

2) The forthcoming conclusion of the Pact, of course, in no way affects the Tripartite Pact. My inquiry as to whether the Pact which was being concluded had any provision to this effect in it, was answered by Matsuoka in the negative, and he added that the Russians had not brought up this question, and accordingly he had not gone into it either.

3) Matsuoka emphasized that the conclusion of the Neutrality Pact was of very great importance for Japan. It would make a powerful impression on Chiang Kai-shek and would appreciably ease Japanese negotiations with him. Also it would result in an appreciable strengthening of the position of Japan as over against

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 1150 to the Special Train, Apr. 13, 9:20 p.m."

² Text of the Pact and accompanying declaration printed in Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, pp. 486-487.

America and England. Matsuoka added that the American and English journalists, who had reported yesterday that his journey to Moscow had been a complete failure, would be compelled today to acknowledge that Japanese policy had achieved a great success, which could not fail to have its effect on England and America.

SCHULENBURG

No. 333

104/113306-07

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, April 13, 1941—9:26 p. m.

SECRET

Received April 13—10:45 p. m.¹

No. 884 of April 13

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to my telegram No. 883 of today.²

1. According to a statement of Matsuoka to the Italian Ambassador here, Matsuoka's assurance that he would do his best to bring about the elimination of the Japanese concession in North Sakhalin has been confirmed in writing by a letter of Matsuoka to Molotov.

2. To a question from the Italian Ambassador to Matsuoka as to whether at the conversation between Matsuoka and Stalin the relations of the Soviet Union with the Axis had been taken up, Matsuoka answered that M. Stalin had told him that he was a convinced adherent of the Axis and an opponent [*Gegner*] of England and America.

3. The departure of Matsuoka was delayed for an hour and then took place with extraordinary ceremony. Apparently completely unexpected for both the Japanese and the Russians, both Stalin and Molotov appeared and greeted Matsuoka and the Japanese who were present in a remarkably friendly manner and wished them a pleasant journey. Then Stalin publicly asked for me, and when he found me, came up to me and threw his arm around my shoulders and said: "We must remain friends and you must now do everything to that end!" Somewhat later Stalin turned to the German Acting Military Attaché, Colonel Krebs, first made sure that he was a German, and then said to him: "We will remain friends with you—in any event [*auf jeden Fall*]!" Stalin doubtless brought about this greeting of Colonel Krebs and me intentionally, and thereby he consciously attracted the general attention of the numerous persons who were present.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 1151, Apr. 13."

² Document No. 332.

No. 334

F5/0274

Adolf Hitler to the Regent of Hungary

At present FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, April 13, 1941.

YOUR HIGHNESS: In all haste I would request Your Highness to permit:

1. The mass of the Hungarian Army, because it is no longer needed for the further operations against Serbia, to be held back on the general line, Drava-Danube;

2. The motorized corps, consisting of the 1st and 2nd Motorized Brigades to continue to participate in the operations of the German motorized units within the framework of the German Army.

The general collapse of the Yugoslav State may even today be considered a definite fact. I think this is the best Easter present for all of us.

I shall very shortly communicate my views to Your Highness in a somewhat longer report, among other things, on those points that you were kind enough to mention to Grand Admiral Raeder.¹

With best regards,

Yours, etc.

ADOLF HITLER

¹ No record found.

No. 335

8589/E602844-47

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, April 13, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) No. 44530/41 g. K. Chefs.

By Officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 27

1) The Yugoslav armed forces are in dissolution. Thereby in conjunction with the elimination of the Greek Army in Thrace and with the occupation of the Salonika basin and the area around Florina, the prerequisites have been created for the launching, after sufficient forces have been brought up, of *the attack on Greece*; in order to destroy the Greek-British forces there; to occupy Greece; and thus to drive the British out of the Balkans for good and all.

2) I therefore order regarding the continuance of operations in the Balkans:

a) *Yugoslavia:*

The aim of the operations continues to be the destruction of remaining Yugoslav forces, as well as mopping up and occupation of the country.

In this, German Army units are to be used in the occupation of old Serbia and the Banat; we must quickly secure the protected area between the Morava and the Danube with the valuable copper mines. The bringing in of further units not yet employed in Yugoslavia must be reduced to the strictest minimum.

The *Luftwaffe* must destroy the remnant of the Yugoslav Air Force and support the Army operations, so that any resistance of more serious nature that might be encountered can quickly be dealt with. If the occasion arises air force units and antiaircraft units, so far as they are not needed for commitment against Greece, can in agreement with the High Command of the Wehrmacht be pulled out for action in other places.

Any necessary agreements with the Italian Air Force on the basis of the establishment of the boundary line between the German Second Army and the Italian Second Army pertain to the Commander in Chief of the *Luftwaffe*.

The *Italian Second Army* will have the task of mopping up and occupying the country southwest of the road Karlovac-Bosanski Novi-Banja Luka-Sarajevo. Occasional drives of German motorized forces beyond that line in support of the Italian advance may well become necessary.

The Hungarian Third Army will mop up and occupy the Yugoslav territory west of the Tisza, to the Danube and Drava. Participation of the two Hungarian motorized brigades in the further operations of the German Second Army has been requested and promised.

b) *Greece*

As soon as sufficient forces have been assembled in the area Florina to the Salonika basin a *decisive attack against the Anglo-Greek forces in northern Greece* is to be mounted. It is the aim of this operation to bring about, through an early breakthrough in the direction Larissa, the destruction by envelopment of the enemy forces standing there, and to prevent the establishment of a new defense front.

At the same time the breakthrough through the Greek front in Albania, which is to be carried out by the *Italians*, is to be supported by the advance of limited forces in a southwestern direction.

Subsequently the occupation of the remainder of the Greek mainland, including the Peloponnesus, is to be brought about by a speedy drive of *motorized troops* principally directed toward Athens, while simultaneously the Italian Army Group Albania advances west of the line Lake Prespa-crest of the Pindus Mountains in the direction Gulf of Patras. If time and the road situation permit, every possibility must be exploited to forestall any retreat of the Greek main forces westward of the Pindus.

The essential task of the *Luftwaffe*, apart from further action against the Greek and British Air Forces, is to support with strong forces the opening phase of the new army operations, and to keep the advance of the German troops fluid. The later operation to occupy the Cyclades is to be supported.

The boundary line for operations with the Italian Air Force is to be regulated through the Commander in Chief of the *Luftwaffe*.

All appropriate efforts of the Army and *Luftwaffe* are to be concentrated against *any possible evacuation of English troops*. Particularly, the escape of the English across the Mediterranean must be prevented, as far as possible, by continuous air attacks on the Greek ports and especially on ship concentrations, as well as by the mining of the approaches.

3) I reserve for myself the issuance of the order for the intended *paratroop operation against Lemnos, and for the occupation of Thasos and Samothrace*.¹ It will be issued at the latest 48 hours before the start of the operation.

In this connection, the *Army* will leave one division in Thrace, while the occupation of the remainder of Thrace will be taken over by the *Bulgarians* on a date to be set by me.

4) *After execution of the operations, the bulk of the Army units* committed will be pulled out for *new employment*. Provision is to be made for leaving approximately:

one to two divisions in Greece;
one further division in Salonika;
two to three divisions in Serbia.

For the *Luftwaffe* (X Air Corps), after completion of the operations against Greece, support of the Africa Corps retains priority. The renewed mining of the Suez Canal will have great importance in the near future, for preventing or at least impeding the movement of enemy reinforcements from East Africa.

Preparations are to be made for the *air defense* of the conquered territories.

The *coastal defense* for the time being is to be provided for on the basis: that the northern coast of the Aegean, including Salonika, will be taken over by the *Bulgarians*; the adjoining eastern Aegean coast, to and including the Gulf of Saros, will be taken over by us; and the remaining Greek littorals will come into Italian hands.

A definitive delimitation can be made only after completion of the operations in the Balkans.

5) I expect reports from the commanders in chief with respect to their *intentions* in detail.

¹ See document No. 195.

The guiding principles laid down in Directive No. 26 of April 3, 1941,² apply regarding any wishes of the branches of the Wehrmacht concerning our allies.

ADOLF HITLER

² Document No. 256.

[EDITORS' NOTE. Jacques Benoist-Méchin, Secretary General to Darlan, had come to Berlin at the beginning of April and had seen Ribbentrop and Keitel at Easter, April 13, 1941. For an account of these meetings, see Jean-Louis Aujol, *Le Procès Benoist-Méchin (29 mai-6 juin 1947) : Compte rendu sténographique avec un Avant-propos et une lettre d'inculpé à son défenseur* (Paris, 1948), pages 111-114. No record of these conversations has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.]

No. 336

2281/482230-33

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy

ROME, April 14, 1941.

At 1:25 p.m. on April 13, Secretary of Legation Gumpert came to see me at the Termini railroad station, where I had been visiting on the occasion of the luncheon for the soldiers, in order to tell me that the Foreign Minister wished to speak to me from the Special Train at once on the direct line.

I got the connection from the Embassy Chancellery at 1:50 p.m. My conversation partner was not the Foreign Minister, however, but Minister von Rintelen, acting on his instructions. He informed me as follows:

The Führer and the Foreign Minister considered that the moment had arrived for giving official recognition to the independence of the Croatian State. Such a step should, however, be taken only in closest accord with the Duce. I would probably receive an instruction to this effect before the day was over. It could not yet be given at the moment, since certain facts were still being ascertained with respect to the present Croatian rulers in Zagreb. It was hoped, however, that the question could be clarified in the course of the late afternoon.

I replied to Herr von Rintelen that it seemed to me well in these circumstances to inform Signor Anfuso now that it would probably

become necessary before this day was over to call on the Duce, since it might perhaps, if only because of the Easter holiday, be difficult to reach him on short notice at the last moment. Herr von Rintelen agreed with this and promised to inform me further. I told him that, except for the trip to Anfuso, which now became necessary, I would keep myself in readiness at the Embassy at all times to receive further communications.

Immediately after the conversation, I called on Minister Anfuso at his apartment and informed him in broad outline. He intimated on this occasion that the Duce would surely agree to the suggestion of recognition, but that matters were somewhat more difficult for him, inasmuch as the question of Dalmatia was involved. I replied that the proposed recognition had, as such, nothing to do with the later boundaries of Croatia. We did not elaborate on the subject, however, but confined ourselves to agreeing to remain in touch with one another.

Minister von Rintelen called me again at 7:05 p.m. and informed me that things had not yet been clarified to the extent that he could give me the promised instruction. This might not be possible until the later hours of the evening. I then asked Herr von Rintelen if possible to see to it that the instructions be worded in such a way as to enable me to wait until next morning before calling on the Duce, whom, only a few days ago, I had had to disturb at 2:00 o'clock in the morning. If my visit was properly announced in advance, he would surely be able to receive me very early. Herr von Rintelen promised to pass on this suggestion.

I then informed Signor Anfuso by telephone concerning the status of the matter and let him know that I had suggested to the Foreign Minister that the conference with the Duce not take place, if possible, at night, but that I intended to call him (Anfuso) as soon as I received definitive information.

At 1:00 o'clock in the morning the Foreign Minister personally called me and instructed me to call on the Duce and hand him the draft of a telegram, which I would receive before this night was over, and in which the Führer officially notified Pavelić, the Croatian Chief of State, of recognition of the Croatian State. The Foreign Minister asked that, in speaking to the Duce, I stress the fact that in the entire matter we considered ourselves as having a secondary interest, and would, of course, not do anything that might be contrary to his wishes. The Führer and he were of the opinion, however, that the moment for recognition by the Axis Powers had come,

since this recognition would cause even the last Croatian soldier to discard his rifle. The Hungarians, moreover, even if they had not given official recognition, were nevertheless moving toward this goal, and that, in consequence of the formulation which they had chosen to justify their invasion, the Yugoslav State as such no longer existed.¹

When I pointed out that the delivery of the promised telegram could be delayed and, consequently, that if the instruction were to be carried out at once I would again have to call on the Duce at an hour of the night that was inconvenient for him, the Foreign Minister agreed that I need not carry out the instruction until next morning at as early an hour as possible. Then the Foreign Minister added some remarks which clearly indicated his optimistic view of the general situation, and added that the treaty of Vienna, sabotaged by the Yugoslavs, had nevertheless proved very useful for the complete clarification of the real conditions.

At 2:00 a.m. Minister von Rintelen called me in order to inform me, by order of the Foreign Minister, that I could no longer expect transmission of the promised telegram from the Special Train during the night, since it had not been possible to submit the text for the Führer's approval. I should nevertheless make the requested démarche with the Duce the following morning, and I could outline on that occasion the contents of the draft perhaps in these terms: The Führer expressed his thanks to M. Pavelić and General Kvaternik for their telegrams and he coupled with this the official declaration of the recognition of independence. I told Herr von Rintelen that I could assume that I would see the Duce at about 9:00 a.m., and I promised to report to him immediately by telephone concerning the course of the conversation. At 2:30 a.m. I informed Signor Anfuso that I was going to call on the Duce at as early an hour as possible. We thereupon agreed to meet at the Palazzo Chigi at 9:00 a.m. and to drive from there at once to the Palazzo Venezia.

The promised telegram² arrived here at 3:10 a.m. after all and was submitted to me this morning.

For the conversation with the Duce, see my telegram No. 816 of today.³

MACKENSEN

¹ See document No. 307.

² Document No. 337.

³ Document No. 338.

No. 337

4849/E247508-09

The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy

Closed circuit coded teletype

MOST URGENT

SPECIAL TRAIN HEINRICH, April 14, 1941—3:00 a. m.

Unnumbered

For the Ambassador.

The text of the telegram which the Führer intends to send to Pavelić reads as follows:

"DR. ANTE PAVELIĆ, Zagreb: Thank you for your telegram¹ and for that of General Kvaternik,² in which you notify me, in accordance with the will of the Croatian people, of the proclamation of the independence of the State of Croatia, and in which you request recognition of Croatia's independence by the German Reich. It is a very special pleasure and satisfaction to me at this hour, in which the Croatian people regain their long-desired freedom as a result of the victorious advance of the troops of the Axis Powers, to be able to convey to you the recognition of the Independent Croatian State by the German Reich.³ My best wishes are to you and to the future of the Croatian people. Adolf Hitler."

End of the Führer's telegram.

The Foreign Minister asks you to transmit to us, as soon as possible after your démarche with the Duce, the text of the Duce's telegram in order that publication of both telegrams may take place in Germany and Italy simultaneously by radio and press, immediately after the Duce's consent has been received.

RINTELEN

¹ See document No. 317.

² See document No. 311.

³ The copy of the document here printed is from the secret files of the German Embassy in Rome.

The text of the message sent at 11:15 a.m. on Apr. 15 to Veessenmayer for delivery to Pavelić (116/66758-59) has the additional sentence at this point:

"The German Government will be happy, in a free exchange of opinion, to come to an agreement with the Croatian National Government on the boundaries of the new state."

The sentence also appears on the typewritten draft copy of the text prepared by Rintelen for Rome (116/66732) but is handwritten on the margin.

See document No. 348 and footnote 4.

No. 338

2281/482235-37

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

By Secret Teletype

MOST URGENT

ROME, April 14, 1941—10:35 a. m.

TOP SECRET

No. 816 of April 14

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telephone instruction of 1:00 a.m. today.¹

In the presence of Anfuso I presented to the Duce in detail at 9:00 o'clock this morning the matter of the recognition of Croatia, in accordance with the instructions telephoned to me by the Foreign Minister. The Duce welcomes most warmly the idea of recognition in principle since, for 12 years, during which his relations with Belgrade were very sorely tried and after the murder of the King at Marseilles,² strained almost to the point of war, he has championed the cause of the Croatsians. It was true that the recognition of independence as such left open the question of the future boundaries, which, moreover, had to be defined not only with reference to Italy but also with respect to all other neighbors. For Italy the case was special, however, since Italy had certain historic, ethnographic, strategic, and maritime rights to Dalmatia; the Croatsians, on the other hand, considered the latter as belonging to them. He had to protect these rights, even though he was, of course, prepared to comply with Croatia's just wishes for an outlet to the Adriatic. The Duce did not, however, dwell on the idea of perhaps including a reservation with respect to Dalmatia in the telegram of recognition, but declared that he would inform Pavelić "privately" through other channels that, although he "welcomed enthusiastically" the recognition of Croatia's independence, he did not wish in any way today to commit himself by this recognition as to the future boundaries of Croatia, above all, not in the matter of Dalmatia. Anfuso, who on this occasion pointed out that the Croatsians, for their part, were already quite active with regard to Dalmatia and had even sent some governmental commissioners to some cities there, remarked here that it would perhaps be a good thing if Germany, too, similarly pointed out that the recognition of independence and the question of the future boundaries were two different things.

The Duce summed up his statements by saying he was prepared forthwith to send a telegram analogous to that of the Führer,³ but

¹ See document No. 336.

² See Series C, vol. III, Editors' Note, p. 468.

³ See document No. 337.

that in this connection he still had to extract from Pavelić or Kvaternik a telegram similar to those which had been sent to the Führer, but not to him so far, by the two Croatian representatives. He would see that this was done at once through the military authorities, since, as Anfuso suggested, no other liaison existed; and he would send me before the day was over—in my opinion, this will scarcely be done so quickly—the text of his telegram.⁴ I pointed out with great insistence, both to him, and later to Anfuso, that we attach particular importance to publication today, if possible. Anfuso will do his utmost to expedite it.

I assume that with respect to the time of publication, in order to assure simultaneity, it would be best to choose the method of a special radio announcement.

Continuous contact with Anfuso is assured.⁵

MACKENSEN

⁴In telegram No. 822, sent Apr. 14, 5:35 p.m. (4849/E247534) Mackensen reported that he expected to be received by Mussolini shortly after 6:00 p.m. It appeared to Mackensen that Mussolini was waiting first to hear from Anfuso whose mission was not only to extract the telegram from Pavelić but also to impress on him the distinction between recognition of Croatia and of its future boundaries.

⁵See document No. 346.

No. 339

177/84979-80

The Chargé d'Affaires in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 563 of April 14

TOKYO, April 14, 1941—11:05 a. m.

Received April 14—11:30 p. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 561 of April 13.¹

The Deputy Foreign Minister² expressed to me today his lively satisfaction on the conclusion of the Neutrality Pact with Russia.³ He declared that Russia, impressed by powerful German successes, had become ready to conclude a pact. Therefore Russia decided on going hand in hand with the Powers of the Tripartite Pact. The Tripartite Pact has only now become the sterling instrument of the policy of the Axis Powers and Japan through the long sought for Russo-Japanese Agreement.

Japan in particular expects from the Neutrality Pact substantial advantages for the termination of the China conflict. Even if,

¹ Not found.

² Chuichi Ohashi.

³ See document No. 332 and footnote 2.

as the Deputy Foreign Minister declared, the China problem had not been the subject of the Moscow negotiations, in any case Chiang Kai-shek's hope of eventual warlike entanglements between Japan and Russia, which would have meant a substantial relief for him, have come to naught with the conclusion of the Pact. Moreover, Japan believes that by calling on the Pact she can achieve a gradual separation between Moscow and Chungking. Furthermore, as all Chiang Kai-shek's support from the Anglo-Saxon powers has more moral than material significance, Japan hopes that the Marshal, now after the conclusion of the Pact, will be ready for the dictation of a peace which preserves Japanese prestige.

The Deputy Foreign Minister further declared that the Neutrality Pact would substantially facilitate Japan's policy of expansion in the south of the Great East Asia sphere and in particular would facilitate an eventual Japanese advance on Singapore.

The Deputy Foreign Minister said regarding the realization of the Neutrality Pact that the beginning of negotiations brought considerable difficulties as Molotov had held fast to the original Russian demand by which Japan, before the conclusion of the Pact, should make certain concessions in the sense of a revision of the Treaty of Portsmouth.⁴ Matsuoka explained that he was neither ready nor empowered to make such concessions. In a personal conversation with Stalin, Matsuoka had finally brought it about that Russia would waive concessions and would declare herself ready for unconditional conclusion of the Pact. This decision took place on April 12, that is, one day before the scheduled departure of Matsuoka from Moscow. In order to empower Matsuoka to sign the Pact in time, the Prime Minister,⁵ without the participation of the Cabinet or Privy Council, effected the Imperial sanction for the signature by immediate audience with the Tenno. Agreement of the Cabinet and Privy Council, which could not be doubted after the Imperial sanction, will be obtained before the ratification which is shortly expected.⁶ The Deputy Foreign Minister emphasized that it was unprecedented in Japanese history that an agreement of such significance should be concluded within a few days. In this connection, Japan has learned much from the "lightning diplomacy" [*Blitz-diplomatie*] of Germany.

BOLTZE

⁴ Between Russia and Japan, signed Sept. 5, 1905; text in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905*, p. 824.

⁵ Prince Fumimaro Konoye.

⁶ In telegram No. 616 of Apr. 26 (177/85017) Ott reported that the Emperor had ratified the Pact.

No. 340

73/53220-21

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Hungary

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SPECIAL TRAIN HEINRICH, April 14, 1941—2:40 p. m. [sic].
No. 212 of April 13

from the Special Train Received Berlin, April 14—1:35 p. m.
No. 622 from the Foreign Ministry Sent April 14—1:45 p. m.
zu RAM 110/R.¹

For the Minister personally.

The Hungarian Government has sent us the following request through military channels:

1. Hungarian occupation of the northern tip of the Banat as far as the Vranjevo-Kikinda railroad, or at least the territory extending to the course of the Aranka.

2. Hungarian occupation of the upper Mur region south of the Mur, north of the Drava, the general area east of Maribor.

To this the following reply will be made, likewise through military channels:

"The Führer requests that any idea of having Hungarian troops enter the Banat be abandoned, since the Rumanians were promised that only German troops would enter the Banat.² Should there be a danger threatening the Hungarian and German inhabitants, the XLI Army Corps will undertake to protect them.

"This does not signify that any position whatever is taken against later Hungarian demands regarding this area, but is only a safeguard in order to prevent clashes between Hungarian and Rumanian troops. The Führer agrees to the Hungarian occupation of the Prekmurje and of the region between the Mur and the Drava, in so far as it belonged to Hungary before the World War, as soon as the rear communications of the Second Army permit. The ultimate territorial disposition of these areas shall—independent of the military occupation—be subject to later settlement."

Please also inform the Hungarian Minister President of this reply. Please report by wire when this has been done.³

RIBBENTROP

¹ RAM 110/R: Not found.

² See document No. 276.

³ Document No. 344.

No. 341

116/66738-39

SS-Standardenführer Veesenmayer to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 62 of April 14

ZAGREB, April 14, 1941.
Received April 14—2:12 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to our telegram No. 59.¹

Pavelić did not arrive in Karlovac until 8:45 p.m., since his journey through Croatia was one triumphal procession.

I was able first of all to note that Kvaternik enjoys the full confidence of Pavelić and that there is accord on all points. Kvaternik's subordination to Pavelić's leadership is an absolute matter of course.

At 9:00 o'clock a conversation took place between Pavelić, Kvaternik, and me. Pavelić stated that, with respect to the Duce, he was entirely free to create a free, independent Croatia; there was no commitment of any kind whatever. He knew that the freedom of Croatia was exclusively due to the strength of the Führer, the Reich, and Europe.

He therefore had only one wish—earliest possible recognition by the Reich of Croatia under his leadership, and the wish that Pavelić and Kvaternik be received by the Führer and Foreign Minister as soon as possible after recognition has been granted in order to express their thanks and to promise to live and die for the Führer. He did not intend to conduct any foreign policy at all—Adolf Hitler was doing that—and he only wanted to raise up his people and to prove that the Croats were not Slavs, but profess themselves, in the last analysis, as being German by blood and race [*blut-und artmässig*].

The welcome accorded to Pavelić by his faithful followers was thrilling. Pavelić's qualifications for leadership are indisputable because of the discipline of his followers and the love of the people. He is a guarantee in himself that the Führer will not be disappointed in him. I would like, therefore, to advocate most warmly that he be received by the Führer and the Foreign Minister after recognition of Croatia by the Reich.

Recognition, if granted today, would coincide with Pavelić's entry into Zagreb and have a particularly strong effect, the more so because the fact that the Italians are increasingly in evidence is creating anxiety.

VEESENMAYER

¹ In this telegram of Apr. 13 (116/66729) Veesenmayer had reported that he would see Pavelić in Karlovac later that day.

No. 342

116/66733

*The Foreign Minister to the Consulate General at Zagreb*Telegram
Sent by RadioPRIORITY
No. 102VIENNA, April 14, 1941—1:15 p. m.
Received Berlin, April 14—1:35 p. m.
Sent April 14—3:50 p. m.
BRAM 127.

For Veessenmayer.

Anfuso, *Chef de Cabinet* of the Italian Foreign Ministry, will arrive by plane at your post at noon today in order to fetch Pavelić's telegram to the Duce. Please tell Anfuso that Pavelić has already drafted the desired telegram and, for the sake of expediting this very urgent matter, already transmitted it through us to Rome.¹ Pavelić should now deliver the original of the telegram to Anfuso.² Transmission of another telegram through Anfuso is accordingly out of the question, in so far as the recognition of Croatia is concerned.³

RIBBENTROP

¹In a radio telegram of Apr. 14, 10:45 a.m., (166/66747) Ribbentrop directed Veessenmayer to send the text of the telegram of Pavelić to Mussolini both to Berlin and to Rome "with lightning speed."

²See document No. 343 for the text which was transmitted from Zagreb, Apr. 14, 3:00 p.m.

³Cf. Filippo Anfuso, *Roma Berlino Salò* (Garzanti, 1950), pp. 191-197.

No. 343

116/66741

Unsigned Memorandum

TEXT AS TRANSMITTED FROM ZAGREB AT 3:00 P. M. ON APRIL 14
(AFTER WE HAD REJECTED THE FIRST TEXT) AND AS SENT TO ROME
AND AS SENT IN ITALIAN TRANSLATION TO ZAGREB (FOR ANFUSO)¹

ZAGREB, April 14, 1941.

As Chief of the Croatian State, desired and chosen by the Croatian people, I take the liberty of informing Your Excellency, the Duce of the Italian empire, most respectfully, that I have today proclaimed Croatia an independent state to the Croatian people.

In accordance with the wish of the Croatian people, I request that the newly established Croatian State be recognized by the Government of His Majesty the King and Emperor of Italy.² Dr. Ante Pavelić.

¹The Italian translation was sent from the Foreign Ministry at 7:05 p.m. to Zagreb by telegram No. 103 (116/66740).

²Marginal note: "Sent to Herr von Mackensen in Rome at 4:00 p.m. so that it may be transmitted to the Duce at once. R[Intelen], Apr. 14."

No. 344

73/58222-28

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUDAPEST, April 14, 1941.

No. 397 of April 14

Received April 14—5:48 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 622 of April 13.¹

Instruction carried out.

The Minister President has thus far known only of point 2. He replied: He took cognizance of the information, particularly of the sentence that the settlement provided for in point 2 did not signify that any position whatever was taken against later Hungarian demands for the Banat.

To be sure, he did not quite understand the word "later," since the Führer and Chancellor had told the Hungarian Minister in Berlin,² as well as the Defense Minister later on,³ that the Regent could take back all Yugoslav areas that had belonged to Hungary prior to 1918. The Führer and Chancellor had, in this connection, mentioned explicitly also the Bačka and the Banat. The Minister President remarked that he was confident that this definite promise remained unchanged. He would consider it a good idea if Hungarian troops would move into the Banat, too, as soon as possible, in order not to give rise to false hopes and false conclusions in the minds of the Rumanians. In the letter of the Führer and Chancellor to the Regent⁴ it had also been stated that an opportunity was now being offered for the restoration of Hungary's rights with respect to Yugoslavia. This necessarily meant, as Bárdossy said, with respect to territory, all the Yugoslav areas that had formerly belonged to Hungary.

The Regent and the Hungarian Government also laid claim in principle to the (group garbled) Mur region and the region between the Mur and the Drava, since it had formerly been undisputed Hungarian territory and had belonged to Hungary but not to Croatia. The Hungarian-Croatian border had run along the Drava. To be sure, the Hungarian Government was prepared to negotiate with the Croats in a friendly spirit later on about the possible return of individual portions of territory between the Mur and the Drava.

ERDMANNSDORFF

¹ Document No. 340.

² See document No. 215.

³ See document No. 282.

⁴ See document No. 282 and footnote 3.

No. 345

2281/482240-42

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

Sent by Teletype

MOST URGENT

ROME, April 14, 1941—7:35—8:00 p. m.

TOP SECRET

No. 823 of April 14

For the Foreign Minister personally.

In accordance with instructions I handed the Duce, who received me at 6:20 p.m., the text of Pavelić's telegram to him as it was transmitted to me by telephone this afternoon by Minister von Rintelen.¹ The Duce read it through and then remarked that, despite all his efforts, he still had not gotten any telephone connection with Anfuso, which was all the more difficult since Pavelić, it seemed, was still staying in Karlovac and not in Zagreb. It would hardly be possible to obtain clarification today. He had sent along with Anfuso a draft telegram for the discussion with Pavelić, which, because of Italy's special position differed from the Führer's telegram² in so far as it referred in the closing sentence to the boundary question, but without mentioning Dalmatia. This closing sentence states approximately that Italy is happy to recognize the Independent Croatian State, with which an agreement will later have to be reached "*liberamente*,"³ i.e., through a free exchange of views, about drawing of boundary lines. The Duce remarked in this connection that he could do without this passage if Pavelić would confirm in a note to Anfuso that the boundary question would have to be settled later. There was, moreover, no serious objection to our making public our recognition a few hours in advance. Still, enemy propaganda might exploit this by misrepresenting it as a sign of certain differences of opinion between the Axis Powers. He would therefore appreciate it greatly if the Führer would stick to the idea of simultaneous publication and give him time till tomorrow, when he would unquestionably be in a position to publish the statement sometime during the day, perhaps as early as around noon. I promised to transmit his request immediately. He will inform me as quickly as possible when he is ready to make a decision in the matter.

¹ A memorandum of Apr. 14 by Mackensen (2281/482239) records his telephone conversation with Rintelen at 3:55 p.m. in the course of which he received the text of the telegram of Pavelić for Mussolini. See document No. 343. Rintelen directed Mackensen to take up with Mussolini the matter of the handling on the radio and in the press of the telegrams which were to be sent to Pavelić by Hitler and Mussolini.

² See document No. 337.

³ In Italian in the original.

He then spoke at some length about the subject of Dalmatia, mentioned among other things that today Fiume was connected with the rest of Italy only by a corridor 500 meters wide—a situation that would have to be corrected—and emphasized that Dalmatia had never been an integral part of Croatia; rather, the official designation had always been, "Croatia and Dalmatia." He mentioned, furthermore, that Pavelić is said to be thinking of making Banja Luka, a city located in the geographical center, the capital, instead of Zagreb—which would also have the advantage of attracting Croatian fellow countrymen from the north and south of the new state, where the Croatian element constituted about 90 percent, to the center of the country, which was the most thinly settled by the Croats. In view of its wealth of natural resources, moreover, the new state would quickly prosper with the return of normal times.

MACKENSEN

No. 346

116/66750-52

Unsigned Memorandum

APRIL 14, 1941.

TELEPHONE MESSAGE FROM ROME AT 9:30 P. M., APRIL 14, 1941,
FROM HERR VON MACKENSEN ¹

In the discussions with the Italian Government the following additional points have developed:

1. The telegram from Pavelić to the Duce has not yet been received in Rome; it is known there only through the German text transmitted by us.²
2. The Italian Government wants to supplement the telegram from Pavelić to the Duce by the following addition:

"The boundaries of the Croatian state will be fixed by agreement between the Croatian Government and the Governments of the Axis Powers."

3. The Duce wants to make public not only his telegram to Pavelić but also the telegram from Pavelić to him and proposes, therefore, that we, too, make public the telegram from Pavelić or both the telegrams, the one from Pavelić³ and that from Kvaternik,⁴ to the Führer. Herr von Mackensen asked that the texts of these telegrams be transmitted at once (this has been done).

¹ A memorandum written by Mackensen at 10:20 p.m. Apr. 14 (2281/482243-44) explains the background of this telephone message. Marchese de Ferrarils of the Italian Foreign Ministry came to Mackensen's villa at about 9:30 p.m.; he explained that Rome had made contact with Anfuso, and proposed on behalf of Mussolini an additional clause in the text of the telegram of Hitler to Pavelić.

² See document No. 343 and footnote 2.

³ See document No. 317.

⁴ See document No. 311.

4. The text of the Duce's telegram to Pavelić will be as follows:

"I have received the telegram by which you inform me, in conformity with the will of the Croatian people, of the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia, and in which you request of me the recognition of the Independent Croatian State by Fascist Italy.

"I welcome with great satisfaction the new Croatia, which is regaining its long-desired freedom today, now that the Axis Powers have destroyed the artificial structure of Yugoslavia.

"I am pleased to convey to you the recognition of the Independent State of Croatia by the Fascist Government, which will be happy to come to an understanding with the national Croatian Government, through a free exchange of views, about the fixing of the boundaries of the new state, to which the Italian nation extends its very best wishes."

5. The Duce requests that a clause about the understanding concerning the boundaries be inserted also in the Führer's telegram to Pavelić. According to the Duce's proposal the Führer's telegram to Pavelić would read as follows:

"I thank you for your telegram and the telegram from General Kvaternik, in which you notify me, in accordance with the will of the Croatian people, of the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia and in which you request recognition of Croatia's independence by the German Reich.

"It is a very great pleasure and satisfaction to me in this hour, in which the Croatian people regain their long-desired freedom as a result of the victorious advance of the troops of the Axis Powers, to be able to convey to you the recognition of the Independent Croatian State by the German Reich, which will be happy, in a free exchange of opinion, to come to an understanding with the national Croatian Government about the boundaries of the new state.⁵ My best wishes are with you and the future of the Croatian people. A[dolf] H[itler]."

6. In Rome they are still waiting for a call from Anfuso, which is supposed to come before the day is over, but substantively this will not alter the foregoing in any way.

7. The Italian Government suggests that publication take place tomorrow morning, since it does not believe that publication today will be technically possible.

End of the telephone message from Herr von Mackensen.

The Reich Foreign Minister concurs in the proposals of the Duce, provided that the Führer does not issue another instruction. Since the addition regarding the understanding concerning the boundaries in the Führer's telegram to Pavelić need apply only to the fixing of the boundaries between the German Reich and Croatia, it does not imply the involvement of Germany in the Dalmatian question.

⁵ See document No. 348 and footnote 4.

No. 347

274/177879

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

SPECIAL TRAIN RAM, April 14, 1941—12:00 midnight.

No. 220 of April 14 from

the Special Train

Received Berlin, April 15—12:30 a. m.

No. 525 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent April 15—12:45 a. m.

zu Pol. IV 1652 g.¹

For Benzler.

With reference to your telegram No. 407 of April 11.²

The fate of the various regions belonging to Yugoslavia will not be settled definitively until later, at the conclusion of peace. At present, therefore, no statements can be made concerning political goals and future boundaries with respect to the area of Macedonia. For the propaganda directed at the Bulgarian population in Yugoslav Macedonia, the watchword would have to be: "Away from Belgrade" [*Los von Belgrad*]. Regarding the extent of the area for such propaganda, it must be taken into account, however, that Italian claims to the Yugoslav areas inhabited by Albanians are to be expected, and that a settlement with regard to the Macedonians living in Greek territory can likewise not be made until later.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Pol. IV 1652 g.: Not found.² This telegram (274/177863-64) reported the growing importance of the Macedonian question in Bulgaria and requested instructions for guidance in conversations.

No. 348

2281/482245-47

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy

ROME, April 15, 1941.

Following the telephone conversation at 9:45 p. m. which I had from the villa with Minister von Rintelen, in the presence of the Marchese de Ferrariis,¹ I received another call from the former at 11:10 p. m., in which he informed me that, according to reports from Zagreb, the original of the telegram from Pavelić to the Duce, which I had handed to the Duce this afternoon [sic],² had meanwhile been delivered to *Chef de Cabinet* Anfuso in Zagreb, and would be delivered by him to the Duce. The text coincided with the one transmitted by me, but contained as a result of Anfuso's consultation with Pavelić, a supplement

¹ See document No. 346 and footnote 1.² See document No. 345.

with regard to the future frontiers.³ Minister von Rintelen also confirms the fact that, if need be, Berlin would agree to publication of all five telegrams, but that it would still prefer if only the texts of the Führer's and Duce's telegrams were published. The Italians, after all, could mention the supplement in the introductory words of the published statement, if they attached importance to its being published.

Herr von Rintelen further informed me that the Führer agreed to the supplement requested by the Italians, but did not wish it to be inserted exactly as the Italians proposed; that is, he did not wish to use the phrase that the Reich Government "would be happy" at the proper time, in a free exchange of opinion, to discuss boundary questions with the Croatian Government. The conclusion of the first paragraph of the Führer's telegram would, therefore, not end in a relative clause, as does the Duce's telegram, but a period would have to be placed after the words "Reich Government," and a new sentence would follow, reading: "The Reich Government will, in a free exchange of opinion . . . etc."

At 12:05 a.m. I informed the Marchese de Ferrariis by telephone of the substance of Minister von Rintelen's communications. He informed me on this occasion that Anfuso's conference in Zagreb had brought about no change in the situation. He then suggested also finding out in Berlin what they would think of the proposal that Italy publish the text of the telegram from Pavelić to the Duce, as well as the two replies, that of the Duce and that of the Führer; but that the text of only the two latter telegrams be published in Berlin. I again pointed out to him that the best solution seemed to me to be to publish on both sides only the telegrams from the Führer and the Duce and to mention the Croatian request only in the introductory words. Finally I asked him again, at the special request of the Foreign Minister, to set the date of publication as early as possible. Even 12:00 o'clock noon seemed to Berlin to be quite late. We finally agreed, however, that it would be better to keep it at this hour, because it was not yet certain whether the Marchese de Ferrariis would be able to speak with the Duce so early in the morning that the instructions could be issued to the radio in time. If the time of publication was set for 12:00 o'clock, this could be done.

At 12:30 a.m. I again got a connection with Minister von Rintelen and informed him of the substance of my conversation with the Marchese de Ferrariis, pointing out particularly that it was impossible to advance the hour of publication. At the same time I promised to inform him as soon as I knew when the Marchese de Ferrariis would

³ See document No. 346.

be received by the Duce. This information will only be able to be given, however, some time in the morning.

Minister von Rintelen informed me on this occasion that the Führer had decided, after all, with regard to the supplement desired by the Italians concerning the future boundaries, to word the sentence in question as follows: "The Reich Government will be happy, at the proper time . . . etc."⁴

Finally, I promised the Marchese de Ferrariis at his request to leave for him, ready to be fetched, at the entrance to the porter's lodge by 8:30 a.m., the texts and translations of the telegrams from Kvaternik and Pavelić to the Führer, which I had received in the meantime,⁵ so that he could submit them to the Duce.

Following the conversation, I asked Consul Reisinger at 1:00 a.m. to attend to the further details with regard to the texts in question.⁶

MACKENSEN

⁴ Such a sentence was added to the text of Hitler's telegram for Pavelić when the text was sent to Rome prior to its being sent to Zagreb. See document No. 337 and footnote 3.

⁵ Sent to Rome Apr. 14, 10:10 p.m., by closed circuit coded telegram (4849/E247525-26).

⁶ Further details regarding the hurried negotiations in the morning of Apr. 15 preparatory to the publication of the telegrams are to be found in Mackensen's longer memorandum of Apr. 15 (2281/482248-49) and his short memorandum of the same date (2281/482250).

The telegram of Hitler to Pavelić (see document No. 337) with the added sentence, and the telegram of Mussolini to Pavelić (see document No. 346) as amended were made public over the radio at noon Apr. 15. The texts of the telegrams of Pavelić to Hitler and to Mussolini were not made public.

For published texts see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, June 1941, pp. 465-466.

No. 349

116/66757

SS-Standartenführer Veessenmayer to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 66 of April 15

ZAGREB, April 15, 1941.

Received April 15—4:40 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Pavelić, the leader of the Croatian people, asks that the following telegram be transmitted to the Führer:

"Führer: With deep emotion I acknowledge the receipt of the telegram in which you have expressed to me the recognition of an Independent Croatian State by the German Reich.¹ On behalf of the whole (one word missing in the clear text) and particularly on my own behalf, I thank you, Führer, for the great confidence which you place in the Croatian people and in me, and ask you to accept the

¹ See document No. 337 and footnote 3, and document No. 348.

assurance that we shall for all time to come prove ourselves worthy of this confidence. We are also filled with the deepest gratitude toward and admiration for the victorious troops of the Axis Powers. The love and admiration of the Croatian people for the Führer of the Greater German Reich are boundless. Zagreb, April 15, 1941. Dr. Ante Pavelić."

VEESENMAYER

No. 350

1000/305872-81

*The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry*¹

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 226 of April 15

TEHRAN, April 15, 1941—[6:10 p. m.]²

[Received April 15—9:45 p. m.]

For the Foreign Minister.

The Egyptian Ambassador in Tehran, Zulfikar Pasha, father-in-law of the Egyptian King, Farouk, and as such related to the Iranian Crown Princess,³ asked me through a reliable intermediary for an urgent and important conversation in private at some neutral place. The conversation took place on April 14.

At the start the Ambassador made the statement that he was acting on the explicit order of King Farouk, who had not only instructed him to make every attempt to bring about this conversation but who had also provided him with instructions for the conversation. He had been instructed by the King in the first place to give me a true picture of Egypt's present situation, with the request that I pass it on to the Führer.

Pressure by England on the King to declare war on the Axis Powers was constantly growing, with the British Ambassador⁴ of late resorting to undisguised threats on account of the King's stubborn refusal. In his refusal the King was relying on a 90 percent majority of the Egyptian people who did not want war and whose sympathies were with Germany.

The Egyptian Army, 45,000 men strong including the entire officers' corps, was loyal to the King, and carried out his orders only. However, the Army was too weak to be able to take action against overwhelmingly superior British forces. The situation was made particularly difficult by the fact that the closest relative of the King,

¹ A note by Ribbentrop at the top of this document indicates that the clean copy was put into the special portfolio where Ribbentrop kept documents which he intended to show to Hitler (Führermappe).

² The times of dispatch and receipt are supplied from another copy of this telegram (65/45254-56).

³ Princess Fawzieh, sister of King Farouk, was married to Crown Prince Mohammed Riza Pahlevi.

⁴ Sir Miles W. Lampson.

Mohammed Ali as the heir to the throne, was an important tool of England.

The majority of the ministers and members of Parliament were in the pay of England. If the pseudo-Parliament under the leadership of President Ahmed Maher, who was subservient to England, had not yet resolved upon entry into the war, it was merely on account of the fear of the deputies of the adverse public opinion well known to them.

The King had expressly instructed the Ambassador to state the following: He was filled with strong admiration for the Führer and respect for the German people, whose victory over England he desired most sincerely. He was one with his people in the wish to see victorious German troops in Egypt as soon as possible as liberators from the unbearably brutal English yoke.

The Ambassador urgently requested that the King's wish to have his statement transmitted to the Führer be complied with. The King had no other safe way of transmitting it, since there were English informers even among his closest entourage. There existed a cordial and unrestricted relationship of trust between the King and himself as his father-in-law. Communications between the King and himself went through entirely safe channels.

I replied to the Ambassador that I would report the conversation to the Foreign Minister. At the same time I pointed out to him that there were still German nationals illegally interned in Egypt, and that this fact marred the German-Egyptian relations.⁵ The Ambassador stated in regard to this that all of the steps undertaken by the King personally to have the internees released had met with cynical refusal by the English. Unfortunately the King was powerless to force the release of the internees.

The Ambassador answered my question on what attitude the Egyptian people took toward Italy as follows: When the Italians upon their entry into the war advanced successfully toward Egypt, the greatest worry of the Egyptian people was that the country would be occupied by the Italians. Therefore the Italian retreat had been welcomed. Now that the German troops stood victoriously at the Egyptian frontier the people were not only calm but longed for an occupation of the country, certain that the Germans were coming as liberators and not, like the Italians, as new oppressors.

During the conversation the Ambassador, who is strikingly nordic in appearance, gave me the favorable impression of being trustworthy. There is evident in him an Egyptian nationalist's genuine

⁵ German nationals in Egypt were interned and German property was confiscated at the outbreak of the war. This matter is dealt with in an unsigned memorandum of Sept. 30, 1939 (266/173558-60).

hatred of England, loyalty to his King, and concern for his daughter and son-in-law. Zulfikar Pasha will not be a traitor to his King. Therefore communications to King Farouk can be safely routed through him.¹

ETTEL

¹ For Ribbentrop's reply, see document No. 427.

No. 351

104/113314-15

The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

URGENT

Moscow, April 15, 1941—9:34 p. m.

No. 899 of April 15

Received April 15—11:45 p. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 823 of April 7.¹

The Secretary General of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Sobolev, summoned me to his office today and stated that, by order of Molotov, he had a communication to make on the demarcation of the section of the German-Soviet boundary from the Igorka river to the Baltic Sea.² The Secretary General first went briefly into the previous negotiations, in which connection he pointed out that the Soviet proposals had been based on decisions of the Conference of Ambassadors of 1923, while the German side advocated a boundary line corresponding to the one actually existing at present. The Secretary General then declared that the Soviet Government did not wish to delay further the solution of the problem and was accordingly prepared to undertake a drawing of the boundary corresponding to its present course, in conformity with the proposals contained in the memorandum of the Embassy of March 6, 1941.³

The Secretary General added that all other proposals thereby lapsed; he requested that his communication be transmitted without delay to the German Government; he hoped the matter would now be brought to a speedy conclusion.

The communication made by Sobolev means the unconditional acceptance of the German demand, as formulated at the end of the memorandum composed by Minister Saucken and transmitted to Molotov through the Ambassador on March 6. Considering the pressure for the view heretofore held by Molotov in this matter, the compliant attitude of the Soviet Government seems very remarkable. Since the Soviet Government doubtless expects that its attitude will meet with proper appreciation on the part of the Germans,

¹ Not found.

² See documents Nos. 132, 163, 176, 181, and 229.

³ See document No. 176.

any delay in giving our consent would produce the greatest mistrust in the Soviet Government, as you have already rightly suspected was the case in connection with the delay in the formation of the subcommission. (See telegraphic instruction No. 456 of March 6⁴ and telegraphic report No. 508 of March 7.⁵)

I request telegraphic instructions.

TIPPELSKIRCH⁶

⁴ See document No. 132, footnote 1.

⁵ Document No. 132.

⁶ Minister Toppelskirch served as Chargé d'Affaires during Schulenburg's home leave, Apr. 15-May 1.

No. 352

70/50256

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, April 15, 1941.

For the State Secretary and the Foreign Minister's Secretariat. Please forward the following to the Special Train Heinrich R for the Foreign Minister:

Now that the Italian Government has withdrawn its objections to the dispatch of German liaison personnel to the Italian Armistice Commission in Syria,¹ the French Government, according to telegram No. 1155 of April 12 from Paris,² has protested in a note by Ambassador de Brinon against the return of Herr von Hentig to Syria.³ Pursuant to instructions⁴ the name of von Hentig had not been mentioned in this connection to the Italians. Nor have we as yet taken the matter up with the French Government.

Herr von Hentig is a man especially suited for the task. Moreover the matter has become a question of prestige to us as a result of the French refusal.

If the dispatch of Hentig is approved in principle, I suggest that first of all an attempt be made to remove the objections raised by the French Government through a discussion between Herr von Hentig

¹ In an instruction of Apr. 7 (2281/482027-29) Woermann informed the Embassy in Rome that the Italian Armistice Commission had so far rejected the establishment of a German liaison unit in Syria, and requested that the matter now be taken up with the Italian Government.

In telegram No. 811 of Apr. 12 (70/50254) Mackensen reported that the Italian Government had agreed to the dispatch of a German liaison unit to Syria.

² Not printed (70/50255).

³ See document No. 133 and footnote 3.

⁴ Woermann's instruction of Apr. 7 (see footnote 1) had stipulated that the matter of the German liaison unit be taken up with the Italians "through careful soundings and without mentioning specific names."

and M. Benoist-Méchin. The latter has made himself especially available for precisely such tasks. In any case we must insist on sending Hentig.⁵

WOERMANN

⁵ For the follow-up see document No. 476.

No. 353

73/53228-80

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 254

BERLIN, April 15, 1941.

Pursuant to my conversation with the Hungarian Minister of the 12th of this month (see memorandum St.S. No. 252¹) Sztójay sent me today the enclosed letter. The purpose of his visit and of this letter is to suggest that, for the sake of avoiding misapprehensions and disputes later on, the Rumanian Government be informed that the Banat is to fall to Hungary.

Herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, April 12, 1941.

DEAR HERR STATE SECRETARY: Please permit me to revert in this way to our conversation of today, for it would be extremely deplorable and certainly also irreparable if so much as the slightest misunderstanding should arise with regard to our confidence in each other.

So I repeat: The words of His Excellency the Führer and Reich Chancellor regarding the ownership of the Banat are sacred to us; no one dares to doubt them. I made to you, dear Herr State Secretary, these communications:

1. On April 11: "that, according to a confidential report from Bucharest, General Antonescu had stated to Field Marshal von Brauchitsch that, although Rumania does not want to participate in the attack on Yugoslavia, if Hungary marches into the Banat, she will find herself with the Rumanian Army there"² (this report is very easy to verify), and further,

2. On April 12th: "that the Rumanians apparently want to lay claim to the eastern portions of the Banat and that they have already started propaganda to this effect." These communications merely had the purpose of drawing your kind attention to this subject. I

¹ Document No. 321.

² See document No. 321 and footnote 1.

had, moreover, taken the liberty of mentioning to you quite privately as early as April 4 that at the Rumanian Legation here there is a good deal of talk of "Rumania's justified territorial demands" in the Yugoslav Banat.³

We considered it our duty also to point out that the attitude and propaganda mentioned above might create and strengthen false impressions among the Rumanian public and also in Government circles, which might at some time result in unnecessary and avoidable difficulties or complications. And precisely for this reason I took the liberty of suggesting most respectfully that it might be expedient to discontinue this propaganda.

I should like also to remark in this connection that, according to a reliable report which has just arrived from Bucharest, the Rumanian Government is already assembling and preparing all those documents by which it could support its claim to portions of the former Yugoslav Banat. It is the intention, among other things, to publish also those letters, or notes, which show that, on the occasion of the territorial reorganization of Rumania in 1940, Yugoslavia did not respond to her request for help and thus really left her ally in the lurch. Consequently Rumania now had a free hand in the event of a partitioning of Yugoslavia.

Please accept these statements, dear Herr State Secretary. I would stress once more: They have simply the one purpose: to permit no unfortunate misunderstanding to arise. To this, as you know, I always attach particular importance.

Yours, etc.

SZTÓJAY

³ No record of such a conversation has been found.

No. 354

104/113316-17

The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

SECRET

No. 902 of April 15

Moscow, April 16, 1941—12:37 a. m.

Received April 16—3:10 a. m.¹

With reference to our telegram No. 884 of April 13.²

The Japanese Ambassador,³ on whom I called today, told me that the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact⁴ had created a very favorable atmosphere on the part of the Soviet Government,

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 1196 to the Special Train, Apr. 16."

² Document No. 833.

³ Lt. Gen. Yoshitsugu Tatekawa.

⁴ See document No. 332 and footnote 2.

of which he was convinced by Molotov, who today had asked him to call immediately in order to continue the negotiations regarding a commercial treaty. The conclusion of the Treaty had caused disappointment and anxiety in America, where Matsuoka's journey to Berlin and Rome had been followed with attention.

Members of the Japanese Embassy here maintain that the Pact is advantageous not only to Japan but also to the Axis, that the Soviet Union's relations with the Axis will be favorably affected by it, and that the Soviet Union is prepared to cooperate with the Axis.

Stalin's manner toward the Ambassador at the railroad station when Matsuoka left is also interpreted in the same way by the Diplomatic Corps here.⁵ The view is frequently expressed that Stalin had purposely brought about an opportunity to show his attitude toward Germany in the presence of the foreign diplomats and press representatives; this, in view of the persistently circulating rumors here of an imminent conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union, is considered to be especially noteworthy. At the same time the changed attitude of the Soviet Government is attributed to the effect here of the success of the German armed forces in Yugoslavia and Greece.

TIPPELSKIRCH

⁵ See document No. 333.

No. 355

3882/E047785

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1319 of April 16

MADRID, April 16, 1941—1:20 p. m.

Received April 16—2:55 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1304 of April 12.¹

I questioned the Spanish Foreign Minister regarding the Anglo-Spanish loan agreement immediately upon his return from his Easter vacation. He handed me copies of the agreement and of the final protocol, from which it appears that the information given by the Foreign Ministry and reported in the earlier telegram was correct.²

¹ In this telegram (3882/E047787) the Embassy reported that in a supplementary agreement of Apr. 7, Britain had granted to Spain an additional credit of 2½ million pounds sterling and that no other agreements were made.

² See footnote 1.

The Foreign Minister added upon further inquiry that the English had not even attempted to have any political clauses incorporated in the new supplementary agreement. The text of the agreement will follow with the next courier.³

I have informed the Italian Ambassador.

STOHRER

³ It was enclosed in report of Apr. 20 (4880/E253220-26).

No. 356

116/66762-63

The Consulate General at Zagreb to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 71 of April 16

ZAGREB, April 16, 1941.

Received April 16—4:50 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

The recognition of Croatia by the Axis Powers has been hailed with enthusiasm by the entire nation, despite the unsettled question of the definitive boundaries, and has greatly strengthened the authority of Pavelić. Pavelić arrived in Zagreb on April 15 at 3:00 a.m. and got to work at once. Consolidation, especially with regard to the police force, is making good progress. General Glaise-Horstenau, in his capacity as representative of the Wehrmacht [Wehrmachtsbevollmächtigter] arrived in Zagreb in the morning of April 15, after a conference with the Führer the day before. He got in touch with me on his own initiative. Then followed the visit to Pavelić. Glaise referred to the special bond that united the Axis Powers with regard to the frontier of Croatia, without going into details.

Pavelić stressed particularly the admiration of the Croatian people for the Führer, but he conceded that he had full understanding of the requirements of Axis policy and would do everything to satisfy them, although he was aware that this was a very great liability to the Croatian leadership. Reports which reached him showed uniformly that the occupation of Dalmatia by Italian troops met with strong disapproval by the local population. Dalmatia was particularly beloved of the Croatian people, and partial or total cession to Italy was creating new hatred and was strengthening again the outdated concept of a Yugoslavia. Reports from the Abwehr and SD fully and completely confirm Pavelić's statement. Today, April 16, Pavelić is dispatching representatives to Dalmatia with unobjectionable directives regarding the discipline and be-

havior of the Dalmatian population toward Italy. Kvaternik, too, is doing his best in this respect.

Concern about Hungary with regard to the Medjumurje is receding into the background compared with the spirit of Dalmatia [*trete gegen den Geist Dalmatiens zurück*].

Early determination of the boundaries would greatly help in further consolidating matters.

VEESENMAYER
FREUNDT

No. 357

274/177885-86

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 424 of April 16

SOFLA, April 16, 1941.

Received Berlin, April 16—4:50 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

Secret for officer in charge.

With reference to our telegram No. 423 of April 16.²

For some days now, uneasiness has been noticeable in leading circles, as well as in large sections of the population in Bulgaria. The impression exists here that Germany is procrastinating regarding the employment of the divisions requested by us for the occupation of southern Serbia,³ and which are now ready to march. An explanation is being sought, and Italian influence is believed to be behind this. The Italian announcement that the Italian troops have occupied Ohrid, which is regarded as a Bulgarian national shrine, burst like a bomb-shell here. The public is beginning again to blame the King and Government for not pressing Bulgaria's claims with sufficient energy.

The Bulgarian occupation of Serbian Macedonia would give the crowning touch to the feeling, now at its height, of gratitude for Germany and the Führer, and which particularly at Easter time found its expression among the entire population in forms which were often touching. It would strengthen the position of the King

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 1208 to the Special Train, Apr. 16, 5:15 p.m."

² In this telegram (274/177891) Richthofen reported the words of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister that the King had been told by Hitler at the Berghof that the Führer would receive him for a personal discussion whenever the King felt the need for such. The King would now wish a time set for a discussion which, Richthofen suggested, would be about Macedonia.

³ See document No. 312 and footnote 1.

and the Government, in whose maintenance, at least, as seen from here, we have an interest, because otherwise, with the situation as it now is, only chauvinistic elements among the Bulgarians and Macedonians here would receive encouragement, and neither the King nor the Government could permanently withstand them. A situation could arise similar to that of 1917, when extremist demands for the possession of *all* of the Dobruja were subsequently made, which the Government could not ignore; disregarding them, however, caused sentiment to become embittered and did much to shake the Bulgarian internal and military front. An assignment of Ohrid to Italy would have incalculable consequences. It is realized by all sensible Bulgarians that no decision can be reached concerning the future of Greek Macedonia west of the Struma.

RICHTHOFEN

No. 358

116/66765-66

*The Foreign Minister to the Legations in Hungary and Bulgaria*¹

Telegram

No. 637 to Budapest

VIENNA, April 16, 1941—6:00 p. m.

No. 533 to Sofia

RAM 118/R

The German Consulate in Zagreb is receiving the following telegraphic instruction:²

"Please have the Croatian Government now inform also the Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian Governments by wire at once of the establishment of an Independent Croatian State with the request for recognition, so that these Governments, too, may thereupon grant recognition."

Please inform the Government at your post of this matter and, in so doing, state that we would appreciate it if the telegrams of the Croatian Government were given a positive reply, at once, if possible.

RIBBENTROP

¹ This telegram was originally also addressed to the Legation in Rumania. The address of the latter and a special addendum for Bucharest were deleted before the telegram was dispatched.

² Sent by Ribbentrop in telegram No. 116 of Apr. 16 to Zagreb (116/66764).

No. 359

141/126757-58

*The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German
Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France to the
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

No. 452 of April 16

BRUSSELS, April 16, 1941—8:00 p. m.

Received April 16—8:53 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 436 of [April] 12.¹

The Belgian King² has expressed the desire to send a letter for President Roosevelt along with a Belgian delegation going to the U.S.A. for negotiations about deliveries of food.³ A draft of the letter will follow by a special teletype message. (See end of telegram.)

The Military Commander welcomes the initiative of the King most warmly and requests that permission be given for the dispatch of the letter. The letter pictures the food situation in Belgium as it actually is, but represents nothing new for the U.S.A., since Belgian conditions are already known there in detail through reports of the Hoover representative.⁴ Exploitation of the letter for propaganda purposes will in any case be rendered difficult by the remark of the King about German food deliveries to Belgium and for that matter would not be of too much importance compared with our great interest in American help for Belgium.

For my part too, I should like to recommend most strongly approval of the dispatch of the letter, since a direct appeal by the King to President Roosevelt would make a certain impression and might make it easier for Hoover to obtain Roosevelt's consent for carrying out a relief program for Belgium.

In view of the impending departure of the Belgian delegation I should appreciate immediate telegraphic instructions.⁵

BARGEN

¹ Not found.

² Leopold III.

³ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Embarrassment for P[resident] R[oosevelt]."

On the subject of United States food deliveries to Belgium, see vol. XI of this series, document No. 183. Other documents concerning this project have been filmed on serial 141.

⁴ On Dec. 8, 1940, the former President, Mr. Herbert Hoover, formed a "National Committee on Food for the Five Small Democracies" (Finland, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and Poland). See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1940-1943*, pp. 4410, 4672.

⁵ In telegram No. 503 of Apr. 21 (141/126762), Weizsäcker advised Bargaen that the King's letter to Roosevelt should not be sent.

Below is the text of a draft of the Belgian King's letter to President Roosevelt: ⁶

"MR. PRESIDENT: An obligation of humanity impels me to appeal to your high intervention in behalf of the Belgian children, whose health and development is endangered by prolonged undernourishment. The whole population of my country suffers from an alarming shortage of food, but the privations imposed on the children and young people threaten to produce irremediable effects. From all parts of Belgium I hear the echo of a distress which is heart-rending, especially in the urban centers and industrial towns. The medical investigations conducted there show that the food shortage, especially in proteins and fats that are indispensable during growth, is so serious that our young people are already showing symptoms of an acute deficiency. It cannot be otherwise when meat, butter, and milk are lacking and when, in the large cities especially, parents are reduced to feeding their children with a little bread, with turnip cabbage or with turnips. The lot of pregnant women and of young mothers also deserves special attention. The state of want threatens to get still worse, despite the recent arrival of certain quantities of cereals and potatoes furnished by Germany. In the face of a situation endangering the future of a valiant and industrious nation, I earnestly request that you come to the rescue, at least of the children of my country. It is with full confidence that Belgium appeals to the heart of the great American nation, which in the past has shown itself to be so generous in relieving her distress.

"Thanking you in advance, Mr. President, I ask you to accept my sentiments of . . ."

(BARGEN)

⁶ In French in the original. In telegram No. 455 of Apr. 17 (141/126780-61) this French text of the draft letter was again sent to Berlin.

No. 360

136/74775

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain

Telegram

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL TRAIN HEINRICH, April 16, 1941—8:00 p. m.

No. 234 of April 16

from the Special Train Received Berlin, April 16—9:00 p. m.

No. 827 of April 16

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent April 16.

RAM 121/R

For the Ambassador personally.

Prince Don Juan of Spain, who is staying in Rome, attempted to contact us at the beginning of this month through an intermediary in order to arouse our interest for the monarchic movement in Spain.

Naturally, he was not received by us. The matter is known to us only through a talk which the intermediary had with a German journalist.¹

When the occasion arises, I request you to mention this incident in passing to Franco and to the Foreign Minister and prevent exaggerated reports on the subject from reaching him through other channels and creating a false impression.²

RIBBENTROP

¹ The German journalist was Dr. Karl Megerle. A record of his conversation of Apr. 7 with the representative of Don Juan was submitted by Woermann to the State Secretary and the Foreign Minister on Apr. 7 (137/127962-67). The record of a second conversation, which took place on Apr. 11, was submitted by Woermann to the Foreign Minister through Rintelen on Apr. 12 (137/127957-60).

² In a supplementary telegram of Apr. 18 (136/74779) Rintelen informed Stohrer that the Foreign Minister requested that, in telling Franco or Serrano Suñer about this incident, he say "some time ago" rather than "at the beginning of this month" and "with a private German citizen" rather than "with a German journalist."

In telegram No. 1367 of Apr. 20 (136/74786) Stohrer informed Ribbentrop that he had talked to Serrano Suñer about this incident. The latter, according to Stohrer, had not heard about it as yet, but was not surprised.

No. 361

124/123041

State Secretary Weissäcker to Ambassador Ott

BERLIN, April 16, 1941.

DEAR HERR OTT: On my daily walk through the Tiergarten I often think of our recent talks in these surroundings. Now that Japan and Russia have signed a neutrality pact, matters have turned out slightly different from what had been anticipated. The reaction here to this pact, however, follows the philosophical maxim of "what is, is good." And there are reasons for this. Moscow must of course believe that Berlin had from behind the stage sponsored this pact. Also, the way is now much more open for a Japanese drive southward. In other respects, everything for the moment is overshadowed by the succession of military events which really are exceeding all expectations and which, as I assume, will encourage fresh deeds.

Best regards and wishes.

Heil Hitler!

WEISSÄCKER

No. 362

274/177890

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 256

BERLIN, April 16, 1941.

The Bulgarian Minister who actually had wanted to speak with the Foreign Minister took up with me, among other things, the wish of his King to call on the Führer for the purpose of a personal discussion. Draganov presented matters to me in the same way as they had been reported in telegram No. 423 from Sofia.¹ He stated that the King was ready to appear at any time and any place indicated by the Führer. He did not want to take ministers from Bulgaria along. It was still not settled whether he would call in Draganov himself. The discussion was to be of an entirely private character.

Herewith to the Foreign Minister by teletype.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 357, footnote 2.

² In telegram No. 251 from the Special Train, forwarded to Sofia as No. 549 of Apr. 18 (274/177898), Ribbentrop informed Richthofen that Hitler was ready to receive King Boris at his headquarters on Apr. 19 and would send his own special plane to fetch him.

Richthofen reported in telegram No. 436, forwarded to the Special Train as No. 1275 (274/177903), that the King had agreed to the arrangements.

No record of this conversation has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry. Papen, who was present, gives an account in his *Memoirs* (New York, 1953), pp. 473-474, but dates it erroneously Apr. 18.

No. 363

280/153086-87

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SPECIAL TRAIN HEINRICH, April 17, 1941—2:00 a. m.

No. 238 of April 16

from the Special Train Received Berlin, April 17—2:55 a. m.

No. 851 of April 17

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent April 17.

[Received April 17—4:00 a. m.]¹zu RAM 122 R.²

Secret for officer in charge.

For the Ambassador personally.

Please inform the Duce through Anfuso, or directly, but, at any rate, not later than Thursday³ morning, as follows:

¹ The time of receipt is supplied from a copy in the files of the Rome Embassy (2281/482256-58).

² RAM 122 R: Not found.

³ Apr. 17.

It seems to us desirable as soon as possible now to enter into an exchange of views with the Italian Government concerning the further handling of the problem of the partitioning of the former Yugoslav territory. We would like it best if the Italian Government could for this purpose, possibly at the end of this week, send Count Ciano to Vienna for an unofficial meeting with me, in order to discuss these questions with me thoroughly and to inform us precisely of the wishes and intentions of the Duce by means of the map, so that we may coordinate our actions in the further handling of these problems. I should like, therefore, if it is agreeable to the Duce, hereby cordially to invite Count Ciano to Vienna.

At the same time, please inform the Duce that the Führer has decided, now that the Yugoslav State has collapsed, to advance the frontier of the German Reich south of the Karawanken and in the region to the east of this, to a line that runs south of the upper course of the Sava, but north of Ljubljana, and further to the east which includes the regions formerly belonging to Styria. We shall inform the Italian Government of the exact location of this line, but we are asking it even now to consider the area north of this line as belonging to the Reich.

Moreover, when making these communications, please inform the Duce again that we wished to leave the Italian Government an entirely free hand with respect to the disposition of matters in the southern part of former Carniola, as well as in the Adriatic areas which are of interest to Italy; we were anxious, however, to be informed concerning Italy's intentions in this respect in order to be able to undertake the reorganization of *all* the former Yugoslav areas in a way that is in accordance with our joint interests.

Please inform Rome also that we intend in the next few days to appoint a German Minister in Croatia, since, in our opinion, it is best to set up the Legation right away.

Please report by wire when this instruction has been carried out.* Please also inform General Rintelen of the foregoing communications regarding the advancement of the border of the Reich to the south, and have him also, without delay, inform General Guzzoni accordingly. As to the details with regard to the evacuation of this area by the Italian troops and the other military questions arising in connection therewith, the Military Attaché will receive further instructions from the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

RIBBENTROP

* In telegram No. 838 of Apr. 17 (230/153105-06) Mackensen reported that Mussolini, upon receiving this communication, gave instructions that Ciano should arrive in Vienna on Apr. 20. Also, Mussolini expressed approval of the line of the new German border.

No. 364

230/153103

The Legation in Belgrade to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BELGRADE, April 17, 1941.

No. 22 of April 17

Received April 17—11:15 p. m.

Armistice signed at 9:00 p.m. on April 17, on the basis of the German terms.¹ It enters into force at noon, April 18. The Yugoslav Armed Forces capitulate unconditionally.

Armistice agreement also applies to the Italian Armed Forces, on whose behalf Colonel Bonfatti, the Military Attaché here, has signed.

The Yugoslav Plenipotentiaries were the former Foreign Minister, Cincar-Marković, and Lieutenant General Janković. They stated that there was no real Yugoslav Government. The Simović Government, which had fled, had, before leaving the country, given General Kalafatović full general powers, on the basis of which he exercises governmental authority.²

FEINE

¹ The Yugoslav request for an armistice had been reported in Belgrade telegram No. 2 of Apr. 15 (230/153071). German conditions laid down to the Yugoslav negotiators by Colonel General Weichs were reported in Belgrade telegram No. 5 of Apr. 15 (230/153077). There is in the files a copy of a telegram sent to the High Command of the Army by the Commander of the Second Army on Apr. 17 setting forth in detail the final armistice provisions which were to be handed to the Yugoslavs (230/153360-63).

For a published text in Serbo-Croatian of these provisions with the signatures of the German, Italian, and Yugoslav Plenipotentiaries, see Vojnoistorijski Institut Jugoslovenske Narodne Armije (Institute of Military History of the Yugoslav Army), *Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu jugoslovenskih naroda*, tome II, vol. 2, pp. 559-562.

² Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 549-554.

No. 365

230/153104

The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

No. 245 of April 17
from Vienna

SPECIAL TRAIN, April 17, 1941—11:45 p. m.
Received April 17 [18]—12:25 a. m.

For the State Secretary.

I. The following letter was today delivered to the OKW:

"Vienna, April 16, 1941.

"The Foreign Ministry intends to transform the present German Legation in Belgrade into a field office [*Dienststelle*] of the Foreign Ministry attached to the Military Commander there. Minister First Class Altenburg has been appointed to head this field office.

"The procedure will be similar in Athens after that city is taken. Minister First Class Benzler, who is at present attached to Army Headquarters List, has been selected to head that field office.

"Please inform the military commanders concerned accordingly."

II. Please make the further arrangements at your end with regard to informing Herr Altenburg and Herr Benzler and with regard to the early departure of Minister Altenburg to Belgrade after he has first reported to the Foreign Minister.¹

RIBBENTROP

¹ These arrangements were subsequently changed. In telegram No. 533, Apr. 29, (230/153196), Ribbentrop notified the Legation in Belgrade that Minister Benzler was to head the Field Office of the Foreign Ministry in Belgrade. In telegram No. 551 of May 3 (230/153205) Weizsäcker sent the Legation in Belgrade the text of a directive issued by Hitler on Apr. 28 which established the position of a Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry with the Military Commander in Serbia, with his seat of office in Belgrade. Paragraph 2 of this directive emphasized the Plenipotentiary's responsibility for "all questions of a foreign policy nature" which would arise in Serbia and especially his task "to prevent the activities of Serbian political elements harmful to the political interests of the Reich." Paragraph 3 of Hitler's directive enjoined the Plenipotentiary to act in accord with the Military Commander in matters touching military interests, and a similar obligation was imposed on the military authorities in matters affecting political interests.

Additional instructions from Ribbentrop (telegram No. 555 of May 3: 230/153206-08), defining the sphere of activity of the Plenipotentiary in relation to the Military Commander in Serbia, were sent to Benzler, who became the Plenipotentiary. In telegram No. 759 of June 8 (230/153258) Rintelen informed Benzler that Ribbentrop had instructed Veessenmayer to place himself at Benzler's disposal for the execution of the tasks of the Plenipotentiary as set forth in paragraph 2 of Hitler's directive.

For the arrangements with regard to Greece see document No. 444 and footnote 2.

No. 366

2134/467782-88

The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister

Teletype

BERLIN, April 17, 1941.

The Hungarian Minister called on me again today, in accordance with instructions from his Government, in order to discuss the questions of the occupation and of the acquisition of Yugoslav territory now awaiting settlement. The Minister brought with him in writing what he intended to say. The text of this memorandum reads as follows:

The German Minister in Budapest, on behalf of the German Government, communicated the following to the Hungarian Minister President and Foreign Minister:

"At the request of the Rumanian Government, the German Government has promised that only German troops will occupy that part of the Banat which up to now belonged to Yugoslavia. For this reason the German Government is unable to comply with

the wish of the Hungarian Army Command that Hungarian troops should take over the occupation of the Banat."

The Minister also stated that this decision did not mean taking a position with respect to "later" Hungarian claims for revision, but that it was to prevent the possibility of a Hungarian-Rumanian clash. The Minister furthermore remarked that the German Army Command agreed to the occupation [by Hungary] of the Prekmurje situated north of the Drava river and of the areas situated to the north of the Mur river but that the decision as to the final possession of this area would be reserved for a later date.

M. de Bárdossy pointed out that he was surprised that Herr von Erdmannsdorff was talking about "later Hungarian claims" with regard to the Banat, and that the question of the possession of the territory situated to the north of the Drava river was also to be reserved for a later decision; he emphasized that Hungary had always fully maintained her revisionist claims to the territory severed from Hungary and incorporated in Yugoslavia in 1918 and that His Excellency, the Reich Chancellor, was kind enough to state these just claims of Hungary of his own accord in front of the Hungarian Minister in Berlin when he had sent His Highness, the Regent, the message that he believed the time for reincorporation of these territories had arrived.¹ M. de Bárdossy remarked at the same time that His Excellency, the Reich Chancellor, had repeated and confirmed this also to Defense Minister Bartha.² He emphasized finally that the Royal Hungarian Government had never even remotely considered that His Excellency, the Reich Chancellor, wished to change this decision of his; rather, it had unshakable confidence in the communication which His Excellency, the Reich Chancellor, had sent the Regent, and which had represented full recognition of our rights to the territories severed from Hungary and ceded to Yugoslavia in 1918.

Further on, M. de Bárdossy remarked that the Hungarian Government, while maintaining its claim to the region of the Banat now liberated was ready, on the other hand, to enter into friendly negotiations with the Independent Croatian State regarding the Prekmurje.

On the basis of the communication by Minister von Erdmannsdorff referred to above, it seems to the Hungarian Government necessary that the question of the disposition of the Banat be absolutely settled, because apparently there is a misunderstanding with regard to this.

In this connection, I may be permitted to recall the essential points of the conversation which His Excellency, the Führer and Reich Chancellor, had with me on March 27 in the presence of His Excellency, the Reich Foreign Minister, and of Minister von Hewel (Keeper of the Minutes):¹

After His Excellency, the Führer and Reich Chancellor, had pronounced his just judgment of the criminal betrayal by the Yugoslav Government, he had the kindness to emphasize that he believed that the time for the fulfillment of the Hungarian revisionist claims with respect to Yugoslavia was approaching. He knew that Hun-

¹ See document No. 215.

² See document No. 282.

gary had not been completely satisfied with the revisions so far, but now there would be an opportunity, to judge by all indications, for fulfilling her just demands with respect to Yugoslavia. His Excellency, the Führer and Reich Chancellor, left it entirely to His Highness, the Regent, to determine himself the extent of this revision. He [Hitler] himself did not wish to limit it. In his view only one limitation could be considered, namely, with respect to the position of Croatia; His Excellency regarded full autonomy for her as desirable. His Excellency also emphasized his absolute understanding for Hungary's receiving a free access to the Adriatic, that is to say, free passage through Croatia and a free port. To be sure, he could not make dispositions regarding the port of Rijeka, which belonged to Italy, but he would bring his influence to bear regarding a free port.

Further on, His Excellency, the Reich Chancellor, emphasized that Hungary was moving toward a beautiful future as a result of the recovery of rich and economically important territories, among them especially the Banat. His Excellency, the Reich Chancellor, kindly emphasized to me repeatedly (twice) and also to the Royal Hungarian Defense Minister, on the occasion of the latter's audience on April 4, that His Highness, the Regent, would take possession of the Banat.

Further on, His Excellency spoke also about the military cooperation of the German and the Hungarian Armies and also about the situation developing in the Balkans.

I was able to report the message of the Führer and Chancellor to His Highness, the Regent, on the very same day, i.e., March 27. Profoundly happy and with a sentiment of sincere gratitude, His Highness expressed his agreement with everything and in his letter of thanks of March 28 to His Excellency, the Führer and Reich Chancellor,³ he requested with sincere satisfaction the establishment of military contact between our Army Commands.

Between April 11 and 13 Hungary has taken possession of the Mur area, of the triangle Danube-Drava (Baranya) and of the Bačka. Through the proclamation of the Regent on April 11, Hungary has recognized autonomous Croatia.⁴

I replied to the Minister that Herr v. Erdmannsdorff had also made a similar report to us here.⁵ The matters that were up for discussion were of two kinds:

1. The military occupation of the former Yugoslav territory and the determination of the boundaries for the military contingents in question.

2. The territorial distribution of this area.

It would today be premature to attempt a settlement with regard to 2. Consequently it was only natural that Herr v. Erdmannsdorff should have spoken of a "later" revision.

Sztójay then also advanced some historical and ethnographic arguments in favor of the awarding of the Banat to Hungary, quite in-

³ Document No. 227.

⁴ See document No. 307.

⁵ See document No. 344.

dependently of the fact that the Führer had already decided in favor of Hungary. This decision had indeed been so clear that, in his letter of reply to the Führer, the Regent had deliberately refrained from bringing it up once more.

Finally, Sztójay also asserted that Rumania was preparing to occupy parts of the Banat in the coming week.

I promised the Minister that I would transmit his wishes to the Foreign Minister. Sztójay also offered to appear in person before the Foreign Minister in order to explain and confirm what he had told me.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 367

274/177896

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

SPECIAL TRAIN, April 17, 1941—11:50 p. m.

No. 244 of April 17 from the

Special Train

Received Berlin, April 17[18]—12:25 a. m.

No. 547 from the

Foreign Ministry

Sent April 18—2:00 a. m.

I. The Bulgarian Army has now been permitted to occupy:

1) Greek Thrace, bounded in the east by the demarcation line Svilengrad-Alexandroupolis; in the west by the Strymon line.

2) Macedonia, but for the present no farther than to the Pirot-Vranje-Skopije line, and, from there, following the course of the Vardar, to the Greek frontier.¹

II. The German military authorities concerned have already received instructions from the High Command of the Wehrmacht.² Please, however, inform the Bulgarian Government also and add that the occupation line indicated for Macedonia is provisional only. It is intended at a suitable, early date to enter into discussions with the Bulgarian Government concerning a provisional settlement of territorial questions arising for Bulgaria from the collapse of the Yugoslav State. There will be further communications regarding the date.

RIBBENTROP

¹ In telegram No. 332 from the Special Train, forwarded to Sofia as No. 603 of Apr. 26 (274/177929), Ritter sent the instruction that the Bulgarian Government was to be informed that the Bulgarian Army was permitted to occupy the area west of this line and up to a line running from Bujanovac to north of Mt. Ljuboten and from there through Brod to Bitolj. The area of Ohrid was not to be occupied until the Italians had evacuated it.

In telegram No. 382 of May 15 (274/177966) Rintelen notified Ritter that Bulgarian troops were free to enter Ohrid.

² The Kramarz memorandum of Apr. 18 (230/153121) records the transmission of Hitler's decision in this matter to the Foreign Ministry.

No. 368

230/153119-20

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SPECIAL TRAIN, April 18, 1941—2:25 a. m.

No. 252 of April 17

from Vienna

Received Berlin, April 18—3:00 a. m.

No. 862 of April 18

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent April 18—6:24 a. m.

RAM 129

Secret for officer in charge.

For the Ambassador personally.

Please inform Count Ciano, if he is already in Rome, otherwise inform Anfuso first of all, that I am happy about the quick acceptance of my invitation to Count Ciano¹ and would be glad to see the Italian Foreign Minister again in Vienna on Sunday.² In view of the Führer's birthday, which falls on the same day and the demands this will make on my time during the noon hours of Sunday, I should be very glad if Count Ciano would arrive in Vienna Sunday morning, by 10:00 o'clock at the latest, since I wish to greet him personally at the railroad station, which would not be possible for me after 10:00 o'clock. It is planned that Count Ciano will be received by the Führer during the afternoon in the vicinity of Vienna, and that I will be able to confer with him in Vienna in the evening and on Monday. Furthermore, please make also the following communications at your end:

We naturally did not expect Count Ciano to come here with a detailed program but we would appreciate it if the Duce would inform us through Count Ciano in broad outline of his ideas concerning the subject of the conversations. We are in agreement with the intention expressed to you by the Duce of letting the remainder of Slovenia go to Italy. With respect to the Dalmatian question, we were, of course, thinking of a solution in accordance with Italian interests. I intended, moreover, to speak with Count Ciano about the future destiny of the former Montenegro, as well as the considerable enlargement of Albania presumably desired by Italy. Similarly, I intended to present to him my views as to how the frontiers of the newly created Croatian State should be defined, and what portions of the former Yugoslavia should, in our opinion, fall to Hungary and to Bulgaria. As far as the latter point was concerned, we

¹ See document No. 363 and footnote 4.

² Apr. 20.

believed we already were sure of Italy's consent to a solution of the Macedonian question in accordance with Bulgarian interests, so that the entire territory in question down to the city of Ohrid on Lake Okhrida, claimed by the Bulgarians as a national shrine, would come under the sovereignty of Bulgaria. I should be greatly interested in learning Italy's views on these points, as well as on Italy's intentions with respect to Greece.

For your personal information only, I should like also to remark that it would appear to us undesirable if Count Ciano came here already largely bound by specific instructions. The purpose of your statements, as outlined above, is merely to acquaint the Italian Government to some extent with our ideas, but by no means to bring about adoption of an exactly defined Italian position even before the departure from Rome. As I have already told you by telephone,³ I shall expect you in Vienna at the same time as Count Ciano.

RIBBENTROP

³ Mackensen's memorandum (4849/E247274) records a telephone conversation with Ribbentrop on Apr. 17, at 9:45 a.m. about the forthcoming meeting in Vienna.

No. 369

104/113391

German-Soviet Protocol

PROTOCOL ON THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE
PLENIPOTENTIARIES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GERMAN REICH
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS TO INQUIRE INTO THE OBSERVANCE OF THE ECONOMIC
AGREEMENT BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIAL-
IST REPUBLICS OF FEBRUARY 11, 1940¹

Ha. Pol. V a 925.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics acting in pursuance of article 10 of the Economic Agreement between Germany and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics of February 11, 1940, have, on the basis of their inquiry into the observance of the above-mentioned agreement as of February 11, 1941, agreed as follows:

According to Soviet calculations, the Soviet deliveries on February 11, 1941, amounted to 310.3 million reichsmarks. The Germans

¹ For text, see vol. VIII of this series, document No. 607.

will by May 11, 1941, make deliveries from Germany in at least this amount.²

Executed in two originals, each in the German and Russian languages, both texts having the same validity.

Done in Berlin, April 18, 1941.

For
the Government of the
German Reich:
K. SCHNURRE

By authority of
the Government of the
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics:
A. KRUTIKOV

²The Protocol was accompanied by an exchange of notes (104/113392-98) by which Schnurre assured Krutikov that all necessary measures would be undertaken to assure by May 11 the delivery from Germany of items on an appended list.

No. 370

116/66813-14

The Leader of the Croatian State to the Reich Foreign Minister¹

ZAGREB, April 18, 1941.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: As the one in charge of future Croatian foreign policy,² I am availing myself, with especial pleasure, of the first possible opportunity to establish direct contact with Your Excellency, and to thank you most cordially for the splendid cooperation, which the nation will never forget, in the liberation of our state. We know well how decisive your services have been in our behalf and ask you to continue to be our friend, adviser, and helper.

As I have learned from an informed source, the inauguration of diplomatic relations between Berlin and Zagreb is about to take place. For this magnanimous act also I extend in advance my best thanks. At the same time I take the liberty of inquiring whether, in connection with the dispatch of a German diplomatic representative to Zagreb, the appointment of Dr. Branko Benzon as Croatian Minister to Berlin would be agreeable. Dr. Benzon is no stranger in the Reich. Being a physician by profession, he practiced in Germany almost regularly once a year and thus acquired an exceptional knowledge of the new Reich and its magnificent progress. In the present critical time he has been unofficially active in Germany as the representative of the revolutionary Croatian movement.³

¹ Marginal note: "Shown to the Führer. Hew[el], Apr. 18."

² In telegram No. 79 of Apr. 18 (116/66769) Veesenmayer had reported that Pavelić would form his government later that day, with himself as Leader of the State and of the Government and with Kvaternik as the Deputy of the Leader of the State. Pavelić would also be in charge of foreign affairs while Kvaternik would head the armed forces and police.

³ In a letter of Apr. 27 (116/66811-12) which acknowledged the letter of Pavelić, Ribbentrop promised an early reply regarding the agreement for Benzon. An undated minute by Counselor Peter-Pirkham which was initialed on Apr. 30 (116/66817) recorded that Hitler approved the agreement for Benzon. See document No. 440.

I should like finally, Your Excellency, to fulfill another deeply-felt obligation. For about a month, Dr. Veessenmayer, the bearer of this letter, has been active in our country in the cause of our liberation. He has in this connection helped us not only politically, but, in close collaboration with General Kvaternik, the leader of the revolution, he has helped us also militarily, to an extent that can hardly be described, and in all this, given proofs of a readiness for personal sacrifice which was very often attended by the utmost danger to life and limb. Your Excellency will surely not take it amiss, and will well understand if the Croatian Government should attach special importance to having this brave man, who has so speedily familiarized himself with the soul and tradition of the Croatian people, retained as long as possible as its collaborator in the work of reconstruction.

With the request that you convey to the Führer and Chancellor the expression of my unbounded admiration, respect, and gratitude, I remain,

Yours, etc.

DR. ANTE PAVELIĆ

No. 371

F15/078-68

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff*¹

Füh. 22 b

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND ROYAL HUNGARIAN MINISTER COUNT SZTÓJAY AT 5:00 P. M. ON APRIL 19, 1941, AT THE FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS

Referring to the incidents with the Volksdeutsche living in the areas occupied by Hungary,² the Führer opened the conversation with the remark that his Foreign Minister had probably already spoken about these deplorable matters. This was bitter news, and one had to expect that the Hungarians would investigate every case most vigorously. After all, the aim was to emerge from this war with our friendship strengthened rather than impaired. Sztójay informed the Führer that he had been shocked to hear of the series of incidents and that he would go to Budapest at once in order to speak there with the Regent in person. He was convinced that the latter would

¹ This memorandum is undated. In a cover note (F15/079) enclosing a copy of this memorandum which was sent to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat on May 16, Hewel explained that he had not been able to draw up the memorandum "until a few days ago."

² Counselor Kramarz' report of Apr. 16 (230/153085) includes the text of a report of the day before from Obergruppenführer Lorenz who stated that Hungarian troops in Novi Sad had shot down Volksdeutsche and committed outrages against German property.

investigate the cases with the greatest vigor. In the meantime he wanted to express his extreme abhorrence over what had happened. It would have to be determined also to what extent malicious and provocative elements had had a hand in the affair.

The Führer then turned to the second point of the discussion.

When the struggle against Yugoslavia began he had first asked Hungary not to let any Hungarian troops move in. He had done this in order to prevent friction, especially with regard to Rumania. Conflicts and shooting could too easily have developed, and that had to be avoided in any case. He would like to stress that the Rumanians had not presented any territorial demands. It was his conviction that Hungary must have her historical frontiers restored. The friendship with the Hungarian state was more important to him than the fate of a few people who could always be resettled. But one had to imagine oneself in Antonescu's situation. He was engaged in a lonely, bitter, fight, and one must not deny him one's admiration for waging this fight. He was being attacked from all sides because conditions in Rumania had not visibly improved and he had so far been unable to achieve any external successes. Rumania had done a great deal for us. She had been very loyal, and by permitting passage of our troops had done us a great service. At the moment Russia had adopted a more modest tone because of our rapid successes. But that did not mean that this would always be so. Rumania lay adjoining Russia like a half moon, with a border extending over a wide area. She was extremely important to us economically; we needed her oil, and therefore did not want any crisis to develop there. Antonescu was being severely attacked by the opposition. Some reproached him for being too far to the right, and others for being against the Legion. It was admirable how courageously he followed his thorny path. It was in the interest of both countries—of Hungary as well as Rumania—that the area under dispute should remain occupied by us for the time being. If a crisis should develop we did not afterwards want to play policeman and place in jeopardy what had been attained with such great difficulties. Sztójay should inform the Regent of the following:

1. The Führer does not think it possible to solve the problem at this time, and our troops had to remain there a few months more.
2. The area under dispute must go to Hungary. They should believe him with regard to this, but they had to give some consideration to Antonescu. If he should fall it would be no gain for us. Militarily we could scarcely bear his overthrow. Now, when conditions in Rumania were still orderly, we needed more than 2 weeks to transport a division across the country, because of the poor communications system. If everything were topsy-turvy this would probably be even much worse. If the Serbian railroads were in order it would facilitate matters for us, but this would take weeks; if chaos should

develop in Rumania, however, we would not be in a position to defend the Rumanian frontiers.

The Führer now made some remarks on military matters. He spoke of the armored divisions which had to be relieved, etc. There was no one there who could replace Antonescu, and the question of the hour was this: How can we prevent chaos in the Balkans? When the Bolsheviks were at the frontiers, Hungary would realize how right he, the Führer, had been. One had to let things ripen. If the Hungarians were just, they had to realize that the Führer's policy was not disadvantageous to Hungary. The Rumanian Legion was not an important factor, but still, it did restrain the Russian Army through a fiction [*Die rumänische Legion sei kein Faktor, aber sie halte die russische Armee immerhin mit einer Fixion zurück*]. Germany could not defend four to five hundred kilometers of frontier with half a division. But another thought forced itself upon him: Somehow he had the feeling that Rumania had to be given an equivalent. One could not always simply dictate and impose by force. Economically eastern Europe was a fortunate supplementary area for Germany. At some time we would have to rebuild our system of production, which had been wrecked by the war. He would see where an equivalent might be found. Antonescu had not made any demands of him, but the opposition was asking the General what he had achieved by his friendship with Germany. He had to cope with a tremendous hostile agitation. The Führer was going to speak with Antonescu in this sense, too, and he did not want anyone to make it too difficult for the latter to do his task.

Sztójay should tell the Regent that the die had been cast and that he had made his decision. It was his sacred endeavor to bring about an honest and lasting friendly relationship with the Hungarian State. One of his aims was to champion the friends of World War days. He wanted to give Bulgaria satisfaction, too, and let her share in the gains from the present struggle. They should all reap the fruits of their cooperation during the World War. He wanted to help in repairing the consequences of the World War. In this connection he was also thinking of Turkey, which unfortunately had not yet found the right way. He wanted to strengthen the friendly relationship to these states beyond the obligations derived from treaties. Hungary would also realize that her destiny would compel her always to go along with Germany. Germany did not want isolation; rather, she was striving for a great community of states which belonged together by reason of friendship and because they supplemented each other economically.

He asked Hungary not to mention these problems in the press at this time. They should wait a few more months for that. Antonescu

had to be helped and his position strengthened. He had to achieve something, be able to point to successes, for so far he was still standing there with empty hands. He was working himself to death, and the handwriting on the wall was clear at the eastern border. Russia was more dangerous today than before the World War. At that time she had been Pan-Slav, but today she wore the head of Janus, Pan-Slav on the one side and Marxist-internationalist on the other.

There followed a few statements about military matters, concerning tank warfare in mountainous country and the care required by motorized troops. Russia had now learned that the Russo-Yugoslav Friendship Pact² had not impressed us, and consequently she was now somewhat subdued. But it could not be denied that at the time of the coup a large number of Soviet flags had appeared in Belgrade. Also a large part of the Yugoslav Government had fled to Russia, and the statements of the Yugoslav Minister in Russia spoke volumes. But as yet one still had to be silent. At any rate he did not see why German and not Serbian territory should be given up.

The Führer had also written the Regent that he should have no qualms of conscience regarding the order for Hungarian troops to invade the country.⁴ The Serbs were a pack of conspirators. He had run after them for 8 years, had asked nothing of them, and had even promised them Salonika at Bulgaria's expense. If it was possible for a few officers to carry through a Putsch and simply to arrest the Government which had made agreements with him, then one need have no compunction here; in that case it was really better that things had developed in this manner. He had never in his life been so indignant as on March 27. None of us should ever permit Belgrade, this center of conspiracy, to play an important role again. The Yugoslav Army must be smashed completely; at most a small police troop should be allowed to remain. All ringleaders had to be made to get out of the country. If the Serbian Government could not guarantee that the intrigues, conspiracies, and Putsches would cease, then all five of us would have to intervene at once and make a joint demonstration. He, the Führer, had set the example with the air raid on Belgrade, that nest of conspirators. He would make sure that this nest, where all the instigators of unrest in the world gathered—the English, Moscow, and later probably France again—was made to disappear. The Führer then spoke briefly about the Danube as an important river and mentioned the possibility of causing tremendous disasters, obstructions, and floods there by means of a powerful explosion.

² See document No. 265 and footnote 2.

⁴ See document No. 282 and footnote 3.

Being a southeastern German he had the greatest understanding for the Hungarian wishes. Being a Viennese he was also convinced emotionally that the Tisza was a Hungarian river and not the border of Hungary, just as it had been the case with the Germans in the old Reich as far as the Rhine was concerned.

Naturally he also understood the other side. Rumania had been a profiteer in the war, to be sure, but for the time being Antonescu had to be kept in power. Rumania was probably not in a position to maintain herself in the long run, for she had no forces of regeneration within the country.

Sztójay remarked that the Regent was of exactly the same opinion as the Führer. He was in favor of complete cooperation with Germany, as he had always been. He was indebted to Germany and was loyal to her. He, Sztójay, wanted to express the Regent's most sincere thanks for everything that Germany had done for Hungary, and also for the final determination of the frontiers as the Führer had described them. The delay which the Führer had termed necessary was of no importance whatsoever, especially since the Führer said it would be a question of only a few months. As for Rumania, Hungary desired good relations with her. But it gave Hungary cause for worry when Antonescu in his speeches constantly hinted at revision. The Führer said that Antonescu had to do this with respect to his opposition. Sztójay was of the belief, however, that this was hard to justify before public opinion in Hungary. Hungary, too, thought that an equivalent had to be found for Rumania, and was convinced that it could be found in Serbia. Hungary would welcome a solution of this problem and did not begrudge the Rumanians anything as long as Hungary's historical borders were left untouched. The Hungarians had thought about the problem themselves. Chaos in Rumania, with the Russian question growing more critical as a result, was not an agreeable state of affairs for Hungary.

As for Yugoslavia, the Hungarian view was exactly in agreement with that of the Führer. Hungary was glad that the problem had become acute. The King had always been a puppet of the English, Russian, and western wire-pullers. The phenomenon of "Peter the Great" was a joke. Hungary was interested in Bulgaria's being strengthened, too. Hungary had a very friendly relationship with Croatia and hoped that the latter would be made as strong as possible. The Führer said that if the Italian demands were too great, the danger of the Pan-Slav question would once more become acute. Sztójay said that Dalmatia was purely Croatian. Kvaternik was more capable than Pavelić. He, Sztójay, knew him well. He was a splendid fellow [*Mordskert*]. He had shown his political leanings

even in the past. He had always been pro-German and presumably pro-Hungarian, too.

Hungary wanted of Croatia merely an access to the sea via Zagreb-Rijeka. That was all. He believed that this could easily be arranged. This connection was a vital artery for Budapest. He believed that the solution suggested by the Führer was truly the model solution for peace in the Balkans. As for Russia, the question was a matter of great concern to the Regent. He had written the Führer about that. Sztójay welcomed the renewal of the brotherhood in arms between the Hungarian and German Armies. The joint struggle was a moment [*Der gemeinsame Kampf sei ein Moment*] which the Hungarian officers had been waiting for a long time. They were happy that it had arrived. The joint struggle was an instance of high moral and psychological significance. It ushered in a new epoch, especially for the young people. Sztójay was afraid that the young people in Germany might not be aware of this, and it should be pointed out to them to a somewhat greater extent. Hungary was trying very hard to bring the young people together and to strengthen and develop the relationship between them. He asked the Führer to help him in this effort, and the Führer promised to do so.

Then Sztójay congratulated the Führer once more on his successes and on the occasion of his birthday the following day.

The Führer closed the conversation with the observation that he had thought Yugoslavia had become somewhat more European. Now that he had seen that this was not the case he was glad, after all, that things had developed as they did. He was compelled to say that the fight against Greece was a bitter drop in the joy over his great successes. He reacted here as he did in the case of the Finns; in some cases sentiment could not be excluded. Molotov had been very much disappointed when he had not given him a free hand in Finland. But he was fighting a war against England, not against small nations. If Greece had not let the English in, then he would never have attacked her. Now he unfortunately had to disarm her, but he would not bring any prisoners to Germany. Italy would never have conquered the Greeks.⁵

HEWEL

⁵ In telegram No. 684, No. 283 from the Special Train, of Apr. 22 (78/53251-52) Ribbentrop informed Erdmannsdorff of Hitler's conversation with Sztójay, particularly as regards the Hungarian excesses against Volksdeutsche in the newly occupied areas, and as regards the Banat.

No. 372

83/61577-78

The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

ROME, April 19, 1941—6:00 p. m.

No. 861 of April 19

Received April 19—6:20 p. m.

Anfuso told me today that the following telegram from the Italian Minister in Baghdad was received here yesterday afternoon:

During the night of April 16 and 17 the English Ambassador¹ in Baghdad had informed the Iraq Minister President, Gaylani, that in view of the situation in Egypt the British High Command had decided to send strong English contingents through Iraq to the theater of war in the Near East and the British Government hoped that the Iraq Government would not make difficulties.

Gaylani had replied that the Iraq Government was willing to permit passage within the numerical limits granted by his predecessor, provided that not more than 3,000 (three thousand) men would be in Iraq territory simultaneously during the time required for transportation from Basra to Transjordan. The ordnance depots set up in Iraq would be available to these troops while in transit through Iraq.

The English Ambassador had replied that he was not satisfied with this answer and would have to report to his Government. He had added that the expeditionary corps from India was already on its way; the situation in Egypt was considered so serious that the British troops would have to pass through Iraq immediately. Numerous warships as well as an aircraft carrier were cruising in the Persian Gulf and at the entrance of Shatt-al-Arab.

Gaylani also told the Italian Minister that the National Council for the Defense of Iraq had met yesterday morning and studied the situation. On the basis of the decision of the National Council he told the Italian Minister the following: The Iraq Government was firmly resolved to defend itself and would therefore like to learn as soon as possible from the Axis Governments:

First, whether the Iraq Army could count on support from the air force of the Axis Powers; the airfields of Iraq would of course be placed at the disposal of the Axis Powers.

Second, whether the Iraq Army could count on receiving rifles and ammunition by air transports such as Italy and Germany had used during the Ethiopian and Norwegian campaigns.

In any case he, Gaylani, requested that all the help which the Iraq Government had requested even earlier be made available to it and that financial aid also be given.²

End of the telegram from the Italian Minister in Baghdad.

¹ Sir Kinahan Cornwallis.

² In a memorandum of Apr. 19 (83/61102-05) Woermann recorded that a detailed account of the events in Iraq based also on the reports from the Italian Minister in Baghdad was handed to him by Zamboni. With regard to the Iraq requests for aid by the Axis Powers Woermann added the following comment to this memorandum which was forwarded to the Foreign Minister: "The German military authorities have not yet been informed here about Iraq's request. Please send instructions as soon as possible indicating whether this is to be done here or at your end."

Anfuso added that the Duce was in principle prepared to grant the Iraq Government the aid requested, but the possibility of doing so seemed to him extremely limited. The matter would first be submitted to the military authorities here for study. Anfuso expressed the view that it would probably be easier for Germany to render military assistance and he asked for the German view so that a reply might be given to the telegram of the Italian Minister in Baghdad.

Please send telegraphic instructions.³

BISMARCK

³ No reply found. However, Bismarck's telegram No. 872 of Apr. 21 (83/6116-17), which forwards subsequent Italian reports from Iraq, refers to a telephone conversation with Rintelen in connection with the document printed.

No. 373

71/50846-47

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

U. St.S. Pol. 320

BERLIN, April 19, 1941.

In accordance with instructions Counselor of Embassy Zamboni informed me on April 10 as follows:

The Italian Government agreed to the dispatch of the letter of the State Secretary, Freiherr von Weizsäcker, to the Grand Mufti,¹ in the text communicated to the Italian Government. The Italian Government would point out, however, that in the letter of the Grand Mufti to the Führer² only Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt were listed as Arab countries. Furthermore, if the demand for independence for these countries should now be recognized in a general form, the fact must be taken into account that these countries would naturally have to adapt themselves to the new world order of the future and hence to the Italian sphere of interest along the Mediterranean.

I did not at that time submit a memorandum of this conversation, because I had first asked Counselor of Embassy Zamboni a question. I told him that I did not understand the significance of the fact that the four countries of Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt were mentioned in his statement. The Grand Mufti's letter referred in general to the Arab world. More or less incidentally the Grand Mufti had spoken in somewhat more detail about the aforesaid countries. In

¹ Document No. 298, enclosure.

² See vol. XI of this series, document No. 680.

the letter of reply by the State Secretary, Freiherr von Weizsäcker, any mention of countries had been deliberately avoided. Rather the Arabs had been spoken of in general terms only. In any case it was certain that the Arab countries in the sense of this exchange of letters were understood to include other countries too, such as, for example, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Palestine. On the other hand we naturally did not understand Arabs in the sense of this exchange of letters to include the Arabs in North Africa west of Egypt.

Counselor of Embassy Zamboni promised me that he would clarify this point immediately. When I recently made further inquiry he could not give me any information, however. In my opinion we have no interest in pursuing this discussion any further.

In any case the Italian Government with this statement has again presented its claim that the Arab countries, including Egypt and Syria, belong to the Italian sphere of interest.

It is presumably unnecessary to take up this statement—which, to be sure, is important—with the Italian Government.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WOERMANN

No. 374

129/121071-72

The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 813 of April 19

LISBON, April 20, 1941—9:58 a. m.

Received April 20—3:00 p. m.

In the course of the negotiation of a treaty Minister President Salazar made the following political observations to the Italian Ambassador¹ here:

1) At best, England's victory would only be possible after the United States had entered the war. This, however, would mean prolonging the war for years and therefore the complete destruction of Europe and its civilization, and would bring about Bolshevik domination.

2) Even a war ending in a stalemate would only be possible after some years, assuming the participation of the United States.

3) The only thing that could save Europe would be an Axis victory, of which he was convinced and which, in his heart he would welcome with joy, as long as his country could preserve its independence and national existence.

4) He did not fear an English attack on the Portuguese mainland or the islands. To be sure, economic pressure exerted by England made it extremely difficult for him to observe a strict neutrality,

¹ Renato Bova Scoppa.

and the blockade measures were causing serious damage to his country. He had to admit, however, that at no time had England made demands affecting the territorial sovereignty of the country. Nor had America ever made such demands, and Donovan in particular had not put forth any such wishes, but, like a schoolmaster, merely quizzed him about his ideas as to the future and the world in all the various kinds of political situations.² Nevertheless he did not rule out the possibility that the Portuguese islands could some day be subjected to a threat from the United States. However, he would meet every attack with force and for this reason he had recently considerably strengthened the military forces stationed in the Azores.

Salazar showed his chagrin over Spain's behavior toward his country. He said that he could not understand the reason for adopting such a hostile tone.³ As regards a possible meeting with the Spanish Generalissimo, Salazar stated that he would personally very much welcome this but that he had the impression that Serrano Suñer wanted to prevent it.

Salazar's attitude toward Germany, as characterized above, is also typified by his personal intervention yesterday in our pending economic negotiations,⁴ which will settle the matter to our satisfaction in very short order.

HUENE

² Cf. document No. 171.

³ In telegrams No. 1246 of Apr. 7 (129/121062) and No. 1291 of Apr. 10 (136/74767-68) Stohrer reported a worsening of Spanish-Portuguese relations caused, among other things, by a strongly worded Spanish note to the Portuguese Government.

⁴ The German-Portuguese economic negotiations dealt with the exchange of Portuguese sardines and German tin plate, and details of it were reported by Huene in telegram No. 797 of Apr. 18 (129/121066-67).

No. 375

136/74784-85

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

MADRID, April 20, 1941—10:30 p. m.

No. 1366 of April 20

Received April 21—12:30 a. m.

The Spanish Foreign Minister informed me that the Ambassador of the United States of America in Madrid¹ had delivered to him a message from Roosevelt holding out the prospect of certain victory by the Anglo-Saxon powers despite all previous setbacks and any that may still come.

¹Alexander Wilbourn Weddell.

In the discussion that followed, the Ambassador had asked in a threatening and downright impudent tone whether the rumors regarding the imminent accession of Spain to the Tripartite Pact were true (see my telegram No. 1318 of April 16²); the Spanish press seemed to be preparing the people for such an accession; the article in question, especially the editorials of *Arriba*, were, as everyone knows, written by the German press advisor, Lazar, and clearly showed this tendency.

All the more indignant over this false assertion since he himself dictates or inspires many of these articles, Foreign Minister Suñer seems to have answered very sharply and said that in Spain there were people to be found on every street corner who were willing and talented enough to write such articles against Spain's enemies. To the Ambassador's question whether Suñer regarded the United States of America as an enemy, the Minister answered that no one could deny that the United States had often taken a far from friendly attitude toward Spain.

The United States Ambassador seems to have acted in accordance with very sharp instructions from Washington, [or] to have completely lost his self-control. Since, according to the account of the Minister, the Ambassador gave the impression of being very nervous and seemed deeply affected by the war conquests,³ the latter is to be assumed.

The Foreign Minister concluded his report with the angry statement that he would have thrown the Ambassador out or, better still, slapped his face if he had not been the representative of a foreign power.⁴

STOHRER

² Not found.

³ This may be an error in transmission; the German text reads "Kriegseroberungen" (war conquests), but should probably read "Kriegsereignisse" (events of the war).

⁴ For Ambassador Weddell's account of his conversation with Serrano Suñer, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 888-890.

[EDITORS' NOTE. On April 20 Ciano had a conversation with Hitler in Mönichkirchen, Austria, prior to his talks with Ribbentrop in Vienna. For the record of the Hitler-Ciano conversation, see Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pages 649-652. No record has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.]

No. 376

222/149526

The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SPECIAL TRAIN, April 21, 1941—2:30 a. m.

No. 275 of April 21 from the

Special Train via Vienna Received Berlin, April 21—3:00 a. m.

No. 1075 of April 21

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent April 21—6:45 a. m.

For the Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 1049 of April 17.¹

With regard to the recommendation made at the end of your telegram for settling the question of awarding the former Yugoslav part of the Banat to Rumania, it is to be said that in no case will such a solution be considered. Furthermore, the Rumanian minority in this part of the Banat is small, amounting to only about one half of the figure of 130,000 claimed by the Rumanians. The Foreign Minister requests that you not let yourself become involved in discussions starting from the assumption that this territory might go to Rumania. The Rumanian agitation in this direction must in no circumstance receive any nourishment from conversations with the German Legation.

Further instructions with regard to your telegram will follow.

RINTELEN

¹ Not printed (222/149521-22).

No. 377

83/61118-20

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister¹

VIENNA, April 21, 1941.

Report for the Führer in reply to the telephone call from Minister Hewel concerning possibilities of aid to Iraq:

1. The Iraq Government's appeal for aid is addressed to the Axis Powers but has reached us only through the Italian Government;² in this connection it should be taken into account that the English

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted to Fräulein Wolff [Special Train] Amerika on Apr. 24, 10:30 a.m. B[runs], Apr. 21."

² See document No. 372 and footnote 2.

can read the telegrams of the Italian Minister in Baghdad and therefore undoubtedly know already about the appeal for aid.³

2. The question of the possibilities of giving assistance has been studied. Speedy assistance is possible only by air. Direct intervention by Luftwaffe units in Iraq is out of the question, since that exceeds the range of the Luftwaffe. It seems possible, however, to transport arms to Iraq in individual Junkers planes, but only by way of Syria. The largest arms to be transported in this way would be the 47-mm. guns. It is therefore possible to send antitank guns to Iraq. However, the Luftwaffe has only a few planes available for such transport missions.

The possibility of an intermediary landing in Syria would have to be assured through an appropriate step with the French Government.

3. By the land route arms can be brought to Iraq only through Turkey. Turkey will not permit direct transportation of arms to Iraq. However, arms can be declared as destined for Afghanistan, since in such a case Turkey grants a transit permit. Preparations have been made for obtaining the consent of the Afghan Government to such a procedure. The arms would then be left behind in Iraq while in transit to Afghanistan. Nevertheless, such transport requires several weeks.⁴

4. The Japanese Government was approached some time ago in order to induce it to transport arms to Iraq by sea.⁵ So far Japan has avoided any clear stand on this; the question is now being asked again in order that a conclusive result may be achieved. Transit over this route requires several months, and thus cannot possibly provide quick aid.

³ Papen's telegram No. 100 of Feb. 4 (3637/E028375) reported that the Iraq Minister in Ankara had told him that the English were informed about all Italian measures because they were reading the Italian cipher.

The memorandum of Apr. 1 (B13/B001669-70) indicates that Woermann made further inquiries about the Italian codes with the military and the Foreign Ministry's own code department. He received the information that the Italians had had three codes of increasing complexity for diplomatic messages. It was assumed that the British were able to read only the first two codes which included the code used for Rome-Baghdad communications. The Germans, however, were able to read all three codes. Woermann discussed various ways of telling the Italians that their code was broken without admitting that the Germans themselves were reading the Italian messages.

⁴ Such a proposal in a slightly different form, namely that arms with destination Afghanistan be left behind in Iraq, was contained in a Woermann memorandum of Apr. 21 (83/61121-23) discussing various possibilities for shipping arms to Iraq. A marginal note of Apr. 22 by Rintelen indicated that it had been shown to Hitler whereupon Woermann had received instructions to put this particular proposal into operation immediately.

⁵ See document No. 133, enclosure and footnote 24.

5. Since it is uncertain whether the Iraq Government is persisting in its will to resist or whether, as indicated by a statement of the Iraq Minister in Ankara making light of the troop landings,⁶ it has decided to yield in view of the English troop landings now in progress, the German Embassy in Ankara has been instructed to find out immediately from the Iraq Minister there, who is a brother of the anti-English Iraq Minister President, Gaylani, what the present situation in Iraq really is⁷ and to report on it immediately by telegram.

6. A decision by the Führer is requested as to whether arms deliveries to Iraq by plane are to be started, if it appears that the Iraq Government still has the will to resist. In such a case it would be necessary to point out to the Italian Government that the encoded messages of a third country which we are also reading show that the cipher telegrams of the Italian Minister in Baghdad are obviously all being read by the English.⁸

7. The Italian Minister in Baghdad has been asked to give another situation report.⁹

R[IBBENTROP]

⁶ In Ankara telegram No. 414 of Apr. 21 (83/61594) Kroll had quoted the Iraq Minister as saying that only 1600 British soldiers had debarked so far.

⁷ Telegram No. 274 of Apr. 21 from the Special Train (792/273045).

⁸ Weizsäcker's memorandum of May 2 (B12/B000847) records that he informed Alfieri that the Germans now had tangible proof corroborating their earlier suspicions of the untrustworthiness of the Italian code for Baghdad. Alfieri indicated that the Italians could quickly change their code.

In a memorandum of May 11 (B12/B000876) Weizsäcker noted a conversation with Alfieri who stated that he had learned from Ciano that the code had been changed.

⁹ Marginal note in Bruns's handwriting: "Woermann ought to wait one more day before he comes."

No. 378

F15/067-57

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RAM 23

VIENNA, April 21, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND COUNT CIANO AT THE HOTEL IMPERIAL IN VIENNA, ON APRIL 21, 1941¹

Following some introductory remarks, the Reich Foreign Minister stated that the principal aim of the new settlement in the Balkans would be to prevent for all future times the repetition of a betrayal such as Serbia perpetrated after Yugoslavia's accession to the Tri-

¹ For Ciano's record of this conversation, see *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 652-654.

partite Pact. It would be a matter of preventing the conspiratorial clique, which had always existed in Serbia, from ever arising again. Serbia, whom the Führer regarded as unteachable, must never again be allowed to become a center of unrest. Then he asked Count Ciano to tell him Mussolini's views about the reorganization of the former Yugoslav territory.

Count Ciano replied that he had seen Mussolini shortly before crossing the border, and Mussolini had set down his ideas in a note. This note, however, dealt only with the Yugoslav territory. In regard to Greece, he (Ciano) could merely give a general outline of the Italian intentions; Italy had not yet studied the Greek problems closely enough to go into detail.

Making use of the note, which apparently had been written by the Duce himself, and referring to a map showing the new boundaries, which he presented afterwards,² Count Ciano made the following statement about the Italian intentions:

That part of Slovenia which did not fall to Germany would be annexed, but it would be given a kind of administrative autonomy.

The whole of Dalmatia and the rest of the Adriatic coast, from Rijeka to Kotor, would be annexed. Administratively it would have the status of an Italian government (*Governatorato italiano della Dalmazia*).

Montenegro was to be restored as an independent state within the boundaries indicated on the map, but would be linked to Italy by personal union under the Italian royal dynasty. This would be all the more easy due to the generally known fact that the Queen of Italy was a Montenegrin princess.

Albania was to be enlarged by the border extensions indicated on the map, which provided for a shift eastward of the former Albanian-Yugoslav border north of Lake Prespa. The Reich Foreign Minister remarked in this connection that the King of Bulgaria, who had visited the Führer a few days earlier,³ had registered a Bulgarian claim to all of Macedonia as far as the Albanian-Yugoslav border, attaching in this connection particular importance to the Bulgarian national shrine of Ohrid. The Führer had intimated to the King of Bulgaria that he thought his demands reasonable. Count Ciano replied that Ohrid could perhaps be taken care of by an enclave or an indentation in the boundary. He emphasized, however, that Italy would prefer to have the border shifted further east, for economic and above all military reasons; this wish was also based on the ethnic composition of the population in that area.

Croatia was likewise to be tied closely to Italy by a personal union.

The Reich Foreign Minister pointed in this connection to the recognition by both Germany and Italy of Croatia's independence.

² Not found. See, however, document No. 393, footnote 1.

³ See document No. 362 and footnote 2.

Germany had already sent a Minister to Zagreb.⁴ In this context the Reich Foreign Minister also mentioned the mission of General Glaise-Horstenau as liaison between the occupying troops and the Croatian Government.⁵

Following this, the Reich Foreign Minister in turn outlined the German view of the reorganization of the former Yugoslav territory, using a map also, which was handed to Count Ciano at the close of the conversation.⁶ He called attention to the definitive change in the northern boundary of Croatia, already ordered by the Führer.⁷ At an appropriate time Germany would make a boundary treaty with the Croatian Government.

The Reich Foreign Minister then added that Hungary had claimed, and been accorded by the Führer, the Bačka and Banat regions, because they were situated within the old boundaries of Hungary. The Banat was still occupied by German troops in order to avert possible clashes between Hungary and Rumania in that area. For Rumania on her part had also pointed to the existence of a Rumanian minority in the Banat. Germany, to be sure, held that such a claim—which, incidentally, had so far not been raised—had little justification, but she did not ignore the fact that Rumania would have to be offered something in compensation; at the present moment it was hard to say what this would be, but the possibility would have to be studied later in greater detail.

No decision had yet been made as to the future regime of Serbia. It might not be a bad idea to bring Prince Paul back to Serbia.

Following this the Reich Foreign Minister referred once more to the Bulgarian claims advanced by King Boris, which were regarded as reasonable from the German viewpoint and concerning which the Führer had expressed sympathy. The only reservation he had made in this connection was that he would want to have an exchange of views on these subjects with the Italian ally.

Count Ciano repeated his arguments on the necessity of advancing the border. He cited the economic and especially military considerations prompting Italy to take this position, and proposed that the Italian experts be given a hearing on that point. The Italian military representatives were called in, but they were not able to furnish very illuminating information, in response to the detailed questions by the Reich Foreign Minister, on the military reasons

⁴ On Apr. 16 Rintelen recorded that Hitler had indicated to Hewel the wish that a German Legation be established in Zagreb without delay, whereupon Ribbentrop had suggested to Hitler the appointment of SA-Obergruppenführer Siegfried Kasche as German Minister (116/66768). Hitler notified Pavelić of Kasche's appointment in a letter of Apr. 19 (116/66779-80) which Kasche handed to Pavelić on Apr. 21.

⁵ See document No. 356.

⁶ Not found.

⁷ See document No. 363.

underlying the proposal for the border in Macedonia. General di Castiglione merely stated that he did not want to have a zig-zag boundary, adding significantly that if the borders were left as they were now Albania would be too narrow and the withdrawal zone to the sea too small. Count Ciano supplemented these statements by saying that Italy wanted a double range of mountains as the border of Albania and wanted to have possession of certain railroad lines in Macedonia. There followed an exchange of views on the ethnic composition of the population in the area in dispute, based on ethnographic maps, but no uniform view emerged from these discussions.

Count Ciano merely stated that he, for his person, was prepared to draw the boundary at Lake Okhrida in such a way that the Bulgarian shrines would be included in Bulgarian territory.

He next asked the Reich Foreign Minister a question which he frequently repeated in the further course of the conversation: namely, whether Germany had any objections to a personal union between Italy and Croatia.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he would ask the Führer for his opinion in the matter, and inquired whether the Croats had actually made any proposals to Italy about a personal union. Ciano replied that Pavelić, whom he had known for a long time, had often talked about a personal union in former days, when a new settlement concerning these matters seemed to be far off in a nebulous future. Ciano, however, had to admit in response to a question by the Reich Foreign Minister that he had not talked to Pavelić very recently.

The Reich Foreign Minister then elaborated the position of the Führer, who held that the shaping of Croatia's future system of government should be left entirely to the Croats themselves. Germany did not think it wise to force anything upon them. Moreover, Germany had not talked with the Croats so far, but had merely heard of certain demands raised among the Croatian people. The Reich Foreign Minister explained these demands to Count Ciano, referring to the German map, and reiterated that Germany and Italy had recognized Croatia's independence and that Germany had already sent a Minister to Zagreb. When the Reich Foreign Minister also mentioned in this connection Germany's desire to withdraw her troops from Croatia as soon as possible, Count Ciano took advantage of this to state that Italy was prepared to send troops for the occupation immediately.

The Reich Foreign Minister then came to speak of Hungary's wish for a free port on the coast of the Adriatic. Count Ciano replied that there were no obstacles in the way of an economic arrangement of this type.

As regards Serbia's future organization, the Reich Foreign Minister stated that the country would have to be kept as small as possible and that accordingly certain Croatian wishes ought to be satisfied with regard to Croatia's eastern border. On the other hand, the Reich Foreign Minister, with the help of the map, explained to Count Ciano that certain ethnographic and historical considerations (Kosovo) would have to be taken into account in the final determination of Serbia's southern boundary.

Reverting to Bulgaria's wishes, the Reich Foreign Minister stated that it was Germany's view that the whole of Macedonia should be transferred to Bulgaria, because that would put this area into the hands of a good and faithful friend of the Axis Powers. The Führer, as he had said before, had expressed his sympathy regarding the demands presented by King Boris, subject to the discussions with the Italians. To this extent, then, there existed, as regards the exact course of the new Albanian-Bulgarian border, a minor divergence of opinion between Germany and Italy, i.e., as to the consideration which the Albanian and the Macedonian population elements were to be given in the determination of the new boundary.

At the close of the conversation Count Ciano added that Italy intended to incorporate in Albania a large portion of northwestern Greece, including the Pindus Mountains. In response to a question by the Reich Foreign Minister he admitted that there were no Albanians living in that area, and that the decision was taken on political grounds. The Italians, moreover, intended to annex the Ionian Islands immediately. The Duce would make up his mind only later about more far-reaching plans with respect to Greece. The Reich Foreign Minister remarked jokingly that these territorial expansions would create a kind of Greater Albania. He added by way of a general observation that he thought it would be advisable to settle matters in such a way as to preclude everywhere the formation of major Irredentist movements and centers of opposition resulting from them. Considering the difficulties usually caused by such movements, it was in most instances more expedient to set new boundaries in such a way as to avoid Irredentist movements.

In conclusion it was noted that Germany and Italy were in agreement about the major outlines of the reorganization of the Yugoslav territory. There were merely some minor differences of opinion about details, with respect to which the Führer's opinion had to be sought. The Reich Foreign Minister and Count Ciano then made provisions for a new conference in the forenoon of the following day, in order to get the Führer's reply.*

SCHMIDT

* See document No. 385.

No. 379

2281/482195-98

Memorandum by the Ambassador to Italy

VIENNA, April 21, 1941.

During my conference with State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker at the Hotel Imperial, I was requested on the telephone this afternoon to call on Count Ciano as soon as possible. I complied with this request and went back without delay to the Grand Hotel. Count Ciano was in a state of considerable agitation and apologized for asking to speak to me at once by pointing out that the Duce, too, was of the opinion that, in the matter on which he wanted to speak to me, I was the best intermediary. The Duce had just called him up—in a manner that was indeed *molto nervoso*—in order to tell him that, according to reports received in Rome, the Greeks had in the course of the day approached the German High Command and asked for an armistice or a capitulation. The Duce had to insist that the Greeks address a similar request also to the Italian High Command, and that it be in writing. He would then be prepared to entertain the idea of an armistice. Count Ciano handed me a paper, in which he had set forth the gist of the telephone call which he had just received.¹

I replied to him that I would relay at once the Duce's worries to the Foreign Minister, who was at present on the Führer's train, with the request that they be reported to the Führer.

From the Foreign Minister's study in the Imperial, I thereupon asked for a telephone connection with the Foreign Minister and presented the matter to him. He stated that at the Führer's headquarters, nothing was known of such occurrences except for certain rumors, at least not to him. He would consult the Führer at once, however, and he asked me to wait on the telephone for the latter's decision.

The Foreign Minister returned to the telephone at once and asked me to tell Count Ciano that only very vague rumors had been received at the Führer's headquarters concerning the events which were apparently involved, as the connection with the headquarters of Field Marshal List was extremely poor; anyway, it extended directly only as far as Salonika, from which place the conversations were transmitted to Larissa. In so far as it was possible to judge matters up to now, the situation had developed from the fact that in the course of the last few hours, parts of an SS formation had come in contact with the Greek troops. The latter did not fight, however, but sent an officer with a flag of truce, who presented the request that Field Marshal List receive a Greek General at head-

¹ This brief statement in Italian is filmed on 2281/482199.

quarters as soon as possible for the purpose of negotiating a surrender. It was not at all known at the Führer's headquarters for what formations the General was speaking, whether for a division, a corps, or even one or several Greek armies. Actually, however, conversations were in progress. Out of regard for the Duce, the Führer had now given the order to let Field Marshal List know that he should request the Greeks to approach the Italians directly.

I replied to the Foreign Minister that such an order did not appear to me to meet entirely the wish of the Duce, since it was evidently the core of his request that he should not receive any communication from the Greeks to the Italian High Command through us, but only directly. I therefore asked that consideration be given as to whether the scope of the Führer's order could not be extended so that Field Marshal List would be instructed not to receive any requests from the Greeks directed toward the Italians or to permit messages [from the Greeks] to come to us regarding the Italians. The Foreign Minister replied that as a result of this he would have to see the Führer once more, but would return to the phone at once.

Instead, the Führer himself came at once and informed me as follows:

As far as the facts in the matter were concerned, several hours ago parts of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler came upon Greek troops who, without fighting, dispatched the bearer of a flag of truce and requested the opportunity for negotiations between a Greek General and the German High Command. The entire matter had, therefore, developed purely out of the combat situation. What units were involved in the Greek request was not even clear in view of the difficulty in communications between Field Marshal List and him. The sooner the negotiations—with respect to which he was not yet able to say either whether the request aimed at a truce, or, as it appeared to do, at a capitulation—were concluded, the better he would like it, for here were involved the lives of German soldiers who should not be exposed to the dangers of war an hour longer than necessary. He was ready, however, to telegraph at once to Field Marshal List that the negotiations in any event should not be brought to a conclusion without the participation of the Italians. He asked me, however, through Ciano, to call the attention of the Duce to the fact that he was not certain whether the order would reach Field Marshal List in time and he thought he could surely expect the Italians to show understanding for the military situation from which such things might result as a matter of course.²

² Cf. the memorandum of Sepp Dietrich, Commander of the SS-Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, and the text of the Greek surrender agreements concluded with Dietrich on Apr. 20 and with the Chief of Staff of the Twelfth Army on Apr. 21 which are printed in Ehrengard Schramm-von Thadden, *Griechenland und die Grossmächte im zweiten Weltkrieg* (Wiesbaden, 1955), pp. 221–225; cf. also the *Halder Diary* entries for Apr. 21 and Apr. 22.

I thereupon called again on Count Ciano who thanked me warmly for my communications and transmitted them at once to the Duce. The telephone connection with Rome during this conversation was such that, though the Duce could understand Ciano's communications, the latter could not hear the answer clearly from Rome.

Half an hour later, and at a time when the Foreign Minister had already left the Führer's train in order to return to Vienna, Minister Hewel called me up by instruction of the Führer and asked me to word my communications to Ciano somewhat differently; he could be told that the Führer had given Field Marshal List the order at all events to incorporate in the agreement, even in case it had been signed in the meantime, a supplementary clause that made the entry into force of the agreement contingent upon ratification by the Führer. This would give us time to include the Italians in the event this order could be put through in time, which, however, was by no means certain.

I replied to Herr Hewel that I had already carried out the Führer's instruction with Count Ciano, who had in turn at once communicated it to the Duce. Nevertheless, I would also inform him of the modification of the Führer's order to Field Marshal List.

On return to the Grand Hotel I requested Ambassador Alfieri—since Count Ciano was just then in the bathtub—to transmit to his chief the last communication of the Führer.

MACKENSEN

VIENNA, April 22, 1941.

On instruction of the Foreign Minister, I was informed this morning by Minister von Rintelen that the Führer had during the night ordered General of Artillery Jodl to be sent by plane to Larissa in the early morning hours in order to conduct the negotiations on the spot. No new reports concerning their progress had thus far been received at the Führer's headquarters.

Immediately thereafter I heard from Italian quarters that Military Attaché General Marras had joined the party of Artillery General Jodl.³

MACKENSEN

³ See, further, document No. 409, enclosure.

No. 380

3784/E042150

*The Foreign Ministry to the High Command of the Wehrmacht¹
and to the Ministry of Transportation*

Ha. Pol. Va. 903

APRIL 21, 1941.

The Deputy People's Commissar for External Trade of the USSR, Krutikov, who is currently in Berlin, complained to me that Germany did not provide enough rolling stock for transporting the goods delivered by the Soviet Union from the German-Soviet border. The Soviet Union, as a result of measures taken by domestic Soviet authorities, is in a position to carry out big shipments to Germany precisely during these weeks. This breaks down, unfortunately, because of the transport difficulties existing on the German side. This applies to all transport routes employed at the present time, the Black Sea-Danube route as well as shipments by land.

The Soviet delivery program for the month of April has scheduled shipment of about 200,000 tons of grain, 91,000 tons of petroleum products, and 20,000 tons of manganese ore, as well as substantial quantities of phosphates, nonferrous metals, etc. M. Krutikov mentioned the possibility of increasing these quantities. I would ask that everything be done also from your end to overcome the transport difficulties affecting the transfer of Soviet raw materials.

M. Krutikov moreover complained that not enough freight cars are being made available for the transport of German deliveries to the Soviet Union.

By order:
SCHNURRE

¹ At the OKW the communication was marked for the attention of Colonel Becker of the War Economy and Armaments Office.

No. 381

104/113335-36

The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, April 22, 1941—12:05 a. m.

No. 957 of April 21

Received April 22—3:30 a. m.

The Secretary General of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs¹ summoned me to his office today and delivered to me a note verbale, in which the urgent request is again made that we take measures

¹ Arkady Sobolev.

against continuing violations of the boundary of the USSR by German planes. Violations had increased considerably of late. From March 27 to April 18, 80 such cases had occurred. The note verbale, to which is attached a detailed statement of the 80 cases mentioned, refers to the case of a plane that landed near Rovno on April 15, in which were found a camera, some rolls of exposed film, and a torn topographical map of the districts of the USSR, all of which gives evidence of the purpose of the crew of this airplane.

The note verbale continues verbatim as follows:

"Consequently the People's Commissariat deems it necessary to remind the German Embassy of the statement that was made on March 28, 1940, by the Assistant Military Attaché of the Embassy of the USSR in Berlin to Reichsmarschall Göring, according to which the People's Commissar for Defense of the USSR made an exception to the very strict measures for the protection of the Soviet border and gave the border troops the order not to fire on the German planes flying over Soviet territory so long as such flights do not occur frequently."

At the end, the note verbale again emphasizes particularly the expectation of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that the German Government will take all the measures necessary in order in future to prevent violation of the national boundaries of the USSR by German planes.

The Secretary General asked me to transmit this to Berlin, which I promised to do.

In view of the fact that the Soviet note verbale refers to previous memoranda on similar border violations by German airplanes, and also reminds us of the statement of the Assistant Military Attaché it is very likely that serious incidents are to be expected if German planes continue to fly across the Soviet border.

TIPPELSKIRCH

No. 382

222/149539

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1092 of April 22

BUCHAREST, April 22, 1941—6:30 p. m.

Received April 22—7:25 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1075 of April 21.¹

1. No discussions of any kind about the future of the Serbian Banat have been held by the Legation with Rumanian Government

¹ Document No. 376.

authorities. I had even protested against articles in the press intended to create sentiment in favor of having the Banat awarded to Rumania, and had their transmission prohibited.

2. The fact that hopes for gaining the Serbian Banat were increasingly expressed in Rumanian governmental circles may also have something to do with the Rumanophile attitude lately displayed in Italian journalistic circles and especially by the Stefani correspondents who have termed the sentiment in favor of annexation of the Banat by Rumania a self-evident solution. It is difficult to judge to what extent these tactics are being encouraged by the Italian Legation here. In any case, the Italian Military and Air Attachés also have expressed themselves clearly to this effect toward foreigners and Germans.

I believe that what is involved here is an effort by the Italians at our expense to improve their badly weakened position in matters of sentiment in Rumania, even though this is perhaps not to be attributed to instructions from Rome. I have been told that Italians in Budapest are pursuing a pointedly pro-Hungarian course.

VON KILLINGER

No. 383

1448/365377-78

The Foreign Ministry to the Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union

Pol. V 199 g. Rs.

BERLIN, April 22, 1941.

For your exclusively personal information.

It has been learned from a reliable, strictly secret source that the British Ambassador in Moscow¹ wrote a personal letter to Deputy Foreign Commissar Vyshinsky on the 11th of this month,² the substance of which is given as follows:

Cripps begins by outlining the efforts of Great Britain immediately following the collapse of France, which were aimed at getting the Soviet Union to take the initiative in forming a bloc of Balkan States in order to prevent a German invasion. As these efforts had failed and also the attempts of the Soviet Government to bring Bulgaria around to its side by promises of territory at the expense of her neighbors, there had resulted the present state of affairs in the Balkans, which was a direct threat to the security of the Soviet Union. Should the Germans remain in the Balkans, it is obvious that they would turn on the Soviet Union. It was therefore high time for the Soviet Union to take the initiative for military measures against

¹ Sir Stafford Cripps.

² Cf. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, pp. 358-359; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 163-165.

Germany, possibly in concert with Turkey. In this case Germany would have three fronts. If this were not done, however, and the war in the Balkans were to result in occupation by Germany, the initiative would pass to Germany and the Soviet Union would be compelled to meet the whole impact of German power under much more adverse conditions.

In view of the source, this information cannot be passed on in any circumstances.³

By order:
WOERMANN

³ In an instruction of Apr. 7 to Schulenburg (1448/365324-26) Woermann had described the communications between Cripps and Vyshinsky at the end of March as learned from the same secret source.

No. 384

116/66782-83

*The Director of the Personnel and Administrative Department to the
Special Train*

Teletype

BERLIN, April 22, 1941.

With reference to your teletype message No. 280 of April 21.¹

On the day of his departure Minister Kasche not only consulted the State Secretary but, upon my suggestion, also the Director of the Political Department. In addition, Kasche obtained information from the Protocol Department about matters of protocol.

SCHROEDER

Addendum by the State Secretary: I was able to see Kasche, who was in a great hurry, only briefly before he departed, but I gave him the following policy instructions orally:

Subject to such instructions as he would receive from the Foreign Minister or from the Führer himself, I said that I wanted to draw his attention to a single though important point. It was in the nature of things that the Croats and Italians would not get along well with each other. It was therefore certain that the Croats would come to Kasche, as he was the German Minister, and attempt to make him the arbiter in their disputes between Italians and Croatsians. As long as the war continued we would absolutely have to spare Italian sensibilities. If we therefore should become involved in deciding disputes between the Italians and the Croats, we would in each instance

¹ This message from Sonnleithner (116/66781) transmitted Ribbentrop's request for an explanation why Kasche had not been asked to consult the Political Department prior to making his speech upon presenting his credentials.

have to decide in favor of the Italians. As a result the Croats would be disgruntled; and there was no reason whatever why we should take this burden upon our shoulders. Therefore Kasche should keep hands off these matters and let Italian hegemony in Croatia prevail to the extent that this was in harmony with our own interests.

As far as I know Kasche has received similar instructions at [the Führer's] headquarters. As regards Italy's most recent demands regarding Croatia, Kasche, to be sure, no more than the Foreign Ministry, had any knowledge of them at the time he made his speech.² For he presented his credentials at the same time that Count Ciano set forth the Italian plans to the Foreign Minister.³ WEIZSÄCKER.

² See footnote 1; the text of this speech delivered by Kasche on Apr. 21 is filmed on 245/161789-90.

³ See documents Nos. 378 and 385.

No. 385

F15/056-45

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RAM 24

VIENNA, April 22, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND COUNT CIANO AT THE HOTEL IMPERIAL IN VIENNA, ON APRIL 22, 1941

The Reich Foreign Minister opened the conversation with the announcement that he had reported to the Führer about yesterday's conversation with Count Ciano and the views held by the Duce on the questions now under discussion regarding the future organization of the Yugoslav territory.¹ The Führer had taken the following position on this subject:

Croatia: The Führer had already determined the boundary between Croatia and Germany. It would be arranged with the Croatian Government in a definitive way at a suitable occasion. For the duration of the occupation of Serbia by German troops, Germany would also maintain occupation of a strip of Croatia running from northwest to southeast in order to safeguard her railroad communications with Serbia. Referring to the fact that a line of demarcation was already in existence,² the Reich Foreign Minister stated that the details of the occupation would be settled upon between the German and Italian military authorities.

¹ See document No. 378.

² There is in the files the undated draft of a teletype from Kramarz to Ritter (230/153122-23) describing the line of demarcation between the German and Italian armed forces on Yugoslav territory on the basis of a reply by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff to an inquiry of General Rintelen.

Germany was in principle politically disinterested in Croatian questions. The Führer therefore saw no occasion for taking a position regarding these questions, but instead would leave it entirely to the Duce to make whatever political decisions in these matters that he wished, and to come to terms with the Croats directly.

With Germany politically disinterested in Croatia, it was for the Reich merely a matter of incorporating the Germans living in the northwest [of Yugoslavia]. That matter had already been taken care of as the determination of the boundary had taken place.

Germany had furthermore economic interests. As a result of her military intervention, it was to be expected that the large Yugoslav economic area, an important source of supplies for Germany, would be unavailable for a while. It would take a long time before order would be restored there. Economically speaking, therefore, the Balkan campaign presented great difficulties for Germany's supply in raw materials and the importation of grain from the Bačka and the Banat, where destruction had been extensive. In these circumstances the Führer, as said before, was interested in two things in that territory: 1) reincorporating the German areas in the Reich, which had already been accomplished by law, and 2) safeguarding for the Reich the chromium and lead mines on the Ljuboten in Macedonia, and the lead deposits in Mitrovica; in the case of Bulgaria the ore mines on the Ljuboten mountain would be made into a kind of German enterprise, on the basis of clear agreements, while in the case of the lead deposits of Mitrovica, where mining operations had yet to be developed, a similar condition would have to be imposed on the Serbs.

It now was a matter of accommodating the Duce's wishes based on ethnographic considerations regarding the Albanian-Macedonian border and simultaneously of seeking a way to secure the German economic interests referred to. The result was the new German proposal which the Reich Foreign Minister presented subsequently in the form of a map with the boundary lines indicated.³ It would then be necessary for him (the Reich Foreign Minister) to speak to the Bulgarians and make them understand that the wishes advanced by Italy made certain cessions necessary in the western part of Macedonia.

The Reich Foreign Minister asked Count Ciano to tell the Duce that the Führer would like to have these matters settled in this way, i.e., the German areas would revert to the Reich, and the mines which fell to Bulgaria and those which remained within Serbia would be at the disposal of the Reich. The other problems—Montenegro, Croatia, Dalmatia, the strip of Greece that was to go to Albania—

³ Not found. See, however, document No. 398, footnote 1.

were matters in which Germany was politically disinterested and which the Führer felt should be left for the Duce to settle as he saw fit.

Following up a remark made in the first conversation with Count Ciano, the Reich Foreign Minister added a general comment concerning Croatia and Greece, which he himself characterized as academic: It was always expedient to arrange things so that the worst hardships would be avoided. That was important with a view to a future understanding between the nations concerned and the Axis Powers, and it always paid off in politics.

Finally the Reich Foreign Minister took up the subject of the supplying of Dalmatian bauxite to Germany. Germany was greatly in need of that raw material and had imported large quantities from Yugoslavia. It was the Führer's wish that Italy not subject these deliveries for Germany to conditions that would be worse than those extended by Yugoslavia in the past; that is, Germany wanted to retain approximately the same position as heretofore in Yugoslavia with respect to her bauxite imports. The details would have to be discussed by the economic experts.

Count Ciano concurred immediately and without qualification in this and in the other wishes set forth by the Reich Foreign Minister. The Führer had taken his position, and that settled these matters.

In the further course of the conversation, Count Ciano asked what the procedure for further negotiations with the Croats should be. The Reich Foreign Minister said that in his opinion it would be best if Pavelić went to Rome first. The Reich Foreign Minister had been approached by the Croatian circles collaborating with Veessenmayer regarding Pavelić's wish to be received by him. But it would be better if Pavelić went to Rome first.

In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister related Veessenmayer's activities in Croatia, among others the saving of two bridges over the Sava river, which were to have been blown up, and the radio proclamation prior to the entry of German troops. Veessenmayer had not only fanned the Croatian opposition against Maček and other leaders, but he had also induced General Kvaternik to hasten proclamation of Croatia's independence; by broadcasting it over the radio, he had caused the Croatian troops to lay down their arms.

Ciano was visibly pleased with the Reich Foreign Minister's statements regarding Pavelić's visit to Rome. He also thanked him for the accommodation shown by Germany in dealing with the other Italian wishes. He was evidently satisfied and also seemed to be very much in accord with the solutions which Germany proposed for these questions.

In the further course of the conversation the Reich Foreign Minister also turned to the wish expressed to the Führer by King Boris regarding the cession of Salonika to Bulgaria. Ciano replied at this point with a certain vigor that he could not say anything on this matter. The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the Führer had not made any definite promises to King Boris. He had told him that decisions on these questions could not be taken until the end of the war. Here the Führer shared the Duce's view as presented by Count Ciano, that the whole complex of questions relating to Greece should not be settled by the Führer and the Duce until the end of the war.

King Boris probably had been prompted to put forward his demand when he learned that the cession of Salonika had been promised to Yugoslavia.⁴ Moreover, he had very strongly pressed for the inclusion of Salonika in Macedonia, stressing that the Salonika area and Macedonia formed a natural entity and that the one could practically not exist without the other. The Reich Foreign Minister added that he personally thought that the Führer was not unsympathetic to King Boris' wish, although he had told him that this question could not be settled until later. The Reich Foreign Minister asked Count Ciano to report to the Duce that the Reich Foreign Minister had the impression that the Führer sympathized with the Bulgarian request.

These statements apparently convinced Count Ciano, for in contrast to the doubts he had voiced before, he characterized the new boundary resulting from Salonika's inclusion in Macedonia as entirely "logical." He added that this logic, to be sure, would also have to be applied to Greece, making a gesture as if he were taking possession of Greece.

Subsequently he asked the Reich Foreign Minister by what act Italy should determine the Dalmatian boundary. He thought that the boundary could be established by a law, just as Germany had determined her own boundary with Croatia. When the Reich Foreign Minister asked whether the ethnographic basis for such a method of determining the boundary was similar to that present in those parts of Croatia which were inhabited by Germans and had been incorporated into the Reich, Count Ciano answered that Dalmatia belonged to Italy by virtue of her history, culture, and language. The towns were Italian, to be sure, but the countryside was entirely Croatian. Hence the annexation of Dalmatia could not be justified on ethnographic grounds. In support of her demand, Italy therefore asserted the argument of Lebensraum and reasons of political and

⁴ See document No. 205.

military necessity. The Reich Foreign Minister replied that in the cases where the Führer had fixed boundaries by law, as in the Sudetenland, Alsace-Lorraine, Danzig, and Memel, the territories in question had been thoroughly German for generations and were inhabited by Germans. Ciano interjected at this point that Alsace was after all inhabited also by people of different ethnic origin; to which the Reich Foreign Minister replied that these were only an infinitesimal minority in Lorraine. Count Ciano broke off the discussion on this subject with the remark that he would talk these matters over with Pavelić.

Next he asked by what procedure the boundary with Bulgaria was to be established. The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he would take it upon himself to talk to the Bulgarians and explain to them that because of Italy's wishes they would have to be satisfied with a less favorable boundary. From the propagandistic viewpoint he thought it desirable to deal with the boundary question without too much fanfare, because the enemy propaganda might exploit it under the heading of dismemberment of small states by the Axis. For this reason he had indeed suggested that Count Ciano's visit be considered as an unofficial one. He wanted to bring about the establishment of the new boundaries as quietly as possible. Without taking a final position on the matters for the time being, he wondered whether the Bulgarians ought not simply by themselves to determine the new frontier. Count Ciano expressed the concern that in that case strong opposition against Bulgaria might develop among the Albanian circles involved, so that perhaps the Axis Powers in one form or another ought to back the determination of this boundary.

The Reich Foreign Minister promised Count Ciano that he would soon make a proposal on the method of procedure to be followed in establishing the boundary.

At the end the Reich Foreign Minister presented to Count Ciano a memorandum containing a formula for the safeguarding of the German economic interests in the new territories falling to Italy.⁵

It was agreed that after Ciano's departure a brief press communiqué would be issued about the visit, which would be picked up subsequently by the official Italian agency.⁶

SCHMIDT

⁵ Not found.

⁶ For Ciano's record of this conversation, see *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 654-656.

No. 386

136/74840-46

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Cipher Letter

URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 2063 g.

MADRID, April 22, 1941.

Pol. III 1985 g.

Secret for officer in charge.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

The domestic political situation in Spain has, as expected and as continually reported,¹ grown more and more acute. The general dissatisfaction with the Government, which is being reproached for failure in all fields, is growing. The reproaches are in part fully justified. The failure is to be attributed above all to the lack of markedly superior leadership, inconsistent economic policy (the Minister of Commerce and the Minister of Finance represent completely different economic concepts), the inability of the Government to actually carry out laws and regulations that have been enacted, failure and mismanagement in the party, and corruption and general lack of discipline. It must, to be sure, be admitted that the disastrous economic situation and the famine were brought about or greatly accentuated, independently of the present mismanagement, by the impoverishment of the country through the Civil War and the destruction of normal commercial relations through the new war, by bad harvests, and English harassments.

The antagonism between the Government and the opposition is greater than ever. More and more dissatisfied elements, who until now were devoted to the new regime, are joining up with the former Reds. Criticism of the Government is especially sharp among the military men, who won the Civil War but see themselves cheated out of the improvement of the country's situation which was promised and hoped for. They, as well as the great majority of the country, place the main blame on the former Minister of Interior, and now Foreign Minister, Serrano Suñer. This man who, considering Spanish conditions, certainly has a superior mind is being made responsible for all of the Government's mistakes, since, as brother-in-law of the Generalissimo, as Foreign Minister, as chief of the Government and party press, Secretary General of the Falange, and Chairman of the National Council, he wields the greatest power and is actually also by far the most active member of the Spanish Government. His influence in the Government is, however, in many regards

¹ See document No. 21.

not by any means so great as is believed, because a number of ministers are working against him and Franco cannot make up his mind to let him have a free hand. The feeling of the military men and other circles against Serrano Suñer, which can actually be characterized as hatred, is being intensified by his frequent failures with regard to the psychological treatment of the masses as well as of the individual, and by his harsh nature, which is receptive to dubious information and which displays extreme distrust. In the conflict between Serrano Suñer and the generals, who are closing ranks more and more against him, the domestic political problem is now coming to a head.

Franco, isolated and undecided, can only with difficulty be moved to make decisions; he personally attends to many details with respect to which he makes decisions that often contradict the policies approved by him in general. There is increasing criticism that Franco sees fewer and fewer people and does not allow himself to be advised even by old friends. Although he has found himself in opposition to the Foreign Minister, more than is known, through the postponement of unpleasant decisions and the failure to approve the plans and intentions of Serrano Suñer, he does, however, stubbornly stick by him since he cannot get along without the latter's keen mind. In this way the antagonism between Franco and the military men, who are quite upset over the removal of deserving generals from their offices and are demanding the dismissal of Serrano Suñer, is assuming serious proportions. A coup d'état in the form of an ultimatum to Franco is possible at any time. In addition, there is the monarchical movement, greatly strengthened since the abdication and death of Alfonso XIII, which has its strongest supporters among the leaders of the Army, among the nobility, and in industry and commerce. Even circles essentially nonmonarchical which are looking for a way out because of the failure of the present regime see a possibility of salvation in the restoration of the monarchy. Monarchists of the Juanist movement which, at the present time, is the only one in the foreground, are endeavoring to win our interest. Don Juan is said to have promised in Berlin to adopt a thoroughly pro-German policy.²

These conditions provide the most fertile soil for the propaganda of the Spanish Reds and the English. Both are zealously preparing the overthrow of the regime. England's chief weapon is the strangulation of the importation of foodstuffs and raw materials by means of a blockade to enable her to regulate the economic distress and the social discontent to suit herself. The starving population is being stirred up by the slander, readily believed in view of our influence

² See document No. 360.

in Spain, that the economic distress is caused by the shipment of necessary foodstuffs and raw materials to Germany and Italy. In this way the atmosphere is worsened for us in spite of the excellent press.

The famine may, however, have reached its zenith for the time being in February and March. As a result of the economic agreements which were concluded by the Spanish Government with Argentina and England³ and the present relaxation of the blockade by England, a certain alleviation of the food situation is beginning to make itself felt. If the English do not tighten the blockade the food situation might experience a gradual, perceptible improvement from May to the end of June and the beginning of July, i.e. to the beginning of the new harvest, which was delayed this year by weather conditions. Then the food supply will be fully assured for a few months and, if the excessive domestic political pressure does not lead to an explosion before that, the domestic political situation will be considerably alleviated.

In the field of foreign policy, the continual aggravation of the economic and hence the domestic political situation of Spain and the Government's fear of responsibility led, at the beginning of the year, to Spain's backing out in the manner known to us. Franco failed to recognize the historic hour and was unable to make a decision. The principal fault lies with the Caudillo's deficient leadership quality. Foreign Minister Serrano Suñer saw clearest of all; he recommended Spain's immediate entry into the war. He did this, not out of friendship for Germany, but in recognition of the need for Spain's future and above all for the purpose of safeguarding the regime and his own position. The military men cast their vote against war chiefly because of economic worries, less because of deficient military preparation. Their strong opposition to Serrano Suñer certainly played a great role in this, too.

In both camps sober after-thoughts have now set in. A few days ago General Aranda, the most energetic representative of the military party, declared to the Military Attaché⁴ that Spain certainly had to take part in the war—to be sure, not without military, and especially economic, preparation—as Serrano Suñer had thoughtlessly recommended at the beginning of the year. The military thus desire without a doubt the continuation of military and economic preparations for entry into the war and (clear text apparently missing) sea communications. They blame us, however, for not support-

³ For the agreement with Great Britain, see document No. 355; the agreement with Argentina, which was concluded on Feb. 8, was reported in Madrid telegram No. 509 of Feb. 10 (136/74666-67).

⁴ Col. W. Bruns.

ing their war preparations sufficiently with deliveries of military material.

The position of the Foreign Minister is clear from his speech at the opening of the press exhibit in Madrid and his obviously quite deliberate statements made to Minister Schmidt, which were intended for the Reich Foreign Minister.⁵ Their quintessence is this: Spain's future depends upon whether she participates in the war; only if she does so can she participate in the new order in Europe and in the world and further her imperialist aims. Spain is ready to enter the war as soon as the food situation is improved and the Spanish people are adequately prepared.

Although I have avoided, on instructions,⁶ touching further on the question of Spain's entry into the war since Franco refused, in January, to enter the war immediately, the Foreign Minister has also given me to understand on different occasions that he intends to stick to his policy. He also assured the Italian Ambassador⁷ of this again a few days ago adding that any closing of the Suez Canal would make Spain's entry into the war absolutely necessary.

Since Hendaye, the Foreign Minister has not again brought up with me the question of how far we intend to support Spanish aspirations in North Africa.

It may consequently be asserted that both the Foreign Minister and the generals' party consider Spain's entry into the war necessary and are contemplating it. For both parties the condition is: safeguarding of the food supply, promotion of the military preparedness of the people as far as possible. If these conditions are met, as they may be, if we fulfill certain military wishes of Spain, on about July 1 the entry of Spain into the war must be expected even without any influence from us, though it is naturally contingent upon the entire war situation. How far a uniform decision is possible, however, while the antagonism between Serrano Suñer and the generals remains unsettled, cannot be anticipated. At present the generals say that they will not enter the war with Serrano Suñer; Serrano Suñer, on the other hand, intends to keep on removing insubordinate generals.

If Spain enters the war, our interest demands that she do this at the right time and be prepared.

From these circumstances the following basic questions present themselves for us:

- (1) Is Spain's entry into the war still of any value to us?
- (2) Do we wish to influence Spain's decision, especially with regard to the date of her entry into war?

⁵ In telegram No. 980 of Mar. 12 (136/74756), Stohrer reported this remark by Suñer expressing the Government's firm determination to enter the war.

⁶ Document No. 73.

⁷ Francesco Lequio.

In case of an affirmative answer to the preceding two questions we will have to decide, in view of the confused internal political conditions in Spain described above, whether we wish to continue the policy followed thus far of noninterference in Spanish internal affairs and disinterest ourselves, so to speak, in Spain's future domestic political development or, whether we should decide to influence this development. In the latter case there are various ways:

(a) We can support the Spanish Foreign Minister against the generals and can try to strengthen his position as much as possible in other respects too. Serrano Suñer has so far doubtless been the strongest advocate of our point of view, but in Spain he is the most hated man and his position is thus weak, except with Franco. His political views are not always clear and straightforward; deep down he is no friend of the Germans, but he is clever enough and prepared to subordinate his feelings to the clearly recognized political needs of his country and of himself.

(b) We can help the generals to come into power. The generals are all friendly to the Germans (except, perhaps, for the present War Minister, Varela), mostly energetic, competent, aggressive, but not too well educated politically. The formation of a military cabinet would represent an important step toward the restoration of the monarchy, because the generals are monarchists almost without exception and to some extent even now inclined to create a transition period by means of a regency. In this case we would therefore have to make up our mind about our attitude regarding a possible restoration.

(c) We can try to achieve a truce between the two opponents. The difficulties here are very great. The main reasons are: Serrano Suñer's distrust and thirst for power, the intransigence and ambition of the generals.

If we still consider Spain's entry into the war important, in view of the attitude of the U.S.A. and the possible developments in the Mediterranean, Portugal, and North Africa, and if we wish to prevent entry at the wrong moment, we will have to take a position regarding these questions. Our influence in Spain makes it entirely feasible to try *all* three possibilities; relations with the Foreign Minister are good and trusting. Because of his strongly pronounced distrust, too close relations with the military party have been avoided, although indirect contact is being kept with it continuously.

Please send instructions.⁸

A detailed report concerning conditions in the separate parts of the country will follow.⁹

STOHRER

⁸ See document No. 492.

⁹ Report of May 9 (4865/E248901-18).

[EDITORS' NOTE. The communication from the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry dated April 23, and

containing reports of border violations by Soviet planes, published in Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941*, edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), page 329, was, along with a number of similar communications, published as part of the documentation accompanying Hitler's Proclamation to the German People of June 22, 1941, and the Note of the Foreign Ministry to the Soviet Government, dated June 21, 1941, also published on June 22. On these, see the Editor's Note on page 1073.]

No. 387

222/149545-48

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, April 23, 1941.

This afternoon Consul General Windecker,¹ who had just arrived from Bucharest, delivered

1. A memorandum of the Rumanian Government² (single copy), regarding Rumanian proposals for a reorganization of the Balkans on the basis of Rumania's interests, with seven single-copy enclosures (one of which was obviously incomplete).³

2. A letter of transmittal by the German Minister in Bucharest to the Foreign Minister (through the State Secretary) attached to this memorandum as enclosure.

The main outlines of the 7½-page memorandum of the Rumanian Government are as follows:

While Hungary and Bulgaria have received considerable enlargements of their territories as a result of conditions which have developed, General Antonescu, being a soldier, at first had not wanted to advance Rumanian territorial claims so long as he could not fight to enforce them. Because of the economic assistance rendered by Rumania during the operation of the Axis Powers, however, the Rumanian Government now believes it can state its views on the forthcoming territorial changes. A supremacy of Bulgaria, and thus of the Slavs in the Balkans, is not in the interest of a racial equilibrium in that region. Likewise the aggrandizement of Hungary upsets the regional balance in the Balkans. Moreover, the Banat, Southern Dobruja, and a compact area in the Balkans from Timok to Bitolj and Salonika are ethnically Rumanian. As a result of the new territorial arrangement in favor of Bulgaria, 600,000 Rumanians would be placed in a position that would make it impossible for them to maintain their national rights.

The weakening of Rumania at the expense of [sic] Hungary and Bulgaria complicates the situation of the Rumanian Government. General Antonescu has told the Rumanian nation that he has full

¹ Adolf Windecker, temporarily assigned to the Legation in Rumania.

² Not printed (222/149711-19).

³ None printed (222/149720-65).

confidence in the Führer's sense of justice. At a moment in which public opinion had turned toward him (Antonescu) completely, he receives a severe blow through the support given to Hungary and Bulgaria at the expense of Rumania, despite the fact that the sacrifices made by Rumania and her role with respect to Russia had given this state justification to entertain hopes. The position of the Government must be supported.

As a solution the Rumanian Government proposes:

1. The revision of all boundaries in southeastern Europe with respect to all countries whose territories were enlarged in 1940-41, since the political equilibrium in the Balkans had changed as a result of the latest events.

2. Rumania was making claim to the Serbian Banat.

3. Rumania wishes a free Macedonia, with the inclusion of the Rumanian national group, or the promise of a Rumanian area for the Rumanian population in the Timok and Vardar valleys, or a German-Rumanian-Italian "condominium" for the Timok region (possibly with Bulgarian participation).

In this way the Serbian national community would be separated from the Bulgarian, and the road from Belgrade to Salonika protected.

In any case Rumania insists on her rights to the Southern Dobruja since Bulgaria is gaining an important seacoast.

In conclusion General Antonescu and the Rumanian Government ask the Reich Foreign Minister to present this point of view which has already been presented orally by Antonescu. General Antonescu requests the German Minister in Bucharest to see to it that he be informed concerning the progress of the matter. In the event that a conference is planned, Antonescu requests that he be enabled to present the Rumanian point of view through direct consultation, possibly directly to the Führer.

The enclosures contain:

1. A statement regarding the Banat, in which the latter is described as a geographic, ethnic, historic, and economic unit, which in 1919 should have been awarded in its entirety to Rumania.

2. Historic data concerning the Macedonian-Rumanians ("Aromanians") (the population of allegedly 630,000 souls in Macedonia, Epirus, Thessaly, and Albania, called "Kutzo-Walachians" by the Greeks).

3. A compilation concerning the question of the Macedonian-Rumanians in political documents.

- 4., 5., and 6. Memorandum of a delegation of priests, teachers, and peasants, as representatives of the Rumanians in the Banat.

7. A list of the police office of Timișoara containing the names of 80 Rumanian nationals in the Yugoslav Banat who requested the entry of the Rumanian Army into the Banat.

Herewith most dutifully submitted to the State Secretary.

V[ELHAGEN]

[Enclosure]

German Legation,
BUCHAREST, April 23, 1941.

To the attention of the Foreign Minister through State Secretary von Weizsäcker.

Enclosed I am transmitting a memorandum of the Rumanian Government which was handed to me by General Antonescu with the request that it be brought as quickly as possible to the attention of the Führer through the Foreign Minister.

I have never discussed the question of an enlargement of Rumania's territory after the crushing of Yugoslavia and Greece. However, I have anticipated the step taken by General Antonescu of asserting his claims, and my latest telegrams in this matter refer to it.⁴ Since, according to the reports available to the Rumanian Government, Hungary and Bulgaria are considerably enlarging their territories, General Antonescu's step had to be taken automatically primarily in order to strengthen his position as Leader of the State.

As I have already mentioned in my latest telegrams, a foreign policy success in this respect would strengthen the position of General Antonescu.

From a conversation with the Italian Minister, Ghigi, yesterday it appeared that General Antonescu would probably take the same step with the Italian Government.

V. KILLINGER

⁴ In telegram No. 1091 of Apr. 22 (222/149537-38) Killinger had reported that Mihai Antonescu in a conversation had raised the question of presumable territorial gains by Bulgaria and Italy and had announced that a statement of the Rumanian position was about to be presented. See also documents Nos. 376 and 382.

No. 388

245/181798

Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Croatia

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 293 of April 23 from

the Special Train

No. 346 of April 23

from the Foreign Ministry

SPECIAL TRAIN, April 23, 1941—6:00 p. m.

Received Berlin, April 23—6:25 p. m.

Sent April 23.

For your information.

When Minister Kasche was in Vienna, the plan was to withdraw German troops from the territory of the Croatian State as early as possible. Meanwhile it has been decided that the Croatian territory

is to remain under military occupation for the time being. The line of occupation for German troops was fixed as follows: Zagreb-Banja Luka-Sarajevo, with all of these points inclusive to the German zone of occupation. From Sarajevo onward the occupation line runs in the direction of Rudo.

RITTER

No. 389

116/66784-85

The Legation in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 105 of April 23

ZAGREB, April 23, 1941.

Received April 23—7:15 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Pavelić, with whom I had frequent conversations in the last few days, urgently requested that the Reich Government at an early date determine the definitive boundaries of Croatia with Germany, Hungary, Rumania, and Serbia. Further consolidation substantially depended upon this condition.

With regard to Dalmatia on the other hand, he saw no cause to be in a hurry. On the contrary, he was passing the word on to all his representatives in Dalmatia in all seriousness that they might have to expect a lapse of as much as 2 years before this question would be settled satisfactorily. He had reason to fear that if the boundary were determined in a great hurry, Italy would make very great demands. On the other hand, he knew that time was on the side of Croatia, especially since the morale and discipline of the Italian occupation troops were very bad and their subversion from within was continuing rapidly, in part with Communist overtones. Therefore he would rather assume all the risks and complications arising from the present situation; he absolutely wants to avoid having to give up all or part of Dalmatia either now or tomorrow.

The numerous reports about the conduct of the Italian occupation troops are conflicting; some [speak of] brutality, others of correct conduct; of promises and enticements in one place, more or less veiled threats in another. Apparently there is a complete lack of any clear directive from Rome. The only consistent factor is the uniform hostility of the entire population and their feeling that soon the people will become strong enough to throw the Italian troops out of Dalmatia in short order. For the moment the Dalmatians maintain good discipline, presumably because they are hoping that Pavelić will act when the time is ripe. Pavelić is a steady and methodical worker who does not allow himself to be unnerved, and this adds to

his authority, despite numerous existing and mounting difficulties, especially as regards economic matters.¹

VEESENMAYER
KASCHÉ

¹ Marginal notes:

"[For] F[ührer]."

"Shown to the Führer. Hewel, Apr. 25."

No. 390

205/142667

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

STOCKHOLM, April 23, 1941—9:55 p. m.

No. 433 of April 23

Received April 14 [24]—2:30 a. m.

For the OKW and the OKH Attaché Section.

On April 23 the Military Attaché¹ had a discussion with Colonel Kellgren, Chief of the National Defense Staff [*Chef des Landesverteidigungsstabs*].² The latter assured him that in case of a renewed Russian attack on Finland, Sweden would give active aid to Finland.

The entire Swedish nation would go along enthusiastically. In this Sweden hoped for German agreement. The Russian Military Attaché³ had made an appointment for the afternoon with Kellgren in order to discuss the general "political situation." In this connection Kellgren stated that in case of a possible German-Russian conflict, Swedish participation would be much more difficult from the domestic point of view—though "not impossible," as he *expressly emphasized*—than in case of a Russian attack on Finland. The Military Attaché refrained from expressing an opinion.

Kellgren characterized General Rappe as next year's successor to Thörnell as Commander in Chief. It had been necessary to put him in isolation at this time as artillery inspector because he was too active for the Government in preparing to fight against Russia and was thus inconvenient. According to the observation of the Military Attaché the Swedish officers' corps is working intensively on the question of a German-Russian conflict and the Swedish attitude to-

¹ Maj. Gen. B. v. Uthmann.

² Use of this term to describe Kellgren's office gives an inaccurate impression of the position which he held in the Swedish military establishment. His post was "chef för lantförsvarets kommandoexpedition" and as such he was head of the office for liaison with foreign Military Attachés. Regarding Colonel Kellgren's relations with the German Military Attaché, see the Swedish Government's publication *Förbindelserna mellan chefen för lantförsvarets kommandoexpedition och tyske militärattachén i Stockholm* (Stockholm, 1946).

³ N. Nikitouchév.

ward it. The majority, including the General Staff, are planning armament preparations. Rappe considers that it would not be possible for Sweden to stay out in such an event. The Government is hesitating.⁴

WIED

⁴ Weizsäcker's comments on this telegram appear in his minute of Apr. 24 (document No. 397).

No. 391

B13/B001741

Memorandum by the State Secretary

BERLIN, April 23, 1941.

When Ambassador Alfieri pressed me for an answer on Monday afternoon, April 21, I gave him to understand, in friendly but clear terms, that it was not the business of the Reich Government to force upon the Croatian Government a new settlement by which the Italian sovereign would also wear the Crown of Croatia. We were taking the very accommodating position that we would approve whatever friendly settlement between Croatia and Italy was reached. No reservation was thereby implied. On the contrary, we loyally supported Italy's aspirations, without, however, promoting them ourselves.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 392

73/53256-57

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Hungary

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SPECIAL TRAIN, April 23, 1941—10:55 p. m.

No. 303 from the

Special Train¹

Received Berlin, April 23—11:25 p. m.

No. 702 from the

Foreign Ministry

Sent April 24.

Secret classification for top secret material. For Chief of Mission personally.

Minister Sztójay whom I received yesterday upon his return from Budapest told me that the Regent had been horrified over the shooting of Volksdeutsche by Hungarian troops occupying the former Yugoslav territory. He had immediately dispatched a commission made up of general officers to the locality to investigate the occur-

¹ This telegram apparently went first from the Special Train to Vienna where it was given the file number RAM 146/R.

rences on the spot, and he intends to take Draconian measures if the reports should prove to be true.

Sztójay also stated that the Regent wanted to visit the Führer. With regard to this visit, which will take place tomorrow, I refer to the communications transmitted to you by telephone earlier.²

I also talked with Sztójay about the question of the Mur river region. In confirmation of what Bárdossy had already told you,³ Sztójay reiterated that Budapest was amenable to reaching an understanding with Croatia whereby the Medjumurje would go to Croatia in return for which Croatia would grant to Hungary special facilities for transit traffic to the Adriatic where Hungary expects to establish a free port zone.

In this connection I called M. Sztójay's attention to the fact that there were three purely German towns on the western border of the Prekmurje north of Radkersburg in territory which formerly belonged to Hungary and directly on the German border, namely the towns of Fuexlintz, Sinnersdorf, and Guitzenhof. We were asking the Hungarian Government to declare its agreement to a frontier rectification in the course of which these three towns would fall to Germany. Minister Sztójay promised to transmit this wish to his Government.⁴

Please keep this question in mind at your end, too, and advise the Hungarian Government of our desire to resettle in Germany the remaining Volksdeutsche inhabiting the Prekmurje.⁵

With regard to point 1 of the memorandum handed to Minister Sztójay on April 20 (telegram No. 683)⁶ I might add that it has since been possible to ascertain the names of the German women who were fatally shot in Novi Vrbas (not Novi Sad).

The names are: Elisabeth Meder and Frau Bayer. They were not shot down in the "Drei Tücher" inn, but were found dead, killed by

² No record of these communications or of Horthy's conversations with Hitler has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry. There is reference to a visit of Horthy with Hitler on Apr. 24 in the Rintelen memorandum referred to in footnote 5; cf. Nikolaus von Horthy, *Ein Leben für Ungarn* (Bonn, 1953), pp. 232-233, and C. A. Macartney, *A History of Hungary, 1929-1945*, vol. II, p. 13.

³ See document No. 344.

⁴ In telegram No. 492 of May 3 (93/103614) Erdmannsdorff reported having been informed by Bárdossy that Hungary agreed to the cession to Germany of four German villages in the Prekmurje.

⁵ A memorandum (73/53278-80) which according to a minute by Rintelen of Apr. 26 was handed to him by Sztójay "on Apr. 24 on the occasion of the visit of Regent Horthy with the Führer" stated that, in the conversation with Sztójay on Apr. 19, Hitler had recognized the validity of Hungary's historic frontiers with respect to the Banat, the Prekmurje, and the Medjumurje, and that he had declared with reference to the latter two regions that he would evacuate the Germans from them. These statements are not found in the record of the Hitler-Sztójay conversation printed as document No. 371.

⁶ This telegram (73/53248-50) had forwarded to Erdmannsdorff the text of the memorandum listing Hungarian excesses against the German minority in the occupied Yugoslav areas which Sztójay was handed on the occasion of his visit with Hitler on Apr. 19.

hand grenades in their houses in Genen Kula row. Please bring this to the attention of the Hungarian Government at once.⁷

RIBBENTROP

⁷ In telegram No. 771 of May ■ (93/103611) Ribbentrop instructed Erdmannsdorff again to inquire regarding the investigation of the Hungarian excesses against Volksdeutsche.

In telegram No. 497 of May ■ (93/103615) Erdmannsdorff reported on the steps which he had taken.

In telegram No. 512 of May 17 (93/103630-32) he forwarded the text of a Hungarian memorandum which admitted that Volksdeutsche had accidentally been killed but only as the "unavoidable result of shooting caused by the activity of Serbian snipers," but insisted that it was "inconceivable" that any Hungarian officer or soldier would act with hostility or malicious intent toward members of the German minority.

No. 393

274/177919-20

The Legation in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SOFIA, April 24, 1941.

No. 454 of April 24

Received April 24—8:05 a. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

I talked with King Boris this evening,² immediately on arrival. Bulgaria agrees to Germany's acquiring ownership of all chromium ore deposits northwest and northeast of Skoplje, in accordance with the understandings previously reached between the two countries regarding exploitation of deposits of raw materials. Accord on this subject was reached in an amicable manner, and the King was not given the impression that we were attempting in some manner to exploit the situation or exert pressure. The King seems to have grasped immediately the significance of the question of ownership, especially in the region of Skoplje. He mentioned that the Führer had himself mentioned to him that he attached importance to having the region around Mount Ljuboten become Bulgarian.

Following this I had a conference with the Foreign Minister during which I brought up besides the question of ownership of the chromium ore mines around Skoplje our other economic and financial wishes. This talk indicated that it will presumably be possible to settle all these questions soon in a satisfactory manner, as was to be expected. Tomorrow I shall draw up the text of a written agreement with the Foreign Minister. I am of the opinion that it would be better for the present to avoid concluding an official agreement

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 1368 to the Special Train, Apr. 24, 8:40 a.m."

² This obviously refers to the evening of Apr. 23. The telegram was presumably drafted in the late evening of Apr. 23 and dispatched in the early morning hours of Apr. 24.

and therefore propose to exchange merely initialed memoranda with the Foreign Minister.³

In a conversation lasting 2 hours the King very candidly presented his position regarding all political and territorial questions arising from the collapse of Yugoslavia. I assume that the King's statements substantially coincide with what he had said in Vienna,⁴ and that it would therefore not be necessary to report by telegraph. I would like to emphasize merely that the King is primarily concerned with the question of determining the frontier between Albania and Bulgarian Macedonia. He is very anxious that Ohrid, Struga, Gostivar, and above all Tetovo should go to Bulgaria for ethnographic and geographic reasons.

CLODIUS

RICHTHOFEN

³ In telegram No. 463 of Apr. 24 (274/177921-22) Clodius reported that following acceptance of all his proposals by the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, the Foreign Minister and he signed the text of the agreement without further discussion.

⁴ See document No. 362, footnote 2.

No. 394

116/66786-93

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

VIENNA, April 24, 1941.

For the Führer's decision:

At noon today Ambassador Alfieri brought up the following two points with State Secretary von Weizsäcker for discussion:

1. In the conversations in Vienna² the Reich Foreign Minister had promised Count Ciano that he would send the Leader of the Croatian State, Pavelić, before the latter's negotiations with the Italians, a general communication to the effect that Germany would agree to the arrangements that he, Pavelić, would make with the Italian Government. According to Ambassador Alfieri's statements, Pavelić will be in Rome as early as tomorrow, Friday noon. For this reason Count Ciano requested that the Reich Foreign Minister carry out the promise made to him as soon as possible.

About an hour later Ambassador Alfieri, on the basis of a telephone conversation with Count Ciano, made the supplementary statement to State Secretary von Weizsäcker that Count Ciano asked that Ambassador Alfieri's step be considered not as an official

¹ Marginal notes:

"Shown to the Führer. Hew[ell], Apr. 24."

"Recorded Apr. 24, 6:15 p.m."

² See documents Nos. 378 and 385.

démarche but as a request, which he now wished to formulate as follows:

The Reich Foreign Minister should tell Pavelić, or have word sent to him, this afternoon, as follows:

The Reich Foreign Minister is informed of Pavelić's forthcoming trip to Rome and he hopes that an amicable solution between the two parties may be found which is satisfactory to both.

2. In the conversation between the Führer and Count Ciano^{*} the idea of a personal meeting between the Führer and the Duce, to be held in the near future at some place at the frontier, was discussed. The Duce sends word that he would be available for such a meeting in the middle of next week. The Führer should decide whether this time is agreeable to him. If the Führer prefers a later date, he, the Duce, would of course agree to it. With regard to this, the Foreign Minister has the following comments:

Regarding point 1

The assertion now made by Count Ciano that the Reich Foreign Minister had promised him in Vienna to send a communication to Pavelić even prior to the negotiations in Rome, stating that we would agree to the arrangements that he would make with the Italians, is incorrect. The Reich Foreign Minister made no such promise, as can indeed be seen, from the memorandum on his conversations with Count Ciano in Vienna. On the contrary, he presented our position on the Croatian question to Count Ciano exactly as it is set forth in the reply to Ambassador Alfieri proposed by him below. Apparently, Count Ciano is now trying by means of dialectical tricks to harness us to the Italian wagon, because he fears that otherwise he will not be able to make Pavelić accede to the Italian aspirations. It is also evident from Ambassador Alfieri's supplementary statement, in which he changed the request first made, that Count Ciano is obviously aware that a promise of the kind referred to above was indeed not made.

The Reich Foreign Minister proposes that the following statement be made to Ambassador Alfieri orally today by State Secretary Weizsäcker:

It was a misunderstanding on Count Ciano's part when he said that the Reich Foreign Minister had promised him in Vienna that he would send a communication to the Leader of the State, Pavelić, before the beginning of his negotiations with the Italian Government stating that Germany would agree to the arrangements that Pavelić would make with the Italian Government. No such promise by the Reich Foreign Minister had been mentioned in Vienna; on

^{*} See Editors' Note, p. 591.

the contrary, he had presented the German position on the Croatian question to Count Ciano as follows:

The Führer had already determined the boundary between Germany and Croatia. The boundary line thus drawn would at the proper time be confirmed by a German-Croatian treaty.⁴ Germany was disinterested in the political questions between Italy and Croatia. The Führer therefore had no reason to take any position on that subject. Rather, the Führer left it entirely to the Duce to arrange those matters according to his own wishes and to settle them with the Croats. This also applied to the question of an Italian-Croatian personal union. For this reason the Foreign Minister had also declined thus far to accede to M. Pavelić's request to be received by him. It was better for Pavelić to go to Rome first.

In view of today's request from Count Ciano, however, the Foreign Minister would now try to send the following additional communication to M. Pavelić; he had to point out, however, that the connections with Zagreb were still in poor shape, so that he was not certain whether his communication would reach him [Pavelić] in time:

"The Reich Foreign Minister has heard that M. Pavelić is going to Rome soon in order to negotiate there about political questions between Croatia and Italy. Germany indeed considers these questions as exclusively a Croatian-Italian matter, but she would be pleased if the two parties came to an amicable understanding which was satisfactory to both."⁵

In order to preclude any misunderstanding the Reich Foreign Minister also intends to have Ambassador von Mackensen convey the foregoing communication directly to Count Ciano. In case the Führer should agree, the Foreign Minister will send Minister Kasche the appropriate instructions by wire.⁶

Regarding point 2

The Foreign Minister asks the Führer to decide what the Duce is to be told regarding the question of a personal meeting.⁷

⁴ See document No. 443, footnote 3.

⁵ In a memorandum of Apr. 24 (245/161807) Weizsäcker recorded having informed Alfieri that evening in accordance with the Foreign Minister's instructions.

⁶ Such instructions have not been found.

⁷ In a memorandum of Apr. 25 (B12/B001763) Weizsäcker recorded that he had informed the Italian Ambassador that afternoon as follows with regard to a Hitler-Mussolini meeting:

"The Führer acknowledges the Duce's communication with thanks. For official reasons he has to go to Berlin first, and consequently he is not able at this time to set a definite date for the meeting. He will let the Duce know right after his return to Berlin as to which date for the meeting he could propose."

See, further, document No. 511.

No. 395

221/149238-39

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1270 of April 24

PARIS, April 24, 1941—1:40 p. m.

Received April 24—9:20 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister through Herr Schwarzmann with the request that it be submitted also to Ambassador Abetz.

In the course of a long conversation with Admiral Darlan, who on April 23 dined with Ambassador de Brinon and Benoist-Méchin at the Embassy, the question of France's relations with the United States was discussed. When we pointed out that France could not evade the choice between Europe and America, Darlan replied that as far as he was concerned this choice had already been made. That the same was true also in the case of the Marshal was proved by the following incident:

Last Friday, April 18, the American Ambassador, Admiral Leahy, had made an appointment with Marshal Pétain with the request that he be permitted to speak with him privately.¹ In the course of this private conversation Admiral Leahy had handed Marshal Pétain a note in which the American Government asked Marshal Pétain whether he was aware of the policy that the leading members of his Government were following. Admiral Darlan and General Huntziger in particular were mentioned in the note. These Ministers were prepared to collaborate with Germany beyond the framework of the Armistice Treaty and intended to order French industry to build planes for Germany. If the French Government continued this policy, it could have grave consequences. Marshal Pétain handed this note to Admiral Darlan, who with the approval of the Marshal drafted a reply in which the Marshal bluntly informed the American Ambassador that his note was unacceptable and was therefore being returned. Admiral Darlan remarked in that connection that the policy of the United States definitely got on his nerves. "Uncle Sam stands beside an icebox, takes a ham out of it, holds it under the nose of the French and tells them that if they behave nicely they will get the ham. But as soon as the French fail to dance completely to the American tune, Uncle Sam has the ham put back in the icebox." He, Darlan, now took the position that if the Americans continued to follow this method they could just as well keep their ham. Benoist-Méchin, too, spoke to the same effect and said that France made far too much fuss about the few

¹ For Admiral Leahy's account of this meeting, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 151-152 and 294-295.

food ships which America had sent.² He promised that he would launch several policy articles in the press of the unoccupied territory through the Minister of Information, Marion;³ in these articles the French would point out to the Americans that after they had spoken arrogantly and condescendingly of the Balkanization of Europe during the years from 1919 to 1939, it ill became them now to try by all means to prevent the unification of Europe. If the American people wished to continue the traditional friendship with France, they would have to stop trying to impose an anti-European foreign policy on the French.

SCHLEIER

² On the question of food shipments from the United States to France, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 112 ff.

³ Paul Marion, Secretary General for Information.

No. 396

118/66795-96

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*¹

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, April 24, 1941—8:35 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received April 24—9:20 p. m.²

No. 894 of April 24

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Ciano summoned me for 6:00 p.m. to tell me substantially the following about his forthcoming trip to meet Pavelić, with the request that I inform the Foreign Minister about this in accordance with the discussions held at Vienna.

The idea of a personal union between Croatia and Italy, as it had been discussed during past conversations with Pavelić, would perhaps represent too much of a liability for Pavelić in his position at the present moment. Nor was there any intention to put pressure on him. The Duce had therefore decided, in the spirit of "making things easier for his friend," to have Ciano take along on his forthcoming talks with Pavelić the draft of a treaty which, in the event Pavelić does not again seize on the idea of a personal union, would still be appropriate for settling the relationship between Italy and Croatia in accordance with Italy's interest. This draft, described as a treaty of alliance, guarantee, and cooperation, would provide for a link between Croatia and Italy, to some extent reminiscent

¹ Unsigned marginal notes:

"Shown to the Führer."

"Through Baron Steengracht on May 1."

² Marginal note: "Forwarded as telegram No. 1384 to the Special Train, Apr. 24."

of the relationship between the Reich and Slovakia, although not so far-reaching; for example, it would not give Italy the right to use Croatian territory for military operations.

Should Pavelić be agreeable to a treaty of such content, Italy would then be able to take a more liberal attitude also on the question of Croatia's access to the sea and accord Croatia at least in the economic field access to the Adriatic within the Croatian littoral which in itself would go to Italy. In that case, even a territorial solution of the question of the port (which apparently has not been rejected altogether) would not present a problem with respect to a direct union of Dalmatia with Italy. Matters would of course be different should Croatia (one group appears to be missing in the clear text) such a close tie with Italy as provided for in the treaty, for in such case Italy would have to insist on an uninterrupted territorial connection along the coast.

It was impossible to make any predictions about the duration of the talks with Pavelić.

I had the impression that the Italians have more or less given up the idea of a personal union, and that they are not even sure whether Pavelić will or can agree to the proposed treaty, especially as they do not want, supposedly, to exert pressure.

The text of the draft treaty which Ciano left with me, translated into German, will follow with the immediately following telegram No. 895.³

MACKENSEN

³ Not printed (116/66797-99).

No. 397

205/142668

Minute by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 279

BERLIN, April 24, 1941.

Supplement by the State Secretary to telegraphic report No. 433 from Stockholm:¹

1. As long as Swedish policy believes that we are confronting it with the choice between Berlin and London it will have great difficulties in domestic politics (i.e., for example, if Sweden should have to take a stand on the Tripartite Pact today).

However, if we confront Sweden with the choice between Berlin and Moscow then the Swedish decision is clear. It would therefore probably be easier and more successful to institute conversations with Sweden in the military sector than in the general political sec-

¹ Document No. 390.

tor. The above-mentioned telegraphic report is a confirmation of this.

2. In my opinion the remark in the report is correct that in case of a German-Russian conflict Sweden would be definitively won over if a Russian provocation of Finland should start the conflict.

Submitted herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 398

116/66890-04

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

VIENNA, April 24, 1941.

RESULTS OF THE GERMAN-ITALIAN DISCUSSIONS ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE AREA OF YUGOSLAVIA ¹

Croatia

The boundary between Croatia and Germany has already been determined by the Führer and will be definitively fixed with the Croatian Government when the occasion presents itself. During the time that Serbia is occupied by German troops, Germany will, moreover, keep under occupation a strip of territory extending from the northwest to the southeast, to be agreed upon between German and Italian military authorities, in order to safeguard the lines of communication to Serbia.

Italy intends to link Croatia closely to Italy possibly through a personal union.

The Italians intend to annex *Dalmatia*; it is to be given the status of an Italian government (*governatorato*). The same holds for the rest of the littoral between Rijeka and the border of Montenegro.

In principle, Germany is politically disinterested in the Croatian questions. Hence the Führer has no reason to take any position concerning them. He leaves it to the Duce to settle them with the Croats.

Croatia's frontier with Hungary will follow the Drava. Croatian wishes on the eastern frontier between the Danube and the Sava (Syrmlia) are to be satisfied. The rest of Croatia's eastern boundary will follow the previous eastern boundary of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which connection Italy wants the frontiers of Montenegro advanced toward the west.

¹ Marginal note: "Shown to the Führer with maps. Hew[el], Apr. 25."

The maps which are also mentioned in the text of the document have not been found with this document. However, on May 8 Rintelen sent Mackensen copies of two maps (4865/E249099-104) "which had served as a basis for the discussions with Count Ciano and had been given to Count Ciano."

Cf. Appendix V, Agreed Partition of Yugoslavia, 1941.

Slovenia

to the extent that it does not fall to the Reich, will be annexed by Italy and given administrative autonomy.

Montenegro

will become independent but will be linked to Italy through a personal union (delimitation of the frontier can be seen from Italian map).

Albania

will receive additional territory at the expense of Greece, Macedonia, and Serbia. (With regard to Macedonia and Serbia see special map, blue line, German proposal.) However, the Bulgarian national shrine Ohrid and the chromium mine of Ljuboten, to be operated as a kind of German enterprise, will go to Bulgaria, and the lead deposits of Trepca (Mitrovica), likewise to be exploited by Germany under German management, will go to Serbia. Considerable additions to Albanian territory at the expense of Greece were indicated in further detail on the map by the Italians. (Line from the former Yugoslav-Greek frontier northeast of Florina to Arta.)

Serbia

will be given the boundary drawn on the German map; but will remain under military occupation for the time being. She is to remain as small as possible, and all measures will be taken to make impossible for all time a repetition of the recent betrayal by the clique of conspirators.

Bačka and Banat

will go to Hungary, likewise Medjumurje and Prekmurje, unless separate arrangements for these last-named areas are made between Hungary on the one hand and Germany and Croatia on the other. The Banat will for the time being remain occupied by German troops in order to prevent clashes between Hungarians and Rumanians.² The necessity of giving Rumania compensation elsewhere is recognized, in spite of the difficulties in finding something suitable. The practical possibilities are not as yet clearly discernible.

Macedonia

as well as smaller areas ceded to former Yugoslavia after the World War will go to Bulgaria, with a broad western strip including Struga, Gostivar, and Tetovo going to Albania.

Bulgarian wishes with respect to Salonika, which the Führer noted with sympathy, will, like the question of the final fate of Greece, be reserved until the end of the war for agreements between the Duce and the Führer.

The *Ionian Islands* will be annexed immediately by Italy.

² See documents Nos. 276 and 340.

For the rest, Italy's intentions with respect to Greece are apparently extensive.

The procedure by which the new boundaries to be established between Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and Bulgaria are to be formally determined will be the subject of a proposal by the Reich Foreign Minister to Count Ciano.

In view of *Germany's special economic interests* in the former Yugoslav State it is agreed that the German economic interests will be given special consideration in the areas falling to Italy. Germany is primarily interested in the development of the production of the Dalmatian bauxite mines. The production of these mines will accordingly be developed as far as possible, and the satisfaction of German requirements will be given preferential consideration in connection with exports.

Hungary will obtain a *free port* on the Dalmatian coast.

(SCHMIDT)

No. 399

426/218002

The Naval Attaché of the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹ to the High Command of the Navy

[Telegram]

No. 34112/110 of April 24

APRIL 24, [1941.]

For the Navy.

1. Rumors current here speak of alleged danger of war between Germany and the Soviet Union and are being fed by travelers passing through from Germany.

2. According to the Counselor of the Italian Embassy,² the English Ambassador predicts June 22 as the day of the outbreak of war.

3. May 20 is set by others.

4. I am endeavoring to counteract the rumors, which are manifestly absurd.

Naval Attaché

¹ Capt. Norbert von Baumbach.

² Luciano Mascia.

No. 400

205/142669

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

SECRET

No. 271 of April 25

HELSINKI, April 25, 1941—1:46 p. m.

Received April 25—5:35 p. m.

The Swedish Military Attaché at Helsinki returned from Stockholm, where he was received by the Swedish Foreign Minister and (evidently one group in the clear text is missing) a subsequent conversation with Colonel Rössing. During the conversation Baron Stedingk brought out the following:

1. The Swedish Foreign Minister would come to Helsinki next week. The main topic for discussion would be: The Swedish attitude in case of warlike involvements of Germany, Finland, and Russia. Also, Colonel Adlercreutz of the Swedish General Staff was expected here.

2. The guiding line of Swedish policy: To stay out of any warlike involvement as long as Finland is not the object of Russian attack.

3. No support of Finland of any kind in case Finland attacks.

4. No support of Finland of any kind in case Finland enters the war on the side of the Axis Powers.

5. In case a German-Russian war should break out and Finland should remain out, Sweden would not oppose the passage through her territory of German troops, in accordance with the attitude of Bulgaria.

6. In case Finland, without participating in the war on the side of Germany, should utilize German successes in Russia to reoccupy lost territories, she would not encounter any difficulties on the part of Sweden.

7. Joint operations by German and Finnish troops under German command would be considered in Sweden as a highly undesirable situation. Please inform the OKH, Attaché Section.

In view of the impending visit of the Swedish Foreign Minister, please wire instructions for conversation.¹

BLÜCHER

¹ See document No. 426.

No. 401

83/61608-10

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

ROME, April 25, 1941—5:20 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received April 26—6:00 p. m.

No. 907 of April 25

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 888 of April 23¹ and 922 of April 24.²

Anfuso handed me today the following telegram from the Italian Minister in Baghdad, of April 24:

I had a long conversation with Gaylani in the presence of the Mufti, which I am summarizing as follows:

1. The English do not intend to send troops to Egypt, but rather to organize a last-ditch defense in the Near East, in view of the possibility of a defeat in Egypt. The occupation of Iraq, therefore, aims at a stiffening of the resistance on this side of the Suez Canal, defense of Palestine, and direct aid to Turkey.

2. Up to now about 7,000 men with 15 cannon and light infantry arms have landed at Basra. Motorized units that have not yet been disembarked are said to be on four other steamships. The contingent en route from India is said to number from 50,000 to 60,000 men.

3. The Government of Iraq immediately lodged an official protest with the English Embassy on account of the violation of the condition agreed upon for the passage. It has further demanded that the disembarkation of the additional contingents be stopped and that the contingent which has landed proceed to Transjordan. The English Embassy has as yet given no reply.

4. The possible preparations for resisting any further violation of the conditions of the agreement have been made by the Iraq Army in the Basra zone.

5. The Gaylani Government—which was formed as a result of the coup d'état that has frustrated the British occupation—appears to want to remain true to its original intentions. The English Government is striving to bring about a new domestic political crisis so as to make possible the occupation of the country. The Government is quite annoyed because it has as yet received no reply to its request for support by Axis aviation³ (Luftwaffe, which was to go into action as soon as there was a clash between the British Army and the Iraq Army), while the situation, which is already extremely delicate, could in 3 or 4 days become downright critical. The annoyance is all the greater since Tewfik Shaki [*Tewfik Ali al-Shakir*] brought back with him from Berlin the most optimistic impression

¹ This telegram (83/61600) forwarded the text of a telegram from the Italian Minister in Baghdad reporting that 40,000 British-Indian troops had landed in Basra and that the Iraq Government and Army considered this a preliminary step to the occupation of Iraq.

² Not found.

³ See document No. 372.

about the possibility of obtaining such aid.⁴ For this purpose and in the expectation of extensive military cooperation with the Axis Powers, Gaylani expressed the wish that a high-ranking officer of the General Staff be sent on a secret mission to Baghdad. This officer might, in view of the urgency, be detailed there from the Italian Armistice Commission in Beirut. The day after tomorrow Gaylani will give me a preliminary estimate of the financial requirements that must be met after the break with England. Gaylani most urgently requests that the Arabic radio broadcasts from Bari and Berlin be intensified. These broadcasts should refute those from London in the strongest manner and plainly show the following: The firm intention of the Iraq people and Army to defend their independence at any price against the threatened occupation, the determination of the two Axis Powers to support the resistance of Iraq by every means, the fact that England broke her word by concealing her intention of occupying the country by merely requesting ordinary passage; the futility of the English attempts to proceed against the unity of the Iraq people by deceit, the favorable attitude which the Arab countries have taken toward the state of Iraq, which is engaged in defending its independence.

End of telegram from Baghdad.

The correction of code group "40,000" has not yet been received but appears to me to have been made unnecessary as a result of the telegram referred to above.⁵

MACKENSEN

⁴ Cf. document No. 92.

⁵ Rome telegram No. 888 (see footnote 1) had indicated that the code group "40,000" had been received in a garbled form.

No. 402

1742/118370

The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

Moscow, April 25, 1941—9:25 p. m.

No. 1006 of April 25

Received April 26—4:00 a.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 794 of April 21, and No. 814 of April 24.¹

It was noticed here, too, that relations between Finland and the Soviet Union have recently become more serene. In the Petsamo matter the last conversation with the Finnish Legation here took place on March 4. Since then the Soviet Government has not reverted to the matter. Trade, to be sure, is stagnating, but this is attributed to a holding back on the Soviet side because Finland is

¹ Neither found.

in arrears. Since the beginning of April the Petrozavodsk radio has actually stopped its anti-Finnish broadcasts. Zotov, the former Soviet Minister in Helsinki, has resigned his post for reasons of health. Zotov has serious lung trouble; he is said to have undergone an operation here and is supposed at present to be in a sanatorium in the Crimea. In any case it is true that his successor, Orlov, is calm and objective and not so aggressive as Zotov. I interpret the attitude of the Soviet Government toward Finland, with respect to Germany, as meaning that its attention is at present directed primarily at the Balkans.²

TIPPELSKIRCH

² In telegram No. 329 of May 13 (4964/E276625) Blücher reported that the Finns had given a reply to Vyshinsky regarding the Petsamo problem which Vyshinsky considered unsatisfactory. The Finns hoped that the Russians would let the problem rest.

No. 403

8589/E602851-52

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, April 25, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
No. 44581/41 g. Kdos. Chefs. WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.)
By Officer Only

DIRECTIVE NO. 28: OPERATION MERKUR

1. The *occupation of the island of Crete (Operation Merkur)* is to be prepared in order to have a base for conducting the air war against England in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The assumption is that the entire Greek mainland including the Peloponnesus is in the hands of the Axis Powers.

2. I confer *command* of the operation on the *Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe* who will principally draw upon the Air-borne Corps and the Luftwaffe units that are employed in the Mediterranean.

The *Army*, in agreement with the *Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe*, has the task of making ready in Greece suitable reinforcements for the Air-borne Corps including a mixed tank battalion which can be transferred to Crete by sea.

The *Navy* will make the preparations for the communications by sea which must be secured by the beginning of the occupation of the island. For the protection of the communications and, as far as necessary, for the supply of transport space, the *Commander in Chief of the Navy* will make the requisite agreements with the Italian Navy.

3. All means are to be utilized to bring up the Air-borne Corps together with the 22nd Division, which has again been placed under command of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, into the assembly area to be designated by the latter. The necessary trucking space is to be made available to the Wehrmacht Transportation Chief by the High Commands of the Army and Luftwaffe. The *transport movements* must not lead to any delay in the strategic concentration for *Barbarossa*.

4. For *antiaircraft protection* in Greece and in Crete the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe may draw upon the antiaircraft units of the Twelfth Army. The Commanders in Chief of the Luftwaffe and Army will make the necessary arrangements for their relief or replacement.

5. *After occupation of the island* the Air-borne Corps in whole or in part will have to be made ready for further employment. Its early replacement by forces of the Army is therefore to be provided for.

For construction of the coastal defense by the Commander in Chief of the Navy, guns captured by the Army may be drawn upon if necessary.

6. I request the Commanders in Chief to report to me on the measures planned, and I request the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe to report also on the prospective date of completion of preparations. I myself will issue the order for execution of the operation.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 404

2361/488512-13

*Memorandum by the Ambassador to Turkey*¹

BERLIN, April 25, 1941.

I called on the Turkish Ambassador today and tried to find out from him the Turkish wishes regarding the further development of our relations.

Ambassador Gerede first brought up his reception by the Führer,² whose personality and clear-sighted policy had deeply impressed him. He believed that the effect of this conversation in Ankara would be excellent, although naturally in view of the situation only slow progress could be expected. He then read me the content of his telegram to Ankara concerning this conversation. Furthermore he expressed himself as particularly pleased that the Foreign Min-

¹ Regarding Papen's presence in Berlin, see document No. 295, footnote 6.

² See document No. 177.

ister had received him in such a friendly manner.³ In discussing the conversation held on that occasion I recalled that the Foreign Minister had proposed the strengthening of German-Turkish relations by way of a mutual treaty instrument, and asked M. Gerede for his view on whether he believed that his Government was willing to carry on a political conversation with us along these lines. The Ambassador gave an affirmative reply and said that he believed assurances in the Straits question would perforce be of extremely great value for his Government. I pointed out that such a treaty naturally had to be bilateral. Turkey herself had after all always attached importance to not receiving unilateral guarantees, but to offering a quid pro quo. I could imagine that, for example, in regard to the areas which Turkey considered her security zone—e.g., the Near Eastern Arab states—Turkey would be willing to support the aspirations of these states for independence. (The Ambassador had earlier assured me repeatedly that in the Arab question Germany and Turkey must pursue a parallel policy.) In regard to Syria he said that it would easily be possible; regarding Iraq he did not know whether the alliance with England permitted making any sort of agreement.

I then pointed out that the new organization of the Balkans also required a change in Turkish policy toward the Balkan countries. In particular it appeared necessary to me that Turkey's relationship with Bulgaria should undergo a revision. Turkey would have to decide whether she recognized the new organization of the Balkans and regarded it as an existing basis for further cooperation with us.

M. Gerede absolutely agreed that such a political revision was necessary and he believed that this would be a suitable subject for talks. He asked me most earnestly to continue with him the joint efforts to bring Turkey into a friendly relationship with Germany; he would most actively support all of our proposals in this connection.

I then promised to call on him again after the Foreign Minister had given me final instructions.

PAPEN

³ See document No. 303.

No. 405

274/177926-27

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SPECIAL TRAIN, April 25, 1941—11:45 p. m.

No. 318 of April 25 from the Special Train at Vienna

Received Berlin, April 26—12:10 a. m.

No. 598 of April 26 from
the Foreign Ministry

Sent April 26—5:30 a.m.

For Minister Clodius.

With reference to your telegram No. 454 of April 24.¹

Following up your previous conversations please tell King Boris, with reference to the hopes mentioned at the close of your telegram to the effect that Ohrid, Struga, Gostivar, and especially Tetovo will go to Bulgaria:

The question of drawing the frontier between Bulgaria and Albania had been the subject of repeated and detailed discussions between me and the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano.² Originally Italy had demanded a broad strip of territory to the east of the present Albanian border, justifying it primarily by strategic and also ethnographic considerations. As a result of this discussion, we had to take account of Italian claims to the area from Tetovo to Struga, and including Gostivar and Kicevo, but we succeeded in making the Italians drop their demand that the town of Ohrid with environs, and Mount Ljuboten be awarded to Albania also. We were happy that we could prevail in this matter in favor of Bulgaria; for the rest, we assumed that Bulgaria would acquiesce in such a settlement, especially as we were ready to offer Bulgaria a certain amount of compensation for this in the region of the upper Morava river (around Vranje). Nor should it be forgotten, moreover, that Bulgaria for her part, by acquiring a wide strip on the Aegean—quite apart from further opportunities in this field—obtains a large territory, which is today almost exclusively settled by Greeks and Turks, where she could receive ethnically Bulgarian elements not to be included in Bulgaria.

In addition, please find out at your end if and to what extent there are any extensive Bulgarian aspirations regarding the region of the upper Morava mentioned above and the area of Pirot, but do not enter into any discussions on this subject. Regarding your reference to the Tetovo electric power plant, please ascertain its exact location, since the boundary could perhaps be so fixed that the town of Tetovo would go to Albania but the electric power plant to Bulgaria.

¹ Document No. 393.² See documents Nos. 378 and 385.

Please report to me in person again after you have carried out these instructions and finished your conversations in Budapest.

RIBBENTROP

No. 406

610/248603

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Slovakia

Telegram

No. 331 from	SPECIAL TRAIN, April 26, 1941—4:33 p. m.
the Special Train	Received Berlin, April 26—5:05 p. m.
No. 444 from the	
Foreign Ministry	Sent April 26—8:50 p. m.
RAM 156/R	

With reference to your telegram No. 389 of April 16.¹

We do not consider it appropriate at this time to approach the question of a Slovak-Hungarian frontier settlement. We are interested in now bringing about at least a temporary settlement of the frontier questions occasioned by the collapse of Yugoslavia, so that tranquillity will be quickly restored in this area. However, if the question of the Hungarian-Slovak frontier were now broached anew, then the Rumanians, too, would immediately push for a revision of the second Vienna Award, and in this way all of the frontier questions in the southeast would become fluid once more. It is therefore necessary that the questions which do not require an immediate solution remain deferred for the duration of the war. In these circumstances you can only repeat the same thing to M. Tuka that I already told him during the visit of Tiso and Tuka to the Berghof in July of last year,² namely, that at the moment a settlement of this question cannot be considered; the moment for that will possibly arrive at some time in the future.³

RIBBENTROP

¹ This telegram (610/248601) reported that Minister President Tuka had raised the question of Slovakia's claims on Hungarian territory.

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 248 and footnote 7.

³ Slovak wishes for territorial revisions were also raised by Černák, the Slovak Minister in Berlin, in a démarche made with Weizsäcker on May 11 (610/248607-08). Černák indicated that the Slovaks claimed about 4000 square kilometers of Hungarian territory. See also document No. 424.

No. 407

83/61139-40

*The Director of the Political Department to the
Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

Teletype en clair

U. St.S. Pol. 350

BERLIN, April 26, 1941.

For Sonnleithner.

I have discussed the question of aid to Iraq today with Colonel Brinckmann of OKW. Brinckmann informed me that when the military reported to him, the Führer made a remark approximately to the effect that, in view of the English landings in Iraq, it was too late. The military report had been based on a statement of the Foreign Armies Branch of the General Staff, according to which two Indian divisions of 14,000 men each were already in Iraq and two more divisions were on the way. In addition, there were 50 to 60 fully equipped British aircraft there, including 20 of Class I, 5 to 12 seaplanes, and a British aviation school in Habbaniya with about 100 planes. Further inquiry confirmed the fact that these were the figures furnished by the Foreign Armies Branch.

These reports, as far as they relate to the stationing of two Indian divisions on Iraq soil, are at the present time certainly false, judging from other reports at hand here. The situation is such, as confirmed by the latest reports from the Italian Minister in Baghdad, that German armed assistance would still be very welcome to the Iraq Government and Army. The reports received thus far are corroborated by telegram No. 436 from Ankara,¹ according to which the Japanese Minister in Baghdad has telegraphically reported that up to now a total of 6,000 men have been routed through Iraq to Palestine.

I requested Colonel Brinckmann to have a military report put before the Führer now regarding the employment of the Luftwaffe; so far this had not been done. It would be employed first of all, in the manner already reported,² for the transportation of arms; it would further have to be decided whether it would be possible to grant the request repeatedly made by the Iraq Government through the Italian Minister in Baghdad for immediate military action by the Luftwaffe in the event of armed conflict between Iraq and England.

I further informed Colonel Brinckmann that we wanted to transfer the discussions with Iraq to Ankara. An officer of the Luftwaffe and an officer of the Army, perhaps also both the Attachés there, ought

¹ Of Apr. 25 (792/272998).

² Presumably a reference to Woermann's memorandum of Apr. 21. See document No. 377, footnote 4.

to take part in them. We did not intend to inform the Italians in detail concerning these discussions.

In view of the above circumstances it would perhaps be well if another report were made to the Führer regarding the political aspects also.³

WOERMANN

³In a supplement of Apr. 26 (83/61141) Woermann asked the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to add the following sentence to this teletype message: "According to information from the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel will not be able to report to the Führer regarding this matter before Monday, Apr. 28."

No. 408

177/35032-34

*Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department*¹

BERLIN, April 26, 1941.

Pol. VIII 611.

From a rather lengthy conversation which I had with Japanese Counselor of Embassy Kase after a dinner at my house, on the subject of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact, the following statements of his appear to merit comment:

I. "The firm conviction prevails with the Japanese Government in Tokyo as well as the Japanese Embassy here that as far as the Russians are concerned, the initiative toward the Pact was inspired solely by the impression made on them by the German advance in the Balkans."

II. "This still only settles our relations with the USSR in a theoretical way," Kase continued, "and Japan will be awaiting with extreme skepticism any practical implementation on the part of the Russians." Kase gave as reason for this skepticism the Soviet Russian statement in Chungking about the unchanged continuation of their former policy toward China,² and continuation of the delivery of military supplies.

III. Once Japanese-Russian relations are eased, liquidation of the China conflict would be tackled, but Kase thinks the right moment for this is not yet at hand.

¹Dr. Hans Bidder, promoted to the rank of Counselor of Legation at Peiping in 1937; recalled to the Foreign Ministry Dec. 21, 1940; transferred to Shanghai in November 1941.

²Possibly a reference to Chinese inquiries made in Moscow and the reply of the Soviet Government that its policy toward China was unaffected by the Japanese-Russian Pact. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. iv, pp. 951-952, 955-956, and 970-971.

"The situation in Japan now is this, that all groups in the Government and of the general public are definitely convinced that things can not go on this way, and that peace must be made. Nevertheless, no one has the courage to pursue this vigorously in defiance of the military clique. We lack the strong political leader who would dare to assume this task."

On this score, Kase cited the historical outcome of the Russo-Japanese war, in which, just as today, the Government, notwithstanding a succession of military victories and victory propaganda, had to acknowledge that only a negotiated peace could save Japan from ruin. At that time, Marquis Komura was willing to face the public with the terms of peace as negotiated, despite personal risk of life. "Japan has no Komura today—thus far!"

IV. It would be interesting to observe if behind Kase's commentary in paragraph II there was concealed diplomatic phraseology with which a possible postponement of the attack on Singapore might be justified.

Japan's contention that Sino-Soviet relations even today, following the signing of the Neutrality Pact, give rise to Japanese distrust, does not hold water, since the question of China is not referred to in the Pact, whether by the Soviet Russians or the Japanese. The fact that the Pact was concluded without concessions or stipulations with respect to China, and that the initiative came—so the Japanese claim—from the Russian side, proves that Soviet Russia, in concluding this Pact, was not pursuing any Asian objectives but was merely taking out insurance against the possibility of becoming involved in the West.

Submitted herewith through the Dirigent in the Political Department to the Under State Secretary.

BIDDER

No. 409

142/127475-82

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division I M

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, April 26, 1941.

Pol. I M 1098 g. Rs.

Enclosed is a copy of a report from General von Rintelen, the German Military Attaché in Rome, concerning his discussions with the Italian Armed Forces Command, regarding the capitulation of the Greek Army of Epirus.

KRAMARZ

[Enclosure]

ROME, April 23, 1941.

The German General at

Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces
(Mil. Att. Rome) No. 798/41 g. Kdos.**MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ITALIAN
ARMED FORCES COMMAND CONCERNING CAPITULATION OF THE GREEK
ARMY OF EPIRUS**

1) On April 21, at 6:00 p.m., General Guzzoni handed me the translation of a radio message of Field Marshal List to the Italian High Command in Albania, containing the information that the Twelfth Army had entered into armistice negotiations with the Greek Army in Epirus and requesting that the Italian Army stop its advance in order not to hamper the negotiations.

The Duce had sent a reply that he was prepared to enter into armistice negotiations only if the Greeks would also ask the Italian troops for an armistice. For reasons of prestige, this was necessary after 8 months of fighting.

2) After having consulted General of Artillery Jodl by telephone, I reported to the Duce at 7:45 p.m. in the presence of General Guzzoni, that, in accordance with the Führer's decision, an armistice was to be concluded with the Greeks only by the German and Italian troops jointly and that, of course, military operations were to continue until the armistice was signed. A unilateral agreement of the Commander in Chief of the Twelfth Army with the Greek Army of Epirus would not be recognized. The Duce was pleased with this communication and stated that he would, of course, be ready to conclude an armistice with the Greeks on the conditions reported earlier: Complete capitulation and occupation of the entire Greek territory including the islands, if the Greeks would also ask the Italian Army for an armistice. He considered it a perfidy on the part of the Greeks that they were approaching only the German troops and not the Italian at the same time. They would then later on assert for the historical record that they had surrendered to the Germans, but not to the Italians. He owed it to his Army and his people, however, to demand that the armistice be requested also of the Italians. The Italian troops had for 6 months been fighting against the Greeks; 500,000 men had been committed; 63,000 had been lost. Now the Italian Army must also have the satisfaction of victory.

The Duce pointed out, furthermore, that the fighting could not stop until the convention was signed. It was impossible to suspend military operations only to resume them later. This he could not expect of his troops.

This reply of the Duce's was transmitted by telephone at 8:50 p.m. to the OKW/WFSt.

After having received further guidance from General Jodl at 10:20 p.m., I called on General Guzzoni at the War Ministry at 11:30 p.m. and told him the following:

This is not a question of an armistice, since the Greek Army capitulated when our troops attacked. German troops are already in Ioannina after having taken 20,000 prisoners. Since the Greeks have laid down their arms, the fighting cannot be continued. Agreements have not yet been reached. General Jodl is to negotiate in this matter in Ioannina on April 22, between 11:00 and 12:00 o'clock.¹ It is requested that an Italian plenipotentiary also be dispatched there.

General Guzzoni thereupon got in touch by telephone with the High Command in Tirana and received the reply that the Greeks were continuing the fight and that nowhere had the Italian troops received the offer of capitulation. He stated therefore that nothing remained for Army Group, Albania other than to go on fighting. In accordance with the Duce's decision, an authorized officer could be sent to Ioannina only when the Greeks offered to capitulate on the Italian front, too.

After another consultation with General Jodl on April 22, at 12:30 a.m., I again called General Guzzoni on the phone saying that General Jodl asked that a plenipotentiary be sent to Larissa who would meet with General Jodl there at 10:00 a.m. in order to conclude the capitulation in his capacity as plenipotentiary in view of the fact that an offer by the Greeks addressed to the Italian troops as well was surely to be expected. General Guzzoni agreed to this proposal.

At 12:00 noon on April 22, in the presence of General Guzzoni, I presented to the Duce the draft capitulation transmitted by the OKW/WFSt.² The Duce, in a state of great agitation, declared that in no circumstances would he participate in negotiations or conclude a capitulation unless the Greeks first offered to capitulate to the Italian troops also. He repeated once more in more emphatic form the statements he had made the evening before concerning the great losses that the Italian armed forces had sustained in the fighting against Greece. He stated that he would also have finished off the Greeks alone; if 500,000 men had not sufficed, he would have used a million. He absolutely could not permit the capitulation of the Greeks now to be represented merely as a consequence of the German attack.

¹ See document No. 379.

² Not found.

I explained to the Duce that this was surely not intended by the Germans and, perhaps, not really by the Greeks either. The military situation in Epirus had become so hopeless for the Greeks in consequence of the strong pressure and the attack by the Italian Army Group, Albania. The appearance of a German motorized regiment in Ioannina on the route of retreat had merely given the Greeks the coup de grâce, so that they had decided to abandon resistance in view of the hopelessness of offering any further effective resistance to the advance of the Italian Army. It was to be explained on purely local grounds that the offer of the Greeks had first been made to the units that arrived in Ioannina. The Duce calmed down a bit at this, but then stated definitely that he could take part in the negotiations only if the capitulation were also offered to his troops. With renewed agitation he referred to the impeding of the Italian advance by the German troops that were said to have arrived near Ponte Berati. I tried to explain that it was natural that the German troops had pushed forward so far beyond Ioannina that they could shake hands with the Italian allies, but that, in accordance with the wish of the Italian High Command, the withdrawal of these troops toward Ioannina had already been requested.

With regard to point 2 of the draft of the capitulation, the Duce declared that he was opposed to allowing the Greek officers to retain their side arms. The Greek officers had behaved in the most outrageous manner toward the captured Italian officers, and of this he had definite proof. Since the capture of Klissoura on January 12, the Greeks had not wrested a single piece of ground from the Italians. It was impossible, therefore, to speak of the special achievements of the Greek Army.

I replied to the Duce that the strength of Greek military resistance had aroused the astonishment and admiration of the entire world. After all, one had to admit that the Greeks had fought valiantly and patriotically, for otherwise the Italian Army would have succeeded in a much shorter time in defeating the Greeks. We, too, had gained the impression in the attack on Thrace that the Greek soldier had fought bravely, and the Führer therefore considered it proper to recognize this bravery on the part of the enemy, which only enhanced our own achievement.

The Duce allowed himself to be persuaded and withdrew his objection to point 2, stating that he agreed to the plan of capitulation. Italy, however, would discuss it only if the Greeks offered to capitulate to the Italian Army also.

At 12:43 p.m. I reported to the OKW/WFSt. by telephone concerning the outcome of the conversation.

After I had learned on April 22 at 7:00 p.m. through the Chief of the OKW that the negotiations regarding capitulation had not been concluded, since the Italian General, Ferrero, was not authorized to sign, I inquired of the Italian High Command and found out that, at the personal direction of the Duce, General Ferrero had not been authorized to accept the offer of negotiations regarding capitulation from the Greeks; rather, this could be accepted only if it were made to the Italian troops fighting at the front.

At 8:30 p.m. General Guzzoni informed me that as late as 7:15 p.m. no negotiator had yet reached the Italian troops, and that the SS-Standarte Adolf Hitler was still at Ponte Berati.

On April 23, at 2:15 a.m. I received a telephone call from General Guzzoni who stated that the Greeks had offered to capitulate to Army Group, Cavallero and that General Ferrero was now authorized to affix his signature to the negotiations regarding capitulation. This information was passed on to the Führer's Headquarters at 2:35 a.m.

Even before a communication had arrived concerning the conclusion of the negotiations regarding capitulation the following special announcement was issued by orders of the Duce personally:

"The armies of the enemy in Epirus and Macedonia have laid down their arms.

"Capitulation was offered at 9:04 last evening by a Greek military delegation to the Commander of the Eleventh Italian Army at the Epirus front.

"The details of the surrender negotiations will now be established in complete agreement with the German allies."

At 3:30 p.m. I informed the Italian Armed Forces General Staff of the signing of the negotiations regarding capitulation which had taken place at 2:45 p.m.

From the conversations, I got the impression that the Duce was anxious to demonstrate to the Italian people as well as to foreign countries that Greek resistance had collapsed as a result of the victories of the Italian Army. In addition, he was confirmed in his stand by the fact that the Italian troops did not reach the Greek border until just then and, because of the appearance of the German troops at the Albanian border, were prevented from making the much-hoped for advance into Greek territory. The premature and unilateral publication of the offer of capitulation serves the same purpose of thrusting the achievements of the Italian troops into the foreground.

No. 410

2281/462203-06

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy

ROME, April 27, 1941.

Last night at 11:45 p.m. the duty officer of the Embassy sent word to me at the Hungarian Legation to the Vatican that the Reich Foreign Minister wanted to talk with me on the direct wire as soon as possible. The call came through at 12:07 a.m. today. The Foreign Minister was in Vienna. He first asked me if I felt it was possible to call on the Duce in the course of this night. I replied that while this would of course be possible, he knew perfectly well how much the Duce disliked being disturbed during the night, at least according to what Count Ciano said, unless matters were of such urgency as to require an immediate decision. The Foreign Minister felt that the matter at hand was of such nature. I should judge for myself. This is what was involved:

He had learned first through Field Marshal Keitel and later had it confirmed by the Führer, that the Greek General, Tsolakoglou, who recently had carried out on behalf of Greece the capitulation of Greek forces in Epirus and in Macedonia, had made an offer to Field Marshal List that he would be willing to form a government to take the place of the old Greek Government which had left the country.¹ Field Marshal List had added to his report the comment that he considered the General, who had repeatedly expressed sentiments friendly to the Axis before him, as being the right man to take on such a mission. The Foreign Minister added that such an offer was simply a gift from heaven, for us as well as for the Italians, because in this way the Athens Government which had been driven out could be replaced by a government headed by a man whose name meant something in Greece. Regardless of how matters developed, this would be of great value to us as we would then have on the Greek side an opposite party for everything that had to be discussed or negotiated. The advantages were obvious. From the *military* point of view the advantages were that the General would be in a position to issue at once a proclamation calling for a general capitulation, so that further unnecessary bloodshed would be avoided in the interest

¹ Tsolakoglou's offer had also been reported in a telegram sent to the Foreign Ministry by the OKH on Apr. 26 (142/127473), according to which Tsolakoglou's statement was as follows:

"I have stated to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, Field Marshal List, and I repeat once more that the army of Epirus and Macedonia which has made the greatest sacrifices in the war on behalf of the Greek people is ready to offer through its generals its services in forming a government in Athens.

We promise to serve his Excellency the Führer of the German people along the course desired by him."

of our soldiers; also, with his assistance it would be easier for us to get possession of the Greek islands and also of Greek ships. As for the *political* point of view, we would be dealing with a man who, he was convinced, was loyal toward the Axis. Furthermore, it would not be necessary in that case to hold separate negotiations with the individual military commanders.

The Foreign Minister added that the Führer was much taken by the idea and would like to consider the offer of the General if the Duce were agreeable. The General had already given assurances as to future cooperation, and these could if necessary be broadened and made binding. On the German side it had first of all been arranged that Consul General Benzler, who is slated to be representative of the Foreign Ministry in Athens, would proceed early this morning to Larissa, accompanied by one or more representatives of the OKW. For this reason it was important to know as soon as possible the Duce's stand in this matter.

I replied to the Foreign Minister that in these circumstances I agreed with him that the matter should be presented to the Duce this night, if possible. The latter would surely on this occasion bring up the question of sending along also an Italian delegation to Field Marshal List, to take part in the conversations with the Greek General, and I would appreciate having supplementary instructions in this respect. The Foreign Minister replied that the Duce could of course be given a completely free hand in this regard. He added in this connection that we would, of course, have to make efforts also to seek the remaining members of the future government from among Greek circles who were friendly toward us. He had in mind among others the Governor of Athens, Kotzias. For my part, I called his attention to former Minister of Justice Tambacopoulos.

The conversation ended with my promise to get in touch with Count Ciano as quickly as possible in order to discuss matters with the Duce.

Before the former had been located and before it had been possible to get in touch with him, the Foreign Minister called up again at 12:45 a.m. to say that the plane with Herr Benzler and party would not depart until between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., so that it would presumably be satisfactory if I called on the Duce in the early morning rather than during the night. I replied that I was already on the trail of Count Ciano and that in any case I would talk with him about the matter tonight. We would then see if he himself would not from a sense of urgency prefer to take up the matter at once with the Duce.

I went to see Count Ciano at his home at 1:15 a.m. and informed him about the situation. He stated that in his opinion it was essential

to inform the Duce at once so that he could make his decisions in time and that an Italian delegation could depart promptly; and he made at once an appointment for us by telephone with the Duce. We called on the latter at 1:30 a.m. at the Villa Torlonia. I outlined to him the situation created by the offer of General Tsolakoglou. He approved of the idea, although without any marked enthusiasm, emphasizing several times, to be sure, that we should harbor no illusions about Greek sincerity. He could tell some stories about their dependability. However, he was not unaware of the advantages for us, as I had presented them to him, which would result from the formation of such a government. We should however always keep Pétain before our eyes, who too had let the English know that he would not undertake anything against his former allies. The Duce then put his views in writing in the form of a reply addressed to the Führer and gave me his memorandum, asking me to transmit it as quickly as possible.²

After a brief consultation with Ciano, the Duce selected Minister Anfuso to be the Italian representative, whom General Ferrero, Chief of Staff of General Cavallero in Albania, would accompany to Larissa. If unexpectedly Anfuso could not make the flight because of weather, his place would have to be taken by a suitable official from Albania; as such, Ciano designated Signor Parini, *Chief de Cabinet* of the Viceroy in Tirana.³

From the Embassy I established a connection with the Special Train once more at 2:30 a.m. and because the Foreign Minister had in the meantime retired, I asked the aide on duty to report to him the first thing in the morning that the conversation with the Duce had taken place in the course of the night and had produced a positive result. Further details would be contained in a cipher telegram via teletype which should reach the Special Train early in the morning.

I passed the telegram to the coding section at 3:00 a.m. and it was dispatched at 5:30 a.m.⁴

² Mussolini's reply was reported verbatim in Rome telegram No. 935 of Apr. 27 (B13/B001775-76) which gave an account of the conversation with Mussolini. An Italian text of Mussolini's message (2281/482209) reads as follows:

"Führer: Ambassador Mackensen has transmitted to me your communication regarding the establishment of a new Greek government proposed by General Tsolakoglou. I am fully in agreement with you in considering that the establishment of a new Greek government favorably disposed toward the Axis is useful and will facilitate the further development of the situation. I am therefore sending General Ferrero and Minister Anfuso to Larissa. I want to add that the function of the new government must signify the application of the clauses of the armistice with the necessary occupations of territory which will guarantee the Axis against any kind of future surprises."

³ For Ciano's account of this démarche see *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Apr. 27, 1941.

⁴ See footnote 2.

To make certain I called the office of the [Foreign Minister's] aides at 9:30 a.m. to say that if the telegram had not yet arrived, to get in touch with the coding section at once.⁵

MACKENSEN

⁵ In telegram No. 972 of Apr. 29 (B13/B001785-87) Ribbentrop informed the Embassy in Rome of the negotiations carried on with Tsolakoglou by Minister Benzler, the Foreign Ministry representative at Twelfth Army Headquarters, jointly with an Italian delegation. Establishment of the Tsolakoglou Government was announced on Apr. 29 (Athens telegram No. 11 of Apr. 29: 142/-127500). The substance of a confidential protocol defining the functions and obligations of the new Government and a list of its members was reported in Athens telegram No. 12 of Apr. 29 (142/127501-02).

No. 411

589/244484

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, April 27, 1941—4:20 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received April 28—3:50 a. m.

No. 1176 of April 27

- 1) For the State Secretary personally.
- 2) For the Chief of the General Staff of the Army personally.

A confidant of Colonel Lindbergh called on General Bötticher and made the urgent request that the German press and German publications of all sorts refrain from all discussion of Lindbergh's stand, his fight against the warmongers and his speeches. Halfeld's article in the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* has been thoroughly exploited in the American press in order to prove that Lindbergh is working for Germany.¹

Lindbergh is of the opinion that he can prevail against Roosevelt's warlike policy if the necessary restraint is observed by the Germans and also by the Italians. General Bötticher, who is the only one who can maintain direct contact with these circles around Lindbergh which are so very important for us, has repeatedly requested the greatest restraint with regard to Lindbergh and repeatedly pointed to the extraordinary importance of this man. Thus for example in telegram No. 1195 of June 15, 1940.²

¹ The *New York Times* of Apr. 25, p. 13, discussed Halfeld's article in the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* describing an "America First" rally in New York in which Lindbergh took a prominent part.

² In this telegram (19/12290-91) the Embassy had suggested that the German press should refrain from commenting on Lindbergh's speech and, if noting it at all, should only indicate its contents; this would be the best way to support Lindbergh.

Lindbergh represents the best of the Americans, who are most important for us now and in the future. The contacts with him are maintained through a group in the General Staff which has the greatest importance as a counterweight against Jews and war-mongers. Handling these contacts and observing Lindbergh's suggestions does not only involve political matters, but also important military matters.³

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

³ In telegram No. 1220 of May 1 (593/245081-32) Thomsen dealt with this subject once more and reiterated his views.

No. 412

83/61614

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL TRAIN, April 27, 1941—10:45 p. m.

No. 345 of April 27 from

the Special Train

Received Berlin, April 27—11:30 p. m.

No. 365 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent April 27.

Through Italy the Iraq Government has sent us an urgent request for aid. Please see to it that the Iraq Minister in Ankara, with reference to this, either receives full powers himself for discussions on this matter or that he has the Iraq Government send a confidential representative to Ankara immediately. In either case the presence of one or two military experts on the Iraq side would be necessary. We for our part intend to send Minister Grobba. A further communication will follow regarding German military experts.

For reasons of secrecy the Italian Government has merely been informed that in this matter we are trying to contact Baghdad through a special channel.¹ Please refrain from informing your Italian colleague there about details and enjoin the Iraq Minister to do the same. Report by telegram.²

RIEBENTROP

¹ See document No. 413.

² In telegram No. 460 of Apr. 28 from Ankara (83/61616) Kroll reported that the Iraq Minister strongly advised against having such discussions in Ankara because it was impossible to keep the matter secret from the British; instead he suggested Iran as a place for the discussions.

No. 413

83/61615

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 346 of April 27 SPECIAL TRAIN, April 27, 1941—11:00 p. m.
from the Special Train Received Berlin, April 27—11:30 p. m.
No. 961 of April 27
from the Foreign Ministry Sent April 27.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 888¹ and 907.²

1. Please tell the Foreign Ministry the following:

We suggest that for the time being the Iraq Government merely be told through the Italian Minister in Baghdad that the Axis Powers stand behind the present Iraq Government, the Iraq Army, and the Iraq people in complete sympathy in their struggle against England, and will do everything that they possibly can. The Iraq Government may expect a further communication in a short time.

2. Please inform the Italian Government further that we are prepared to aid Iraq financially, and are still studying the question of assistance with arms and munitions. For the sake of secrecy, we intend to establish connections with the Iraq Government through a special channel. We will inform the Italian Government further in regard to this as soon as possible. In these circumstances, it appears advisable to us to postpone for the time being the sending of the Italian staff officer to Baghdad (tel. 907, point 5) in order that confusion may not result from duplication.

3. The necessary arrangements regarding the radio broadcasts (tel. 907, point 5) will be made here. Report by wire.³

RIBBENTROP

¹ See document No. 401, footnote 1.

² Document No. 401.

³ In telegram No. 949 of Apr. 29 (83/61618-20) Mackensen reported that the instructions had been transmitted to the Italian Foreign Ministry where it was promised that the German position would be brought to Count Ciano's attention without delay.

No. 414

230/153189

The Legation in Belgrade to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BELGRADE, April 27, 1941.

No. 77 of April 27

Received April 28—12:15 a. m.

The Military Commander in Serbia¹ intends to establish a Serbian administration and for this purpose to appoint provisional heads of a number of still existing Yugoslav governmental departments. Leading personality in this connection is said to be Milan Acimović who was formerly head of the police and Minister of Interior in the Stojadinović Cabinet, and who is slated for the Ministry of Interior. It is hoped to secure Ljotić² for the Ministry of Economics. There had been plans for making Radosavljević, who is governor of the National Bank, Finance Minister, but he declined and will continue as head of the National Bank. The well-known Minister Dušan Pantić will become Minister of Posts; Stanislaus Josifović will take over Public Works; Momčilo Janković, former minister under Stojadinović, Justice; Miloslav Vasiarjević, the Ministry of Social Welfare. Apart from the Ministry of Finance, there are still vacant Culture, where Djordje Perić will be Under State Secretary, also the Ministries of Transport and Food.³

Cincar-Marković, who was asked to take part and was offered the Education Ministry, has declined for reasons of health.

FEINE

¹ Gen. Helmuth Förster.

² Leader of the right-wing Zbor Movement. In telegram No. 90 of Apr. 29 (230/153918) Feine reported that Ljotić had declined the post. This report also noted other changes in the list of provisional heads of Serbian ministries and emphasized that the appointees were predominantly members of the Stojadinović party and the Ljotić group.

³ In a dispatch of May 1 (529/238644-47) Feine reported that the names of the provisional heads of governmental departments had been published that day and in that connection he submitted some background material on the appointees.

No. 415

83/61153-62

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister

VIENNA, April 27, 1941.

BRIEF FOR THE FÜHRER¹

Subject: Developments in Iraq.

The present Iraq Government is to be considered as definitely anti-English. It is supported by the Army, which is likewise predominantly anti-English. Regarding the recent English landings, English sources are spreading propaganda figures that have no relation to the facts. It is the same method that was used in Greece, where figures of up to 200,000 men were cited falsely. Also the high figures received by the Wehrmacht regarding troops landed so far do not agree with the consistent reports received here from Ankara and Tehran based on Iraq, Japanese, Italian, and Turkish sources.² The troops landed so far seem as in the past to be scheduled for transit to Transjordan, Palestine, and Egypt. These movements are also of importance for our troops in North Africa. But it can very well be assumed that the English will try in every way to establish themselves in Iraq contrary to the desire of the Iraq Government and Army, to gain possession of the Mosul oil and from there also to obtain jump-off positions against Syria and for the purpose of exerting pressure on Turkey.

In the last few days the Iraq Government, in accord with the Army, has repeatedly and urgently asked us through the Italian Minister in Baghdad for support. It desires in particular support by the Luftwaffe in case of hostilities between the Iraq and English Armies, delivery of arms and ammunition by air, and financial aid.

I. For support with arms and ammunition preparations are being made for the following:

1. Arms deliveries destined for Iran are to be left behind in Iraq. The arms are available. It involves 500 to 600 tons. It will take several weeks to carry this through.

2. A similar course of action with respect to arms deliveries to Afghanistan. Carrying this out will take 2 to 3 months.

3. Arms deliveries from the French stocks of the former Weygand Army in Syria, which were placed under supervision. The execution will be treated as one of the military-political counterdemands offsetting the French wishes for the service of seven submarines and six

¹ Marginal note: "Shown to the Führer. Hew[el], Apr. 28."

² Such reports were transmitted in Ankara telegram No. 414 of Apr. 21 (83/61594), Tehran telegram No. 292 of Apr. 22 (83/61598), and Tehran telegram No. 299 of Apr. 24 (83/61607).

destroyers. Because of the Italian Military Control Commission the examination of this matter in Syria will be undertaken with the aid of Abetz and of the OKW.³

4. Arms deliveries by sea through an Italian corsair operation, likewise via Syria. The Italians are making preparations for this.

5. Arms deliveries by the German Luftwaffe. If the Führer consents to this in principle, such an operation could be prepared to the point where it would require only an order at the proper moment.

II. Support of the Iraq Army in the struggle against England through commitment of our Luftwaffe has been discussed with the Luftwaffe Operations Staff in a preparatory and informational manner.⁴ Whether further military commitment by the Axis will be possible in the future, perhaps by way of Syria, depends on the further development of German-French relations.

The prerequisite for carrying out these operations is that we gain still more clarity about the situation in Iraq, especially whether or not the British are so strong there that any operations of the sort would have to be considered useless.

Therefore contact should be established first in Ankara with the Iraq Government, with the military experts participating.⁵ The take-off order which may be issued at the proper time would depend upon the results of these conversations. The Iraq Government should by no means be induced to enter into an open fight against England until it is certain that Iraq is strong enough with the aid of the Axis to hold her own against the English.

R[IBBENTROP]

³ See documents Nos. 421, 442, and 459.

⁴ See document No. 407.

⁵ See document No. 412.

No. 416

222/149577-79

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 1170 of April 28

BUCHAREST, April 28, 1941—1:40 a.m.

Received April 29—12:15 a.m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

General Antonescu went into detail with me yesterday concerning the ideas about Rumania's position in the Balkans contained in the memorandum² that was passed on to the Führer a few days ago. At

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 1451 to the Special Train, Apr. 28."

² See document No. 387.

the beginning of his remarks he said that he felt aligned with the Führer's policy until his death, and that the cooperation with Italy came only in second place. The latter idea was tellingly expressed by the fact that the Italian Minister,³ who was with me in the General's house at the time of the conversation, was asked not to participate in it.

Antonescu pointed in particular to the danger of a union of the Slavs, and in this connection characterized the history of the Rumanians as a "barrier" against the Slavs and the Turks.

As a solution he proposed:

1. German connection with the Black Sea via Lvov;
2. A German connection with the Black Sea via Rumania by enlarging Slovakia;
3. Establishment of a condominium along the line Belgrade-Salonika with the aid of the Macedonian Rumanians;
4. In this way the establishment of a route linking Germany with Salonika which is not dominated by Slavs.

This was a policy of the future, which had nothing to do with him personally; for this reason, too, it did not aim in a decisive manner at any special territorial aspirations of Rumania's but was conceived in the interest of Europe's future. If the connection between the Greater German Reich and Salonika were established by means of a corridor, a twofold purpose would be achieved:

1. Separation of the Bulgarians and the Serbs, who, as Slavs, would otherwise very soon gravitate toward Bulgaria.
2. The strengthening of the German influence with respect to the Slavs on the one hand and the Italians on the other; in this context General Antonescu pointed out that the Italians would not summon the strength to hold out against the Slavic influence and that they would hardly be in a position to break the local resistance in the former Yugoslav territory.

Going over to purely military matters, the General pointed to the still existing difficulties of an expedition in the eastern Mediterranean area from Greece to Egypt, and emphasized that in contrast to this a drive against the Soviet Union as a first operation was the logical thing. Of course it had to be taken into account that the Luftwaffe was in a position to operate from the Peloponnesus against Suez; but a large-scale landing operation would still encounter difficulties for as long a time as the English fleet was present in the Mediterranean. General Antonescu on the other hand considers an operation through Turkey also to be very difficult. A drive against the Russian Army, which was already concentrated at the border with about 140 divisions, would not present 13 German armies with any difficulty at

³ Pellegrino Ghigi.

the present time, that is, as long as the support of England by the United States of America was not yet effective, and it could be carried out successfully within a month. The reserves of the Soviet Army could not be brought up at all within this short time because of technical transportation difficulties. On the other hand these operations would offer the following advantages:

1. Elimination of the Slavic danger and therewith of the second greatest enemy of the Reich.
2. Opening up of the routes to the oil fields in Baku and Iraq, and to India.

Taking also into consideration the supply problem of Europe General Antonescu said that military operations against the USSR had to be carried out at a time when the harvest was still green and could not be destroyed. Then the alleged disadvantage that would arise as a result of a temporary stoppage of deliveries would turn into an advantage. Furthermore, if Germany did not move she would run the risk of having Russia slowing down deliveries and causing difficulties, using one pretext or another, and one day herself striking when the situation was favorable because of cooperation with the Anglo-American bloc. The General remarked that he believed he could today clearly recognize a plan of cooperation between Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and the USSR linked with the Anglo-American bloc. The military concentration of the Soviet Army in the area of Lvov and Chernovtsy, the concentration of the Turkish troops in the Thracian plain—entirely inexplicable from the military standpoint—and numerous other factors point to the existence of a plan to strike Germany at this vulnerable point. Even today one had to be prepared for surprises by the Soviet Army, which would represent a kind of act of desperation.

General Antonescu knows nothing about Turkish troops being withdrawn to Anatolia; he had told the Turkish Minister before his departure for Ankara his views which are known to the effect that Turkey's military situation would have disastrous effects unless within a short time she adopted a clear position with respect to the Reich.

V. KILLINGER

No. 417

221/149250-52

*The Office of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the
German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

WIESBADEN, April 28, 1941—2:35 a.m.

No. 119 of April 27

Received April 28—4:25 a.m.

With reference to our teletype message No. 118 of April 27.¹

That the chairman of the French delegation was able after only 30 hours to announce that the French Government consented to the German request for the transfer of motor vehicles in North Africa is probably to be attributed in the main to the fact that he discussed the matter with Admiral Darlan in Paris and that Darlan made an affirmative decision regarding the German request without consulting the other members of the Government. The willingness of the French to sell the motor vehicles is to be appreciated all the more in that the conduct of the war against the English by the Axis Powers will in this way be aided directly and the French must expect that the English and Americans will criticize them vehemently on that account and possibly place difficulties in the way of supplying the homeland and the North African possessions. The French Government has not made its consent conditional upon [fulfillment of] any counterdemands whatever and has merely expressed certain wishes with regard to the release of the remainder of the motor vehicles in stock, release of French prisoners of war, and relaxation of controls in Mediterranean ports.

The attitude of Darlan in this question is a further indication of the willingness of the French Government to go far beyond the stipulations of the Armistice Treaty in meeting German wishes and thus prove by actions their willingness to collaborate. The French Government has recently been accommodating especially on the following questions:

Sale of 13,000 trucks which were in stock in occupied metropolitan France;²

Negotiations on the execution of the German plane production program and on deliveries of naval gun powder, explosives, ammunition, and war material.³

¹ In this telegram (378/209571-73) Welck passed on a detailed report from the German Armistice Commission to the OKW regarding the purchase of French motor vehicles in North Africa. Further details about this transaction have been filmed on 378/209587-70.

² Details of this transaction are recorded in Grote memoranda of Mar. 4 and Apr. 4 (378/209479-81, 209538-40); cf. *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. iv, pp. 31 ff. and pp. 74 ff.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 279 ff.

According to information by the appropriate group of the Armistice Commission the negotiations on the plane production program are almost concluded while the negotiations on other armament questions will presumably still take a certain time. However, thus far the course of these negotiations too has indicated that there is great willingness to be accommodating.

In connection with the German armament program the French Government has expressed particularly the following military and economic wishes, which are directly related to the implementation of the program:

The release of antiaircraft artillery and fighter planes for the protection of French industry against possible British air attacks;
Provision by Germany of the raw materials, coal, fuel, etc. needed for production; release of technicians held as prisoners of war;
Improvement of the food supply for the French people, especially the workers.

In addition, the chairman of the French delegation has repeatedly emphasized that the French Government would eagerly welcome more far-reaching "gestures" by the German Government for improving public sentiment in France and thereby consolidating the position of the French Government. Hitherto France has always performed in advance in all fields and there is a widespread impression among the French that in Franco-German "collaboration" France only gives and Germany only takes. In this connection Doyen mentioned especially the following political and economic questions:

Relaxation of controls at the demarcation line,
Abolition of the restricted zone in northern and eastern France,
Placing of the départements of Nord and Pas-de-Calais under the Military Commander of France,
Release of additional prisoners of war, especially of farmers,
Cessation of further confiscation of French estates in the restricted zone by the Ostland-Gesellschaft.⁴

The representative of the French Foreign Ministry also said that the immediate provision of seed potatoes and turnip seed by Germany was especially urgent.

In agreement with the Chairman of the Armistice Commission I should like to suggest for your consideration that the present moment might be especially appropriate for making certain concessions

⁴The Ostland-Gesellschaft was a state organization which, under German direction, expropriated and exploited rural properties in the départements of Aisne, Nord, Meurthe, Moselle, and Ardennes; the former owners of these properties were dispossessed and turned into agricultural laborers. See *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. IV, pp. 188-193, 332, 342, 345, 361, and 386-387.

to the French Government in these political and economic questions, the more so since here, too, the German interest coincides to a large extent with that of the French.

WELCK

No. 418

177/85030

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1941—2:48 p. m.

No. 1181 of April 28

Received April 29—2:00 a.m.

As communicated to me by an absolutely reliable source, the State Department is in possession of the key to the Japanese coding system and is therefore also able to decipher information telegrams from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura here regarding Ambassador Oshima's reports from Berlin.

THOMSEN

No. 419

F15/S11-12

Memorandum by the State Secretary

Teletype Message¹

BERLIN, April 28, 1941.

Concerning Count Schulenburg's memorandum² on German-Russian relations:

I can summarize in one sentence my views on a German-Russian conflict: If every Russian city reduced to ashes were as valuable to us as a sunken British warship, I should advocate the German-Russian war for this summer; but I believe that we would be victors over Russia only in a military sense, and would, on the other hand, lose in an economic sense.

It might perhaps be considered an alluring prospect to give the Communist system its death blow and it might also be said that it was inherent in the logic of things to muster the Eurasian continent against Anglo-Saxondom and its following. But the sole decisive factor is whether this project will hasten the fall of England.

¹ Marginal note at the head of the document in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Transmitted to Vienna by telephone by Secretary of Legation Schweimer. Apr. 28."

² A handwritten "x" at this point relates to a marginal note which reads: "Not in the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, and likewise not the supplement by Schulenburg."

The reference is apparently to a memorandum which was drafted in the Moscow Embassy for Hitler and warning of the dangers in armed conflict with the USSR. See Gustav Hilger, *The Incompatible Allies* (New York, 1953), p. 328. No copy of that memorandum has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

We must distinguish between two possibilities:

a) England is close to collapse: if we accept this [assumption], we should be wrong to encourage England by taking on a new opponent. Russia is no potential ally of the English. England can expect nothing good from Russia. Hope in Russia is not postponing England's collapse. With Russia we do not destroy any English hopes.³

b) If we do not believe in the imminent collapse of England, then the thought might suggest itself that by the use of force, we must feed ourselves from Soviet territory. I take it as a matter of course that we shall advance victoriously to Moscow and beyond that. I doubt very much, however, whether we shall be able to turn to account what we have won in the face of the well-known passive resistance of the Slavs. I do not see in the Russian realm any effective opposition capable of succeeding the Communist system and uniting with us and being of service to us. We would therefore probably have to reckon with a continuation of the Stalin system in eastern Russia and in Siberia and with a renewed outbreak of hostilities in the spring of 1942. The window to the Pacific Ocean would remain shut.

A German attack on Russia would only give the English a new moral lift. It would be interpreted there as German uncertainty as to the success of our fight against England. We would thereby not only be admitting that the war was going to last a long time yet, but we might actually prolong it in this way, instead of shortening it.

WEIZSÄCKER

This position is drafted in very brief form, since the Foreign Minister wanted it within the shortest possible time.⁴ WEIZSÄCKER.

³ This sentence was written in the typescript by hand. A supplementary typewritten note dated Apr. 28 (F15/313) directs that the sentence be telephoned or telegraphed to Vienna. The typewritten note bears a handwritten notation that the sentence was telegraphed Apr. 28, at 3:40 p.m.

⁴ In Weizsäcker's memoirs, *Erinnerungen* (Munich, Leipzig, and Freiburg, 1950), pp. 314-315, it is stated that Ribbentrop was preparing a memorandum for Hitler on the subject of war with Soviet Russia and had demanded the memorandum by Weizsäcker in this connection. No record of such a memorandum by Ribbentrop has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

No. 420

104/113378

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1160 of April 28

BUCHAREST, April 28, 1941—6:55 p. m.

Received April 28—7:30 p. m.

Gafencu reported from Moscow on April 25 that prolongation of the visit of Herr von der Schulenburg was arousing surprise and caused the comment that Germany was going to pose the question of

confidence to the USSR and demand a clear attitude with respect to Yugoslavia. This has made a lasting impression also in Soviet quarters; in this connection it is rumored that preparations are in process to send away children and valuables from the German Embassy. Gafencu described the internal situation in the Soviet Union as completely obscure. The Soviet Union was pursuing a policy of the drawn sword. He thinks that the internal situation could drive Russia into the war, and he no longer regards his view that the USSR was ready to proceed from compromise to compromise with the Axis as unconditionally certain. Considering the "amorphous" structure of the Soviet state, the very sharp reaction of public opinion to the pact with Yugoslavia and the German invasion of Yugoslavia was a significant reflection of the atmosphere.

KILLINGER

No. 421

792/272972-74

The Foreign Minister to the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht

VIENNA, April 28, 1941.

DEAR FIELD MARSHAL: As a *political* concession in return for permission for the rearming of seven French torpedo boats and six French destroyers¹ the replacement of unreliable French officials in Syria, Tunis, Algeria, Morocco, and French West Africa, in accordance with a list of German and Italian recommendations, can be demanded.

The *military* concession contemplated, to assist and supply German submarines and certain merchant vessels on the West African coast, could at present be provided only in secret, because any official assistance might bring on English hostilities against French naval bases in West Africa.

A concession of both *military* and *political* character that ought also be demanded would be the providing of Iraq with arms from the military stores in Syria under Italian control, French assistance for arms shipments to Iraq through Syria, and permission for stopovers in Syria of German aircraft destined for Iraq.

Since the German counterdemands on Vichy must not reach the ears of the English and Americans, it might be advisable not to inform the French Government of them through the French Armistice Commission, but to inform Darlan of them directly by word of mouth, through the German Ambassador in Paris. I should recom-

¹ See document No. 415.

mend that for this purpose a representative of the High Command of the Wehrmacht be sent to Paris, in order to discuss all the details.

If Darlan, in the name of his Government, promises to meet the German counterdemands in principle, I would then suggest the following timetable:

1) Contact of the special representative of the High Command of the Wehrmacht with the Chairman of the Italian Armistice Commission concerning the confidential procedure to be followed in these matters.

2) Establishing the quantities and route of the arms to be transferred by the French Mandate Government in Syria to Iraq in a confidential meeting of Ambassador Abetz and the special representative of the High Command of the Wehrmacht with Darlan and, if necessary, Huntziger.

3) Permission by Wiesbaden and Turin for the rearmament of seven French torpedo boats.

4) Issuance of secret instructions from Darlan to the French naval bases in West Africa agreed upon, that they should supply and assist any German submarines and merchant vessels that should arrive.

5) Permission by Wiesbaden and Turin for the rearmament of six French destroyers.

6) Permission by Wiesbaden and Turin for the rearmed units to sail, as soon as Darlan's oral promises to replace unreliable colonial officials in accordance with German and Italian recommendations, to supply and assist German submarines and merchant ships in the French naval bases of West Africa, and to provide arms for Iraq through Syria, have been fulfilled in several conclusive instances.²

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

RIBBENTROP

²In his reply of May 3 (83/61165) Keitel indicated his approval of Ribbentrop's proposals. See, further, documents Nos. 442 and 459.

No. 422

F15/041-44

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Füh. 25

BERLIN, April 28, 1941.

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND SPANISH AMBASSADOR ESPINOSA AT THE REICH CHANCELLERY ON APRIL 28, 1941

In the course of a brief conversation lasting about 10 minutes the Führer expressed to the Spanish Ambassador his concern over the

motives behind the present English propaganda on Spanish affairs. When the English talked about the alleged transit of German troops and the construction of airfields and similar false reports, he (the Führer) was afraid that they did this only to have a pretext for some operation against Spain or Spanish Morocco.

To a question by the Führer whether Spain was on her guard, Espinosa replied that he regarded the English press campaign purely as a propaganda move. The English would not dare to undertake anything of consequence. The Führer replied that he could not escape the impression that the English had the intention of establishing themselves on Spanish territory. He was also convinced that the British Government would do everything to replace the Generalissimo with a leftist Spanish government, which would be more amenable to English wishes. In this connection the Führer expressed deep regret that the operation against Gibraltar could not have been launched in January or February, as planned.¹ If it had, Gibraltar would be taken today and German troops would be in Morocco, too. The situation of the English in the Mediterranean would then have been impossible, while today it would not be so easy to take Gibraltar as it would have been in February, because the English had in the meantime been working feverishly on the fortification of the Rock, as was evident from the numerous shiploads of cement which had arrived in Gibraltar.

The current objective of the English was to establish themselves in North Africa, to occupy the Portuguese islands, and overthrow Franco. Only yesterday he (the Führer) had received information in this regard which caused him serious misgivings. In these circumstances he was afraid for North Africa.² The English would want to land there in order to establish new airfields. In order to inspire new courage in their own people, they would, in their desperate situation, gladly grasp every opportunity, even if it gave scope only for short-term operations of 4 weeks, so as to gain a little more time, just as they had done in the Balkans. If they now asserted that the Empire troops had, for the first time in the war, shown their superiority over the German troops and had only retreated before their numerical superiority, this was simply ridiculous. The German troops had been held up by nothing more than the English bridge

¹ See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 707 and 718.

² The Records of Situation Conferences of the Defense Branch by Helmuth Greiner, Aug. 8, 1940-June 25, 1941 (typescript, MS C-0651, of the U.S. Army, Historical Division, European Command) contains this passage at April 30, 1941:

"... The Führer expects British measures against the Iberian Peninsula. The OKH will, therefore, make all preparations to release quietly eight to ten divisions in order to be able to support Spain and Portugal in ousting landed enemy forces..."

and road demolitions. Their advance had, moreover, been slowed down because of the fact that in the narrow valleys and on the narrow roads it was always only the advance elements of a division which were in contact with the enemy, while the rest could not be moved up because of the conditions mentioned above. However, wherever German troops had engaged the English, the latter had fled the battlefield.

In conclusion the Spanish Ambassador emphasized once more that he did not believe that the English would undertake anything of a serious nature.

The Führer then dismissed him with another warning to be cautious.³

(SCHMIDT)

³ In telegram No. 1486 of May 1 (136/74808) Stohrer reported that Suñer did not seem to be quite satisfied with Espinosa's attitude during his conversation with Hitler. Suñer also expressed an unmistakable apprehension lest Germany would march into Spain on the pretext of forestalling the British.

No. 423

F15/315-20

Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union, at the Time in Germany¹

TOP SECRET

CONVERSATION OF THE FÜHRER WITH AMBASSADOR COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG, ON APRIL 28, 1941, FROM 5:15 P. M. TO 5:45 P. M.²

The Führer began with the question whether I would be back in Moscow by May 1, which I answered in the affirmative since I wanted to be present at the review.

The Führer then mentioned that I had been present in Moscow during the visit of Matsuoka, and asked what was the opinion of the

¹ In telegram No. 344 of Apr. 27, from Ribbentrop's special train (104/113377), Schulenburg was requested to make a memorandum of his conversation with Hitler for presentation to the Foreign Minister.

A note (F15/314) preceding the memorandum reads:

"Office of the Foreign Minister.

The original of the enclosed memorandum together with two carbon copies was sent today to Vienna at 3:00 p.m. by air courier.

Respectfully submitted to the State Secretary for his information.

Berlin, Apr. 29, Lohmann."

² According to Hilger (*The Incompatible Allies*, p. 328) Schulenburg at the interview with Hitler saw on the table the memorandum which had been drafted in Moscow and which the Ambassador submitted on arriving in Berlin. But Schulenburg could not learn if Hitler had read it. See document No. 419, footnote 2.

Russians of the Russo-Japanese Agreement. I replied that the Russians had been very pleased at concluding it, even though they had had to make concessions.

The Führer thereupon asked me what kind of devil had possessed the Russians to conclude the Friendship Pact with Yugoslavia.³ I expressed the opinion that it was solely a matter of the declaration of Russian interests in the Balkans. Russia had done something each time that we undertook anything in the Balkans. Then, too, we had probably been obligated by the consultative pact⁴ to consult the Russians. Russia, to be sure, had no special interest in Yugoslavia, but certainly had in the Balkans, in principle. The Führer said that upon conclusion of the Russo-Yugoslav Friendship Pact he had had the feeling that Russia had wanted to frighten us off. I denied this and repeated that the Russians had only intended to serve notice of their interest, but had nevertheless behaved correctly by informing us of their intention.

The Führer then said that it was not yet clear who had pulled the strings in the overthrow of the Yugoslav Government. England or Russia! In his opinion it had been the English, while the Balkan peoples all had the impression that Russia had been behind it. I replied that, as seen from Moscow, there was nothing to support the theory that Russia had had her hand in it. As an example, I cited the lack of success of the Yugoslav Minister in Moscow, Gavrilović, whose attempts to interest the Soviet Union in the Yugoslav cause were abortive until the last moment. The Yugoslav-Russian Agreement had become a reality only when Yugoslavia seized the initiative after the Putsch and sent officers who offered the treaty. Russia had then concluded the Agreement on the principle that an instrument of peace was involved. Now, Russia was very apprehensive at the rumors predicting a German attack on Russia. The Führer insisted that the Russians had begun the strategic concentrations, since they had concentrated needlessly large numbers of divisions in the Baltic area. I replied that this was a matter of the well-known Russian urge for 300 percent security. If for any reason we sent one German division, they would send 10 for the same purpose in order to be completely safe. I could not believe that Russia would ever attack Germany. The Führer said that he had been forewarned by events in Serbia. What had happened there was to him an example of the political unreliability of a state.

The Führer went on at some length about the nations misled by England, particularly about the development of her political endeavors in Yugoslavia. England had hoped for a Yugoslav-Greek-

³ See document No. 265 and footnote 2.

⁴ See vol. VII of this series, document No. 223.

Turko-Russian front in the southeast and had striven for this broad grouping of powers in memory of the Salonika front in the World War. He regretted exceedingly that—because of these efforts of England—he had now been forced to move against poor little Greece also. It had been repugnant to him to have to strike down, against his natural impulses, this small, plucky nation. The Yugoslav coup d'état had come suddenly out of the blue. When the news of it was brought to him on the morning of the 27th, he thought it was a joke. When one had gone through that sort of thing one was bound to be suspicious. Nations today allowed hatred and perhaps also financial interests to determine their policies rather than good sense and logic, and so it had happened that as a result of the promises and the lies of the English, one after another, the Poles, to whom he had offered the most favorable terms; France, who had not wanted the war at all; Holland and Belgium; Norway, and now Greece, and Yugoslavia had plunged to disaster. It might be said that the masses could not help it, but he dealt not with the peoples but with the governments. And Greece had decidedly not been neutral! Her press had been impudent. Greece had always been sympathetic to England and had, above all, placed her shipping and her submarine bases at the disposal of England. Turkey, too, had very nearly taken the same road. He did not, it was true, believe that Russia could be hired to attack Germany, but strong instincts of hatred had survived, nevertheless, and, above all, Russian determination to approach closer to Finland and the Dardanelles was unchanged, as Molotov had allowed clearly to be seen on his visit. When he considered all this, he was obliged to be careful.

I pointed out that Cripps had not succeeded until 6 days after the conclusion of the Russo-Yugoslav Treaty in even speaking to Molotov's Deputy, Vyshinsky. I further reminded him that Stalin had told Matsuoka he was committed to the Axis and could not collaborate with England and France, as well as of the scene at the railroad station, which Stalin had purposely brought about in order to demonstrate publicly his intention to collaborate with the Axis.⁵ In 1939 England and France had taken all conceivable means to win Russia over to their side, and if Stalin had not been able to decide in favor of England and France at a time when England and France were both still strong, I believed that he would certainly not make such a decision today, when France was destroyed and England badly battered. On the contrary, I was convinced that Stalin was prepared to make even further concessions to us. It had already been intimated to our economic negotiators that (if we applied in due time) Russia could supply us up to 5 million tons of grain next year. Cit-

⁵ See document No. 333.

ing figures, the Führer said he thought that Russian deliveries were limited by transportation conditions. I pointed out that a more thorough utilization of Russian ports would obviate the difficulties of transportation.

The Führer then took leave of me.⁶

⁶ According to Hilger (*The Incompatible Allies*, p. 328), at the end of the conversation Hitler said to Schulenburg: "Oh, one more thing: I do not intend a war against Russia." When Hilger met Schulenburg at the Moscow airport on Apr. 30 he was told that the die was cast, war had been decided. The Ambassador explained that Hitler had deliberately lied to him.

No. 424

7815/E566880-81

Memorandum by the Special Representative in Charge of Economic Questions

SUPPLEMENT TO THE REPORT OF APRIL 28, 1941, BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE REGARDING HIS TRAVELS¹

On the occasion of my sojourn in Bratislava, the State President invited me, together with Minister Ludin, for a talk at the President's office, in which Minister President Tuka participated. The initiative for this talk undoubtedly came from Tuka, who was afraid that final decisions were being taken at the conversations regarding the determination of frontiers in southeastern Europe, then held in Vienna,² without Slovakia's having an opportunity to state her wishes. Tuka said that he intended to send an official from his Foreign Ministry to Vienna and mobilize his Viennese connections in order to obtain for this representative an audience with the Reich Foreign Minister. He would for his part keep himself in readiness for any call.

I declared most decidedly that I considered such a step quite inexpedient because the Vienna conference was not dealing with any Middle-European frontier questions outside of the Yugoslav problem. Presenting Slovak wishes in Vienna was therefore completely useless; it could only be a subject of current information for the Reich Foreign Minister through the usual channel of the Minister.³ Tuka pointed out that the great territorial gains by the Hungarians made

¹ This report by Neubacher (7815/E566871-79) concerned a trip to Bratislava and Budapest for the purpose of discussing principles of the future economic cooperation of the nations of Europe and of finding out what the ideas of the political leaders of the countries concerned were with regard to this problem. The discussions in Bratislava were held Apr. 20-21, those in Budapest Apr. 22-24.

² See documents Nos. 378 and 385.

³ See document No. 406 and footnote 3.

this a favorable moment for Slovak wishes which would have to be satisfied by Hungary. I said that I was compelled to doubt it. With the aid of an ethnographic map, Tuka defended the justice of the Slovak demand for incorporation of Hungarian border areas settled by Slovaks, and especially referred to Kaschau (Košice).

We allowed matters to rest, with Minister Ludin promising that he would speak to the Reich Foreign Minister about these matters at an early date.

During this talk I had the impression that State President Tiso did not think very much of Tuka's initiative but did not wish to leave himself open to the criticism that he failed to support a nationalist action on the part of his political rival. He kept out of the discussion almost completely.

HERMANN NEUBACHER

No. 425

67/47245-66

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RAM 26

BERLIN, May 1, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND INDIAN NATIONALIST LEADER BOSE IN THE HOTEL IMPERIAL IN VIENNA ON APRIL 29, 1941

With regard to the Reich Foreign Minister's question about the present situation in India, Bose answered that the Indian people were anti-British, to be sure, but were entirely without weapons and that therefore the small English Army could easily dominate the whole country. The Foreign Minister replied that one of the most noteworthy results of modern weapons developments was the fact that a small military power which was very mobile could, with very limited means, hold great areas in check. He cited several examples of this from the history of the present war.

Bose mentioned in this connection mutinies which had occurred in various Indian regiments. One regiment had mutinied in Egypt, and several others had refused to permit themselves to be shipped from India. Although these were only sporadic incidents, it could be said nevertheless that the time was certainly psychologically ripe for a great mass movement in India.

After the defeat of France, moreover, the morale of the English in India had been extremely low. English firms had taken Indian names as camouflage and had transferred their administrative staffs to newly erected buildings in the mountains of India. Commercial circles had also been extremely depressed by the air attacks on Lon-

don. Only the English victories in Africa had again raised the morale of the English in India.

To the Foreign Minister's inquiry about Gandhi's attitude and the tactics he was pursuing, Bose replied that Gandhi did not wish to shut the door in the face of the English. He was a man of compromise, and when the war broke out he had in the first rush of sentiment spoken in favor of assistance to England. After a conference with the Viceroy¹ he had passed the word that the Indians should not "hamper" the English conduct of the war. This statement of Gandhi's had been quite unexpected for the masses and had occasioned unrest, revolts, and insurrection among them in the whole country.

He (Bose) himself had spread propaganda throughout the country and spoken at numerous meetings from the time the war started until he was arrested. Accompanied by the approval of his listeners he had always upheld the thesis that in destroying England the Führer was also working for India and that therefore the Indians ought to hope for his victory. Surprisingly enough the English had let him go his own way for quite a while before arresting him; he had really expected that after every meeting at which he had spoken. During the first months of the war the English had not dared to touch the prominent Indians.

When the Foreign Minister asked about the political organization of the Indian nationalist movement, Bose answered that a party-like organization with wide ramifications extended over the whole country.

To the Foreign Minister's question about the number of troops stationed in India, Bose replied that there were available about 70,000 purely English troops and 180,000 Indian troops, thus about 250,000 men in all, who were reasonably well equipped. The English had the intention of conscripting another 500,000 Indian troops. So far, 100,000 men had been gathered within a year and a half with great difficulty; they were mainly employed in Egypt, the Near East, and Hong Kong. If there were appropriate Indian counterpropaganda the English would find it difficult in these circumstances to attain the figure of 500,000 men.

At a question by the Foreign Minister about the attitude of the maharajas, Bose replied that they were aiding the English, to be sure, but much less than in the World War. They were providing money more than anything else.

Gandhi had made the mistake of believing that under the pressure of the war England would prove to be more accommodating toward

¹ V. A. Johnstone-Hope, Marquess of Linlithgow.

the Indians. The opposite had occurred. The English policy in India was more conservative and reactionary today than ever before. Among other things this was also evident from the fact that the progressive industrialization of the country was carried out exclusively with British capital, while Indian participation was being curbed. The Indians therefore feared that if England survived her defeat she would institute a new wave of anti-Indian policies. On the basis of their exact knowledge of the English character which the Indians had gained as a result of living with the English for so long, and on the strength of certain experiences made in the past, they knew that the English might accept a defeat, but that immediately thereafter they would make preparations to regain the lost terrain. They would also do this in the case of India.

The Foreign Minister replied that the English had gone too far and it would be all over with them this time. They, too, were beginning to realize this. Some time would pass, however, before it was quite clear to them.

To a renewed question by the Foreign Minister as to whether the Indian nationalists possessed a political party organization Bose answered that there was a political party and even a kind of SA. When the Foreign Minister remarked that armed resistance was probably out of the question, Bose replied that after the defeat of France the Indian regiments had lost their faith in England. A good deal of doubt had arisen among the Indian officers, many of whom were nationalists, and they listened very attentively to the news broadcasts sent from Berlin in Hindustani.

The Communists were of little importance, especially in view of the fact that the nationalists had incorporated into their own program important points of the Communist program.

When the Foreign Minister asked what would happen if the English should leave India, Bose answered that then a nationalist government would be formed. He explained in this connection that the religious difficulties that were being artificially exaggerated by England could also be eliminated. He pointed to the extremely bad constitution which the English had given India and which, for instance, made it impossible for a Mohammedan to elect him (Bose), even if they held the same political opinions, simply for the reason that Bose belonged to a different religion. Furthermore, if the English regime came to an end the Army would of course disintegrate, and there would be some difficulty in bridging the time until the English officers who left could be replaced by newly trained Indian officers.

Thereupon the Foreign Minister asked about India's attitude toward Germany. Bose answered that he wanted to admit in all frankness that feeling against the National Socialists and the Fascists

had been rather strong in India. For the English and Communist propaganda had upheld the thesis that National Socialism and Fascism were striving to dominate the other races.

The Foreign Minister interjected at this point that National Socialism merely advocated racial purity, but not its own rule over other races. Racial purity was also valued in India and conformed, moreover, to the laws of nature.

Bose went on to state that in their propaganda toward the Indians the English took the stand that the English rule might be unsatisfactory, to be sure, but German rule would be infinitely worse for India. With this slogan they indeed had been successful with the Indian masses. Not until after the German-Russian Pact was concluded did the mood change. Many Indians had greatly welcomed this Pact by reason of their social and anti-imperialist views and as a result they had arrived at a different attitude toward Germany. India knew, moreover, that without a close connection with a great power she could not exist, and therefore she was now entirely willing to align herself with Germany and Italy. He had to stress, however, that in order to win over the Indian masses completely it was very important to obtain an open declaration from Germany in advance stating that a German victory would result in the liberation of India.

Further on in the conversation the Foreign Minister asked about India's attitude toward Japan. Bose answered that owing to Japan's anti-British stand India had a benevolent interest in Japan. Moreover, India would greatly welcome a settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict; because of her anti-imperialist attitude she was also pro-Chinese. India would greatly welcome a Japanese advance against Singapore because she would regard this as a severe blow against England. Trade with Japan was extremely important for India, even though the Imperial preference system caused difficulties here; 70 percent of the entire English trade went to India. Therefore it could be said that the Empire was synonymous with India and if India were torn away from the British Empire, the Empire as such would no longer exist.

Concerning Afghanistan, to which country Bose had fled from India and where he had stayed for some time, he related that the country was ruled by a family regime. Ninety percent of the population rejected the present Government. Amanullah² was very well liked and if he should return would be received joyfully. When the Foreign Minister asked about Afghanistan's armed forces, Bose replied that one could not give any exact information on that point. The extent to which the "large number of people in uniform who

² Amanullah Khan, Amir of Afghanistan from 1919 until his forced abdication in 1929.

were paid by the Government" could be considered an army or possessed the value of an army was doubtful. The present Government was under the influence of the English, even though from time to time it seemed to act in a somewhat more independent way. Afghanistan was afraid of Russia. The people were against Russia, mainly for ecclesiastic-religious reasons.

When the Foreign Minister asked about India's attitude toward Russia, Bose answered that on account of the anti-imperialist attitude of the Indians the Soviet Union enjoyed a certain sympathy.

Otherwise, the only thing the Indians feared was that there might be a compromise between England and Germany and that England might survive her defeat. The Foreign Minister replied that Germany was resolved to settle matters now once and for all. He then brought up once more the question of India's possibilities for resisting the English. It was clear that for an unarmed country it would be extremely difficult to do anything against the occupation army. Perhaps, however, it might be possible to prepare the ground and organize the resistance from within the armed forces themselves. For the troops had weapons and were trained. In this connection he asked Bose whether the Indian troops were also trained as military specialists. Bose answered in the affirmative, with respect to the time since the beginning of the war. Before that time the technical troops had mainly been composed of Englishmen.

Later in the conversation the Foreign Minister explained to Bose the Führer's plans for a new Europe without England; this would be a contented Europe in which no one would play off anymore the separate countries against one another as England did with the various ethnic and religious groups in India and as she had so far been doing in the Balkans. In the new European order the countries would be grouped around the Axis and especially Germany as the center of power; and under the protection of this center of power they would not be played off against one another but would confidently cooperate with one another.

For a disarmed country like India it would naturally be difficult to undertake anything. Nevertheless, passive resistance could be practiced and an organization founded which would be ready for action at the decisive moment. The question now was whether it would be possible to influence the course of developments in India by propaganda.

Bose answered that the propaganda campaign of the nationalists extended to the civilian population, the Army, and the unsubjected tribes along the Afghan border. The Indians, indeed, regarded this area as a kind of base for an offensive. If a simultaneous attack were carried out by all of the tribes living there, the main part of the Indian occupation army would be withdrawn from the country.

Then the moment would have arrived for an open revolt by the civilian population within the country itself. Bose termed the defeat of the 70,000 Englishmen along with their supporters within the country as quite within the realm of possibility. The Foreign Minister said that it seemed to him very probable that India would achieve her freedom in the course of this war. He was quite sure of this. Bose suggested in this connection that the Indian prisoners of war in German hands be utilized as tools of the Indian insurrectionary movement. These prisoners would doubtless express their willingness to fight against England immediately, and if this were made known in India it would have a very strong effect on the rest of the Army. The English would then lose most of their confidence in the Indian troops and would not be able to employ them as unconditionally as they did now.

Then the Foreign Minister sketched for Bose the development of German-English relations. For many years the Führer had tried to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain. This had been one of the basic principles of his foreign policy, for the realization of which he had worked. When National Socialism came to power the Führer had repeatedly sent the Foreign Minister to Great Britain, most recently as Ambassador of the German Reich,³ to promote a rapprochement. In this capacity he had done his very best to assure friendship with England. He had made Great Britain offers of friendship, cooperation, and even of alliance. The basis for these offers was that Germany would have supremacy in Europe and in return not meddle in any way in the affairs of the British Empire. This had been the German policy before the war. Germany had hoped that England would be reasonable and for her part, too, adopt such a policy. England had not recognized her opportunity, however. Overestimating her own power, she had not realized that she had already forfeited her leading position in the world during the previous war. And now she wanted to maintain this position, which actually had been lost, with the help of the old doctrine of the balance of power. In this she had been 100 percent wrong. She had thought that Hitler would fade from the scene for both political and economic reasons. When England saw that neither of these hopes was being fulfilled she pursued a policy of preparing for war and isolating her future opponent, and then at the given moment finally declared war on Germany. Even after the outbreak of the war, at the end of the Polish war, and after the French collapse the Führer made speeches which amounted to offers to England.⁴ In

³ Ribbentrop had been Ambassador in Great Britain from 1936 to 1938.

⁴ Apparently a reference to Hitler's speeches of Oct. 6, 1939, and July 19, 1940; see Editors' Notes, vol. VIII of this series, p. 227 and vol. X of this series, p. 249.

her arrogance and stupidity, however, England had rejected the Führer's hand. Thereupon he had resolved to fight the matter out. The Führer now intended to fight the war to the end. In Germany the conviction prevailed that the war was already won. There was no power that could still contest Germany's victory. No one confronted her any longer in Europe. Wherever resistance appeared it was smashed at once, so that the position of the Reich on the Continent was absolutely secure.

England found herself in a difficult situation. The island was being destroyed to a constantly increasing degree by air attacks, and even though the English tried to throw dust into the eyes of the world it was becoming increasingly known how terrible the conditions in the country were.

Submarine warfare had just begun and would be considerably intensified. The German submarines would swarm around the English Isles like sharks. It was extremely dangerous today to approach Great Britain.

England's hope, and her only hope, was America. The American affair, however, was the greatest bluff in the history of the world. At the end of the year America would find herself isolated at the side of her collapsing British ally. If America should enter the war she would immediately be confronted by Japan, too. In an encounter between the American and the Japanese Navies, however, the odds were 10 to 1 that the Japanese fleet would be victorious. The Japanese would be enthusiastic if a fight developed. Their only fear was that the American fleet might not dare to go beyond Honolulu.

On land America could not help England in any way either in Europe or in Africa. There was absolutely no problem in the European-African hemisphere that Germany could not solve. A landing of foreign troops here was naturally out of the question.

America claimed to be able to support England with airplanes. But the question immediately arose whether these American planes would ever even reach England, and if they did whether they could remain undamaged at the airfields. Furthermore, German production capacity was so superior even to the combined capacity of America and England that every basis was lacking for effective American help in this field.

Germany's foes spoke of her shortage of raw materials and foods. The Foreign Minister termed this assertion absolutely ridiculous. If it were a question of raw materials Germany would be able to carry on the war for 200 years, and with regard to the food situation, difficulties had to be surmounted only in a few places at the most, especially in the line of fats. But here, too, the situation was constantly improving by virtue of more thorough organization.

Germany was striking at England wherever she could get in a blow at the British Empire. If there were certain possibilities in India in this regard, the Foreign Minister wished to examine them, and to do so in a sober spirit without any illusions so that no mistakes would be made.

Under State Secretary Woermann had already spoken to him, the Foreign Minister, of the plans which Bose himself had.⁵ In these circumstances the Foreign Minister would suggest that Woermann remain in close contact with Bose and continue to study the conditions together with him, and that in the near future there be another conference between the Foreign Minister and Bose concerning very close cooperation.⁶

The important thing in the Indian question was to choose the proper time for the actions which might be undertaken. Caution would have to be exercised, for that was the only way in which something effective could develop both with respect to the German-English war and to the cause of Indian freedom. If something were done at the wrong moment this could lead to consequences which were the exact opposite of the aim being followed. Therefore action would have to be taken step by step and not too hurriedly.

In order to avoid opposition in India herself they would always have to take Gandhi into account. It would be wrong to do things which would give the English a chance of bringing Gandhi into opposition to Bose. The latter would have to feel his way very carefully, therefore, and consider in what way the propaganda campaign could best be started.

Later in the conversation the Foreign Minister suggested in particular that technical questions be studied, for instance whether there were enough transmitters available and whether illegal transmitters should be employed. In any case, a policy of pinpricks should be avoided in this respect, too, for this would only serve to arouse resistance to the campaign. In view of the adroitness of the English they could not afford to expose themselves, but the propaganda should go beyond the purely negative and be of a positive and aggressive sort. Bose was very agreeable to these suggestions. He advocated an illegal transmitter (free India station⁷) which would be directed toward the three groups he had already mentioned: the civilian population, the army, and the insurrectionary tribes along the Afghan border; he expressed himself very hopefully regarding the effect of this propaganda, especially now that India had been as-

⁵ See documents Nos. 300 and 323.

⁶ Ribbentrop did not see Bose again until Nov. 29, 1941. See vol. XIII of this series.

⁷ In English in the original.

sured of her liberation by the Axis Powers and knew that the English no longer had any prospect of victory.

Furthermore, in order to influence the rebellious tribes he would send agents to this area with propaganda instructions. It was important, however, that the British Empire be destroyed in all circumstances. The Foreign Minister answered that the English would certainly not give up the fight before they had been entirely crushed, and then it would probably be too late to save the British Empire.

In conclusion the Foreign Minister stressed the confidential nature of the conversation and promised another conference with Bose after further examination of the questions involved. If possible, Bose's presence in Germany must not become known. Therefore he would see that suitable quarters were made available to him outside Berlin. Bose answered that in his opinion the English were not aware that he was in Germany. At most they would have information that he had left India.

For the rest, they had degenerated to an inconceivable degree, as regards both character and intelligence. The present Viceroy was extremely limited intellectually and his subordinates were entirely lacking in character and courage, the qualities which had distinguished the English in India in former times.

After a short exchange of opinion on Churchill's extremely foolish speech of recent date² the conversation came to an end.

(SCHMIDT)

² This may be a reference to Churchill's radio broadcast of Apr. 27 to Great Britain and the Empire in which he reviewed the war situation. For text see *Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 1940-1943*, pp. 4587-88.

No. 426

205/142671-72

The State Secretary to the Legation in Finland

Telegram

URGENT

SECRET

No. 324

BERLIN, April 30, 1941—9:00 p. m.
zu Pol. VI 1960 g.¹ Ang. II.

With reference to your telegram No. 271.²

I. On April 26 Foreign Minister Günther informed Prince Wied that he would pay the Finnish Foreign Minister an unofficial return visit at the beginning of May; he would travel without an entourage.

¹ Pol. VI 1960 g.: Not found.

² Document No. 400.

There was no program for conversations. The visit was meant to cultivate relations with Finland, which also had good and close relations with Germany.

II. Points 5 and 6 of telegram No. 271 do not seem completely understandable.

Point 5 mentions German passage through Swedish territory in case a German-Russian war should break out and Finland should remain outside such a war, whereas the same question in the much more likely case of Finnish participation in the war is not discussed. Are these hedging clauses perhaps meant to have the result that in practice Sweden wants to prevent the passage of German troops through Sweden?

Point 6 amounts to the assurance that in a new Russo-Finnish war Sweden will not make any difficulties for the Finns, which is obvious in any case.

It would be interesting if Colonel Rössing would take up these points once more in conversations with the Swedish Military Attaché there and report on his replies.³

III. For guidance of conversation.

In regard to questions assuming the case of a German-Russian war, it should be remarked that we do *not* believe that this will occur; but if it should do so after all, we should expect every assistance from Sweden or Finland as a matter of course.

It is to our interest and also to Finland's that during the visit of the Swedish Foreign Minister in Helsinki the Finnish Government should oppose possible Swedish influence directed toward stricter maintenance of Finnish *de facto* neutrality and should, on the contrary, try to exert influence on the Swedish Foreign Minister in the direction of a relaxation of the all too rigid Swedish concept of neutrality. In no case should the Finnish Government bind itself to any sort of agreement that would limit its freedom of political action in the future.

WEIZSÄCKER

³ On further conversations of Rössing with the Swedish Military Attaché in Helsinki, see documents Nos. 434 and 437.

No. 427

65/45262-64

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran*¹

Telegram

No. 197

VIENNA, April 30, 1941.

RAM 134

Received Berlin, April 30—10:30 p. m.

Sent May 1—3:00 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 226 of April 15.²

Please reply to the Egyptian Ambassador there in response to his communication as follows:

The Führer had with the greatest interest taken cognizance of his statements made on instruction of the King of Egypt. He appreciated the difficult situation of Egypt, and particularly of the King of Egypt, whom he thanked for his confidential communications transmitted through the Ambassador. On the basis of the past conduct of the Reich Government toward Egypt, the King of Egypt surely knew that Germany's fight was not directed against Egypt or the other Arab countries of the Near East, but only against the common foe of Germany as well as the Arab countries: England. Germany was well enough acquainted with England's methods toward the countries she had oppressed to be perfectly aware of the harshness of the pressure exerted upon Egypt. For this reason it had perhaps been impossible for the Egyptian Government to avoid taking some measures which had indicated a compliancy toward England which the Reich Government could not otherwise understand. The Führer assumed for certain that a change would certainly occur immediately as soon as imminent collapse of England and her Empire became more perceptible to the Arab world and to Egypt, too, and English pressure disappeared simultaneously. The fight forced upon Germany by England would end with the latter's total defeat, and even the help promised by the United States would not be capable of changing this in the least.

It was the immovable purpose of the Axis Powers to eliminate for the entire future the fatal influence which England had exerted in the past in Europe as well as in the Near East, and in its place to bring about a new order of things which would be based upon the principle of respect for the rightful interests of all nations. As far as Egypt in particular was concerned, the Führer had already stated earlier that Germany had no territorial aspirations of any sort in regard to the Arab countries, but rather—and in this he was also in agreement with the Duce—desired the independence of Egypt and the entire Arab world.³

¹ Marginal notes:

"[For] F[Führer]. [Ribbentrop]."

"F[Führer] agrees. H[e]w[el], Apr. 30."

² Document No. 350.

³ Probably a reference to the German declaration addressed to the Arabs which was broadcast over the radio on Oct. 23 and published in the press on Dec. 5, 1940. See vol. xi of this series, documents Nos. 190 and footnote 4, 496, and 596 and footnote 6.

You asked the Ambassador to have this message from the Führer brought to the King and at the same time to let him know that we were happy to consider closer cooperation with him. If he saw the possibility of sending an authorized representative for discussions concerning such cooperation to a neutral place, such as, for example, Bucharest or Ankara, we would be willing to establish contact with the latter. In such a case the Ambassador could send you a message to that effect.

Wire report on execution of instructions.⁴

RIBBENTROP

⁴ Document No. 448.

No. 428

245/161829-31

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, May 1, 1941—3:00 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received May 1—3:30 a. m.

No. 964 of April 30

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Count Ciano asked me to call on him this evening so that he might inform me about the present state of the Italian discussions [with Croatia]. He asked that I stress, when reporting to the Foreign Minister, that the only persons informed about what had happened were the Duce, he himself, and Chargé d'Affaires Casertano, and he therefore requested that these conversations be regarded as intended solely for the Foreign Minister's personal information, to be used when briefing the Führer. He made the following statements:

In his talks in Ljubljana,¹ after long-drawn-out discussions, he had on behalf of the Italian Government agreed with Pavelić on a boundary along the Dalmatian-Croatian coast, to run approximately as follows:

The region of Sušak as far as Kraljevica, including a small strip of hinterland, falls to Italy; from there onward the coast as far as Obrovac goes to Croatia; further to the south the coast, to a maximum depth of 40 kilometers, with Šibenik and Trogir, goes to Italy, including the islands of Krk, Rab, Vis, Korčula, Mljet, and the

¹ In telegram No. 933 of Apr. 26 (245/161811) Mackensen had reported that Ciano had returned that morning from his conversation with Pavelić in Ljubljana. A report by the German Minister in Zagreb about the Ciano-Pavelić conversations (Zagreb telegram No. 126 of Apr. 26: 245/161814) stated that all the Italian demands had been presented "in a dictatorial manner."

See also *The Ciano Diaries*, entries for Apr. 25 and 26.

region of Kotor, while Croatia receives the island of Pag and the coast exclusive of Trogir, as far as and *including* Dubrovnik.

As to Split, the views had clashed sharply, but no decision had been reached as yet. Casertano was instructed to continue fighting for Split to the utmost, but not to let the negotiations break down over this, in other words, to yield if absolutely necessary. Ciano added that while he had to admit that from the ethnic standpoint the Italians were a minority there today, historically Split had belonged to Rome since Diocletian's time; therefore the sacrifice, if it had to be made, would be a heavy one.

Ciano further showed me a letter from Pavelić to the Duce in which he offered, on behalf of the Croatian Government, the crown of Croatia to a prince of the House of Savoy, to be designated by the King of Italy. The Duce accepted the offer with the consent of the King who reportedly has designated the Duke of Spoleto. Ciano showed me the draft of the Duce's reply to Pavelić to this effect.

He said that Pavelić agreed in principle to the draft treaty (my telegrams Nos. 894/895 of April 24²), although there would be some alterations as to detail. For example, there must be no mention (in article 4) of an "Italian-Albanian" customs union; some other expression would have to be chosen for this, because Croatia did not want to be lumped together with Albania. These modifications, however, involve only minor matters.

Pavelić stated in his letter that beginning May 6 he would be prepared to come to an agreement with the Italians on the basis outlined above and to come to Rome personally with a delegation to make a formal offer of the crown to the King for a prince of his house. Ciano felt that this was likely not to happen before the 10th or 15th of the month, since the desire here was in any case to settle the questions of the crown, the treaty, and the boundaries all at the same time.

From Ciano's statements of his conversations with Pavelić and of Italy's plans for dealing with the question of Croatia it could be clearly seen that he had grasped the meaning of the repeated reminders of the Foreign Minister during the conversation in Vienna on April 21³ to the effect that in reorganizing matters in the Balkans it was advisable to create something that would last. Otherwise there would scarcely have been such wise restraint with regard to territorial aspirations which originally were much more extensive, especially in the question of Split.

MACKENSEN

² Document No. 396. The telegram references in this passage are somewhat garbled and have been corrected on the basis of a copy from the files of the Rome Embassy (4849/E247319-21).

³ See document No. 378.

No. 429

154/131964

The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 648 of April 30

Tokyo, May 1, 1941—11:50 a.m.

Received May 1—1:15 p.m.

1. The delegation arrived April 26.¹ The first session, in accord with the Japanese delegation, took place under the chairmanship of Deputy Foreign Minister Ohashi, and the Manchurian [delegation?] under Counselor of Embassy Yamanashib. The Japanese renewed their proposal for a unitary agreement between Greater Germany and the yen bloc² which now would also comprise goods from central China. Because of basic disagreement in the question of a unified agreement with the countries of the yen bloc, the discussions on this will at first be continued on an informal basis. The next session will be on May 2 on the regulation of economic relations with Manchukuo after May 31. In drafting the press communiqué regarding today's opening session the Japanese wanted a rather colorless statement—with the explanation that strong attention by the Anglo-American sea powers could have a repercussion on the flow of supplies from the Netherlands Indies and the Malay States. In consequence of our objections the theme of the discussions was taken up in the communiqué and it was characterized as the harmonizing of German economic relations with Japan and Manchukuo to current conditions.

2. I request from the Reichsbank the latest figure of the special account of Manchukuo. If possible I should also like a statement of the payments which are expected to be taken care of by the end of May because of payments put in after the discussion with the Reich Office for Fats [*Reichsfettstelle*].

3. I request a telegraphic report regarding the status of the discussions about List B.

4. I would be grateful if the information were sent to the relatives that all members of the delegation arrived in good health.

WOHLTHAT
OTT

¹ The reference is to the Wohlthat delegation. See documents Nos. 78 and 190. In a memorandum of Mar. 25 (174/136864-77) Wohlthat outlined his program for negotiations with the Japanese.

² See vol. xi of this series, document No. 341 and footnote 3.

No. 430

205/142673

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, May 1, 1941—1:00 p. m.

No. 290 of May 1

Received May 1—3:50 p. m.

1. The impending meeting between the Finnish and Swedish Foreign Ministers can be of importance for the future political course of both countries. M. Witting has so far spoken with me only in vague terms. However, he did make some remarks which indicate that after the conclusion of the Balkan campaign he considers that the time has come for a new arrangement in the North, that he wonders whether the example of Bulgaria or that of Yugoslavia is to be preferred, and that he would like to establish a parallel between the Finnish and Swedish positions.

2. The impression here is that England's interest in the North has been newly aroused and also that Russia is following developments more closely. An accelerating factor here can be the response which the campaign for "Viking" has found among the Finnish youth.¹ The fact must become known in the next few days in London and Moscow and can lead to England and Russia submitting precise questions to Finland on her political orientation.

3. Please send instructions whether I should remain passive in the negotiations between the Finnish and Swedish Foreign Ministers or should "try" to gain influence on the negotiations. The cardinal question is whether I may treat Finland's accession to the Tripartite Pact—alone or with Sweden—as a fact now in the realm of possibility, and if so what conditions should be set up for this.

4. Considering that the meeting will take place in the next few days, please send immediate telegraphic instructions.²

BLÜCHER

¹Material on the attempt to recruit an SS division, "Viking," and on the enrollment of Finnish volunteers in the regular German Army is filmed on serial B19. Cf. Wipert von Blücher, *Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie*, p. 217.

²See document No. 449 and footnote 4.

No. 431

P2/P00010-11

Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, May 1, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

High Command of the Wehrmacht

No. 44638/41 g.K. Chefs. WFSt/L (I Op.)

By officer only

With reference to the participation of foreign states in the preparation for Barbarossa the Führer has planned for conversations with the following scope:

1. *Finland*

Within the next few days the Finns will be induced by an appropriate political step¹ to send officers invested with full powers to Berlin.²

See enclosure for the intended course of this discussion.³

2. *Hungary*

The requisite discussions with the Hungarians are planned for the last third of May.⁴ Further directions for their execution will be issued at the appropriate time through OKW. The aim of these discussions will be to bring about an increased state of defense and at a given time an appropriate commitment of the Hungarian armed forces.

3. *Rumania*

The discussions with the Rumanians are to be taken up as late as possible.⁵

The Commander in Chief of the Army and the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe are requested to report the latest possible date.

4. *The following guidelines are to apply regarding camouflage for all of the discussions:*

The greater offensive operations intended by us in the West make it necessary also in view of earlier experiences to establish and maintain an enhanced readiness for defense in the East.

¹ See document No. 501 and Editors' Note, p. 850.

² See document No. 554.

³ Not printed here. This is NOKW-241, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nurnberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Case 12, Document Book 17, Part II, pp. 68-69.

⁴ See document No. 631.

⁵ See document No. 544.

The aim of the conversations is, therefore, to induce the states listed likewise to take appropriate defensive measures and to start now with the preparations for them.

*The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht*
KEITEL

No. 432

83/61152

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*¹

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 487 of May 2

ANKARA, May 2, 1941.

Received May 2—10:10 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

The Iraq Minister read me the telegram from his Government which had just arrived. According to this, fighting began today between English and Iraq troops at the Habbaniya airfield, and consequently war is in progress. Relations with England have been broken off. The Iraq Government requests that Minister Grobba be sent to Baghdad at once so that diplomatic relations may be resumed.² It also requests immediate military aid. In particular a considerable number of airplanes in order to prevent further English landings and to drive the English from the airfields. The English have a total of 8,500 troops on Iraq territory, including the recently landed forces, and the Iraqi have 50,000 men under arms. They want to raise another 50,000 and weapons for them are urgently needed. The Iraq Minister asked for an answer by tomorrow if in any way possible. I should be grateful for immediate radio instructions.³

KROLL

¹ Marginal notes:

In Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]."

"Shown to the Führer. Hew[el], May 3."

² Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "Yes. Grobba is the man who has done very excellent work in Iraq in the past. Until relations were broken off he was Minister there and since then has been engaged in secret work directed toward that area."

³ In subsequent telegram No. 489 of May 2 (83/61151) Kroll transmitted new urgent requests of the Iraq Minister for German antiaircraft artillery, tanks, and airplanes and urged that a reply be given at once. For the instructions sent in reply see document No. 441.

No. 433

1448/365359

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

Moscow, May 2, 1941.

A/g/229

Subject: Rumors of German-Russian military showdown.

With reference to instruction Pol. V 1495 g. of April 16, 1941.¹

I and all the higher officials of my Embassy have always combated rumors of an imminent German-Russian military showdown, since it is obvious that rumors of that kind constitute a great hazard for the continued peaceful development of German-Soviet relations. Please bear in mind, however, that attempts to counteract these rumors here in Moscow must necessarily remain ineffectual if such rumors incessantly reach here from Germany, and if every traveler who comes to Moscow or travels through Moscow not only brings these rumors along, but can even confirm them by citing facts.

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

¹ See document No. 260 and footnote 1.

No. 434

205/142874-75

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, May 2, 1941—10:00 p. m.

No. 293 of May 2

Received May 3—2:35 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 324.¹

I. Today Colonel Rössing had another conversation with the Swedish Military Attaché. The latter stated the following, repeating in part what was reported in earlier telegram No. 271:²

"1. Sweden will at all times support without reservation a defensive policy of the Finnish Government toward Russia.

"2. It would be intolerable for the Swedish Government and people, [and] would at the least make their position much more difficult, if Finland should accede to the Tripartite Pact.

"3. Likewise if Finnish troops should fight under German command or together with German troops.

"4. If the possibilities under 2 and 3 should not occur, Baron Stedingk believes, on the basis of a conversation with his Foreign Minister, that one can count on a benevolent Swedish attitude particularly in the transit question.

¹ Document No. 426.

² Document No. 400.

"5. Discerning members of the Swedish Government and important persons in the Swedish armed forces and economic life are trying to prevent Sweden's being eliminated as a decisive factor in the North as a result of a possible German-Finnish alignment.

"6. Several persons in the Swedish Cabinet wish to change the policy toward Germany in such a way that in case of a conflict between Germany and Finland on the one hand and Russia on the other, Sweden will take a more positive attitude toward the first two powers.

"7. Foreign Minister Günther is a weak personality.

"8. Sweden is very much interested in the question who will occupy the Åland Islands in case of war."³

II. I am giving this information for the time being without comment. An appraisal follows by telegram.⁴

III. The OKH, Attaché Section, should be informed.

BLÜCHER

³ See documents Nos. 554 and 592.

⁴ See document No. 437.

No. 435

83/61154-57

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister

BERLIN, May 3, 1941.

BRIEF FOR THE FÜHRER¹

According to the enclosed telegrams received tonight from Ankara,² the Iraq Government considers itself at war with England. It asks us to send Minister Grobba to Baghdad immediately so that diplomatic relations may be resumed and it also requests immediate military aid.

I assume that the Führer agrees to our complying at once with the wish for the dispatch of Minister Grobba. Until relations were broken off, Minister Grobba was the German Minister in Baghdad. He has done very excellent work in Iraq in the past, and since the outbreak of the war has been constantly engaged in secret work directed toward that area. He is our best Iraq expert, speaks the language of the country and has known all the leading persons for many years.

Minister Grobba is to go to Iraq by plane, and I intend to send along the personnel necessary for his work. He will also receive the assignment to direct and further expand our network of agents in the Near East from Iraq, and to establish contact with Egypt as well

¹ Marginal note: "Shown to the Führer. Hew[el], May 3."

² Document No. 432 and footnote 3.

as with Minister von Hentig in Syria (the well-known diplomat who did excellent work there in the World War). The whole Arab world shall then be aroused into rebellion against England from our center in Iraq.

One officer of the Luftwaffe and one from the Army could also be attached to Minister Grobba. The OKW, with which contact was established in this matter, is willing to send the officers along. After his arrival in Baghdad Minister Grobba will have to discuss with the Iraq Government whether it wishes to have further German military personnel sent to advise it in fighting the English troops.

The Luftwaffe officer accompanying Minister Grobba would have to find out immediately after his arrival in Iraq whether the necessary landing possibilities and the prerequisites for creating a ground organization are at hand there, so that the Iraq Government may be sent effective aid in material by air immediately. I should appreciate being informed whether the Führer wishes to instruct the Luftwaffe at this time to make the necessary preparations for carrying arms and ammunition to Iraq (in accordance with yesterday's telegram), so as to be ready to take off within a few days. Would it not be the best help to transfer a fighter and a bomber squadron there immediately if the question of landing should be clarified in a positive sense by the officer of the Luftwaffe after the arrival of Minister Grobba?

If the available reports are correct regarding the relatively small forces the English have landed in Iraq so far, there would seem to be a great opportunity for establishing a base for warfare against England through an armed Iraq. A constantly expanding insurrection of the Arab world could be of the greatest help in the preparation of our decisive advance toward Egypt.

I would suggest that we refrain for the time being from announcing that Minister Grobba has been sent to Iraq, but rather reserve this announcement until the situation there is sufficiently consolidated.

R[IBBENTROP]

[Supplement]: The figures regarding the British in Iraq show again how weak England evidently still is today at the Suez Canal.³

R[IBBENTROP]

³ This supplement was added in handwriting.

No. 436

83/61168-69

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

BERLIN, May 3, 1941.

BRIEF FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER

The Führer read the memorandum¹ and telegrams² regarding Iraq attentively and several times expressed his approval of the Foreign Minister's memorandum. He agrees entirely with the proposals of the Foreign Minister and desires that everything possible be done with regard to military support. The Führer expressed skepticism, however, concerning the transfer of air forces to Iraq; nevertheless, he finally said that if it should prove to be true that there were sufficient supplies of fuel in Iraq, the planes would then have the possibility of making return flights and thus might be able to take over certain transports.

In regard to Ambassador v. Mackensen's memorandum dealing with Iraq's wishes,³ the Führer said that we could furnish antitank guns in sufficient quantities. However, they could not have our most modern antitank gun (5 cm.). The calibers for ammunition, etc., cited in the list of things wanted were entirely unknown to him; we did not have these.

I should be grateful to the Foreign Minister if I might be present at one of the conferences with Minister Grobba regarding the Iraq question, so that I will be in a position during conversations with the Führer to tell him a few things about the activities of the Foreign Ministry there and to give him information on technical matters.

HEWEL

¹ Document No. 435.² See document No. 432 and footnote 3.³ Not found.

No. 437

205/142679-80

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, May 3, 1941—1:42 p. m.

No. 294 of May 3

Received May 3—5:15 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 293.¹

From the statements of the Swedish Military Attaché, some of them probably intentionally vague, I get the following impression of the quintessence of Swedish policy toward Finland:

¹ Document No. 434.

1. The aim of Swedish policy is supremacy in the northern area. This is what decides Sweden's policy toward the war question and toward Finland.

2. Sweden remains indifferent toward a war limited to Germany and Russia and would therefore also be cooperative in the transit question.

3. Sweden is against the participation of Finland in a German-Russian war and in such a case would reserve her position in the transit question. Reasons: Sweden is afraid that if the Finnish troops operate together with the Germans, Finland would become dependent upon Germany. Participation by Swedish troops is out of the question, however, because of public opinion, and also because in such a case Sweden would play a subordinate role in relation to Germany.

4. Sweden would like to see Finland strengthened by the re-acquisition of the areas ceded to Russia, but a Greater Finland going beyond this does not agree with the hegemony plans of Swedish policy.

5. Accession by Finland to the Tripartite Pact is not desired by Sweden, since this would not only eliminate Sweden's supremacy in the northern area but would also mean the encirclement of Sweden.

6. If the above is correct, the Swedish Foreign Minister will try at the impending conference in Helsinki to persuade Finland to refrain from any closer political and military cooperation with Germany and in case of a future weakening of Russia to gain possession once more of the ceded areas by independent action under open or covert Swedish patronage.

7. Colonel Rössing shares the above opinion.

8. Please inform the OKH, Attaché Section.

BLÜCHER

No. 438

105/113406-07

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1063 of May 3

Moscow, May 3, 1941—4:47 p. m.

Received May 3—6:40 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1060 of May 2.¹

Pravda, the only paper published today, shows on top of page 1 the picture of the government tribune at the May Day parade, where Dekanozov, the Soviet Ambassador to Berlin, is seen standing

¹ Not found.

next to Stalin.² This is probably meant to indicate the special recognition accorded to the Ambassador in Berlin.

The text of the speech of Marshal Timoshenko at the May Day parade published today, in paragraph (group garbled) dealing with the international situation, reads verbatim as follows:

"The Government of the Soviet Union firmly and consistently carries forward the wise foreign policy of Stalin, the policy of peace among the peoples and the guarantee for the security of our fatherland. In this it meets with the sympathy of the peoples of the countries waging war. The Soviet Union stands outside the war and fights against its extension. That is the purpose of the neutrality pact with our eastern neighbor Japan, as well as of other international acts of the Soviet Government. We are for peace and for the consolidation of friendly and good-neighborly relations with all countries which are seeking to establish the same relations with the Soviet Union. The Bolshevik party, the Soviet Government, and our entire people take account of the fact (8 groups garbled, repetition requested) and that the international situation is very heated and harbors all sorts of surprises. That is why the entire Soviet people, the Red Army, and the Navy must be in readiness to fight."

SCHULENBURG

² Dekanozov returned to Berlin May 14 (105/113433).

No. 439

222/149592

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1217 of May 2

BUCHAREST, May 3, 1941—6:35 p. m.

Received May 3—7:00 p. m.

Minister Antonescu informed me that Pavelić had approached General A[ntonescu] regarding recognition of the Croatian State. The General requests me to ask the Reich Government whether it considered this the right moment for recognition and whether it did not perhaps see in this a possibility for complications with the Soviet Union. However, the General did not want to permit any doubt to develop about the attitude of the Rumanian Government in this matter, stressing that his standpoint was determined purely by the interests of the Reich.¹

KILLINGER

¹ In telegram No. 1220 of May 4 (4685/E225265) Woermann instructed Killinger: "Please reply that we consider an early statement regarding recognition of the Croatian State as appropriate."

No. 440

116/66823-25

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 299

BERLIN, May 3, 1941.

The new Croatian Minister,¹ who had first made the attempt to speak with the Foreign Minister himself, called on me this evening at about 11:00 o'clock. He justified the late hour of his call by stating that he had received the news from Pavelić, Leader of the Croatian State, that Croatia had to reply to an Italian ultimatum by 12:00 noon tomorrow, Sunday, May 4. The conditions which the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in Zagreb² had stated were:

- a) a Croatian-Italian customs union;
- b) a prince of the House of Savoy to wear the royal crown of Croatia.

Only after acceptance of the conditions of this ultimatum could one proceed to draw the frontiers. The Minister then described the predicament which this Italian conduct had created for M. Pavelić. In particular the demand for a customs union destroyed the independence which Croatia had just achieved. The enthusiasm at the rebirth of Croatia still existed. Order and discipline, however, had first to be established in the country. The economic situation was entirely unsettled. The Italian occupation was a heavy burden on the country. If Pavelić were now forced to accept the Italian ultimatum, then his authority would soon be at an end. Everything was at stake. All the hopes of the Croats were placed on the Führer. They expected him to determine the Croatian borders, but only after the war. The Croatian Government could not imagine that the Italian ultimatum had been laid down in agreement with the German Government.

The Minister asserted that he had to inform M. Pavelić by 10:00 a.m. tomorrow, Sunday, of the position Berlin was taking regarding his communication. The Minister wanted to hear from me whether he could expect an answer by then.

I asked the Minister what was really to be understood by the Italian "ultimatum." What would be the consequences if M. Pavelić could not give a satisfactory answer by tomorrow noon?

The Minister replied that in this case Italy threatened to annex the territory now occupied by Italian troops. Pavelić would then not be able to stay in office.

I did not tell the Croatian Minister outright that the ultimatum mentioned by him was entirely unfamiliar to us and very much sur-

¹ Branko Benzon. See document No. 370 and footnote 3.

² Raffaele Casertano.

prised me personally. I asked whether the ultimatum was really to be taken so very literally. The German Government had incidentally left the field of negotiations to the Croats and the Italians and was willing for its part to approve a friendly settlement that would be arrived at between Croatia and Italy. M. Pavelić, too, was acquainted with this position of ours. Considering the late hour and the short time limit I was not in a position to promise the Minister that he would hear from me again before 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning, as he desired. I would try, however, to bring his request to the knowledge of those in authority as soon as feasible.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister with the request that he take cognizance of it.

If the Minister should again telephone here tomorrow morning I intend to give him an evasive answer. I can add that Minister Kasche's reports do not mention such an ultimatum.³

Perhaps the matter was after all not so acute as the Minister had represented it to me.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER

³ According to a communication of May 4 from Veesenmayer to Ribbentrop (116/66829), the Italian Chargé d'Affaires had again presented to Pavelić "the well-known demands in the form of an ultimatum." Pavelić had rejected them and was urgently requesting Germany to let him know whether his negative attitude was approved.

⁴ Marginal notes:

"Yes. R[ibbentrop]."

"Intimate that we do not know anything about it."

In a memorandum of May 4 (116/66828) Weizsäcker recorded that he had spoken to the Croatian Minister on the telephone as indicated in the memorandum printed here.

No. 441

83/61171

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, May 3, 1941—11:50 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Pol. VII 236 g. Rs.

No. 392

For the Chargé d'Affaires personally.

With reference to your telegrams 487,¹ 489,² 492.³

¹ Document No. 432.

² See document No. 432, footnote 3.

³ This telegram of May 3 (83/61167) forwarded information about the military situation in Iraq and reported that the Iraq Minister in Ankara was urging a reply to his requests.

Please inform the Iraq Minister at once that we welcome the Iraq desire for resumption of diplomatic relations and shall send to Baghdad by a safe route immediately a confidential representative, who will have full powers to discuss in detail the questions relating to support.⁴

Since in spite of the greatest dispatch it is not entirely sure exactly when our representative will arrive, we request that nevertheless an Iraq representative be sent to Ankara along with specialists.

The Italian Government has been succinctly informed.⁵

WOERMANN

⁴ See documents Nos. 435 and 436.

⁵ In the files is the draft of a teletype message of May 3 by Woermann (792/272934) informing Mackensen that Ribbentrop had told Alfieri in confidence about the immediate dispatch of a German representative to Baghdad.

No. 442

221/149271

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

SECRET

BERLIN, May 3, 1941.

U. St.S. Pol. 366

As instructed I informed Ambassador Abetz by telephone this evening that the Foreign Minister has authorized the talk with Darlan in accordance with the letter of the Foreign Minister to Field Marshal Keitel of April 28 from Vienna,¹ and that he requests that in the talk with Darlan to be held today foremost attention should be given to the question of arms shipments from Syria to Iraq.²

Immediately thereafter I informed Ambassador Abetz by teletype³ that General Vogl has been made available by the OKW for the discussions and is standing by awaiting Ambassador Abetz' call. It was explained to the OKW that, owing to the urgency of the Syrian arms question, it was impossible to include Vogl in the initial talk today.

WOERMANN

¹ Document No. 421.

² For Abetz' report on his talks with Darlan, see document No. 459. See also *Pétain et les allemands: Mémoire d'Abetz sur les rapports franco-allemands*, pp. 99-103.

³ Not found.

No. 443

116/66818

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Croatia

Telegram

No. 191

BERLIN, May 3, 1941.

e. o. Pol. IV 1453.

On the basis of the line laid down by the Führer a state treaty concerning the German-Croatian frontier is to be concluded as soon as possible.

A short draft is being prepared here. The new frontier corresponds to the former administrative boundary between Austria (southern Styria) and Hungarian Croatia.¹ The draft with a map² will be transmitted very soon by Senior Counselor von Kamphoevener who will be authorized to sign jointly with you.³ After signing of the state treaty it is intended that there should be negotiations by mixed delegations on the spot for the purpose of concluding the usual frontier treaty.

Please inform the Croatian Government and see that the state treaty can be signed not later than next week, if possible. At such time, please get quarters for K[amphoevener], who will probably be accompanied by Oberregierungsrat Essen and Fräulein Schöne as secretary.

WOERMANN

¹ This refers to the pre-1918 boundaries within the Dual Monarchy.

² Neither the draft copy nor the map has been found.

³ On May 12 Kasche reported in telegram No. 211 (245/161862-63) that the German delegation had arrived in Zagreb on May 10 and that the subsequent negotiations with the Croats had resulted in full agreement on the text of a treaty which would be signed on May 13; the text of the draft treaty formed part of this telegram. The text of the German-Croatian State Treaty of May 13, concerning determination of the common frontier including annexes is filmed on 2871/563705-40. For a published text, see *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1942, II, pp. 264-265.

No. 444

142/127518

The State Secretary to the Legation in Athens

Telegram

No. 253

BERLIN, May 3, 1941.

zu Pers. H 3886¹ Ang. 2.

By a decree of April 28 the Führer appointed a Reich Plenipotentiary for Greece² with official seat at Athens. The decree reads as follows:

¹ Pers. H 3886: Not found.

² See document No. 365 and footnote 1. By telegram No. 241 of Apr. 29 (142/127505) Ribbentrop had notified the Legation in Athens that Minister Altenburg was leaving Salonika for Athens to assume his assignment there as Reich Plenipotentiary.

"1. I appoint a 'Reich Plenipotentiary for Greece.' His office is at Athens.

"2. The Reich Plenipotentiary shall represent the political, economic, and cultural interests of the Reich in Greece with the new Greek Government until the assumption of formal diplomatic relations with Greece.

"3. Furthermore, the Reich Plenipotentiary shall maintain with the Italian occupation authorities the contact necessary for the carrying out of his tasks. Adolf Hitler."

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 445

173/84632-33

Reich Commissar Seyss-Inquart to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop

Zl. 1443 S-P

THE HAGUE, May 3, 1941.

DEAR PARTY COMRADE VON RIBBENTROP: If the efforts to obtain release of our countrymen from internment camps in the Netherlands Indies, initiated in connection with M. Kleffens's trip to the Netherlands Indies, should be unsuccessful the question of drastic measures to take hostages will have to be actively considered.¹ Lists for this purpose have already been compiled and comprise, as reported to me, some 2,000 persons.² Included in it are about 300 relatives of persons living in the Netherlands Indies, or persons associated with businesses there; the remainder are individuals who played some part in the political or economic life in the past and whose removal is desirable for political reasons. You yourself mentioned to me at one time a remark of the Führer's to this effect.

But before this operation is carried out, I must point out to you that as things stand now we not only cannot expect any improvement in the situation of our countrymen in the Netherlands Indies, but also may expect that the way the hostages are interned at present may cause the Netherlands Indies administration to resort to very severe reprisals. I am led to this conclusion by the fact that of the

¹ For previous developments of this problem, see vol. ix of this series, document No. 333 and footnote 2. In telegram No. 104 of Apr. 1 from The Hague (173/84427-28) Counselor of Legation Mohr reported on the attempts to obtain the release of the German internees in the Netherlands Indies through negotiations between emissaries of the Dutch administration in the German-occupied Netherlands and the Minister for Colonies in the Dutch Government in London, Welter. According to this telegram Welter had expressed the hope for achieving this release in accord with Foreign Minister Kleffens and the Governor General of the Netherlands Indies and had mentioned in this connection that he and Kleffens would arrive in Batavia around April 9.

² In telegram No. 109 of Feb. 22 from Fuschl (173/84412), Rintelen asked Weizsäcker to prepare a report for Ribbentrop on the current situation of the German internees in the Netherlands East Indies and to outline counter-measures such as the preparation of lists of prominent persons in the Netherlands who would be arrested as hostages.

hostages already taken eleven have died, nine of them from pneumonia. This means that these are not deaths such as would occur in the normal course of events, but fatalities attributable to the unaccustomed living conditions, probably the climate. The percentage in itself, too, is remarkable especially bearing in mind that these deaths have almost all occurred within the past 2 or 3 months. I would add that on the basis of repeated inspections no blame can be placed upon the camp administration itself; everything is provided for in the camp, including appropriate medical care, but it seems that these people—particularly those from the Netherlands Indies, but also those from the coast here, when they come to Buchenwald under conditions so different from what they are used to—just do not have the necessary physical resistance to poor health. I therefore believe that if the big operation should be carried into effect, it will be necessary to set up a regular internment camp outside a concentration camp, in an area that has a climate suited to the constitution of the Dutch. For if in such an internment camp with 2,000 inmates, the deaths were to increase proportionately, that is increase nearly tenfold, there would be reason to fear that the relatively favorable conditions under which our countrymen are now detained in the Netherlands Indies might be brought down to the level of the initial camps, or perhaps even worse. I believe I should bring my apprehensions to your attention while assuring you at the same time that I am willing to accept the difficulties which such an operation would undoubtedly create for the domestic situation in the Netherlands, if this should become necessary in order to improve the lot of our countrymen in the Netherlands Indies.*

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

SEYSS-INQUART

* On June 6 Weizsäcker noted a démarche by the Swedish Minister (205/-142703-05) who left a note verbale and called to his attention the great number of deaths and illnesses among the Dutch internees at Buchenwald.

No. 446

426/218003-04

The Head of Political Division I ■ to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 878 of May 3

BERLIN, May 4, 1941—5:45 a. m.

Received May 4—10:00 a. m.

Secret. To be decoded only by those entrusted with matters requiring Special Security Handling. Reply via courier or secret

code. For Military Attaché. Top Secret Military No. 602/41 G. Kdos. Att. Abt. O. Qu. 4, Foreign Armies East section, to Military Attaché, Moscow.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht, Wehrmacht Operations Staff, National Defense Department advises on May 3 under No. 952/41 g. Kdos., as follows: With regard to the telegram of the Naval Attaché of April 24, No. 34112/110,¹ there is the following for guidance in conduct of conversation.

On No. 1: The same war rumors are current here as in Russia so we suspect a renewed attempt on the part of England to poison the wells. Reports that are without any foundation—as, for example, stories about extensive map making (the Ukraine) in Prague, or about the landing of more than 12,000 German soldiers in Finland—confirm these suspicions.

Moreover, currency is given to such rumors by substantial Russian troop concentrations near the border, especially since they are without military justification, since on the German side, only such forces are posted at the border as are absolutely necessary as rear cover for the Balkan operations.

On No. 4: The quashing of rumors by the German officials at your post is very desirable, in which connection use can be made in suitable form of the fact that German troop transports are being carried out from east to west, which in the first half of May will reach considerable proportions (added only for personal information: eight divisions). General Staff of the Army, Attaché Division T. No. 602/41 G. Kdos.²

KRAMARZ

¹ Document No. 399.

² A memorandum by Kramarz of May 7 (105/113421) recorded that similar instructions for combating rumors of impending Russo-German conflict were to be issued to the Military Attachés at Ankara, Bern, Helsinki, Lisbon, Bratislava, Stockholm, Tehran, and Tokyo.

No. 447

177/85041

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Japan

Telegram

SECRET

No. 548

BERLIN, May 3, 1941.

Sent May 4—11:40 a. m.

Pol. VIII 1847 g.¹ II.

For the Ambassador for his personal and confidential information.

With reference to our telegram No. 485 of April 22,¹ and your telegram No. 655 of May 2.²

The following is learned from a strictly confidential source here (for your personal and confidential information):

After the Japanese Embassy in Moscow had let the British Ambassador there know that Matsuoka would not be able to receive him, a meeting took place through the mediation of the United States Ambassador, and Matsuoka had had a full talk with Ambassador Cripps.³ Matsuoka had urgently begged the British Ambassador not to tell the Embassy about this conversation. Matsuoka assured the British Government of his friendship and confirmed that no military projects would be pursued toward the South, other than an extension of influence in matters of economic policy. Matsuoka, who spoke kind words about Churchill and Eden, sent them his greetings and showed his friendly feelings for England.⁴

End of report, details of which otherwise are not confirmed.

WOERMANN

¹ Not found. According to telegram No. 655 of May 2 (177/85035-37), No. 485 is Pol. VIII 1847 g.

² In this telegram Ott forwarded to Berlin the text of Churchill's message to Matsuoka with the explanation that Churchill had intended that it be delivered to Matsuoka in Berlin by the Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, but that when Shigemitsu was unable to go to Berlin, the message was delivered to Matsuoka by Cripps in Moscow. The Director of the European Department of the Japanese Foreign Office, Sakamoto, in delivering the text to Ott, stated that Matsuoka had characterized the message as "infantile madness" (infantile Torheit). Cf. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, pp. 189-190; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. IV, pp. 927-928.

³ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 938-941.

⁴ Matsuoka's reply of Apr. 22, as reported to Washington by the United States Ambassador in Japan, is printed in *ibid.*, pp. 968-969.

No. 448

1000/305874

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, May 4, 1941—6:00 p. m.

No. 331 of May 4

Received May 4—10:15 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 197 of April 30.¹

On May 3 at 9:00 p. m. I replied as instructed to the Egyptian Ambassador, who was very grateful for the answer and stated that he would transmit the answer to King Farouk at once.

The Ambassador said that the King could not send an authorized representative for the following reasons:

1. The King was surrounded solely by politically unreliable elements in sympathy with England.
2. The Egyptian Cabinet was a "hostile" government for the King, and he had to be constantly on guard with its members.
3. The King had no one besides himself, his father-in-law, in whom he had unlimited confidence.
4. The entirely safe channel of communication through a special secret code between the King and himself was the only one which the King had with the outside world.
5. Even if there were another confidential representative, his dispatches would not remain secret from the English.²

The Ambassador therefore proposes that discussions concerning closer cooperation should be conducted with him. He had been provided with the necessary full powers by the King. He would of course transmit the German proposal to King Farouk, but could already assure us on his own initiative that carrying it out was impossible for the reasons stated above.³

ETTEL

¹ Document No. 427.

² Marginal note: "Woermann. Please consult me. R[ibbentrop]."

³ For Ribbentrop's reply, see vol. XIII of this series.

No. 449

205/142678

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, May 4, 1941.

SECRET

No. 333

1. I refer to my telegram No. 324 of April 30.¹

2. The Finnish Government should respond evasively to any questions from English quarters about the political orientation of Finland.

3. The joint accession of Sweden and Finland to the Tripartite Pact would as such be welcome.² I have no objection if you would on your own initiative, i.e., without instructions from Berlin, indicate to the Finnish³ Minister in a confidential way that it would interest you personally to learn what Sweden's attitude would be toward a possible invitation to accede to the Tripartite Pact at a given time. During such a conversation please leave, for the time being, an eventual accession by Finland as much in the background as possible.⁴

RIBBENTROP

¹ Document No. 426.

² See document No. 430, paragraph 3.

³ The margin at this point has the typed notation: "(Swedish)?"

⁴ In telegram No. 303 of May 5 (205/142683) Blücher reported a third conversation of Colonel Rössing with the Swedish Military Attaché who remarked that Sweden might adhere to the Tripartite Pact as part of a Scandinavian bloc, Sweden, Norway, and Finland, but that an accession by Sweden without Norway was out of the question.

No. 450

230/153212-13

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

SECRET

BERLIN, May 4, 1941.

No. 645

For the Minister personally.

As Minister Clodius has reported, King Boris has let him know that Bulgaria would be anxious to acquire a part of the Old Serbian area southeast of Niš.¹ He wished to come into possession there of the Sveti Nikola Pass northeast of Kalna. From there the border line should run southeast of Bela Palanka and past Leskovac, cross

¹ This was reported in Sofia telegram No. 463 of Apr. 27 (274/177932-34).

the Morava and then run along the mountain ridge west of the Morava into the valley of the Binačka Morava. Bulgaria would rather waive claim to Bela Palanka and Leskovac, because these places, which, to be sure, were once Bulgarian, were now purely Serbian.

Please inform the Bulgarian King that the Reich Government agreed in principle to the frontier line proposed by him; however, the details of the course of the frontier were left to be determined later.

Furthermore the King let Herr Clodius know that Bulgaria would attach great importance to having the basin south of Bitolj with its principal town, Florina, fall to Bulgaria, since this area was inhabited by a purely Bulgarian population. The King remarked in this connection that by drawing the frontier in such a way one would avoid having the Bitolj-Edessa-Salonika railroad run for a short stretch over territory which might become Italian.

Since the Italians actually lay claim to the town of Florina, which they want to award to the future Greater Albania, please tell the Bulgarian Government, if it should again bring up this request, merely that this matter was problematical because of Italian claims.²

Likewise, the other wish expressed by the King for possession of the city of Kilkis 40 kilometers north of Salonika, which, he said, was a purely Bulgarian town, must also be left open. Regarding this the King also let Clodius be told that he wanted to express this wish only if it would not upset any German dispositions. Kilkis belongs to the area of Salonika, and how it will later be assigned is still an entirely open question; at the present time we cannot take a position toward this wish.

Likewise we cannot today take a position toward the recently expressed request of the King regarding the glaxis of Edirne. This had been Turkish up to 1915,³ and recently had belonged to Greece. The request is that if possible only the half of the glaxis zone be returned to Turkey and the other half be given to Bulgaria so that country can set up over the plain a new railway link between Old Bulgaria and the line to Alexandroupolis. This whole question is not yet acute at the present time.

RIBBENTROP

² By a message of May 29 (962/302180) the OKW instructed the OKH to comply with the request by the Foreign Ministry that the regions of Florina and Edessa be included in the German-occupied area of Salonika so that the road and the railroad from Salonika to Bitolj would remain in German hands. Woermann's memorandum of June 5 (274/177983) records that he informed Draganov that the area concerned would remain under German occupation and requested that wishes for occupation by Bulgaria be put off. Woermann noted that "M. Draganov was very pleased with this communication."

³ Turkey had ceded this area to Bulgaria in an agreement of Sept. 6, 1915.

No. 451

67/47228/2-244

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RAM 27

BERLIN, May 5, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE FORMER AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN BRUSSELS, MR. CUDAHY, IN THE PRESENCE OF AMBASSADOR DIECKHOFF AND COUNSELOR OF LEGATION SALLET, ON MAY 4, 1941¹

After a few introductory words Cudahy pointed out that a portion of the American public was of the opinion that the United States was moving toward war. It was absolutely certain, however, that the American people as such were absolutely against the war.

If, however, the decision were taken on the conveying of trans-Atlantic ships by American naval forces, then incidents would be unavoidable. Probably American ships would then also be sunk, and after a third or fourth incident of this sort the United States would be drawn into the war. This did not seem to be unwelcome to the American Government.

If a statement could be issued by Germany (this would not have to be a speech) saying that, if America provided escorts for trans-Atlantic convoys, German submarines would sink the American escort vessels and that in this way the war with America would have arrived, such a statement would have an enlightening effect on American public opinion in this sense: It would even at this time establish publicly the responsibility of the American Government for drawing the United States into the war. This clear realization, however, would produce such a reaction among the American people who are against the war, that it would defeat the resolution to provide American protection for trans-Atlantic convoys.

Upon a question interjected by the Foreign Minister, Cudahy explained what resolution was involved, and remarked that the German statement would have to be made as soon as possible in order to achieve the desired effect.

The Foreign Minister replied that he had followed with the greatest interest Cudahy's efforts, which had presumably not always been very popular in America. Cudahy's views were correct, and the events of the next 12 months would prove the correctness of his stand. He (the Foreign Minister) naturally did not know what course the United States would take. Doubtless the man in the street did not want war, whereas a movement under the leadership of President

¹ Cudahy's meeting with Ribbentrop, and his subsequent meeting with Hitler (see document No. 542) had been recommended by Dieckhoff in a memorandum of Mar. 5 (589/244170). Cf. John Cudahy, *The Armies March: A Personal Report* (New York, 1941), pp. 166-189.

Roosevelt was aiming at war. Germany regarded these things very calmly, conscious that she had won the war. There was no power that could rob the German Reich of this victory. Neither would America's attitude change anything in this.

Intervention in the war was undesirable even in the interest of the United States herself, for in doing so America would take on an exceedingly great risk.

Seen from Germany, the situation was as follows: In the air war, in spite of the propaganda emanating from England and the pro-English American circles, Great Britain had no prospects of any sort, just as the American aid regarding the war in the air had no chance of success, either. The awakening from the dream created by propaganda would be very painful.

On land the position of the Axis Powers in Europe and Africa was entirely consolidated. There was absolute certainty that no power in the world could undertake anything whatever against the German-Italian forces. The Führer was so sure of himself that he had stated in a recent speech that he would even evacuate Holland voluntarily if he knew that the English would land there and accept battle.² A landing by the Americans on the European Continent was also entirely out of the question. If it should be attempted, it would lead to a complete catastrophe. In the Mediterranean area and in North Africa Germany had the considerable advantage of being located closer to this area than England or the United States. There was not the slightest chance that Americans could gain a foothold in the Mediterranean area, for example, or in the Near East. If Germany and Italy had really intended to, they could have driven the English completely out of this area inside 6 months or a year, as any military expert could confirm to Mr. Cudahy.

In England conditions even now could not exactly be called excellent. But this was nothing compared to the condition that would prevail in 3 or 6 months, for Germany would bomb the country day and night and have her submarines surround the British Isles like sharks. In this way only a few supplies would reach England, and one must ask oneself whether the English could endure this for long. There were various possibilities for the arrival of a quick and sudden end. In any case Germany was watching these possibilities with the greatest attention.

As regards the United States, the Foreign Minister stated that he had to say very candidly that he sometimes wondered what the reason really was that the Americans were moving toward the war.

² A statement approximately to this effect was made in Hitler's speech at the Sportpalast in Berlin on Jan. 30. For text see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, February 1941, pp. 123-132.

The American Army was such that any action against the European-African hemisphere was entirely ridiculous, not the least reason being that shipping tonnage was lacking and that the matter would lead to considerable losses. The entire operation would develop into an American Dunkirk.

As regards the American Navy the situation was equally unclear. It was a very long distance from the United States to Europe, and, furthermore, America had two oceans to take care of. The real American experts were therefore also exceedingly disturbed at the idea of having to employ the Navy in a war across two oceans.

As regards the Air Force there were certain fantastic rumors about possibilities of attacking Europe by air. That was impossible, however. On the other hand America could naturally send airplanes to England. However, not very many would arrive in Europe, and of those that actually got there many would be destroyed on the ground and not even be able to get into the air. Incidentally, Germany was destroying more planes than the Americans could replace.

On the other hand there was the fact that the German Army actually had no opponents in Europe. General Rommel had only a few divisions at his disposal in North Africa and would soon show the "famous" Wavell³ that he was no longer famous. But the fighting there was a subordinate matter and was being carried out by a few especially picked troops well-tried in the fighting in North Africa, which had undone all of the British conquests.

Germany had 240 divisions at her disposal, and had accumulated so much war material that she could last for 20 to 30 years with it. In certain sectors she had actually had to reduce her war production on account of this surplus. The productive energies of the entire European Continent were now being concentrated solely on the production of airplanes and submarines, which was being carried on at a daily increasing rate. This accomplishment in production could not be surpassed by anyone, no matter what the United States did or did not do. In these circumstances it would be actually criminal to lead America into the war.

Politically speaking Germany did not want anything of America. The Germans did not have anything at all against the American people. Indeed, information about the warmongering tendencies in America was kept from the German people in so far as possible. There was no real reason for America to go to war against Germany.

On the basis of his personal acquaintance with conditions during a year's sojourn in the United States and a 3-year stay in Canada the Foreign Minister stated that he knew very well the possibility of influencing the American people by means of propaganda. Even the

³ Gen. Sir Archibald P. Wavell, Commander in Chief of the British Forces in the Middle East.

fluctuations in the stock market showed to what extent public opinion could be stirred up by slogans in which there was not a grain of truth. If Roosevelt would actually lead the country into the war purposely, he would assume a tremendous responsibility. Senator Wheeler, Cudahy, and Colonel Lindbergh, however, represented the true American people in the Foreign Minister's opinion. It would become clear in a short time that their views were correct and that an irresponsible leadership was embarked on a wrong course.

No matter what America might do, England was lost in any case. That was absolutely certain. It was possible, to be sure, that England could still cause the Axis some difficulty, here and there, but fate had already decided against Great Britain. Any sort of help would come too late.

If the United States nevertheless wanted to come to the aid of England, then it would do so at a tremendous risk. An isolated America would then have to fight a war against the whole world.

The British Empire stood and fell with the British Isles. If the British Isles were conquered then no more power could emanate from the rest of the Empire.

Moreover, the Empire had difficulties all over. The Arabian world would rise up against the English, and the events in Iraq were only the beginnings of this revolution. The English were simply lost. Of course they would keep on fighting, for they didn't fight badly and they were a courageous race. After all they belonged to the same Germanic family as the Americans and the Germans. By this resistance, however, they would not change anything in their final fate. It would therefore be senseless for America to enter a war in such circumstances.

However, if Roosevelt had taken this decision, then such entry into the war by the United States would have very serious consequences, for the whole world would turn against America. This time Germany was not the isolated country, but America would be isolated.

Even though in America people sometimes believed fantastic stories such as the landing of the men from Mars and the sort, still, it was certain that Germany could not invade the United States, just as the United States could not land in Europe. America had to realize, however, that in case she entered the war her position in the East would immediately be affected.

Germany faced all eventualities with the greatest calm, for she was entirely sure of her position. She was convinced that she had won the war, and knew that nothing could happen to deprive her of this victory, no matter how long the war lasted, whether one-half, 1, 2, 5, or 10 years. Germany was naturally not willing to make any compromise with England. But if Great Britain should still yield in the course of this year, then the possibility existed of preventing

the ultimate and worst. If Great Britain did not yield, then the war would continue.

For the Führer this development was a great tragedy, for he, who at heart wanted to be a friend of England, had been chosen by fate to break the great Empire. In his efforts to create a good relationship with England, the Führer had accepted with respect to England a limitation of the German fleet at 35 percent of the English fleet,⁴ and had, finally, wanted to make available to England 12 German divisions for all eventualities; i.e., he had been willing to guarantee the British Empire with German blood.⁵ In return England should only have recognized Germany as the dominant power in Europe.

If Roosevelt should actually enter the war, the United States would be at war with Germany, Italy, Japan, and a number of other allies, whereas America's sole ally would be Great Britain, a country that would enter its death agony this very year and collapse in the very near future. In these circumstances America's entry into the war would be absolute insanity.

Cudahy thanked the Foreign Minister in the first place for his excellent analysis of the present situation, and then remarked with respect to America's entry into the war that once the United States had entered the war then she would not let go very soon, especially in consideration of her prestige. The injury which she could inflict on Germany was mainly in the economic sphere. Of course she could not invade Europe. Regarding Africa he was not so sure, however, but assumed that the view expressed by the Foreign Minister regarding this point was accurate. In any case the war with America would drag on for a very long time. Therefore, it was of the greatest importance that a statement now be issued by Germany to the effect that if an American convoy escort were organized the German Navy would fire on the American ships. Such a statement did not need to contain any kind of threat, but would enlighten the American public as to the actual situation and perhaps prevent the entry into the war.

When the Foreign Minister interjected that the Führer had already stated this in one of his speeches,⁶ Cudahy replied that in view of the volatile nature of American public opinion this statement by the Führer had already been forgotten, and that such a statement must come at exactly the right time to have its full effect, considering the mentality of the American public. One had to somewhat drama-

⁴ See Series C, vol. iv, document No. 156 and footnote 3.

⁵ For Hitler's willingness to guarantee the existence of the British Empire, see vol. vii of this series, document No. 265.

⁶ In his speech at the Sportpalast in Berlin on Jan. 30 (see footnote 2) Hitler made the following statement: "They should not deceive themselves. Whoever believes that he can help England, should know one thing for certain: any ship, with or without escort, that appears before our torpedo tubes will be torpedoed!"

tize matters for the American public, so to speak. If such a statement were made now, it was his conviction that the resolution regarding convoy escort could thereby be defeated. The statement could also be made, for example, to him (Cudahy) in a precisely arranged text, so that it could in no case be published in a distorted form in America.

The Foreign Minister then described at some length the internal developments in Germany, starting with the time in which 7 million unemployed and 20 million Marxists lived in Germany alongside a small clique, earning a good deal of money. He showed how the development at home and abroad was gradually influenced by the National Socialists. He particularly stressed in this connection that it was one of the principles of National Socialism not to extend over other nations. Napoleon had, to be sure, placed the members of his family on the thrones of Europe; a German Gauleiter, however, even if the Führer sent him to a non-German country, would always want to get back to the Reich. National Socialism had no other aim than to create a strong Germany, who of course laid claim to colonies but otherwise wanted to carry on her own cultural life. If Germany today occupied other countries in apparent contradiction to this basic concept, she had simply been impelled to do this by England, who had time and time again proved to be a disturber of the peace in Norway, France, Holland, Belgium, and finally in the Balkans in Yugoslavia. Germany would be happy if the moment had arrived when she could leave these countries and lead her own life. She would be very happy, for example, if she could withdraw from Greece. The Greek prisoners had in any case already been set free, since Germany had not fought Greece but only the English in Greece. She had greatly admired the courage of the Greeks during the fortunately brief military operations, and it was a real tragedy that on account of the intervention of the English two nations that had not the slightest reason for carrying on war against one another had come into conflict. If this situation brought about by England was constantly being exploited in the propaganda against Germany, nothing could be done about that. But if America should thereupon enter the war, she would assume a 10-to-1 risk.

Cudahy replied that since the Foreign Minister had himself said that Germany could not attack America this would probably be a risk only in the economic sphere.

In the further course of the conversation the Foreign Minister pointed to the fact that America had now given up the Monroe Doctrine. After a year of English and Jewish propaganda she had evidently entirely forgotten the Monroe Doctrine, formerly so much respected, for the President of the United States was meddling in for-

eign matters in every corner of the world. Just recently he had done so again in the question of the Red Sea.¹

Cudahy replied that Roosevelt was very much influenced by Bullitt. In character he was a stubborn Dutchman who clung with great obstinacy to an opinion once formed.

For the rest Cudahy came back time and again to the statement regarding the question of the convoy escort proposed by him.

The Foreign Minister promised to think the matter over and possibly to receive Cudahy once more.²

SCHMIDT

¹This is a reference to the presidential proclamation of Apr. 10 which revoked the extension of the combat area covering the Red Sea. For text see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. iv, p. 450.

²See, further, document No. 542.

No. 452

1000/305682

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, May 4, 1941.

With reference to the enclosed letter telegram No. 430 of April 28 from Bern.¹

The Foreign Minister had decided at the discussion of the Egyptian affair in Vienna that for the time being the channel via Tehran should be utilized exclusively for communication with Egypt, aside from the connection with the former Khedive which is to be established with different ends in view.² The Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires, Assal Bey, mentioned in the letter telegram from Bern has, according to this message, offered to go to Egypt with a German answer. Assal Bey himself is judged to be entirely reliable. In accordance with the decision made, the offer will not be taken up for the time being. The Bern Legation should be instructed to keep up the contact with Assal Bey. One could after all go so far with him as to tell him, as was done in Tehran,³ that Germany had no territorial aspirations with respect to Egypt and the Arab coun-

¹In this telegram (266/173609-14) Minister Köcher reported a conversation between the Hungarian Minister, von Wettstein, and the Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires, Assal Bey, in Bern in the course of which Assal Bey expressed his desire to obtain an authoritative German statement about Germany's intentions in Egypt which he would personally pass on to King Farouk.

²Contacts with the former Khedive, Abbas Hilmi Pasha II, had been established through Paris and Geneva. Documents on this subject have been filmed on serials 1000, 1124, and 4799. Referring to these contacts, Woermann noted on May 5 (1124/321615-16) that these should not be utilized to establish relations with the Egyptian King or the Egyptian Government but rather to make use of the extensive international connections of the former Khedive.

³See document No. 427.

tries, but rather desires, in accord with Italy, the independence of Egypt and the entire Arab world.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request for a decision.⁴

WOERMANN

⁴In an instruction of May 8 (4799/E236730) Woermann informed Köcher (in reply to his telegram No. 430 of Apr. 28) that for the time being the establishment of contacts with the Egyptian Government through the Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires in Bern was not being considered. He further advised Köcher to maintain contacts with Assal Bey who could be told that Germany had, in principle, no territorial aspirations regarding Egypt and, together with Italy, desired the independence of Egypt and the entire Arab world.

No. 453

136/74821

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

MADRID, May 4, 1941.

No. 1527 of May 4

Received May 5—3:15 a. m.

With reference to my cipher letter No. 2063 (group garbled) of April 22.¹

The Spanish Foreign Minister made the following statements to an absolutely reliable informant:

1. It is to be hoped that Germany will not resort to military measures in Spain without the consent of Spain. The reaction of the Spanish people would be very vigorous. We could not and would not resist, however, since the Germans are very much stronger. Moreover, we want to and shall enter the war.

2. Spain's entry into the war would be greatly facilitated if Spain knew what she had to gain. The assurances she has had from Germany thus far (Hendaye) are too vague.

STOHRER

¹ Document No. 386.

No. 454

177/85042

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOKYO, May 5, 1941—1:25 a. m.

No. 675 of May 4

Received May 5—6:15 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

The Japanese Foreign Minister just informed me about the proposal of the Washington Government for the conclusion of a secret

agreement between the United States and Japan.¹ Washington describes the purpose of this step as being the restoration of friendly relations and the prevention of the extension of the war in the Pacific.

There were four principal proposals:

- 1) Japan and America pledge themselves not to enter the European war of their own initiative and to restrict their policies exclusively to defense.
- 2) America will influence Chiang Kai-shek to come to a direct understanding with Japan.
- 3) Restoration of normal Japanese-American trade relations. Cooperation in exploitation of raw materials in the South Pacific.
- 4) American recognition of Manchukuo and a Japanese-American guaranty of the status quo in the Philippines.

The American proposal, dated April 16, is being considered at the moment. The Foreign Minister assured me that he would oppose any proposition which was not consistent with the Tripartite Pact. With this in mind he had sent today to Admiral Nomura an interim reply to the Washington Government. The text of this interim reply and my position on the whole question follows.²

The Italian Ambassador³ is being informed also. Matsuoka requests that the matter be handled confidentially. The Japanese Ambassadors at Berlin and Rome⁴ have not been informed so far.

OTT

¹ The documents from the files of the Department of State, as published in the official series, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, indicate that the proposal originated with certain private individuals recently returned from the Far East; that the initial proposal was dated Apr. 9; and that the four points listed by Cordell Hull in his discussion with Nomura on Apr. 16 were:

"1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.

"2. Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries.

"3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.

"4. Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means."

See *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. II, pp. 398-410; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. IV, pp. 135-175.

² See documents Nos. 455 and 456.

³ Mario Indelli.

⁴ Zenbei Horikiri.

No. 455

177/85048-45

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Tokyo, May 5, 1941—5:35 a. m.

No. 676 of May 5

Received May 5—4:25 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 675 of May 4.¹

I. The text of the verbal interim message presented to Secretary of State Hull by Ambassador Nomura is as follows:²

Strictly confidential.

Oral statement of the Foreign Minister of Japan.

Upon my arrival in Tokyo in the afternoon of April 22nd, I was apprised at once of the contents of the project of an agreement between Japan and America which was cabled by our Ambassador Admiral Nomura a few days prior to my return. I should have taken the matter up immediately but I could not devise [sic] my attention to any question other than reporting on my recent journey to Europe and taking steps to complete the procedures necessary in putting into effect the pact of neutrality concluded at Moscow between Japan and the USSR. After disposing of them, I have been obliged to remain inactive for a few days due to an indisposition. As a matter of fact, I ought to [have] only been able to resume my work today. The project necessarily claims very careful and thorough consideration and it will take some days yet before I can express my opinion more or less definitely on the various and multitudinous points contained in the project, some of which are of a far-reaching character. I need hardly assure your Excellency that I shall do my best to reach a speedy decision, as the nature of the project obviously calls for as early a disposition as possible.

Having enjoyed the privilege of the acquaintanceship with the President since he was the Assistant Secretary of the Navy and having also had the pleasure of meeting your Excellency at Washington some 8 years ago, I feel that I would not be considered as making entirely useless and obtrusive remarks if I took the advantage of this opportunity frankly to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency and, through your Excellency, of the President, some of the things I observed during my recent trip in Europe. The German and Italian leaders are determined never to have peace by negotiation, they demand capitulation. They seem to regard that the war is as good as won even at the present stage, with the expulsion of British soldiers from the Balkans, there is not one

¹ Document No. 454.

² The message which follows is in English in the original and the text appearing here follows that of the original.

British soldier left on the European Continent from Norway to the Balkans and Soviet Russia maintains her neutrality supplying them even with what they need. To support this view, they further point out the vast differences between the conditions prevailing in the European Continent and elsewhere at the end of the first 20 months in the last great war and those now prevailing in Europe and elsewhere after the lapse of the same 20 months since the commencement of the present war. I may also add for what it is worth that these leaders feel that the American entry into the war will not materially affect the final issue, although they are ready to admit that in that event, the war is likely to become protracted. Whatever views your Excellency or the President may hold, it is, I trust, always worthwhile and interesting to know what other parties are thinking. Of course, I reserve my own opinion on this point but I must confess that my sole and primary concern is, as your Excellency must know by my utterances on several occasions, that the American intervention is fraught with the grave danger of prolonging the war to the untold misery and suffering of humanity, entailing, who knows, in its wake, an eventual downfall of modern civilization. In that eventuality, there would be no more question of democracy or totalitarianism left on earth. Even at this moment, I shudder at the mere thought of such a dire possibility. The key to prevent or to hasten such a possibility to be translated into probability is largely held in the hands of the President of the United States. This has been my view ever since the outbreak of the European war.

I need hardly add, that Japan can not and will not do anything that might in the least degree adversely affect the position of Germany and Italy, to whom Japan is in honour bound as an ally under the Tripartite Pact. Such a caution on Japan's part, I trust, will be readily appreciated by your Excellency.

Continuation follows.

OTT

No. 456

177/85046-47

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 677 of May 5

Tokyo, May 5, 1941—10:05 a. m.

Received May 5—7:30 p. m.

Continuation of telegram No. 676.¹

II. The American proposal² clearly represents an attempt to make the Tripartite Pact ineffective and to neutralize Japan for the duration of the war. The formulation of the proposal is designed, in a

¹ Document No. 455.

² See document No. 454.

not unskillful manner, to influence elements in Japanese society through a number of outwardly attractive features, especially the business elements (a new trade treaty), but also the naval group and the Army, for whom the procurement of raw materials and the termination of the Chinese conflict is of the greatest importance.

Although Matsuoka in the concluding sentence of his interim reply referred expressly to the Tripartite Pact, he will, for reasons connected with foreign and domestic politics, have to conduct himself carefully in his negotiations with Washington and will, therefore, have to try to force the American Government to commit itself by making its propositions more concretely or to show its hand [*oder zu überführen*].

III. I will thank the Foreign Minister, whom I shall see tomorrow, following his return, for his having, in the spirit of the Tripartite Pact, informed me of the American proposal, and I will talk with him along the following lines:

The American proposal contains [suggestions?] dishonorable to Japan; that she break with the Tripartite Pact and give up the new order in East Asia.

1) Proposal number 1 would afford the Anglo-Saxon powers full security in the Pacific against Japan. Particularly the main danger of a Japanese attack on Singapore would be eliminated. On the other hand, in the Atlantic, it would permit America to render any aid to England outside of a formal declaration of war.

2) An agreement between Japan and Chungking brought about under American auspices could only lead to Japan's giving up the new order, since the American Government always insists on the complete independence of the Chinese Government and the basic principle of the "Open Door."

3) The offer of a new commercial treaty and joint exploitation of the South Pacific areas is an attempt at bribery to buy Japan out of the Tripartite Pact and to deprive her of the independent exploitation of sources of raw materials in the South Pacific.

4) The offer to recognize Manchukuo is a worthless gesture.

Summing up I shall tell the Foreign Minister that America, in a prearranged effort with England, is trying to restrain Japan and to take advantage of the weakness of England in the Pacific area for carrying out her own plans in the greater Asiatic area.

About my conversation with the Foreign Minister and the reaction of the Cabinet to the American proposal, I shall report further.*

OTT

* See document No. 464.

No. 457

83/61189-90

*The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry*¹

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TEHRAN, May 5, 1941—5:32 p.m.

SECRET

Received May 5—8:15 p.m.

No. 336 of May 5

The special representative of the Iraq Government, Talib Mushtaq, until now Iraq Consul General in Palestine, arrived in Tehran today for the purpose of conveying a message from his Government to the Italian Minister and me. The special representative was properly identified by the Iraq Chargé d'Affaires here. He also brought a letter of recommendation from the Italian Minister in Baghdad.

In the presence of the Iraq Chargé he transmitted the following message from the Iraq Government to the Italian Minister and me:

1. The Iraq Government asked the German Government for the resumption of diplomatic relations and, if that request were granted, for the immediate dispatch of an envoy to Baghdad.

By this communication the Iraq Government wanted expressly to confirm the identical instructions which it had telegraphed to the Iraq diplomatic representatives in Tehran and Ankara² a few days ago.

2. The Iraq Government asked the German Government for the dispatch of military experts to Baghdad as soon as possible so that General Staff talks might be started.

3. The Iraq (evidently "Government" missing) asked urgently for the immediate dispatch of bomber and fighter planes. The Iraq Army was in the most urgent need of antitank guns, anti-aircraft guns, machine guns, as well as ammunition, which might be brought up by air.

4. Iraq troops had all oil fields and refineries in Iraq firmly in their hands. All British employees were under arrest. All the installations were in good condition. All precautionary measures for the protection of the entire installations had been taken. Since attacks on the oil fields and installations by the Royal Air Force had to be expected it was necessary that fighter planes be sent without delay.

5. At the moment, the Iraq Army had the situation in hand in the whole country, but it was in very urgent need of the arms listed under point 4. In addition, there was a lack of heavy artillery and tanks.

6. The Iraq Government was asking the German and Italian Governments that they consider how steps taken by the English from

¹ Marginal notes:

In Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]."

"Shown to the Führer. Hew[el], May 7."

² See document No. 432.

Abadan and Khorramshahr, i.e., from territory under Iranian sovereignty could be effectively met.

7. The Iraq Government asked the German and Italian Governments to make available 3 million Iraq dinars at once, since the Iraq state exchequer had been in England in British possession for a long time. Of these 3 million, 1 million should be made available in gold coin, and the remainder in Swiss francs or a similar neutral currency, but in no case in U.S. dollars, since these were without value for Iraq. Furthermore, the Iraq Government asked that Iraq dinars abroad be bought up and sent to Iraq.

8. Finally, the Iraq Government pointed to the great importance of radio propaganda. It asked that strong transmitters that could be heard in all the Arab countries be set up in Baghdad and the technical personnel necessary for this be sent.

The special representative repeatedly pointed to the "time factor", which was of decisive importance for the further course of military events. The quicker German military aid came, the more valuable would it be. The arrival of merely a few German planes in Iraq would have the greatest psychological effect not only in Iraq but also in Palestine, Syria, Transjordan, and Saudi Arabia, for this would prove to the Arab peoples that Germany was rendering them active military assistance against their oppressor, England.

The special representative will stay in Tehran for the time being in order to await the reply of the German Government.

ETTEL

No. 458

205/142685

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, May 5, 1941—9:25 p. m.

No. 489 of May 5

Received May 6—12:45 a. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 451 of April 26.¹

The Foreign Minister, on whom I called once more this morning, intends to fly to Helsinki in the morning of May 6, to return here again on May 9, by ship. He will travel by himself (unaccompanied even by Colonel Adlercreutz²). The Finnish Minister here³ will not be present in Helsinki during the visit. No definite program has been set up for the talks, but the discussion would naturally be about issues concerning Germany, Sweden, Finland, and Russia.

¹ Not found.

² Col. Carl Adlercreutz, chief of the intelligence division of the Swedish defense staff.

³ Dr. Jarl de Vasastjerna.

To my remark that articles recently published in *Svenska Dagbladet* and *Dagens Nyheter* could be construed as warnings to Finland to avoid too close and friendly relations with Germany, Günther replied that such an effect would be altogether contrary to the foreign policy of the Swedish Government. He could assure me, on the contrary, that it was one of the objects of his trip to counteract any such impression.

Günther finally mentioned of his own accord that the German Military Attaché in Finland had lately talked an unusually great deal with the Swedish Military Attaché there, discussing also questions dealing with Russia, and doing so, as he added, "in strange expressions."^{*} He would make specific inquiries about this during his visit in Helsinki.

WIED

^{*} See documents Nos. 400, 434, and 437.

No. 459

83/61194-98

*The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry*¹

Teletype Message

MOST URGENT

PARIS, May 5, 1941—[10:10 p. m.]^{*}

TOP SECRET

[Received May 5—11:25 p. m.]

No. 1376

For the Foreign Minister, through Dr. Schwarzmann.

Darlan arrived in Paris this evening and brought the virtual agreement of Pétain and the Cabinet members immediately concerned in the matter, with respect to support of the shipment of arms to Iraq through Syria.³ I discussed with Darlan:

I. The question of deliveries from French Army stocks subject to Italian control;

II. Support of any other shipments of arms through Syria;

III. The possibility of intermediate landings by German aircraft destined for Iraq;

IV. The question of German concessions in return for the assistance given in Syria;

and informed him that the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden, General Vogl, will come to Paris tomorrow

^{*} Marginal notes:

"[For] F[ührer]."

"Shown to the Führer. H[e]w[el], May 7."

³ The times of dispatch and receipt are supplied from another copy of this document (792/272892-95).

⁴ See documents Nos. 415 and 421.

morning to arrange with him the military side of the questions referred to.⁴

1. Darlan believes that it would be most advisable for reasons of security if a German and a French plenipotentiary were to fly to Beirut by French commercial plane for the purpose of informing orally the Chairman of the Italian Control Commission⁵ and General Dentz of the agreement reached in Paris. The German and French commissioners would represent themselves as private arms dealers and would get in touch with a representative of the Iraq Government and Army. The French Government asks only for an opportunity to make sure that the weapons released actually pass across the Iraq border and do not fall into the hands of natives in Syria while being transported.

2. The German and French plenipotentiaries could also be instructed to make arrangements on the spot which might be necessary to expedite other arms shipments to Iraq through Syria that might prove practicable.

3. Sometime tomorrow Darlan will have instructions sent to Dentz by telegraph via Vichy, that assistance be given to German aircraft forced to land [in Syria], and he will inform me when these instructions have been carried out.⁶ For scheduled intermediate landings of German aircraft, Darlan proposes a newly constructed airfield in that part of Syria northeast of the Euphrates, where the surrounding country could be easily sealed off against foreign observers. The air distance of this airfield from Rhodes is 1,200 km. Darlan requests that pending settlement of the question of gasoline supply, an initial gasoline supply be brought in by German cargo planes. He also requests that the German aircraft should have no German markings and that the crews should not be recognizable as military personnel. As a precaution against surprises, Darlan suggests release of anti-aircraft artillery for the protection of the airfield. In the event of English protests Darlan will deny all allegations and if pictorial evidence is submitted, he will have a statement issued that it was a matter of emergency landings made in error by aircraft of unknown origin purchased by the Iraq Government.

4. Darlan stated what was confirmed to me also by other sources that he had had great trouble getting the German demands accepted

⁴ Additional information regarding these negotiations was given by Abetz in telegram No. 1387 of May 6 (221/149277-79); details of the economic negotiations were reported in a number of telegrams sent by Hemmen which are filmed on serial 378. For the major results of these negotiations see document No. 475.

⁵ General de Gorgis.

⁶ In telegram No. 1379 of May 6 (221/149276) Abetz reported that "on account of the difficulties in keeping telephone messages secret, Darlan sent a reliable assistant to Vichy this morning in order to arrange for orders to be sent by the code of the Chief of the Navy that assistance be given to German planes making intermediate landings in Syria."

in Vichy. He was reproached for involving France deeply in decisions which might readily lead to belligerent actions against England, as, for instance, in the case of the delivery of trucks to Libya,⁷ without first obtaining German concessions and promises of any kind. I replied to Darlan that in tomorrow's discussion with General Vogl he could positively count on the approval requested by him for the rearmament of seven French submarines.⁸ Darlan acknowledged this with pleasure in his capacity of Chief of the Navy, but remarked that the anti-English faction in the French Government and the Government as a whole needed conspicuous results which had a direct appeal to the people in order to strengthen domestic political support for collaboration with Germany. Among the possibilities mentioned by him in this connection, a relaxation of the demarcation line with respect to the postal service for the population seems to be the least troublesome for us. I ask therefore for instructions whether General Vogl and I may permit correspondence on open postcards across the demarcation line at tomorrow's conference. Postcards with printed text and three lines of free text are permitted at the present time, so that this is not likely to cause any considerable complication in the work of the Abwehr. I requested Darlan most emphatically to treat the question of the arms shipments through Syria most confidentially in Vichy because I had been informed only today by an absolutely reliable source that all negotiations of the French Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden are reported to Admiral Leahy in Vichy.⁹

ABETZ

⁷ See document No. 417.

⁸ Unsigned marginal note: "Torpedo boats."

⁹ Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. III, pp. 701-702.

No. 460

222/149598

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1248 of May 5

BUCHAREST, May 5, 1941—11:35 p. m.

Received May 6—12:40 a. m.

In yesterday's discussion with the Leader of the State in Predeal I mentioned my conversations in Bratislava and Budapest.¹ In this discussion of future economic cooperation in Europe General Antonescu stated that he was ready at any moment to have Rumania join in an economic union with Germany. He professed to be a supporter

¹ See document No. 424, footnote 1.

of the total European economic union and, beyond this, of a political European union under the leadership of Germany.

NEUBACHER
KILLINGER

No. 461

1448/365389

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

A 263 g

BERLIN, May 5, 1941.

Received May 12.

Pol. V 2155 g.

The German Ambassador in Tokyo telegraphs under date of May 3,¹ as follows:

"Had the opportunity through confidential source to see private letter of Charlie Tayre [*Thayer*], Secretary, American Embassy at Moscow, April 17, to Secretary of Legation Bohlen, American Embassy in Tokyo. Main content, that according to English source Germany will launch attack against Soviet Union on May 20."

By order:
SCHLIEF

¹ Telegram No. 644 (4667/E221198).

No. 462

2670/528137

*Marshal Pétain to Adolf Hitler*¹

MAY 5, 1941.

HERR FÜHRER AND CHANCELLOR: Admiral Darlan has just informed me that Your Excellency has expressed the intention of receiving him shortly.²

I have noted this news with the greatest satisfaction. I discern in it your desire to include France in the building of the European order that is taking shape.

I should like to assure you that this is also my desire.

At a moment of such importance to Europe and to my country, I am happy that Your Excellency will receive in the person of Admiral Darlan both the statesman who possesses my full confidence

¹ This document is in French in the original. No record of the time of dispatch of the letter and of the manner in which it was transmitted has been found.

² In telegram No. 323 of Apr. 26 (221/149249) from Ribbentrop's special train, Abetz instructed the Embassy in Paris to inform Darlan orally and confidentially that Hitler had decided to receive him in Munich during the first or second week in May.

and the Chief of the Navy, whose heroism and coolness has successfully protected the honor of France since the Armistice.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

PH. PÉTAIN

No. 463

142/127528-29

The Reich Plenipotentiary for Greece to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 79 of May 5

ATHENS, May 6, 1941.

Received May 6—11:00 a. m.

At the request of the Greek Minister President I am passing on the following telegrams:

"To the Führer and Chancellor of the German Reich, Herr Adolf Hitler, Berlin.

"The Greek Government feels obligated to inform Your Excellency that your noble decision to free the Greek officers and men¹ had the most agreeable response in the hearts of the people. It has the honor to state herewith that its most fervent wish and most sincere request is that Your Excellency may take the fate of our country in your hands and place the historic soil of Greece under your protection. George Tsolakoglou."

"To His Excellency Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, Berlin.

"In the name of the Greek people, the Greek Government expresses the most sincere wish and the warmest request that Your Excellency may bring your influence to bear so that the Führer and Chancellor of the German Reich will take the fate of Greece in his hands and place the Greek soil under the protection of the German Reich. For this it modestly takes the liberty of expressing the gratitude of the Greek nation for your personal support. George Tsolakoglou."

Telegrams of homage along the same lines, the texts of which I am not repeating, were also sent to the Führer by the following: The Panhellenic Medical Association, the Chamber of Trade and Commerce, the Corporation for Small Business, the Professional and Small Business Chamber, the Maritime Cooperative, and the General Cooperative of Workers. All of them request the Führer's protection for the further fate of the country.²

ALTENBURG

¹ In telegram No. 51 of May 2 (142/127513) Altenburg had strongly supported Field Marshal List's request that the OKH obtain a decision by Hitler to this effect.

² In telegram No. 78 of May 5 (142/127525) Altenburg had reported having been informed by Tsolakoglou of his intention to send a delegation to Germany to thank Hitler on behalf of the Greek Government and to present simultaneously certain wishes regarding the country's future. Altenburg added the comment that the main point of such a journey to Berlin would be the problem "of the replacement of the German occupation by an Italian one."

No. 464

177/85048-50

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 685 of May 6

Tokyo, May 6, 1941—11:10 a. m.

Received May 7—1:00 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 676 of May 5.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

Today I had a lengthy talk with Matsuoka to whom I presented the points of view listed in the prior telegram.² Matsuoka agreed entirely with my way of thinking and asked me to explain to the Foreign Minister his views on the present situation as follows:

He said he had read the Führer's speech yesterday³ and had been greatly impressed by the assurance and wisdom of the statements. By contrast, it seems to him as if Roosevelt, with his hysterical attacks, had completely lost his head. He said that while under the impression of the Führer's speech he had sent a telegram through the Japanese Embassy at Berlin to the Foreign Minister, a copy of which he gave me.

Passing on to a discussion of the general situation, Matsuoka said that he had not wanted to take up the American proposal⁴ until he had obtained acceptance of his views from responsible authorities handling domestic policy matters. The American proposal no doubt originated in a dispatch sent to Washington by the American Ambassador in Moscow, whom he had known for a long time and with whom he had had a frank discussion in Moscow on his homeward trip.⁵ The American Ambassador, who made no attempt to hide his critical attitude toward Roosevelt, had put the question to him as to what Japan would do in the event the United States entered the war. His answer had been that Japan would then certainly also enter the war, on the side of the Axis Powers. The Ambassador, he said, had attempted to soften this position by stating in his report to Washington that Japan's intervention was a possibility. He, Matsuoka, however, had emphasized in most unequivocal terms that in such case, Japan would strike.

He said that he had expected an American countermove even as he was still en route back to Tokyo, and when he arrived he had found

¹ Document No. 455.

² See document No. 456.

³ i.e., Hitler's address to the Reichstag on May 4. Text in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, June 1941, pp. 449-464.

⁴ See document No. 454 and footnote 1.

⁵ For dispatches from the American Ambassador in Moscow regarding Matsuoka's second visit there, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. IV, pp. 929, 932-941, and 942-945.

the American proposal which he had communicated to me and which skillfully appeals to the interests of certain circles in domestic policy. At first not only industrial circles, but higher officials in the Navy had been inclined to discuss seriously the American proposal. He said that he had utilized the intervening time to work on the Admiral, pointing out especially the feelings in activist circles of younger officers of the Army and Navy who decidedly would reject such a policy. On Saturday,⁶ a committee consisting of the Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior Hiranuma, and the Chief of the Armed Forces had given him their endorsement of the interim reply, communicated in the previous report, and voted him their expression of confidence. Still, the handling of the American proposal will evoke dissatisfaction in business and industrial circles. He said that he would try to proceed with the tactics of making the United States commit herself not to enter the European war,⁷ especially as he had gathered from the Führer's speech that this was the aim of German policy. To be sure, he was not very hopeful about this, as he was of the personal opinion that developments in the United States would continue to move rapidly in the direction of entrance into the war. At the moment he was having a study made of the question whether a Japanese protest was not in order against the patrol activities by American armed forces, which amounted to proclaiming an American security zone by unilateral action.

He would be grateful for receiving as soon as possible the views of the Foreign Minister on the American proposal, in order to face unavoidable argument in the sphere of domestic policy.

Regarding the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact Matsuoka advised that after his departure from Berlin he had at first not reckoned with the possibility of its coming about. He had said so in a talk with the Foreign Minister and had merely stated that he would want to accept, in the event of Russia's willingness. The Neutrality Pact, in his opinion, was the product of Russia's fear of Germany. He said that he had found Stalin to be absolutely desirous of peace. Stalin, he said, had assured him that there could be no question of Russia's making a deal with the Anglo-Saxon powers. To head off such a deal also in future had been one of his (Matsuoka's) motives for concluding the Neutrality Pact. According to Stalin, Russia did not join the Tripartite Pact because the associated powers did not require Russia's assistance. If necessary, however, Russia was ready to collaborate extensively with the Tripartite Pact partners. When I commented that the Soviet Union was anxious to secure her rear and asked what position Japan would take on American shipments of munitions via Vladivostok in the event of

⁶ i.e., May 3.

⁷ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Compensation?"

war between Germany and Russia, Matsuoka replied as follows: If war should break out between Germany and the Soviet Union, no Japanese Prime Minister or Foreign Minister would be able to keep Japan neutral. In such a case Japan would be impelled by natural consideration to join Germany in attacking Russia. No neutrality pact could change anything in this respect. In conclusion, Matsuoka expressed his opinion that America's entry into the war could decide the Führer to solve the Russian question by force, in order to secure control of territories with resources, since the war then could be expected to last longer. Personally he said he was convinced that German arms in this case would bring a quick victory.

I thanked Matsuoka for his frank explanations and promised him to ask the Foreign Minister for his views as early as possible.

It goes without saying that in my conversation today I continued my endeavors to focus Japanese policy on Singapore, notwithstanding American interference tactics and the obviously prevalent Japanese inclination to look in the first place in the direction of Russia.

OTT

No. 465

116/66820-31

The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 134 of May 6

BELGRADE, May 6, 1941.
Received May 7—1:55 a.m.

With reference to my telegram No. 109 of May 3.¹

At the conference on the resettlement of the Slovenes held today in Maribor under the chairmanship of Reichsstatthalter Uiberreither,² the Military Commander in Serbia promised that, to carry out the directive issued by the Führer that southern Styria should be made a German land, he would accommodate in Old Serbia as many as possible of the estimated 220,000-260,000 Slovenes to be evacuated from southern Styria and Carinthia; this, in spite of great misgivings about feeding and lodging them, and also about the danger to security in the territory under his authority.

According to information from the Chief of Transportation the resettlement cannot start before the beginning of July for technical reasons (for example, dynamited bridges, oil transports for Italy),

¹ Not found.

² Siegfried Uiberreither, Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter of Styria, had been appointed "Chief of the Civil Administration in Lower Styria" on Apr. 15. Lower Styria comprised the Slovene areas of Yugoslavia that had been part of the Austrian Crownland of Styria until 1918.

although domestic Reich authorities attach the greatest importance to quick action. Furthermore, thorough preparation is necessary; regarding this, the Military Commander has requested data from the Gauleiter.

The plans are for resettlement in three waves: first, the Slovene intelligentsia, 6,000 persons; second, the 30,000 Slovenes who immigrated from the littoral; and third, the remainder.

The Führer has rejected the proposal to remove part of the Slovenes to Croatia. However, the Military Commander wants to induce Italy and Bulgaria to take a part of the evacuees. He requests the cooperation of the Foreign Ministry in inducing the Italians to take 60-70,000. Grounds [for this]: The littoral where many of the Slovenes come from will be Italian. Furthermore, 18,000 Volksdeutsche from Kočevje [Gottschee], likewise falling to Italy, are being brought to Lower Styria, which will make room for the Slovenes.

Furthermore the Military Commander requests that Bulgaria be persuaded to take 40-50,000 Slovenes in southern Serbia, which has become Bulgarian. Since finding shelter for the bulk of 120-150,000 Slovenes in the reduced area of Old Serbia encounters even now the most serious difficulties, I very emphatically support the Military Commander's request.³

BENZLER

³ In telegram No. 1107 of May 14 (4671/E221536) Twardowski asked the Embassy in Rome to take a position regarding the suggestion by the Military Commander in Serbia that Italy accept part of the Slovenes to be evacuated. A similar instruction regarding settlement of Slovenes in Bulgaria was sent to the Legation in Sofia in telegram No. 701 of May 14 (4671/E221537). Replying from Rome in telegram No. 113 of May 16 (230/153235) Bismarck advised against approaching the Italian Government with the proposal of settling 60-70,000 Slovenes from southern Styria in those parts of Slovenia which had fallen to Italy. At the most, Bismarck urged, Germany might ask the Italians to take a number of Slovenes equivalent to the number of Volksdeutsche that would leave the Italian portion of Slovenia. For the reply from Sofia, see document No. 524.

No. 466

792/272876-79

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Iran

Draft Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. [208]¹

BERLIN, May 6, 1941.

e. o. Pol. VII 243 g. Rs.

One of the main difficulties in assisting the Iraq Government through arms deliveries as requested is the question of transport.

¹ Although only a draft copy of this telegram is in the files it may be assumed that it was sent as No. 208; cf. the reference made in document No. 472.

We have reason to believe that the Iranian Government is on Iraq's side even if it does not acknowledge it openly. As you know, Turkey permits shipment of arms for Iran through Turkish territory. Although all arms shipments agreed upon with Iran and earmarked for that country will be fully continued, there is now a plan according to which additional arms shipments would be designated with respect to Turkey as being earmarked for Iran but would actually be either left behind in Iraq or sent on from Iran to Iraq.

In the former instance it would be a question of the route of the Baghdad Railway to Iran; in the latter, of the route to Iran through the Turkish Black Sea ports, i.e., the same route now being used for the second and third arms shipments to Iran.

Such an undertaking is feasible only with the cooperation of Iranian Government officials, if only for the reason that Iran must give notice of transit shipments through Turkey through diplomatic channels.

If after you have carefully examined all facts you see no serious objections, please approach immediately the Iranian Government confidentially through suitable channels and ask for its agreement in principle.

The circle of persons to be informed of this would naturally have to be kept to a minimum. In case you deem it the safer method, you are free to proceed through the Military Attaché² and the military authorities; OKW and OKH have agreed to this. In this case too, however, I request that all further reports be sent by you and not the Military Attaché.

We regard an exhaustive investigation of all possibilities of getting arms aid through to Iraq as so critical that we are willing to run the risk of a negative reply by the Iranian Government, even if this means that the English will sooner or later learn of it; of course, every effort must be made, even in the case of a negative decision, to preserve secrecy.

You may give the Iranian Government explicit assurance that the arms shipments earmarked for Iran herself would in no way be affected by this plan.

If you consider it necessary to distribute gratuities, funds for such are available.

If there is an opportunity in this connection, please ascertain from the Iranian Government in accordance with telegram No. 336,³ item 6, whether there is any question of British steps taken from

² Major von Geldern-Crispendorf.

³ Document No. 457.

territory under Iranian sovereignty, and express the firm expectation that such steps will be prevented by all means, if necessary.⁴

Otherwise, the reply to telegram No. 336 will go out separately.⁵

Report by telegraph.⁶

WOERMANN

⁴In telegram No. 349 of May 8 (83/61211-12) Ettel quoted the Iranian Minister President as saying that British military steps against Iraq from Iranian territory were out of the question; strong Iranian military forces were concentrated at Abadan and other danger points on the border against Iraq to meet any possible attack on Iranian territory.

⁵Not found.

⁶See document No. 472.

No. 467

2345/487429-30

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 312

BERLIN, May 6, 1941.

The Afghan Minister of Economics, Abdul Majid Khan, called on me several times in the course of the last few weeks.¹ After he had described to me with oriental verbosity how he views the European and world situations, he finally left with me today the enclosed detailed memorandum.² I have now received Abdul Majid Khan once more and have asked him a few questions concerning his memorandum. In particular I asked him about the division of spheres of interest between Iran and Afghanistan, as well as between Afghanistan and India, mentioned by him.

The Minister here advanced the well-known desire of Afghanistan to push forward her frontiers with India to include the Afghan ethnic group and a port on the Indian Ocean. (The Minister did not mention expressly Karachi or the Indus as a frontier.) Afghanistan had some insignificant territorial questions to settle with Iran. In the north, with respect to Russia, Afghanistan attached no importance at the present time to regaining old Afghan territory.

Abdul Majid Khan hopes that Germany will be on equally good terms, in so far as possible, with all four countries of the Saadabad Pact,³ and will draw them more and more toward the German policy; in this connection Italy should either be excluded or coor-

¹Weizsäcker recorded one such meeting in his memoranda of Apr. 10 (617/249830) and Apr. 12 (617/249928). For the first Weizsäcker-Abdul Majid meeting, see document No. 158.

²Of Apr. 15 (2345/487431-48).

³The Saadabad Pact, signed on July 8, 1937, by Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey provided for noninterference, nonaggression, consultation, and mutual guarantee of common frontiers. For the text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1937, vol. CXXI, p. 712.

minated with the German policy of friendship toward the countries mentioned.

Abdul Majid Khan mentioned the suspicion prevalent in the Orient that Germany only wanted to exploit the Saadabad countries and possibly had even given Russia a free hand with regard to them. I replied that it was in the nature of things that we were entirely disinterested in these countries, territorially and politically. We sought merely friendship and trade with them. For this we wished them prosperity. Thus our attitude toward these countries was and remained fundamentally different from that of England. It was an invention that we had given the Russians a free hand in these areas.

In conclusion Abdul Majid Khan stressed once more the private character of the conversations that he had so far conducted with me. He would be glad, however, to go further into the matter if he found an opportunity of meeting with the Foreign Minister personally.* He was in no hurry, however, for he would probably be operated on in Berlin in the middle of the month (by Professor Sauerbruch). Thus he would still be in the country for some time. In a conversation with the Foreign Minister one could then also examine whether it would be possible for him to have an audience with the Führer later on.

Since I know that Abdul Majid Khan is acquainted with Reichsleiter Rosenberg from earlier times and has also seen him again at this time,⁵ I told him that the proper channel for him to the Führer according to protocol, and the only one useful to him, was through the Foreign Minister. Abdul Majid Khan understood this very well.

Conversations with Abdul Majid Khan take a great deal of time. One can hardly talk with him without an interpreter. Nevertheless a conversation with him is worthwhile.

He has placed his cards on the defeat of England. His past conversations in Berlin have been without commitment. I believe, however, that one can make progress with him and use him against England.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

* In a minute of May ■ (2345/487428) Sonnleithner informed Weizsäcker that Ribbentrop wanted him to keep in contact with Abdul Majid and that he was willing to receive the Afghan Minister of Economics at a later date.

In a memorandum of May 20 (617/249953-54) Weizsäcker recorded some concrete proposals by Abdul Majid for German-Afghan cooperation providing for a reorientation of Afghan foreign policy. In a minute of May 24 (2345/-487449) the Foreign Minister's Secretariat informed Weizsäcker of Ribbentrop's request that Abdul Majid's proposal be further discussed in a cautious though positive spirit. For further developments in this matter, see document No. 598.

⁵ A minute of May 5 by Velhagen (617/249949) noted that Abdul Majid had had an interview with Rosenberg, who told Hitler about it. Hitler had then expressed the desire to receive Abdul Majid.

No. 468

105/113418-19

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, May 7, 1941—2:02 p. m.

SECRET

Received May 7—3:10 p. m.

No. 1092 of May 7

Stalin has taken over the chairmanship of the Council of People's Commissars in place of Molotov and thereby has become Head of the Government of the Soviet Union. Molotov received the rank of Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and remains People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. This change is being explained by the pressure of work on Molotov, but it actually means a considerable abridgment of his former authority. The reason for it may be sought in the recent mistakes in foreign policy which led to a cooling off of the cordiality of German-Soviet relations, for the creation and preservation of which Stalin had consciously striven, while Molotov's own initiative often expended itself in an obstinate defense of individual positions.

In his new capacity as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, that is, as Minister President of the Soviet Union, Stalin assumes responsibility for all acts of the Government, in both the domestic and foreign fields. This will put an end to the unnatural situation wherein the position of the recognized and undisputed leader of the peoples of the Soviet Union was nowhere established in the Constitution. The centralization of all the powers in the hands of Stalin means a consolidation of governmental authority in the USSR and a further advancement of the position of Stalin, who obviously felt that, in a situation of foreign policy which he considered serious, he personally had to assume full responsibility for the fate of the Soviet Union. I am convinced that Stalin will use his new position in order to take part personally in the maintenance and development of good relations between the Soviets and Germany.

SCHULENBURG

No. 469

MR 1749/1822-28

*Directive of the High Command of the Army*¹

CHEFSACHE

HEADQUARTERS OKH, May 7, 1941.

No. 811/41 Top Secret Military

High Command of the Army

General Staff of the Army Op. Div. (II a)

By officer only

Regarding: *Isabella*.

1. It is not excluded that England, in the event of the mass of the German Army being tied down in the eastern theater of war in the summer of 1941, will try—while perhaps at the same time gaining a foothold in the Tangier zone—to create for herself a new continental position on the Iberian Peninsula, with the aim of:

- a) preventing *Spain* from joining the Axis Powers;
- b) compensating for the *loss of prestige* she has suffered, and of offering the U.S.A. promising conditions for her entry into the war;
- c) seizing important coastal positions for the protection of her sea routes and as a *base for her fleet*;
- d) obtaining a broader *base for the commitment of her Air Force* against our naval and Luftwaffe bases on the Atlantic coast;
- e) acquiring a wide *outpost area opposite the fortress of Gibraltar*, as a safeguard against a German attack.

A *landing in the Portuguese ports* is to be expected primarily rather than in the ports of northern Spain. In view of the forces and the means of transport available to the enemy, a simultaneous landing in *France* appears scarcely possible.

2. Of the other states it is to be expected that:

- a) *France* will wait and see how things develop. Armed intervention by France in England's favor is not to be expected.
- b) *Spain* will resist an advance by the English, but will not be in a military position, without German help, to hold out permanently against stronger English forces.
- c) *Portugal* will resign herself, under protest, to an English landing. Whether or not she will resist an advance of German troops toward Portugal will depend largely on the strength of the English troops landed there and the pressure exerted by England.

3. In the event of a British landing or of a British advance from Gibraltar, it is the *intention* to attack the English on the Iberian Peninsula with the aim: of *destroying the English forces or at least of driving them out*; of taking possession of the most important

¹This document is from a film of file H 22/251, Operationsabteilung, OKH (deposited at the Special Collections Branch, World War II Records Division, National Archives, Washington, D. C.).

ports on the Spanish and Portuguese Atlantic coast and of creating favorable conditions for a later attack *against Gibraltar*.

4. The operation is given the code name of: *Isabella*;

The Commander in Chief, West will be charged with its preparation and execution.

5. *In the execution of the operation* it is a matter of importance with strong forces from the occupied area of southern France to gain the plateau of Old Castile around Valladolid and Madrid, and from there, as the situation develops:

either to take the most important ports on the *Portuguese coast*;

or to drive through to the *southern Spanish coast*. Mobile component forces are to be committed at once for the occupation of the *Spanish northern coast* from Vigo to San Sebastián.

The utmost attempt is to be made to make use of the Spanish *railroads*.

A cooperation of *Italian forces* is not for the present contemplated.

6. The *Luftwaffe*, besides providing aerial defense for the Army units marching into Spain and Portugal and supporting them, will attack the ports and bases occupied by the enemy.

Flying units will probably be transferred to Spain for this purpose.

7. The *forces* for the operation—some 6 to 8 divisions—are to be taken from the troops remaining to the Commander in Chief, West at the final stage [*im Endziel*].

An improvised motorization according to orders in the same form as is prepared for Operation *Attila*,² is to be provided for Operation *Isabella*.

The bringing up of two additional divisions, 15th wave, can be expected as of June 16, so that altogether there will be at the disposal of the Commander in Chief, West at the final stage:

4 Divisions	3rd Wave (up to strength by June 15)
6 Divisions	3rd Wave (limited equipment)
3 Divisions	6th Wave
■ Divisions	13th Wave
8 Divisions	14th Wave
7 Divisions	15th Wave
1 Armored Brigade	

It is as yet impossible to tell whether additional forces, particularly mobile units, can be made available by OKH. For the preliminary work only the above-mentioned forces should be counted on.

8. In the case of *Isabella*,

The *protection of the coast* must be guaranteed with a minimum force, and an adequate *protection of the demarcation line* must be maintained.

On the other hand, the patrolling of the northeast line can be abandoned.

² See vol. XI of this series, document No. 488.

A *simultaneous* execution of Operation *Attila* is not to be considered.

Preparations for Operation *Isabella*, however, are to be made in such a way that, *either Isabella or Attila* as the case may be, can be carried out. The state of preparation for *Attila* must, therefore, not be diminished by the preparations for *Isabella*, particularly not by the distribution of forces for *Isabella*.

9. A special order will be issued regarding preparatory measures in the *matter of supply*.

10. The *maintenance of secrecy* in connection with all the preliminary work is especially enjoined.

11. *Working data regarding:*

- a) Data on the Spanish Army;
- b) Data on the Portuguese Army;
- c) Data on transportation conditions in Spain and Portugal;
- d) Military-geographic study of the Iberian Peninsula with road condition maps (1,000 copies in the map depot, Paris);
- e) Data on the artillery armament of the coastal positions and on the capacity of ports of the Iberian Peninsula

were sent at the time as material for Operation *Felix*³ to the offices participating in *Felix*, and, pursuant to an order of OKH GenStdH Op. Abt. (IIb) No. 699/40 g. Kdos. of December 14, 1940,⁴ deposited with Army Group D.

12. Commander in Chief, West will report to OKH: *by May 15:*

a) Operational plans with time schedule, chain of command, and distribution of forces; the earliest time of operational preparedness and the shortest alerting time are to be indicated.

b) Requirements of GHQ troops (available only to a *limited extent*);

c) Requirements to be made of the Luftwaffe;

d) Requirements to be made of the Navy;

e) The intended change in the distribution of forces in the area under the command of the Commander in Chief, West, with a view to the state of readiness for *Isabella* and *Attila* and the time when the new distribution of forces can be effected.

At the same time the attempt should be made to use the non-mobile units from the start in coastal defense.

A re-grouping of the forces is not to take place until approval is given by OKH.⁵

By order:
HALDER

³ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 323.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Additional documents on Operation *Isabella* from file OKW/116 are filmed on roll 781, serial 781, frames 5508299-372, and the film microcopy T 77 has been deposited in the National Archives, Washington, D.C. Cf. Hans Guenther Seraphim, "Felix' and 'Isabella', Dokumente zu Hitlers Plannungen betr. Spanien und Portugal aus den Jahren 1940/1941," *Die Welt als Geschichte*, 1 (1955), pp. 45-86.

No. 470

124/123117-20

Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsäcker

A/g/255

Moscow, May 7, 1941.

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: When I was last in Berlin, we discussed, among other things, measures that should be taken if, contrary to expectations, a German-Soviet conflict should break out. In connection with these matters, I forgot to mention one point:

(I should like very much to ask you to see to it that in the event of a conflict the members of the Soviet Embassy, the Soviet Consulates, and the Soviet trade missions in Germany be treated with as much consideration as possible. The same should apply to all representatives of the Soviet press. Every severity shown the Soviet Russians would be repaid with much greater severity against us. We should all be very glad here if our officials would also show themselves generous if the Soviet Russians should ask that they be allowed to take along Reich Germans in their employ. We have here employed in our houses numerous volksdeutsch Soviet citizens as maids, cooks, etc., one or another of whom will surely want to leave with us.)¹

The new French Ambassador, M. Bergery, paid me a visit day before yesterday. He expressed himself in a manner very sympathetic to Germany, and gave me a lengthy report on the policy that he intends to pursue here and which, according to him, is the policy of his Government. It may be summed up approximately in the thought that France wishes to be neither anti-German nor anti-English nor anti-American, but considers it urgently necessary that close, all-European cooperation should come about, in which the great Soviet Union and its abundance of raw materials must be included.

The sensation of the day is the taking over of the premiership by Stalin. I have hardly anything to add to the telegram that I dispatched today on this subject.² I had intended at first to ask whether I should in any way convey to M. Stalin the congratulations of the Reich Government. I finally omitted this sentence.

With all best wishes and Heil Hitler,

Yours, etc.

F. W. SCHULENBURG

Postscript. (I should like also to call your attention to the following: To the astonishment of all, the Soviet Government has not done anything vigorous either here or in Leningrad to meet an aerial

¹ The foregoing paragraph and the postscript are marked on the original with parentheses in Weizsäcker's handwriting and a marginal note reads: "Note from Amb[assador] Count Schulenburg. Moscow, May 7."

Cf. document No. 485.

² Document No. 468.

danger. From time to time, to be sure, small air raid drills are held, but there is hardly a home in either of the principal Soviet cities that has black-out facilities. In our opinion, this apparent carelessness on the part of the Soviet Government is attributable to the fact that it was long ago decided, in the event of war, to evacuate Moscow and Leningrad and declare them open cities. Without a doubt the Soviet Government has for some time already prepared a wartime capital "somewhere", equipped with all the frills (means of inter-communication, etc.) which it can reach in a very short time. It will in any event not remain in Moscow.) With best regards, Yours, etc., F. W. SCHULENBURG.

No. 471

205/142688-90

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, May 8, 1941—6:40 p. m.

SECRET

Received May 8—11:35 p. m.

No. 504 of May 8

With reference to your telegram No. 627 of May 6 (Pol. VI 2105 g. I).¹

I. Seen from the viewpoint of Stockholm, the issue dealt with presents itself as follows:

a) The aim of Sweden's policy, according to the statements of all responsible elements, is to preserve intact the existence of an independent Swedish state which makes no claim to hegemony in the international field. The so-called claim to Northern leadership, found in certain nationalistically colored groups has so far acquired no concrete or politically significant form. These are the same insignificant groups which, during the late Finnish-Russian conflict, recklessly agitated for Sweden's entry into the war, and they represent a mentality similar to that of the forces which urged that war be declared on Norway in 1905, and on Prussia in 1864. The responsible Sweden fully recognizes the realities of the power situation in the Baltic area today. In this regard Counselor Söderblom, chief of the Political Department of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, recently told Dankwort that in the new Europe as in the past, Sweden would follow a policy that would always accord first place to Germany as her largest and most important neighbor. To talk of a Swedish foreign policy planning for hegemony could only be described as idiotic.

¹ Not found.

b) This does not keep Sweden from looking upon herself among the Nordic states as something of a *primus inter pares*, especially in cultural questions and in some measure also economically, or from trying to have the Nordic states work together in all fields of peaceful joint undertakings, with the aim of winning in the new Europe recognition and treatment as a natural geopolitical group of sincere cooperators.

c) As regards Sweden's action in the event of a conflict in the East, Counselor Söderblom, in a routine conversation with Dankwort on May 6,² referring to the UP report from London of Molotov's resignation as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, which *Allehanda*,³ No. 121, published under the heading "Stalin Disturbed by German Expansion," made approximately the following remarks:

1. The Swedish Government has lately been receiving from a large number of sources increasing numbers of reports of a deep deterioration in German-Russian relations, which moved the Swedish Government to undertake a hypothetical consideration of this question complex. While an early discussion of the matter with Germany might perhaps seem very useful, the Swedish Government had gotten the impression from all official German statements to date that we did not think a conflict likely, and so a statement of Sweden's view of the subject was not desirable. Sweden had therefore made no statement of her position until now.

2. He could, however, state confidentially as his private opinion that Sweden would assist Finland in every way if Russia were to attack Finland.

3. In the event that a state of war should arise between Germany and Finland on the one side, and Russia on the other, Sweden would, furthermore, support all measures tending to bring about Russia's complete defeat.

d) During the same conversation, at which there were present for part of the time State Secretary Boheman and the Deputy Chief of the Political Department, Kumlin, Söderblom stated that the Swedish Government has to date complied with practically all German demands arising from military-political requirements; and he was convinced that it would be possible also in the future, by timely talks conducted confidentially as well as in the spirit of mutual confidence, to find ways and means which would bring about the necessary co-operation. The Swedish Government was moreover gratified to note that Finland could now hope to be sure of strong German protection if anything serious should happen. (See also paragraph 2 of our telegram No. 489 of May 5.⁴)

² No report of this conversation has been found.

³ I.e., the Stockholm *Nya Dagligt Allehanda*.

⁴ Document No. 458.

II. The impression here is that the present conference of the Swedish and Finnish Foreign Ministers in Helsinki is founded on this basic policy of the Swedish Government; the Military Attaché whom you know [*bekannter*] shares this view and requests that OKW and OKH be notified.⁵

WIED

⁵ The Foreign Ministry received reports from Helsinki and Stockholm concerning the meeting between the Swedish and Finnish Foreign Ministers. Blücher reported in Helsinki telegram No. 313 of May ■ (205/142691-92) what Witting told him of the meeting, while Wied reported in Stockholm telegram No. 512 of May 10 (205/142695-96) a conversation of that day with Günther on the meeting.

No. 472

83/61213-14

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TEHRAN, May 8, 1941—8:50 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received May 9—9:25 a. m.

No. 351 of May 8

[Pol. VII 250 g. Rs.]¹

With reference to your telegram No. 208 of May 6.²

1. Your assumption that the Iranian Government will not openly acknowledge that it is on Iraq's side, is correct.

2. It must be expected that despite any assurances that the Iranian Government might give, it will not permit any arms that have arrived on Iranian territory to be taken out of the country again, because of the very great need for arms of the Iranian Army.

3. Consequently, if Germany wishes to make sure that arms shipments reach Iraq, only the route over the Baghdad Railway can be considered.

4. Any cooperation of the Iranian Government in carrying through the plan is subject solely and exclusively to the Shah's decision. It is most expedient that he be approached through the Minister President.

5. I therefore presented this matter today to the Minister President who, in the light of past experience, I believe is intelligent enough to keep this confidential with respect to everybody.

a) The Minister President pointed out immediately that execution [of the plan] would be impossible without the Shah's assent and said that he had no way of anticipating how the Shah would decide.

b) The Minister President also said that the Shah would undoubtedly raise the question of arms shipments for Iran. I assured

¹ The file number is supplied from the reply telegram (4809/E238168). See footnote 4.

² Presumably document No. 466.

the Minister President, as instructed, that the arms shipments for the Iranian Government would not in any way be affected by this plan.

c) The Minister President replied that the Shah was angered by the negative attitude of the German governmental departments in refusing to deliver the arms and war material which the Iranian War Ministry had requested as long ago as December, 1939.³ I told the Minister President that I would immediately inquire by telegraph about the possibility of delivery of the war material mentioned by him.

d) The Minister President promised that he would present the matter to the Shah at the earliest opportunity.

6. It is my impression that if the Shah is to acquiesce in our plan at all, he will give his consent only if Germany meets the wishes for deliveries stated by the Iranian War Ministry with which the Army and Luftwaffe authorities are sufficiently acquainted.

Please let me have your reply at the earliest possible.⁴

ETTEL

³ Such a request had been reported in Tehran telegram No. 254 of Dec. 27, 1939 (6687/E505859-60). The objections raised by some German military and civilian departments and difficulties in finding safe transit routes resulted in a failure to comply with part of these requests as well as in carrying out deliveries of arms to Iran which had been contracted earlier. The pertinent documents are filmed on serials 6667 and 4809.

See vol. ix of this series, document No. 3 and footnote 3.

⁴ In telegram No. 235 of May 19 (4809/E238163) Wiehl replied that earlier Iranian requests for war material had not been specific enough and therefore the Iranians should draw up lists with exact specifications regarding numbers, caliber, and amounts of ammunition. "Immediate study in an accommodating spirit is being promised in the event that the Government in Tehran meets our wishes regarding Iraq."

No. 473

116/66832-33

The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, May 8, 1941—10:35 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received May 8—11:00 p. m.

No. 1043 of May 8

With reference to my telegram No. 894 of April 24.¹

Count Ciano, who returned to Rome last night from his trip with the Duce to Monfalcone for a conference with Pavelić,² asked me to call on him this noon in order to inform me of the outcome of the conversation with Pavelić; he requested that I immediately inform the Reich Government of his communication. He handed me the "Treaty of Alliance, Guarantee, and Cooperation" between Italy and

¹ Document No. 396.

² Vessenmayer's telegrams No. 170 (116/66834) and No. 175 of May 8 (116/66835-36) gave some additional details regarding the negotiations at Monfalcone. Cf. *The Ciano Diaries*, entries for May 6 and 7, 1941.

Croatia, which will be transmitted in the next telegram³ in its final form, as it was signed yesterday by the Duce and Pavelić.

Count Ciano pointed out to me that the final text differs from the text transmitted in telegram No. 895 of April 24⁴ only in articles 3 and 4. Both articles had been somewhat weakened in favor of Croatia; in particular Italy had abandoned [the idea] of putting into effect immediately a customs and currency union.

Count Ciano then handed me a document likewise signed by the Duce and Pavelić, which determines the new frontiers between Italy and Croatia. The text of this document likewise follows in a separate subsequent telegram.⁵ At my request Ciano promised me that he would send me as soon as possible an exact map⁶ of the delimitation of the new frontiers on the basis of the document mentioned above.

Finally, Ciano informed me that Pavelić would arrive in Rome on May 18 with a special delegation in order to offer the King of Italy the royal crown of Croatia. The King of Italy would accept this offer and transfer the kingship to Duke Spolet⁷ (group garbled), the brother of the Duke of Aosta. Pavelić would remain Minister President of the Croatian Government.

BISMARCK

³ Rome telegram No. 1044 of May 8 (116/66837-38).

⁴ See document No. 396 and footnote 3.

⁵ Rome telegram No. 1045 of May 8 (116/66839).

⁶ Not found.

⁷ The reference is to Aimone di Savoia-Aosta, Duke of Spoleto.

No. 474

534/239854

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 318

BERLIN, May 8, 1941.

Today the Nuncio, as expected, again spoke to me about the conference he desires with Suffragan Bishop Dymek of Gau Warthe-land.¹

I told the Nuncio at once that I had not been able to make possible such a personal conference as suggested by the Nunciature. One objective reason which the Nunciature had cited, namely settlement of the church contribution procedure, had been superseded by the fact that this procedure had become effective since April 1 of this

¹ Previous conversations between the Nuncio and Weizsäcker had taken place on Apr. 9, 23, and 30 (534/239795-96; 239809; 239837-38). They dealt with the church contribution procedure in the Warthegau which had been changed by the Reichsstatthalter so that instead of the State the Church itself would be in charge of the collections. The Nuncio was not opposed to this scheme but wanted to discuss the matter with Bishop Dymek.

year and no resistance on the part of the Polish portion of the diocese had to be expected.²

The Nuncio then wanted to make this a matter of principle and within the area of his jurisdiction. I did not follow him along these lines, however, but kept to the view that although the Warthegau was Reich territory, it was still under a special regime so that for technical reasons I was not in a position to fulfill the wishes of the Nunciature. I had to refer it to written channels.

The Nuncio, who was very dissatisfied with this information, asked me to confirm my oral answer to him in writing. I promised to do so.³

WEIZSÄCKER

² Reported in telegram of Apr. 28 (534/239835-36) from Reichsstatthalter Greiser to Weizsäcker.

³ Marginal notes:

"Counselor Haidlen please submit a letter to the Nuncio as outlined above."

"Taken care of with letter, Pol. III 901, to the Nuncio."

This letter has not been found.

No. 475

221/149286-88

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, May 8, 1941.

Dir. Ha. Pol. 110.

RECORD OF THE RESULTS OF YESTERDAY'S NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ADMIRAL DARLAN, FINANCE MINISTER BOUTHILLIER, AND AMBASSADOR ABETZ, GENERAL VOGL, MINISTER HEMMEN¹

I. In the military-political field the following concessions were obtained from the French:

- a) The stocks of French arms under Italian control in Syria to be made available for arms transports to Iraq;
- b) Assistance in the forwarding of arms shipments of other origin that arrive in Syria by land or sea for Iraq;
- c) Permission for German planes, destined for Iraq, to make intermediate landings and take on gasoline in Syria;
- d) Cession to Iraq of reconnaissance, pursuit, and bombing planes, as well as bombs, from the air force permitted for Syria under the Armistice Treaty;
- e) An airfield in Syria to be made available especially for the intermediate landing of German planes;²

¹ See document No. 459 and footnote 4.

² According to an undated memorandum by Ritter summarizing the Paris negotiations of May 11 and 7, the airport at Palmyra was being considered for this purpose (587/243485-88).

f) Until such an airfield has been made available, an order to be issued to all airfields in Syria to assist German planes making intermediate landings.

These French concessions go considerably beyond what could have been expected on the German side.

II. Within the framework of the full powers granted to them, our negotiators made the following concessions in the military-political field:

- a) Permission for the rearming of seven French torpedo boats;
- b) Relaxation of controls at the demarcation line through permission of open post cards without printed forms, issuance of passes for members of the land and air forces on leave in as large a number as the quota already granted for the Navy, and the granting of passes in serious cases of illness or bereavement—in addition general opening of the demarcation line for the movement of goods and payments;
- c) Immediate negotiations for reduction of the installments on the occupation costs; a decrease from 20 million reichsmarks to 15 million reichsmarks per day is being considered in this connection. The negotiations are to be conducted on the basis of the proposals of Minister Hemmen, i.e., in accordance with the instructions of the Commercial Policy Committee (see III e below).³

III. In connection with the concession regarding the occupation costs (II c above) Minister Hemmen, in accordance with instructions,⁴ obtained the following French concessions:

- a) Establishment of a German or Italian control of the outer borders of the unoccupied French territory;
- b) Installation of German control commissioners in French central offices in Paris; in particular, the immediate installation of a bank commissioner at the Bank of France and a foreign exchange commissioner in the French Finance Ministry; and, at a date to be agreed upon later, a commissioner for merchandise in the French Ministry of Commerce.⁵
- c) Final acceptance of the German demand for the delivery of considerable amounts of aluminum and alumina (22,000 tons that are overdue, immediately; 3,000 tons per month thereafter);⁶

³ In the negotiations regarding occupation costs, difficulties arose partly as a result of French objections to having a portion of the payments transferred in gold, securities, and goods. Hemmen's reports about these negotiations are filmed on serial 378. In telegram No. 1728 of June 8 (386/211070-73) Abetz reviewed these difficulties, their effect on the political discussions with France, and his own proposals in that matter. See *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. iv, pp. 411-412, 417-426, 443-451, 457, 482-483, 518, 526, and 529; and Yves Bouthillier, *Le Drame de Vichy*, vol. II: *Finances sous la contrainte* (Paris, 1951), pp. 71-76.

For further developments see vol. XIII of this series.

⁴ See document No. 213.

⁵ The text of these agreements was reported by Hemmen in telegram No. 207 of May 8 (378/209582-90).

⁶ The text of the aluminum and alumina treaty was reported by Hemmen in telegram No. 206 of May 8 (1003/306707-08).

d) Acceptance in principle of the German demand that in the future part of the reduced installments of occupation costs must be transferred in gold, foreign exchange or securities;

e) The proposals of Minister Hemmen (instructions of the Commercial Policy Committee),⁷ which are to form the basis of the further negotiations on reduction of occupation costs, also include: fulfillment of the German demand for the production of planes for the German Luftwaffe, return of the French and Polish gold from Africa (return of the Belgian gold is being continued), fulfillment of a number of other financial and economic demands (redemption of requisition certificates, facilitation of the acquisition of French securities, labor questions, etc.).

Herewith submitted in accordance with instructions to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WIEHL

⁷ See document No. 213.

No. 476

70/50259

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

U. St.S. Pol. 380

BERLIN, May 8, 1941.

As Ambassador Abetz indicated to Dr. Schwarzmann on the telephone, Ambassador Abetz, in view of the negotiations in Paris,¹ does not consider sending Minister Hentig to Syria advisable at this time.²

In order to prepare the groundwork in Syria for the action relating to Iraq, Senior Counselor Rahn, together with a Frenchman,³ has meanwhile left by plane for Syria, where he will arrive in the morning of May 9.

In these circumstances it will be advisable that Herr Rahn, who is accompanied by an interpreter and a radio operator, be assigned the functions which should have been assumed by Herr von Hentig. Whether Herr Rahn, as had been planned in the case of Herr von Hentig, should now also be appointed head of the German liaison unit to the Italian Armistice Commission, or what other form is to be given to the German mission in Syria, is still under study.

¹ See document No. 475.

² In Paris telegram No. 1423 of May 9 (70/50260-61) Abetz explained his reasons for advising against the sending of Hentig to Syria: Hentig was so well known in Syria, particularly among Syrian nationalists, that the French Government had objected to his being sent there.

³ In Paris telegram No. 1423, referred to in footnote 2, Abetz stated that Rahn would be accompanied by the French national Guérard "who will transmit to General Dentz an instruction from Darlan that all the measures desired by Guérard with regard to arms deliveries and transports by German planes to Iraq are to be taken at once."

It is planned that von Hentig is to replace Rahn later on, if circumstances permit.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WOERMANN

No. 477

177/85051-52

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan

Telegram

No. 573

BERLIN, May 9, 1941—3:50 a. m.

For the Ambassador.

Foreign Minister Matsuoka sent me through the Japanese Embassy here a lengthy telegram, expressing his enthusiastic admiration for the Führer's Reichstag speech,¹ and also his concern over the further development of Roosevelt's policy. Please transmit the following reply telegram to the Foreign Minister:

"Ambassador Oshima has transmitted to me the telegram which Your Excellency sent me about your return trip to Tokyo after visiting the holy places at Ise, Unebi, and Momoyana, and in which you inform me that while en route you learned the substance of the Führer's declaration before the Reichstag. I have transmitted to the Führer your good wishes and expressions of enthusiastic admiration for this speech, as you had directed, and he has instructed me to thank you for them.

"President Roosevelt's attitude, which you discuss in your telegram, is being followed by the Reich Government with the greatest attention. The Government in this respect is convinced that there is only one thing which could sway the decisions of this man—the iron determination of the Powers associated in the Tripartite Pact to hold steadfastly to the line of action laid down in this Pact. If we do not allow ourselves to waver in this resolve, even the President of the United States will not find it easy to decide on a military intervention in the war. Should he nevertheless do so, not the Tripartite Pact Powers but his own country will soon come to rue this step bitterly. It is not with anxiety but with the greatest calm that the Reich Government is waiting to see whether the policy of the United States will continue to develop along sensible lines, or whether it will move on to futile adventures, as Your Excellency has correctly termed the other alternative.

"Recalling your visit to Germany with lively pleasure, and conscious of our common interests, I transmit to you, Mr. Foreign Minister, my warmest regards. Joachim von Ribbentrop."

End of telegram.

Report by telegram on carrying out of instructions.²

RIBBENTROP

¹ See document No. 464 and footnote 3.

² See document No. 484.

No. 478

4699/E226936

The Foreign Ministry to the Gauleitung Styria of the NSDAP

Teletype

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, May 9, 1941—1:55 p. m.

D VIII 6 g.

For Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter Uiberreither.

The Foreign Minister has just heard that there are difficulties regarding the evacuation of the Slovenes.¹ The Foreign Minister agrees to the immediate transfer of the Slovenes to Old Serbia as planned by you. He asks that he be informed if there are difficulties at your end with respect to any authorities whatsoever, and is prepared if necessary to help the Gauleiter in eliminating such difficulties.²

By order:
RINTELEN³

¹ See document No. 465.

² Uiberreither replied to this message in teletype No. 423 of May 9 from Maribor (230/153219) stating that it was merely a matter of transportation difficulties.

³ The document bears Ribbentrop's paraph.

No. 479

83/61215-16

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

U. St.S. Pol. 395

BERLIN, May 9, 1941.

General Warlimont (OKW) telephoned the following today, about 7:00 p.m.:

He has been informed by the German Armistice Commission that according to a French report the Italian Government approached the French Government for permission to use Syrian airfields for an Italian aircraft formation assigned for operational employment in Iraq. The French Government showed itself very averse to complying with the Italian request because it finds the appearance of the Italian Air Force in Syria undesirable. It also raised the question whether the Italian wishes were known to the German Government and, if so, why they were not presented at the conferences with Admiral Darlan.¹ The Italians afterwards narrowed down their demand explaining that this was for the time being only a general inquiry and that there was no question as yet of actually sending planes.

¹ See document No. 475.

The German Armistice Commission has requested instructions from the OKW on what the answer should be. It has been agreed with the French that the French Government would not give a reply until the German position has been stated. General Warlimont requested in view of the predominantly political character of the decision that the Foreign Ministry make known its position at the earliest opportunity. Without committing himself he suggested that it would indeed be desirable on general principles if Italian assistance to Iraq could be confined to areas less conspicuous than Syria. The German operations by way of Syria would not be much advanced by an Italian effort there, the more so as such an effort would hardly be effective.

I promised immediate study and an early reply.

It would seem to me that the German operations by way of Syria would actually be endangered by simultaneous Italian action in that area. Desirable as simultaneous Italian effort is, it ought to be suggested that it would be better concentrated elsewhere.²

WOERMANN

² Cf. the reference to the Italian request for use of the Syrian airfields in the Hitler-Darlan conversation of May 11 (document No. 491). There is in the files an undated draft of a telegram to Paris for Ritter's signature (699/260848-50) stating that the matter was discussed but not settled in the conferences with Darlan. According to this draft instruction Darlan was to be asked to direct the French High Commissioner in Syria that Italian planes be given the same facilities in Syria as those granted to German planes.

No. 480

177/85054-55

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, May 9, 1941.

TOP SECRET

No. 577

RAM 146

For the Ambassador personally.

In your telegram No. 675 of May 4,¹ the substance of the American proposals is simply reproduced in brief summary form in four principal points.

In an examination of these points, the question arises whether this summary really conveys an accurate picture of the proposals and, particularly in point 1, also coincides with the text of the American

¹ Document No. 454.

proposals with regard to this point (nonintervention in the war on their own initiative).²

Please try to clarify this matter in a conversation with Mr. Matsuoka. Should you find Mr. Matsuoka ready to communicate to us the exact text, please take advantage of the fact and wire us the text at once. Please, however, conduct the conversation lightly, and if Mr. Matsuoka has objections to giving further information because of the secret nature of the American proposals, please do not insist, since a detailed knowledge of the text is really of secondary importance in an appraisal of the entire matter. You might then confine yourself to obtaining from Mr. Matsuoka reconfirmation of the substance of the four points without giving any intimation of a mistrust occasioned by previous Japanese communications in this matter.³

RIBBENTROP

² In telegram No. 1058 of May 9 (2281/482072) Rintelen asked Bismarck what information had been given the Italian Government by Matsuoka regarding the American proposals.

In telegram No. 1068 of May 10 (177/85059-61) Bismarck replied, quoting a memorandum prepared in the Italian Foreign Ministry which summarized the American proposal in four points substantially the same as those originally reported to Berlin by Ott's telegram of May 4 (document No. 454).

³ See document No. 488.

No. 481

222/149620

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, May 9, 1941.

No. 1304

RAM 148

With reference to your No. 1272 of May 6.¹

It appears from your telegram that Minister Bossy, on the basis of a few friendly words from State Minister Meissner, made a report to his Government which contains thoroughly inaccurate statements. For example, he made out of the remark that we had understanding for the Rumanian wishes, as transmitted to us in the memorandum, the report that Rumania would receive the Serbian Banat.

In order to correct the false impression that arose as a result of this in Bucharest, State Minister Meissner will ask Minister Bossy

¹ In this telegram (222/149601) Killinger reported having learned from Minister Antonescu of a conversation of Bossy with Meissner in Berlin according to which Meissner indicated that Rumania would receive the Serbian Banat.

to call on him in order to reduce to their proper dimensions Bossy's false interpretations that evidently came about through a misunderstanding.

RIBBENTROP

No. 482

1084/317084-87

*The High Command of the Army to the Chief of the High
Command of the Wehrmacht¹*

Teletype

CHEFSACHE

MAY 9, 1941.

Gen. St. d. H, Op Abt.
No. 838/41 g. Kdos. Chefs.

The Commander in Chief, Army, on the basis of his personal impressions during his stay in Athens on May 6 and 7 as well as of a report from Field Marshal List, who is familiar with the local conditions, attaches special importance to having the following points of view considered in the further handling of the Greek question in the military and political field:

1. It is of the greatest importance for the tasks before us that the situation in Greece is stabilized as soon as possible and also remains quiet in the future. Only then will it be possible to manage with small military forces in Greece.

2. This stabilization of conditions in Greece and the maintenance of tranquillity appears to be assured only if Greece feels that she is under German protection. Considering the sharply negative attitude of the Greek people toward Italy, an occupation of the major part of Greece, in particular of the capital, Athens, by Italian forces involves the danger that the present Greek Government will disintegrate further or resign entirely. In this way there will be a danger of disturbances.² It is doubtful whether the Italians in that case will be able to control these disturbances by themselves. The result would be that German forces would have to be employed again and to an increased degree.

3. For this reason it appears important to support very extensively the Greek Government now in office, without intervening unneces-

¹ Under a cover note of May 13 (1084/317084) a copy of this teletype message was sent to Counselor Kramarz of Political Division I M by the Foreign Ministry's representative with the OKH.

² In telegram No. 69 of May 4 (142/127523-24) Altenburg reported having been told by a Greek Cabinet member on instructions from Tsolakoglou that an Italian occupation of the country would be intolerable for the Greek people and would result in unrest and the resignation of the Government.

sarily in the domestic troubles of the country. As regards the military occupation, an arrangement is proposed in agreement with the Commander in Chief of the Twelfth Army which will permit the Italians to occupy the area west of the Pindus Mountains, with a clear line of division fixed, as well as the Peloponnesus up to and including the southern bank of the Canal of Corinth, after the departure of the 5th Armored Division (as of the end of May), and the area around Patras at once. The remaining parts of Greece, including Athens, must continue to be occupied by German forces. Restriction to separate German "military districts" in the form of military enclaves is not desired.

4. The decision regarding the occupation of the islands will have to be made after conclusion of Operation *Merkur*.³ This decision depends primarily upon the requirements of aerial and naval warfare.

5. The Commander in Chief, Balkans, will have to be given executive authority for the entire Greek territory so that in this manner the Greek Government will have to negotiate *with only one controlling authority*. For defense against possible military attacks and in case of internal political tensions the Commander in Chief, Balkans, must also receive full powers to exercise command authority over all forces stationed in this area, not only over forces of the three branches of the Wehrmacht but also over the branches of the Italian and Bulgarian forces. The necessary full powers must be assured by means of political agreements with Italy and Bulgaria.

6. For the support of the Greek Government it further appears necessary to provide assistance as soon as possible in eliminating the difficulties with respect to food. The available food stocks supposedly will last for only another 2 to 3 weeks.

The Commander in Chief of the Army requests that the Führer be informed of his views and that the points of view stated above be taken into account in the discussions with Italy. OKH points once more urgently to the fact that, in the opinion of the Commander in Chief of the Twelfth Army in particular, any arrangement which is more accommodating toward the Italians involves the danger that there will be a constant center of unrest in Greece and thus exceedingly undesirable consequences for the further prosecution of the war as a whole.⁴

High Command of the Army

³ See document No. 408.

⁴ In telegram No. 48 of May 2 (142/127516-17) Altenburg reported having been told by Field Marshal List that he would "recommend re-examination of the question of an Italian occupation." List had referred to statements by Tsolakoglou similar to those cited in footnote 2. Altenburg himself added a warning against the plan of having the Italians take over the occupation of Greece.

No. 483

177/85058-57

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Tokyo, May 10, 1941—1:20 a. m.

No. 714 of May ■

Received May 9—9:40 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to our telegram No. 685 of the 6th.¹

Matsuoka, who, before today's opening session of the central commission of the Tripartite Pact, sent around to inquire whether there were already a reply from Berlin with regard to the American proposal, again spoke to me about this after the meeting. He added that, according to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington,² America was at the moment faced with serious decisions, and that Secretary of State Hull had therefore repeatedly pressed for an immediate reply from Japan. Through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, he would obtain clarification from the American Government of the following preliminary questions:

Would America pledge herself

- 1) not to enter the European war; and
- 2) to induce Chiang Kai-shek to enter into direct negotiations with Japan without the participation of the United States? In this case Japan would be ready to enter into discussions of details of the American proposal.

When I again pointed out that the American proposal simply aimed at restraining Japan from an advance in the South Pacific, particularly against Singapore, Matsuoka declared that he would in no case allow his hands to be tied in the Pacific Ocean. He would not relieve the Americans of their anxiety concerning the safety of the British possessions in the Pacific Ocean. He was simply prepared to guarantee the independence of the Philippines.

I pointed out to Matsuoka that the moment might come when America's measures would have to be regarded as acts of aggression even without her formal entry into the war. He replied that in this respect also for Japan it would be a case involving the alliance.

I request telegraphic instructions.³

Orr

¹ Document No. 464.² Adm. Kichisaburo Nomura.³ No direct reply has been found, but see document No. 488.

No. 484

177/85058

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOKYO, May 10, 1941—1:26 a. m.

No. 715 of May 10

Received May 10—11:03 a. m.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 573¹ and 574² of May 9.
For the Foreign Minister.

Instructions carried out with the Japanese Foreign Minister. Matsukata appeared to be very pleased with the Reich Foreign Minister's message. He considered it proof of complete agreement of opinion, and asked me to convey to the Reich Foreign Minister his sincerest thanks. In anticipation of the receipt of the Foreign Minister's statement of views with regard to the American proposal, he promised to postpone the contemplated communication to the American Government which had been announced for today or tomorrow.

OTT

¹ Document No. 477.² Not printed (177/85053).

No. 485

277/178822

State Secretary Weissäcker to Ambassador Schulenburg

BERLIN, May 10, 1941.

DEAR COUNT SCHULENBURG: I have read your letter of May 7 and made certain excerpts from it which at a given time will be brought to light.¹ I did not present your letter to the Foreign Minister because this would not have been a rewarding thing, and also it certainly was not so planned by you.

The near future will again bring some meetings of important personalities which, however, will scarcely affect your particular province.

All good wishes and greetings from my wife as well,

Yours, etc.

WEISSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 470 and footnote 1.

No. 486

277/178823-24

Under State Secretary Woermann to Ambassador Schulenburg

BERLIN, May 10, 1941.

DEAR COUNT SCHULENBURG: It appears from the strictly confidential source with which you are acquainted that various of your Moscow colleagues are very much interested in knowing what instructions you have brought along from Berlin.

Thus, the Greek Minister¹ claims to have learned from one of his colleagues that on the occasion of your visit to Berlin you came to the conclusion that in certain circles there the thought of an operation against Russia was uppermost. Furthermore, in his conversation with you, the Führer is said to have stated that the strengthening of the German forces on the Russian border had been necessitated on grounds of defense as a result of the challenging attitude of the Soviet Government, which had found expression in the Russian-Yugoslav Treaty.²

Your Turkish colleague³ reports from a conversation between you and the Rumanian Minister⁴ concerning similar statements by you, and that you have been given no instructions of any kind for negotiations with the Soviets. You would wait for the Soviets to take the initiative for any sort of negotiations. The Turk reports also that, according to information received, you were very depressed in the last few days (beginning of May) and were already packing your private belongings in cases.⁵

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Yours as ever,

WOERMANN

¹ C. Diamantopoulos.

² See document No. 265 and footnote 2.

³ Ali Haydar Aktay.

⁴ Grigore Gafencu.

⁵ Schulenburg's reply is document No. 504.

No. 487

177/85092-95

Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff

BERLIN, May 10, 1941.

With regard to the American proposals to Japan,¹ I should like, with reference to yesterday's conversation, to sum up my opinion as follows:

I. Roosevelt's proposals are not sincerely intended and cannot be sincerely intended. It is not conceivable that the United States

¹ See document No. 454 and footnote 1.

honestly wishes to abandon the stand she has persistently taken in the Manchukuo question for 10 years (which corresponds to the rigid American stand on similar European questions, for example, Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc., and has repeatedly been emphatically proclaimed by the American Government).

What the President really wants is, first of all, to gain time. He wants to lull Japan to sleep until such time as he can intervene in the fight for England with a war industry operating at full capacity and with full mobilization, especially with a larger navy. If Japan were now to play his game, Roosevelt could turn with all his force against the Axis Powers, since he would be free to the rear. Later on Roosevelt would not keep his promises to Japan; on the contrary, it would then be Japan's own turn.

The President is, secondly, pursuing the intention of undermining the Tripartite Pact as much as possible and compromising Japan. The very opening of negotiations on the new proposals would make it possible for the President sooner or later to come out with explanations regarding the Japanese attitude, or, at least, to have disclosures made in the press which would make that attitude appear dubious and the Tripartite Pact shaky. The effect of such disclosures would be very great throughout the world. In the United States those circles that have always assumed that Japan had only been bluffing by joining the Axis Powers and, in the last analysis, shrank from the consequences of the Tripartite Pact, would be strengthened, and thus the readiness for war in the American nation would be given a powerful impulse. Just as Italy's dalliance in Algeiras and after Algeiras was weakening to the Triple Alliance and strengthened the Entente Cordiale, so would such dalliance on the part of Japan weaken the Tripartite Pact and give confidence to the Anglo-Saxons. The danger of the entry of the United States into the war would therefore not be lessened, but would be considerably increased.

II. If Japan now clearly refuses, Roosevelt must realize that the Tripartite Pact is absolutely firm and that there is no possibility of shaking it. That course would even aggravate the difficult situation in which the President finds himself today. An entry into the war against the Axis Powers would, in view of such an attitude on the part of Japan, be attended with such great risk that Roosevelt would probably not risk such a decision, however strongly he still adheres to his fanatical policy against Germany. The entry of the United States into the war, or all measures of the United States that might lead to her entry into the war (convoys, sea patrols, etc.) would most effectively be prevented by a clear, unyielding attitude on the part of Japan at the present moment.

If Japan, by agreeing to the negotiations, so much as gives the impression of being ready to accede to Roosevelt's proposals, she will weaken the Tripartite Pact and strengthen England (which country would naturally be informed by Washington at once) and the war party in the United States. Japan would, moreover, gain nothing through such compliance, for Roosevelt would only protract the negotiations in order to compromise Japan more and more and in order to gain time for himself. Japan would then later on be betrayed by the Anglo-Saxon powers in exactly the same way as was Italy by the Entente Cordiale.

III. I believe, therefore, that we should strongly caution the Japanese against acceding to the American proposals. Should Tokyo for domestic political reasons have to refrain from giving Washington a flat refusal, it ought, at least, to make such counterproposals as Roosevelt could not possibly accept. In that case the negotiations ought soon to be announced publicly by the Japanese side in order that no disadvantages might arise through disclosures by the American side.²

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

DIECKHOFF

² Marginal notes:

"Shown to the Foreign Minister."

"R[intelen], May 10."

"[For] Foreign Minister: I agree with Herr Dieckhoff. What the U.S.A. demands of Japan is an unequal deal at our expense. U.S.A. is helping England on a very large scale: Japan on the other hand is to remain immobilized.

"I can scarcely conceive that Matsuoka would not realize this. Weizsäcker, May 10."

"Back to the Office of the State Secretary. R[intelen], May 11."

No. 488

177/85068-69

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 722 of May 11

Tokyo, May 11, 1941—1:11 a. m.

Received May 11—12:38 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 577 of May 9.²

In accordance with instructions, I again spoke to the Japanese Foreign Minister about the details of the American proposal. He

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 1475 to the Foreign Minister's special train, May 11, 1:30 p.m."

² Document No. 480.

confirmed to me the substance of the four principal points reported in telegram No. 675 of May 4.³

With regard to point 1, he stated that my rendering corresponded accurately and completely to the wording of the American proposal.

With regard to point 2, Matsuoka declared that America had made her willingness to use her influence with Chiang Kai-shek dependent on a number of "arrogant" conditions, in order to complicate the establishment of a new order. He intimated that America was demanding participation in the negotiations, the guaranty of special rights, and even provisions restricting the settlement of Japanese in China. In order to counteract this, he would request the opening of direct negotiations between Chiang Kai-shek and Japan without the participation of the United States. He would reject all conditions that militated against the principles drawn up by the Konoye Cabinet for the establishment of a new order in China. He would also demand that America withdraw all support from Chiang Kai-shek, should he refuse to negotiate directly.

With regard to point 3, Matsuoka stated that he would not consent to any restrictions in an economic respect on the new order to be established in the Greater East Asian area.

With regard to point 4, he would finally demand as equivalent for a guarantee of the status quo of the Philippines, neutral attitude on their part and equality of status of the Japanese with other nations.

I then casually expressed the wish that I might be given the text of the American proposal in order to avoid misunderstandings. Matsuoka told me that, to his extreme regret, in consequence of the promise of secrecy, he did not feel in a position to do this. Whereupon, as instructed, I did not insist.

Matsuoka assured me once more that he had wanted, mainly for tactical reasons, to make his preliminary inquiry to America, concerning which I reported in telegram No. 714 of May 9,⁴ and would not in any case consent to negotiations that might in any way be detrimental to the Tripartite Pact, the new order in Greater East Asia, and the interests of his allies. He expects in all probability that America will reply in the negative to his preliminary inquiry.

I requested Matsuoka urgently, in view of the extraordinary importance of these questions for the Tripartite Pact, first to await the German standpoint, and I shall again urge him to do so this afternoon.

OTT

³ Document No. 454.

⁴ Document No. 483.

No. 489

177/85070

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Tokyo, May 11, 1941—9:25 a. m.

No. 724 of May 11

Received May 11—5:30 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

Matsuoka just informed me that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington has telephoned to urge an early reply. Matsuoka added that according to reliable reports Roosevelt would announce institution of a convoy system before the Pan-American Union on May 14.² He had been confidentially informed by a member of the American Cabinet that opening of Japanese-American negotiations would delay this decision, and in these circumstances he would now approach the American Government with the preliminary inquiry, which had been communicated to me.³ He would ascertain the reaction of the Axis Powers immediately upon conveying the preliminary inquiry.

I told Matsuoka most emphatically that the German Government could not approve such separate action, to which he replied that he was willing to put off sending instructions to Washington until Monday noon, Japanese time.⁴

I request telegraphic instruction by special radio.⁵ Please establish immediate contact through transmitters DLY, PDX, or DLD.

OTT

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 1480 to the Foreign Minister's special train, May 11, 5:50 p.m."

² See document No. 516 and footnote 5.

³ See documents Nos. 483 and 488.

⁴ i.e., May 12.

⁵ See document No. 496.

No. 490

67/47206-28/1

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RAM 28

FUSCHL, May 11, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND ADMIRAL DARLAN, IN THE PRESENCE OF AMBASSADOR ABETZ AT FUSCHL ON MAY 11, 1941

In opening the conversation the Reich Foreign Minister reminded Admiral Darlan of their first meeting in 1938 on the occasion of the signing of the German-French declaration in Paris.¹ The develop-

¹ See vol. IV of this series, document No. 369.

ments since then had unfortunately been different from what had been envisaged at that time. Germany had hoped that a real understanding could be brought about with France, and the fact that this was the first time that it had been possible to achieve an agreement of this kind between Germany and France had seemed a good omen for the attainment of that goal.

The Reich Foreign Minister emphasized that the German-French accord was a matter especially dear to him personally. It had been his wish ever since the end of the World War that some day, at long last, Germany and France might and would find the way to each other. He was therefore deeply pained when he discovered soon after the signing of the joint declaration in 1938 that French policy was turning in a different direction and thus the personal hope which he had cherished for nearly 20 years was blighted.

The fact that developments had turned out differently could not be helped now, and one had to face the new situation. In this connection he (the Reich Foreign Minister) would like to say this:

Following the Armistice the Führer initiated the policy that was given expression at Montoire,² by which a new era of collaboration between the two countries was to be opened. But subsequent to this, events came to pass in France which gave Germany the impression that France was not in earnest about that policy. It was a great disappointment to the Führer. The new policy initiated by him and Pétain thus was stopped short at its very inception.

If Admiral Darlan had come to Germany today to talk things over with the Führer and with him, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) welcomed that despite everything that had happened. Accordingly he wanted to say at the outset of this conversation that if a new start were now to be made to reshape German-French relations, he hoped and expected that this time the Führer's intent was really understood in France and that there would not be another disappointment.

Following this and after having told Darlan that he would be received by the Führer that afternoon at the Berghof,³ the Reich Foreign Minister requested him to state for his part his position on the question of German-French relations.

After a few introductory remarks, Admiral Darlan called attention to his own efforts in behalf of a rapprochement between France and Germany, of which the Reich Foreign Minister was doubtless aware. It was a matter of keen regret to him that his views were not shared everywhere in France, and at his meeting with the Führer, which had taken place at Christmas under circumstances which were

² See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 212 and 227.

³ See document No. 491.

difficult for him (Darlan), he had set forth the reasons for this.⁴ He emphasized in this connection that the chiefs of the French Admiralty had never been consulted in the shaping of foreign policy; if they had, French foreign policy would have taken a different course.

Darlan also stressed that Marshal Pétain's views on the German-French rapprochement had undergone no change since the meeting at Montoire. With regard to Laval, Darlan remarked that collaboration with Pétain was in this instance handicapped by an "incompatibility of temperament" (*incompatibilité d'humeur*). Marshal Pétain had on many occasions talked with him (Darlan) about the German-French problem and had expressed his agreement with what Darlan had written him on November 15, namely, that there was no other solution for the French and European problems but German-French collaboration. Both Marshal Pétain and, particularly, he (Darlan) had stoutly defended their views in the face of opposing opinions which had crystallized especially in opposition to Darlan.

He (Darlan) had since last December cooperated with Ambassador Abetz on these questions in a satisfying manner. Their relations were cordial, and each appreciated the sincerity of the other.

As the conversation continued, Darlan referred to the sale of trucks in Tunisia to Germany and the placing of airfields in Syria at Germany's disposal, which he had effected with Marshal Pétain's concurrence.⁵ These were political gestures which France had made in order to demonstrate the spirit in which she intended to collaborate with Germany. They had not been easy for him, but had been undertaken in full consciousness of the possible consequences. To all these measures Marshal Pétain had given his agreement. But, according to his own words, he held that "France was compelled at the moment to march in the dark. He hoped, therefore, that Germany would throw some light on France's path." Darlan added that he naturally was not hinting at a disclosure of the peace terms. He only wanted Germany to let him know enough so that he could explain to the French people whither the road of collaboration really led. On this account he was very glad that today's meeting had come about, and particularly because it fell on the day commemorating Joan of Arc, the French national heroine who drove the English from France.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that, without wishing to anticipate the Führer, he wanted to speak with Darlan quite openly and bluntly, and in a spirit of absolute realism. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) was not a professional diplomat, but rather came from an old family of soldiers. He therefore had a soldier's heart himself

⁴ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 564.

⁵ See documents Nos. 417 and 475.

and knew that words spoken in frankness would be correctly understood by a sailor like Darlan.

One thing was absolutely certain: Today Germany had won the war; that is, the war in general. It was essential that this fact be grasped once and for all by the French leadership.

After that the Reich Foreign Minister gave a survey of the military and political situation, as seen from the German standpoint. England had declared war on Germany. It was regrettable that the French Government then in office had made common cause with her. Whereas Germany was constantly trying to localize the war, it had always been the tendency of England to spread it as far as possible. Germany, who had originally wanted to do no more than correct the worst wrongs of the Versailles Treaty in the east, was now compelled by the extension of the war by the English to wage war in virtually the whole of Europe and in Africa, and thus to turn this war, which Germany had hoped to localize, into a hemispheric war.

Germany had neither desired nor foreseen this development. Everything had come about that way against her will. Perhaps it was inevitable, and perhaps it was good that it had happened. It was important, however, that France should be entirely clear about the new situation which had arisen as a result of the war. Only after having realized that no change was possible any more in the existing results could France reach the right platform from which she would be able to gain perspective with regard to future developments and draw the logical conclusions from it.

In the military field (as well as in the political field) Germany and her friends now occupied a position which no power in the world could jeopardize. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) did not know whether America deluded herself that she would one day be able to wage war against Europe. In politics the Americans were children, and in military matters, as Admiral Darlan would readily agree, something much worse. In any event, the economic and political situation of Germany and her friends was unassailable. Germany was today in a position to stop in the long run any power that might attempt to intervene in either Europe or Africa.

In Europe the German Army had virtually no longer any opponent. In Africa Germany had taken the liberty of demonstrating to the English with only a very small force that newly taken territory could be lost as quickly as it was conquered. Germany would not stop until the English were expelled once and for all from Europe and Africa, that is, the European-African hemisphere.

Without wishing to predict too much, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) believed he could nevertheless declare that, with the last of the English gone from the European Continent since the liquidation

of the Greek campaign, by the end of the year they would have been driven out of North Africa as well.

At the same time Germany was continuing her war against England in the air and on the sea. The air war was gradually turning the British Isles into a pile of rubble and ashes. To be sure, England claimed the same with respect to Germany, but Admiral Darlan would be able to see for himself in the German cities that they had suffered no damage. The German bombers on the other hand would continue their flights over England by day and by night so that, as was in fact already the case in certain parts of England, life would gradually die out and cease altogether.

As regards the naval war against England, it was not for him to explain any of the particulars to an expert who was surely better able than he to judge such matters. He would only say this much: that the submarine war had not begun in earnest until this month and would be steadily intensified from now on. Whereas no more than 8 to 10 submarines had been stalking the enemy at any one time up to this month, their number would in the future be increased six and eightfold. The reports received from the British Isles in these past weeks indicated clearly enough that the effects of German naval warfare were gradually causing very serious concern there. It was his personal opinion that the problem of shipping space alone would be decisive in the war against England and would compel the English to sue for peace probably in the near future.

The Reich Foreign Minister then passed on to the subject of the material supply of the German armed forces. The ammunition reserves were so large that war could be waged for 20 to 30 years with the present stocks, without its being necessary to produce one new shell. On that account the production of ammunition had been partially stopped. All the energies of the German people and of the friendly countries and the territories situated within the German sphere of interest would now be concentrated on the production of submarines and aircraft. No coalition in the world—even if such a coalition were possible today, when there were no countries left from which to form it—would be able to approximate such a production achievement.

This was the setting in which Roosevelt now engaged in his war-mongering. The Reich Foreign Minister believed that it would be desirable to have a clear understanding now about a matter that would before long become obvious to all, namely, that the whole affair of American assistance to England was the greatest bluff in world history. Germany knew that even now, and the world would realize it too in the near future. England was lost, regardless of whether America entered the war or not. He could not say whether

Roosevelt would succeed in inducing the American people to enter the war. In any event, the American President had done everything in his power to achieve that aim. This point would be definitively cleared up in a short time. Should Roosevelt enter the war, the present conflict would become a conflict between our hemisphere and the American hemisphere. In this conflict our hemisphere would not be alone, however, but would have the support of a not inconsiderable ally, Japan, who would attack the American hemisphere from the other side. This involved a great risk for America, and to enter the war in such circumstances was sheer insanity.

It would be a good thing if the Europeans realized that in this way the war would of necessity attain such dimensions that the nations of one hemisphere would be compelled to stand by one another in warding off any attempt at outside intervention. While Roosevelt talked a great deal about democracy, he actually embodied the biggest and stupidest imperialism in world history. It was not an organic kind of imperialism, which methodically conquered one position after another, but an inorganic and disorderly imperialism, consisting in Roosevelt's sticking his nose into all sorts of places where he had no business to be.

Still, we had to reckon with the Americans' trying to undertake a move against Europe, even though, viewed within the larger picture, such a move would be of no consequence for the outcome of the war. One must realize that it would be undesirable, for instance, if America gained a foothold in Africa. It was essential that France should recognize that henceforth the European-African hemisphere could conduct but one common policy. The German center of power would possess absolute preponderance in this hemisphere at the end of the war. He would like to emphasize, however, that Germany was definitely willing to grant an honorable place in this new Europe to other nations as well. The Führer was no random conqueror, without a plan, such as had appeared in the past. He was sober in his calculations and was accustomed to think in terms of long periods of time. His thoughts had developed far beyond his original idea of a consolidated Germany; in other words, he held that it was not enough to think of Germany alone, but that if a still greater catastrophe than the present one was to be averted in the future, consideration had to be given to the organization and security of Europe and Africa, i.e., our hemisphere.

Germany naturally had no desire to wage war continuously, but wished to terminate the present conflict as promptly as possible and with the least possible loss of life. Several decisive blows would still be struck this year, and he was convinced that even if England had not collapsed by the end of the year the world would realize that it was no longer possible to do anything against Germany. It was in

the interest of France not only that the war should be terminated at the earliest possible date but also that the defeat of England should be as complete as possible. For since it was not Germany who had declared the war, someone would have to pay for it. And the swifter and more complete the defeat of England, the more advantageous would be the position of France.

After the meeting at Montoire, Germany had wished and hoped for really close collaboration with France. This experiment had failed. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) did not want to explore the reasons for this but the fact as such had to be taken into account. This brought up the question whether France was now willing to do her share so that England's defeat, now already a fact, might be made evident in the shortest possible time; in other words, whether France would assist Germany actively or passively to bring about as fast as possible the definitive defeat of England, and, secondly, whether France was prepared to help forestall in advance any attempt of the Americans to intervene in the war, in Africa or in any other way.

He (the Reich Foreign Minister) was not in a position to name the future peace terms. These questions had to be left for later settlement. But in one thing the Führer was in complete agreement with him (the Reich Foreign Minister), namely, that if a clear road should be found by France and Germany, France would have a place of honor reserved for her in the Europe of the future.

In regard to France's colonial empire in Africa, Admiral Darlan, who was familiar with Italian aspirations, could not fail to realize that France would have to make concessions to Italy in the Mediterranean. But if German-French collaboration could be brought about, Germany was willing and would see to it not only that the peace treaty left France a considerable colonial empire, but that in return for the concessions which France had to make she would be compensated in other areas, so that ultimately the significance of the French colonial empire as a whole would be even larger than before the war. Although he (the Reich Foreign Minister) could give no details on this point, he nevertheless believed that it would be possible to arrive at rational solutions; this, however, depended on the English—with whom a compromise was no longer possible—suffering a total defeat and surrendering unconditionally.

It was essential for France to realize that Germany had no intention to deprive France of her life or the French people of their means of existence. No one in Germany wanted that. Just in the last few days during their talks, the Führer had made reference to French culture, which had achieved so much in the past and must be preserved as a positive factor. In the Europe of the future the German and French cultures must enrich each other and create new values

through this interchange. The Reich Foreign Minister repeated in this connection that while the union of the German nation with the states related to it would make Germany the preponderant center of power in the new Europe, the other nations would nevertheless be guaranteed the honorable places to which they were entitled. The Führer believed that on this basis a real and sincere collaboration between France and Germany in the course of future developments could be assured. The decisive question was whether France was genuinely desirous of carrying out this collaboration. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) was aware that there were circles in France which were toying with the possibility of a new coalition against Germany. This attitude was, of course, incompatible with the large concept of Europe. France therefore had to understand that she had to live with the Greater German Reich in the future. By virtue of the size of her population, it was Germany's task to guarantee the security of Europe and the European-African hemisphere. A confederation of European nations would arise. Collaboration in absolute harmony would rule out the possibility of any internal war in Europe. Whether one liked it or not, it would be impossible to stop this trend of development, and it would be well for the people if those governing them had a clear realization of this. In the new European order, in which each state would collaborate in proportion to its size, Germany would represent the strongest power. She would then, in one form or another, also collaborate with France in the military field. Thus he could visualize that there would be very close contact between the German and the French Navies. France had to defend the Atlantic coast on behalf of the European Continent, and this would give rise to many a joint task. And likewise if other hemispheres [sic] attempted to establish themselves, say, in Africa—if, for instance, America were to attack Africa—France by herself would not be strong enough to conduct that struggle, and a collaboration with Germany would have to come into being.

These were new questions, to be sure, but owing to the rapid technical advances they were already of immediate interest and so close to the thinking of the German statesmen that the latter had all but ceased to pay attention to intrigues in Europe, and were rather concentrating on securing the entire Continent against other hemispheres. If in another 10 years it should be possible to fly at a speed of about 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers an hour, the world would be so small as to rule out entirely any future intra-European conflict.

Darlan replied that he knew that France had been defeated, and he was of the opinion that she had to pay for her defeat. No one could evade these consequences. The Führer had achieved victory by creating a splendid instrument of power, and now was able to organize Europe under German leadership. But it was important

for the permanence of such a new Europe that the other nations participated in this reorganization of their own free will.

At this point the Reich Foreign Minister informed Admiral Darlan that he had just been called to the Führer and therefore had to break off the conversation. He would, however, resume their talk after the conversation on the Obersalzberg.⁶

(SCHMIDT)

⁶ See document No. 499.

No. 491

67/47183-205/2

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Füh. 30

[MAY 11, 1941.]

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND ADMIRAL DARLAN IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE BERGHOF ON MAY 11, 1941

Darlan first transmitted Marshal Pétain's greetings to the Führer and then thanked him for the great honor which the Führer had accorded him by this reception, which took place on the day commemorating Joan of Arc, i.e., the day honoring the French national heroine who drove the English out of France. Darlan also thanked the Führer for the concessions made with reference to the demarcation line and for the reduction in the occupation costs which Germany had granted.¹

Moreover he (Darlan) welcomed this opportunity to stress once more the extent to which Marshal Pétain and he himself were convinced of the need for cooperation between France and Germany. Ever since the German Army won its lightning victories, the strength and invincibility of the Wehrmacht had become obvious. Not only was the Führer the inspired creator of this instrument of power, but he also knew how to use it with unequaled strategic skill. Darlan stated in this connection that he himself, as a fighting man, had on a more modest scale created the French Navy as an instrument of power and had also commanded it. Therefore he knew that the prerequisite for the effectiveness of such a weapon was the creation of a moral climate. In this task, too, the Führer had been exceptionally successful; he had completely transformed the spirit of the German nation and reorganized the relations of the separate parts of this nation with one another on the basis of National Socialist theory.

¹ See document No. 475 and footnote 3.

In a similar manner the new order could also develop the relations between the nations of Europe within the framework of a European hierarchy.

The Führer had conquered Europe. The formation of a European confederation of states therefore depended on him. He alone was qualified to bring about this development. To be sure, the permanence and continuity of such a European confederation required the voluntary and sincere cooperation of all its members. From this there also followed the unavoidable necessity of German-French collaboration.

He (Darlan) would direct French policy in this spirit, in agreement with Pétain. He was fully aware of the fact that France had been beaten and would have to assume the consequences of her defeat. France found a certain consolation in the fact that she had not been beaten by just any opponent, but by the Führer, who was more of a constructive than destructive spirit.

In the further course of his remarks Darlan then quoted a statement by Marshal Pétain, in which the latter expressed the wish for promoting the rapprochement between France and Germany but at the same time pointed out that at the moment France was unfortunately marching "in the dark"; he hoped that the Führer would light up the dark road along which France was moving, so that the French nation could get a clearer picture of its future.

In conclusion Darlan once more emphasized the confidence which Pétain and he himself had in the Führer and asked the latter to have the same confidence in the loyalty of Pétain and Darlan.

The Führer replied that he was a man who from personal disposition and a sense of responsibility had fought most for European understanding. Even now he did not understand why France and England had declared war on Germany. There were no practical or sensible reasons for it, unless the two countries wished to keep a great nation from existing. The declaration of war was made without any cause. For Germany had demanded nothing from either France or England. The tremendous disaster involved in a war such as the present one was out of all proportion to the colonial revision for which Germany was striving. Moreover, Germany had never presented these colonial demands in an urgent form or in a manner that would in any way have threatened the honor or the existence of France or England. On the other hand he (the Führer), a nationalist, had taken upon himself the grave sacrifice of waiving claim to a province, Alsace-Lorraine. He had hoped that this sacrifice would be acknowledged in such a manner that peace would thereby be assured for the future.

As late as September 1, 1939, he (the Führer) had implored French Ambassador Coulondre during a conversation with him that France

should not make the mad decision to go to war.² The Polish conflict could easily have been localized. The German demands on Poland had been very moderate. The German city of Danzig was to have been returned to Germany, and for the rest a vote had been planned under international supervision. He (the Führer) had not declared his agreement to such international supervision because of weakness—the world had probably come to realize this in the meantime—but merely from his feeling of responsibility. The French Ambassador had, however, taken an abruptly negative attitude and the British Ambassador had even become insulting to the Führer. Thus, unfortunately, the armed conflict which was still going on, had come about. Not only Germany but also the other European nations were suffering as a result. France was doubly affected: by the suffering which she had had to undergo as the direct consequence of the war, and the difficulties which she was now experiencing because of the continuation of the conflict.

In the preamble to the armistice provisions it was stated that Germany's position must in no circumstances be injured or made more difficult as long as the war lasted.³ If the war had ended in June or July, all of the European nations would have benefited.

The Führer emphasized in this connection that he did not have the ambition to be a great military leader but was interested rather, as the leader of his nation, in assuring the cultural and social advance of the German nation. Others had forced him to be a military leader. He would have been happy if the war had ended in June or July of last year, just as he had striven for peace after the Polish campaign. All nations would have benefited by such a peace. For no gain through war was in any proportion to the sacrifices imposed by war. In England, however, a few insane statesmen had wanted to continue the war. Therefore German policy was forced to take care of the needs arising out of the continuation of the war. The measures which were taken by Germany must therefore also be adapted to the war requirements. Germany was being forced to continue the war. She had tried, at the outbreak of the war in September 1939, to save the peace. The same was true after the Polish campaign. The action of the English, however, had compelled her to intervene in Norway and recently also in the Balkans. Lord Halifax had now openly stated that the English knew that Germany did not want to wage war in the Balkans and considered it a special victory on their

² No record of such a conversation has been found and it seems extremely doubtful that one took place on the date and in the manner described by Hitler. The only meeting between Hitler and Coudondre immediately before the outbreak of the war was on Aug. 25, 1939. See vol. VII of this series, Editors' Note, p. 284.

³ See vol. IX of this series, document No. 512, footnote 2.

part to have forced Germany into this war.⁴ Therefore Germany had to safeguard for the future, too, the requirements growing out of the continuation of the war.

Those who suffered were:

1. The German people, who had to shed their blood and sacrifice their men, time, and equipment;
2. The innocent European states which had been drawn into the conflict without any action on their part;
3. Those countries which themselves shared in the responsibility for the outbreak of the war; to this group belonged France.

If the English had not fanatically insisted on continuing the war, there would have been peace long since and all European countries could devote themselves to repairing the misfortunes of war and to reconstruction. It was not Germany's fault, at any rate, that this could not be done. The question now was whether, in the greater European interest of ending the war, one should not jointly oppose the incendiaries who constantly wished to feed the flames of war in Europe with new objects. Germany, at any rate, would fight until England was forced to her knees. This might possibly be the case in 3 months, but perhaps not for another year, or for 3 or 5 years; Germany, however, would never capitulate. In these circumstances the question arose whether other nations merely wished to watch this conflict as neutral observers, even though they could not escape its consequences. The complaints presented by Admiral Darlan with reference to France could likewise be made by other countries. Only recently the English had tried to draw the Turks into the war; fortunately the members of the Turkish Government had been clever enough to recognize this danger at once. As long as the war continued, suffering and hardships would continue to burden all of Europe.

On the other hand he (the Führer) knew that certain groups continued to nurse the hope that Germany would lose in the end after all. Even if this should happen, Europe would not gain, for nowadays the interests of Europe as a whole had to be considered, and in the eventuality mentioned one could rest assured that Europe's possessions in the world would be lost. At the same time Germany was not primarily threatened. Countries such as Holland, Belgium, and Portugal, with their large overseas possessions, and naturally France, too, with her colonial empire, and finally even England herself would be much more affected. For almost 20 years Germany's life had had a continental orientation. German chemistry would certainly do what was necessary to produce synthetically the mate-

⁴ This is a reference to a speech by Lord Halifax in Atlanta, Ga., on Apr. 25, 1941; for text, see Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Bulletin of International News*, vol. xviii (1941), pp. 607-608.

rials necessary to the Reich, such as, for example, rubber and other raw materials. Moreover, Germany had assured herself a Lebensraum in Europe, so that she herself would be able to survive in any case. It was not a question, however, of what Germany would lose but of what Europe would lose. From that point of view he (the Führer) could not understand how anyone could rejoice if a European state, which was at present the strongest champion defending Europe's vital interests against non-European interests, should lose the war. An American imperialism was coming into being, and it should be recalled in this connection that France had at an earlier time lost certain areas situated in America to the United States. Now it might happen that she would have to cede African territories to America as well. Those groups in France which still placed their hopes on England had to realize that the initiative no longer lay with Great Britain but with America. If little England had developed such a big appetite as to incorporate a quarter of the territories of the world into her empire, how big would be the land hunger of the much larger United States!

In summary the Führer stated that:

1. Germany was not to blame for the distress in Europe; the responsibility should be placed on English and French political leaders who started the war;

2. Nor was it Germany's fault that the emergency in Europe continued.

3. Germany was doing everything in her power to remove this emergency, i.e., to end the war, by energetically fighting England. The question arose as to what the others were doing to achieve this aim.

Germany did not by any chance want to rule and tyrannize Europe. Being a nationalist he (the Führer) merely wished to be the leader of the German people and develop his own people culturally and above all socially. He was not interested in appearing as a great military leader; therefore he did not have any rank in the Army and wore no insignia of any kind, although he was the Supreme Commander. After peace was re-established he wished to be active only in a domestic colonization and as a social reformer. Thus he was actually fighting for peace, and he wondered what the others were doing to achieve this aim.

On the other hand it was natural that Germany should not be weakened in any way in her struggle and not miss her chances against England for reasons of being goodhearted. She and her ally alone were fighting the war against England. The sooner it could be ended, the sooner the European countries could be given relief. Today the German soldier was not giving his life for Germany alone, but was serving Europe as well by dying for peace. What were the

others doing to end this period of suffering? It was obvious that the difficulties now prevailing with reference to the supply of food and consumer goods could not finally be removed until peacetime, after the millions who were now mobilized, about to be mobilized, or held prisoner in other countries, could be brought back into the process of production, where they would then produce consumer goods instead of shells. All measures which could be taken at the moment were merely emergency measures. France had to realize that real recovery could not begin until after England had finally been beaten. At present he (the Führer) could grant relief only within certain limits, i.e., only if Germany's position in the war benefited thereby, and in no circumstances if it were made difficult in any way. Therefore he always had to ask a compensation for any relief granted. He was no haggler, but acted in this manner only because the circumstances of the war forced him to do so.

Admiral Darlan thanked the Führer for his statements and agreed with his view that nothing definitive could be done until England was defeated.

He pointed out that since he joined the French Government certain measures had been taken in agreement with Marshal Pétain, especially in the economic field, which clearly supported the spirit of French collaboration with Germany. In this connection he referred to the trucks sold in Tunisia and the airfields which were being made available in Syria.⁵ Compared to Germany's efforts this was little, to be sure, but Marshal Pétain and he himself had agreed to these things in order to show to what extent they subscribed to German-French collaboration. They knew that they were exposing themselves to incurring the bad graces of England and perhaps even to an English attack on French territory. France was prepared to make the appropriate reply.

Marshal Pétain thought it was important, however, to be able to tell the French, especially those in Syria, West Africa, and Morocco, whom he was asking to defend their territory against the English and also the Americans, that they were actually defending territory that would remain French. These French groups were constantly asking him why they should defend a territory which will after all be taken away from them later on. He (Darlan) understood that nothing definite could be said about these things until England was defeated. It would, however, greatly facilitate the work of the Marshal and his own work with the French people if the French Government could somehow make it understandable to these overseas Frenchmen that they do not work for the "*Roi de Prusse*." Besides, it was the

⁵ See documents Nos. 417 and 475.

theme of English propaganda that it was of no use for the French to defend these territories because they would lose them in the end in any event.

Among the French at home, the question was raised time and again how one could cooperate with a Germany which had divided France into two parts, had imposed high occupation costs, and prevented the French Government from governing the two parts uniformly. Every gesture which would ameliorate these difficulties in this respect and reduce the occupation costs would evoke a favorable reaction among the French people.

Regarding the question of food supply, Darlan remarked that by and large he considered it very salutary for the French to limit themselves in this respect, because before the war they had not given enough thought to the consequences of such a conflict. It was a good training in moral education but matters must not be pushed too far.

Furthermore they were saying in France that it was difficult to collaborate with a country that was retaining so many French prisoners. Naturally there could be no talk of releasing all of the prisoners at once. It would probably be difficult for France to digest such a large number of returning soldiers. But a certain number of prisoners should, after all, be released. This too would create an exceedingly good impression in France.

In reply to the concern voiced by Darlan with respect to the French colonial empire, the Führer stated that he had already told Marshal Pétain that Germany had no intention of destroying the French colonial empire. Germany had also indicated as much on the occasion of the armistice negotiations; otherwise the armistice terms would have been quite different. Germany was merely demanding the return of the German colonies. This demand was known to France and did not affect the interests of her colonial empire. The demands of Germany's ally were also moderate. He had already told Laval that the colonial bill of this war would have to be paid by the English.* Germany, at any rate, did not constitute a threat to the French colonial empire. She had incorporated huge areas east of the Reich, for the development of which she would need a century.

Moreover he (the Führer) was not a fanatic for space [*Raumfanatiker*], who strove to conquer as large a number of square kilometers as possible. He merely wished to guarantee the independence, existence, and economic well-being of Germany. It was up to France to keep her colonial empire and not to relinquish it to America.

With reference to the points raised by Darlan concerning metropolitan France the Führer remarked that the division of France into

* See vol. XI of this series, document No. 212.

two parts was a military necessity. Germany needed a part of the French territory for the assembly of a strong army. She would be happy if she could again withdraw her troops. The Führer, however, had to be prepared for all eventualities, in case England should suddenly attack Portugal, or Spain and her colonies, and Tangiers;¹ in the light of recent events in the Balkans this did not appear impossible. Thirty-six to forty divisions had to be available for these purposes.

Moreover, the situation with respect to England might at a certain moment be clarified in such a manner that Germany would be able to strike the decisive blow against Great Britain. Admiral Darlan knew that Germany had maintained her preparations for this operation to a certain extent in order to be ready at any time. From all this it followed that the measures taken by German authorities in France were necessitated by the circumstances of the war. If the French Government should be at war with England tomorrow, the points raised by Darlan would no longer present a problem. Furthermore, Germany still needed a certain guarantee with respect to France. Not the least important reason for Laval's falling into disfavor was his policy of collaboration with Germany. Until France undertook some decisive action in order to confirm her policy, the latter rested exclusively on Marshal Pétain, who was quite advanced in years, and on Admiral Darlan. If some madman should assassinate these leading personalities, the continuation of the French policy would no longer be guaranteed. With reference to the question of prisoners [of war] the Führer pointed out that the German prisoners were not released until 1920, although the war had ended long before that. For the duration of the war the prisoners not only meant a safeguard for Germany, but were also a safeguard for a France who was ready for an understanding. Their sudden return to France would probably, as Admiral Darlan had also indicated, create a serious crisis for the French Government.

In the further course of the conversation the Führer also asked Admiral Darlan a few detailed questions: for example, what practical measures France would take in the defense of Dakar. Darlan replied that the Americans certainly had their eye on Dakar. Moreover, they were the ones who, according to reports received in France, had induced the British to attack Dakar in the autumn. To be sure, Dakar was not the only base that might be desirable to the Anglo-Saxons in this area. In addition there were the islands of the Azores, the Canary Islands, and the Cape Verde Islands. The latter were only of little interest, since they had insufficient anchorages, no drink-

¹ See document No. 469.

ing water or other supplies, and Dakar could take their place in every respect. The Canary Islands, on the other hand, had much better anchorages and supplies. Especially favorable was the situation of the Azores, the "turntable" of the Atlantic, with the two anchorages and the overseas cables converging from all directions.

Since the vigorous submarine campaign on the part of Germany the convoys to England had, moreover, been forced to use the southern route. Proof of this fact had again been provided just recently by a French merchantman, which was repeatedly stopped by British naval vessels between the Azores and the Canary Islands and had discovered on this occasion that the convoys from Canada and from the Cape of Good Hope assemble in the area between the Canary Islands and the Azores. The French ship, by the way, which had a British guard aboard, was liberated by French naval vessels. Thereupon the Führer remarked that England had not only lost every one of her European positions in this war, but would have to expect a terrible economic and social crisis internally, too, after the war was over. He had told Marshal Pétain at Montoire that naval warfare against England would not begin with full intensity until March and April.⁸ The figures of sinkings which the English themselves published, although they reported only 30 percent to 40 percent of their actual losses, confirmed this prediction.

The Führer then also spoke about Iraq. Germany was about to oppose the English in Iraq and was looking into the possibilities of doing this. He (the Führer) would be interested in hearing Darlan's opinion in the matter, especially with reference to the French forces stationed there. Darlan, who did not appear well informed about the particulars, replied that there were approximately two divisions of French troops in Syria, but that they did not have any modern equipment. Furthermore numerous airfields were available, some of which had been rendered useless by order of the Italians but could again be put in operation relatively quickly. He had given the list of these airfields to General Vogl.⁹ Moreover, considerable stores of French aerial bombs were available. To be sure, France could not transfer any sizable reinforcements to Syria, since the English from their base at Cyprus would stop the transports.

He had no information concerning the forces available to the English in Iraq.

Otherwise Darlan repeated his offer to sell war material to Iraq through the intermediary of Minister Rahn, i.e., all rifles stocked up under Italian control as well as two-thirds of all stores of arms and ammunition. France needed the remaining third to equip her own

⁸ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 227.

⁹ Chairman of the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden.

troops in the event of an English attack. Finally Darlan asked support for the French propaganda among the natives of Syria to the effect that France would in all circumstances retain the mandate over this area.

The Führer emphasized in his reply that Germany was as little responsible for the outbreak of the conflict in Iraq as for the spreading of the war to Greece and Yugoslavia. If Germany were behind the events in Iraq, she would certainly have made better preparations.

The Führer then asked Darlan whether the French Government would consent to letting the trucks purchased by Germany in Tunisia proceed to Tripoli with a load; since the unloading facilities of the harbors of Tripoli were being used to capacity, additional quantities of German equipment, which would be unloaded in French harbors and then transported to Tripoli with the help of these trucks, would in this manner be placed at Germany's disposal in North Africa. Darlan stated that, faithful to the policy on which he had embarked, he would answer this question in the affirmative;¹⁰ however, he pointed out in this connection that the Italian delegation in Tunisia had also tried to buy trucks, which the French Government, however, could in no circumstances relinquish unless it wished to provoke a revolution in the colony.

At the same time Italy was now also demanding airfields in Syria for her own planes. He did not know where Italy had learned about the German-French negotiations in this matter. General Vogl had at the time instructed him, Darlan, not to tell the Italians anything about it.¹¹ In general, each time France made a concession to Germany the Italians demanded the same of the French, and this led to extraordinary difficulties. If, for example, Italy demanded trucks from France, he (Darlan) suggested that these vehicles be given to Germany and only then be handed over to Italy by the Germans. France was making concessions to Germany because she had been defeated by Germany; she had not been defeated by Italy, however, and therefore had no intention of making concessions.

The Führer replied that France should not make concessions to Germany as the victor but rather as the country which was fighting to end the war and therefore obtaining for France, too, the benefits of the efforts toward peace. Germany was fighting in North Africa to help her ally. Her own situation would be eased if this ally were

¹⁰ In telegram No. 1468 of May 14 (221/149302-03) Abetz reported that Darlan had suggested that the German supply material for Libya be brought to the French Army arsenal at Toulon and from there be shipped to the arsenal at Bizerte.

¹¹ See document No. 479.

to become strong enough to do its own fighting. Indirectly this would also benefit Germany.

Darlan replied that he ought to supplement his remark concerning France's concessions to Germany as the victor to the effect that Germany was the victor with whom France was engaged in conversations pertaining to close cooperation. France did not, however, consider it advisable to enter into conversations with Italy.

In conclusion Darlan asked the Führer to facilitate through granting concessions the task facing the present French Government of getting the support of the majority of the French for the policy of collaboration. It should be kept in mind that official French propaganda had for 35 years done everything to orient French public opinion toward England and to educate it to admire everything English. Now public opinion had to be guided in the opposite direction. The concessions recently made by Germany had already reduced the number of Anglophiles in France. Therefore he was asking the Führer to grant France further concessions; they did not so much need to go very deeply as to be outwardly apparent (*des avantages plus spectaculaires que profonds*).¹²

After an interruption for tea the conversation was resumed with the help of a map of Syria. In addition to the above-mentioned persons, Minister von Hentig and Baron Benoist-Méchin¹³ took part in this conference. The transport question was discussed and the observation made that the railroad leading to the so-called "duck's bill" of Syria, i.e., the strip of territory between Iraq and Turkey—which would be needed to transport the war materials to be delivered to Iraq—was in part on Turkish territory. The assumption was expressed that there existed a Turkish-Syrian treaty, on the basis of which the Syrian Government could demand the transport of war material in sealed cars. The French stated that a more southerly route could not be used for these transports, since there was danger that the materials might fall into English hands.

On the basis of his travel experiences Minister von Hentig commented on the condition of the country in general, on the roads, some of which were very good in the dry season but were impassable in the rainy season, as well as on the nature of the plains in the eastern areas, which offered the best possible conditions for landing planes. The French, who did not appear very well informed on the strength of the troops, stated that there were approximately two or three divisions of French troops in the country. They again pointed to

¹² In French in the original.

¹³ For Benoist-Méchin's rôle at the Hitler-Darlan meeting, cf. Jean-Louis Aujol, *Le Procès Benoist-Méchin: Compte rendu sténographique avec un Avant-propos et une lettre d'inculpé à son défenseur*, pp. 149 ff.

the supply difficulties as long as Cyprus was not captured. At most an attempt could now be made to establish connections with Syria by loading the materials on small Turkish ships and utilizing Turkish territorial waters. "Complicity" by the Turks, however, was required in this case as also in others. After a discussion of further technical details of lesser importance the conversation was concluded and another conference with the Reich Foreign Minister in Fuschl was planned for the next day.¹⁴

SCHMIDT

¹⁴ See document No. 499.

No. 492

136/74854

The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister

Teletype Message

No. 1476

BERLIN, May 11, 1941—3:20 p. m.

Regarding Madrid telegram No. 1601 of May 9.¹

Ambassador von Stohrer stresses in his cipher letter of April 22²—and in my opinion justifiably so—that Germany and not Spain should determine the date of Spain's entry into the war.

Furthermore, Stohrer says that Serrano Suñer seems to favor a diversion in the field of foreign policy to remove his difficulties in his domestic policies. Finally Stohrer advises against any German interference by force. Stohrer points out the various possibilities to exercise political influence in internal Spanish developments, without, however, making a precise proposal. Stohrer asks for instructions.³

I believe that we should not interfere in the internal Spanish quarrels as long as we are not willing to follow up our political advice with action, should the need arise. According to the report of the Embassy almost all Spanish generals are also pro-German. The loss would therefore perhaps be not too great if Suñer should not be able to deal effectively with his military opposition. I do not believe that England will in the meantime embark upon anything against Spain on the Continent.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ In this telegram (136/74834-38) Stohrer reported a deepening of the internal crisis due to the appointment of Colonel Galazar as Minister of Interior and to clashes between the police and members of the Falange.

² Document No. 386.

³ See document No. 509, footnote 1.

No. 493

83/61220

Minister Grobba to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 3 of May 11

BAGHDAD, May 11, 1941.

Departure from Mosul yesterday was delayed by two air raids. We arrived here this morning at 6:30. We are all staying at the Minister President's house. We had detailed conferences with him, the Foreign Minister,¹ Corps Commander Salaheddin, and Commander of the Air Force Mahmud Salman. Immediate appearance of German fliers, if only for purposes of a demonstration, is essential for military and political reasons. Details will follow. The planes in Mosul are ready again for takeoff.

IHRKE²

End of telegram from Baghdad. The telegram was immediately forwarded to the Berghof, attention of Baron Steengracht.

Foreign Minister's Secretariat

¹ Musa ash-Shabandar.

² Woermann's memorandum of May 7 (83/61690) explained that Grobba's mission to Baghdad was to be kept secret, that he should not appear under his own name for the time being, and that he would instead use the name "Franz Ihrke." Later on, apparently this name was changed to "Gehrcke." See document No. 494.

No. 494

83/61221

Minister Grobba to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 4 of May 11

BAGHDAD, May 11, 1941.

Received May 11—7:20 p.m.¹

1. The Minister President expresses his thanks for the 10,000 (ten thousand) in specie, the Grand Mufti for the 25,000 (twenty-five thousand) in notes. Both request earliest possible further remittance in specie which is more usable here. The Mufti's requirements are very urgent because he plans a major action in Palestine very soon. The Minister President has received Italy's promise of 1 million in specie, and requests a similar promise from us. This would meet his requirements for the time being. He is prepared to repay with Iraq products in the equivalent amount. The remaining 25,000 (twenty-five thousand) in notes will be retained for the time being as a reserve.

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted to the Berghof. S[onnleithner], May 12."

2. According to confidential information from the Italian Minister to the Minister President, the Italian Air Force is planning an operation against the English in Iraq in the next few days.

GEHRCKE²

² See document No. 493, footnote 2.

No. 495

142/127552

The Reich Plenipotentiary for Greece to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ATHENS, May 11, 1941.

No. 143 of May 11

Received May 11—11:00 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 330 of May 4 [11].¹

The inquiry of the OKW is to be answered as follows:

Regarding point 1: The new Greek Government, according to impressions from its short period of activity so far, has not given rise to any doubt regarding its reliability with respect to us. Its stability essentially depends on the authority which it has with its own people. For this, dispensing with a German, and also Italian, military administration is (clear text apparently missing). However, this alone is not sufficient. As shown by the current reports,² the Greek Government will be able to stay in power in the existing circumstances only if military occupation, above all, Italian military occupation, is restricted to a minimum and if the food problem is solved. This presupposes that the Greek Government is supported by us in solving the latter question. If the population has enough to eat, it will remain quiet.

Regarding point 2: Assuming a satisfactory solution of the question of an Italian occupation and of support for the Greek Government in solving the problem of food, a German and Italian military administration can be dispensed with.

Regarding point 3: Consultation with the Italian Government properly would have to take place through the Foreign Ministry.³

ALTENBURG

¹ This telegram (142/127553-54) informed Altenburg that the OKW wished no military government but wished to leave the administration of the country completely to the Greek Government. The OKW asked: (1) if the Foreign Ministry considered the Greek Government sufficiently firm and trustworthy; (2) if the Foreign Ministry would agree to renunciation of German and Italian military administration; and (3) if it would speak in this sense to the Italian Government.

² See document No. 482 and footnotes 2 and 4.

³ In telegram No. 147 of May 12 (962/302195) Altenburg again urged a speedy decision in the question of occupation.

No. 496

177/85062-66

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan

Telegram
(en clair to the Foreign Ministry)

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL TRAIN, May 11, 1941—11:30 p. m.

No. 367 from the Special Train

Received Berlin, May 11—11:45 p. m.

No. 592 of May 11

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent May 12—12:30-2:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 724 of May 11.¹

You are requested to call on Mr. Matsuoka and convey to him, and at the same time present as a note, the following communication regarding the American proposal for concluding a secret understanding between Japan and the United States:²

The Reich Government has noted the communication of the Japanese Government relating to the proposals made to it by the United States Government. Considering the very important bearing which this matter may have on the current policy of the Tripartite Pact and the future of the nations associated in this Pact, the Reich Government is grateful for the opportunity it has been afforded to state its views on this proposal made by the United States. It is desirous of stating its views on this so very important matter in all candor.

Fundamentally: The struggle in which Germany and Italy are engaged is a conflict decisive of life or death. Its outcome, however, is no less decisive for the future of Japan. If Germany and Italy were to succumb in this struggle, Japan would very shortly find herself facing an overpowering Anglo-Saxon coalition which would probably associate Russia with itself and possibly also France, and make use of them to block any further aspirations on the part of Japan in the East Asian Lebensraum. The Government of the German Reich believes that it is in accord with the views of the Japanese Government in this assessment of the situation. It goes without saying that it is particularly desirable from this paramount viewpoint to prevent America from intervening in this war. Only the American Government itself can judge with certainty whether it is possible to achieve this goal, for neither Germany nor Italy has taken even the least action against America that might furnish any cause for a military conflict. If America, by her policy and by the actions to match, is nevertheless pushing toward war, that is the result of a deliberate plan of men who, as in the World War, whether for capitalistic reasons or from ulterior imperialistic objectives of the United States, hold this to be the right moment for taking the

¹ Document No. 489. A preliminary reply from the Foreign Ministry had been sent earlier in telegram No. 591 of May 11 (177/85071), with the information that the statement of the German position was on the way and that Matsuoka should be requested to wait for it before making a reply to the United States.

² See document No. 454 and footnote 1.

United States into a new war. Other controlling factors in this are probably domestic political considerations, the total fiasco of the American economic policies at home, which are irrevocably linked to the name of the present President, Roosevelt, together with the overpowering influence of Jewry, its organizations, especially its press, etc.

If this decision of the leading and responsible men in America is or should be definitely taken, their first objective would be to facilitate intervention against Germany and Italy by breaking up the Tripartite Pact and thus isolating these two nations. From the standpoint of internal politics it would also be easier to overcome the opposition in America to war if Roosevelt could show that Japan could for certain reasons and for the time being be kept from taking an active part, at this time, at least.

Assuming, therefore, that America's leading men are inherently determined to enter into the war, there is, if at all, only one means of restraining them, to wit:

The brutally frank demonstration that whatever America might do, and however she might motivate her actions or whatever the measures applied by her might be, her entrance into the war would in all circumstances compel Japan to intervene. But even if so positive a will to enter into the war has not yet crystallized in America, such a clarification could not help but strengthen the trend of opinion that even mere further descent along the downward road must be checked and avoided.

In the event, however, that the American President should have made his proposal to Japan only for the purpose of securing for himself a tactically favorable position for his entrance into the war, hoping perhaps that by coming forward with an American-Japanese understanding, he might be able to inject an element of uncertainty in the unity of Japanese popular sentiment, it seems to the Reich Government that it would be all the more essential for the Japanese Government to react to this proposal with straightforwardness as well as tactical adroitness.

To what extent the proposal of the American President might be designed to place treaty curbs upon future Japanese demands in the Far East is a matter which the Japanese Government itself is of course best able to judge.

By and large, however, the German Government cannot avoid the impression that it might be one of the political moves of the American President, by an apparent relaxation of tension in the Pacific area, the more easily to persuade the antiwar elements among his own people and so condition them for war.

The test for assessing the sincerity of the American proposal is in the formula that the entrance into the war would not come about through their "own initiative." It would be entirely in character with Roosevelt's past tactics to wage a de facto war through a continuous series of actually unneutral acts, and without any formal declaration of war and to shift responsibility for it to the Axis Powers in Europe; that is, to enter into the war and ascribe the initiative to the other side. At the same time it is also readily conceivable that Roosevelt hopes or believes that he may succeed by this means in dispelling the anxieties of those who are fearful that continuation of his past policy

must inevitably lead to war, in which case Japan would also appear as an enemy of America by reason of her obligation under the Tripartite Pact; for the American President would have the best chance of overcoming the doubts of these people if he showed them a treaty by which Japan is bound not to enter into the war *provided* the onus for the initiative of America's entrance into the war could by the adroitness of his policy be shifted to the side of the Axis Powers. That would strengthen the American President as against the antiwar elements in his endeavor to continue the very same policy that he is pursuing now, which policy nevertheless must inescapably lead to acts that are likely to bring about war.

The Government of the German Reich in the light of this—by no means exhaustive—analysis of the situation as seen from its side, feels that it may submit to the Japanese Government the following views bearing on the reply to be made to the American proposal:

1. The Japanese Government would in principle be glad if any extension of the war could be avoided. It was to this end that it made its accession to the Tripartite Pact. Therefore, if the American Government is sincerely desirous of avoiding entry into the war, an event which the Japanese Government knows could not be occasioned by any acts on the part of the Axis Powers, this would be in accord with the similar desire of the Japanese Government, the same one which prompted it to conclude the Tripartite Pact. The Japanese Government, however, regrets to have to observe that America's past attitude, both in the utterances of responsible political leaders and in the measures adopted by the Government, has steadily moved away from genuine non-interference. The Japanese Government is obliged to note in this connection that the initiative in these acts, which can no longer be regarded as neutral, was exclusively on the American side. The Japanese Government does not believe that continuance of this policy can preserve the peace. It therefore desires to make it understood that any further pursuit of this policy, such as by surveillance of one of the belligerents through so-called patrol activity, which is unauthorized under international law, or, for that matter, the organization of convoys, must be considered as a deliberate step toward war and consequently will unfailingly compel Japan also to enter the war immediately. This is incumbent upon Japan under the Tripartite Pact, which has the sole objective of preventing the spread of this fatal conflict.

2. If it should, however, be the wish and intention of the American Government to avoid entering the war and therefore to refrain from all acts which clearly are of the nature of initiatives calculated to provoke armed clashes, the Japanese Government would be happy to proceed to the examination in detail of an agreement of the nature set forth by the American Government in its proposal.

Considering that the pursuit of this matter involves a question which is of utmost importance to all states of the Tripartite Pact, the Government of the German Reich would be particularly grateful if the Japanese Government prior to sending its definitive note, would first afford the German and Italian Governments an opportunity to

study it and thus enable them to communicate their thoughts on the subject.³

RIBBENTROP

³ In telegram No. 1073, sent May 11, 12:00 midnight (177/85067), the Embassy in Rome was informed of this instruction to Tokyo and was requested to urge the Italian Government to take a similar stand in Tokyo.

Bismarck replied from Rome in telegram No. 1076 of May 12, 2:45 a.m. (177/85072) that the matter had been taken up with Mussolini and that the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo had been directed to associate himself with the German démarche.

No. 497

222/149622

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 1335 of May 12

BUCHAREST, May 12, 1941—3:15 p. m.

Received May 12—3:40 p.m.

For State Secretary Weizsäcker.

I report herewith that I am receiving from the Foreign Ministry no information whatsoever of a political or military nature such as is necessary to me to carry out the directives I have been given. I obtain my information from my armed forces Attachés, the Army Mission, the Rumanian General Staff, the Rumanian Foreign Ministry, and the Rumanian Security Service. Thus, for example, I do not know what the position of Berlin is regarding the question of the Legion on the basis of my last report.¹ The fact that Rumania will not receive the Banat I had to learn by my having called attention to Rumania's claims,² and recently through the Meissner-Bossy case.³ For example, Consul General Wüster⁴ knows much (one word evidently lacking in the clear text) than I, and I thus have to depend on informed persons who are passing through here. My work is made much more difficult by this fact.

KILLINGER

¹ Possibly Bucharest telegram No. 1090 of Apr. 22 (222/149532-36), which dealt with this problem and with the political and economic difficulties facing Antonescu.

² See document No. 376.

³ See document No. 481 and footnote 1.

⁴ Walther Wüster, Cultural Attaché in the German Embassy in Italy, had been active in Rumania as an expert on propaganda.

No. 498

136/74864

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Minister

Telegram

No. 1652 of May 12

MADRID, May 12, 1941.

Received May 12—11:00 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1596 of May 9.¹

I asked the Spanish Foreign Minister what Spain would do if England or the United States were to attempt a landing of troops on Portuguese territory and if after a possible overthrow of Salazar a new Portuguese Government should resist such an action. In reply he declared that in such an event the treaty of friendship between Spain and Portugal² would be broken and Spain would at once march into Portugal, even if only the Azores were occupied. The Minister added that Spain would then count on help from Germany, but that Spain would be quite able to deal with the Portuguese armed forces and would surely also be able to hold its own for some time against any hostile forces that might land in Portugal.

STOHRER

¹ In this telegram (129/121083) Stohrer reported great concern in Spanish military and political circles regarding Portuguese inability to oppose either an Anglo-American occupation of the Azores or a landing on Portuguese soil.

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 255, footnote 2.

No. 499

67/47180-82

Unsigned Memorandum

RAM 29

FUSCHL, May 12, 1941.

RECORD OF THE PRIVATE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN
MINISTER AND ADMIRAL DARLAN IN FUSCHL ON MAY 12, 1941

The Reich Foreign Minister began the conversation with the remark that there had been enough diplomatic talk in the previous discussions¹ and now he wanted to talk with Darlan as man to man. The conversation would be useful, however, only if Darlan were convinced of the victory of Germany.

When Darlan thereupon gave assurance of his belief in a German victory, the Foreign Minister first described the efforts made in the past 20 years for German-French understanding and told in detail how things had developed; how efforts toward an understanding between France and Germany had first been made directly with

¹ See documents Nos. 490 and 491.

France and then through England, and how, owing to the lack of decision and goodwill on the part of France, nothing had been achieved in the end after all.

The Foreign Minister had always foreseen a war if no understanding were achieved with France and England. Now the future had to be faced. The problem had become larger.

It was no longer merely a matter of German-French relations, but of Europe and the European-African hemisphere, in which Germany represented the center of power and held the leading position. France, however, would receive her honorable place within this new framework if she fully cooperated politically with Germany in Europe. It was now necessary for France to make her choice unreservedly in favor of Germany. Today such option still had value for Germany. The Reich was so strong, however, that such an option might, in a few months, have only secondary importance. Therefore France had to make a choice at once, and it was: War against England.

The Foreign Minister added that he by no means required an immediate answer from Admiral Darlan, and he promised moreover that this private conversation would be kept entirely secret. He would report only to the Führer, as was his duty, but the Führer, too, would treat the matter in strict confidence.

Admiral Darlan replied that he was entirely willing to make a choice, and was resolved to go with Germany. He recognized Germany as the predominant power in the Europe of the future, and was willing to do everything to fit France into the new European federation of states. However, in order to wage war against England, France needed weapons and soldiers. He therefore asked that he be helped in this regard. The Reich Foreign Minister answered that the war would be fought almost entirely by Germany and France would merely have to render a certain kind of assistance, especially as regards the Navy. Admiral Darlan replied that the French Navy was ready, but that it was nevertheless asking for several concessions. He also asked for a manifestly accommodating attitude by Germany in one or two points, so that he could finally win over the French people for the new policy.

The conversation ended with the position on both sides having been made completely clear, i.e., that Darlan was resolved to take the clear course of entering the war against England in the near future. Since agreement in principle was considered the important thing, details were not discussed but were left for the negotiations by Ambassador Abetz.²

² See document No. 520.

[EDITORS' NOTE. On May 12 the German radio announced that on May 10 Rudolf Hess, Hitler's Deputy as Leader of the National Socialist party, had set out from Augsburg on a flight from which he had not returned. According to the announcement it was to be feared that Hess, who had been ill, had become the victim of hallucinations and had crashed. Later that day it was announced in London that Hess had landed by parachute near Glasgow. According to subsequent statements issued by British Government spokesmen, Hess had planned to land on the estate of the Duke of Hamilton. For a record of the Duke of Hamilton's interview with Hess on May 11 see *Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuremberg, 1948), volume xxxviii, document No. 116-M (GB Exhibit 269), pages 174-176. For a record of interviews with Hess on May 13, 14, and 15 by Ivone Kirkpatrick of the British Foreign Office, see *ibid.*, documents Nos. 117-M, 118-M, and 119-M (GB Exhibits 270, 271, and 272), pages 177-184.

On May 13 the German press and radio announced that the work of the office of the Führer's Deputy would be carried on by Martin Bormann as head of the Party Chancellery.]

No. 500

*Memorandum by Dr. Albrecht Haushofer*¹

OBERSALZBERG, May 12, 1941.

The enclosed report is, as directed, respectfully submitted to the Führer, with the request that I may explain particular points also orally.²

A[LBRECHT] H[AUSHOFER]

[Enclosure]

At present at the OBERALSZBERG, May 12, 1941.

English Connections and the Possibility of Utilizing Them.

The circle of English individuals whom I have known very well for years, and whose utilization in behalf of ■ German-English under-

¹ This document was found among the private papers of Dr. Karl Haushofer, father of Albrecht Haushofer. It has been filmed as item HC 833, serial 36, frames 1499258-70, roll 46, and the film microcopy, T 253, has been deposited in the National Archives.

² For the background of this report, see Editor's Note, *supra*, and vol xi of this series, documents Nos. 12, 46, 61, 76, and 93.

Cf. Walter Stubbe, "In Memoriam Albrecht Haushofer," in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, July 1960 (Stuttgart, 1960), p. 236.

standing in the years from 1934 to 1938 was the core of my activity in England, comprises the following groups and persons:

1. A leading group of younger conservatives (many of them Scotsmen). Among them are: The Duke of Hamilton, up to the death of his father Lord Clydesdale, conservative Member of Parliament; The parliamentary private secretary of Neville Chamberlain, Lord Douglass.

The present Under State Secretary in the Air Ministry, Balfour.

The present Under State Secretary in the Ministry of Education, Lindsay (National Labor).

The present Under State Secretary in the Ministry for Scotland, Wedderburn.

Close ties link this circle with the Court. The younger brother of the Duke of Hamilton is closely related to the present Queen through his wife; the mother-in-law of the Duke of Hamilton, the Duchess of Northumberland, is the mistress of the robes; her brother-in-law, Lord Eustace Percy, was several times member of the Cabinet and is still today an influential member of the Conservative party (especially close to former Prime Minister Baldwin). There are close connections between this circle and important groups of the older conservatives, as for example the Stanley family (Lord Derby, Oliver Stanley) and Astor (the last is owner of the *Times*). The young Astor, likewise a Member of Parliament, was parliamentary private secretary to the former Foreign and Interior Minister, Sir Samuel Hoare, at present English Ambassador in Madrid.

I have known almost all of the persons mentioned for years and from close personal contact. The present Under State Secretary of the Foreign Office, Butler, also belongs here; in spite of many of his public utterances he is not a follower of Churchill or Eden. Numerous connections lead from most of those named to Lord Halifax, to whom I likewise had personal access.

2. The so-called "Round Table" circle of younger imperialists (particularly colonial and empire politicians), whose most important personage was Lord Lothian.

3. A group of the "Ministerialdirektoren" in the Foreign Office. The most important of these were Strang, the chief of the Central European Department, and O'Malley, the chief of the Southeastern Department and afterwards Minister in Budapest.

There was hardly one of those named who was not at least occasionally in favor of a German-English understanding. Although most of them in 1939 finally considered that war was inevitable, it was nevertheless reasonable to think of these persons if one thought the moment had come for investigating the possibility of an English inclination to make peace. Therefore when the Deputy of the

Führer, Reich Minister Hess, asked me in the autumn of 1940 about possibilities of gaining access to possibly reasonable Englishmen, I suggested two concrete possibilities for establishing contacts. It seemed to me that the following could be considered for this:

A. Personal contact with Lothian, Hoare, or O'Malley, all three of whom were accessible in neutral countries.

B. Contact by letter with one of my friends in England. For this purpose the Duke of Hamilton was considered in the first place, since my connection with him was so firm and personal that I could suppose he would understand a letter addressed to him even if it were formulated in very veiled language.

Reich Minister Hess decided in favor of the second possibility; I wrote a letter to the Duke of Hamilton at the end of September 1940³ and its dispatch to Lisbon was arranged by the Deputy of the Führer. I did not learn whether the letter reached the addressee. The possibilities of its being lost en route from Lisbon to England are not small, after all.

Then in April 1941 I received greetings from Switzerland from Carl Burckhardt, the former League of Nations Commissioner in Danzig and now Vice President of the International Red Cross, whom I had also known well for years. He sent the message that he had greetings to pass on to me from someone in my old circle of English friends. I should please visit him sometime in Geneva. Since the possibility existed that these greetings were in connection with my letter of last autumn, I thought I should again submit the matter to the Deputy of the Führer, though with the reservation (as already last autumn) that the chances of a serious peace feeler seemed to me to be extremely slight. Reich Minister Hess decided that I should go to Geneva.

In Geneva I had a long conversation with Burckhardt on April 28. I found him in something of a quandary between his desire to support the possibilities of a European peace and the greatest concern lest his name might somehow be involved with publicity. He expressly asked that what went on be kept strictly secret. In consideration of the discretion enjoined upon him he could only tell me the following:

A few weeks ago a person well known and respected in London, who was close to the leading conservative and city circles, had called on him in Geneva. This person, whose name he could not give, though he could vouch for his earnestness, had in a rather long conversation expressed the wish of important English circles for an examination of the possibilities for peace; in the search for possible channels my name had been mentioned.

³ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 76, enclosures 1 and 2, and footnote 7.

I for my part informed Professor Burckhardt that I had to expect the same discretion with regard to my name. Should his informant in London be willing to come to Switzerland once more and should he further be willing to have his name communicated to me in Berlin through confidential channels, so that the earnestness of both person and mission could be investigated in Germany, then I thought that I, too, could agree to taking another trip to Geneva. Professor Burckhardt stated that he was willing to act as a go-between for this in this manner: It would simply be communicated to England through an entirely safe channel that there was a prospect for a trusted representative from London, after he himself had given his name, to meet in Geneva a German also well-known in England, who was in a position to bring such communications as there might be to the attention of the competent German authorities.

My own conversation with Professor Burckhardt furnished a number of important points regarding the substantive part of possible peace talks (Burckhardt has not only been in England during the war—for example, he had a long and detailed conversation with Halifax—but he also has frequent contact with the English observer in Geneva, Consul General Livingston,⁴ who likewise is one of those Englishmen whom the war does not please). Burckhardt's general impression of the opinions of the more moderate groups in England can be summarized as follows:

1. The substantive English interest in the areas of eastern and southeastern Europe (with the exception of Greece) is nominal.

2. No English government that is still capable of action will be able to renounce [the aim of] a restoration of the western European system of states.

3. The colonial question will not present any overwhelming difficulties if the German demand is limited to the old German possessions and if the Italian appetite can be curbed.

All of this, however—and this fact could not be stressed seriously enough—under the assumption, which overshadowed everything else, that a basis of personal confidence could be found between Berlin and London; and this would be as difficult to find as during the Crusades or in the Thirty-Years' War. As matters stood, the contest with "Hitlerism" was being considered, by the masses of the English people, too, to be a religious war with all of the fanaticizing psychological consequences of such an attitude. If anyone in London was inclined toward peace, then it was the indigenous portion of the plutocracy, which was able to calculate when it, along with the indigenous British tradition, would be destroyed, whereas the nonindigenous, mainly Jewish element, had already in large part completed

⁴ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 622.

the jump to America and the overseas dominions. It was Burckhardt's own and deepest concern that if the war continued for a considerable length of time every possibility that the reasonable forces in England would force Churchill to make peace would disappear, since by that time the whole power of decision regarding the overseas assets of the Empire would be taken over by the Americans. Once the remainder of the indigenous English upper class had been eliminated, however, it would be impossible to talk sense to Roosevelt and his circle.

A[LBRECHT] H[AUSHOFER]

No. 501

833/280852-53

*Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter*¹

BERLIN, May 12, 1941.

e. o. Pol. I M 1266 g. Rs.

General Jodl told me that it is now becoming urgent to enter into detailed discussions with Finland concerning military cooperation, particularly about further troop transports to Finland, a joint plan of operations, High Command, etc.

In this connection *Barbarossa* naturally should not be discussed as a current matter. The military discussions should take place on the assumption of a possible conflict originating with the Soviet Union.

For this purpose, the OKW would like to invite two Finnish General Staff officers to Germany as soon as possible.

The OKW asks whether these discussions should be inaugurated through military channels (Military Attaché) alone, or whether they should be opened politically through the Foreign Ministry, that is, by way of the Finnish Minister in Berlin or through the German Minister in Helsinki or through another person of the Foreign Ministry.

The OKW considers it correct that these discussions should be initiated politically through the Foreign Ministry, and asks the Foreign Minister to decide this point. If the reply is affirmative, Minister Schnurre could perhaps be sent to Helsinki. Because of his close personal relations with the Finnish Minister President and the Finnish Foreign Minister, he would be best qualified to conduct a preliminary political conversation in an atmosphere of complete confidence.²

ITTER

¹ A typewritten note at the head of the document shows that it was submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary and Minister Rintelen.

² See Editors' Note, p. 850.

No. 502

177/85076

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

U. St.S. Pol. 141

BERLIN, May 12, 1941.

Counselor of Embassy Kase told me today that he had just returned from Moscow whither he had gone in early May under instruction from Ambassador Oshima so that a personal contact between Oshima and the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, Tatekawa, could be established through him. The talk brought out that the main reason of Kase's journey apparently was that Oshima is not sure what Germany's intentions are in relation to the Soviet Union, and simply wanted to obtain an appraisal of the situation as it looks from Moscow. Ambassador Tatekawa said that it might be that the German troop concentrations in the east were actually merely intended as flank cover for the German operations in the Balkans. Ambassador Oshima, however, thought that it might well be otherwise. Kase, who called on me with some trivial matter, evidently wanted to hear something from me about the relationship between Germany and Russia. I corroborated the interpretation that the German troops in the east served as flank cover for our operations in the Balkans.¹

WOERMANN

¹ In a memorandum of May 17 (177/85106) Weizsäcker recorded a discussion with Oshima who asked if a détente had taken place between Germany and Soviet Russia. Weizsäcker replied that the relationship was unchanged, and noted that the theme of Russia was much discussed in the diplomatic corps.

Woermann's memorandum of May 23 (4667/E221295) records a discussion with Kase who at the instigation of Oshima inquired regarding a report that German troops were marching in the direction of Kiev, or that they were marching toward Iran or Iraq with Russian consent. Woermann termed such rumors pure invention.

No. 503

83/61231

Minister Grobba to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BAGHDAD, May 12, 1941.

No. 12 of May 12

According to a statement of the Minister President, Turkey has orally and in writing offered Iraq mediation in the conflict with England. England's¹ proposals are as follows:

1. Cessation of Iraq military operations and withdrawal of Iraq troops.

¹ Apparently this ought to read "Turkey's." Cf. footnote 3.

2. Permission to establish English military bases in the country for the protection of troops in transit to Transjordan.

3. Recognition of Rashid Ali's Government.²

The Iraq Government has sent the Minister of Defense, Naji Shawkat, to Ankara for negotiations and hopes that he will be able to see Ambassador von Papen.³ The Iraq Government is afraid, in view of the very determined attitude taken by Turkey in the question, that the proposed Turkish mediation might lead to intervention. The Iraq Government is determined to reject the proposal as a matter of principle and meanwhile delays its reply. It requests a statement as to the German views regarding Turkey's attitude.⁴

GEHRCKE

² For a somewhat different version of these proposals based on information from Arab sources see Majid Khadduri, *Independent Iraq, 1932-1958*, 2nd ed. (London, 1960), p. 228.

³ Naji Shawkat's arrival in Ankara had been reported by Kroll, the Chargé d'Affaires, in telegram No. 525 of May 8 (83/61209-10). Subsequently Kroll reported in telegram No. 534 of May 10 (83/61719-20) that Iraq was considering Turkish mediation and that Naji Shawkat had told him "that the Turks had offered their good offices in this matter, strongly asserting that they could induce the English to accept Iraq's conditions." See document No. 514.

⁴ See document No. 515.

No. 504

277/178825-27

Ambassador Schulenburg to Under State Secretary Woermann

Moscow, May 12, 1941.

DEAR HERR WOERMANN: Many thanks for your cordial letter of May 10.¹

Everything that my colleagues here are going around saying and reporting to their Governments is complete nonsense. The truth is as follows: After my return here a large number of my colleagues besieged me and urgently requested information as to what truth there might be in the persistent rumors which asserted that a German-Soviet conflict was immediately impending. I had just been in Berlin and should certainly know what was what. I gave all my colleagues, including M. Gafencu, the same answer: I had talked with all the influential persons in Germany and everywhere I had been given the assurance that nothing out of the ordinary was impending. On our side of the German-Soviet border nothing had occurred beyond the precautionary measures which were generally customary in times of war. In essence, I adhered to the official position prescribed for our Wehrmacht Attachés.²

¹ Document No. 488.

² See document No. 446.

It is true that M. Gafencu asked me whether I had any special message for M. Molotov and M. Stalin. I told him that I had no such message and that I saw no reason why I should carry on special negotiations with these gentlemen. I would probably in the near future talk with M. Molotov about current matters but, aside from that, there was nothing else to discuss.

Naturally I said nothing about the fact that the German forces on the Russian border had been strengthened and that the reason for it was defense against the "challenging attitude of the Soviets."

I do not believe that I am "especially depressed" and I have not thought of "packing up my private belongings in boxes" either. My very costly rugs are lying in their old place, the pictures of my parents and other relatives are hanging on the walls as before and in my residence nothing at all has changed, as every visitor can see for himself. It is well known with what lively imagination my Turkish colleague is wont to write his reports. I myself have not spoken to him at all.

With many cordial greetings and with "Heil Hilter" I remain,
Yours, etc.

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

* Woermann replied on May 14 (277/178828): "I passed on to you these reports which are at hand here only in order that you may know what other people are saying, not because I myself accepted them at face value. Since these reports are certainly accessible to a rather large circle of people, I consider it useful to give you the opportunity, in any case, to put down on paper your point of view in regard to them. I believe that we are in complete agreement in this respect."

No. 505

1448/365383-88

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

Moscow, May 12, 1941.

Ag/259

Subject: Appointment of Stalin as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

With reference to telegram No. 1092 of May 7¹ and also to Nos. 1113 of May 8,² 1124 of May 10,³ 1115 of May 9, 1120 of May 9, and 1137 of May 12.

The present political position of the Soviet Union is illustrated by the appointment of Stalin as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Stalin's decision to take over this office, which V. I. Lenin was the first to fill after the Bolshevik Revolution, gains especial significance from the fact that Stalin had previously avoided

¹ Document No. 468.

² Not printed (105/113426-27); see footnote 7.

³ This and the following telegrams mentioned have not been found.

taking a government post. Stalin won his position of power in party and state solely by his personal authority and by the aid of men devoted to him. No problems of domestic or foreign policy had heretofore been able to induce Stalin to abandon this characteristic attitude. Even when the Stalin constitution, his personal work, went into effect, he had apparently deliberately refrained from occupying the highest government post by allowing himself to be elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviets.

The reasons that now caused Stalin to make this decision cannot be ascertained, for example, by direct questioning of competent Soviet officials, because of the peculiar conditions here. The new French Ambassador,⁴ who was ignorant of this situation, attempted to do so nevertheless, and asked this question on the occasion of his initial visits to First Deputy Foreign Commissar Vyshinsky, Secretary General of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs Sobolev, and Departmental Chief Kusnetzov. The three gentlemen interrogated expressed themselves spontaneously and unanimously to the effect that the appointment of Stalin to the Chairmanship of the Council of People's Commissars was the greatest historical event in the Soviet Union since its inception. Asked as to the reasons for this appointment, the three gentlemen declared after brief hesitation that the appointment of Stalin had been occasioned by the all too heavy burden carried by Molotov. When the disparity between cause and effect was pointed out to them, the gentlemen consulted could make no further reply.

There can be no doubt that the assumption of the Chairmanship of the Council of People's Commissars by Josef Stalin constitutes an event of extraordinary importance. That this event was brought about by problems of domestic policy, as was first asserted here, especially among correspondents of the foreign press, I do not consider correct. I do not know of any problem that could have been raised as a result of domestic conditions in the Soviet Union of such importance as to necessitate such a step on Stalin's part. It can rather be stated with great certainty that if Stalin decided to take over the highest government office, it was done for reasons of foreign policy. In order to clarify the specific circumstances that must have influenced Stalin's decision, one must refer to some occurrences that took place in the days previous. It was generally noticed that at the great review of May 1 the Soviet Ambassador to Berlin, Dekanozov, stood directly next to Stalin, on his right, on the Government reviewing stand. This prominence given to Dekanozov must be regarded as a special mark of confidence on the part of Stalin. Also, a remarkably large number of generals and admirals of the Red Army and the Red Fleet participated in the review and the large

⁴ Gaston Bergery.

reception in the Kremlin that followed. Finally, on May 5, the graduation exercises of the War Academy were the occasion of a rather large ceremony, at which Stalin made an address of some 40 minutes' duration.⁵ Since the appointment of Stalin was announced by the Kremlin on May 6, the obvious assumption is that the conversations with the Soviet Ambassador to Germany and the mingling with representatives of the staff of generals precipitated Stalin's decision to take over the Chairmanship of the Council of People's Commissars. No other reason for this action could have applied than a re-evaluation of the international situation on the basis of the magnitude and rapidity of German military successes in Yugoslavia and Greece and the realization that this makes necessary a departure from the former diplomacy of the Soviet Government that had led to an estrangement with Germany. Probably, also, conflicting opinions that were noted among the party politicians and high-ranking military men, confirmed Stalin in the decision to take the helm himself from now on.

If one reviews the pronouncements and decrees that have been promulgated since Stalin's assumption of office, in so far as they enter into consideration, one can state that the point of the matter was undoubtedly missed by the version originally circulated by foreign correspondents, especially by the Japanese Domei agency,⁶ to the effect that the appointment of Stalin legalizes an existing condition and that everything otherwise remains the same. The pronouncements and decrees in question are all in the realm of foreign policy. The matters involved are:

1. The Tass denial of alleged strong concentrations of military forces on the western border of the Soviet Union, etc.⁷
2. The decree regarding the restoration of diplomatic ranks (Ambassador, Minister, Chargé).
3. The decision regarding the closing of the Legations of Belgium, Norway, and Yugoslavia, and
4. The government decision regarding the opening up of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Iraq.⁸

These manifestations of the intention of the Stalin Government are calculated in the first place, while safeguarding its own interests, to relieve the tension between the Soviet Union and Germany and to create a better atmosphere for the future. We must bear in mind

⁵ See document No. 593.

⁶ Reported in a Tokyo telegram of May 8 (493/233081).

⁷ The Moscow Embassy reported the Tass denial of a Domei report on this subject in telegram No. 1113 of May 5 (105/113426-27). The Tass statement is printed in Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, pp. 487-488.

⁸ For the Soviet statement on establishment of diplomatic relations with Iraq, see *ibid.*, p. 488.

particularly that Stalin personally has always advocated a friendly relationship between Germany and the Soviet Union.

It is self-evident that in the Diplomatic Corps here there is a great amount of guesswork being done as to what could have induced Stalin at this time to take over a government office created by the constitution. It is remarkable that groups representing the most divergent opinion agree in the presumption that Stalin is pursuing a policy of rapprochement with Germany and the Axis.

In my opinion, it may be assumed with certainty that Stalin has set himself a foreign policy goal of overwhelming importance for the Soviet Union, which he hopes to attain by his personal efforts. I firmly believe that, in an international situation which he considers serious, Stalin has set himself the goal of preserving the Soviet Union from a conflict with Germany.

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

No. 506

105/113434

The Consul at Harbin to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

HARBIN, May 13, 1941—12:50 a. m.

SECRET

Received May 13—10:30 a. m.

No. 39 of May 13

With reference to my telegram No. 37 of May 11.¹

Circular instructions of May 9 from Moscow:

Although German-Russian negotiations are proceeding normally, it has become imperative for the Soviets, in view of Germany's dictatorial attitude, to warn Germany that the Soviets are prepared to protect their interests, if (this group missing in the original telegram) they are violated. In the circumstances it is very important to learn the attitude of all other countries in the event of a German-Russian conflict. It is necessary to proceed with the greatest caution. A survey of the situation and prompt report are requested.

PONSCHAB

¹ Not printed (105/113431-32). Serial 105 contains a series of telegrams from the Consulate at Harbin with purported texts of intercepted Soviet Russian diplomatic communications in May and June 1941 which were submitted to State Secretary Weizsäcker.

No. 507

177/85074

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Tokyo, May 13, 1941—1:00 a. m.

No. 728 of May 12

Received May 12—9:20 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to telegraphic instructions Nos. 591² and 592³ of May 11.

Upon receipt of telegram No. 591 I immediately requested as directed by the Reich Foreign Minister that Matsuoka by all means defer the proposed reply until the German standpoint was received here. Upon receipt of the first part of the instruction in telegram No. 592, the second part of which did not arrive until the afternoon because of atmospheric disturbances, I called upon Matsuoka and requested again that he hold off sending the instruction to Washington. Matsuoka explained to me that much as he regretted it, it was impossible for him for reasons of domestic policy to cause any further delay and that he would therefore instruct Ambassador Nomura to open negotiations. Despite vigorous insistence on my part, Matsuoka could not be dissuaded from this.

After receipt of the second part of the instructions, I carried out the instruction in telegram No. 592 jointly with the Italian Ambassador, who had received analogous instructions from his Government. Matsuoka stated that he would closely study the German statement of position, but meanwhile had to let the instructions go out to Nomura. He would let me have the text of the instructions in the course of the following day and keep me currently informed on further developments.⁴

I reserved the matter of the standpoint of my Government regarding the Japanese action, and the Italian Ambassador made a similar reservation.

OTT

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted by telephone by the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Special Train, May 12, 10:30 p.m."

² See document No. 496, footnote 1.

³ Document No. 496.

⁴ See document No. 512, footnote 2.

No. 508

222/149625

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

No. 370 of May 12 from SPECIAL TRAIN, May 13, 1941—2:50 a. m.
the Special Train Received Berlin, May 13—3:40 a. m.

No. 1324 of May 13

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent May 13.

RAM 180/R

For Minister v. Killinger personally.

Please call on General Antonescu and tell him that Horia Sima, as the General knows already, is in a German camp where any political activity has been made impossible for him. It is not the Führer's intention to grant Horia Sima hospitality; on the contrary, the Führer is willing to have him expelled from Germany. The question arises, however, whether this would be expedient since in Germany he is under supervision while abroad he could freely engage in activities and thus make trouble. In these circumstances the Führer asks Antonescu for his opinion.

If Horia Sima should violate the prohibition imposed on him to engage in political activities the Führer will extradite him any time Antonescu desires.

Please report by wire.¹

RIBBENTROP

¹ In telegram No. 1365 of May 14 (222/149627) Killinger replied that General Antonescu agreed to let Sima remain in Germany in the circumstances.

No. 509

136/74869

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

MADRID, May 13, 1941—4:20 p. m.

No. 1663 of May 13

Received May 13—7:15 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

The Spanish internal political crisis is taking on a more and more serious aspect, above all, because of the growing antagonism between the military and the Falange.

I intend to call on Franco and to question him concerning the meaning and significance of internal political developments since, in view of the English attitude, these may have strong political

repercussions abroad. But I don't want to do this without approval from you. I request telegraphic instructions.¹

STOHRER

¹ In telegram No. 377 of May 15 from Fuschl (136/74873) Rintelen, following an order from Ribbentrop, requested Stohrer to observe the strictest reserve toward the internal crisis in Spain and not to see Franco at that time.

No. 510

962/302188-89

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, May 13, 1941.

e. o. Pol. I M 1290 g. Rs.

Lieutenant Colonel von Tippelskirch informs us provisionally as follows. General Jodl has given General Warlimont the following instruction:

After the question of military occupation and military administration of Greece had been presented to him, the Führer decided as follows:

Our efforts must be directed toward evacuating Greece as soon as possible and toward withdrawing as many forces as possible and leaving the protection of the entire area to Italy. In so far as German troops must remain there for protecting southern Greece, they are to be closely concentrated locally. For this area alone we have responsibility. There we may also provide measures of assistance for the population in individual cases. Germany does not assume any responsibility whatsoever for the entire Greek territory which is or will be occupied by Italian troops. It is out of the question for Germany to play the part of arbiter between Greece and Italy, and for the Greek Government to turn to the German Commander in Chief in all of these questions. Twelfth Army Headquarters is therefore to be transferred back to Salonika as soon as the situation permits. It is none of our business whether the Italian occupation troops can cope with the Greek Government or not. After the elimination of the Greek Army and its weapons there no longer exists any military danger which could result in the renewed employment of German troops. All airfields that do not have to be occupied by us are to be made available at once to the Italian Air Force.¹

For the time being this is still an internal directive within the OKW. On the basis of this directive, General Warlimont will draw up an order, of which we will be informed.²

RITTER

¹ In telegram No. 369 of May 16 (142/127574) Ribbentrop informed Altenburg of the general contents of this decision by Hitler, instructing him to observe the greatest possible reserve with regard to Greek requests for German intervention with the Italians or Bulgarians. "We do not want to play the role of the arbiter in such cases."

² See document No. 536.

No. 511

67/47158-54; 67/47156;
 67/47159; 67/47160;
 67/47162-65; 67/47167;
 67/47169-76; 67/47178

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*¹

RAM 31

FUSCHL, May 14, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE DUCE IN THE PRESENCE OF COUNT CIANO IN THE PALAZZO VENEZIA ON MAY 13, 1941

The Foreign Minister first conveyed the regards of the Führer to the Duce. He would also shortly propose to the Duce a time for the contemplated meeting, which he would like to have take place as soon as possible.² He would probably prefer the Brenner as a meeting place. At the moment he was, as the Duce could well understand, still occupied with the Hess affair³ and with some military questions, but he could be available for a conversation afterwards.

The Duce replied that he agreed to all the proposals of the Führer in regard to place and time of this meeting. He was prepared to go to Germany, to meet at the Brenner, or to have the conversation take place somewhere in Italy.

The Foreign Minister then stated that the Führer had sent him to the Duce in order to inform the latter about the Hess affair and the conversations with Admiral Darlan.⁴

With regard to the Hess affair, he remarked that the Führer and his aides had been dumbfounded at the news of the Hess venture. This was the act of a madman.

Hess had for some time been suffering from a gall ailment and had fallen into the hands of hypnotists and naturopaths, who allowed his condition to drift from bad to worse. All these things were being investigated just at the moment, as was also the responsibility of the adjutants, who had known about the forbidden flights Hess had made. Hess had for weeks been making secret practice flights in a

¹ This document is in two versions. The first is the initial, typewritten draft by Schmidt which is recorded on the film 67/47153-79. The document consists of 19 numbered pages. Pages 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 18, and 19 are in duplicate. This initial version has several deletions and corrections, entered in ink in Ribbentrop's handwriting. The eight duplicate pages have the same corrections but in a different handwriting. The text printed here is the one presented at Nuremberg as Document No. 1866-PS, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. XXIX, pp. 29-40.

The second version is that which is preserved in the film of the files of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat (F11/0405-17, F2/0383-84, F16/0107-08) and represents a clean copy incorporating the corrections made on the initial draft. The film of this clean copy is not uniformly legible.

² The meeting did not take place until June 2. See document No. 584.

³ See Editors' Note, p. 783.

⁴ On the conversations with Darlan, see documents Nos. 459, 475, 490, and 491.

Me.-110. He had ~~undoubtedly~~⁵ acted from idealistic motives. Disloyalty to the Führer was entirely ruled out. His action, ~~which clearly bore traces of infantilism,~~⁶ was to be explained by a certain unworldliness, as well as by his emotional state, which was caused by his illness.

The Foreign Minister stated further that Hess was, indeed, convinced that England faced defeat. Only the English ~~had not found~~⁷ the springboard for drawing the necessary conclusions. In view of his sympathies for England, he had conceived the insane notion of working through fascist circles in Great Britain to induce the English to yield. He had explained all this in a long and confused letter to the Führer. When this letter reached the Führer, Hess was already in England. It had been hoped in Germany that he might perhaps meet with an accident on the way. He was now actually in England, however, and had tried to get in touch with the former Marquess of Clydesdale, the present Duke of Hamilton.⁸ He considered the latter, quite erroneously, to be a great friend of Germany's and had flown to the neighborhood of his castle in Scotland. He had in this way carried out his ~~crazy~~⁹ plan at the risk of his life. ~~He had for some time already impressed the Foreign Minister as having become unbalanced, especially during the recent Reichstag session, during which the Foreign Minister sat beside him, his eyes had had a completely abnormal expression.~~¹⁰

The Führer, who had naturally been deeply affected personally by these incidents, took a very stern view of the affair, had discharged Hess at once and ¹¹ would, indeed, have him shot if he returned to Germany. The investigation of the affair was continuing, but it was entirely clear that Hess had not acted from disloyalty to the Führer.

The Duce replied that he shared the view that Hess was no traitor. From the political point of view he did not consider the consequences of his actions as serious. He wondered what Hess wanted to say in England. His first words when he was found are said to have been that he had always had much sympathy for England.

Though there should be no mistaking the fact that psychologically the consequences of Hess's flight were not slight, it could nevertheless be said that the conduct of the war and sentiment in the Axis countries would remain unaffected by it. In 3 or 4 days the whole

⁵ The word scored through was deleted. The words "obviously" and "only" were inserted.

⁶ The words scored through were deleted.

⁷ The words scored through were deleted. The words "could" and "find" were inserted.

⁸ See Editors' Note, p. 783.

⁹ The word scored through was deleted.

¹⁰ The words scored through were deleted.

¹¹ The words "had said that he" were inserted.

affair would gradually blow over. The question arose whether no one in Germany had known of Hess's attitude toward England, whether perchance Hess wanted to save England.

The Foreign Minister remarked that in Germany Hess had principally the support of the less important people.¹² Now, however, every German was wondering how Hess could have done such a thing. He had, moreover, apparently been in contact with pacifist circles. Even people like Professor Haushofer had with their intrigues lured him more and more into a definite channel.¹³

The Führer would now wait for the time being to see how the matter would be exploited by enemy propaganda. In view of the public feeling in England and the condition of the country, Churchill could naturally pursue no propaganda with Hess' peace idea. That would at once get him into difficulties with his own people. The English would more likely gear their propaganda tactics to represent the entire affair as a sign of disunity and internal dissension and as a symptom of the¹⁴ difficult situation of the Reich, and would claim that Germany now would have to make peace soon. Should it be necessary, the Führer would deal this propaganda an energetic counterblow and possibly convene the Reichstag in order to clarify the entire matter there.

The Duce again repeated his calm opinion of the affair and remarked that it seemed best to him, too, that the full truth be told about the entire matter.

Changing the subject to the conversations with Admiral Darlan, the Foreign Minister told the Duce that two subjects particularly had been discussed:

- 1) The aid that France could give in Syria for the support of Iraq;
- 2) The facilitation she could give to Germany and Italy for the flow of supplies in North Africa.

Darlan had agreed to deliver to Iraq certain quantities of arms and war material from stocks under Italian control in Syria. These arms were, indeed, in part already en route to Iraq. Minister Rahn and a French official had flown to Syria and had submitted to General Dentz, the Commissioner of the French Government, an instruction of the Vichy Government, as a result of which he was to make deliveries and perform other services recommended by the two delegates.¹⁵

In addition, Darlan had made available landing fields for German planes and supplies of gasoline.

¹² The words scored through were deleted. The words "sympathy of many true Party comrades" were inserted.

¹³ The words scored through were deleted.

¹⁴ The word "allegedly" was inserted.

¹⁵ See document No. 476.

At the same time Ambassador von Papen had been summoned to Germany and had, as he (the Foreign Minister) could report confidentially to the Duce, received instructions to try to get permission from the Turks for the camouflaged transit shipment of arms for Iraq through Turkish territory.¹⁶

From the impression he had made, Darlan would surely do everything possible to help the Axis. Although one could naturally not read his mind, he certainly seemed to be an enemy of the English. If a sizable arms shipment reached Iraq, air-borne troops could then be brought into the area, which could then with the material on hand advance against the English and from Iraq, in certain circumstances, they could attack Egypt from the east.

The Duce defined his position on the question of Iraq:

1. Iraq had to be helped in any case, for in this way a new front would be opened up against the English and a revolt not only of the Arabs, but also of a great number of Mohammedans would be started. Already the Grand Mufti had summoned the Arabs of the world to a Holy War against England. In reply to a question from the Foreign Minister, the Duce stated that he did attach a certain importance to this action.

2. It would be necessary to get hold of Crete and Cyprus (the "anteroom" of Syria). If one then had the permission of the French to land troops and planes in Syria, the help of the Axis Powers to Iraq might be very substantial. The Italians had already detailed 5 planes with arms which would go by way of Rhodes to Baghdad, in order to transport 400 machine guns as well as 20 antitank guns there. Furthermore, 12 fighter planes were being held ready for action.

Should the shipment of arms through Turkey be impossible, one would have to march against England from Syria. The great advantage in this lay in the stretch of desert, only 100 km. long, which would have to be crossed in the event of an attack from Syria on Egypt, as against 500 km. of desert in the event of the attack on Egypt from the west.

In reply to a question of the Foreign Minister as to how long Iraq could hold out against the English, the Duce replied that the Head of the Iraq Government had stated that he could hold his own against the English if he could only get some war material. If he got no help, however, then, in the opinion of the Duce, resistance would be broken by the English in 3 to 4 weeks. He wondered, moreover, whether the de Gaulle movement in Syria would not perhaps create difficulties in the matter of aid from France. The Foreign Minister replied that Darlan was apparently convinced that he could carry things out in Syria as planned.

¹⁶ See document No. 529.

With regard to Tunis, the Foreign Minister reported about the purchase of trucks and the recent concession that these trucks could be sent with loads to Tripolitania. Darlan had promised that he would make available an Algerian port, Bône, for the unloading of the material shipped there by sea (since in Algeria these things were easier to do than in Tunis). The Foreign Minister also mentioned on this occasion that Darlan had told him that for internal reasons he would prefer it if the trucks were sold only to Germany. Should Italy wish to have such vehicles from the French, he suggested that the sale first be made to Germany and that the trucks then be given by the Reich to Italy.¹⁷ The Duce and Count Ciano approved this procedure.

In reply to a question from the Duce as to what Germany had agreed to give France in return for these concessions, the Foreign Minister referred to the reduction of the occupation costs from 20 to 15 millions. This had not yet been definitively settled, but was being contemplated, as well as certain concessions in the matter of the demarcation line.¹⁸

~~Darlan had been told in principle~~¹⁹ that France herself ~~would~~²⁰ be granted concessions to the extent that she, for her part, facilitated the war²¹ against England.

To the question of the Duce as to whether concessions had been made with regard to the French prisoners of war, the Foreign Minister replied in the negative, and he mentioned that the Führer had²² reminded Darlan how the German prisoners of war had not been released until 1920, when the World War had long been over.²³

The Foreign Minister then also pointed out that he had promised Darlan that if France would now facilitate the continuance of the war against England, such an attitude would be taken into account in the peace treaty. He had, moreover, in speaking to Darlan, emphasized the need for France now to opt and take her place unequivocally beside the Axis system.²⁴

Germany had certain wishes to make with regard to naval bases in Morocco, for the maintenance of submarines and surface forces. If France agreed, she would be granted the long requested permis-

¹⁷ For Hitler's and Ribbentrop's conversation with Darlan regarding the sale of French trucks, see document No. 491. Bône was not mentioned in this conversation, however, and according to Abetz, Darlan, after his return to Paris, suggested to him that the French trucks and the supplies destined for Libya should be sent from Toulon to Bizerte (document No. 491, footnote 10).

¹⁸ The words "and further the rearming of some torpedo boats" were inserted.

¹⁹ The words scored through were deleted. The words "The Führer laid it down as a principle" were inserted.

²⁰ The word scored through was deleted. The words "could gain" were inserted.

²¹ The words "of the Axis" were inserted.

²² The words "first of all" were inserted.

²³ See document No. 491.

²⁴ See document No. 490.

sion to rearm some ~~torpedo boats~~.²⁵ Beyond this Germany has not contemplated any large-scale assistance by France,²⁶ nor any possible naval help from the French fleet against England.

It had been made clear to Darlan that in the future the Axis Powers in Europe would be the decisive center of strength in Europe and that France would have to integrate herself in it. It had been pointed out, moreover, that France naturally had to expect that she would have to make concessions in the Mediterranean area in the peace treaty. Italy's demands were, indeed, known to her. She could, however, receive compensation²⁷ at some other place²⁸ for the concessions.

In a private conversation, Darlan had told the Foreign Minister that he wished in all circumstances to help the Axis Powers against England, after the Foreign Minister had explained to him the three possibilities that were open to France, namely: that France could either work against Germany, in which case she would be destroyed; or she could take an attitude of watchful waiting, which would also be detrimental to her in the end; or, finally, she could give clear proof of her will to cooperate with the Axis and she would then obtain an honorable place among the peoples of Europe.²⁹

The Duce replied that there were two camps in France: those who wanted to wait and see, and those who favored collaboration. When the war with Yugoslavia began, people in France had hoped that it would turn out badly for the Axis. The opinion of the French politicians had become vacillating. Significant of the state of public opinion was the fact that in those days the monument to King Alexander of Yugoslavia was decked with flowers by the people. When the French had seen, however, how rapidly Germany was winning in the Balkans, they had at once again switched over to collaboration. In Vichy most of the people just belonged to the camp of those who wanted to wait and see. Count Ciano interrupted here to say that the only difference between Vichy and Paris was that in Paris they were saying, "let's hope the English will win," while in Vichy they were saying, "let's hope these English swine will win." The Foreign Minister remarked that naturally there were still chauvinists in France who had to be eliminated by some method yet to be devised. Pétain was, in his opinion, an old fox, whose memory failed him precisely at the moments when it suited him best. A few days ago he had, in connection with the invitation to Admiral

²⁵ The words scored through were deleted. The word "destroyers" was inserted.

²⁶ The words "for the time being" were inserted.

²⁷ The words "at England's expense" were inserted.

²⁸ The words "for example in Africa" were inserted.

²⁹ Cf. document No. 499.

Darlan to the Berghof, written a letter to the Führer³⁰ which actually contained nothing important, but which nevertheless indicated that in France they were getting to realize more and more clearly that the war had definitely been lost. The Führer was of the opinion that final victory over England had to be fought for in all circumstances. For this purpose he wanted to get a maximum of concessions from France, without committing himself definitively in any way. The French questions would be handled on this basis, and it would now be necessary to see how far Darlan was prepared to go in this direction. As already mentioned, France would be granted concessions only on the basis and in relation to her cooperation received in the fight against England. Whether France would help in a big way in the fight against England remained to be seen. The Duce remarked that France could help the Axis in many little but very important ways. He stressed in this connection the fact that France always moved closer to the Axis when the latter was winning. When things did not go right, however, she flirted with England and the United States. The latter in particular had to be watched in this connection. The Foreign Minister agreed to this and remarked that if France should in some way integrate herself in the Axis organization, this would make a deep impression on the United States.

The Duce agreed and referred to the policy enunciated by the Führer of the unification of the whole of Europe against England. Only Russia and Spain were outside this united front. Serrano Suñer had, to be sure, stated that Spain would march after this year's harvest. This seemed to him extremely dubious, however. The Foreign Minister remarked that at the beginning of this year Franco had unfortunately left the Axis entirely in the lurch. He had to note this again and again with deep regret. If he had gone along at that time, Gibraltar would today be wrested from the English and the Spanish people would probably have much more to eat than at present, when they could not be saved through alms from England and America either.

The Duce reverted to his remark about the united front of Europe against England, and the two missing countries, Spain and Russia, saying that it seemed to him advantageous that a policy of cooperation with Russia should be pursued. He asked the Foreign Minister whether Germany ruled out such a possibility, that is, collaboration with Russia. The Foreign Minister replied that Germany had treaties with Russia and that the relations of the two countries were, moreover, correct. He personally did not think that Stalin would attempt anything against Germany. If he did so anyway,

³⁰ Of May 5, document No. 462.

or if he pursued a policy that was intolerable for Germany, he would be destroyed within 3 months. Here the Duce agreed. The Führer would certainly not seek any quarrel, but had taken precautions against all eventualities. He had in no way reached any decisions; he had, however, become suspicious as a result of certain incidents and ambiguities on the Russian side. Thus, for instance, the Russians had reinforced their troops on their western frontier, and this naturally prompted Germany for her part also to undertake to reinforce her troops, but not until the Russians had started to do so.

Russia would, however, never be a problem that could influence the final victory over England. She could never hamper Germany, for Germany had so many troops available that she could deal with all eventualities without further ado.

The Duce then asked whether Germany was not getting raw materials from Russia, whereupon the Foreign Minister mentioned the figures 1 million tons of oil and 1½ million tons of grain, and added that these deliveries were coming along relatively well.

In the further course of the conversation, the subject of Japan and, in particular, the Japanese-American exchange of opinion was discussed.³¹ The Foreign Minister stressed the fact that the principle that Japan shared a common destiny with Germany and Italy had been so clearly understood by the Japanese that he (the Foreign Minister) did not believe that Japan would pursue a policy that did not in the last analysis revert to the line of policy of Italy and Germany. The Foreign Minister also referred in this connection to the remarks of Matsuoka to the effect that for internal political reasons he had to do a lot of maneuvering and sometimes perhaps would be forced to do things that would not be readily understood in Germany. He (the Foreign Minister) at any rate had confidence in Matsuoka, although he could naturally not read his mind. That the conversations with Roosevelt were being conducted through Admiral Nomura was not a good thing, for Nomura was at heart rather close to the Anglo-Saxons. To begin with Matsuoka had now made inquiry, namely, as to

- 1) whether America was prepared to commit herself not to enter the European conflict, and
- 2) what attitude America would take in the question of the Philippines.³²

Should Japanese policy, contrary to expectations, follow a course that was irreconcilable with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact, the greatest opposition would surely arise everywhere in Japan, and Ambassador Oshima would probably become the guiding spirit of such a genuine revolution. But these matters had to be handled

³¹ See documents Nos. 454 and 455.

³² Cf. document No. 488.

with caution and it was necessary to avoid causing Matsuoka unnecessary difficulties.

The whole matter showed that Roosevelt was beginning to get worried, probably because he was gradually coming to realize that in view of the poor state of American armaments he could not, in the event of warlike complications, accomplish anything, and he therefore wished to keep his rear free.

The Duce remarked that it would undoubtedly be advantageous for Germany and Italy if Matsuoka in this way kept the United States from entering the war. On the other hand, the motive of his actions might possibly be the desire of Japan herself to keep out of the war.

The Foreign Minister remarked that if a strong line were taken and if it were explained that American convoy protection meant war, the Americans would probably hesitate, for the American rearmament was the biggest bluff in world history.

The Duce referred in this connection to the rift that had occurred in the United States and he cited the speeches of Hoover and Lindbergh, as being those of the most prominent opponents of Roosevelt's course. Compared with them, however, the Jews and their propaganda were so strong that they had brought all of America under their influence. If, however, in a country a war party fought against a peace party, the war party generally won out, because war was closer to the human soul than peace.

The Foreign Minister replied that the same was naturally also true of Japan and he expressed the conviction that Japan would nevertheless sooner or later enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, in order to take advantage of the opportunities offered. He was absolutely certain that Japan would fulfill her treaty obligations.

The Duce then went on to speak of Turkey, which he described as the best trump of Germany and Italy. He asked the Foreign Minister whether the latter thought that Turkey would go along with Germany and Italy.

The Foreign Minister replied that Germany was just then trying to influence Turkey in this direction. The conditions were favorable in so far as Turkey had no interest in letting large numbers of English troops assemble in Iraq, so that Germany hoped to be able to bring the Turks to her side. A certain improvement in the attitude of the Turkish press was already noticeable.³³ In the further course of the conversation the Foreign Minister spoke of a big propaganda campaign contemplated in the British Empire under the slogan that Germany³⁴ would support the liberation of all peoples oppressed by the English. He mentioned in this connection the presence of the

³³ A sign for a new paragraph was inserted here.

³⁴ The word scored through was deleted. The words "the Axis" were inserted.

Indian nationalist leader, Bose, in Germany—a piece of news that the Duce received with surprise and great interest.³⁵

In conclusion the Foreign Minister outlined the plans by which he wished to put Bose in charge of Indian propaganda, and he stressed the fact that no difference must be allowed to arise between Bose and Gandhi. Gandhi had, moreover, written a very good article recently that was directed against the English.

The Duce mentioned in conclusion in this connection that Italy was in touch with the Fakir of Ipi³⁶ and was trying, through large gifts of money, to win him, as well as the Grand Mufti, to work along pro-Axis lines. Even if these operations were not very extensive, they would nevertheless make many unpleasant difficulties for the English.

In parting, the possibility was kept open of holding another conversation the next morning shortly before the return flight of the Foreign Minister.³⁷

SCHMIDT

³⁵ The words "The Duce expressed his agreement with such a line of propaganda" were inserted.

See document No. 257.

³⁶ See document No. 300, footnote 3.

³⁷ The words "The tone of the conversation was especially cordial" were inserted. For the subsequent conversation, see document No. 513.

No. 512

177/85085-88

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 732 of May 13

TOKYO, May 14, 1941—5:00 a. m.

Received May 14—10:00 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 728 of May 12.¹

The Japanese Foreign Minister today gave me the text of the instruction sent to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington yesterday for transmission to the American Government. The English text was sent out earlier in telegram No. 731.²

¹ Document No. 507.

² The text of the instruction as transmitted in English in telegram No. 731 of May 13 (177/85077-79) reads as follows:

"Strictly confidential.

"Actuated by a desire to restore their traditional friendship, the Governments of Japan and the United States will embark upon the negotiation of a general agreement with a view to establishing, by a joint effort, a just peace in the Pacific and thus arresting the tragic confusion that now threatens civilization.

"I. The concepts of Japan and the United States respecting international relations and character of nations.

"The Governments of Japan and the United States jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign States and contiguous Pacific powers.

"Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed

After looking it over briefly, I told Matsuoka that the form and content of the instruction were most surprising to me. From various talks I had had with him, I had every reason to assume that the

towards the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation between their peoples.

"Both Governments declare that it is their traditional and present concept and conviction that nations and races compose as members of a family one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others. There should, of course, be neither oppression nor exploitation of the backward peoples.

"Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and that they will not be deformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

"II. *The attitudes of both Governments towards the European war.*

"It being the common aim of both Governments to establish world peace, they will join forces with a view to preventing the extension of the European war and restoring peace speedily.

"The Government of Japan believes that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was and is defensive and designed to prevent the participation of nations in the European war [not] present[ly] involved in it.

"The Government of Japan declares that there is no question that the obligation of military assistance under the Tripartite Pact comes into force in the case stipulated in Article three of the said Pact.

"Being pledged to the hate of war the attitude of the United States towards the European war is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defence of its own national welfare and security. The Government of the United States declares that it does not and will not resort to any aggressive measure aimed to assist any one nation against another.

"III. *China affair.*

"In appreciation of the three principles set forth in the Konoye statement and of the principles enunciated in the treaty concluded with the Nanking Government upon the basis of the said statement and in the joint declaration of Japan, Manchuria and China and also in reliance upon Japan's policy of friendship and good neighbourhood towards China, the Government of the United States will immediately request the Chiang Kai-shek régime to negotiate peace with Japan.

"IV. *Commerce between both nations.*

"When an understanding is reached between the two Governments, Japan and the United States shall assure each other to supply mutually such commodities as are respectively available or required by them. Both Governments will take steps necessary for the resumption of normal trade relations as once existed under the treaty of navigation and commerce between the two countries.

"V. *Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific Area.*

"Having in view that Japanese expansion in the direction of the Southwestern Pacific is declared to be of peaceful nature, the United States will co-operate with Japan in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

"VI. *The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.*

"A) The Governments of Japan and the United States jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands on the condition that the latter observes permanent neutrality and accords to the Japanese subjects a treatment equal to the Commonwealth citizens.

"B) Amicable consideration shall be accorded to Japanese immigration to the United States. Japanese immigrants shall be placed on a basis of equality with other nationals free from discrimination."

The draft proposal as handed by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary of State Hull on May 12, 1941, is printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, pp. 420-425.

Japanese Government merely intended to address the previously mentioned preliminary inquiries to the American Government and wanted to have the view of the German Government on the matter. Instead of this, the Japanese Government had transmitted to the American Government a definitive text. This text already constituted the complete instrument, which seemed to lack nothing but the signature. In regard to the contents and without anticipating my Government, I wished to make the following remarks:

The instruction breathes an atmosphere from which even the mildest criticism of America's unneutral conduct is excluded. On the contrary, the passage "the attitudes of both Governments towards the European war" amounted in paraphrase to a legitimization of America's interventionist policy. Furthermore, the allusion in section I to a certain foreign ideology could not but impress the objective reader as a kind of recognition of the fight of "Democracy" against the Axis Powers preached by Roosevelt.

Section V, dealing with peaceful Japanese expansion in the Southwest Pacific, implies to my mind a renunciation of the new order envisioned by the Tripartite Pact. Moreover, it seemed to me that section V went very far in relieving America in the Pacific, something that according to Matsuoka's repeated statements the Japanese Government would not do in any circumstances.

Matsuoka in answering protested that nothing of that nature was in the Government's (group missing). The instruction, in his view, was entirely in keeping with Ambassador Nomura's oral statement to Cordell Hull previously communicated to us (cf. telegraphic report No. 676 of May 5³). As regards, first, the procedure, he had addressed the two preliminary inquiries to America long before and would certainly conclude no agreement before receiving positive replies to them. In spite of my contradicting he kept insisting that the instruction to Nomura upheld that demand. To give emphasis to this, Matsuoka, as he told me later, had caused a special oral statement to be communicated to Secretary of State Hull, which will be transmitted in a separate telegram;⁴ for reasons of domestic and

³ Document No. 455.

⁴ The statement was transmitted in English in telegram No. 733 of May 13 (177/85089) and reads as follows:

"Really I feel it hardly necessary, but in order to leave no room whatever for any misapprehension, I wish to put the following on record at this juncture. It must have been clear from what I have often stated publicly or otherwise that my decision to follow the pourparlers between your Excellency and Ambassador Nomura and open the present negotiation was based on the premises that the United States would not enter the European war and that the United States Government agree to advise Chiang Kai-shek to enter into a direct negotiation with Japan with a view to bring about peace between Japan and China at the earliest possible date. Of course it must have been plain from the start that on no other premises would or could Japan possibly come to any kind of understanding of the sort held in view in the present negotiation."

foreign politics he had been unable to delay any further giving a reply, conciliatory in form, to the proposal of the United States. As responsible Foreign Minister it was incumbent upon him under the Tripartite Pact to do everything calculated to keep the United States from entering into the European war. He was willing to admit that his effort had only little chance of leading to success. In his audience with the Emperor he had estimated that chance at 30 percent. As to the atmosphere of the instruction, he earnestly asked that we have confidence in him. He hoped to conduct the negotiations in such a way as to turn them to the profit, and not the detriment, of Germany and Italy. There could be no question of his approving America's unneutral attitude. He would on the contrary instruct Ambassador Nomura to state to Mr. Cordell Hull in most categorical terms that by replying to America's proposal Japan did not by any means recognize or approve the present attitude of the United States. The reference to foreign ideas and ideologies in section I referred only to the mutual obligation of the United States and Japan to refrain from interfering in each other's domestic affairs. The remark about peaceful expansion in section V was a figure of speech that meant nothing.

I told Matsuoka that my Government would state its position in due course, but that I was not convinced by his arguments; he then repeated his request that his motives be communicated to the Reich Foreign Minister and pleaded again for confidence in his policy. He added that his attention was also deeply absorbed by the present situation with respect to Russia. He had already told me once before that in the event of a German-Russian conflict, Japan would with elemental force [*Naturgewalt*] also join in the war against Russia without regard to the existing neutrality agreement.⁵ He had received information according to which Germany had stationed six divisions in Finland and had addressed sharp demands to Stalin. He would be extremely grateful to the German Government for timely information on Germany's intentions so that he could take a position accordingly.

I answered Matsuoka that our position in relation to Russia had certainly been thoroughly discussed in Berlin. There was nothing I could add to that. During the Berlin talks it was developed what role of Japan's would be most advantageous to her allies in the hypothetical event of a German-Russian conflict. I would immediately report to Berlin on our conversation. The key to Japan's attitude on the American proposal lies in a course of domestic political development which had already set in here when Matsuoka came to Berlin. American intrigue, adroitly cooperating with Anglophiles,

⁵ See document No. 464.

defeatists, and business groups, on the one hand, and the Navy and even groups in the Army, which have not resisted the enticements of the American proposal, on the other hand, has succeeded in provoking a crisis in the present Japanese foreign policy. Ambassador Nomura, who comes from Navy circles, is acting in concert with these groups. The American threat to institute the convoy system, which would entail entrance into the war, has not failed to make an impression here. Finally an uncertainty has developed in the Navy as well as parts of the Army as to where the center of hostilities would lie in the event of a conflict in the Far East.

Summing up it is my opinion that Matsuoka has yielded to a considerable extent to domestic political pressure under the impact of the threat of an immediate entrance of America into the war, but that he is determined to adhere to the Tripartite Pact policy sanctioned by the Emperor, with which he stands or falls.

OTT

No. 513

FZ/0416-18

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RAM 32

FUSCHL, May 14, 1941.

RECORD OF THE BRIEF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE DUCE ON THE OCCASION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S FAREWELL CALL AT THE PALAZZO VENEZIA ON MAY 14, 1941

The Foreign Minister remarked with reference to the Hess affair that the international reaction seemed to be dying down. The Duce voiced a similar view and repeated the thoughts he had expressed during the preceding conversation.¹

The Foreign Minister informed the Duce about a telegram from Ambassador von Papen, according to which the talk with the Turkish Foreign Minister for the purpose of securing permission for the proposed shipment of arms through Turkish territory had taken place in an auspicious atmosphere, even though the matter had yet to be submitted to the President.² The Duce was deeply gratified by this information and repeated his views expressed on the previous day about the tactical possibilities of an attack on Egypt and Syria. The Foreign Minister remarked that if war material could be shipped to Iraq by that route, it would be possible to bring a large number of air-borne troops there by plane; with the material sent there

¹ See document No. 511.

² See document No. 514, footnote 4.

previously, these could then become a very serious threat to the English in Egypt. He told the Duce that if Turkey should actually permit the transit of arms, Germany was considering granting her in return a territorial rectification of the boundary in the area of Edirne and giving her some of the islands opposite Izmir. He stressed, however, that no hint of that kind had yet been made to Turkey.

The Duce concurred with these ideas. The Foreign Minister then gave the Duce a brief summary of his talk with Ambassador Oshima,² who was so uncompromising in his zeal for the cause of the Tripartite Pact that it was almost necessary to restrain him a little at this time, because he was greatly dissatisfied with the way things were developing in Japan.

The Foreign Minister asked the Duce in this connection in what way he thought the Japanese matter should be handled in the future. There was the method of going easy, so as not to create any difficulties for Matsuoka, with which the Führer was more inclined to agree; he, the Foreign Minister, on the other hand, believed that if a stronger line were taken and it was made plain to Matsuoka that any cooperation with America that was inconsistent with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact would mean a break with the Axis, it would definitely be possible to prevent any undesirable agreements between Japan and the United States; for any rapprochement between Japan and the United States was harmful. No matter how carefully a treaty might be drafted, Roosevelt, notorious pettifogger that he was, would get around it under some pretext.

The Duce, who had at first said that he, like the Führer, thought the easy method the more useful with Japan, appeared to be convinced by the Foreign Minister's arguments. He repeatedly expressed his agreement.

At the parting the Duce asked the Foreign Minister to convey his best regards to the Führer and to tell him that he, the Duce, could very well understand his feelings in the Hess affair; he himself had on three or four occasions had similar experiences, among others with his private secretary and his press chief.

SCHMIDT

² See document No. 78.

No. 514

2361/488545-52

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

ANKARA, May 13, 1941.

Sent May 14.

Subject: Situation in Turkey upon my return.

For the Foreign Minister.

I am using the return plane flight to send a first report of my impressions on the situation here:

1. Immediately upon my return I had a detailed conversation with the Iraq War Minister,¹ whom I had known earlier. He told me that the Gaylani Government was firmly resolved to adhere to its present position with respect to England. The acceptance of Turkish mediation meant for the Iraq Government only that it would gain time, for he was firmly convinced that an agreement on the proposed basis—return to the status quo ante—would not come about.² England had to eliminate the Gaylani Government and seize the places in the country that were of military importance. He therefore considered the outcome of the mediation action pessimistically.

I then arranged with him that we would both request the Turkish Government to continue the action regarding mediation in all circumstances.³ In this way we would first gain time for mobilizing German-Italian assistance and, secondly, Turko-English relations would be impaired as much as possible. I did not leave the War Minister in any doubt, however, concerning the difficulty of military assistance and I pointed out to him in particular that the flow through Turkey of supplies for the planes, etc., which were to be employed had to be assured. However, I told him that I hoped to settle this question satisfactorily. In reply to his urgent request that a few planes first be made available in order to drive the English out of Habbaniya, I told him that they could count on this help within a few days. The War Minister as well as Minister Gaylani consider the support of their action to be especially important also for the reason that the Arab movement would have wide repercussions in the area under the power of the English. The War Minister intends to return on Friday.

2. My first conversation with M. Saracoglu had a very satisfactory outcome.⁴ Even more so than last November,⁵ as I could note here,

¹ Naji Shawkat; see document No. 503 and footnote 3.

² See document No. 503.

³ In telegram No. 553 of May 14 (265/172845) Papen quoted Saracoglu as saying that he would continue his efforts at mediation although he had little hope for their success.

⁴ Papen had reported briefly about his conversations with Saracoglu and with the Iraq Minister of War in telegram No. 543 of May 13 (265/172842-43).

⁵ See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 363 and 386.

Turkey's entire public opinion awaited my return with close attention. As in the past, the possibility and necessity of a conquest of Egypt by us is uppermost in the political thinking. In this regard the assumption is confirmed to me in all circles that after the conquest of the islands Germany will send an expeditionary corps to the Suez Canal from Syria, because the conquest from the direction of Libya would encounter too many difficulties. This assumption is supported by the announcement of the discussions with Darlan.⁶ However, the military circles say: An operation from Syria in the direction of the Suez Canal can be undertaken successfully only if the supply of material overland through Turkey is arranged. The Turkish Government has told various diplomats that if the German Ambassador should make such a request in the form of an ultimatum it could not grant the request in view of the treaty with England. This would mean war. However, it intimated at the same time that there certainly would be a way of settling this question, too, in a satisfactory way if Turkey could save face in this matter with respect to England. Considering this, military assistance to be given Iraq by way of Syria would lose a great deal in importance because, as they said correctly, this assistance could only be very restricted, and because it was a German military principle to undertake military operations only if they promised absolute success.

When, aware of this situation, I called on the Foreign Minister, I was first received by him most amiably. His joy was almost excessive when I told him the contents of the Führer's letter to the State President.⁷ On being asked about the reason for the unrest which I had encountered here, M. Saracoglu said: "I have always told my colleagues that Germany would not expect anything of us that was incompatible with our honor and the obligations entered into. I am happy that you, Herr Ambassador, have been instructed by the Führer and the Foreign Minister to continue this policy, for we will certainly arrive at a comprehensive agreement on this basis."

I then pictured to the Minister the extremely strong situation of the Reich and its military power, which was equal to any, really any, eventuality. Now that the Balkan campaign had been concluded and the Führer had loyally fulfilled the promises he had given the State President,⁸ it was now a question of Turkey's preparing a definite change in her policy. I sketched to him in broad outline the assurances which the Reich was prepared to give Turkey, and I mentioned that the Führer as well as the Reich Foreign Minister had always adhered to the idea of winning over the old ally of former times in the end.

⁶ See document No. 475.

⁷ No letter of Hitler to İnönü, other than that of Mar. 1 (document No. 113), has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

⁸ See document No. 113.

Then the Minister asked me the surprising question: "Would you be now really willing to supply us with war material?" I replied: "As soon as you are on our side we would certainly be willing to support you in every way."

Regarding the situation in Iraq I told him, as instructed, that the Reich had no territorial interests there of any sort, but in all circumstances desired to maintain the independence of the Arab states, and that the establishment of a new English front to the south of Turkey could neither be in Turkey's nor Germany's interest. We would like it best if the conflict were settled on the basis of the status quo ante, and we asked the Turkish Government to continue its efforts in this respect.

M. Saracoglu received this statement with satisfaction. He said: In the beginning he had entertained the hope of settling the conflict, but the Iraq-English treaty, which was to be restored again, was interpreted differently by the two sides. His hopes of reaching a result were therefore small. I replied that Germany had contractual obligations to deliver arms to several of the countries there, and was asserting her right to route these transports of material through Turkey. One could find some formula which would make it outwardly possible for Turkey not to raise objections. The Minister agreed to this demand.

In the course of the conversation the Minister asked me about German-Russian relations. In accordance with instructions, I told him that our relations were entirely regulated, and we had no further wishes with respect to Russia. However, we had taken note of the inexplicable political attitude of Russia in the case of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as well as of the fact that very strong Russian forces were mobilized at the frontier of the Reich. Our aim continued to be the defeat of England and an attack on the island. However, we were strong enough to cope with any other eventuality, too. The Minister interrupted me with the remark that Stalin had evidently seen the mistakes in his political attitude; the expulsion of the Yugoslav, Norwegian, and Belgian Ministers,⁹ as well as the recognition of the Iraq aspirations for independence¹⁰ and the demotion of Molotov¹¹ seemed to prove that Russia was now willing to do everything that the Reich could desire. He did not want to leave me in doubt that since Stalin had resumed the tsarist policy toward the Balkans and the Straits Turkey again had to regard Russia as her implacable and greatest enemy. A German-Russian conflict would find Turkey with her heart on our side.

⁹ The Soviet Government had announced on May 9 that it could no longer recognize these three Legations as a result of their countries' loss of sovereignty.

¹⁰ See document No. 505 and footnote 8.

¹¹ See document No. 468.

Without a doubt there emerged from the Minister's statements the great concern that we might decide on the basis of Stalin's accommodating attitude in favor of a close alliance with Russia, which would result in setting the Russian steamroller going in the direction of India and the Persian Gulf. Afghanistan and Iran were greatly worried about such a development; they would prefer by far the existence of the British Empire to the penetration of Bolshevism to the Indian Ocean, and would arrange their attitude toward England accordingly.

As far as I can judge from this first conversation, it is exactly the fear of such German-Russian cooperation which will make the Turkish Government inclined to come to an agreement with us that will perhaps go much further than I could anticipate during my discussions in Berlin.¹²

With reference to these ideas, M. Saracoglu made statements that are exceedingly surprising and interesting. He reminded me of the last conversation before my departure, in which he had told me that it was his purely personal feeling that England would shortly be ready to reach an agreement with us.¹³ I did not accord the conversation any importance at the time, and disposed of it with the remark that the Reich did not see any possibility of reaching any sort of agreement with the present English Government, since the Führer's repeated offers had never found the slightest response. M. Saracoglu now asked me whether I had thought about his question and had brought it up in Berlin. I said that I had not done so. He now repeated for the second time: It was his firm conviction that England was ready for talks, and this on the basis that the German Reich retained an entirely free hand in Central Europe and in the East to settle matters as it saw fit, if there could be an agreement with England on the Belgian-Dutch question, i.e., the question of the Channel coast. The Minister went still further and said: "You would render humanity a service if you would crush present day Russia and in this way do away with Bolshevism once and for all. In so doing you would meet with considerable approval even in England and America. But you should first get into conversation with the English, which would lead to an armistice, and then restore order in Russia, acting as the representative of England and America and in accord with them."

I listened to these remarks with interest, but of course did not comment on them. But it seems quite clear to me that M. Saracoglu cannot have brought up these ideas without having consulted Eng-

¹² See document No. 404.

¹³ No record found.

land. He continued: "If there should be a German-Russian clash without an understanding with England having been reached first, then the war will continue for years, and we are afraid that the end of a world weakened by exhaustion and destruction will be an extensive Bolshevization of Europe."

The entire conversation left with me the impression that we can very definitely and also very quickly find a treaty instrument with Turkey preparing the transition of Turkey to our camp. What is necessary is that we act very quickly, i.e., under the impression of the uncertainty concerning German-Russian relations. All officials here confirm to me that in the past 2 weeks the Turkish press has undergone a very essential change. I am enclosing a short report regarding this.¹⁴ Isolated attacks are not to be taken seriously, and can be stopped in the course of the developments.

Finally, I told the Minister that it was unnecessary to accredit Turkish diplomats to the deposed governments. He told me that the diplomats who had represented Turkey in Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Yugoslavia were all in Ankara. I urgently advised him not to accredit the Athenian Minister to the Greek pseudo-government, either. He made a note of this.

MAY 14, 1941.

The State President has just received me. I have never been greeted in such a cordial way as today. After reading the Führer's letter very attentively, the President asked me to give the Führer his sincerest thanks for the statements in the letter, which had greatly impressed him.¹⁵ He was responding to the fullest extent to the language of friendship and trust which spoke from this letter.

In an hour long conversation the entire situation was now brought under review. I presented to the President the same ideas as I had to the Foreign Minister. He, too, asked me whether Germany was willing to help Turkey also with material. The greatest proof of confidence which Germany could give Turkey would be the resumption of deliveries of war material. He would personally guarantee that this material would never be employed contrary to German interests. He wanted to repeat to me the assurances which he had given me several times during this recent difficult period: Turkey had her treaty with England, to be sure, but she would do everything to avoid ever coming into conflict with Germany. We had to recognize that in spite of the strongest pressure he had always interpreted

¹⁴ Memorandum of May 13 by Setler (2361/488553-54).

¹⁵ See footnote 7.

the English treaty in this way. He could well appreciate that a decisive moment had now come at which Turkey had to clarify her relationship with Germany, and he agreed entirely to having agreements concluded between us which would fully restore the balance of the good relationship with Germany.

In the present situation Turkey was naturally most interested in the Russian problem. He considered the Russians to be an entirely uncertain factor. If Germany should succeed this year in reaching another amicable settlement with Russia, he was convinced that this would be only provisional and would confront us next year with a new and probably much more uncomfortable situation.

If I should attach importance to knowing where Turkey would stand in a German-Russian conflict, then he wanted to assure me that she would be on our side.

At the conclusion of the academic discussions I told the President that Germany had frequently judged Turkey's attitude by the hostile attitude of the Turkish press. It was necessary to decide at this time to establish each other's position so that both partners knew exactly where they stood. It would also be of importance for Germany's decisions regarding the future organization in the southeast to know whether Turkey was willing in principle to restore the old friendly relationship by means of a treaty instrument.

The President replied: "Tell the Führer that I am entirely prepared to do so. If Germany obligates herself not to enter into any commitment against Turkey with any power, no matter which one it may be, we will commit ourselves never to undertake anything against the interests of Germany, in particular never to enter a conflict with her. We must find formulations in this document which are compatible with our obligations toward the other side—but where there is the will a formula will be found."

I promised the President to transmit this decision of his to the Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister at once, and arranged with M. Saracoglu, who was present during the audience, to start the work in the near future.

The President dismissed me with the renewed request that I express to the Führer his thanks and his sincere feelings of friendship.¹⁸

PAPEN

¹⁸ Papen had briefly reported about his conversation with President İnönü in telegram No. 552 of May 14 (265/172844).

No. 515

83/61240

The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Legation in Iraq

Telegram by Radio Message

RAM 184/R

FUSCHL, May 14, 1941.

No. 17

Sent May 15—1:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 12 of May 12.¹

The apprehensions of the Iraq Government that a Turkish proposal for mediation, if rejected, could lead to Turkish intervention seem to us unfounded. Our view of Turkey's attitude is that Turkey wants to keep out of any warlike complication.²

RINTELEN

¹ Document No. 503.

² In telegram No. 31 of May 15 (83/61255) Grobba reported that "as a result of the reassuring explanation of the Turkish attitude by Ambassador Papen and by me, the Iraq Government has rejected the Turkish mediation proposal."

No. 516

177/85103

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Tokyo, May 15, 1941—9:00 a. m.

No. 750 of May 15

Received May 15—4:30 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Matsuoka informed me today that the British¹ and American² Ambassadors tried during a conversation to extract from him a statement that institution of a convoy system did not constructively [*durch Substitution*] come under article III of the Tripartite Pact.³ He had made it unequivocally plain to the two Ambassadors that a convoy system might at any time be declared by the Tripartite Pact to be an indirect attack and that Japan would then unfailingly fulfill her obligation under the alliance. Matsuoka then showed me a letter of the American Ambassador in which, referring to that conversation, the latter had characterized this view taken by Japan as "of grave and far-reaching implication",⁴ and that he thought it regrettable.

¹ Sir Robert Craigie.

² Joseph C. Grew.

³ For the text see vol. XI of this series, document No. 118.

⁴ The quoted passage is in English in the original. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. IV, pp. 189-190. Cf. also Joseph C. Grew, *Ten Years in Japan* (New York, 1944), pp. 388-389.

Matsuoka remarked that he believed that the position which Japan had taken was responsible for postponement of the Roosevelt speech of May 14,⁵ in which a convoy system was to have been announced.

OTT

⁵ The reference is to an address by President Roosevelt which was originally planned to be delivered earlier but which was eventually delivered on May 27 (see document No. 560 and footnote 2). Cf. Matsuoka's earlier statement in document No. 489.

No. 517

593/245183

The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister

Telegram

PRIORITY

BERLIN, May 15, 1941—9:15 a. m.

Comments of the State Secretary on telegraphic reports from Tokyo Nos. 731,¹ 732,² and 733³ (text of Japanese-American treaty).

I. Political agreements of any sort between Japan and the United States are undesirable at the present time. The treaty text, moreover, as it reads now, would mean that Japan is disengaging herself from us. It would leave the field of conflict with England and the United States to us alone. The Tripartite Pact would thus be discredited. The sanctioning of United States assistance to England in the concluding sentence in section II is definitely anti-German (more evident even in the English than the German text).

II. Since the text of the treaty is already in Washington, it has already done damage. An effort should be made even now so to encumber it that the treaty will not be concluded. (Provision for Japanese interpretation of the treaty; conditions for bringing it into force; making the coming into force of section II dependent upon the operation of section III, or the like.)

III. If the treaty cannot be stopped even in this way, it is essential to take steps to ensure Japan's realignment with us in practical matters. The minimum would be to get Japan to expand her aid to Germany on the same lines as American aid to England.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 512, footnote 2.

² Document No. 512.

³ See document No. 512, footnote 4.

No. 518

177/85096-98

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan

Telegram
(en clair to the Foreign Ministry)

MOST URGENT

FUSCHL, May 15, 1941—4:55 p. m.

TOP SECRET

No. 379 of May 15

from Fuschl

Received Berlin, May 15—6:10 p. m.

No. 622 from the Foreign Ministry

RAM 185/R

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 731¹ and 733.²

The action of the Japanese Government in making, as it now appears, a complete answer to Washington without previously awaiting a statement of our position, seems to us inexplicable. Has Matsuoka had to give in to powerful pressure from dominant elements there? Since it is a matter of secret negotiations, there could be only a few personalities from whom this pressure could come. I request that you report telegraphically in even more detail about this crisis in the control of Japan's foreign policy.

On the matter of the Japanese-American negotiations themselves, I request that you inform Mr. Matsuoka orally as follows:

We regret that it has not been possible for the Japanese Government to await our standpoint before making its answer to Washington. As we now know what that answer is, you are directed to bring the following points to the attention of Mr. Matsuoka in amplification of our statement of position of May 12:³

(1) It is our impression now as before that the best way to restrain American policy from an entry into the war would be the complete refusal on the part of Japan to take up negotiations on the American proposal. The Tripartite Pact was concluded, in the past year, as a political and moral alliance between Germany, Italy, and Japan, with the principal purpose of preventing the entry of third powers into the war. Up to this time it has had this effect, and will continue to do so as long as the united front of the three Powers is maintained unbroken. Any agreement on the part of one of the Tripartite Pact members with a great power outside would appear to the world as weakening the front of the members of the

¹ See document No. 512, footnote 2.² See document No. 512, footnote 4.³ See document No. 496.

Tripartite Pact and would have the political result of reducing the effect of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact.

(2) If, however, the Japanese Government considers that, for reasons of domestic policy, it cannot avoid negotiations with the United States about American-Japanese relations, at least the appearance of those detrimental effects should be prevented, since, in the case of the United States, that country is, if not strictly by international law, yet certainly in actuality, an open enemy of the Axis Powers. A pledge by the United States not to enter the war between the Axis Powers and England and a clear and emphatic statement by Japan concerning her obligations under the Tripartite Pact, should therefore be made the core of the American-Japanese agreement to which all other provisions should remain subordinate.

Since Matsuoka, in explaining to you his two preliminary questions to Hull, said that Japan would not conclude any agreement without an affirmative answer to these preliminary questions, we assume that the Japanese Government itself considers it important that there should be embodied in the draft agreement, even more clearly than has hitherto been done, the undertaking that America pledges herself not to enter the war against the Axis Powers.

(3) In these circumstances, the question of the formula to be adopted in the draft agreement becomes of greatest importance. What is stated in section II of the Japanese answer concerning the maintenance of the obligations of Japan under the Tripartite Pact, represents the absolute minimum of what must be stated on this subject in the Japanese-American agreements. I request that you advise Matsuoka most urgently not to allow himself to be outmaneuvered by the Americans on this point or to be misled into permitting any weakening in his position. Any departure herefrom, or any weakening, would put him on the downward path and by its consequences would result in contradiction of the spirit and intent of the Tripartite Pact and could make the pact illusory.

(4) I ask that you insist that we be informed fully about the course of negotiations between Japan and America and that we receive information immediately about the American reply. It would not be in accordance with the relationship under the Tripartite Pact if the Japanese Government by agreeing with the American communication thus reaffirmed its position without having consulted with us in advance about such an important question.

I do not for a moment, in view of the confidential discussions which took place between Mr. Matsuoka and me in Berlin, doubt the complete loyalty of the Japanese Foreign Minister and I am convinced that he will look at things from the point of view outlined above.

In addition to the foregoing, I ask that you emphasize once more to the Japanese Government the point of view outlined in telegram No. 592 of May 12,⁴ which we regard as basic.⁵

RIBBENTROP

⁴ Document No. 496.

⁵ In telegram No. 1135 of May 15 (177/85099-102) the text of this instruction to Ott was forwarded to the Embassy in Italy with the request that the Italian Government undertake a similar démarche in Tokyo.

In telegram No. 1123 of May 16 (177/85104) Bismarck replied that Ciano had that day instructed Indelli to get in touch with Ott and to make a similar statement to Matsuoka.

Weizsäcker's memorandum of May 17 (593/245168) records a discussion of this instruction to Tokyo with Oshima who appeared bitter over being left in the dark by his own Foreign Minister and in having to get his information on the subject from the Germans.

No. 519

426/217951

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 938 of May 14

BERLIN, May 15, 1941—6:27 p. m.

Received May 15—10:30 p. m.

Special security handling. Secret. To be decoded only by officials authorized to handle confidential material. Reply via courier or secret code.

With reference to telegram No. 957 of April 21,¹ and dispatch No. A 1408 of April 22, 1941.²

Please inform the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that the 71 cases mentioned of border violations by Germans are being investigated. The investigation will require some time as the Luftwaffe units and airplane crews concerned will have to be interrogated individually. Please effect the early release by the Soviet Government of the plane that made the emergency landing near Rovno on April 15.³

RITTER

¹ Document No. 381.

² Not printed (426/217952-88).

³ Marginal note in Tippelskirch's handwriting: "Informed S[obolev]. He says border violations are continuing, recently they are frequent."

No. 520

295/184428-32

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

PARIS, May 15, 1941—7:41 p. m.

No. 1480 of May 14

Received May 15—7:00 a. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

The principle laid down by the Führer at his reception on May 11² to grant concessions to France only if she is willing in return to provide services which would be of use for our war with England can be realized in four parts of negotiations.

I. Deliveries of motor vehicles from Tunis to Libya.³

No German service has been agreed upon as yet in return for the French consent to deliver motor vehicles to the German Africa Corps in Libya, load them with the necessary supplies, and transport these supplies from unoccupied France to French North Africa. I propose in return the release of about 1,000 captive officers, non-commissioned officers, and specialists of the French colonial army, to be designated by Darlan individually, who are required as white cadres for the increased defensive readiness of French Morocco and French West Africa against English and American landing attempts.

II. The military support for Iraq through Syria.

In return for the French weapons stored in Syria for Iraq, and released, and for the authorization for German planes destined for Iraq to fly over and make intermediate landings [in Syria], France has been conceded the rearmament of 7 torpedo boats and the relaxation of the line of demarcation for the passage of open post cards and for persons in cases of serious illness and death of close relatives.⁴

Moreover, travel by members of the armed forces on leave was permitted in the occupied zone.

The relaxation of the demarcation line for the movement of goods and money and the reduction of the daily occupation costs from 20 to 15 million marks was mentioned for propaganda reasons in the communiqué after the negotiations on the delivery of arms to Iraq.⁵ They have no connection with these negotiations, however, but were granted to the French Government in return for the concession of

¹ There seems to be a mistake with regard to the date and the time of dispatch and receipt of this telegram. A marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting indicates that he saw the telegram on May 15.

² Document No. 491.

³ See document No. 417 and footnote 1.

⁴ See document No. 475.

⁵ The text of this communiqué was reported by Abetz in telegram No. 1398 of May 7 (221/149280-81).

German controls at the outer borders and the installation of German commissioners in the finance and commerce departments.

III. Support and supply of German submarines and certain merchant ships in French Morocco and French West Africa.*

As a military concession in return for such willingness of the French Government, already stated in principle, it is intended to authorize the rearmament of 6 French destroyers. Owing to the very far-reaching consequences which can result from a camouflaged utilization of French naval bases by German ships, Darlan requests a number of concessions affecting the broad masses of the people.

I propose the following German concessions:

1. Release of altogether 80,000 French prisoners of war, including
 - 15,000 miners who are not employed in this capacity in Germany,
 - 35,000 farmers, who are not employed in this capacity in Germany,
 - 3,000 officials and employees in bridge and road construction, and
 - 27,000 World War veterans over 45 years of age, who are not needed in the German economy.
2. Relaxation of the line of demarcation on the occasion of weddings and births of immediate members of a family.
3. Facilitating the entry into the northern départements and the blocked zone for a limited number of administrative officials and businessmen urgently needed in these areas.

In part III of the negotiations it would also be propagandistically effective to publish simultaneously with the political and military concessions those arrived at independently in the discussions of the economic delegation of the Armistice Commission. In return for the willingness of the French Government:

To rescind the special regulations for German citizens and firms in Morocco dating from the World War;

to permit Germany to participate to the greatest possible extent in the agricultural production and exploitation of raw materials in North Africa;

to prevent a monopoly on the part of the United States in the supplying of Morocco; and

either to cancel entirely the rights of supervision given the Americans in return for their deliveries or at least to restrict them as regards time, place, and extent to a minimum.⁷

The economic delegation of the Armistice Commission can concede the following:

a reduction of the daily occupation costs to 12 million marks, if a part of this amount is transferred in the form of assets;

* See document No. 421.

⁷ See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 112 ff.

to supply North Africa with required industrial goods within the limits of the German possibilities;
a onetime delivery of 10,000 tons of sugar to North Africa.

IV. Open support of German war measures against England.

France can on her own initiative or as a result of English provocation, which may occur, support German war measures by

employing her 2 Syrian divisions on the side of Iraq forces against England;

providing North African troop contingents and arms for the operations of the Africa Corps against the Suez Canal;

assistance of French naval forces in German operations against the Canary Islands and Gibraltar;

offensive action against Bathurst and Freetown;

thus she would enter into an open state of war with England.

In return for this open support of German military operations against England, it is advisable:

to incorporate the northern départements into the military administration of France;⁸

to reduce the occupation costs to the amount necessary for the immediate maintenance of the occupation troops;

to open the line of demarcation to the widest possible extent for the passage of civilians; and

to release all prisoners of war over 40, and the remainder to that extent which is tolerable for the German economy.

Please let me know whether part III of the negotiations can be taken up with Darlan within the framework of the proposal submitted. Since part III of the negotiations contains political and economic subjects of negotiations besides the purely military ones, I suggest that it be discussed jointly with General Vogl and Minister Hemmen in Paris. Darlan has expressed the request (one group apparently missing) appointment of General Warlimont that he be given for the coming weeks a permanent negotiating partner from the High Command of the Wehrmacht in Paris, since many questions require very urgent and immediate discussion.⁹

ABETZ

⁸ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 206.

⁹ In telegram No. 1689 of May 17 (221/149323) Rintelen informed Abetz that Ribbentrop would like to have him keep a current record of all French services which went beyond the Armistice Treaty and of German concessions to France in response to these services. A copy of such a record drawn up by Abetz was sent to Ribbentrop on May 26 (F9/0247-57). As for Abetz' proposals, Ribbentrop asked that his suggestions contained in part IV be postponed for the time being, as he wanted to discuss these things with him personally.

No. 521

34/24524-27

Memorandum by Minister Schnurre

Ha. Pol. 294 g. Rs.

BERLIN, May 15, 1941.

SECOND MEMORANDUM ON THE STATUS OF GERMAN-SOVIET TRADE
RELATIONS ¹

1) The discussions concluded a few days ago with Krutikov, First Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the USSR, were conducted in a notably constructive spirit by Krutikov. It was therefore possible to settle satisfactorily difficult points in the Economic Agreement of January 10, 1941,² such as delivery of oil seed, non-ferrous metals, petroleum, and transit of raw rubber from East Asia through the territory of the USSR. Despite his constructive attitude, Krutikov's stand when defending Russian interests was firm. He showed no extreme willingness to give way which might have been construed as weakness.

2) Difficulties arose, as in the past, regarding the execution of German delivery commitments to the USSR, especially in the field of armaments. We shall not be able to adhere to the more distant delivery dates. However, the nonfulfillment of German commitments will only make itself felt after August 1941, since until then Russia is obligated to make deliveries in advance. Difficulties arose especially with respect to the execution of certain contracts covering supplies for the air force, as the Reich Air Ministry will not release the aircraft promised and already sold. Krutikov brought up these questions, without too great insistence, however. Construction of the cruiser *L* in Leningrad is proceeding according to plan, with German supplies coming in as scheduled. Approximately 70 German engineers and fitters are working on the construction of the cruiser in Leningrad under the direction of Admiral Feige.

3) The status of Soviet raw material deliveries still presents a favorable picture. Of the most important items of raw materials, the following deliveries were made in April:

Grain	208,000 tons
Petroleum	90,000 tons
Cotton	8,300 tons
Nonferrous metals	6,340 tons; copper, tin, and nickel.

¹ Typewritten marginal note: "My first memorandum of Apr. 5 on this same subject is attached."

See document No. 280.

² Vol. XI of this series, document No. 637.

With regard to manganese ore and phosphates, deliveries suffered from the lack of tonnage and transportation difficulties in the Southeast area.

The transit route through Siberia is still operating. The shipments of raw materials from East Asia, particularly of raw rubber, that reach Germany by this route, continue to be substantial (raw rubber during the month of April, 2,000 tons by special trains, 2,000 by regular Siberian trains).

Total deliveries in the current year amount to:

Grain	632,000 tons
Petroleum	232,000 tons
Cotton	23,500 tons
Manganese ore	50,000 tons
Phosphates	67,000 tons
Platinum	900 kilograms

4) Great difficulties are created by the countless rumors of an imminent German-Soviet conflict. Official sources are in large measure responsible for the persistence of these rumors. These rumors are causing grave anxiety to German industry, which is eager to withdraw from its engagements with Russia and in some cases already refuses to dispatch to Moscow the personnel needed for the execution of the contracts.

5) I am under the impression that we could make economic demands on Moscow which would even go beyond the scope of the Treaty of January 10, 1941, demands designed to secure German food and raw material requirements beyond the extent now contracted for. The quantities of raw materials now contracted for are being delivered punctually by the Russians, despite the heavy burden this imposes on them, which, especially with regard to grain, is a notable performance, since the total quantity of grain to be delivered under the agreement of April 10 of this year and the Belgian and Norwegian agreements,³ amounts to over 3 million tons up to August 1, 1942.

6) For the end of May or beginning of June, the Economic Agreement of January 10, 1941, provides for new negotiations in Moscow regarding settlement of balances. Such negotiations would, however, only make sense if they were used to present specific German demands. If this is not to be the case, I intend to procrastinate with regard to the date of the negotiations.

SCHNURRE

³ In a memorandum of Apr. 12 (3784/E042138) Schnurre noted the conclusion of these trade agreements.

No. 522

265/172846

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

RAM 191/R

FUSCHL, May 16, 1941—6:40 p. m.

No. 388 of May 16

from Fuschl

Received Berlin, May 16—7:00 p. m.

No. 471 of May 16

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent May 16—8:10 p. m.

For the Ambassador personally.

Before we carry out the idea of concluding a treaty with Turkey which would detach this country from its present ties with England and lead it more or less into our camp, it is also necessary to examine the question of whether we may not expose ourselves in this way to the danger of a domestic political Putsch in Turkey, as we recently experienced it after Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact. Are we running the risk of sudden surprises in the form of the removal of the President and of the leading ministers by way of a coup d'état or of something similar to it? Please communicate your views on this question in detail by telegraph, discussing the entire internal political situation in Turkey and the stability of the present Government leadership, also in case of that new orientation in foreign policy, which we desire.¹

RIBBENTROP

¹ See document No. 531.

No. 523

265/172847-48

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

ANKARA, May 16, 1941.

No. 563 of May 16

Received May 16—10:20 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

At today's conversation with the Foreign Minister the entire complex of questions concerning German-Turkish relations was once more discussed in detail. The English threat of an attack on Syria

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 1549 to Fuschl, May 16, 10:53 p.m."

has aroused the greatest interest here. I told the Foreign Minister that it was in Turkey's as well as in Germany's interest not to weaken France's position there. If help with material should be necessary, it would only be in accordance with the Turkish-French treaty² for Turkey to agree to the transit of such deliveries. Saracoglu replied: "We will then be allies of both belligerents." As regards arms deliveries to Iraq I stressed once again that Germany must have absolute security regarding the transit route. The Minister raised no objection to the proposal that such shipments be addressed to Iran in order to protect Turkey against outward violation of the treaty with England.

The State President had instructed him to get in touch with the English Ambassador at once in order to tell him that Turkey now felt impelled to clarify her position toward Germany and intended to give Germany a declaration of neutrality. In this manner Turkey wished to bring her relations with us into harmony with the obligations arising out of her alliance. The Minister added: "If I assume the possibility of a German-Russian conflict, then we will get into a very (clear text missing) situation. Up to now we have based our attitude toward England on Protocol II.³ However, if in case of a German-Russian conflict Russia should request England's aid via Turkey, Protocol II is inapplicable. If only for this reason we need a statement of our neutrality toward Germany."⁴ The Minister concluded: "As soon as I have settled the relations with England, I shall take up with you the discussions of our treaty instrument."

PAPEN

²Turkey's mutual assistance pact with Great Britain and France, signed Oct. 19, 1939. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167.

³Of the Anglo-French-Turkish treaty referred to in footnote 2. The text of the main provisions of this protocol reads as follows: "The obligations undertaken by Turkey in virtue of the above-mentioned Treaty cannot compel that country to take action having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, entry into armed conflict with the Soviet Union."

⁴In a telegram sent to the Foreign Minister on May 17 (265/172849) Weizsäcker commented on the notion of a Turkish statement of neutrality with respect to Germany and stated that "we certainly want more from the Turks than neutrality."

No. 524

4671/E221553

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SECRET

No. 534

SOFIA, May 6 [16], 1941.

Received May 17—10:55 a. m.¹

Kult. A 2558 g.

With reference to your telegram No. 701 of May 14.²

The new areas falling to Bulgaria confront the Government with very difficult tasks, a fact which governmental circles do not conceal. Thrace presents them with a large Greek minority because of the compulsory removal of Bulgarian elements after the World War and the settlement of Greeks from Asia Minor. Macedonia contains, besides a large Bulgarian population, not inconsiderable portions of Kutzo-Walachians and Albanians. Rumania is already making attempts to intervene on behalf of the Kutzo-Walachians. The Italians, as I gather from remarks of the Albanian Special Attaché with the local Italian Legation, have not yet stopped using Albanian elements in Macedonia for more far-reaching Balkan plans. New settlements of Slovenes in Macedonia would perhaps render permanently impossible any chance of a pacification and economic development of Macedonia.³

RICHTHOFEN

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 1556 to Fuschl, May 17."

² See document No. 465, footnote 3.

³ Marginal note: "No instruction has been issued as yet. To be submitted again in 4 weeks. Goe[ken], June 10."

An attached sheet (4671/E221554) has the further notation: "The suggestion has not been followed up. To the files. Goe[ken], July 11."

No. 525

116/66852-53

Note by the Foreign Minister for the Führer

FUSCHL, May 16, 1941.

According to a telegram from Minister Kasche in Zagreb,¹ the Croatian Government would if necessary be willing to receive in Croatia the 220,000 to 260,000 Slovenes to be evacuated from Lower Styria, or part of them, if it could deport the same number of Serbs to Old Serbia.

According to a directive of the Führer's there actually should be no deportation of Slovenes to Croatia. However, since the Croatian

¹ Telegram No. 220 of May 13 (116/66849).

Government apparently is anxious to be able to reduce the exceedingly strong Serbian minority in Croatia, and seems to be ready to receive a corresponding number of Slovenes in order to achieve this goal, the question arises whether this idea should not be given some consideration after all. The transportation difficulties which so far have stood in the way of carrying through the evacuation of the Slovenes from Lower Styria could thereby be considerably eased.

Furthermore it is doubtless correct that acceptance of these Slovenes represents a lesser danger for the Croatian State internally than the continued existence of the undiminished strong Serbian minority.

I should therefore like to ask for a decision by the Führer as to whether this idea should be further pursued and the Croatian Government be approached accordingly.²

R[IBBENTROP]

² Marginal note: "The Führer considers this solution a good one and agrees to it. Hewel, May 18."

No. 526

2120/461885-86

Confidential Protocol, Signed at Zagreb, May 16, 1941

The German and Croatian Governments, in the desire to place the economic relations between the two countries upon a basis satisfactory to both nations as soon as possible, have agreed as follows:

The two Governments will each establish a governmental committee for the regulation of German-Croatian economic relations, the chairman of each to be appointed by the Government concerned. It shall be the task of these committees to settle all questions concerning the economic relations between the two states.

The work of these committees shall be carried out according to the following principles:

1. In view of Germany's special economic interests in the former Yugoslav State it is agreed that the German economic interests in Croatia are to have special consideration. The two Governments will see that the trade between the two countries remains at least at the same level as in the past.

2. Germany may continue unrestricted exploitation of industrial raw materials, in particular minerals, which she has instituted. In granting additional new concessions the Croatian State will give special consideration to the German interests. The same applies to the export of raw materials, and in particular of minerals, to Germany.

The oil concessions belonging to German companies may be exploited under the same conditions as in the past. In cases where binding promises regarding concessions had already been made but where the contracts for concessions had not yet been drawn up this will be done, under the same conditions as were intended for this and in accordance with the conditions applying to the other concessions. In the export of the petroleum extracted in these concession areas the German requirements will be given preferential treatment.

3. It is agreed that the financial questions resulting from the presence of German troops in Croatia must be settled quickly; in this connection it must in any case be made certain that these troops in Croatia can dispose of the currency necessary for their needs.

The expenses of German military installations, in so far as these are expenses arising within the country itself, will be borne for the duration of the war by Croatia.

4. It is agreed that the states which have received areas of the former Yugoslav State will be liable proportionately to Germany and her citizens for all of the obligations of the former Yugoslav State and the former Yugoslav National Bank.

Special agreements will be made concerning the settlement of the details of this question.

Signed at Zagreb, in duplicate in the German and Croatian languages, on May 16, 1941.

SIEGFRIED KASCHE
CARL CLODIUS

SUSIĆ
LORKOVIĆ

No. 527

426/217944

*The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*¹

Telegram

No. 534 of May 16

STOCKHOLM, [May 16, 1941.]

I have learned that the Soviet Russian Minister here, Mme. Kolontay, said recently that at no time in Russian history have there been stronger troop contingents assembled on Russia's western border than now.

WIED

¹ Transmitted to the Embassy in Moscow under Pol. I M 3378 g.

No. 528

83/61770-74

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division I M

BERLIN, May 16, 1941.

Pol. I M 1392.

Subject: Status of military aid to Iraq.

I. In regard to the question of military aid to Iraq a considerable number of talks have been held between the Foreign Ministry (Ambassador Ritter and Under State Secretary Woermann) and various Departments of the OKW, with the primary purpose of demonstrating to the Wehrmacht the political necessity and the political possibilities of an operation in Iraq.

After first viewing an operation in Iraq with skepticism, the Wehrmacht, and in particular the Luftwaffe, have now realized the importance of such an operation, even if in the long run it should not be crowned by complete success. A decisive factor in this connection was the Foreign Minister's personal letter to the Reichsmarschall.¹

II. Measures taken by the Luftwaffe:

The main weight of the effort is with the Luftwaffe and must remain so for as long as transit through Turkey is impossible. The Luftwaffe first sent a reconnaissance detachment with three aircraft under the command of Major von Blomberg to Iraq, via Syria. Major von Blomberg was killed by Iraq antiaircraft fire upon his arrival over Baghdad. Since the results of his reconnaissance operation so far are not known, all actions to date are chiefly based on the reports of Minister Grobba and Senior Counselor Rahn.²

a. "Air Commander, Iraq." To direct the Luftwaffe operations "Air Commander, Iraq" (Colonel Jungk, with rank of division commander) was organized. This group is already in Rhodes or on its way thither. Subordinated to Jungk's group is Special Staff Manteuffel, which will remain in Syria to assure the movement of supplies. Special Staff Manteuffel will outwardly function as German liaison staff with the Italian Armistice Commission in Syria. Through an official directive to Senior Counselor Rahn it has been settled that all negotiations of Special Staff Manteuffel with the

¹ Not found.² See document No. 476. A Woermann message to Grobba of May 9 (792/-272812) stated that Rahn's task was to organize Syria as a supply base for Iraq.

Rahn's reports on his activities in Syria during the hostilities in Iraq and later on in Syria itself were incorporated in a lengthy memorandum of July 30. This memorandum which is a detailed chronological account of Rahn's activities in the period May 9-July 11 will be published in vol. XXX of this series.

Mandate Government will be conducted through Senior Counselor Rahn; he will also make all political decisions.³

The following units have so far been assigned to Air Commander, Iraq:

1. One twin-engine fighter bomber squadron (Me-110) and 1 bomber squadron (He-111), of 12 aircraft each. The assembly point was Rhodes, on May 13. Some of the aircraft (5 or 6 He-111) are already in Syria.

2. To assure supply: 1 transport squadron (10 Ju-52, 3 Ju-90 for special cargoes, and 1 Ju-90 and 2 Ju-52 with radio equipment).

Departure of the transport squadron from Berlin on May 13, arrival in Athens or Rhodes on May 16.

The *transport squadron*, commanded by Captain Rother, will establish a shuttle service on the route Athens-Rhodes-Syria-Baghdad. The base will at first be Rhodes, to which point fuel, equipment, and other supplies will be directed by sea. (One shipload left Athens on May 13.)

b. Operational intentions:

1. Operation by 2 squadrons, with Rhodes as base. *Probable mission:* Attack on the airfield and base at Habbaniya.

After successful completion of mission, the 2 squadrons will remain in Baghdad under the direct command of Colonel Jungk.

The final operational orders will be issued on May 14 by Colonel Jungk, after consultation with Captain Darjes.

2. If this first operation is successful, it is planned to bring in additional combat aircraft (build up to at least group strength, i.e., 3 squadrons). Preparations for this are already under way.

c. Antiaircraft support.

Colonel Jungk has urgently requested antiaircraft protection for the airfield in Baghdad. The Chief of the General Staff has authorized the sending by air to Baghdad first of all of one section of light antiaircraft artillery (four 20-mm. guns). It is intended to increase this to battery strength later on.

Bringing in French antiaircraft equipment would probably take considerable time and is therefore of little value for the purposes of immediate action. This notwithstanding the French Government is being asked to apply to the Turkish Government for transit per-

³ This directive was transmitted in Ribbentrop's telegram No. 399 of May 17 from Fuschl, forwarded to Rahn as No. 21 of May 18 (70/50801).

mission.* On the part of the Luftwaffe no objections are raised against releasing stocks of French material or captured Greek or Yugoslav equipment. However, there would be some problems with respect to supplying crews trained in the use of that equipment.

III. Captain Darjes, who returned today from his first mission in Iraq, has been summoned to make an oral report to the Führer. His first report indicates that the initial stage of German assistance has made a good impression in Iraq and that early operational action is looked forward to with keen anticipation. This subject was discussed in a conference between Captain Darjes and the Air Commander, Iraq, Colonel Jungk, in Rhodes last Wednesday morning, May 14. Colonel Jungk assembled all aircraft assigned to this combat mission on Mosul airfield in the course of yesterday. During the transfer of the bomber squadron there were some operational losses (crackup, engine failure, lubrication failure) so that the number of combat-ready machines is only 3 or 4. The fighter squadron had 11 combat-ready machines yesterday. The date of the first combat mission will be decided by Colonel Jungk after he arrives in Mosul.

Regarding the British bombing attacks on Baghdad airfield, Captain Darjes reports that the Iraq military personnel were seized by panic, fled into the desert, and did not reappear until the following day. Major von Blomberg was killed by a hit from an Iraq antiaircraft gun when he landed in Baghdad; the other crew members are reported to be unhurt.

IV. *Operations by the Army and Navy:*

The Army envisages sending a military mission consisting of several arms specialists and general staff officers. Gehrcke has made a proposal on this subject in telegram No. 26⁵ and suggested General Felmy as head of that mission.

The Navy, in consultation with the Foreign Ministry, has instructed the cargo vessels lying in Bandar Shahpur, Iran, to attempt to enter the delta of the Shatt-al-Arab and then to scuttle themselves in order to hamper the flow of British supplies to Basra.

KRAMARZ

* In telegram No. 1613 of May 13 (699/260870-71) Ritter sent Abetz instructions that Darlan be induced to take steps to this effect.

⁵ Sent from Baghdad, May 15 (83/61256-57).

No. 529

265/172850

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

MOST URGENT

FUSCHL, May 17, 1941—1:55 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received Berlin, May 17—2:50 a. m.

No. 393 from Fuschl

No. 476 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent May 17—4:35 a. m.

For the Ambassador personally.

Your report of May 13 and 14¹ concerning the situation you found there after your return, confirms to me that the moment for reaching an agreement with Turkey has now arrived. In this connection, I believe that we must make use of the situation described in your report and go a little further with the Turks than we have up to now anticipated. Supplementing the oral instructions which you have already been given here,² I request that you conduct preliminary discussions at your post in such a manner as to obtain the following results:

Simultaneously with the conclusion of an official treaty with Turkey there will be concluded a secret treaty which will permit us unlimited transit of arms and war material through Turkey. In this connection, provision should be made in appropriate form that Turkey will not object to having the war material escorted by the necessary personnel during transit. Practically, this would amount to permitting transit of a certain number of troops in a camouflaged manner. Should we meet with a willingness on the part of the Turks to allow transport of material and arms with the escorting personnel, Turkey might be promised rectification of its frontier near Edirne to an extent yet to be determined and, possibly, also one or the other island in the Aegean Sea. It is understood that this does not only involve small shipments of material such as, for instance, shipments resulting from commitments for the delivery of arms to Iran, etc., but more considerable shipments the extent of which should be left to our discretion. There must not be any uncertainty on this score. It is also necessary to note that according to the general practice of international law the transit of materials alone is fully compatible with the neutrality of a state, so that in this respect an arrangement by a treaty could probably be reached without any further ado. It will be easy to find a form for establishing an agreement about the admission of the escorting personnel, inasmuch as the Turks are prepared to conclude such an agreement and apply it in accordance with our wishes.

¹ Document No. 514.² No record found.

Such a course of action would enable the Turks to save face with regard to England. Any scruples which they may show could be overcome by the following line of argument.

Turkey concluded a treaty with England and France based on the obligation of mutual assistance in the event of a threat. France is beaten and England is no longer in any position at all to render any assistance to Turkey. Moreover, one of the parties to the treaty, namely France, is now swinging toward our side. Thus the former Turkish-French-English Treaty has lost its juridical as well as its practical basis. Please make this clear to the Turks in your discussions.

The fact that the Turks want to save face is understandable. We can, therefore, give the official treaty an appropriate form without further ado. The whole world will understand that Turkey, for reasons of self-preservation, particularly now that England is no longer able to give her any support, is compelled to protect herself against the alleged German and the real Russian danger. Turkey may obtain this protection against Russia by concluding an agreement of friendship with us. Since the price of this agreement of friendship is merely the permission for transit of war materials with escorting personnel for the support of Arab nations such as, for instance, Iraq, against English attacks or against the violation of treaties, Turkey will be able to oppose with weighty arguments anyone asserting that she lost face.

In accordance with the oral instructions given to you here and basing yourself on the foregoing directives, please enter immediately into discussions with the Turkish Government about the conclusion of a treaty. Please conduct these preliminary negotiations at first only orally and abstain for the time being from handing in a draft treaty or from putting things in writing in any other way. I shall give further instructions in this matter after your report about the result of your oral discussions has been received.

We are interested in completing this matter as soon as possible. Therefore, please enter into negotiations at once and send a report.² Should it be necessary, I will send you the drafts of the treaty immediately.

RIBBENTROP

² See document No. 531.

No. 530

129/121085-87

The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1046 of May 15

LISBON, May 17, 1941—2:15 a. m.

Received May 17—1:25 p. m.

After the economic protocol was signed¹ and in view of my forthcoming official journey to Berlin I had a friendly 2 hour conversation with Salazar whom I have never seen more calm, self-possessed, and clear-sighted since I have been here. The attitude of the Minister President, as known from constant reports based on public statements and private communications, was reflected by ideas which encompassed all areas of general policies and specifically the relations between Germany and Portugal. While he was very much concerned about the future which may also directly affect Portugal in an unfavorable way in the event the war should be of long duration, Salazar was more emphatic than ever before in embracing the cause of the reorganization of Europe. That it was taking place was clear, and it was incomprehensible to him that England should fail to recognize it. The Minister President dwelt with particular detail on the importance of military reinforcement for the Azores, which he termed his contribution to the defense of Europe. Salazar showed great interest in the effects of future intra-European economic co-operation and asked detailed questions about experiences to date, particularly in the matter of a central clearing system.

Salazar spoke with bitterness about England and stressed the steady economic pressure exerted on Portugal from that quarter. The disappearance of the democracies was a foregone conclusion which England as yet had refused to recognize. Whereas the Führer in his speeches was constantly pointing up the positive aspects of the present struggle, England merely put forth negative considerations and offered only disintegration and destruction. The only way to explain the obstinate resistance of the English was that they had not yet given a moment's serious thought to matters and witlessly plodded along the same road.

As for the impressions of the Portuguese Ambassador to London, Monteiro, whom Salazar had called back to Lisbon for a few days of rest and who would soon be flying back with his wife, the Minister President reported that according to them the morale of the English people was still unimpaired, although destruction of ships' tonnage and docks was already having serious effects. As yet there was no sign of any political trend in the direction of a change of

¹ On May 15, 1941 (4837/E244622-27); see document No. 374, footnote 4.

sentiment. The greatest boost to morale is the conviction that American aid would have a powerful effect even if that country did not enter the war. For the most part, foodstuffs were adequate, although some items were, of course, short. For example, the Ambassador had not been able to find any fresh fruit since November. He lived outside of London and commuted to the Embassy every day.

Salazar noted with satisfaction that the Spanish press employed a moderate tone toward Portugal. The basis underlying the relations with the neighboring country continued to be the existing treaty of friendship.² As regards Serrano Suñer, Salazar said that it would be better if he considered mutual relations solely from the viewpoint of Iberian interests and did not try to draw conclusions from the attitude of the treaty partner to third countries with respect to the relationship of his own country to Portugal.

The Minister President mentioned with particular pleasure the performance of the Regensburg Cathedral Choir, and particularly the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra here. He had enjoyed listening to their performances on the radio. He had been able to judge the extent of the propaganda success of these visits for us by the representations which the English Embassy made to block these guest performances as well as subsequently. When I took my departure the Minister President asked me to transmit to the Führer his sincerest and most respectful greetings.

HUENE

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 255, footnote 2.

No. 531

265/172853-54

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

TOP SECRET

ANKARA, May 17, 1941.

Received May 17—7:05 p. m.¹

No. 569 of May 17

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 471² and 476.³

I regret that my reports of May 13 and May 14⁴ made you believe that we could achieve the objective of such an extensive accord with Turkey as sketched in your telegram No. 476 as easily as this. It is by no means possible today to lay it down in the form of a treaty that we will route through Turkey a considerable shipment of a size

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 1568 to the Special Train, May 17."

² Document No. 522.

³ Document No. 529.

⁴ Document No. 514.

which will be left to our discretion, along with the necessary military escort personnel, amounting to a transport of troops in camouflaged form. I wish to remind you that a few days ago Numan replied categorically to a question by Kroll, whether the transport permitted between Svilengrad and Pythion might include escort personnel, that they would give up the administration offered to them if we insisted on transporting even one soldier.⁵ If I wired you yesterday that the State President has decided to modify his relations with England by means of a statement addressed to England, this highly important first and decisive step is exclusively due to the fact that we are leaving him time gradually to change the psychological climate in Turkey and that we do not ask anything at the moment that would bring Turkey into open opposition to England; this would be in sharp contrast to the political course which Turkey had followed so far. One should not forget that since the beginning of the war and on the basis of the irreconcilable Italo-Turkish antagonism public opinion in Turkey had been in favor of a victory by England. In the question of transports of material Turkey has so far not taken the position of a neutral state, with which agreements on this matter would be a matter of course according to the general practice of international law. Until my return the Turkish Government has adhered to the principle that only such transports of material would be allowed to pass through as were not directed against the direct interest of its ally. If today I should bring up the demand you have transmitted to me, we are in danger of experiencing the same thing as in Yugoslavia. Our moderate requests so far and our regard for the feeling of national dignity, which is strong with the Turks, particularly in the case of Ismet [Inönü], will spare us a repetition of the Belgrade experiences, since the Turkish statesmen will now make it possible to present also to their own people, the continuity of the past foreign policy based on preservation of national independence. Therefore I see no danger of a political short circuit if our present tactics are continued. The opposition of the Anglophile clique in Parliament and of a few generals would gain adherents in the decisive political circles only if the entirely possible new development [*Orientierung*] which we are aiming at does not take into account the psychological situation. I am firmly convinced that if we now reach an agreement along the lines planned so far, the alliance with England will lose all practical value. As a result of British vexation that will doubtless develop and our growing cooperation it will then be possible within a short time to put through more ex-

⁵ Regarding this railroad line, see document No. 137. In telegram No. 499 of May 5 (2109/456557) Kroll had reported that Turkey considered the idea unacceptable that German transport be escorted by German military personnel on the Turkish section of this railroad line. There is no report of the statement by Numan referred to in this passage.

tensive demands, too. When I spoke in the report of May 13 of the possibility of an alliance more comprehensive than we had so far envisaged, it was with reference to agreements that can be made between us on the problem of Russia; this, of course, only when we can speak about them openly.

Therefore, please let matters rest for the time being with the instructions given me orally.

PAPEN

No. 532

105/113440

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1193 of May 17

Moscow, May 17, 1941—10:02 p. m.

Received May 17—11:45 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 938 of May 14.¹

The case of the German plane that made the emergency landing near Rovno, with which the liaison staff of the Red Army and the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs are already occupied, was also brought up today with Secretary General Sobolev, with the request for early release of the airplane. At the same time, the communication ordered by you regarding the investigation of border violations by the Germans was made. Sobolev countered that the Soviet Government awaited the German reply, and referred gravely to the fact that border violations by German planes were continuing and were still frequent.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 519.

No. 533

221/149324

The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Embassy in Paris

Telegram

MOST URGENT

FUSCHL, May 17, 1941—9:47 p. m.

No. 400 from Fuschl

Received Berlin, May 17—10:30 p. m.

No. 1714 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent May 17.

RAM 198/R

For Ambassador Abetz.

The Foreign Minister requests that you immediately transmit the following telegram from the Führer to Marshal Pétain:

"His Excellency, the French Chief of State, M. Marshal Pétain.

"I wish to thank Your Excellency for the letter of May 5¹ as well as for the telegram which you sent me after the return of Admiral Darlan to France.² I have noted with satisfaction your message that you personally agree with the statements Admiral Darlan has made to me.³ I sincerely hope that this renewed contact between the two Governments will now work to the advantage of our two peoples. Adolf Hitler."

End of the telegram from the Führer.

RINTELEN

¹ Document No. 462.

² In telegram No. 1482 of May 14 (221/149307) Abetz transmitted a telegram from Pétain to Hitler in which the French Chief of State thanked Hitler for having received Darlan and personally associated himself with Darlan's declarations.

³ See document No. 491.

No. 534

4865/E249053-55

Circular of the Foreign Ministry¹

BERLIN, May 17, 1941.

Pol. IV 2444 g.

The collapse of the Yugoslav State and the military defeat of Greece have resulted in a political reorganization of the area occupied by these countries. The development has not yet been entirely completed; its present status is shown on the enclosed map.² The most important thing shown on this map is the newly established Independent State of Croatia. The map shows further that the neighbors and opponents in war of former Yugoslavia have drawn the natural conclusions from her dissolution by re-establishing old historic frontiers or by translating into reality old claims recognized as being justified.

Thus the *German Reich* has proceeded to the reincorporation of the northern half of Carniola, a border strip of Carinthia and of southern Styria. Hungary will also cede to the Reich four German communities belonging to the compact Volksdeutsche area of settlement of the so-called Prekmurje [*Übermurgebiet*] which will now become Hungarian.

Italy has already incorporated by decree the southern corner of Slovenia as the province of Ljubljana, and has also obtained from Croatia the cession of the areas and islands around Rijeka, Zara-

¹ Sent to the Embassies in Turkey, Spain, the Soviet Union, Paris, and Italy; to the Legations in Switzerland, Hungary, Rumania, Finland, Denmark, Portugal, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Sweden, and Croatia, and to the Reich Plenipotentiaries in Athens and Belgrade.

² Not printed (4865/E249057-68). The boundary lines shown on the map printed as Appendix V (facing p. 1110) are the same as those on the annex to this document.

Šibenik-Split and Kotor, which can be seen on the map. In southern Serbia Italy has occupied the area bordering on Albania, mainly inhabited by Albanians, whereas Bulgarian troops have moved into the area to the east of there which is settled by a Macedonian-Bulgarian population. It can be expected that this military occupation will lead to the political incorporation of the strips of territory in question in Albania and Bulgaria.

At the northern edge of the former Yugoslav national territory *Hungary* has taken possession of so-called Medjumurje [*Murinsel*] and the Prekmurje as well as of the triangle further east between the Drava and the Danube (Baranja) and between the Danube and the Tisza (Bačka) so as to reincorporate them. The western Banat (east of the Tisza), which also formerly belonged to Hungary and to which Hungary and Rumania lay claim simultaneously, is for the moment occupied by German troops in order to avoid complications.

As a result of the foregoing *Croatia* has as her frontier in the west the Adriatic Sea and the aforementioned areas along her border claimed by Italy, in the north the province of Ljubljana; with respect to Germany the old historic frontier between the Austrian crown land Styria and the former Kingdom of Croatia (which has already been determined in the treaty of May 13^a); in the northeast with respect to Hungary in general the historic frontier which follows the course of the Drava and the Danube up to the mouth of the Sava. The negotiations on determination of the frontier between Croatia and Serbia have not yet been concluded. In the main this frontier is marked by the course of the Drina up to the Sava, and by the course of the Sava up to where it flows into the Danube. In the south Croatia will border on the kingdom of *Montenegro*, which will probably be re-established within approximately its old historic frontiers. Thus Croatia comprises the area formerly known under the designations of Croatia, Slavonia, Syrmia, Dalmatia (in part), Bosnia, and Herzegovina.

The area not affected by the reorganization, the extent of which corresponds approximately to the earlier Old Serbia, is to be regarded as the area of the *Serbian residual state*; at the present time it is under a German military commander.

As far as *Greece* is concerned, *Italy* has expressed the intention to incorporate *Epirus* to an extent not yet known. *Bulgaria* is occupying *western Thrace*, aside from a strip along the Turkish border, up to and including the Strymon valley. As in Macedonia, Bulgaria considers this occupation of Thrace to be a preliminary stage in its reincorporation in the mother country.

¹ See document No. 443, footnote 3.

Since Italy has not yet made public the extent of her acquisitions along the Adriatic,⁴ please do not, for the time being, make any use with respect to the outside of the information about this, derived from the map.⁵

By order:
W. SCHMEIDEN

⁴ The Italian-Croatian boundary treaty and other texts referred to in document No. 473 were signed on May 18 in Rome. Copies of these treaties in German translation were sent to Berlin as enclosures to a dispatch of May 21 by Bismarck (4849/E247475-85). For published texts in Italian and German, see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, June 1941, pp. 468-473.

⁵ A subsequent Foreign Ministry circular sent to the same addresses on May 21 supplied figures about the extent of the areas in question and the size and ethnic composition of the populations (230/153350-54).

No. 535

105/113436

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 340

BERLIN, May 17, 1941.

Ambassador Oshima asked me today in the course of a conversation on Japanese-American negotiations whether an "easing of tension" had occurred in German-Russian relations. I replied that German-Russian relations were unchanged. We were observing Russia carefully. Russian concentration at our border was a matter of common knowledge. That we had also sent German troops to the east in reply, was natural. We had not exactly liked everything the Russians had been doing in the last few months. I would not, however, call it a state of "tension."

In the diplomatic corps, the subject of Russia is much discussed. I recently told the Swedish Minister,¹ in reply to a direct question, that developments between Germany and Russia depended on Stalin's conduct.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Arvid Richert.

No. 536

8589/B602860-63

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, May 17, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme'Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) No. 44717/41 g. K. Chefs.
By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 29

1) The aim of German intervention in the southeast, to drive the English out of the Balkans and to expand the bases for the employment of German air forces in the eastern Mediterranean, has been achieved and is further being improved by the execution of Operation *Merkur*.¹

The protection of the Greek area, apart from the exceptions listed below, henceforth devolves on the Italians. German authorities are therefore not to intervene in general questions of the protection and administration of the country. In particular, any kind of mediatory activity that might be requested by the Greeks is to be declined.

Arrangements are to be made with the Italian Armed Forces for transport routes and the scheduling of their use for the bringing up of supplies.

2) The following apply for the *Wehrmacht*:

Army:

There will remain in Greece only those forces which are indispensable for the protection of the supply base for Operation *Merkur* and which locally will be kept closely concentrated; and one division near Salonika (see item 3), on which devolves the protection of Lemnos and whatever other islands are to be kept occupied.

Until conclusion of Operation *Merkur*, however, the areas serving for the jumpoff, including the islands provided for this, must remain in German hands. All forces that can be spared according to this arrangement are to be pulled out as quickly as possible.

The Italian High Command will be advised that the arrangements required for the rapid taking over of Greece are to be made with the Commander in Chief of the Twelfth Army. As "Commander in Chief of German Troops in the Balkans" the latter will move his seat to Salonika, as soon as the situation (Operation *Merkur*) permits.

Luftwaffe:

The X Air Corps even after its transfer to Greece will conduct the air war independently, according to the directives of the Com-

¹ See document No. 403.

mander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, to whom it remains immediately subordinate. Regarding the defense of the Balkan area it will depend on cooperation with Twelfth Army Headquarters (Commander of German Troops in the Balkans), for the struggle in North Africa on cooperation with the Africa Corps. Orders on territorial matters which require uniform regulation in the Balkans will be issued by Twelfth Army Headquarters also regarding the X Air Corps.

The air force ground organization in Greece and on the islands is at the disposal of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe for the air operations in the eastern Mediterranean. Airfields and installations that are not needed are to be turned over to the Italian armed forces.

After the occupation of Crete, its protection at first devolves on the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe (Air-borne Corps) who shall recommend the date of the relief of that corps. I myself shall issue instructions on this and on the later occupation.

Navy:

Besides Salonika, the port of Athens and, as far as required for managing the coastal traffic, the coastal strip between the two ports will remain in the hands of the German Navy. The Commander in Chief of the Navy will make the appropriate agreements with the Italians. The coastal defense of Crete will also devolve on the German Navy, if Crete remains occupied by German troops.

Regarding territorial questions the same regulation applies as for the X Air Corps.

On the northern coast of the Aegean the German influence upon the Bulgarian coastal defense must be assured, as in the past.

The Admiral, Southeast carries out the operations and sea transports in the Aegean, with the Italian naval forces assigned to him for that purpose, under the directives of the Commander in Chief of the Navy.

Otherwise the Admiral, Southeast is directed to cooperate with the competent Italian authorities.

3) In the *area around Salonika* the Wehrmacht alone has the authority for all military measures. The OKH (Commander in Chief of the German Troops in the Balkans) shall submit recommendations regarding the exact demarcation of that area.

4) The *administration* of the Greek territories that are to remain occupied by German troops shall be organized by OKH, in concert with the Reich Plenipotentiary for Greece. In this connection the Greek administration is to be utilized as far as possible and the employment of German authorities avoided.

5) The "*Military Commander, Serbia*" shall, in order to fulfill his urgent economic tasks, be provided by OKH with all the necessary

powers and the necessary security forces, so as to be able to carry out his mission independently.

6) I expect reports of the Commanders in Chief regarding the measures initiated on the basis of this directive, and the agreements made with the Italians.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 537

177/85107-08

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 759 of May 17

TOKYO, May 18, 1941—1:40 a. m.

Received May 18—1:00 a. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 622 of May 15.²

Today in a lengthy discussion with Foreign Minister Matsuoka I carried out the instruction in the above-mentioned telegram. In so doing I particularly stressed the great regret of the German Government that the German statement of position of May 11 was not awaited before dispatch of the reply to Washington. Using the arguments in telegraphic instructions No. 592 of May 11³ and No. 622 of May 15, I pointed out the necessity of the clearest and most exact commitment by America not to participate in the European conflict as well as the fact that the formulation concerning Article III of the Tripartite Pact used in the Japanese reply represented the absolute minimum of what must be required in regard to the Tripartite Pact. The German Government must insist on being informed immediately concerning the American reply and being included in further negotiations between Japan and the U.S.A.

Matsuoka referred to his oral communication to Hull transmitted in telegram No. 733⁴ of (group garbled) [May 13] as well as his conversations with the British and American Ambassadors reported in telegram No. 750 of May 15,⁵ from which it was evident that he would not let the Tripartite Pact be touched. In a secret Cabinet meeting he had asked all members of the Government for their part, too, in all their conversations to acknowledge clearly Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. All the members of the Cabinet had

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 1573 to Fuschl, May 18, 3:25 a.m."

² Document No. 518.

³ Document No. 496.

⁴ See document No. 512, footnote 4.

⁵ Document No. 516.

agreed as one. For the rest, he regarded the prospects of Japanese-American negotiations with extreme skepticism, and counted as before on America entering the war soon. His motive in negotiating with the U.S.A. was purely to delay or prevent the United States from entering the war, if possible, and in addition also to eliminate an increase in the present American aid to England.

Hull had still not taken any stand on the Japanese proposal, but had merely promised to consider it, which would take a certain amount of time. He [Matsuoka] would inform us at once about the American reply and also keep the allied Governments of Germany and Italy informed regarding the progress of the negotiations, and consult them as far as possible. In reply to my request to participate in a later stage, he replied that he would comply with our wish very extensively, but that he could not commit himself to await an opinion by the Axis Powers in every case, especially if a quick statement were absolutely necessary. I urgently requested Matsuoka not to undertake anything in these negotiations, which affected the Tripartite Pact in its fullest extent, without the allies of Japan.

Internal political influences, to the pressure of which Matsuoka has yielded, in consideration of the allegedly imminent American entry into the war, can be found among certain Anglophile personages of the court, such as Minister of the Imperial Court, Matsudaira, a representative of industry and big capital, such as Minister without Portfolio Ogura [*Hoshino?*], as well as a number of important naval officers, with whom Ambassador Admiral Optura [*Nomura?*] evidently worked in Washington. To this circle were added parts of the Army who wished to gain time in order to maintain freedom of action in view of the lack of clarity about Russia's future position. Minister of the Interior, Hiranuma, who as a proponent of the Japanese-German alliance against Russia had to resign at the conclusion of the German-Russian Nonaggression Pact, probably worked along the same lines. Finally, the activist group cooperating closely with the Embassy had been weakened at this moment by the serious illness of Shiratori,* who left the political arena owing to a grave and seemingly incurable malady.

OTT

*Toshio Shiratori, former Japanese Ambassador in Italy and special adviser to the Foreign Ministry.

No. 538

265/172855-57

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SECRET

FUSCHL, May 19, 1941.

No. 405 of May 19

from Fuschl

Received Berlin, May 19—2:30 a. m.

No. 485 of May 19

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent May 19.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 569 of May 17.¹

Taking into consideration your statements, I agree to your putting off the attempt to arrive at an agreement with Turkey on the basis indicated in my telegram No. 476 of May 17.² If, as I understand from your telegram, the situation on the spot does not permit obtaining the desired result, we must try to obtain it in several phases, the first of which must be an agreement along the lines discussed here orally. Please begin negotiations with the Turkish Government in this sense immediately, paying attention, however, also to the following points:

1. It is important that the desired agreement be now concluded as soon as possible. As soon as your report about the results of your preliminary negotiations has been received a draft treaty will be sent to you from here so that it may be transmitted to the Turkish Government. Please wire your proposals in this matter.

2. The decisive point in the planned agreement is to make possible for us the transit of war material through Turkey, which would have to be laid down in an additional secret agreement. If we want to help Iraq, we must do it fast. Material is already being assembled at Constanța. This is the only case where the Turks give rather than receive, and is, therefore, to be considered as Turkey's concession in return for our extensive promises in guaranteeing Turkey's security and her interests in the question of the Straits. It is, therefore, necessary that there be complete understanding between both parties regarding this concession in return.

It would not be sufficient for us if there should be merely an agreement that Turkey would only permit transit of war material addressed to neutral states, believing that she had only obligated herself to send a few railway cars to Iran or Afghanistan occasionally. Depending on the further development of the situation in the Near East, it may rather prove desirable for us to send larger shipments

¹ Document No. 531.² Document No. 529.

of war materials through Turkey to Syria or Iraq. Such a possibility must be assured by the agreement which is to be reached.

3. If during the discussion of the problem it should be necessary to promise that the shipments will be addressed to neutral states, please take into consideration the fact that this kind of addressing will be done for the purpose of camouflage. There should be an understanding that no further importance is to be attached to this.

4. As a tangible concession in return you may first of all promise the Turks the transfer of a strip of the territory near Edirne. In this connection we have in mind, as you know, not all the territory near Edirne ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria in 1915 and which King Boris would not wish to give away in its entirety,³ but, in the first place, its eastern half, whereby, at any rate, the railroad from Pythion to Edirne would go to Turkey.

5. As to offering one island or the other in the Aegean Sea, I would like to leave the decision to you to decide whether it is necessary to touch upon this question in discussing the agreement to be concluded. Should it be necessary, please wire to us before making a promise.

Please report about the course of your discussions by telegraph as soon as possible.⁴

RIBBENTROP

³ See document No. 303 and footnote 5, and document No. 450.

⁴ Replying to these instructions in telegram No. 582 of May 20, (265/172859) Papen reported having been told by Saracoglu that he wished to wait with the start of the negotiations until he had informed the British Ambassador of Turkey's intentions. For a published text of this Papen telegram in French translation, see *Documents secrets du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères d'Allemagne: Turquie* (Paris, 1946), document No. 5.

See, further, document No. 545.

[EDITORS' NOTE. In *The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim*, translated by Eric Lewenhaupt (London, 1953), pages 406-407, the Marshal records:

"... on May 20th the President of the Republic received Minister Schnurre, who had been sent on Hitler's orders. As has been mentioned earlier, the demand for a free hand in Finland, which Molotov made during the negotiations with Berlin in November 1940, and Germany's reaction to it were now revealed. The strained relations between Germany and the Soviet Union would not necessarily lead to war, said Minister Schnurre, but added that such an eventuality could not be entirely excluded any more than that of the Soviet Union attacking both in Finland and in the Balkans. The Chancellor of the Reich had for this reason proposed that one or more Finnish military experts should be sent to Germany to receive information regarding the alarming world situation, which Germany was willing to give.

"To this, President Ryti replied that Finland would under no circumstances attack the Soviet Union, and did not wish to be drawn into the war between the Great Powers. On the other hand, if we were attacked, we, too, in the future would hit back. If we could count on help in such a situation it would, of course, be welcomed. To the President's question whether Germany would regard Russian aggression against Finland as a *casus belli*, Minister Schnurre replied in the affirmative.

"The unanimous opinion of President Ryti and the members of the Cabinet, which I fully shared, was that in order to be fully informed about the present political situation in the world, we had every reason to send a delegation of officers to Germany to obtain the information to which Minister Schnurre had referred."

In telegram No. 353 sent from Helsinki on May 22 (260/169995) Schnurre reported that his discussions there had been successfully concluded. No substantive report by Schnurre on his political discussions in Helsinki has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry. Cf. document No. 554.]

No. 539

116/66847

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 350

BERLIN, May 20, 1941.

The Croatian Minister called on me for the first time after the conclusion of the Croatian-Italian treaty.¹

M. Benzon merely wished to unburden his heart. Obviously, he has as yet little taste for the present royal regime² and he is dissatisfied otherwise too with the Croatian-Italian treaty because of its territorial and military clauses.³ It was Benzon's aim to produce an anti-Italian mood in me, for instance by peddling the rumor that the new King of Croatia had already been taken into consideration as candidate for the Hungarian throne. A link with the old Croatian-Hungarian tradition was to be established thereby and the road prepared toward a new Rome-Zagreb-Budapest bloc. M. Benzon repeated some gloomy reflections about the future which Mussolini is said to have communicated to M. Pavelić in confidence. In this connection the Duce is supposed to have expressed himself

¹ See documents Nos. 473 and 534 and footnote 4.

² Croatia was proclaimed a Kingdom on May 15; on May 18 the King of Italy designated the Duke of Spoleto as King of Croatia (see document No. 473 and footnote 7).

³ Dissatisfaction with a Croatian monarchy and with the Croatian-Italian treaty was also expressed by Benzon and a member of his staff in a conversation with Woermann on May 24 (Woermann memorandum of May 24: 116/-66856). On this occasion the two Croats told Woermann "that only a settlement of Croatia's destiny along the lines of a protectorate type connection with the German Reich represented an acceptable solution for the future."

skeptically about the prospects of the Axis.⁴ I told Benzon he must have heard wrong.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.⁵

WEIZSÄCKER

⁴On May 23 Weizsäcker sent to Ribbentrop by teletype a memorandum (116/66854-55) discussing in great detail this particular statement by the Croatian Minister. See document No. 579.

⁵This document has routing instructions in Ribbentrop's handwriting and was to be placed in Ribbentrop's special portfolio of documents which he intended to show to Hitler (Führermappe).

No. 540

593/245192

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IV

BERLIN, May 21, 1941.

During his visit today Counselor of Embassy Zamboni gave me the following information from a report from the Italian Ambassador in Washington:¹

The Italian Ambassador had spoken with Mr. Dunn² in the State Department. The latter, without being asked by the Ambassador, had said the following spontaneously:

The political line of the Americans was quite clear. The American Government was definitely resolved to continue its present policy and to provide the greatest assistance to England. This would inevitably lead America into the war; and it would happen whether escort ships were now provided by America or not. America would come into the war without a declaration of war, and her entry would bring about an extension of the conflict for a long period, perhaps for a generation.

The Italian Ambassador reported that he had contradicted Dunn's statements. He had the impression that these statements were made in order to have an intimidating effect.

In his report the Ambassador had added that at the moment it was almost impossible to obtain news or statements from the State Department. Counselor of Embassy Zamboni told me that, as he had already informed Under State Secretary Woermann, the Spanish Ambassador in Washington had made a similar report.³

HEINBURG

¹Prince A. Colonna.

²James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations, Department of State.

³In a comment to Heinburg's memorandum, Dieckhoff noted on May 22 (593/245191) that it seemed clear that Dunn had made his statement not because of personal conviction but on orders from above. It was part of a planned campaign of intimidation, as similar reports from Madrid, Vichy, Helsinki, Baghdad, and Toyko clearly demonstrated.

No. 541

88/45711-12

Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Iran

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SECRET

No. 415 from Fuschl
No. 250 of May 22 from
the Foreign Ministry

FUSCHL, May 22, 1941—2:20 p. m.
Received Berlin, May 22—2:50 p. m.

Sent May 22.

Secret for officer in charge.

1. For your own confidential information only.

Continuation of our military action in Iraq is hampered and even imperiled by the fact that gasoline suitable for our aircraft is not available in sufficient quantities in either Syria or Iraq.

2. Please talk to the Foreign Minister and, using all political and economic arguments but without letting anything transpire of the emergency referred to in point 1, demand Iran's cooperation in supplying gasoline to Iraq. There are two possibilities open to us. One possibility is that Iran would deliver aviation gasoline from its own stocks either to the German Government for use in Iraq or to the Iraq Government directly. The gasoline is needed in Mosul. It should have an octane number of 98 and a lead content of 012 percent by volume. However, gasoline with a lower octane number would also be acceptable, and it would then be improved by us on the spot. If the Iranian Government is able and willing to supply such gasoline, I would ask you to arrange at the same time the route by which it would be shipped and to get in touch with Gehrcke, the German representative in Baghdad, informing him directly of the possible deliveries and the shipping route. If necessary, one of Gehrcke's assistants might come to Tehran by plane to arrange the particulars.

The second possibility would be to get aviation gasoline for Iraq from the Soviet Union by way of Iran. For certain political reasons we would rather not approach the Soviet Government now with such a request. This channel would therefore be available only if the Iranian Government should approach the Soviet Union and buy aviation gasoline from the Soviet Union on its own account, and then ship it to Mosul by way of Tabriz. Please, first explore through discreet inquiries whether this is a feasible way in the light of the political relations between Iran and the Soviet Union. If this way is possible, please inform the Iranian Foreign Minister that the transaction is for the account of the German Government which will bear all the expenses. The details would subsequently be laid down in an agreement. The decisive consideration is that de-

liveries should start immediately. For the first shipment it would be a matter of a quantity of about two thousand tons of aviation gasoline. Should the Iranian Foreign Minister in this connection raise the question of Iran's own wishes for deliveries of arms,¹ you may assure him that as regards compliance with Iran's wishes, the Reich Government would show its appreciation of the Iranian Government's willing and prompt cooperation in procuring gasoline for Iraq.

I shall point out once more that these two channels can be of any use only if deliveries can be made immediately.

Report by telegraph.²

RITTER

¹ See document No. 472.

² See document No. 552.

No. 542

67/47129-49

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

[Undated.]

Füh. 33.

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND MR. CUDAHY ON THE OBERSALZBERG ON MAY 23, 1941, IN THE PRESENCE OF MINISTER HEWEL

Cudahy stated by way of introduction that he had come to Germany and had asked to be received by the Führer because he hoped to do his country a service by keeping America out of the war. The strong tendency existing in American public opinion in favor of the entry of the United States into the war was, for one who knew the American mentality, to be attributed to lack of understanding of the situation. The American public was especially confused in regard to the convoy question. If, therefore, the Führer would announce once more clearly and distinctly the German position regarding this point, this would in his (Cudahy's) opinion be an excellent way of restraining America from taking precipitate steps.

The Führer replied that in his opinion American escorts for convoys meant war.

Cudahy suggested in this connection that one could perhaps best explain Germany's position to the American public by putting to it the question what the United States would do if it were involved in a life and death struggle and a third country delivered war material to its enemies.

The Führer replied that it was not so much a question of the arms deliveries as of the legal position. In accordance with mari-

time law, which had been developed particularly by the Anglo-Saxon nations, the providing of military protection for such deliveries of war material unquestionably represented a belligerent act. This state of affairs, moreover, had already been repeatedly explained by many quarters, including American experts.

Cudahy remarked that he interpreted the Führer's remark as a corroboration of the statement on this question which the Führer had made in an earlier speech 5 or 6 months ago.¹

The Führer affirmed this.

Cudahy pointed out that he was a close friend of Lindbergh's. Lindbergh had only refrained from his original intention of giving Cudahy letters to German statesmen because he had been afraid that the matter would be used in Congress for a new campaign against him.

Moreover, American public opinion was wrongly informed as a result of misunderstandings and lack of clarity. Two complaints in particular were brought forward against Germany.

In the first place it was claimed that Germany intended to invade the Western Hemisphere. Even intelligent Americans believed these assertions. It would therefore be useful if the Führer expressed an opinion with regard to this.

The Führer replied that he had no reason to discuss the military aspects of this question, because it was not only childish but absolutely absurd. The leading warmongers in America were also entirely aware of the impossibility of a German invasion. They made these assertions contrary to their better knowledge on the assumption that in this way they could involve America more easily in the war, because they believed that participation of the United States in the war was of advantage to their business interests. He (the Führer) was of the opinion that they deceived themselves on this point. Participation in the World War had not brought America any business advantages either.

One could not discuss seriously the assertions about a German invasion. If someone stated that Europe wanted to take possession of America, this was on the same level with the assertion that America wanted to conquer the moon.

Cudahy remarked that in a recent conversation the Reich Foreign Minister had made a similar statement when he said that certain Americans had after all believed the story of the invasion of the Martians.²

Even though he (Cudahy) admitted that one could dispose of the assertions concerning a German invasion as something fantastic and ridiculous, he nevertheless had to point out that large portions

¹ See document No. 451, footnote 6.

² See document No. 451.

of the American public and also many quite intelligent people believed such statements. Perhaps the OKW had at some time concerned itself with this problem from the technical military angle and had found it to be impossible. In order to influence the American public it would be advantageous if on some occasion a statement were made concerning the technical impossibility of such an operation.

The Führer replied that the OKW did not concern itself with expeditions to the moon. It concerned itself with expeditions across shorter distances, e.g., 100 km. to Crete or 40 km. to England, but not 4,000 km. to America. Furthermore, such expeditions were not undertaken merely to prove that they were technically possible, but they pursued very definite aims. But what would Germany want in America? Before the war broke out she had had nothing further in mind than to reincorporate the German city of Danzig into the structure of the Reich. For the rest he (the Führer) had not yet heard any German assert that the frontiers of the Reich were at the Mississippi or in Australia, whereas only recently an Australian Minister had again asserted, in imitation of Baldwin, that the Australian frontier lay on the Rhine.³ He (the Führer) would see that some Australian prisoners of war got to the Rhine, so that when they returned to Australia they could at least say that they had seen "their Rhine border".

In the further course of the conversation Cudahy referred to his activity as American Ambassador in Belgium at the time of the German invasion. At that time he had followed the movements of the German troops very closely and had indeed stated in his report that the attitude of the Belgian King had been entirely justified and that no other possibility had been open to him any longer.⁴ He (Cudahy) was deeply impressed by the strategic genius of the Führer, who had carried out the main thrust in the center of the front rather than at the right wing according to the Schlieffen plan. On the other hand, how ridiculous was the chatter of a German invasion of America across 4,000 km. of ocean! Considering the transport possibilities, the most one could do was land an expeditionary corps of 25,000 men in America.

The Führer replied that one would need an army of millions, not 25,000 men, to conquer America, and that the entire shipping space of Germany, England, and America would not be nearly enough for the transport of a sizable military force.

³The reference is to the speech by Stanley Baldwin, Lord President of the Council, in the House of Commons on July 30, 1934. For text see *Parl. Deb.*, 5th ser., H of C, vol. 292, col. 2339.

⁴See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940*, vol. 1, pp. 212-214.

Cudahy replied that he had spoken of 25,000 men because he considered this the greatest possible number that could be transported; for he knew that eight tons of supplies were necessary for every soldier.

The Führer pointed out once more that no one in Germany concerned himself with such fantastic matters. We were interested in things closer at hand. Besides, even very short distances required enormous efforts. If one asked oneself why the English had not employed more soldiers in North Africa and in Greece, as the distance between Egypt and Greece was after all very small, one came to the conclusion that there would not have been adequate possibilities for transportation even over these short distances. For greater distances one naturally needed much greater transportation facilities. Furthermore, he had a good enough opinion of the intelligence of the Americans not to believe that the intelligent American gave credence to the assertions about a German invasion. That was only talk for the masses. But one ought to ask the American soldiers, generals, and naval officers about it. They would merely reply with a laugh.

Cudahy then brought up the second complaint of the Americans against Germany. Many Americans were not afraid of a physical invasion, to be sure, but they did believe in the threat posed by German economic competition on the basis of the "slave labor" of the German worker, who was ruled with an almost military discipline.

The Führer interjected here that the question should be asked at this point whether the German workers lived any worse than the American workers.

Cudahy replied that the cost of living in Germany was lower than in America, to be sure, but that for the rest the American worker enjoyed a very high living standard. Almost every one had his own automobile and ate and dressed very well. The Führer remarked that in Germany too after the war the German workers would own their own cars, on the basis of their productive activity. If the war had not come this would already be the case today for most of them. The decisive thing, however, was that in a country that had 140 inhabitants per square kilometer everyone had his work and his living, whereas in the United States, where only 11 persons lived on one square kilometer, there were millions of unemployed. Under these conditions which economic system should be regarded as the better one?

To another remark by Cudahy about the American fears of economic strangulation by Germany after the war, the Führer replied with the question how a country of 9½ million square kilometers and 135 million inhabitants should be economically destroyed by a

country with only 600,000-700,000 square kilometers and 85 million inhabitants. After all, there were much greater blocs in the world which could make such a fear appear justified. The Führer pointed in this connection to the 400 million inhabitants of the British Empire, the 100 million in Japan, the 175 million Russians, and the other one-half billion population groups. In the American view all of these appeared not to injure the American economic interests. Only Germany which was much smaller was considered to be such a threat.

Cudahy replied that the reason for the American apprehensions was to be found in the industrial genius of Germany and in the disciplined labor force which was not allowed to have any labor unions, particularly as labor accounted for 90 percent of the production costs of industrial products.

The Führer replied that these fears were unwarranted if only for the reason that no country in the world used so much of its national production for its own people as Germany. If there was fear of German economic competition, however, why were Germany's colonies taken away from her, where she could have created her own big Lebensraum without touching upon the economic interests of others. If the United States were afraid of being supposedly crushed by the German economy, why was it the very one to oppose the German efforts to bring about a new order in Europe and thus to create an economic area which would not touch upon American interests?

Cudahy then inquired about the Führer's views concerning the greater economic sphere and the development of the markets once stability was restored in Europe after the war.

The Führer replied that he had little to say on this point. One could sell to other countries only if one were willing to buy their goods as well. This was the iron economic law of international trade. By way of an example the Führer pointed to the situation of the countries in southeastern Europe, which needed industrial products but could pay only with their own goods. Germany needed the raw materials and foodstuffs of these countries, so that a very natural trade was developing here. America would never be able to sell goods in southeastern Europe, not because the countries there did not want American goods but because they could not pay for them, since America could not absorb the raw materials and foodstuffs of southeastern Europe. She produced these things herself.

Cudahy then asked whether the Führer intended to eliminate the many trade barriers, customs tariffs, quotas, and foreign exchange restrictions by creating a confederation of states.

The Führer replied that no confederation of states was necessary for this. Germany concluded bilateral trade agreements on a very

long-term basis, which excluded all speculation and stayed in force for 10 to 20 years.

To another question by Cudahy concerning the elimination of artificial trade barriers and quotas the Führer replied that Germany's sound commercial policy gave her partners in the trade agreements absolute security regarding their national production (agriculture or industry) over a period of many years.

When Cudahy asked about the future development of German-American trade relations, the Führer answered that he did not consider the prospects favorable. What Germany exported, America could not use, and therefore it was impossible for Germany to import from America foodstuffs and raw materials which she could as such use very well. At the most, small amounts of a few specialties such as optical equipment and chemical and electrical products could be exported to America. But no large-scale trade could be built up on that basis. The other possibility of payment, i.e., payment in gold, was not open to Germany, since she had lost her gold as a result of the reparations payments.

In this connection Cudahy pointed to the 12 billion marks of American money which had poured into Germany as "foolish" loans in the years from 1925 to 1930. He added the question whether German-American trade could not be promoted by financing on a more sensible and sounder basis.

The Führer replied that he had already stressed at the start that economic relations could be built up permanently only on the basis of reciprocal trade. Loans would sooner or later end up in bankruptcy anyway. And of course it was natural that a growing increase in payment liabilities such as the loans represented, along with a simultaneous impossibility of expanding the sales of goods, must necessarily lead to difficulties. Germany built up her trade relations on the solid foundation of goods for goods, and not on paper that could be devaluated at will. For this reason all respectable economists were for Germany, and all speculators against her.

Cudahy expressed his admiration at the clarity and far-sightedness with which the Führer treated the economic problems. If only the American bankers had had a part of this insight, then the economic crisis in the United States would not have occurred.

The Führer replied that perhaps at the end of the war after having spent billions for unproductive values and political adventures America would have to take measures similar to those Germany had taken.

This would actually represent a triumph for Germany, not because she would introduce German principles there through a conquest of the United States, but because America was on the point of taking steps which would lead to heavy economic burdens, so that

the prerequisites for the measures necessary for the elimination of such difficulties would be established. He (the Führer) was afraid that he would also not be spared being praised after 20 to 30 years as an outstanding economist by the professors of economics who had attacked his economic views in the past.

Upon inquiry by Cudahy the Führer confirmed that the trade agreements with Bulgaria and Rumania worked just as well as the trade agreement with Yugoslavia had up to the recent events. Cudahy then asked about the German position regarding the gold question. He said that there were surely no objections on the part of Germany to the use of gold for the international exchange and that Germany certainly recognized that gold was necessary for such transactions.

The Führer replied that Germany did not admit the necessity but only the possibility of using gold for such purposes. There were also states, however, which had no gold and had to help themselves in some other way if they wanted to continue to exist. In this regard Germany had achieved full success with her economic methods that were independent of gold.

Before the World War the German Reich had owned 13½ billions^{*} in gold and foreign exchange within the country. In addition there had been another 25 billions in foreign assets. At the end of the World War the foreign assets had been lost and the domestic holdings of gold and foreign exchange had amounted to 9½ billions^{*} (in 1919). At the assumption of power in 1933 he (the Führer) had found only 83 millions in gold and foreign exchange. But the German nation wanted to continue to live. It would have been impossible simply to shut down the German economy. Thus there originated of necessity the new German economic policy which had been carried through successfully.

Cudahy asked whether he had understood correctly that Germany had no prejudices against gold, and that its utility was recognized.

The Führer replied in the affirmative.

Cudahy stressed once more that the sole reason why he had come to Germany and had asked to be received by the Führer was to do everything he could to keep his country out of the war. What the Führer had said in today's conversation would have a big influence on American public opinion.

However, he wanted to point out to the Führer very candidly that the Americans were very much concerned about the "aggressive methods" and the "strong arm" policy pursued by Germany. This could be counteracted if the Führer would sketch in outline what he intended to do with the countries conquered by Germany, as for example Belgium, Norway, or occupied and unoccupied France. In

^{*} The figures are barely legible in the original.

America Germany was considered to be a ruthless conqueror. If the Führer would make known in broad outline his intentions with regard to the small countries, if he would state that Germany did not intend to obliterate the traditions of the small countries and enslave their peoples, this would contribute greatly to pacifying American public opinion.

The Führer replied with the statement that it was not Germany that had begun the war, but that other countries had proceeded against Germany. Even these countries, however, would perhaps not have done it if they had not been encouraged to do so, unfortunately also by America.

Quite particularly the war in the West had been forced upon Germany, for France and England had declared war on Germany, and not the other way around. If incidentally German conduct of the war was successful, this had nothing to do with aggressiveness. If one wished to speak of aggressiveness one ought to address those countries which, like Great Britain, suppressed 350 million Indians, as the Indian patriots constantly asserted, and which held Egypt and the Arabian world in their power. One ought to address those countries which exercised actual world hegemony or were claiming it. Germany would arrange her relations with her neighbors in such a way that peace and prosperity would be assured for a long time to come.

Cudahy tried again to obtain more concrete information regarding the fate of the small countries, in particular "little Belgium".

The Führer replied that he had already answered this question when he stated that Germany's relations with her neighbors in Europe would be arranged in such a way that peace, prosperity, and happiness would be assured all of these countries for a long time to come, and added that Germany had not the slightest interest in slaves.

In taking his departure Cudahy said that the Führer's statements would have a very salutary influence on American public opinion, since he assumed that the conversation could be made public; it was to be assumed, of course, that it would be reviewed prior to that by the competent German authorities.*

The Führer said that he agreed to this and took leave of Cudahy, who on the way back showed himself to be exceedingly well satisfied with the Führer's statements and only regretted that there had not been enough time to bring up a few more questions, such as for example the freedom of the seas.

SCHMIDT

* In telegram No. 1769 of June 12 (593/245399) Thomsen briefly reported on Cudahy's statement, made to the press upon his arrival in New York, concerning his conversation with Hitler. This statement was printed in the *New York Times* of June 10, p. 12.

No. 543

8589/E602884-86

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, May 23, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) No. 44772/41 g. K. Chefs.
By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 30

THE MIDDLE EAST

1. The *Arab liberation movement* in the Middle East is our natural ally against England. In this connection the rising in Iraq has special importance. It strengthens beyond the boundaries of Iraq the forces hostile to England in the Middle East, disturbs English communications, and ties down English troops and shipping space at the expense of other theaters of war.

I have therefore decided to advance developments in the Middle East by giving *assistance to Iraq*.

Whether and how the English position between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf—in connection with an offensive against the Suez Canal—shall later be definitively defeated, is to be decided only after *Barbarossa*.

2. In summing up my specific decisions, I order for the *support of Iraq*:

the dispatch of a military mission;
support by the Luftwaffe;
arms shipments.

3. The military mission (cover name: Special Staff F) is placed under General of the Luftwaffe Felmy.¹

Its tasks are

- (a) to advise and assist the Iraq Armed Forces;
- (b) to establish military liaison, where possible, with forces hostile to England also outside of Iraq;
- (c) to gain experience and data for the German Wehrmacht in this area.

Its *composition*, in conformity with these duties, shall be determined by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

The following applies regarding the *chain of command*:

¹ See document No. 528.

(a) All Wehrmacht personnel to be sent to Iraq and, in addition, the Syrian liaison unit are subordinate to the head of the military mission.

(b) The head of the military mission is subordinate to the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht with the proviso that orders and directives for the air force units are issued exclusively by the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe.

(c) The head of the military mission deals only with the military authorities of Iraq. Negotiations with the Iraq Government on affairs of the mission will be conducted by the representative of the Foreign Ministry in Iraq.

In the case of military arrangements that could have foreign policy repercussions the head of the military mission must arrive at prior agreement with the Foreign Ministry representative in Iraq.

(d) The members of the military mission for the time being are considered as *volunteers* (in the manner of the Condor Legion²). They wear a tropical uniform with Iraq insignia. The latter shall also be carried by German aircraft.

4. *Luftwaffe*

Its employment, which is to be limited in numbers, in addition to having a purely military effect, serves also the purpose of strengthening the self-confidence and will to resist of the armed forces and people of Iraq.

The manner and extent of German intervention will be determined by the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe.

5. *Arms shipments*

The necessary dispositions (shipments from Syria on the basis of the agreement concluded for that purpose with the French,³ and from Germany) will be taken by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

6. Guidance of the propaganda in the Middle East is the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry which collaborates with the High Command of the Wehrmacht (WFSt/WPr) for that purpose.

The basic idea of the propaganda is:

"The victory of the Axis brings to the countries of the Middle East liberation from the English yoke and thus the right of self-determination. Whoever loves liberty will therefore join the front against England."

Propaganda against the French position in *Syria* must be avoided.

7. In so far as members of the Italian Armed Forces are engaged in Iraq, there will be cooperation with them on the basis of this direc-

² The Condor Legion was made up of German military personnel sent to the aid of General Franco in the Spanish Civil War. See vol. III of this series.

³ See document No. 475.

tive. Their subordination to the head of the German military mission is to be sought.⁴

ADOLF HITLER

⁴ In telegram No. 424 of May 23 from Salzburg, forwarded to Baghdad as No. 76 on May 24 (83/61840), Ritter instructed Grobba to inform the Iraq Government of the dispatch of the German military mission and to emphasize that this fact must not be made public.

By Ritter's telegram No. 428 of May 24 from Salzburg, forwarded to Baghdad as No. 81 on May 25 (83/61847-48), a summary of the document printed here was sent to Grobba for his own information.

No. 544

8589/E602887-89

Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, May 23, 1941.

High Command of the Wehrmacht

No. 44780/41 g. K. Chefs. WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.)

By officer only

Subject: Rumania.

On the occasion of the report of Colonel General Ritter von Schobert,¹ the Führer has decided as follows:

Upon his arrival in Rumania Colonel General Ritter von Schobert will be appointed Commander in Chief of the German troops in Rumania. His tasks shall be as follows:

a) He prepares the defense measures and the later attack operations ordered for Case *Barbarossa*.

b) He shall be responsible for the protection of the entire Rumanian area provided that he can assign the protection of Rumania to the chief of the Wehrmacht mission as an independent task of the latter as soon as the Eleventh Army leaves Rumanian territory in the course of the attack.

The chief of the Wehrmacht mission and the chiefs of the Service missions shall be subordinate to him for this purpose (see in this connection the directives given for the protection of the oil region and the coasts).

c) In all questions directly affecting his duties he shall conduct the negotiations with the Rumanian Chief of State.

Regarding the negotiations with the Rumanian Chief of State, the Führer has ordered as follows:

¹ Eugen Ritter von Schobert, Commanding General of the Eleventh Army, October 1940-Sept. 12, 1941.

1. Colonel General Ritter von Schobert is to report to General Antonescu upon his arrival and to introduce himself as successor to Field Marshal List as Commander in Chief of the German troops in Rumania.²

He is to tell General Antonescu that the Führer intends shortly to ask General Antonescu to come to Germany for a personal conference.

2. The new appointment to the post of "Commander in Chief of the German troops in Rumania" is to be explained to General Antonescu on the grounds that the present concentration of extremely large Russian forces in the western border area requires preventive measures for the protection of Rumanian territory. For this reason, in connection with the dispersal of the Balkan concentration, the German Army units in Rumania are being increased to about six divisions.

3. The joint German-Rumanian task of protecting Rumanian territory against surprises makes necessary appropriate measures on the part of Rumania. General Antonescu is to be requested to make suggestions on that score and they should be coordinated with the German measures of Colonel General Ritter von Schobert.

A mobilization of the Rumanian armed forces on a large scale is, nevertheless, not desired.

4. Any questions as to whether Germany expected a war with Russia or whether Germany would, if need be, attack Russia, are to be evaded.

5. Should General Antonescu express fear that Hungary might become hostile toward Rumania, it should be stated that this danger does not exist because Germany would not permit it.

6. After the conversation with General Antonescu, Colonel General Ritter von Schobert is to submit a proposal concerning his intentions and orders to OKW/WFSt/Abt. L and to OKH.

² By telegram No. 1447, sent from Berlin on May 24 (222/149645-46), Ritter directed Killinger to present General Schobert to Antonescu and to explain that "an army for the protection of Rumania against possible Soviet attacks is to be formed from divisions called back from the south and from other divisions in Rumania."

In telegram No. 1529 of May 27 (1126/321711) Killinger reported that General Schobert had that day been introduced to Antonescu, and had extended Hitler's invitation to Antonescu to visit him in Germany. Antonescu thereupon dropped his original intention to write a letter to Hitler.

According to Tippelskirch's memorandum of May 29 (1126/321708) Antonescu had asked to be received by Hitler as soon as possible.

See also documents Nos. 551 and 614.

In addition, an estimate of the Rumanian Army is to be submitted through General of Cavalry Hansen * (combat value of the individual divisions and evaluation of the leaders).⁴

*The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht*
KEITEL

* Gen. Erich Hansen, chief of the Army mission in Rumania, October 1940 to June 1, 1941, when he was succeeded by Major General Hauffe. General Hansen also served as chief of the Wehrmacht mission, in which function he was succeeded by Lieutenant General Speidel, chief of the Luftwaffe mission.

⁴ By a letter of Lieutenant Colonel Tippelskirch to Ritter of May 24 (1126/321722-23) the OKW forwarded excerpts of this directive to the Foreign Ministry. Not included in these excerpts were point a) in its entirety, and of point b) the first paragraph after "Rumanian area" as well as the part of the second paragraph which is enclosed within parentheses. With respect to the numbered points of the document printed the excerpts included only the contents of points 1), 3), and 5).

No. 545

265/172863-64

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 598 of May 23

ANKARA, May 23, 1941.

Received Berlin, May 23—5:40 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

Saracoglu told me that the English reply had not arrived by today,² and he therefore wanted to start talks with me. Following this I discussed with Numan the drawing up of the following documents as a basis for discussion and as a personal suggestion:

1. Open treaty containing in two articles the mutual obligations defining the relationship between Germany and Turkey.
2. Secret protocol 1 concerning compliance by the Reich at the conclusion of the peace with Turkish wishes in regard to Thrace, the islands, modification of the Straits Statute, further consideration for Turkish wishes, and interests in the southern and eastern neighboring areas in case military operations should spread thither.
3. Secret protocol 2 concerning the Turkish obligation to permit transit of war material.
4. Protocol 3 concerning a trade agreement and the press.

Numan, while agreeing to the essentials, said that the formulations could possibly be influenced by the English reply in case it should still arrive.

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 1632 to the Special Train, May 23."

² See document No. 538, footnote 4.

The conversation will be continued as soon as possible.

With reference to your telegram No. 509 of May 22:³ The French request for arms transit was submitted to the Council of Ministers yesterday and referred to jurists for review, reply not before Monday. Saracoglu indicated that the juridical situation was very difficult because the Franco-Turkish trade agreement had lapsed; the request would be treated benevolently, however. When he made the point that Syria was under the stipulations of the armistice provisions and therefore German consent was required, I replied that the German consent could be taken for granted.

Numan added that three trains with war material were already en route to Iraq over the Baghdad Railway, although the Syrian-Turkish railroad convention did not provide any juridical excuse for this. Before the arms transit through Turkey is laid down in the treaty to be concluded, please have all shipments destined for Iraq sent by the Baghdad Railway addressed to Iran.

PAPEN

³In this telegram (265/172862) Ritter informed Papen of a telegram from the German Embassy in Paris which stated that it was of decisive importance for the current German-French military negotiations that transit of German and French arms through Turkey into Syria and Iraq could be counted on.

No. 546

221/149342-44

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, May 24, 1941—12:30 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received May 24—3:20 a. m.¹

No. 1577 of May 23

The discussions about support for German military operations against England, jointly conducted with General Warlimont and the French Government at the German Embassy since May 20,² have resulted this evening in agreements with regard to the problems relating to Syria/Iraq and North Africa.

The concluding negotiations regarding the problem of West and Equatorial Africa will be held next Monday.

The *general* readiness of the French Government to furnish such support, which was obtained in my preceding discussions with Dar-

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 1637 to Fuschl, May 24."

² See document No. 520. Further details about Warlimont's negotiations with the French military authorities in connection with the Syrian and North African operations were reported by Welch in his telegrams Nos. 153 and 156 from Wiesbaden of May 24 and 25, respectively (221/149347-50; 878/209639-40). Cf. *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. iv, pp. 460-472.

lan and described in telegram No. 1480 of May 16, 1941,³ has now led to the following detailed practical agreements:

I. *In the negotiations regarding Syria/Iraq*, the French Government is prepared:

1. To sell to Iraq up to three-fourths of all French war material stored in Syria.

2. To grant to German and Italian aircraft the right to make intermediate landings in Syria, to supply them within the limits of the possible, and place at the disposal of the Luftwaffe an airfield north of Alep for its regular use.

3. To authorize the use of Syrian ports, highways, and railroads for shipments to Iraq and, in so far as practicable, provide protection by French vessels for German supply transports by sea from a point off Cyprus.

4. To train Iraq soldiers in Syrian territory in the use of the French weapons supplied.

5. To transmit to Germany reports received by the French High Command on English military forces and war measures in the Near East.

6. To comply with any other German demands for support of military operations in Iraq.

In consideration of these French contributions and with a view to strengthening Syria's defenses against England, which is also in Germany's interest, the High Command of the Wehrmacht is prepared, subject to the agreement of the Italian Armistice Commission, to authorize a number of measures for the military strengthening of Syria, which go beyond the terms of the Armistice Treaty.

II. *In the negotiations regarding North Africa*, the French Government has undertaken to comply with the following German wishes:

1. To furnish 400 more motor vehicles from metropolitan France, in addition to the 1,740 motor vehicles already earmarked for the German Africa Corps in Libya,⁴ and to transport them to North Africa in French vessels and bring them to the Libyan border.

2. To load these trucks with the cargoes purchased by German buyers in North Africa.

3. To permit use of the naval port of Bizerte for German supply shipments with limited escort personnel in civilian dress, and to exempt such escort personnel and goods from all passport and customs regulations.

4. To make French shipping available for supply transports to Bizerte and provide convoy escort for these transports.

³ Document No. 520.

⁴ See document No. 417 and footnote 1.

5. To permit the use of the railroad from Bizerte to Gabès by German supply transports.

6. To furnish to the German Africa Corps in Libya heavy artillery and the necessary ammunition from the stocks stored in North Africa.

Since North Africa is now exposed to an increasing degree to English attacks as a result of these concessions, the High Command of the Wehrmacht, subject to the consent of the Italian Armistice Commission, has agreed to the immediate execution of a number of military measures for the strengthening of North Africa, authorized under the Armistice but not yet carried into effect; and it has agreed to comply with several requests of the French Government for military reinforcement, which go beyond the Armistice terms. The [French] Navy has in the discussion of this point asked merely for greater freedom of action for its units stationed in the Mediterranean. If necessary, Darlan would be prepared to put off the authorized recommissioning of seven torpedo boats and six destroyers^{*} in favor of a substantial reinforcement of the North African land forces, which is more essential in his opinion.

III. *Negotiations regarding West and Equatorial Africa*, as noted in the beginning, have been set aside until Monday. Since the French measures of cooperation which are being considered may be expected to result in immediate countermeasures by England or the United States, it is necessary to examine very carefully the defensive capabilities of that area.

The French Government is prepared *in principle*, as of July 15, 1941, to make the naval base of Dakar available for the purposes of German sea warfare. It requests, however, that it be enabled to place Dakar and West Africa in that condition of increased readiness for defense which will be essential from that date on. Since English or, as the case may be, American attacks could be launched not only from the sea but also from the English colonies which adjoin French West Africa, and the insurrectionary Chad Colony, the French Government wishes to submit by Monday its own plan for an offensive against the territories threatening French West Africa.^{*}

IV. I have, as instructed,[†] avoided discussion on the *point of overt support of German war measures against England*, which I mentioned as a possible subject for negotiations in my telegram of May 16,[‡] and I have also, as instructed,[§] given the French Govern-

^{*} See document No. 421.

[†] Not found. See, however, *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. IV, pp. 464-469.

[‡] See document No. 520, footnote 9.

[§] Document No. 520.

^{*} Not found; see, however, Otto Abetz, *Das offene Problem* (Cologne, 1951), pp. 190-191.

ment to understand that the beginning of direct military action by France against England or, as the case may be, America is not to be pushed at this time.¹⁰

ABETZ

¹⁰ For the final results of these discussions, see document No. 559.

No. 547

105/113450

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, May 24, 1941—3:45 p. m.

SECRET

Received May 24—6:15 p. m.

No. 1223 of May 24

With reference to my telegram No. 1092 of May 7.¹

On May 22 I called on Molotov to discuss with him current negotiations on cultural questions, release of prisoners, etc. Molotov received me in the same study that he had formerly, surrounded by his usual staff in the Kremlin. He was as amiable, self-assured, and well-informed as ever. The only difference was the name-plate at the entrance, bearing the new inscription "Molotov, Deputy Chairman, Council of People's Commissars." There was nothing to indicate that his position with Stalin was shaken or that his influence as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs had suffered any diminution.

This and other observations made here since Stalin took over the supreme power of the state, show that the two strongest men in the Soviet Union—Stalin and Molotov—hold positions which are decisive for the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. That this foreign policy is, above all, directed at the avoidance of a conflict with Germany, is proved by the attitude taken by the Soviet Government during the last few weeks, the tone of the Soviet press, which treats all the events which concern Germany in an unobjectionable manner, and the observance of the trade agreements concluded with Germany.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 468.

No. 548

34/24480-82

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Draft Telegram

BERLIN, May 24, 1941.
zu Pol. V 2523.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 1192 of May 17.²

I. By Sobolev's reply, our wishes regarding the final demarcation of the boundary from the Igorka River to the Baltic Sea have been satisfactorily met. Since, however, the settlement of our claims under the Treaty of January 10, 1941,³ has been protracted for months due to no fault of ours, both Minister von Saucken and Ministerialrat Conrad had to be employed at other urgent tasks and are therefore not available at this time. We are trying to release them as soon as possible in order that they may resume their work in the Central Boundary Commission and we will shortly make a proposal for a new date.

Since, in these circumstances, Assistant Wieber would have to remain idle there for some time, while he is urgently needed here, please arrange for his return.

II. The instrument of ratification for the Treaty of January 10, 1941, has been executed by the Führer. Kindly notify the Soviet Government so that preparations for the exchange of documents can be made.

WOERMANN

Minute for the Office of the Foreign Minister, Fuschl

BERLIN, May 24, 1941.

The intent of the attached telegram to Moscow is a further effort to treat in a dilatory manner the matter of the boundary commission, since otherwise the next step would be a survey of the boundary by a Mixed Commission.

On the other hand, Soviet wishes are deferred to, in that we have now declared ourselves prepared to exchange instruments of ratification for the boundary Treaty of January 10, 1941.

WOERMANN

¹ Pol. V 2523; Not found.² Not printed (105/118439).³ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 638.

No. 549

83/61328-30

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

MOST URGENT

U. St. S. Pol. 441

BERLIN, May 24, 1941.

zu Pol. VII 2608 g.¹

Gehrcke transmitted in telegram No. 74 of May 21² the request of the Iraq Minister President to supply him with additional £80,000 in gold before June 1. He pointed out that as a result of special circumstances funds are lacking for the pay of soldiers and government officials due June 1.

The Foreign Minister had so far authorized 1 million reichsmarks for the Iraq operation, of which 584,200 have been paid out to Gehrcke, leaving a balance of 415,800 reichsmarks.

The equivalent of the requested £80,000, at the gold exchange rate of 20.46, amounts for the pound in gold to 1,636,800 reichsmarks leaving a shortage of 1,221,000 reichsmarks for the balance of the requested sum.

It is requested that this sum be made available. It should be noted that Gehrcke has paid out the monies authorized so far to the Iraq Minister President and the Grand Mufti partly in gold and partly in dollars, keeping back a reserve for himself.³ It would be advisable to increase the amount requested to 1,500,000 reichsmarks so as to leave an additional reserve. The Italian Government has placed 10 million lire at the disposal of the Iraq Minister President.⁴

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

Please send the report of the decision by teletype.⁵

WOERMANN

¹ Pol. VII 2608 g.: Not found.

² Not printed (83/61298-99).

³ See document No. 494.

⁴ Woermann had recorded in a memorandum of May 15 (83/61764) that he was informed of this by Zamboni.

⁵ Sonnleithner's memorandum of May 25 (699/260720) records that Woermann was notified that Ribbentrop approved the proposal that £80,000 in gold be made available to Gaylani before June 1.

No. 550

2119/461845-49

*The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*¹

SECRET

ANKARA, May 24, 1941.

A 1650

Subject: Report of the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow.

I am forwarding herein a report of the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow² of May 1, 1941, for information.

PAPEN

[Enclosure]

Source X

MAY 15, 1941.

REPORT OF THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW OF MAY 1, 1941

In accordance with the order of Your Excellency, I have examined the effects that the results of the German war in the Balkans have had on political circles and statesmen here. The result that I have arrived at is substantially as follows:

The military operations of the Germans in the Balkans were far swifter than the Russian statesmen had imagined. Stalin's people and he himself were, as I definitely suppose, of the opinion that the Germans would strain themselves for at least 2 months in the Balkans and during that time British and American aid would begin to come in sufficient quantities and would win out in the Balkans. But the unexpectedly rapid defeat of the Serbs and the resulting collapse of Greece, which the English were unable to help, had the effect of a cold shower on the leaders in Moscow. It would be a mistake to say that the cannon shots that thundered on the Yugoslav and Greek-Bulgarian borders 3 hours after the pact of friendship with Yugoslavia³ had not robbed the Soviet statesmen of their sleep. Repercussions of the bloody storm that broke out in the Balkans began to appear a few hours later on the Moscow horizon. As soon as the news arrived here, I looked for ways of getting information both from the Soviet men and from Mr. Cripps. In the opinion of Mr. Cripps, Stalin was aware that he had again made a terrible mistake. This is, in fact, the case. Stalin, who was one of the factors who had made possible the German victory in Poland by his support of the Germans, showed the same lack of foresight in the

¹ A copy was forwarded to the Embassy in Moscow under Pol. V 2908 g. of June 13 and was received in Moscow on June 16 (2119/461844).

² Ali Haydar Aktay.

³ See document No. 265 and footnote 2.

case of the French defeat. While the Germans were engaged in their operations in France, he stood by with folded arms. He was the strongest factor in the French defeat because of his blind obstinacy. Only lately has Stalin understood the fearful role that he had played in the collapse of Poland and France, the props of European civilization. But now it is already too late. The Germans now have on the Continent of Europe a power that can no longer be overthrown. When the repercussions of the German victory began to shake also the walls of the Kremlin in Moscow, the beginning awakening was both pointless and futile. Neither I nor Mr. Cripps nor the American Ambassador could avoid the feeling that the fate of the Soviets will be a very terrible one. Stalin expected that Poland would put up a resistance for at least 3 months, and that France would hold out 1 or 2 years. He expected, therefore, that the German and English blockades would last 2 years and that both belligerents would be exhausted and that he could then greatly benefit by the situation. All his hopes were dashed, not in the course of a year, but of months. So Stalin began to be afraid of Germany, which was casting a greedy eye at Russia. But he hoped at least to rescue the Balkans from a German onslaught, and he set out, through the bitter words to Bulgaria, as well as through the declaration of neutrality toward us, and finally, the well-known agreement with Yugoslavia and similar precipitate measures, to issue a silent threat to the Germans. He could not thereby, however, deflect the victorious and determined German Chief of State, Hitler, one iota from his decisions. Hitler disregarded the Soviets and carried out his intentions. If Stalin wanted to ruin us with his declaration of neutrality in the Balkan war, the folly of such a course is evident. The fact that we were not plunged into the Balkan conflagration caused deep despair in Moscow. Among those who were expecting help from us in the Balkans were also the English. Mr. Cripps indicated these hopes of his to me at various times. After the German victory in the Balkans, Stalin will certainly want to try to make himself agreeable to the Germans again. Stalin had believed that the war in the Balkans would be protracted also because of our intervention. The rapid victories of the Germans must have struck terror into the simple Stalin. Undoubtedly the German fliers will certainly ascend some time in order to seize the territories of the Ukraine. Stalin, the simple peasant, will one day understand the real truth that lies in the German-Soviet Russian controversy and that will dawn with the appearance of the German fliers on the Moscow horizon. But then it will be too late. How ignominious he will then appear to England, which has had to suffer all the afflictions resulting from his tragic play, I shall leave to your own estimation. Germany, which absolutely requires for her Greater

Germany concept the regions of the Ukraine, has equal need of the oil wells in Rumania and Baku. As I mentioned in my last reports, I hinted at this idea several times to Sobolev, the General Secretary of Foreign Affairs. I had the feeling that this person, who communicated my thoughts to the Kremlin, displayed a strange indifference. I felt that he was going toward a fate, of which there was already no doubt. I would say that the Balkan victories have penetrated with lightning effect the dark skulls of the Soviets. Stalin, who now feels as though his tender feet had plunged into ice water has, through various acts, begun to show that he wants to make up to the Germans. Also the flattering of the Japanese by Stalin in the Soviet-Japanese Agreement^{*} has been done purely and simply to win the heart of Germany. I am of the opinion that he will put up with very many more things in order to satisfy Germany. Stalin will certainly give aid to the German advance in the Near East. He pretends, to be sure, that he is only doing all this because he is annoyed with England, but that is all only empty talk. Everyone who, like me, knows the situation, knows that the Soviet leader is helping the Germans like a servant from fear of them and not out of annoyance with the English. Stalin, the murderer of Poland, France, and her allies, has again played a significant role in the Balkan tragedy. This man, who, with the Treaty of Friendship, had caused Yugoslavia to indulge in justified hopes, after Yugoslavia had plunged into the war, rubbed his hands like a madman who rubs his hands in glee at the sight of a fire. That is how, so to speak, I have always imagined him walking about in the Kremlin. Stalin just thought that in the conflict in the Balkans, Germany would, through the intervention of Turkey, suffer great and bloody hardships. But the German victories, which came much more rapidly than he had supposed, had knocked his opinions into a cocked hat. I repeat once more: Stalin has, to be sure, through the Japanese agreement, played up to the Germans without losing any time, but it is feared that he will prepare to work with the Germans in connection with Germany's military operations, which may very probably begin in the Near East. Stalin may succumb to the desire both to gratify the German Chief of State and to secure some advantages for himself. Please give these ideas your careful consideration and analyze the events accordingly. The Chief of the Bolsheviks hasn't a friend. This man, who is waiting for Germany and England to bleed to death, is mistaken, I think, in his views. There is no doubt that Germany, if she is victorious, will incorporate the Ukraine, the coasts of the Black Sea, and the basin of the Crimea in her Lebens-

^{*} See document No. 332 and footnote 2.

raum. Only by means of the great organizational skill of German agriculture can the Ukraine feed the German people. But if England triumphs, the questions that she is going to ask the Soviet Government will naturally be very numerous. In my opinion, Stalin is about to become a blind tool of Germany. This Balkan defeat particularly has been a grievous setback to morale in Russia. I am watching events in Moscow.

No. 551

222/149651

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

TOP SECRET

FUSCHL, May 25, 1941—12:50 a. m.

No. 430 of May 25

from Fuschl

Received Berlin, May 25—1:20 a. m.

No. 1456 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent May 25.

For the Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 1405¹ of May 16, 1941.

As regards General Antonescu's wish to receive a reply to his memorandum of April 22,² I wish to remark that it is not possible for us at the moment to go more closely into the Rumanian ideas set forth in the memorandum. I am, however, considering inviting the Rumanian Leader of the State very shortly to come to Germany for a brief visit in order to discuss with him the important questions now confronting Rumanian policy. At this occasion the Führer will also be willing to receive General Antonescu and to have a discussion with him. Today, I cannot as yet name the date for which General Antonescu will be invited, but I will have a further instruction on this follow in the near future.³ Please advise General Antonescu of the foregoing in a manner that appears appropriate to you.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Presumably this should read No. 1406 (222/149633) in which Killinger transmitted Antonescu's request that Ribbentrop use his influence with Hitler to induce the latter to reply to Antonescu's memorandum.

² See document No. 387.

³ In telegram No. 515 of June 8 from Fuschl, transmitted to Bucharest as No. 1571 (222/149669), Ribbentrop instructed Killinger to invite General Antonescu for an "unofficial visit" to Germany on June 10. See document No. 614.

No. 552

83/61857-59

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, May 25, 1941—8:30 p. m.

No. 408 of May 25

Received May 26—12:50 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 250 of May 22.¹

On May 24 when, as instructed, I requested the Minister President that Iran cooperate in supplying gasoline to Iraq, the Iraq Government had already undertaken two démarches with the Iranian Government in the same matter:

1. The Iraq Minister President, Gaylani, explaining Iraq's shortage, requested the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad to present to his Government the Iraq Government's request for delivery of gasoline.

2. The Iraq Chargé d'Affaires here presented on May 24 the same request to the State Secretary in the Iranian Foreign Ministry.

The Minister President informed me of the negative reply of the Iranian Government in both instances, explaining them on the grounds that the Iranian Government had no stocks of its own but rather arranged for delivery of gasoline from AIOC [Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.] stores, as needed. I did not content myself with this reply and pressed for delivery of gasoline. The Minister President then made the following statement regarding Iran's situation with respect to foreign policy.

1. It was a foregone conclusion that England would regard delivery of gasoline to Iraq by the Iranian Government as a hostile act and counter it with military measures. The invasion of Iranian territory by British soldiers would have as its immediate consequence the entrance of Russian troops into Iran. This would mean the end of Iran.

2. Turkey's attitude was of decisive importance for Iran. As long as Turkey did not openly side with the Axis Powers, Iran must maintain a strictly neutral position with regard to England and Russia.

3. Gaylani's Government, as had meanwhile become apparent, had acted rashly. Iraq was not prepared for war, either militarily or in the field of foreign relations. Iran was closely and anxiously watching developments in Iraq's situation, of the favorable outcome of which she is not yet convinced. The Minister President expressed the hope that the German Government would have understanding for Iran's extremely difficult situation and realize that Iran could not act otherwise at the moment.

¹ Document No. 541.

I then discussed the alternate possibility, of shipping aviation gasoline from the Soviet Union to Iraq by way of Iran.

The Minister President promised immediate study by the Ministry of Finance of the feasibility of the plan on the basis of the Iranian-Russian Treaty.² A telegraphic report on this matter will follow at the earliest possible.³

Today I informed the Iraq Foreign Minister⁴ and the Minister of Finance of Iraq,⁵ who are currently in Tehran, in strictest confidence of points 1 and 2 of the statement of the Iranian Minister President. Both Ministers were agreed in their view that:

1. Iran's warlike involvement with England or Russia was not in the interest of Iraq, and that

2. The Iraq Government would have to try at once through its Minister⁶ and the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara⁷ to obtain the Soviet Union's promise to deliver gasoline.

The Foreign Minister said that he would immediately telegraph Gaylani to this effect. We further agreed that regardless of this action taken by Iraq, I would continue my vigorous efforts to obtain from the Iranian Government delivery of Russian gasoline.

ETTEL

² Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed Mar. 25. For text, see Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, pp. 424-435.

³ Not found.

⁴ Musa ash-Shabandar.

⁵ Naji as-Suwaydi.

⁶ Kamil al-Gaylani.

⁷ Sergey Alexandrovich Vinogradov.

No. 553

195/139161-62

The Director of the Political Department to the Foreign Minister

Teletype en clair

BERLIN, May 25, 1941.

Drafting officer: Counselor Bidder.

Through the Foreign Minister's Secretariat for the Foreign Minister at Fuschl.

I informed Bose yesterday that the Foreign Minister wanted to postpone somewhat the deadline for releasing the declaration on a free India, and that he wished all preparations for the establishment of a central "free India" office to be begun at once.¹

¹ In a memorandum of May 10 (195/139157) Woermann noted that Hitler had, according to Ribbentrop, cleared the release of a declaration for a "free India." This declaration was to be issued in about 8 or 10 days. In the meantime preparations in the field of propaganda were to be made, including the establishment of a medium wave radio station in the India frontier region.

Bose, who is in agreement with this program, has now informed me today that he had just received the invitation of the Italian Government, which he had expected from the beginning. The latter would inform us about it directly. He assumed that he would be received by Mussolini, who had been very kind to him during his last visit in Europe.

Bose asked whether we had any wishes of any kind in regard to the time of the trip. I told him that I would submit the question to the Foreign Minister.

In my opinion there are no objections to Bose's going at once, so that he is available as soon as possible for further action. The fact that Bose will probably be received by the Duce, whereas he has not yet seen the Führer, can be accepted since no announcement will be made until further notice.

I should be grateful for instructions.²

WOERMANN

²In telegram No. 458 of May 27 (195/139167) Sonnleithner informed Woermann of Ribbentrop's request that Bose's trip to Italy be prevented; moreover a reception of Bose by Hitler was not under consideration for the time being. See, however, document No. 561.

No. 554

M175/M005544-53

Memorandum of the High Command of the Wehrmacht

TOP SECRET MILITARY FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, May 25, 1941.
 High Command of the Wehrmacht
 No. 44794/41 g. K. Chfs. WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.)
 By officer only

PROTOCOL OF THE DISCUSSION WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FINNISH ARMED FORCES ON MAY 25, 1941, IN SALZBURG

ALSO BASIC GUIDELINES FOR DISCUSSIONS OF THE BRANCHES OF THE
 WEHRMACHT PLANNED TO TAKE PLACE BEGINNING MAY 26, 1941

I. German participants:

Chief, Wehrmacht Operations Staff¹ and Staff Officer delegate
 of Department L;²
 Chief, Foreign Department [*Abteilung Ausland*];³
 Chief of Staff, Armed Forces Commander in Norway.⁴

¹Gen. Alfred Jodl.

²Apparently this was Lieutenant Colonel Münch who is known to have represented Department L in the conference held the next day.

³Naval Captain Leopold Bürkner.

⁴Col. Erich Buschenhagen.

Finnish participants:

General Heinrichs;⁵
 Colonel Tapola, Chief, Operations Department;
 Colonel Maekinen, Chief, Mobilization Department;
 Colonel Ross, Chief, Services of Supply;
 Commodore Sundmann, Chief of Staff, Naval Operations.

II. Principal statements by General Jodl: (also guidelines for discussions).⁶

Germany stands in friendly treaty relationship with Russia. One particular result of this is Russian economic deliveries.

Against it stands the unwarranted concentration of Russian forces along the German border (figures for ground and air forces). Hereby Germany is compelled to assemble forces of her own as a countermeasure.

A political clarification is intended in a short time. Should this not be possible, it is fairly safe to say that settlement by military measures will be necessary in order not to allow Russia to choose her own time.

With a clash thus possible by early summer, the discussion should provide the basis for cooperation. This does not mean that the Finns would be saddled with heavy burdens, but merely told about [our] wishes, whose execution is left for political decision by the Finns.

The course of the potential struggle can be predicted with certainty:

By the participation of many small states (anti-Bolshevist crusade), and particularly because of the superiority of the German Wehrmacht, Russia, after losing a certain area, will be unable to continue fighting. The collapse will come most quickly in the North and the Baltic will soon be in our hands.

After the Russian catastrophe, Germany will represent Europe's foremost and unassailable power; Germany will reduce her ground forces in favor of air and naval armaments and will likewise be able to crush England, which now still pins her hopes on Russia.

III. Intended course of such military operations as may be necessary.

General Jodl outlined the following:

German forces drive through the Baltic States to Leningrad. The Navy will close the Baltic. In addition, the Arctic Canal will be attacked by air and will be mined. (Operations by Army Group, Center and Army Group, South will not be mentioned at all.)

⁵ Gen. Axel Erik Heinrichs, Chief of the Finnish General Staff.

⁶ The basis for Jodl's discussion was laid down in an OKW memorandum of May 22, No. 44638/41 WFSt./Abt. L (I Op.) II Ang., printed in *Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuernberg, October 1946-April 1949* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951), vol. x, pp. 998-1000.

Within the framework of these operations, Germany has the following intentions for the Finnish area:

1. *Intended chain of command:*

In northern and central Finland (*Renntier*⁷ and *Silberfuchs*⁸—code names are not known to the Finns) command by the High Command of the Wehrmacht through General von Falkenhorst, with participating Finnish forces placed under his command.

Ladoga Front

Command by Field Marshal Mannerheim in direct consultation with OKH. Such German forces as may participate will be under Finnish command.

A German liaison officer representing both OKW and OKH will be attached to Field Marshal Mannerheim (OKH will name him). The Finns agree.⁹

2. *Occupation of Petsamo (Nickel mines);*

And then attack by 2 divisions in the direction of Murmansk-Polarnoye.

German wishes regarding Finland:

Mobilize Finnish forces around Petsamo, support the protection of Petsamo (coastal batteries, mine-laying), provide scouts and reconnaissance teams.

The Finns agree to this.

3. *Central Finland, Attack via Salla on Kandalaksha:*

Provide for this purpose 2 divisions, camouflaged as replacement movements along the Arctic Highway, specifically one from the north, in the region of Kirkenes, one from Germany via the Gulf of Bothnia (this movement is expected to get under way early in June).

Drop camouflage when moving eastward from the Arctic Highway.

German wishes regarding Finland:

Participation by the Finnish V Corps or, as a minimum, by 1 division, at least as far as the old border. Thereafter release will be possible for employment elsewhere (Ladoga), while German forces drive through to Kandalaksha and cut the Murmansk railway.

Finnish Reaction:

General Heinrichs envisages the main effort of the Finnish armed forces on the southeast front, therefore he proposes that the Salla-Kandalaksha operation be carried out with German forces only.

⁷ *Renntier*, code name for the German plan, in case of a Russian attack on Finland, to use the Mountain Corps, Norway for the occupation of the Petsamo area and defense of the northern Norwegian fjords against possible landings. The plan was first formulated in August 1940.

⁸ *Silberfuchs*, code name for a plan, first formulated in January 1941, by which the Army of Norway with attached Finnish formations would advance from northern Finland southeastward into the Lake Ladoga-Lake Onega-White Sea area, thus cutting off the Kola Peninsula.

⁹ On June 7 the OKW approved the dispatch of Gen. Waldemar Erfurth as Chief of the Liaison Staff with Field Marshal Mannerheim (F17/044).

German Standpoint:

In citing the difficulties involved in bringing up additional German forces, the greater risk of exposure of camouflage, and the greater interference with Finnish mobilization, the German side stands by its request to make available 1 division as a minimum, at least as far as the old border. Release at a later date is once more pointed out.

4. Finnish Southeast Front (Lake Ladoga):

In conjunction with the operations conducted by the OKH with the Army Group, North against Leningrad the mission of the Finns will be to immobilize Russian forces in the area of Ladoga. No demand is made for mounting a high-casualty assault to achieve a breakthrough inasmuch as the Russian front there will collapse automatically as the attack by the Army Group, North progresses.

Details of this joint operation will be the subject of the discussions with the OKH on May 26.¹⁰

Finnish Reaction:

They agree. This being the center of Finnish interests, the Finnish forces will not limit themselves to waiting tactics but will attack as far as is possible.

5. Hangö:

Important because of later freedom of movement in the Baltic. However, German air forces will at first be indispensably committed along the German main front and will only later become available against Hangö. Finns are therefore requested initially to block off Hangö, since they lack the necessary technical support and specialized troop units (dive bombers, armor, combat engineers, heavy artillery, and possibly also paratroops) for an assault.

At the earliest possible time (perhaps 2 to 3 weeks after start of the over-all operations) German air support for a Finnish assault on Hangö is envisaged. Any wishes concerning support by the Army and Luftwaffe can be brought up by the Finns in direct discussions on May 26.

¹⁰ The Halder Diary bears this entry for May 26:

"11:30: Discussion with the Commander in Chief of the Army regarding Finland.

"12:30: Welcome of the Finns under the leadership of the Chief of their General Staff, Heinrichs. Luncheon. Following it discussion with the Finnish General Staff: In connection with the OKW discussions the operation possibilities are discussed:

"Commitment to the east or to the west of Lake Ladoga.

"With an appropriate grouping during the concentration it can be expected that up to 6 divisions can be committed eastward of Lake Ladoga. Camouflaged mobilization along the border; in the rest of the country mobilization only after the passage of the German troops for *Silberfuchs* (June 16).

"The Finns themselves must undertake Hangö. Likewise they must undertake the Åland Islands operation or at least make allotment for it (it requires 2 regiments)."

The "Protocol on the German-Finnish Discussion on May 26, 1941" is entered as Document NOKW-1184 in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Case 12, Document Book 17, Part II, pp. 132-135.

Finnish Standpoint:

A sealing-off operation would tie up 2 or 3 divisions; this is undesirable with reference to the southeast front. Unofficially the wish is therefore expressed that Hangö be attacked by German forces with the participation of Finnish troops under German command. The point is made in this regard that the Russian occupation of Hangö is in any case somewhat directed against Germany.

German Standpoint:

To bring up German assault troops would be possible only through Sweden, since transportation via the Baltic Sea is out of the question. Adoption of this course would therefore mean delaying the assault which would have to be accepted as a negative factor if the Finns persist in their views.

6. Åland Islands:

General Jodl asks for the Finnish opinion on the question of their importance.

General Heinrichs desires to prevent the Russians from gaining a foothold and proposes occupation of 4 or 5 of the islands by German troops, which would at the same time afford a pretext for mobilization (against Germany). Otherwise the occupation will be accomplished by 2 Finnish regiments.

German Reaction:

Justification of a Finnish mobilization is a political question. Hardly practical on these grounds, since in that case the Åland Islands would have to be occupied at a very early date. A decision will be obtained from the Führer whether the Åland Islands will be occupied by German forces at all.

7. Air Force:

(a) Plans call for German support of operations in northern and central Finland. Finns will make airfields at Helsinki and Kemi available for this purpose.

(b) Active air defense by not very strong German forces is envisaged.

Finns are therefore requested to provide antiaircraft protection:

- (1) for unloading operations;
- (2) for the region around Rovaniemi;
- (3) for the region around Kemijärvi.

Standpoint of the Finns:

(a) They cite the threat to the capital due to relinquishing the civil airport at Helsinki, even though this was used also as a military airfield during the Finnish-Russian war.

(b) Finnish air defense very weak. Reinforcements are needed, primarily material and ammunition.

(c) They cite their attempt at one time to obtain from Germany delivery of 80 pursuit planes and 65 bombers, which would not even cover the deficiency.

8. *Navy:*

To achieve coordination with the German Navy, direct discussions are contemplated in Berlin, concerning among other items the protection of coastal waters by the Finns, and their participation in mining operations, also the safe accommodation of Finnish tonnage.

9. *Finnish Mobilization:*

Date to be flexible. Dependent on development of the situation and attitude of the Russians. This in turn would possibly be influenced by German transports through Finland.

Dates for this

Movements begin June 5;

Arrival of the first movements in Finland June 8;

Arrival of German armor in Finland between June 10 and 15.

Finnish standpoint:

Nine days are needed.

Apprehension about a Russian coup against Finland and interference by Russian aviation with Finnish mobilization (Germans point out that Russian air forces will be tied up at the main front against Germany).

Finnish intention for first mobilizing the 8 western divisions, then the ■ eastern ones (Reasons: Western divisions are more dependent on railroad exposed to aerial attack; camouflage).

On the German side the reverse sequence would be desired.

Finns cite special difficulties in the food supply situation; the Army is provided for for a few months; not the people; particularly there is a shortage of bread and fodder. Still greater difficulties are to be expected should American shipments via Petsamo cease.

Specific shortages in supplies for the armed forces:

Ammunition, motor fuel, aviation gasoline.

10. *Attitude of Sweden:*

Despite Germany's high regard for the Swedish officer corps there have been no negotiations, because Sweden's policy does not permit this. There is a possibility that Sweden's attitude may change in the course of further developments, in which case it is intended to utilize Swedish railways for moving up further reinforcements.

11. *Attitude of Great Britain:*

A threat to Norway is no longer envisioned, because an extremely powerful coastal defense system has been built up and England is handicapped by ■ lack of shipping space.

12. *Further discussions planned in Berlin with:*

a. the three branches of the Wehrmacht;

b. the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces Commander in Norway, representing the OKW, who would bring to these discussions the ap-

propriate representatives of the different branches, the Wehrmacht Chief of Transportation, etc., to take part therein to the extent necessary;

c. the Wehrmacht Chief of Transportation, inter alia, jointly also with the Navy, to coordinate the planned German transports to and through Finland with the movements made necessary by Finnish mobilization.

Schedules prepared by OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (IV Qu) on the subject of quartermaster problems (annex 2¹¹ to OKW/WFSt/Abt. L—No. 44638/41, Top Secret Military, of May 1, 1941¹²) have been transmitted.

13. In conclusion, urgent request for preserving secrecy, particularly also in the interest of the Finns, in view of the danger of a sudden Russian initiative prior to completion of Finnish mobilization.¹³

IV. General Heinrichs made the point that the presence of the Finnish representatives showed the Finnish attitude, even though authority to make political commitments was still lacking.

¹¹ Not found.

¹² Document No. 431.

¹³ A supplementary directive issued by Keitel on May 28 (M175/M005558-59) affirmed Hitler's order "that any further discussions with the Finns not go beyond the limits set by the discussions at Salzburg on May 25, and that they follow the guidelines covering the German intentions with respect to Soviet Russia." The Finns were to be told only so much about the German operation as they would need to know in order to insure local cooperation.

No. 555

265/172868-69

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

SECRET

FUSCHL, May 26, 1941—1:41 a. m.

RAM 213/R of May 25

from Fuschl

Received Berlin, May 26—2:45 a. m.

No. 527 of May 26 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent May 26.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 598 of May 23, 1941.¹

I have noted with interest your report of your first conversation with Saracoglu about the conclusion of the treaty which is being envisaged.

As to point 2 of your telegram I would like to remark that the promises to "give consideration to Turkish wishes and interests in the southern and eastern neighboring areas" must be treated with special caution. Please limit yourself to phrases of very little concrete character on this point. In the draft treaty here prepared which is known to you the following was said on this matter: "Polit-

¹ Document No. 545.

ically and diplomatically Germany will support the aspirations of Turkey to secure her possessions and achieve a revision of the Treaty of Lausanne² in accordance with Turkey's vital necessities." We must avoid any reference to precise geographical definition of the direction which such Turkish aspirations may take. Particularly our relations with France today and our cooperation with this country in Syria do not permit us to encourage any ambitions of Turkey in this direction. Likewise, in regard to prospects for the acquisition of one or the other island in the Aegean Sea and regarding the Statute of the Straits it is recommended that the phrasing be chosen very carefully until the treaty project has become more concrete.

I expect at an early date your further reports concerning the progress of the negotiations.³

RIBBENTROP

² Signed July 24, 1923. For text see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. XXVIII, p. 11.

³ See document No. 556.

No. 556

265/172872-77

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 629 of May 27

ANKARA, May 27, 1941.

Received May 27—5:45 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

Negotiations about the transit of arms have come to a deadlock today. The English reply which arrived yesterday is apparently so full of the most bitter accusations against Turkey that as Saracoglu told me today, he would not be surprised if England severed relations with Turkey when our treaty is published. Precisely this situation, however, imposed on Turkey the duty not to promise anything at the present moment, which in the eyes of the world would make her appear as if she broke her word. Yesterday Numan handed me the proposal for a declaration which should be made public at the conclusion of our treaty. This declaration states that Germany would not demand anything that was not compatible with the English-Turkish treaty.² In the course of negotiations lasting several hours, I explained yesterday to Saracoglu and Numan that such a declaration would be unacceptable to us especially in the event that we would

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 1680 to the Special Train, May 27, 7:40 p. m."

² Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "New confirmation of Anglo-Turkish treaty."

have to content ourselves with oral assurances in the matter of the transit of arms. Our assurances, as laid down in the secret protocol, would not be reciprocated in that case. Thereupon the Cabinet met yesterday evening. Saracoglu just told me that as an outcome of this, his Government withdrew the proposal of making the declaration public. On the other hand, however, Turkey was unable to give us any oral assurances about the transit of arms. All my arguments that there existed a right, based on the commercial treaty and that Turkey, especially on account of Syria, had a contractual obligation also towards the French, were rejected with this statement: One must be in a position to reply to the English that nothing has been agreed upon which directly or indirectly might be aimed against the former allies.³

Upon repeated urging Saracoglu promised to postpone the decision concerning Syria and to examine it once more. (No obstacles will be put in the way of the aviation gasoline en route to Haydarpaşa.⁴) In order that you may perceive what can be attained now I am giving you below the formulations regarding which Saracoglu and I have come to a provisional agreement pending your approval:

Preamble

Turkey and Germany, desiring to prevent the extension of the war to the regions of the Near and Middle East, which so far have been spared from the war, and with the intention to assert the friendly character of their common policy, within the framework of the letters exchanged between the Chiefs of State,⁵ have decided:

Article 1. The German Reich pledges itself to refrain from adopting any aggressive attitude toward Turkey. It declares that it has not made any commitments and will not make any commitments for the duration of the present treaty which directly or indirectly might be aimed against Turkey.

Article 2. Turkey pledges herself to refrain from adopting any aggressive attitude toward the German Reich. She states that her commitments deriving from the Three Power Pact of October 19, 1939,⁶ the defensive purpose of which is to assure the independence and integrity of Turkey against any external attack, do not commit her in any other respect to undertake an action which could have the effect or the result of involving Turkey in an armed conflict with the Reich.⁷

³ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Fear of England that great!"

⁴ According to a memorandum by Eisenlohr of May 24 (88/61321-22) Papen had been instructed on May 22 to ask the Turkish Government for the unhampered transit of gasoline from Constanta to Haydarpaşa and from there over the Turkish railways to Syria; on May 24 Papen had been able to report that transit of the gasoline over Turkish railways was assured.

⁵ See documents Nos. 113 and 161.

⁶ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Repetition of this pact!"

Concerning this pact see document No. 122, footnote 4.

⁷ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Not like the Russia clause?"

A French text of article 2 follows the German text of this article in the original document.

Article 3. The Governments of the contracting parties will keep in constant touch regarding questions referring to the interpretation of this treaty.

Article 4. Denunciation of treaty.

Article 5. The treaty becomes effective on the day it is signed.

Secret Protocol

The Government of the German Reich declares that at the time of the peace negotiations it will take into account Turkish wishes which, in principle, relate to:

- a) Rectification of the frontier in Thrace west of Edirne
- b) The islands in the Aegean near the Turkish coast⁹
- c) A change in the Montreux Convention regarding the Straits.

Concerning point a), the determination of the new border will take into account the need for a new railroad connection outside the Turkish frontier between and

Concerning points a) and b) there is agreement that if during the course of the war it should prove useful to introduce Turkish administration in the districts and islands referred to,⁹ the Government of the Reich would be willing to examine these questions with the Turkish Government in order to arrive at an equitable solution.

In the event that the military operations should spread to Turkey's neighboring areas, especially to the south or east, the German Government will take into consideration the requirements¹⁰ of security as well as the possible political and economic interests of Turkey in the areas referred to.¹¹

This secret protocol is an integral part of the foregoing German-Turkish treaty.

The question of our commercial relations shall be clarified in an exchange of letters which will follow, while the question of the press and radio will be settled by a joint public declaration when the treaty is signed. Because of your instructions concerning Syria and German-French cooperation, I have kept the relevant passage more general than was the case in the draft of the treaty which we discussed. Any reference to claims of the Treaty of Lausanne is avoided, and our assurances are valid only in the event of war. But we cannot avoid giving consideration in general to Turkish interests in the southern area unless we want to run the risk that Turkey, in case of an English-Turkish conflict in Syria, will move in immediately and do what she considers necessary. During my discussions with

⁹ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Dodec[anese]?"

¹⁰ Marginal note: "?"

¹¹ This phrase is also given in French.

¹² Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Yes."

Saracoglu I upheld the position that maintaining the French mandate over Syria is in the common German-Turkish interest.

My view of the present state of the political discussions is as follows:

I consider the general political and moral repercussions to be of far greater importance than securing for the moment the transit of material and consider it to be decisive in judging whether we should conclude the treaty on the conditions now attainable. The public German-Turkish treaty of friendship, especially as the element of surprise is assured by keeping the negotiations secret,

a) will appear to the whole world as a signal that the last English ally in Europe, whose comprehensive 15-year alliance with England was only recently characterized by the President in a public speech before the National Assembly as the pillar of Turkish foreign policy and whose press until recently came out in favor of England's victory, now considers England's cause as lost. An especially strong, indeed sensational reaction, is to be expected in the United States, whose Government and press always characterized the Turkish attitude as unshakable, and also in the Near East, India, and in the territories of the Empire.

b) The English Government will be convinced that Turkey can no longer be counted on, and this will deal English morale another blow.

c) The anticipated English indignation and the corresponding attacks will make it easier for Turkey to find the way toward increasingly closer cooperation with us quicker than heretofore. Turkish public opinion and the press will take the conclusion of the treaty as the official cue to advocate openly friendship with Germany.

Concerning our relations with Russia, Saracoglu confirmed to me that in case of possible conflict, the Turkish position would be "more than benevolently neutral." The application of the Montreux Convention would permit also, in case of need, the transit through the Straits of troops and material on merchant ships in any number desired.¹²

I request instructions as to what is to be done. Munition transports slated for Iraq would temporarily have to be dispatched over the route Samsun-Tehran and an agreement on having them sent on would have to be made with the Iranian Government. Saracoglu expressly verified that there exist no restrictions on the shipments to Iran and Afghanistan.

PAPEN

¹² Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Good."

No. 557

71/50857-59

The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

ROME, May 27, 1941—8:25 p. m.

No. 1227 of May 27

Received May 27—11:05 p. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 1198 of May 23.¹

Anfuso gave me today the text of the telegram of May 24, from the Italian Minister in Baghdad, which I transmit below in translation. There follows the telegram from Baghdad:

"The Mufti, with whom I had a long talk, told me that he was rousing the Arabs to revolt against England wherever he could. In Palestine the uprising was in full swing. In Transjordan he was able to rely on the friendship of Talal, Emir Abdullah's son, and point to the fact that the Transjordan Arab troops in the meantime had refused to fight against their Iraq brothers. Ibn Saud did not want to take a position against England but would be compelled, in the course of the present struggle, at least to manifest his solidarity, so as not to jeopardize his popularity. As regards Egypt, the Mufti was counting heavily on Ali Maher² and his political friends, who were collaborating with Misr el Fattat and had the backing of the young King. The Mufti and Gaylani have sent messages to Imam Yahya,³ designed to raise revolts in the Aden area and revive his aspirations to acquire new emirates. The Mufti believes, however, that all this is only of limited value if the current uprising in Iraq, which in his opinion is the key to the situation, should fail. Because of this he had held back sending ammunition and arms to Palestine in order to have all strength and resources available for Iraq. What was causing him the greatest concern was not so much the general military situation as the political situation at the moment. There was no lack of timorous pessimists, friends of Nuri-Said and Jews, who were endeavoring both covertly and in the open to sabotage the efforts of the Mufti and Gaylani, who was fighting like a lion. Even the Cabinet included some individuals who held that if the Axis Powers did not render immediate and substantial assistance, it might be better to negotiate with the English. The next 14 days would be of decisive importance. If they were unable to last through this period, it would be necessary to give in. The aircraft that had arrived to date were insufficient in number. Arab tribesmen had attacked an English motorized column on the way to Ramadi and captured all the material in the column, including a considerable amount of gold. However, new English armored and motorized forces were on the march from Basra and Transjordan. To be sure, their movements were hampered and slowed down by the Arab tribes, but in case of failure to stop or scatter them with

¹This telegram (83/61835-36) forwarded the text of a telegram of May 22 from the Italian Minister in Baghdad which Anfuso had made available to Bismarck.

²Egyptian Minister President, August 1939-June 1940.

³Of Yemen.

weapons of the same power, and especially aircraft, he was certain that they would have to reckon with the loss of a part of Iraq and with a military defeat, albeit not a decisive one. This would of course be grist to the mills of the opposition, which would contend that the Axis was unwilling or unable to help Iraq. Gaylani might be forced to resign, and this was bound to have serious consequences both here and in other areas. The Mufti concluded his statements by asking me to tell you that he urgently requested the Axis to send immediately—before it is too late—aircraft and war material as proof of tangible solidarity.

The Mufti then added that if Iraq should fall during these coming days, the anti-English movement throughout the whole Middle East would step by step succumb to British arms or to British gold and intrigues. To be sure, the Axis was girded for it, but if this came to pass it would be necessary for the Axis to reconquer one position after another by force of arms, without being able to rely on the present militant spirit and the aid of the Arab world, which was now still at its disposal." End of telegram from Baghdad.

BISMARCK

No. 558

177/85118-19

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 358

BERLIN, May 27, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called on me today in order to tell me in the first place that in three different telegrams to his Foreign Minister he had expressed an opinion on the Japanese-American treaty negotiations. He had supported three theses in his telegraphic reports, namely: The Tripartite Pact should not be touched. The Japanese hegemony in East Asia must remain secured. America must be kept neutral. Without these three prerequisites any pact-making with America was injurious.

Matsuoka replied to Oshima merely that he would never let the Tripartite Pact be shaken. Regarding the further objective treatment of the Japanese-American conversation, however, Matsuoka had not told Oshima anything. I for my part thereupon informed Oshima of the status of the matter, by bringing to his knowledge what was essential from telegraphic report Tokyo No. 759.¹ (I told Oshima only portions of Ambassador Ott's opinion about the domestic policy events and influences in Japan.)

Oshima was grateful for my information. He then guided the conversation to German-Russian relations. He reminded me of an item of information on this subject which he had received on April

¹ Document No. 587.

10 from the Reich Foreign Minister for Prince Konoye, and asked me about today's situation.²

I told Oshima in this regard that we were still, as in the past, in the position of observing Russian conduct attentively, after we had been obliged to take appropriate military security measures to counter the Russian concentration on our eastern border. The rumors about German-Russian negotiations which were cropping up everywhere were incorrect; thus the situation was in the main unchanged.

Finally, Oshima expressed the wish to visit the Reich Foreign Minister in Fuschl. He did not want to bother him at Whitsuntide; if it could be arranged, he would therefore rather come still in the course of this week, or otherwise in the week after Whitsuntide.

I had the impression that Oshima's purpose in desiring this trip is to obtain clearer information about German-Russian relations than I gave him.

Submitted herewith (by telegraph) to the Reich Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

² This item is mentioned by Ernst L. Presseisen, *Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy 1933-1941* (The Hague, 1958), p. 300, citing "Extracts from the Diary of Marquis Koichi Kido 1931-1941" (microfilmed by the University of California, Berkeley), entry for Apr. 18.

No record of this has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

No. 559

F10/441-58
F10/137

Protocols Signed at Paris on May 27 and May 28, 1941

Within the framework of the political negotiations now in progress between the German and French Governments, military discussions were held between the High Commands of the German and the French Armed Forces at the German Embassy in Paris during the period of May 20 to May 26, 1941, leading to the following agreements:

- I. *Agreement with regard to Syria and Iraq*
- II. *Agreement with regard to North Africa*
- III. *Project for an agreement with regard to West and Equatorial Africa*

I. SYRIA AND IRAQ

1. The *French Government* undertakes to carry out the following wishes of the High Command of the Wehrmacht:

a. Readiness in principle to cede, against payment, the French war material stored in Syria up to three-fourths of the entire stocks, as previously agreed upon (for Iraq).¹

The arms needed for the direct defense of Syria are excepted in accordance with more detailed agreements.²

b. Intermediate landing, and, in so far as the supplies permit, servicing of German and Italian planes, together with granting of a base for the Luftwaffe in the northern part of Syria (Alep), for the duration of the present situation in Iraq.

c. Utilization of Syrian ports, highways, and railroads for shipments to Iraq.

d. Training of Iraq soldiers on Syrian territory in the use of arms delivered by France, according to more detailed instructions by the French High Commissioner.

e. Communication to the German High Command of all intelligence concerning English forces and war measures in the Near East received by the French High Command (mutual exchange procedure).

The French Government further declares that the French High Commissioner,³ at the request of the local German authorities, will furnish further services within the limits of the possible and in accordance with the situation; it assures, moreover, that it is resolved, in order to maintain French sovereignty, to defend Syria and Lebanon against every attack with all the resources available there.

2. In consideration of the situation in the Near East the *High Command of the Wehrmacht* agrees to the immediate execution of the following measures, which go beyond the Armistice Treaty:*

a. Release of one-quarter of the total French war material stockpiled in Syria and the additional stocks to be left there according to a special agreement.

b. Transfer to Syria of a heavy antiaircraft battalion of 3 batteries with 5 issues of ammunition and 150 men from units released in metropolitan France. Replacement of these guns from supplies stored in metropolitan France.

c. Transfer to Syria of a light motorized antiaircraft battalion (thirty-six 25-mm. guns) with 5 issues of ammunition and 150 men from units released in metropolitan France. Replacement of these guns from supplies stored in metropolitan France.

d. Transfer to Syria of twenty-four 25-mm. antitank guns with 7,200 rounds of ammunition from supplies stored in metropolitan France.

e. Transfer to Syria of twenty-four 75-mm. guns from supplies stored in metropolitan France. For the time being, these guns are to be stockpiled there again under Italian control. Release for combat is subject to the requirements of the situation.

f. Transfer of 80 tons of materials (airplane parts).

¹ See document No. 546.

² See document No. 546 and footnote 2.

³ Gen. Henri Dentz.

* In so far as the measures set forth herein affect Italian interests they apply subject to Italian approval. [Footnote in the original.]

g. Transfer to Syria of 150 specialists from metropolitan France to reinforce the personnel of three fixed 75-mm. antiaircraft batteries there.

Regarding b. to g.: If, in exceptional cases, these or German supply transports to Syria go by sea, German forces will provide protection in the danger zone as far as the island of Kastellorizon, and by the French from there to Syria. If the land route is used, the transports through German-controlled territory will be arranged by Germany.

h. Transfer to Syria of a reinforced fighter group from North Africa, together with individual transport planes, with intermediate landings at Brindisi, Athens or Larissa, and Rhodes.

i. Reinforcement of the air defenses of Syria by means of machine guns to be taken from the supplies released in accordance with point a.

The *High Command of the Wehrmacht* is furthermore prepared in principle to supplement in so far as possible the supplies of gasoline and oil in Syria. If shipments are made by sea, the French transport ships in Greece and the escort units will be fueled in Greece, if necessary. For this purpose French tankers will be chartered to Germany in so far as possible.

II. NORTH AFRICA

1. The *French Government* undertakes to carry out the following wishes of the *High Command of the Wehrmacht*:

a. Utilization of the naval port of Bizerte as an unloading point for supplies and material for the German forces in Africa, with a small escort detachment (in civilian clothes).

Ports in southern Italy, and in the case of French ships, preferably Toulon, will be used as loading ports. The French Navy will provide any convoy units required for transports on French ships from Toulon to Bizerte* (cf. also section b).

b. Chartering of ships under French control for supply and fuel transports, as well as for coastal shipping in North Africa, as requested by Germany.

c. Transit to Libya and the use of the railroad from Bizerte to Gabès for the German supply and material transports.

*The Records of Situation Conferences of the Defense Branch by Helmuth Greiner, Aug. 8, 1940-June 25, 1941 (typescript MS C-0651, of the U.S. Army Historical Division, European Command) contains this passage on June 4, 1941:

"Staff Conference: (1) On June 6 the question of supplies to North Africa via Bizerte will be discussed by the Armistice Commission. Shipments from Bizerte will primarily be made from Naples and only secondarily from Toulon. According to the opinion of the Chief of the National Defense Branch the second route can be camouflaged better. The employment of French ships from Naples is possible but an escort necessary. The Führer wishes to avoid armed conflict between England and France if possible. . . ."

d. The German escort personnel in Bizerte and for the subsequent transport to Libya, as well as the supplies themselves, are exempted from any otherwise prevailing regulations concerning imports and passports, customs, and other regulations at the national frontiers.

e. Readiness in principle to sell heavy artillery, coastal guns, and the ammunition for them from the stockpiles in North Africa. However, sufficient supplies would be left in the depots for the time being, to be used, if needed, to reinforce the defenses of French *North Africa*.

f. In addition to the following material which is now being bought up in North Africa, i.e.,

- 1,100 trucks
- 300 automobiles
- 300 motorcycles
- 30 buses
- 10 automobile repair shops

the sale of additional 400 operative trucks from metropolitan France and their transfer in French ships to North Africa as far as the Libyan border or, by land, to a port in southern Italy.

g. Readiness in principle to release goods as cargoes for the motor vehicles bought by Germany for Libya. These goods will be replaced by German deliveries.

2. The *High Command of the Wehrmacht* agrees to the immediate execution of the following measures, which go beyond the Armistice Agreement: †

a. Retention of 1 of the 3 light artillery battalions (horse-drawn), scheduled to be disbanded, in excess of the heretofore authorized strength.

b. Release of a total of thirty-three 25-mm. antitank guns with 33,000 rounds of ammunition from stocks in metropolitan France, if available. Of these, 11 guns are intended for strengthening the coastal defense.

c. Release of 140 machine guns from North African stocks for strengthening the air defenses in North Africa.

3. The *High Command of the Wehrmacht* also agrees to the following measures:

a. Transfer of 200 officers and 6,000 noncommissioned officers and enlisted men of the Army from metropolitan France to North Africa to fill vacancies in the ground force units authorized there.

b. Transfer of 50 officers, 1,600 noncommissioned officers, and 3,000 enlisted men from metropolitan France to North and West Africa to fill the vacancies in the air force units authorized there. The above figures also include the civilians required for ground crews.

c. Restriction of the joint German-Italian Mediterranean control in the French Mediterranean ports to military personnel, on condition that the measures applying to civilian persons at the present time be maintained.

† In so far as the measures set forth herein affect Italian interests they apply subject to Italian approval. [Footnote in the original.]

d. Greater freedom of movement for the French Navy:

aa. Convoy units of the Navy and the Air Force are to have freedom of movement, subject to simple notification of the control authorities or the Armistice Commissions.

The choice of the routes for merchant shipping is left to the discretion of French naval authorities in accordance with the situation; the Armistice Commissions will be notified.

bb. Units not released for convoy or security duty will have freedom of movement in case of an active English threat and of need for defense against such a threat. Movements designed for this purpose should be reported to the local control organs and the Armistice Commissions not later than the time of issuance of the combat order; these authorities are to be kept currently informed about all actions and movements. Passage through the Strait of Gibraltar in either direction by the task force "Strasbourg" is subject to authorization by both Armistice Commissions.

cc. Freedom of movement for training purposes within a confined area where such movements are unlikely to interfere with Italian or German operations is authorized subject to 3 days' notice before sailing.

e. Replacement of the [fighter]⁵ group transferred to Syria by release of the necessary material from stocks in metropolitan France or in North Africa.

f. Replacement of fuel and oil necessary for the shipment and conveying of German supplies.

4. Pending clarification, a decision has been deferred regarding the following *French wishes*:

a. Retention of the native police scheduled to be disbanded (Goumiers, Chaouch, etc.).

b. Release of 961 officers (including General Juin), 3,200 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, and 2,686 specialists from German captivity for the transition Army in North Africa.

c. Release of 62 tanks from North African stocks for the French transition Army in North Africa.

Regarding I and II:

All details arising from this Protocol will be settled by the Armistice Commissions.

PARIS, May 27, 1941.

For the High Command
of the Wehrmacht:

WARLIMONT
Major General

*Admiral of the Fleet and Vice
President of the Ministerial Council*
F. DARLAN

⁵This word which is illegible on the file copy of this document was filled in from the French text printed in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. IV, pp. 472 ff.

III. WEST AND EQUATORIAL AFRICA

1. The *French Government* declares its readiness in principle to permit utilization of the harbor and installations of Dakar as a base for German naval and merchant ships as well as a base for the Luftwaffe in this area.

This agreement shall for the present, during an *initial phase*, i.e., from July 15, 1941, on, permit German submarines to be supplied from a tender in the harbor of Dakar and for German merchant vessels to stay there for a limited period.

Other services, in particular the utilization of the base also by *surface units*, use of the *harbor installations*, as well as the utilization of the *air base* are to be realized in a second phase in accordance with the general agreements laid down in the annexed Supplementary Protocol.

The *French Government* undertakes to assume with its own resources the defense of these facilities used by German forces, as well as of its entire West African possessions, and to repel any attacks—if necessary by offensive action against the enemy bases from which these attacks are launched.

2. The *French Government* considers the following reinforcement of its West African forces absolutely essential before the measures outlined in Section 1, paragraph 2, can be put into effect:

(1) *Army*:

a. Filling up of the reinforced motorized regimental group in West Africa, already authorized, by the release of:

154	officers	
594	noncommissioned officers	
1,967	enlisted men (specialists)	from captivity,
	including	
154	officers	
346	noncommissioned officers	whose release has already
		been granted.

b. Release of:

32	machine guns mounted on motor vehicles
15	platoons of three 25-mm. antitank guns with light
	full-track vehicles and the requisite personnel,
	to be specified later.
2	bridge columns (model 35) for crossing the Niger
28,000	rounds, pistol ammunition
646,000	rounds, 75-mm. ammunition
5,000	rounds, 75-mm. armor-piercing shells
52,000	rounds, mortar ammunition
3,000	rounds, 81-mm. ammunition
2,800	rounds, 60-mm. ammunition
67,500	rounds, 25-mm. ammunition
6,500	rounds, 25-mm. ammunition
	as well as additional ammunition to fill up the
	stocks, the quantities to be specified later.

56 motor fuel trucks	
4 trucks with trailers	
100 light trucks	
174 motorcycles	
50 three-horse wagons	} (with harness)
100 two-horse baggage carts	

(2) *Navy:*

a. Release of about 6,000 French Navy personnel now in captivity.

b. Equipping and commissioning of the following naval units prior to *July 15, 1941*:

- 2 destroyers (*Kersaint, Verdun*)
- 3 torpedo boats (*Pomone, L'Iphigénie, Bombarde*)
- 2 submarines (*Diamant, Argonaute*);

besides the equipping of these submarines, an increase in the reinforcement of the submarine relief group (15 percent equipped) from 9 to 12; *after July 15, 1941*:

- 4 destroyers (*Vautour, Gerfaut, Vauban, Aigle*)
 - 3 additional destroyers (*Panthère, Tigre, Lynx*)
(provided enough personnel is available for manning them)
 - 4 torpedo boats (*Casque, Sirocco, Le Foudroyant, Trombe*)
 - Cruisers (replacement of the fully equipped ships which go into repair by units which were decommissioned)
 - 1 battleship (*Provence*)
 - 1 aircraft carrier (*CDT Teste*)
- | |
|--|
| provided enough
personnel is
available |
|--|

c. *Naval air forces, prior to July 15, 1941*: Replacement of 3 reconnaissance planes (Loire 130) of Squadron 4 E (Dakar) by 3 seaplanes (Loire 37) of Squadron ■ E (Berre) and replacement of the latter from stockpiles.

Use of the 3 reconnaissance planes (Loire 130) thus released as artillery observers for the *Richelieu* in Dakar.

Re-establishment of an air torpedo unit of 13 planes for Dakar.

(3) *Air Force:*

Increase in number of airplanes of the bomber groups in West Africa from 13 to 17.

Release of:

- 18 batteries of 75-mm. antiaircraft guns (8 permanent and 10 mobile batteries).
- 65 platoons of 2 small-caliber antiaircraft guns each (25- or 20-mm.) (35 permanent and 30 mobile units) with personnel and ammunition to be specified later.
- 26 20-mm. antiaircraft guns with 20,000 rounds of ammunition.

(4) Furthermore, the following *additional measures* are considered necessary, partly in amplification of the Protocol of May 21, 1941:^a

^a This might refer to certain accords reached in the course of the negotiations, which were referred to in Welck's telegram No. 153 of May 24 (see document No. 546, footnote 2). Cf. *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, pp. 460-461.

a. Authorization in the occupied zone to enlist volunteers for the French Armed Forces, with the stipulation that for the volunteers enlisted in the occupied area approximately the same number of soldiers will be released for return there.

b. Reopening of the Air Force School at Saint-Raphaël.

c. Doubling of the present allotments of fuel for the French Navy and Merchant Marine (mazut, gas oil, coal).

(5) Exchange of intelligence concerning English forces and war measures in West and Equatorial Africa obtained by the French High Command.

3. The *High Command of the Wehrmacht* takes cognizance of the fact that the French Government, in order to restore its sovereignty in the areas of Equatorial Africa occupied by de Gaulle's forces, considers it essential to be authorized to carry out the following additional measures for strengthening the forces in West and Equatorial Africa which, in consideration of the eventual threat to Dakar, must be completed in the main by the middle of July, 1941:

(1) *Army:*

Organization of 4 additional reinforced (motorized) regimental groups. This requires the following:

Release from German captivity of

614 officers

2,376 noncommissioned officers

7,868 white enlisted men

11,660 Senegalese

Release of the requisite war material for these 4 reinforced motorized regimental groups.

(2) *Air Force:*

Reactivation of

4 reconnaissance squadrons

2 bomber groups

4 fighter groups

and release of the requisite war material. Increase in the French share of the production of the German-French air construction program^{*} with this extra production of airplanes to be stockpiled for the time being.

(3) *Fuel:*

Provision of the following quantities of fuel necessary for these operations:

300,000 hectoliters of motor fuel

60,000 hectoliters of aviation fuel.

^{*} For previous developments on this subject, see vol. XI of this series, document No. 713, footnote 3. An agreement on the construction of airplanes in France was signed by Generals Udet and Bergeret on June 30, 1941 (4609/E193845-53).

4. The settling of all the details concerning the measures agreed to or projected in this Protocol is the function of the German Armistice Commission.

PARIS, May 28, 1941.

For the High Command
of the Wehrmacht
WARLIMONT
Major General

*Admiral of the Fleet and
Vice President of the Ministerial Council*
F. DARLAN

Supplementary to and in connection with the preceding military agreements, the following

SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL

has been agreed upon between the German Ambassador in Paris and the Vice President of the French Ministerial Council.

The French Government must expect that the utilization of the port of *Bizerte* and the protection of convoys for the supplies for the German Africa Corps arriving in that port, as laid down in the agreement regarding North Africa, as well as the assistance to the German naval and air forces provided for in the agreement regarding West and Equatorial Africa, can lead to an immediate armed conflict with England or the United States.

The French Government must therefore be provided with the necessary military and political prerequisites for such a contingency.

The German concessions to increase the defense preparedness on land, at sea, and in the air established and projected in the agreement regarding *North Africa* permit the immediate assumption of the risk attending the performance of the French services in *Bizerte*.

The great dangers attending the performance of the services furnished by the French under the agreement regarding *French West and Equatorial Africa* render it necessary, however, to make the practical implementation of these services agreed upon in principle dependent upon the following actions of the Reich Government:

1. Authorizing in advance the necessary reinforcements for the increased defense preparedness of French West Africa;

2. Placing the French Government in a position, by granting political and economic concessions, to justify before public opinion in its own country a possible outbreak of an armed conflict with England and the United States.

PARIS, May 28, 1941.

German Ambassador in Paris:
OTTO ABETZ

Deputy French Premier:
F. DARLAN

No. 560

593/245238-40

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1941—1:06 a. m.

No. 1539 of May 27

Received May 28—8:25 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1518 of May 26.¹

Roosevelt's speech today,² awaited with the greatest suspense, shows clearly that at the present time America is not in a position to enter the war actively, for the reasons which have been often stated. It contains the admission that the state of armaments is unsatisfactory, and that even the joint efforts of England and America can not make up for the sunken ship tonnage. For the first time Roosevelt said expressly that he is interested in gaining time. The speech is set to a decidedly defensive tone. All of the continuing dangers which can threaten the Western Hemisphere are again recounted; in order to be able to show England and the Latin American countries how seriously Roosevelt is resolved to fight these dangers, the two points of the national policy are announced.

First: Resistance to the attempt by Germany to win mastery of the seas. For this purpose the freedom of the seas is proclaimed, as America interprets it; but at the same time America's line of defense, which was still in Europe a short time ago, is pulled back to a line from Greenland through Iceland, the Azores to the Cape Verde Islands. This cannot be otherwise interpreted than that the idea of an expeditionary corps has been abandoned for good.

Second: The American naval patrol will aid in delivering goods to England; it has taken new advanced positions from which it is to observe and explore Germany's intentions. There is no discussion of convoys; the problem has become more difficult than in 1917. Roosevelt reserves to himself [the decision] as to what he wants to interpret as a German attack on the Western Hemisphere; but it is clearly evident from his speech that in case of England's defeat he would not declare war unless Germany took possession of the chain of islands in the eastern Atlantic or of Dakar.

Mixed with his statements there is a concern about the weakness of the English position in Egypt and the possibility that the Indian Ocean might fall to Germany as a "gate to the East."

¹ In this telegram (593/245215-17) Thomsen reported the various internal pressures put on Roosevelt to influence his forthcoming speech in favor of an increasing intervention in the European war and analyzed the factors which would militate against such a policy.

² For text see Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. x, pp. 181-194.

(Group garbled) the speech shows that the unity of the people cannot be brought about by persuasive power alone. Therefore the national emergency is proclaimed, regarding the effect and significance of which a separate telegram will follow.² This measure is meant at the same time to show England once more that America is employing her entire machinery of production while giving up her own standard of living. I described in the preceding report⁴ the difficulties involved in rendering effective aid to England. They cannot be eliminated for the time being even if Roosevelt should cancel the right to strike; this course is open to him after proclamation of the national emergency.

In order to make understandable and acceptable to the American people the burdens which the national emergency will involve, and to show the Latin American countries, England, and China what sacrifices America is determined to make, the speech is keyed to the basic idea that Germany's plans of world conquest involve political, military, cultural, and economic dangers, which America stands resolved to ward off in the interest of all democracies with every means, including force.

In order to cover the purely defensive character of his statements the speech is amply provided with the insults, insinuations, and falsehoods common to Roosevelt in the expectation that they will lead to counterinsults or sharp (one group evidently missing) which he could use advantageously in the press.

THOMSEN

²For the text of the National Emergency proclamation see Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. x, pp. 194-195. Thomsen reported on this matter in telegram No. 1540 of May 27 (593/245241-42).

⁴This might refer to telegram No. 1513 of May 25 (593/245206-07) which stated that the sinking of the British battle cruiser *Hood* had made a tremendous impression in the United States and had proved that Germany was capable of carrying out her threat that all ships entering the blockaded zone around the British Isles would be attacked.

No. 561

195/139168-70

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1264

BERLIN, May 28, 1941—[11:40 p. m.]¹
e. o. Pol. VII 2751 g.

The well-known Indian nationalist, Subhas C. Bose, who has escaped from India and has been staying here secretly for almost 3

¹The time of dispatch is supplied from another copy of this telegram (41/28476).

months with an Italian passport under the cover name of Mazzotta, will arrive in Rome by plane on May 29 at the invitation of the Italian Government. He is accompanied by his secretary, the Reich German, Emilie Schenkl.

The Italian Government has been informed through the Berlin Embassy regarding the conversations that have been carried on here with Bose. The intention is to work together very closely with him in all Indian matters. Extensive confidential plans of large scope are being considered here regarding which the Italian Government has likewise been informed and which in certain circumstances are to be executed on short notice. We are therefore interested in Bose's curtailing his stay in Rome as much as possible and returning here as soon as possible.²

Upon his arrival in Rome, Bose will establish contact with the Embassy.³ Please receive him in a friendly manner and afford him any help he desires. In Rome he is the guest of the Italian Government. It is possible, however, that there, too, he will need a certain amount of money, which perhaps cannot be given him here in lire at the last moment. In case he expresses such a wish please provide him with the necessary funds and carry these in your books as payments on instruction with reference to this telegram.

The Embassy may indicate to the Italian Government that it is completely informed in regard to Bose's stay. Please report regularly by telegram regarding Bose's stay in Rome and the people who receive him.⁴

WOERMANN

² In telegram No. 1265 of May 28 (41/28477), Woermann advised the Embassy in Rome that it was of decisive importance that Bose, during his stay there, should not be persuaded to transfer the center of his activities to Rome and that this could best be prevented by having him return to Berlin as soon as possible.

³ In telegram No. 1296 of June 6 (195/139174) Bismarck reported that Bose had arrived in Rome on May 29 but had not as yet visited the Embassy.

⁴ In telegrams Nos. 1299, 1331, 1380, and 1455 of June 6, 11, 19, and 27, respectively (195/139171, 139175, 139177, 139178) Bismarck reported on Bose's activities in Rome and his reception by Ciano. For further developments in this matter, see vol. xiii of this series.

No. 562

4896/E254556-57

*The Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of Economics and the High Command of the Wehrmacht*¹

Special Delivery Letter

BERLIN, May 27, 1941.

Sent May 28.

Ha. Pol. 3349 g. IV.

Subject: German-Spanish trade, especially deliveries of war material.

With reference to your letter, VSO629 of May 17.²With reference to your letter, Az 3i24 WiRü Amt/W VII b No. 26.660/41 g. of April 28.³

The German Embassy in Madrid has been informed⁴ that we will dispense with a comprehensive agreement concerning the deliveries by the Wehrmacht units and have agreed that this trade should be channeled through general clearing. A comprehensive agreement did not appear expedient because deliveries by the Wehrmacht units to Spain are much smaller than was originally assumed, and because, apart from the fact that a good deal of time would again be required to conclude it, it might entail obligations and restrictions on shipments that might, in the long run, be undesirable for us. In order, however, to ensure that we receive raw materials of military importance as deliveries in return, the Embassy has been instructed⁴ to put in the form of a reciprocal confirmation the list of wishes on both sides, as indicated in the letter of the Ministry of Economics on May 17. Since, accordingly, there are no reasons from a formal point of view for holding back on the shipments to the Spanish armed forces,⁵ I should be grateful to the War Economy and Armaments Office if the Naval Attaché, who, in accordance with the wish of the High Command of the Navy, is to convey Germany's promises, were provided with instructions at once. Even if the delay in supplying Spain with naval equipment is attributable to the lack of clarity on the part of the Spanish Navy in presenting its wishes, the Foreign Ministry would, however, appreciate it, in view of the great interest that is shown by the Spanish Government in these pur-

¹ Copies of this letter were sent to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, the Ministry of Finance, and the Directorate of the Reichsbank.

² In this letter (4896/E254543-46) the Ministry of Economics submitted its proposals for a comprehensive reciprocal trade agreement with Spain.

³ See document No. 46, footnote 3.

⁴ On May 24 (4896/E254553-54).

⁵ In an unnumbered telegram of May 10 (136/74850) Stohrer reported considerable resentment by the Spanish Minister for Naval Affairs because of the failure of the German Navy to deliver equipment which it had promised some time before.

chases, if we, too, did everything possible to facilitate an early decision by the Spanish Navy. I should also appreciate receiving from the High Command of the Wehrmacht a statement as to whether, in the case of air force equipment, supplies for Spain should be considered out of the question, or whether the delivery of air force equipment can still be expected and if so, in what amounts.⁶

By order:
SABATH

⁶ In a letter of May 30 (4896/E254566) the OKW expressed its willingness to cooperate in the speedy settlement of the deliveries of naval equipment to Spain. There was, however, no chance for any deliveries of air force material in the near future.

No. 563

419/216440-47

*The Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of Public Enlightenment
and Propaganda*

BERLIN, May 28, 1941.

Subject: America propaganda.

For State Secretary Gutterer.

The Foreign Minister asked me to reply to your letter of May 23¹ as follows:

Regarding your proposal, it can be said in principle that any propaganda action with respect to foreign countries unfriendly toward us which is recognizable from the outset as propaganda, involves in general the certainty of failure for this very reason. Experience has shown that any attempt to impose German arguments as such directly upon a foreigner meets with rejection rather than willingness to accept them. This fact cannot be changed, and if we want to be successful we must adjust our propaganda measures accordingly. Thus in our foreign propaganda the fundamental principle should be established that any attempt, which is recognized as such, to influence foreign countries unfriendly to us, will of necessity produce the opposite effect from that which was intended. Therefore propaganda arguments must be presented to the foreigner in such a manner that they would seem to have developed from his own ideas and his own

¹ In this letter (419/216429-31) State Secretary Gutterer had suggested a radical change in the current radio program to America and proposed to place it under a committee of experts working under the general direction of the Propaganda Ministry. Woermann recorded on May 24 that he had received this letter in the absence of Weizsäcker and had discussed the matter with Dieckhoff and Senior Counselor Rühle of the Cultural Policy Department (419/216428). Both strongly opposed the Propaganda Ministry's plan and their arguments were partly used in Weizsäcker's reply to Gutterer (Dieckhoff memorandum of May 24: 419/216432-34; Rühle memorandum of May 24: 419/216435-36).

insight. It follows that the institution of a news program for foreign countries under the name of the Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda would likewise produce of necessity the opposite effect from that intended.

The following is to be said on the question of propaganda for the U.S.A. in particular:

1. As far as the American public is concerned, one must, considering the situation there, be particularly careful with direct propaganda. If the American public were divided into friends of Germany and of England then one could count on the willingness of the pro-Germans to be receptive to direct German propaganda. If we proceeded from this assumption in the present American case, however, we would be seriously deceiving ourselves. The actual situation is rather that in the U.S.A. there is a war party and a peace party confronting one another, both of which are by and large very decidedly anti-German as a result of incitement by the news media which are predominantly in Jewish hands. The real friends of Germany are unfortunately so few and far between that they are hardly a political factor at the present time. The efforts of the war party, however, are directed toward discrediting the peace party by trying to accuse it of pro-German tendencies which are at present generally out of favor in America. Thus particular caution is needed in our measures designed to strengthen the peace party. If we intervene ostentatiously and theatrically in the internal American conflict through regular German radio propaganda we will thereby make it more difficult for the peace party to uphold our arguments and we will thereby weaken it. The less we intervene spectacularly from Germany in this contest, and the more we skillfully let the Americans themselves carry on this fight, in part by radio, in part in other ways, the better for us. On the other hand, any obvious intervention by Germany will only have the result that all Americans will unite against us, and that instead of deepening the gulf between the two camps we will join them together against ourselves. Typical of this, for example, is the case of Lindbergh. Lindbergh as one of the leaders of the peace party successfully presents our arguments to the American people, and will do so as long as we refrain from any public reaction to his activity. The moment, however, we let him have even the slightest response in the German press and the German radio he will be shouted down and silenced in America as a German propagandist. For this reason Lindbergh has several times asked us indirectly through the Embassy if possible not even to mention his name in the German press.² What applies to Lindbergh's person also

² See document No. 411 and footnote 2.

applies in general to putting the German arguments before the American public. If we present these arguments regularly by radio as direct German propaganda instead of skillfully suggesting them to the Americans indirectly in a camouflaged manner, as is being done at present successfully in many ways, including radio, then these theses will be branded from the outset as German propaganda by the basically hostile American news media, in such a way that in the present situation no American will dare to make use of such arguments out of fear of being decried as a paid German agent or member of the fifth column. In this way our best arguments would be wasted.

2. The Foreign Minister therefore considers it to be erroneous to make any change in our present propaganda methods in the U.S.A., and with respect to the U.S.A. either in the field of radio or in other fields. The idea of calling a radio program the "Goebbels hour" and making this the "leitmotiv and core" of the German radio program for the U.S.A. would in this situation be a really fatal propaganda mistake. For a radio program with this name, announced with fanfares, etc., would be rejected by the entire American public as "German propaganda".³ The failure of such a campaign would thus be assured from the start. You will also be aware that as a result of the distortions and misrepresentations of the image of the leading German personalities, i.e., including the Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, by the lying American press, subservient to the Jews, one has in the U.S.A. such a misconception of the person of the Reich Minister of Propaganda that merely the announcement of a "Goebbels hour" would cause the American listeners to shut off their radios at once, unless they wanted to pursue anti-German objectives in listening. But even if this radio program were not expressly termed the "Goebbels hour" the idea is inappropriate for the general reasons mentioned in point 1. There is the additional fact that such radio addresses by German personalities could not have any effect if only because most of them would be made in the German language and therefore would not be understood in those circles which matter; and no one listens to translations in any case except of the Führer's speeches. The Foreign Minister is therefore of the opinion that any attempt to change our present very cautious and carefully considered radio propaganda directed toward America would be damaging to our interests and likely to jeopardize the successes of our present propaganda, which are noticeable in spite of the strongest counterefforts.

3. As regards the special committee planned by the Propaganda Ministry the following is to be said:

³ In English in the original.

The Foreign Minister established some time ago under Ambassador Dieckhoff an "America Committee" on the same basis as the "England Committee" and the "France Committee" which at the time directed the propaganda toward France. This America Committee includes a considerable number of first rate experts on the United States, who assist the Foreign Minister as advisers on questions regarding America and who have directed the propaganda for America since the outbreak of the war. In the sphere of radio this is done in regular discussions and instructions to our English announcers of the short wave broadcasts and by influencing the representatives of the American radio companies.

In regard to the persons you have suggested for a new "U.S.A. Propaganda Committee" the following is to be said:

Herr von Bülow is married to an American lady to be sure, and has lived in America for a long time. Some time ago he applied for a position in the Foreign Ministry. However, for certain reasons he was not hired. For a long time Frau von Bülow has been trying to obtain employment in the field of propaganda. She can perhaps be used occasionally as a radio announcer but she is not suitable to participate in the direction of a committee for propaganda directed toward the U.S.A. A few months ago Frau Anderson was accepted here for employment and is working as an employee of the information section of the Foreign Ministry. As such she has been made available to the Reich Radio Company for a number of speeches and, being a fanatical Catholic, she has indeed proved to be quite usable for special Catholic propaganda directed toward Spain and South America. However, in her latest lectures of a general nature she did not strike the right note so that our Embassy in Washington urgently requested that Frau Anderson change her bombastic-dramatic manner of expression, which the Americans find disgusting.⁴ But she must in no case be given any influence in the conduct or direction of our propaganda aimed at the U.S.A. In summary, it should be said regarding the idea of establishing a propaganda committee for the U.S.A. that such an institution alongside the existing America Committee would not only be superfluous but would be actually injurious, and would disturb the good propaganda work of the Committee directed toward the U.S.A.

4. The Foreign Minister is of the opinion that so far in this war practically no mistakes have been made in our America propaganda—in contrast to our clumsy propaganda in the United States and aimed at that country during the World War. This has been con-

⁴ Dieckhoff, in his comments on Gutterer's letter (see footnote 1), noted that the Washington Embassy had complained, in telegram No. 1402 of May 15, about Frau Anderson's style. This telegram has not been found.

firmed time and again by real American friends, and American newspapers hostile to us have often had to admit this with chagrin. The America Committee under the direction of Ambassador Dieckhoff has made a continuous effort to improve this very difficult propaganda even more, especially on the basis of the regular reports and proposals from our representatives in the U.S.A., and to shape the propaganda directed toward the U.S.A. according to the instructions of the Foreign Minister. The plan of the Propaganda Ministry would not only endanger this work, it would of necessity lead to a serious setback. We must in no circumstances, however, expose ourselves to the possibility of such a setback. It is one of the main objectives of our present foreign policy work to keep the United States out of the war, by means of political pressure (Europe and East Asia against America) on the one hand and by strengthening the peace party in the U.S.A. through suitable handling of the sensitive, if not hysterical, public opinion on the other; for, in this way the collapse of England will be brought about most quickly and a long war will be prevented.

In these circumstances the Foreign Minister has instructed me to inform you that he cannot agree to the establishment of a special committee for propaganda directed toward America and of a "Goebbels hour" in German radio programs for America, and that he must request the Reich Minister of Propaganda to refrain from carrying out the plan described in your letter.

By order:
WEIZSÄCKER

No. 564

93/103674

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 364

BERLIN, May 28, 1941.

Today I resumed with the Hungarian Minister the conversation on the subject of the Banat begun by him on May 20.¹ I told Sztójay that the wishes concerning the further handling [of the matter] of the Banat which the Hungarian Government submitted to us could not be fulfilled at this time. For the time being the present arrangement had to remain in force; the Hungarian Government as well as the Regent personally were very well aware of the reasons for this. Hungary had a clear promise from us concerning the Banat and she simply had to have patience now. I ex-

¹ Recorded in Weizsäcker's memorandum, St. S. No. 351 of May 20 (93/103665-66).

plained this basic decision also in regard to the three special wishes advanced by Sztójay (cf. St.S. No. 351).²

Minister Sztójay took note of my statements. He will report about them to Budapest. In talking to me he only added that if things were as I described them, then we should after all look into the question whether the German national group in the Banat might not get on a better footing with the Hungarian national group there than had been the case up to now. The wishes concerning the Banat advanced by Sztójay which we had put off had their origin in the very fact that there was still no good relationship between these two ethnic groups. Perhaps something could really be done in order to adjust existing conflicts.

Sztójay also referred in this connection to a manifestation by the German national group in Timișoara, regarding which the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* reported on May 27. The German speaker is supposed to have said on that occasion that the "Jewish-Hungarian circles" were enemies of German-Rumanian cooperation. Sztójay will probably bring up the matter of the manifestation again here when he has the original text of the speech.

WEIZSÄCKER

²Namely: (1) that the population be told that Hungary would definitely receive the Banat; (2) that Hungarian administrative organs be established in the Banat; and (3) that occupation of the Banat by Hungarian troops be hastened.

No. 565

265/172880-82

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 462 from Fuschl

FUSCHL, May 29, 1941—12:20 a. m.

No. 553 from the Foreign Ministry

Received Berlin, May 29—1:15 a. m.

RAM 223/R

Sent May 29.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 629 of May 27.¹

Your telegram proceeds from the assumption that the negotiations with Turkey regarding arms transit have now arrived at a deadlock. On the other hand your telegram contains a formulated draft treaty, of which you say that you had reached a provisional agreement with Saracoglu on it pending my consent. This gives me cause to make the following remarks:

¹ Document No. 556.

1. In my telegram of May 18 [17]² it was stated that a formulated draft would be sent you from here to be handed on to the Turkish Government as soon as your report on the outcome of your preliminary conversations had been received. I asked you to wire your proposals for such a draft. This, of course, could not be understood to mean that I wished to get a draft from you regarding which you had already come to an agreement with Saracoglu.

2. It is incomprehensible to me why you were prepared to arrange a draft of secret protocol 1 regarding Edirne, the islands, etc., as long as you were not certain that you could also put through secret protocol 2 regarding the arms transit.

The complex of treaties with Turkey must of course be a well-balanced whole. Because of the fact that in the project which you transmitted the secret protocol regarding arms transit was omitted, there cannot be any question of a balance between performance and counterperformance in this project. Rather, the situation now is that the Turks have stated that they are willing to accept all of our extensive assurances for guaranteeing their interests, without offering us more than the promise to refrain from any aggressive attitude toward the German Reich. That they will do the latter, however, goes without saying in any case. The entire treaty would thus become an entirely one-sided transaction permitting the Turks not only to save face with respect to the English, but also to provide proof that they have paid for tangible German promises with empty words.

3. If the Turkish Government now takes an entirely negative standpoint in the question of arms transit, this attitude is inexplicable in view of your reporting on this question so far. Rather, your telegrams of May 13,³ 14,⁴ 16,⁵ and 23⁶ dealt with the promise of arms transit as an essential and also attainable point in the agreements under discussion. Only your telegram of May 26⁷ then spoke about the matter presenting difficulties. According to this there must be especially important reasons which have brought about the change in the Turkish attitude on this question, and which must surely consist of more than the bitter reproaches in the English note of reply which your telegram mentions.

I can therefore not help having the impression that the Turks are after all still wavering as to whether they would not perhaps fare better on the English side than on ours. In addition to the

² Document No. 529.

³ Telegram No. 543 of May 13 (265/172842-43).

⁴ In telegram No. 552 of May 14 (265/172844) Papen had stated that "transit of war material for Iraq accordingly can be considered as assured."

⁵ Document No. 523.

⁶ Document No. 545.

⁷ Telegram No. 631 (265/172871).

bitter reproaches from the English side, English inducements probably also play a part in this, possibly by promises of Iraq or Syrian territory. If this is the case then this shows that the Turks still have no clear balance sheet of the general situation at present. Otherwise they would have to realize that it is after all only in their wisely understood own interest to support our measures, which amount to keeping the English off their backs at their southern border. For the Turks can hardly avoid realizing that any Turkish encouragement of an advance by the English in the Near East doubtless involves the danger of turning out to be very costly for the Turks.

4. If Turkey wants to permit only passage of shipments of war material which are addressed to Iran or Afghanistan, then it is not understandable why at the same time the Samsun-Tehran route should be prescribed to us as the sole transit route for this, particularly since shipments were also sent earlier to Iran via Iraq. If this demand is now suddenly made, it is to be assumed that this is evidently in compliance with an English request.

5. In this situation the question arises whether there is any sense in continuing the discussions which you have started there. The Turks are evidently still much more subservient to England than we have of late assumed, and they now want to accept gifts from us, to be sure, but above all not incur the displeasure of England. Given such an attitude it must be very much doubted whether, as you predict, a German-Turkish treaty today would have the effect of a signal for the whole world and convince England that Turkey can no longer be counted on. Still, it will be expedient not to let the thread break off entirely at this time, but for the moment to sound out the Turkish Government.

For the foregoing reasons I request you to explain to Saracoglu that we had naturally, as you had already told him, expected the promise of the transit of arms as a performance in return for the assurances sketched in the draft of a secret protocol. If this should be out of the question, then you would not be in a position either to continue offering him the prospects of such extensive assurances. Accordingly, there would remain only a more modest program for discussion, namely the contents of the treaty to be published. We were willing to discuss this further with the Turks and you would be in a position in the next few days to present him with a draft treaty drawn up here. You were asking him to tell you whether he was willing now to give consideration to a more modest program of this sort.

Report by wire.*

RIBBENTROP

* See document No. 566.

No. 566

265/172888-86

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 635 of May 29

ANKARA, May 29, 1941.

Received May 29—11:45 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 553 of May 29.²

1. In my preliminary discussions with the State President and the Foreign Minister I stated, in accordance with your instructions, that if Turkey were willing to make a fundamental change in her policy toward us we would be willing to guarantee the interests of Turkey in the couth points. Since after all my preliminary discussions for drawing up a treaty could not be fruitful in a vacuum, Saracoglu had asked me to make concrete proposals in order to see to what extent we could come to an agreement. The proposals subsequently made by me—with the reservation that they were personal and, in accordance with your instructions, should serve only as a basis for discussion—also contained of course the proposal for the Turkish performance in return in the matter of arms transit.

Please also note that my formulations in secret protocol 1 regarding the islands or neighboring areas are put entirely in general terms and neither designate an island nor define any other geographical claim. The whole secret protocol is the bill made out in general terms in the event of the German victory which, as you know, Turkey now considers as increasingly likely, to be sure, but nevertheless not as a definite fact.

2. Before I transmit your views to Saracoglu, I feel myself obliged to indicate the following as regards your arguments:

The view that Turkey is wavering between us and England like a shopper in the bazaars in order to see with whom she can make a better deal represents a mistaken view of the situation here and of the prestige of the present Turkish statesmen, above all of the State President himself. Turkey is not willing to make a treaty with Germany and gradually to shift her foreign policy toward cooperation with us for the reason that we are issuing her a bill on the future, but because we have finally convinced her that we intend to respect her independence and that we have not sold her either to Italy or to Russia.

3. The motives for Turkey's negative attitude in the transit question are entirely clear if one knows the psychological situation of the country: When Saracoglu and Numan at first made no objection

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 1735 to Fuschl, May 30."

² Document No. 565.

to this request if it were carried out in a camouflaged way, they probably had not counted on such a massive reaction by England to the wish of the Turkish Government to reorient its policy toward Germany. The English threat to present Turkey to the world as violating her treaties hit the Turks in their most sensitive spot, for hitherto they had always stressed that they intended as "gentlemen" fully to observe their treaties.³

It would be erroneous to assume that the German promise of this or that island or English promises of areas in northern Syria could influence the course which the Turkish Government is determined to pursue in the interest of its clean reputation. If this were not so, then the English would easily have been able to achieve success with their promises regarding the Turkish frontier when the situation of the Reich was still unsettled. Remember that in the World War, too, the Turks adhered to us loyally to the last day, in contrast to other allies. They will therefore not be able to understand either that we withdraw the consideration to be given to their wishes for security in Thrace, at the Straits and in the Aegean at that moment when the material counterservice demanded by us is declined by them. For they assume that our willingness to champion their interests in these areas does not arise from the intention of engaging in a mere business transaction, but rather from the realization that a strong and independent Turkey, which allegedly we always advocate, has a claim to receiving consideration for these wishes regarding her security.

4. Therefore if we now intend simply to [evidently a word omitted in the encoding] a public nonaggression pact, then the Turks will regard this as a proof that our assurances of restoring the old friendly relationship with them were merely meant tactically, and are not the beginning of a long-term cooperation, as stated in the Führer's message.⁴ It appears to me to be doubtful whether they will then still have an interest in accepting the bitter reproaches of England and America that are to be expected as a result of the publication of such a treaty.

5. Furthermore, I should like to point out that there is not a total lack of Turkish performances in return. There is the permission of the unlimited transit of war material to Iran and Afghanistan as well as of other supplies to Syria that are not war material in the narrow sense (aviation gasoline). Also the consideration to be given to possible German wishes for use of the Straits would not be without significance at the proper time, and could be laid down in the secret protocol. At the same time I would have to insist that these concessions are very much outweighed by the *psychological* effect of

³ Cf. Franz von Papen, *Memoirs*, p. 478.

⁴ See document No. 113.

the conclusion of a treaty as heretofore planned. Moreover, *our* promises will also be effective only after victory has been attained.

6. I should like to point out in conclusion that according to your interpretation there, too, we should not require of the Turkish statesmen more than they can justify to themselves and to their people at the present time. However, if we wish to force concessions from them today under pressure which would make them appear in the eyes of the world and of their people as men who broke their word, we would again conjure up the danger of a political short circuit.

For the above reasons I should like to request once more that I be authorized to continue the negotiations on the present basis; please be convinced that in so doing we are taking a first important step that will be very worth our while.⁵

PAPEN

⁵ In telegram No. 575 of May 31 (3883/E048192) Ribbentrop took note of this telegram and directed Papen to continue the conversations with the Turks in accordance with the instructions given in telegram No. 553 (document No. 565). However, in telegram No. 576 of May 31 (265/172889) Rintelen forwarded to Ankara supplementary instructions from Ribbentrop that the talks with the Turks should not be resumed until June 2. In his reply to these instructions Papen reported in telegram No. 651 of May 31 (265/172901) that Saracoglu had expressed hope for an agreement "in spite of obvious difficulties."

No. 567

534/239828-30

Note Verbale to the Apostolic Nunciature

BERLIN, May 19 [29], 1941.¹

Pol. III 960.

The Foreign Ministry refers to its note verbale—Pol. III 774—of April 22² concerning confiscation of monasteries and has the honor to inform the Apostolic Nunciature as follows:

The confiscation of the property of the Catholic Church as well as of the Catholic foundations, orders, and associations in the *incorporated eastern areas* as directed by the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost is based on the decree of September 17, 1940 (*Reichsgesetzblatt* I, p. 1270) regarding the treatment of property of subjects of the former Polish state. According to this not only the property of private persons who are members of the former Polish state but also, under Section 10, the property of a corporate body, societies, associations, and other groups of persons in which members of the former Polish

¹ Marginal notes:

"The draft of the note has been sent to the Foreign Minister today. The State Secretary asked, however, that it be submitted to Under State Secretary Gaus for examination, before submission to the Foreign Minister. Resubmit after one week. Rf, May 22."

"The RAM approved dispatch of the note today. Si[egfried], May 29."

² Not found. See document No. 183 for previous exchanges on this subject.

state were still in 1939 either predominant capital participants or whose administration was predominantly influenced by members of the former Polish state, is subject to confiscation and commissarial administration. To the extent defined by Section 10, paragraph 3 of the regulation, assets of these juridical persons can also be confiscated.

The Catholic parishes, foundations, orders, and associations in the incorporated eastern areas are considered a corporate body to which Section 10 of the decree applies, because their administration has been predominantly influenced by subjects of the former Polish state—this with the close connection of the Catholic Church with the Polish element [*Polentum*]. Section 10 of the decree of September 17, 1940, applies both to a corporate body under private law and, with the exception of the territorial corporations coming under the regulation regarding the securing of the assets of the former Polish state of January 15, 1940 (*Reichsgesetzblatt I*, p. 174), to those under public law. Thus it is unimportant under German law, which is solely applicable, whether the individual Catholic parishes, foundations, orders, and associations in the incorporated eastern areas are a corporate body under private or public law. Furthermore it is also of no importance whether the Catholic Church as a whole has a right of supreme ownership over the property of the corporate bodies belonging to its organization, since under canon law this is a matter of internal church law that has no application here.

Thus the confiscation of Catholic Church property in the incorporated eastern areas as declared by the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost is justified in accordance with the regulation on the treatment of assets of the members of the former Polish state of September 17, 1940 (*Reichsgesetzblatt I*, p. 1270).

Excepted from confiscation in every case are the churches and chapels, the cemeteries still maintained as such, etc., as well as all other institutions connected with the conduct of divine service.

The Foreign Ministry wishes to reserve a further communication in regard to the confiscation of various *monasteries in the old Reich* mentioned in the note verbale of the Apostolic Nunciature No. 39291 of April 20^{*} until an investigation of the matter by the competent authorities has been concluded.

^{*} A copy of this note verbale dated Apr. 22 (534/239812-13) is appended to Weizsäcker's memorandum of Apr. 23 (534/239811).

No. 568

83/61386-87

Minister Grobba to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MAY 29, 1941.

Special Security Handling

No. 151 of May 29

1. The English attack on Baghdad continued last night and today with an increased number of armored cars and tanks. Since it moved last night up to the neighborhood of the suburb of Kazimein, on the advice of the Minister President I left Baghdad at 6:00 a.m. with escort and arrived at Kirkuk at 3:00 p.m.

2. All local Germans left here this morning via Mosul; as I have heard from Mosul, all German military persons there left the city today by plane. The reason for their sudden departure is not known to me.

3. The Minister President urgently requests military support by the Luftwaffe in the defense of Baghdad; he still believes that he can hold the city with this help. When the sudden departure of the German air force personnel becomes known it will mean a tremendous disappointment for the Minister President and the people of Iraq, unless there are compelling reasons for it, and German prestige will suffer for a long time. This outcome can be prevented only if the Luftwaffe is committed again quickly.

4. Of the Italian fighters three were committed today, and one of them was shot down.

5. Even if Baghdad falls, Rashid Ali intends to continue defending the country and to retreat step by step.

6. The Italian Minister, protected by extraterritorial status, intends to join Rashid Ali.

7. The defense of the Mosul area is urgently in the German interest and should therefore be attempted by the necessary German commitment.

8. I intend to proceed to Mosul tomorrow morning, and hope to find there a promise of a renewed commitment of German planes.¹

GEHRCKE

¹ Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]."

No. 569

124/122689-700

Counselor of Embassy Bergen to State Secretary Weissäcker

BRUSSELS, May 29, 1941.

DEAR HERR STATE SECRETARY: I have the honor to transmit to you enclosed a memorandum containing proposals for the inauguration of a policy of cooperation with Belgium. As you will remember, I presented similar ideas to you orally as early as last November.¹ The time was not yet ripe, however, for carrying out these plans, and the setback of December 13 in France² subsequently eliminated every prospect of their materializing. I therefore put them off but should now like to take them up again, since the time appears to me more favorable. Once there is military involvement with the United States and perhaps a change in the situation in the east, compelling us to make special military efforts, it will probably be too late.

The proposals made in the memorandum contain nothing impossible and are designed in such a way as not to bind our policy for the future, so that, if we should so desire, we might even, at the conclusion of peace, wipe the Belgium state off the map or divide it up. But it is difficult for me to judge from here whether my suggestions fit into the general political picture, since I have no means of informing myself, except through newspapers and the radio. It is for this reason that I am taking the liberty of sending you the memorandum in order that you may first be able to examine the question whether it is advisable from the general political viewpoint to advance such suggestions.

The carrying out of the proposals would in my opinion be impossible unless the King can be brought into the matter. I do not know whether this is considered feasible in Berlin; nor do I know whether the King is willing to cooperate in the modest form required.

I have naturally not yet discussed the plan as such with anyone. Nor have I, in view of the uncertain fate of my suggestions, informed the Military Commander or the military administration. My purpose with the memorandum is first of all merely to request your consent to very discreet soundings concerning German-Belgian collaboration.

I have been intending also for other official reasons to come to Berlin during the week from June 8 to 14. I could then supplement my memorandum by an oral presentation. If you would like to see

¹ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 463.

² See *ibid.*, document No. 510.

me earlier or later, I should appreciate being so informed by teletype.³

Yours, etc.

W. v. BARGEN

[Enclosure]

SECRET

MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE POSSIBILITIES OF A POLICY OF
COOPERATION WITH BELGIUM

The policy of France has always had a great influence on that of Belgium. In spite of all bitter experiences and serious disappointments which it has brought for Belgium in this war, it has nevertheless remained a kind of orientation point, so that everything that happens in Paris or in Vichy arouses great interest in all the political circles of Belgium. The first phase of the German effort to come to a relationship of political cooperation with France, which began with the historical meeting between the Führer and Marshal Pétain at Montoire⁴ and was concluded by the palace revolution of December 13, 1940, was therefore observed in Brussels with great attention and interested concern. As I reported at the time,⁵ there developed here, though only in the initial stages, a certain willingness to pursue a course similar to that of France. After December 13 this did not develop any further. With the resumption of the German-French negotiations and their fortunate conclusion⁶ the problem has once more become acute, however. It is occasionally mentioned in the Belgian press and is often referred to in private conversations of politically interested Belgians. The thought is evidently that Belgium with such a policy might be able to assure her continued existence as an independent state. However, developments have so far not progressed beyond the vague wish that an attempt be made in this direction. At any rate, the special position of Belgium, which is entirely occupied by us and no longer possesses any capability of taking political action, and is neither in a position to make any special concessions, has not yet permitted any sort of concrete plans to be formulated.

³ Weizsäcker replied by telegram No. 739 of June 6 (124/122702) that he himself would be away from Berlin during the week of June 8 to 14 but that Woermann would see Bargaen if he were unable to postpone his trip. In telegram No. 667 of June 7 (124/122703), Bargaen indicated that he would postpone his trip for one week. On his copy of this telegram Weizsäcker noted: "Regarding his suggestion I have advised H. v. Bargaen to submit it again on Sept. 1, 1941. W[eißsäcker], June 18."

⁴ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 227.

⁵ No such report has been found.

⁶ See document No. 559.

Nevertheless it appears to me worth considering whether it is not advisable to institute a policy of cooperation with Belgium and to place German-Belgian relations more into the sphere of foreign policy. It would be an incontestable success of German policy and would find response all over the world if it were possible to give this relationship, which at the present time is based on military coercion, a voluntary character. The moral impression of such a transformation of German-Belgian relations would be all the stronger since it is precisely Belgium that has been widely considered to be a citadel of anti-German feeling and a reliable and staunch opponent of the Reich. If it is possible to enlist the voluntary cooperation of this country in the new order of Europe under German leadership, this will be a political victory in the fight against England, which will have favorable repercussions for us in the other occupied areas as well. What a Belgian journalist, whom I have known well for many years, told me a few days ago is characteristic for the significance of such a change in the German-Belgian relationship. The man in question had returned the previous day from a trip of several days to Holland, during which he saw numerous Dutch politicians from all camps with whom he was acquainted. As he told me, the idea of German-Belgian cooperation which he occasionally mentioned in conversations, aroused actual horror among the Dutchmen, who mostly were very anti-German. Aside from the effects described above, a policy of cooperation with Belgium would also be useful for us in so far as it would give a new face to our propaganda for a new order in Europe; it would permit us to point out that we are treating a small country that is entirely at our mercy with generosity and consideration for its own interests.

Of all the countries occupied by us, Belgium—aside from Greece—is probably the only one in which there exists certain internal prerequisites for a policy of cooperation, and where an attempt in this direction would not appear hopeless from the very start. In this favorable situation the methods of government of the Military Commander have proved themselves, in that he has avoided coercion and sought voluntary cooperation as far as possible in consideration of the Belgian character.

Nevertheless, considerable difficulties will still have to be overcome here, too, if practical bases for cooperation are to be found. The existing interest in such a cooperation on the German and the Belgian side is entirely different. It is important for us, above all, to win Belgium over to the new order of Europe, with the resulting political and propagandistic repercussions. Besides this we have an interest in a careful and appreciative treatment of Belgium which provides us with the most valuable assistance for our war economy, more than any other occupied area, and therewith in effect greatly

facilitates our war effort. Finally, with a policy of cooperation we can prepare the close connection of Belgium with the Reich for the coming period of peace and create the psychological prerequisites for this.

On the Belgian side the decisive political interest that could give inducement to a voluntary alignment with Germany is directed to the maintenance of a relative independence and freedom. Behind this interest is the wish of an overwhelming majority—one can even say 99 percent of the population—in both the Walloon and the Flemish camp. Beside this and overshadowing all political problems is the interest in preserving the material existence of a nation threatened by hunger.

From the complex of interests outlined above, a program of cooperation could be developed which I shall describe in detail:

Belgian Contributions

1. Belgium would have to accomplish the act of voluntary entry into a Europe led by National Socialist Germany by a statement indicating perhaps that the state of war between Belgium and Germany had de facto come to an end, that the new order in Europe would be brought about under Germany's leadership, and that Belgium was willing to do her part.

Here, the question of who could issue such a statement presents difficulties. If we do not wish to consider the Committee of Secretaries General as authorized to do this, as the highest governmental body at present, then we must consider establishing a small cabinet or a presidium of secretaries general. At any rate ways could surely be found for justifying the competence of the authority issuing the statement.

It is absolutely necessary—and this is a further difficulty—to get the King's participation in this statement in order to popularize the action. Without some sort of cooperation by the King the introduction of a common policy with Belgium is unthinkable. However, it should be possible to do this without the King's having to appear generally again as the Chief of State.

In this connection I might mention that the great reserve which the King exhibits in accordance with our wishes is used against us particularly by our opponents. Not long ago the former Belgian Minister President Pierlot,⁷ who is now living in London, talked in a speech of the proud attitude of the King who refused to reassume any sort of governmental functions and continued to consider himself a prisoner so as to express in this way his protest against the violence done to his country.

⁷ Hubert Pierlot, Belgian Minister President, 1939–1945.

2. Doubtless Belgium would concede the utilization of her full—and very large—industrial potentialities for our defense economy and a large-scale shift in orders extending the already existing economic cooperation.

3. It would probably be possible to achieve the gradual adoption of National Socialist ideas and the ideological alignment of Belgium with the Reich if we proceed carefully, avoid exercising too much tutelage, and encourage the development of appropriate Belgian aspirations instead of forcing German organizations upon them. Points of departure for this are present in both the Flemish and the Walloon part of the country.

German Contributions in Return

1. The widespread wish, constantly expressed by the Belgians, namely to learn something about the future status for Belgium and to obtain a guarantee of the continued existence of the country as a state after the war can hardly be fulfilled by Germany. This would eliminate the strongest political incentive for Belgium to seek a voluntary alignment with Germany, unless some substitution for the desired guarantee were offered. I visualize this as a renunciation of all propaganda directed toward an incorporation of the whole country or its Flemish provinces with Germany and against the person of the King. Such propaganda has never been disseminated by the military administration but according to the Belgians it has been made by individual representatives of the party organizations. A statement renouncing such propaganda would be very valuable to the Belgians because it would appear to them more or less as a guarantee. On the other hand it would cost us nothing. In the first place it would not tie our hands but would leave us perfectly free for the future. On the other hand it would mean nothing to us, since such propaganda is in any case without all prospect of success at the present time and would not arouse either a desire for incorporation or hostility toward the King, but would rather have the opposite effect in both cases.

The favorable impression created by such a statement of renunciation, which is in itself noncommittal but is very interesting for the Belgians, could even be strengthened by a gesture toward the King. One could imagine, for example, that he might be informed by a letter from the Führer that his captivity was at an end, his full personal freedom was being restored to him; he could not, however, resume the government of the country as long as the occupation was necessary on grounds that war was being waged. Other possibilities, too, exist in this regard.

2. As regards supplying Belgium with foodstuffs, we should give the assurance that we shall provide what is lacking after all Belgian

resources have been utilized, so that the rations, which are in themselves low and are below those in Germany, can be distributed in their entirety. This is an extremely important point, from both the political and the economic aspects. Every sort of political propaganda campaign is useless in Belgium, every social improvement uninteresting, unless the most primitive needs of the people can be met. German aid is all the more necessary here since it is precisely the poorer elements that are easier to win over to National Socialism which suffer from the food shortage, whereas the prosperous groups can still supply themselves from the black market. On the other hand, no great accomplishments in mining or industry can be expected from starving workers; these, however, are necessary in the interest of our military economy. Our own political and economic interest therefore bids us to provide adequately for the Belgian population, so that this, too, is not a concession of special significance for us but would appear to the Belgians as such.

3. A question that has aroused a great deal of dissatisfaction in Belgium is the release of the prisoners. As is known, all of the Flemish prisoners have been released to Belgium, whereas the Walloons are still retained in Germany. This arrangement is felt to be unjust and is criticized particularly because the Walloons do not show themselves to be less willing to cooperate with the military administration than the Flemings and they contribute more to our armaments than the latter, since the largest part of Belgian heavy industry is in Walloon territory. It is therefore absolutely necessary to settle the prisoner problem, whether by releasing the Walloon prisoners or by letting them be free workers with the possibility of returning to Belgium.

The three points mentioned above are absolute prerequisites for cooperation with Belgium. It is possible that the Belgians would advance still other wishes, but without fulfillment of the above-mentioned three there would be no prospect of an agreement and any conversation would be useless.

In closing I would like to point out that the introduction of a policy of cooperation with Belgium would naturally also affect the internal conditions in the country. It would inevitably lead to a reinforcement of the concept of Belgian unity and would force us to subject our Flemish policy—which is incidentally not entirely consistent—to a certain revision and to direct it in the future mainly toward supporting the Flemish element within the framework of the Belgian state.

[EDITORS' NOTE. The diary of Ugo Cavallero, *Comando Supremo: Diario 1940-48 del Capo di S. M. G.* (Bologna, 1948), page 105, records under the date May 30:

"The Duce told me that he foresaw the possibility of a conflict between Germany and Russia. He said that we could not stay out of this because it involved the struggle against communism. It was therefore necessary to make arrangements for the bringing together between Ljubljana and Zagreb of a motorized division, of an armored division, and of the grenadier division."

According to Emilio Faldella, *L'Italia e la seconda guerra mondiale*, 2nd ed. (Bologna, 1960), page 351, General Marras was directed on June 15 to offer Hitler the participation of an army corps in the imminent war, and on June 18 the Comando Supremo issued the orders for constituting the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia.

On June 23 by message No. 15004 sent from Rome at 9:10 p.m. (M341/MO15275) Rintelen reported:

"I have just learned at the Comando Supremo that on the basis of an immediate agreement between the Führer and the Duce an Italian Army corps of three divisions is being prepared for transport to the Eastern Theater (Rumania). The army corps is composed as follows: corps headquarters, motorized; Commanding General, General Zingales; Torino Division, Pasubio Division, and 3rd Rapid Division. A reconnaissance group forms part of the corps and the Italian Air Force wishes in addition to send a fighter group of MC-200's.

"All questions regarding the transport of these troops to the Eastern Theater and of their commitment there are to be settled through General Marras with the OKW or OKH."

No record has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry of any discussion of the matter prior to June 22.]

No. 570

593/245246

Circular of the Foreign Minister

Telegram

No. 470 from Fuschl

FUSCHL, May 30, 1941—3:10 a. m.

Received Berlin, May 30—3:30 a. m.

Multex 353 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent May 30.

To all German Missions in America (except Washington).

As is known, President Roosevelt invited all of the Ambassadors and Ministers of the countries of the Pan American Union in Washington to his speech on May 27, 1941,¹ and expressly referred to their presence at the beginning of his speech. Evidently this was to arouse the impression among the listeners that Roosevelt was speaking in

¹ See document No. 560 and footnote 2.

the name of the entire Western Hemisphere; he indeed conducted himself as its spokesman in his speech.

Please use this incident as the occasion for asking the Foreign Minister whether this action of Roosevelt is in accordance with the intentions of the Government to which you are accredited. We did not assume, to be sure, that we had to interpret Roosevelt's statements also as an expression of the opinion of the Government to which you are accredited. However, it was nevertheless interesting for us to hear what the Government to which you are accredited thought of this.

Supplement only for Buenos Aires, Rio, Santiago, Mexico, Lima, Quito, Bogotá, La Paz, Asunción, Caracas:

It would be desirable to us if the Government to which you are accredited would disavow either officially or through the press the impression desired by Roosevelt, namely that he had spoken in the name of all the American States.

Please work in this direction.

Report execution by telegram.²

The same text to all American Missions except Washington.

RIBBENTROP

² Reply telegrams from Rio, No. 940 of May 31 (593/245298), Santiago, No. 248 of May 31 (593/245296), Montevideo, No. 126 of May 31 (593/245297), Managua, Nicaragua, No. 4 of May 31 (593/245299), and Guatemala City, No. 217 of May 31 (593/245300) indicated that since Roosevelt had not consulted the Governments there before his speech, he could not have been their spokesman and his proclamation could not be looked upon as a demonstration of solidarity. No other replies have been found.

No. 571

83/61397

Minister Grobba to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MAY 30, 1941.

PRIORITY

Special Security Handling

No. 156 of May 30

The situation in Baghdad has changed. The Minister President, along with the ministers present there, the Grand Mufti, and the highest officers have left Baghdad and have allegedly crossed the Iranian border.¹ Under the chairmanship of former Minister President Taha E (group garbled) Emi a working committee has been formed which is negotiating with the English regarding surrender.

¹ In telegram No. 480 of May 30 from Tehran (83/61400) Ettel reported having been told by an Iranian official that Gaylani and members of his Government had arrived on Iranian territory that morning.

The Mosul Division under General Ismael Hakki and Kassismak Sud is determined to continue the fight if Germany immediately promises effective military aid. The generals are making preparations but are reserving a final decision until the arrival of the German answer with respect to the amount of German aid and the time when it will get here. Please send an answer, signed by the Reich Foreign Minister if possible, by noon on Saturday, May 31, 11:00 a.m., Berlin time, at the latest.² If there is no answer or if the answer is negative I intend to cross the Syrian border at Tell Kotshek tomorrow afternoon.³

GEHRCKE

² In telegram No. 123 of May 31 (83/61424) Ribbentrop informed Grobba that the question of aid would be discussed that very day, and that further instructions would reach him before noon on May 31. See document No. 576.

³ Unidentified marginal note: "Forwarded to Minister Hewel, 1:00 a.m."

No. 572

222/149662

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

U. St.S. Pol. 463

BERLIN, May 30, 1941.

The Rumanian Minister expressed himself today as satisfied with the development of German-Rumanian relations, mentioning in this connection a series of favorable instances: the removal, now under way, of some 4000 Rumanian refugees from Germany;¹ the discussions conducted with Clodius;² the intended journey of the President of the Rumanian National Bank to Germany; and other happenings in the area of cultural exchange.

On the other hand the Minister said that there had been no improvement in Rumanian-Soviet relations. The Soviet Union had continued to be completely negative toward the Rumanian wishes for removal of the injustices in the new drawing of the boundary at the Danube and in the Bucovina.³ In this way the Minister came around to the topic of German-Soviet relations and mentioned that rumors of various sorts in this regard constituted the topic of the day with the diplomatic corps. I said, as I always do in such conversations,

¹ Inquiries by the Rumanian Minister regarding the removal of 5000 Rumanians from Germany were recorded in memoranda by Woermann of May 8 (222/149607) and May 14 (222/149628). A memorandum of May 9 by Senior Counselor Grosskopf of the Cultural Policy Department (222/149608) states that negotiations in this matter between the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the OKW established the fact that no transportation for civilians either by railroad or by Danube steamers would be possible until the end of May.

² Negotiations dealing with German-Rumanian exchanges and with Germany's need for Rumanian bank notes to defray expenses in Rumania were reported by Clodius in telegrams Nos. 1377 of May 15 (222/149630-32) and 1460 of May 21 (222/149640-42).

³ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 189.

that it was indeed known that certain German troop movements had taken place in the east in connection with developments in the Balkans and that otherwise there was nothing new in German-Russian relations.

WOERMANN

No. 573

2800/548179-80

Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs

BERLIN, May 30, 1941.

e. o. D IX 4 g. Rs.

Subject: Presumable boundaries of the German protectorates and assignment of leading positions.

In the conference held in the Aussenpolitisches Amt on May 29 the attached ethnographic map of the nationalities of the USSR¹ was distributed by Dr. Leibbrandt.

Off the record I heard the following items concerning the prospective delimitation, which I marked in red.

I. It seems that four Reich protectorates have definitely been agreed upon:

(1) *Baltic States and White Russia.*

The boundary begins at Oranienbaum on the Gulf of Finland. Leningrad remains outside. Then the boundary runs south to Lake Ilmen and thence along the Volkhov river 50 kilometers east of Smolensk to the Ukraine.

Probable Reich Commissar, Gauleiter Lohse (rather certain).

(2) *Muscovy [Moskowien]*, Russia proper (RSFSR). The eastern boundary has not yet been fixed.

Probable Reich Commissar, Gauleiter Erich Koch (but still uncertain).

(3) *Ukraine.* Quite expanded at the cost of Muscovy. The republic of the Volga Germans also belongs to it. The northern Caucasus belongs to the Caucasian Federated State.

Probable Reich Commissar still altogether uncertain; Gauleiter Sauckel is being mentioned.

(4) *Caucasian Federated State.*

Probable Reich Commissar, Stabsführer Schickedanz.

II. Regarding further projects in the direction of Central Asia, regarding Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, and Kirgiz nothing could be learned as yet.

III. The prospective representatives of the Foreign Ministry at the Reich Commissariats which are to be established will have to be

¹ Map not filmed. A further description of the map and the circumstances of its preparation appear in a memorandum of June 18 by Triska of the Department for German Internal Affairs (34/24544).

assigned in accordance with this scheme. The changes needed are not important.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

GR[OSSKOPF] ²

² On May 17 Senior Counselor Georg Wilhelm Grosskopf was transferred from the Cultural Policy Department to the Department for German Internal Affairs: his Referat, Kult. B, was redesignated D IX (1780/406578).

No. 574

124/123135-38

Ambassador Stohrer to State Secretary Weizsäcker

TOP SECRET

MADRID, May 30, 1941.

STRICTLY PERSONAL

DEAR WEIZSÄCKER: I am very grateful to you for the hints you sent me through Twardowski ¹ and Bergmann ² concerning probable further developments in certain matters in the very near future.

From my reports you know, however, that in certain circumstances things might go off here by themselves.³ Provisions for that contingency, as well as for a later time in which Spain's participation might perhaps again seem desirable to us would, in my opinion, have to be made. These consist, in my opinion,

1. In the greatest possible assistance to the Spanish armed forces with the arms, spare parts, etc., that are absolutely necessary to them, in so far as we are able to do without them. Berlin knows precisely what the Spanish desire; ⁴

2. In our own military preparedness at the frontier;

3. In political preparation. It is evident from my reports that Serrano Suñer urgently desires entry into the war.⁵ As long as he does not fall, he will adhere to this view. But the generals, too, realize that only entry into the war will enable Spain to participate in the reorganization of Europe and to realize at least a part of her national aspirations. I think that even France is of this opinion, although she hesitates the most.

4. In a clear-cut decision as to whether we do or do not want to act here against the will of Spain, I have already, on one occasion, cau-

¹ Stohrer had reported Twardowski's presence in Madrid at the occasion of the opening of a German-Spanish cultural center in telegram No. 1843 of May 27 (136/74889-900).

² Of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

³ See document No. 386.

⁴ See document No. 28.

⁵ See document No. 386 and footnote 5.

tioned against the former,⁶ although I have never found indications that we intend any such thing. Just recently I and members of the Embassy have repeatedly been told by official and unofficial friends that to act against the will of Spain would, in view of the Spanish mentality, cost us all the sympathies we enjoy here, as I recently had written explicitly.⁷ Moreover, acts of sabotage would make us pay dearly for such a course of action, and the like. I no longer believe in an official opposition, particularly after the events in Yugoslavia, but a gun goes off easily, and blood might be shed nevertheless. It is, moreover, in my opinion, not at all necessary to proceed independently, if we prepare carefully and in time for Spain's entry into the war or for her consent to our entry into Spain.

5. In a consideration of what we wish to grant the Spaniards in return for their entry into the war. As I have reported,⁸ Serrano Suñer never again mentioned to me the question as to how we felt about Spanish aspirations in Africa. He did, indeed, however, speak at various times, in an intimate circle and to the Italian Ambassador, about the unsatisfactory settlement of this question in Hendaye.⁹ How greatly he is occupied with this question is also shown by the repeated inquiries as to the status of the present German-French negotiations.¹⁰ I therefore consider it quite possible that at some moment or other he will raise the question again with us, too. Would it not be expedient—in so far, of course, as this is possible, and in view of our relations with France—to make up our minds soon as to the maximum that we want to or are able to offer to the Spaniards? This would have the advantage, in the event that we receive an inquiry from Spain relating to her entry into the war, that we shall be able to reply at once clearly and positively.

6. In negotiations with the Spanish Government, in order to obtain unequivocal and binding promises with regard to the time of her entry into the war (the commitment to enter the war at the request of the Axis Powers at any time after a certain date, or to permit the entry or passage of German troops). The prospect of obtaining this is much more favorable today than last winter, above all, because of the expected easing of the food situation and because of the operation

⁶ See document No. 492.

⁷ In telegram No. 1601 of May 9 (136/74834-38) Stohrer had reported statements by Suñer warning against an arbitrary intervention which would lose Germany all her friends in Spain.

⁸ See document No. 386.

⁹ See document No. 453.

¹⁰ Stohrer reported these inquiries by the Spanish Foreign Minister in telegrams No. 1485 of May 1 (136/74807), No. 1593 of May 8 (136/74830-31), and No. 1776 of May 20 (136/74888).

against Suez with respect to which Franco has, from the beginning, asked that it take place at least simultaneously.¹¹

As a result of the instruction given me last winter and which still holds good, that I should no longer mention here the question of Spain's entry into the war,¹² and of recent instruction to play only the part of an observer in the internal struggle now going on,¹³ which is by no means concluded by the settlement of the last crisis, my hands are tied and I am unable to influence the course of things in a direction favorable to us. As I have reported,¹⁴ it is quite possible that for any reason at all, even without any intervention on our part, Spain will enter the war; to be sure, not until the food situation seems assured for at least half a year through the harvesting of the crops (from June 15 on). Nor is it out of the question that Spain will take the initiative in suggesting to us that she enter the war. In certain circumstances, because of other ventures, this, as well as an entry of Spain into the war precipitated by other events, might become awkward for us, if we do not exert an influence on setting the date of this event.

I should appreciate it if you would turn this matter over in your mind, occasionally. I shall, of course, continue to deal with it in my official reports.

Should you want to make any use of the foregoing statements, I would appreciate it if you would say that they were derived from the statements I made orally to Minister v. Twardowski.¹⁵ Actually I did express myself to Twardowski in this manner and I informed him of the contents of this letter. The letter was written by me at the last moment before Twardowski's departure and was therefore not composed as if it had been a report.

Yours, etc.

STOHRER

¹¹ See document No. 95.

¹² See document No. 73.

¹³ See document No. 509, footnote 1.

¹⁴ See document No. 386.

¹⁵ Replying to Stohrer's letter on June 7 (124/123141) Weizsäcker wrote that he had asked Twardowski to submit a memorandum of his conversation with Stohrer. This memorandum by Twardowski of June 7 (124/123143-44) was sent to Ribbentrop with Weizsäcker's recommendation that in case Suñer should again talk of Spanish intentions to go to war, Stohrer should advise him to consult Berlin first so as to prevent any unscheduled action by the Spanish Government. On June 28, Weizsäcker informed Stohrer (136/-75029) that Ribbentrop had decided that no further steps should be taken in this matter since the Foreign Minister believed that Suñer's often expressed desires to go to war were, after all, not very serious.

No. 575

177/85128-29

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Tokyo, May 31, 1941—2:52 a. m.

No. 855 of May 31

Received May 31—12:35 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 852 of May 31.¹

The Foreign Minister gave me the following explanation regarding his statement reported in the previous telegram: According to a telegraphic report from the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, the American Senator, George, had utilized in the American press an alleged statement of Roosevelt's according to which the latter had not mentioned Japan in his recent speech because he believed he could expect a change in Japanese foreign policy. Now that Japanese financial and industrial circles had gained a predominant influence in the leadership of the Japanese state and the Army and Navy had started to waver, Roosevelt no longer believed in a threat by Japan, who would be more likely to withdraw gradually from the Tripartite Pact.

¹In this telegram (177/85137-38), Ott forwarded the text of Matsuoka's statement in English as follows:

"Some American newspapers are said to have recently carried reports conjecturing that Japan is becoming indifferent toward the Tripartite Pact. The Foreign Minister stated in this connection that there is no question whatever as to the fact that the Pact constitutes the immutable basis of Japan's foreign policy and that he could hardly believe the American authorities to be entertaining such a misunderstanding. If there were any misunderstandings of that sort, he continued, it was an absurd misconception and that, if such erroneous views were current in America, he could not but ascribe it to misleading information spread willfully. Considering that it would not be entirely useless to clarify Japan's position on this point he said as follows:

1) Japan's fundamental policy has for a long time been firmly established and has undergone no change whatever.

2) Since the conclusion on September 27th last of the Tripartite Pact Japan's foreign policy has consistently been conducted with this Pact as its pivot. This should be clear to all from the statements on various occasions by Prime Minister Prince Konoye and myself as well as from the subsequent development of Japan's policy. There has of course been not the slightest deflection from this course of policy.

3) It is therefore absolutely impossible to imagine that Japan should fail in the slightest degree to carry out faithfully her obligations under the Tripartite Pact.

4) As has frequently been affirmed Japan's policy toward the South Seas is peaceful. Should, however, untoward international developments render the execution of such policy impossible it is a possibility that Japan may have to reconsider her attitude in the light of the changed situation."

A slightly different version was forwarded by Grew to Washington on the same day; see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. IV, pp. 973-974.

The Foreign Minister explained to me that in these circumstances he had put into effect the intention he had several times stated to me, of immediately making a counterblow in case Roosevelt should misuse the secret negotiations between Japan and America. He had therewith taken up an open fight against the pro-Anglo-Saxon domestic opposition which would be facilitated by Roosevelt's imputations, insulting as they were to Japan. Matsuoka's serious tone and the widely felt tension of recent days indicate serious domestic controversies. The Army and Navy, as I had been able to ascertain through the Armed Forces Attachés, decidedly welcome Matsuoka's spontaneous procedure; however, the determination and consistent work of the influential court and industrial circles should not be underestimated. Indicative of the degree of tension that has been evoked is the emergence of activist groups with handbills reading "Defenselessness—Anglo-Saxon Traitors." I shall report separately on the effect of this situation on the negotiations between Japan and America.

OTT

No. 576

83/61405

*The Foreign Minister to Minister Grobba*Telegram¹

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, May 31, 1941—10:40 a. m.

TOP SECRET

No. 124

RAM 154

Luftwaffe support was started yesterday. Will arrive in Mosul probably tomorrow, Sunday.² Further reports on support measures undertaken from here will follow.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted by telephone from the Berghof."

² Replying in telegram No. 164 of May 31, which was transmitted to the Berghof by telephone (83/61905), Grobba urged that the announced planes must not land in Mosul or Kirkuk because of the danger and lack of gasoline; only from Syria could aircraft now operate.

Ciano in Vienna.³ It is not feasible to revert to this matter again at this time.

The Reich Ministry of Interior (attention: State Secretary Stuckart) is being sent a copy of this letter.⁴

By order:
RITTER

³ See document No. 385, footnote 3.

⁴ In his letter of transmittal sent to the Reich Ministry of Interior on May 31 (230/153257) Ritter added the following passages:

"The same applies, incidentally, to the wishes advanced by the Gauleitung of Styria in regard to a subsequent change in the German-Hungarian border. Concerning this, too, a settlement has already been reached in the German-Hungarian discussions which cannot be reversed."

No. 579

116/66565-66

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, May 31, 1941.

Today I asked Croatian Minister Benzon confidentially and cautiously about the details of his conversation with Pavelić.¹ The following was established in this connection:

On his visit in Zagreb, Benzon was asked by Pavelić confidentially and privately whether he really believed in a final victory of Germany. When in turn Benzon inquired with surprise how Pavelić could even ask such a question, the latter said that he had heard something like that in circles of very high German officers. Benzon replied that he believed this to be impossible, whereupon Pavelić leaned over to Benzon and stated: Mussolini was very depressed during their conversation in Monfalcone and had told him that he did not believe in a final German victory.

Pavelić had derived his opinion from this statement of Mussolini. Indeed, for this reason Pavelić had accepted the Prince from the House of Savoy since the latter was married to a Greek princess and thereby related to the English Court. In Pavelić's opinion, however, a defeat of Italy was not yet a defeat of the House of Savoy.

Benzon pointed out to Pavelić that Mussolini had perhaps been depressed by the internal difficulties in Italy.

Pavelić also asked Benzon how matters stood with Russia, where presumably things would start happening soon. Benzon replied that in his opinion this was not the case. Benzon assumes that Mussolini talked about this question with Pavelić.

¹ See document No. 539 and footnote 4.

Upon inquiry Benzon stated that as far as he knew, the conversation between Mussolini and Pavelić had taken place with nobody else present.

I also asked Benzon whether he knew that Mussolini made this statement to Pavelić or whether Pavelić perhaps for some reason or other invented such a statement by Mussolini when he talked to Benzon. Benzon did not consider this likely.

I told Benzon that I considered it impossible that Mussolini made such a statement and that some kind of falsification must be involved.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.²

STAHLCKER

² Notations on the document indicate that it was shown to Ribbentrop and subsequently put in the special portfolio of documents which he was to place before Hitler (Führermappe).

No. 580

93/103682-84

The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Foreign Minister

Draft

BERLIN, May 31, 1941.

For the Foreign Minister.

Yesterday evening I signed an agreement with the Hungarian Government concerning the safeguarding of our oil interests in former Yugoslav territories now falling to Hungary. During the war the entire output of oil will be delivered to Germany without regard for coverage of Hungarian domestic requirements. Furthermore, the Hungarian Government has now granted to Germany the oil concessions in the Prekmurje and Medjumurje which had been under dispute for such a long time, and actually not merely to a mixed German-Hungarian company but to a purely German company.

Minister President de Bárdossy asked me to report to the Foreign Minister that the consent to granting the oil concessions to a German company was obtained only after long internal discussions in the Hungarian Cabinet and after serious objections on grounds of principle had been set aside. However, in view of the personal wish of the Foreign Minister communicated to him, he had insisted on a solution which took full account of the German wishes. He asked that the Foreign Minister on his part support with the domestic German authorities the Hungarian wishes for transfer of drilling equipment if this should be necessary.

If no agreement is reached with the pertinent domestic German ministries concerning this last question I shall report the particulars.

CLODIUS

No. 581

386/211059-60

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram (en clair)

MOST URGENT

PARIS, June 1, 1941.

TOP SECRET

Received June 1—3:15 p. m.¹

No. 1690 of June 1

Teletype Office: Please transmit the following telegram to Ambassador Abetz in Fuschl immediately:

Benoist-Méchin just brought me, at 1:30 p.m., a letter of Admiral Darlan to Ambassador Abetz. The letter, in German translation, reads as follows:

"Herr Ambassador: The reports which I have received from Syria since Iraq has sued for an armistice cause me to fear the possibility of an English attack against the Levant countries and in any case an intensification of de Gaullist activity and of English propaganda in these countries.

"I have issued formal instructions to the High Commissioner to combat that propaganda most vigorously and to defend the Levant countries at any cost against such an attack if it should materialize.

"Given the present condition of our forces in the Levant, it would indeed be preferable, however, if the attack did not occur.

"In order to deprive such an attack in advance of any pretext, it is of the greatest importance that German aircraft and German personnel returning from Iraq not stay in Syria.

"If they remained in the country, moreover, this would tend to confuse the spirits and thus bring about a decline of morale, which must be avoided.

"I would therefore urgently request you to intervene with the German High Command with a view to ordering the evacuation of personnel and of German and Italian air force material sent to the Levant since May 9.

"It goes without saying that we shall extend to such personnel in transit every assistance that is in our power.

"Formal close. François Darlan."

End of text.

Darlan wrote the foregoing letter, as Benoist-Méchin informed me, on the basis of Guérard's telegram forwarded to you by Rahn;²

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 1794 to the Special Train, June 1, 3:30 p.m."

² In telegram No. 72 of May 31, forwarded to Fuschl as No. 478 (70/50858-59), which was also telephoned to the Berghof, Rahn transmitted the German text of a telegram sent to Darlan in which Guérard analyzed the effects of the collapse of Iraq.

and a telegram of High Commissioner Dentz, in which he explained that the Luftwaffe had been unable to play the expected role in Iraq because of the insufficient number of aircraft employed and the excessive distance of the air bases from the operational theater around Baghdad. He, Dentz, had continually pointed this out when arms were sold to Iraq. He would request that the German missions be recalled from Syria so that the same mistake would not be repeated in Syria. The corresponding passage in Guérard's telegram said that if Germany is not able to give immediate massive aid, complete German withdrawal (*abstention complète*) would be better for the defensive potential of Syria.³ Benoist-Méchin added that pending the start of massive German-French military collaboration, France must be left in a position to denounce any English attack on Syria as a clear case of aggression against France alone.

Benoist-Méchin further pointed out the need of replenishing as quickly as possible, perhaps by way of Turkey, the gasoline supplies furnished to German aircraft. Guérard has flown to Ankara today for consultation with the French Ambassador there.⁴ He will promptly return to Syria in order to inform the High Commissioner of the Ambassador's view of Turkey's attitude.

ACHENBACH

³ Such a passage is not found in the German text of the telegram referred to in footnote 2. A somewhat similar passage reads as follows: "If there is no assurance of an effective defense of Syria it is better to gain time by statements about our purely defensive intentions and to point out that an attack against Syria would start an Anglo-French war and shift German-French cooperation from the peaceful sphere to the military sphere."

⁴ Jules Henry.

No. 582

265/172896-97

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

RAM 236/R

No. 490 from Fuschl

No. 584 from the Foreign Ministry

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 651 of May 31.¹

Owing to the change in the situation in Iraq which has occurred in the meantime, the question of the transit of war material through Turkey has lost current interest for us, so that we no longer need to

FUSCHL, June 1, 1941—7:58 p. m.

Received Berlin, June 1—8:50 p. m.

Sent June 1—11:30 p. m.

¹ See document No. 566, footnote 5.

make the conclusion of a political treaty dependent upon a corresponding promise by Turkey. We have no objections to your now resuming the negotiations concerning the political treaty alone. Revising the prior instructions I therefore request you now to proceed as follows:

Please call on Saracoglu and tell him that we had taken cognizance here of the communications which he made to you and had examined the formulations envisaged by you and Saracoglu. We were in agreement with the basic direction; however, we wished to alter the wording. Please give the Turkish Foreign Minister the drafts of a treaty and a secret protocol which are being transmitted to you simultaneously in a special telegram,² and explain them to him with the aid of the remarks appended to the drafts.

Regarding the proposal that the question of trade relations be settled in an exchange of letters and the questions concerning press and radio in a joint public statement on the occasion of the signing of the treaty, you may remark that we consider this way to be feasible. Please let me have your suggestions on these two points.³

I assume that this treaty, which is exceedingly favorable for Turkey in the present circumstances, will now be brought about in the version proposed by us without any further delay and discussion.

RIBBENTROP

² Document No. 583.

³ In telegram No. 663 of June 3 (265/172913) Papen submitted proposed texts for these points. After the expression of views by the Press Department and Economic Policy Department (Weber memorandum of June 4: 265/172914 and Clodius memorandum of the same date: 265/172915) Ribbentrop's telegraphic instruction No. 611 of June 6 (265/172922) transmitted the amended texts of the declaration regarding the press and radio, and for the exchange of letters regarding trade relations.

No. 583

265/172898-900

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

MOST URGENT

FUSCHL, June 1, 1941—8:05 p. m.

TOP SECRET

No. 491 of June 1 from Fuschl

Received Berlin, June 1—8:50 p. m.

No. 585 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent June 2—12:25 a. m.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to my telegram No. 584 of June 1.¹

Following are the drafts of the German-Turkish treaty and of the secret protocol:

¹ Document No. 582.

"The German Reich Chancellor and the President of the Turkish Republic, desiring to assure the preservation of peace between their countries even during the present war, as well as to affirm the friendly character of their mutual relations in accordance with the letters exchanged between them, have agreed to conclude a treaty with this aim and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries

The German Reich Chancellor

.....

The President of the Turkish Republic

.....

who on the basis of the full powers accorded them have agreed upon the following provisions:

"Article 1. Germany and Turkey undertake mutually to respect the integrity and inviolability of their territories.

"Article 2. Germany and Turkey undertake in the future to consult with one another in a friendly spirit in all questions affecting their common interests, in order to reach an understanding regarding the treatment of such questions.

"Article 3. This treaty shall enter into force on the day of its signature and shall be valid from that date for a period of ten years. The contracting parties shall consult with one another at the appropriate time concerning the question of an extension of the treaty.

"Done in duplicate in the German and Turkish languages, in Ankara, on 1941."

"Secret Protocol

"At the signature today of the treaty between Germany and Turkey agreement by both parties on the following points was established:

"1. Germany states that she recognizes the territorial sovereignty of Turkey in the Straits and that she will support all of the efforts of Turkey to secure the exercise of this sovereignty internationally. Turkey for her part states in the Straits question that she will take account of the requirements of German shipping.

"2. The Reich Government states that at the conclusion of the peace it will take into account in so far as possible any wishes of Turkey's regarding a rectification of her frontier at Edirne."

Conclusion of the drafts.

In explanation of them the following is noted:

1. Regarding the preamble to the treaty:

Since it cannot be anticipated today how the war situation in the eastern Mediterranean will develop, it is not possible to choose the Turkish formula regarding the Near and Middle East, particularly since it could give rise to undesirable interpretations by public opinion. It is better to restrict the passage to the two contracting countries.

2. Regarding Article 1:

We do not consider the idea of renouncing an aggressive attitude to be right, since it would be a contradiction even to mention the possibility of an aggressive attitude in this treaty which is directed

toward the establishment of friendly relations. Nor do we consider it right to go into the interpretation of the existing treaties. Considering the formulation proposed by us, this does not appear necessary even from the Turkish standpoint.²

3. Article 3 of the Turkish draft is without substance and should be replaced by our formulation in article 2 in order to give the treaty proper political importance.

4. Regarding the secret protocol:

We can assume a commitment in writing only in regard to the frontier at Edirne. At the present time we cannot assume a formal commitment with respect to possible Turkish wishes regarding the islands off the western coast of Anatolia. If you have already gone into this matter in more detail during your negotiations so far, I authorize you to tell the Turkish Foreign Minister orally, if this should be necessary, that at the conclusion of the peace we would take into account in so far as possible any Turkish wishes in this respect.

RIBBENTROP

² See, further, document No. 585.

No. 584

F2/0388-415

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Füh. 34 g. Rs.

FUSCHL, June 3, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE DUCE
IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND COUNT
CIANO AT THE BRENNER ON JUNE 2, 1941

After the Führer and the Duce had talked in private for about an hour and three quarters, the Reich Foreign Minister and Count Ciano were drawn into the discussion.¹ The Führer was just then describing the difficulties of the Serbian campaign to the Duce. A substantial risk had been taken with the military operations in the Balkans. One had not known how the tanks would stand the test of that mountainous terrain. The experts had been very skeptical. They had pointed to the lack of bridges and terrain obstacles which, in their opinion, made the employment of armored units almost impossible for purely geographical reasons. Thus he (the Führer) had at times been greatly worried about the extraordinary responsibility he had to bear in that campaign. Fortunately here too, as on many

¹ Ciano's record of his discussion with Ribbentrop is printed in *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 660-663. No record of this discussion has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

previous occasions, the experts had been mistaken and everything had gone well.

In the further course of the conversation the question was discussed whether it was advisable to reply to the address of President Roosevelt.² The Duce and Count Ciano replied in the negative to this question, as did the Foreign Minister who declared he and his staff felt that a reply to Roosevelt would only give him another opportunity. Furthermore, the war party in America would accuse the isolationists and antiwar elements of being Axis agents, if in the reply to Roosevelt the same arguments would figure which these American circles were using in their opposition to Roosevelt.

The Duce also held the view that after the disappointing effect of Roosevelt's address, which the warmongers in America had expected to amount to a great deal more, the circles favoring America's entry into the war would only welcome a resurgence of the discussion by a reply from the Axis Powers.

The conversation then turned to the attitude of Japan and Matsuoka's last statements in reply to the rumors circulated in America that Japan was moving away from the Axis.³ Both the Führer and the Duce declared as very satisfactory the statement of the Japanese Foreign Minister who had unmistakably stated Japan's readiness to stand by the Tripartite Pact down to the utmost contingencies. If Japan would continue her firm adherence, America would not enter the war. The Foreign Minister commented on this that, as he had heard from circles close to Roosevelt, the latter was very much afraid of a two-front war. Furthermore, one could take for granted that Japan realized that she herself would be completely ruined in case the Axis Powers should not win the war. Matsuoka was surely aware of this situation, but he had to overcome internal difficulties. Among other people, Matsudaira, Minister of the Imperial Household, who had great influence upon the Emperor, had Anglophile leanings. Although the Japanese Army favored the Axis, it was concerned primarily with the settlement of the China problem. The young naval officers were also followers of the Axis, while the older officers showed less understanding for Germany and Italy. Shiratori,⁴ who so far had performed such useful work for the Axis, was

² In this address of May 27, 1941, Roosevelt made the proclamation of an unlimited national emergency. For text see Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. x, pp. 181-194. On May 30 Ribbentrop sent telegram No. 472 (593/245271-75) from Fuschl to the Foreign Ministry directing the Ambassadors in Rome and Tokyo to consult with the Italian and Japanese Foreign Ministers, respectively, about a common attitude toward Roosevelt's speech and proclamation. Ribbentrop outlined various policies that could be pursued in this respect. Following the Hitler-Mussolini meeting, Ribbentrop canceled this instruction in telegram No. 498 of June 3 (593/245326-27) from Fuschl to Berlin.

³ See document No. 575 and footnote 1.

⁴ Toshio Shiratori, former Japanese Ambassador in Italy and special adviser to the Foreign Ministry.

unfortunately critically ill. In any case, Oshima was standing by as a last reserve, who would certainly create a stupendous scandal if Japan by any chance should not keep her word. The Führer commented that the Japanese probably knew what they could expect if, after a war that turned out unfavorably for the Axis, they would have to face all their foes alone. As a personality, Matsuoka was very hard to understand. If one considers that he was a Japanese Catholic but, upon returning from his European journey, he nevertheless sacrificed ceremoniously to the different pagan gods and spirits, one must conclude that he was combining the hypocrisy of an American Bible missionary with the craftiness of a Japanese Asiatic. Anyway, when he took his leave from Berlin, he had told him (the Führer) in very solemn words that he completely realized that the Japanese interests were on the side of the Axis and that he was determined to go to the limits in this matter.⁵ His present statement regarding America was also similarly plain-spoken.⁶

The Foreign Minister supplemented these comments with the remark that Matsuoka had explained to him confidentially how, before the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact,⁷ he had done as if he were in no way interested in concluding it. Only when he received the consent of the Emperor did he act in a flash and sign the Pact. He had added that people in Germany should not take exception to any statements he might make in applying the same tactics, concerning relations with the Axis and America.

With regard to France the Führer stated that the German position was somewhat difficult. On the one hand, one could never be quite sure of the Vichy Government and one did not know whether it did not perhaps cooperate somehow with de Gaulle. On the other hand, in order not to provoke the defection of the North African French colonies to de Gaulle nothing vigorous could be done. In this manner France had managed to present constantly new demands to Germany. In this way there were now only 1.2 million left of the 1.9 million prisoners of war which Germany had at the conclusion of the Armistice. He, the Führer, had, however, decided henceforth not to make any more presents to France but to make concessions only to the same extent as the Vichy Government was offering Germany facilities for her struggle against England. He had plainly told this to Darlan in his recent interview with him.⁸

The Foreign Minister remarked that no kind of pressure could be applied to France, because of the danger of the defection of North Africa, and that the French were perfectly aware of this.

⁵ No record of this statement by Matsuoka has been found. For a record of his conversation with Hitler, see document No. 266.

⁶ See document No. 575 and footnote 1.

⁷ Cf. vol. XI of this series, document No. 77.

⁸ See document No. 491.

The Führer regretted in this connection that at the time the Spaniards had not been prepared to enter the war, so as to enable Germany to seize Gibraltar in January or February. In that event the French Government could not have conducted a two-faced policy. But as it was, the French by constant demands were able to infringe upon the Armistice Treaty. If a demand were presented to Pétain to remove some uncertain elements from the colonies, such as General Nogues, for instance, he always asked for the release from detention of this or that general, because he had selected him as the successor of the uncertain elements who are to be relieved. Thus he had requested the release of General Giraud, one of the most dangerous and vigorous opponents of Germany, which naturally had to be declined from the German side. A further request for the release of General Juin also had to be declined. In such circumstances, Ambassador Abetz has an exceedingly difficult position. From now on, however, one would negotiate only on the basis of give and take.

Among the French, Darlan was undoubtedly the most reliable. His attitude was thoroughly anti-English. Laval was an opportunist, while Pétain was an old man, who was entirely under the influence of his retinue. But the French circles in Vichy were anti-German. In Vichy, there was a representative of the Comité des Forges, of the circle of the *Action Française*, and finally there were many Freemasons and Jews. In the circumstances Vichy might very well practice the same policies as those advocated by de Gaulle, if the present rulers were not afraid that they would then be taken prisoner by the Germans.

Continuing, the Führer spoke of the war with England. According to reports that had reached him, the mood of the public has greatly deteriorated. The blockade of the British Isles seems to him particularly effective. According to German estimates, America and England together could build only 1.5 million tons of new tonnage per year. If Germany were therefore able to continue her sinkings of 700,000 tons per month, the English would collapse. If once 8 million tons of shipping space serving England were to have been sunk, England would not continue the war, because she would surely not fight until she had exhausted all of her supplies, because in that case she would find herself unconditionally surrendered to Germany.

The Foreign Minister remarked the situation in England was so bad that Churchill had sent the American Ambassador, Winant, with an SOS to Roosevelt, especially because England, among other things, had been greatly disappointed by Roosevelt's address.

The Duce observed that also according to his information the situation in England was very bad. If an Anglophile like the Duke of Alba in his last reports sounded as extremely pessimistic as he had

done, this spoke volumes. The Hungarian Military Attaché in London⁹ has also talked in that vein. Besides, Churchill's last speech had been unusually feeble.¹⁰

The Foreign Minister interjected here that Churchill seemed in general to be losing his nerve. Recently in the House of Commons, e.g., when answering questions of English members about German parachutists who allegedly appeared wearing Australian uniforms, he had given a reply full of confusion and discrepancies by stating at first that it was true, but upon a further question admitting that the matter had still to be investigated.

The Führer declared on this subject, that according to information he had received from the circle of Churchill's acquaintances, the latter had answered the question whether he hated Germany and the Führer decidedly in the negative. He had added with brutal frankness, however, that Germany had to be destroyed because she constituted a danger to the British Empire in Africa and elsewhere and in general was an inconvenient competitor.

If Churchill resigned, the Führer continued in response to a question of the Duce, perhaps Lloyd George or Sir Samuel Hoare would take over the Government; in any event, the English would surely not fight to the last ounce of their supplies.

The Foreign Minister observed that in his opinion Hoare was too insignificant a personage to be able to succeed to Churchill. He rather thought his successor would be Lloyd George. For the rest, he was convinced that most Englishmen realized the impossibility of an English victory.

In this connection, the Führer spoke of the possibility that Lloyd George might still play a role and mentioned the interview which he had some years ago with him.¹¹ Lloyd George had proved to be the most intelligent of all the English visitors of the Führer and had demonstrated great interest and understanding for the German point of view and the achievements that had been attained in Germany in the social field. He would undoubtedly make peace immediately if he were convinced that the British Empire would not suffer thereby. He would also surely be prepared to return conquered Abyssinia. His attitude was thoroughly anti-French and he would surely want to impose the cost of the war upon the French. One would have "to look into this whether there was a possibility."

On the situation in the Mediterranean the Duce remarked that after the conquest of Crete, Alexandria would be hard to maintain

⁹ Maj. R. Utassy de Utas.

¹⁰ The reference is probably to Churchill's speech in the House of Commons on May 20. For text, see *Parl. Deb.*, 5th ser., H of C, vol. 371, col. 1401-1403.

¹¹ See Paul Schmidt, *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923-45* (Bonn, 1949), pp. 336-340.

as an English naval base against aerial attacks. Then Gibraltar would remain the sole refuge of the English fleet in the Mediterranean.

The Führer replied that he, too, was satisfied with the course of developments in the Mediterranean because the Axis could more easily sink ships sailing for England there than in the vast Atlantic Ocean, where not much could be done with the Luftwaffe, and where the whole struggle had to be carried on with U-boats only. From Crete it was possible not only to sink English ships from the air, but Africa on the opposite shore and especially Alexandria could also be bombed incessantly so that gradually the situation would become intolerable for the fleet. The English would finally be forced to abandon the Mediterranean just as they did the North Sea where, outside the English coastal waters that were protected by fighter planes, no English ship showed itself any more. The sooner the English understood this, the fewer would be their losses. Against Alexandria, one would not even have to use Stukas but could simply bomb the city and the port at nighttime from heights of 6,000 to 7,000 meters, where the flak danger was much reduced. The chances of hitting ships were by no means small and the attrition by daily attacks would be very hard on the garrison.

Next, the conversation turned to America and her aid to England. The figures circulated by the American Ambassador in Rome¹² among the diplomatic corps, regarding an aircraft output of 18,000 next year, 30,000 in the year after, and 60,000 in subsequent years, were characterized by the Führer and the Duce as gigantic exaggerations. The Führer pointed out that in 10 months the Americans had delivered only 700 aircraft. Upon closer examination, it was concluded that neither on the basis of American productive capacity, nor on the basis of aluminum supplies or available skilled manpower, was a large production of aircraft to be expected immediately. The American aircraft industry was employing only 230,000 workers, while Germany alone was employing several times as many.

Just as childish were the statements of the Americans that within a few months they would attain an output of 400 tanks, although so far not even the experimental stage had been concluded. In Germany one knew very well that such matters take much longer. The manufacture of a 38-cm. gun for example took 16 to 18 months.

The situation regarding the training of pilots was similar. Germany needed a year to a year and a half to train a skilled pilot for heavy long-range bombers. Compared with this, the statements that the Americans or the English were training pilots in 20 weeks altogether lacked credibility.

¹² William Phillips.

Analyzing the personality of Roosevelt, one had to conclude that he thoroughly detested the Duce and the Führer because these two European statesmen had solved problems at which he had failed. Despite his braintrust, despite the enormous indebtedness into which he had led the United States, he had accomplished nothing. There were still 11 to 12 million unemployed in the States and the misery in the country, especially in New York, was very great. He was therefore undoubtedly acting from jealousy against the Duce and the Führer and was letting himself be guided by the hatred of the defeated.

For the rest, he was acting as an American with the intention, in any event, to obtain substantial gains for the United States from the present war. If England would win the war, he would be wanting to be stronger than Great Britain in order to be able to stand up to her, whereas, if England lost the war, he would want to inherit the British Empire. That is why he had already taken bases in the American hemisphere from England and he would also like to pocket the French possessions like Martinique, etc., in that hemisphere. But he did not dare to do that, because he was afraid of warlike complications.

His rearmament program had also opened to him fresh sources of money, after the Congress, because of his penchant for plunging into debt, had refused to grant him further means for civilian purposes. Under the slogan that the English would later pay for all this, he thus obtained money that would carry him over the 4 years of his term. This was sufficient for him because with the recklessness typical of democratic statesmen he believed in "after me the deluge." Moreover, he was financially interested in America's rearmament.

In connection with the American aid, the conversation reverted to the situation of England. The Führer stressed the fact that the figures of the June sinkings would be of decisive importance. If during the fair weather and the bright nights in June 700,000 tons should again be sunk, England would collapse this year, because in July and in August 16 and 18 additional U-boats respectively would be after the enemy, and so forth, so that by the autumn more than 180 U-boats would at all times be active on the front. This ought to finish England off. Great Britain has already lost the war, but because of her slow thinking she did not yet know it, but it was plain that without an army on the European Continent she could not last long. Until recently, the English had been able to resist the onslaught of the U-boats by the changes in the convoy routings, whereby the German submarine weapon was constantly forced to change its dispositions. In 3 months, however, submarine packs would be stationed everywhere so that changes in the convoy routes

would no longer be advantageous for the English. The Führer then proceeded to show by several examples the effect of the U-boat blockade upon the English supply situation. When a certain stage has been reached, even the loss from a convoy of a few vessels carrying frozen meat could bring on a real disaster.

Reverting to the Mediterranean questions, the Führer remarked that after the events of the last few days, the affair of Iraq was finished. Regarding Syria, the question was whether the English would attack. In the view of the Duce the French would not defend themselves in that case, and Syria would fall into the hands of de Gaulle. But if the French should resist, Germany and Italy ought to help them. How that could be done, he himself did not yet know.

Cyprus could not be conquered by the Luftwaffe, because it was situated outside the range of the fighter planes needed to accompany the bombers. The Duce commented that fighter planes could get to Cyprus, if the Turkish coast of Asia Minor opposite it could be used as a base. The Foreign Minister replied that in his opinion the Turks would not agree to this, and he described the current state of the negotiations with Turkey concerning permission for transit of arms and ammunition.¹³ After the Turks had at first granted that permission to Herr von Papen they had, probably because of strong English protests (or because they foresaw the developments in Iraq, interjected the Führer), revoked their consent.

On the German side it had been intended to conclude an agreement with Turkey in which her territorial integrity was to be stipulated and Turkey recognized as the guardian of the Dardanelles. Furthermore, certain border rectifications in the area around Edirne were to be provided and it was to be intimated that at the conclusion of peace Turkish wishes regarding certain islands off the coast of Asia Minor might possibly be fulfilled (the Foreign Minister added that Mytilene and Chios were meant). The last point was, however, brought forward only vaguely and orally and no commitments had been made. The Führer remarked that he would have given Turkey the islands in which she was interested only if she had agreed to the transit of ammunition and generally adopted a political attitude convenient to Germany.

The Foreign Minister replied that from a propaganda point of view the conclusion of an agreement would nevertheless be a heavy blow to England, because Turkey was the only country which England still boasted of as an ally. In any event, Ambassador von Papen had been authorized to make only a vague statement in the question of the islands.

¹³ See documents Nos. 556, 565, and 566.

To a question of the Duce whether Turkey would be prepared to make such an agreement with Italy as well, the Foreign Minister replied that this had not yet been mentioned, but that he was assuming without question that Turkey would indeed be eager to conclude an agreement with Italy too.

The Führer repeated that he would not assume any obligation whatever regarding the cession of the islands, unless Turkey would concede to Germany certain things, as for example, the transit of gasoline and ammunition. In these circumstances he would have been prepared to cede some islands, but in view of Turkey's negative attitude this was out of the question.

In these circumstances, the problem of Cyprus could not be solved at this time either. For, as had been mentioned, no fighter planes could fly to Cyprus without the cooperation of Turkey. Besides, an air-borne operation was difficult also because such things could be done only once or twice until the enemy caught on to the method, and put up a successful defense. Germany had for the first time used air-borne forces in Holland and, incurring heavy losses, had gained much experience. For the second time an air-borne operation was carried out against the Fort Eben Emael and for the third time now against Crete, but to be sure with very heavy losses. Thus it was that 280 transport planes alone were destroyed and photographs of airfields in Crete showed that these were practically covered with the debris of airplanes. This time still the operation had been a success. But a repetition would probably be extremely difficult.¹⁴ The continued existence of Cyprus as an English base could, incidentally, be an advantage. The Führer recalled the Norwegian campaign, when the English had landed at Namsos, Åndalsnes, and Narvik. When the German operations had developed so far that the Wehrmacht dominated the situation in Norway, the moment arrived when it was realized that the English ought not to be attacked too strongly. For as long as they still had troops in Norway, transport vessels protected by naval units had to be furnished to supply them, some of which could be sunk every day by planes which could be used only with difficulty for the sinking of ships on the vast Atlantic Ocean. The same consideration applied to Cyprus. Here, too, the English would have to dispatch ships to secure the communications in the Mediterranean, which could then be sunk from the air. Even if for a month every day 2 or 3 fighter planes were lost, the monthly loss of 60 to 90 machines could be easily replaced while, if 1 ship were lost per day, the monthly loss of 30 ships could be replaced only very slowly and with great difficulty.

¹⁴ This sentence originally read: "But a repetition was out of the question."

On the general situation the Führer remarked that the struggle would be hard, of course, but the hardest part was behind us because the most difficult operations were undoubtedly carried out in the campaigns in France and in the Balkans. The only danger that still existed was the defection of French North Africa. One must try to prevent that by skillful diplomacy. Besides, one could perhaps still succeed in pulling Spain entirely over to the side of the Axis. To be sure, the Gibraltar operation would now be far more difficult than it would have been in February, when it could have been carried out in 8 days. Meanwhile the English had stationed first-rate troops in Gibraltar and constantly installed new improvements for the defense. For the English had gradually become acquainted with the German tactics in such operations and had prepared themselves accordingly.

The Führer described in detail what comprehensive preparations had already been made for the operation against Gibraltar when to his greatest regret he had to tell the officers in charge that the operation would not take place.¹⁵ Just as for the operations against the Maginot Line and Fort Eben Emael, the exact movements of every single soldier were drilled into the participating troops in month-long exercises on suitable models. The Führer mentioned that for example the forts of the Maginot Line had been painstakingly studied and it was found that they had certain dead spots on which none of the cannons or machine guns available could fire. A handful of determined men who with suitable technical equipment would penetrate to such a dead spot could decisively contribute to the taking of the whole fort. Such dead spots had been ascertained in Gibraltar too. But now it could be seen that apparently the English had noticed these themselves, for they had improved their fortifications in such a way that most of those dead spots had gradually been eliminated. The English had improved Gibraltar in other ways too. The cisterns for drinking water, which in the past were exposed, had now been shifted into the Rock. In the same way armored turrets have been built at the crest of the Rock, where only open trenches had existed previously. Moreover, the cut [*Durchstich*] was now completed, so that heavy vehicles were kept out of Gibraltar. While in February the taking of Gibraltar would have been merely a matter of courage and intelligence, it has now become a question of equipment also.

The Führer continued to say that he felt all the worse from the French blackmail as he was continually telling himself that if Gibraltar had been taken in February, two armored divisions would have been stationed in Africa. He could have then taken a firm line with the French Government and demanded from the French airfields in

¹⁵ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 476 and footnote 2.

Algeciras [sic] and Agadir and bases of the Moroccan coast. He would have demanded Dakar, too, in order to advance from there against Freetown.

The Duce remarked that at the meeting of Bordighera Franco had declared he was himself amassing the Spanish artillery in order to advance against Gibraltar.¹⁸ He had referred to the conquest of Gibraltar as a Spanish affair and stated that he could not accept that base from foreign hands.

The Führer replied that the Spaniards were brave soldiers to be sure, but nevertheless the conquest of Gibraltar called for considerable technical skill in the use of complicated equipment, which the Spaniards could attain only with much loss of time. Besides, Germany did not have sufficient long-range bombers to assault Gibraltar from far away. It needed those planes for the cooperation with the U-boats in the Atlantic. New long-range bombers with an enormous radius were being mass-produced, but would not be ready until the end of this year. Incidentally, aerial torpedoes had a very promising future.

In conclusion, the Führer explained with regard to the situation in the Mediterranean that in the west one would have to try to bring the Spaniards to the adoption of at least a friendly attitude toward the Axis.

The Duce interjected that one would have to prevent the Spaniards from making common cause with the English, whereupon the Foreign Minister remarked that in his view they would not do that.

The Führer also stated that the French had to be handled carefully to prevent the defection of North Africa because such a defection would be very bad. Whether Vichy would for long be able to keep North Africa with metropolitan France was not quite clear. Besides, it was a question whether Vichy was really honest in its intentions.

Turning to the question of raw materials, the Führer declared that the supply of oil could be taken as assured. Things had even advanced to the point of making oil wells bombproof, as far as possible.

To be sure, the refineries were the point of danger. Germany had taken the necessary steps to protect the oil tanks in Constanța as well.

For the continuation of the war it was absolutely necessary to obtain nickel for the making of steel. For this the deposit in Petsamo (Finland) was important. With regard to copper the mines in Bor and in Croatia assured a sufficient supply. Aluminum and bauxite were coming from the former Yugoslav area, from Hungary, France, and Italy, in sufficient quantities. The supply of coal was merely a problem of labor and of transportation that could be solved. If the

¹⁸ See document No. 49.

entire European economy, which now was under the control of the Axis, were properly organized, the problems could be mastered. The Führer mentioned crude rubber as another important raw material, because it was always needed in the manufacture of buna. A further important article was tungsten, the lack of which would have very bad effects. Germany, however, had a certain stock of this and was using it sparingly for the most important machine tools.

The food situation was made difficult by the deficit areas of Norway, Belgium, Holland, France, and some others. However, before long more might be produced in the eastern territories and in Rumania. Pressure should also be applied to Hungary to increase agricultural production in the territories allotted to her.

Upon a question of the Duce the Führer stated that the harvest prospects were good and he concluded that in the light of the aforementioned facts it was inconceivable that the Axis could lose the war.

The Duce fully and completely agreed with this remark.

The Führer called Switzerland the most despicable and miserable people and state structure. The Swiss were mortal enemies of the new Germany and characteristically declared that if no miracle should happen the "Swabians" would in the end yet win the war. They were obviously against the Reich because they had hoped to do better by their separation from the common fate of the German people. That had indeed been the case for long periods—but now in the light of the latest developments they had become aware that their calculation had been faulty. Their attitude was to a certain extent determined by the hatred of renegades.

To the question of the Duce, what kind of a future Switzerland, which really was an anachronism, could expect, the Foreign Minister replied with a smile that the Duce had to talk that over with the Führer. The Duce remarked that only the French Swiss stood by France in Switzerland while the Italians were against Italy and the Germans against Germany.

About the Jewish question the Führer said that after the war, all the Jews would have to get out of Europe. Nor could they remain in the eastern territories (Lublin) for sanitary reasons because they constituted a breeding place for disease owing to their lack of cleanliness. Perhaps they could be resettled in Madagascar. With proper soil conservation this island would perhaps have room for 15 million people.

The conference was followed by a luncheon to which Field Marshal Keitel and General Cavallero were invited.¹⁷

SCHMIDT

¹⁷ Cavallero, *Comando Supremo: Diario 1940-43 del Capo di S.M.G.* (Bologna, 1948), pp. 107-108, refers briefly to his discussion with Keitel.

No. 585

265/172906

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 660 of June 2

ANKARA, June 2, 1941.

Received June 2—7:40 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 585 of the 1st.²

I should like to comment as follows on the draft transmitted:

The content of article 1 is respect for each other's territories. In this way, it [the treaty] juridically becomes a nonaggression pact for us, whereas Turkey would be in a position to attack us outside our national frontiers. The second sentence of article 2 in my draft³ was designed to prevent this. Omission of the second sentence in the first article of my draft will immediately raise the question that some other power allied with us might attack Turkey in spite of our treaty.

Please reconsider this question. I shall have a conversation with Saracoglu on Tuesday.

PAPEN

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 1798 to the Special Train, June 2."

² Document No. 583.

³ See document No. 556.

No. 586

265/172907-08

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 662 of June 3

ANKARA, June 3, 1941.

Received June 3—1:22 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

1. With reference to your telegram No. 591 of June 3.²

Your instruction to postpone a discussion arrived just in time; however, I have already told Saracoglu on the basis of your instruction No. 584 of June 1³ that you were in agreement with the basic trend of the treaty, but desired different formulations. Therefore, today I could only tell him that I had not yet received your formulation.

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 1809 to Fuschl, June 3, 2:09 p.m."

² This telegram sent by Rintelen (3883/E048211) instructed Papen not to continue discussions with Saracoglu that day but to await further instructions.

³ Document No. 582.

2. In discussing questions relating to the German-Turkish railroad commission Saracoglu brought up the question of Syria. It was quite obvious that they were afraid here of an English attack on Syria, which would perforce place Turkey under the necessity of taking over the Baghdad railroad and the area around Alep for the strategic protection of her position. The Minister intimated that he wished to speak with us about this question, and I am convinced that if we talk with them at this time about this last question involving their wishes with respect to security, too, we can bring them still more definitely into the anti-English camp.

3. The Foreign Minister asked that the Führer be told the following: The Turkish State President was urging that the Führer be sent an appropriate answer to his kind letter.⁴ Saracoglu had recommended, however, that an answer be postponed until we could see that our discussions would produce a positive result.

I am awaiting your further instructions regarding a continuation of the conversation.⁵

PAPEN

⁴ See document No. 514 and footnote 7.

⁵ See document No. 588.

No. 587

658/256881

The Foreign Minister to Senior Counselor Rahn

Telegram

No. 500 of June 3
from Fuschl

FUSCHL, June 3, 1941—12:00 midnight.
Received Berlin, June 4—12:55 a. m.

No. 110 of June 4
from the Foreign Ministry

Sent June 4.

RAM No. 242/R

With reference to your No. 76 of June 2.¹

Please remain for the time being as unofficial representative of the German Government in Syria. Gehrcke and his staff are to return to Berlin.

RIBBENTROP

¹ In this telegram (658/256882) Rahn inquired whether his mission was terminated in view of the fact that "the Führer has ordered the immediate withdrawal of German forces."

No. 588

265/172909-12

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

MOST URGENT

FUSCHL, June 3, 1941—12:00 midnight.

TOP SECRET

No. 501 of June 3

from Fuschl

Received Berlin, June 4—2:05 a. m.

No. 600 of June 4

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent June 4—7:00 a. m.

RAM 243/R

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to telegram No. 662 of June 3.¹

Your reporting in the last few days arouses to a certain extent the impression that the conclusion of a German-Turkish treaty is a vital matter for Germany and that Germany has to be particularly concerned about protecting herself with respect to the great Ottoman Empire. In the face of this I consider it necessary to define once more our position in principle as follows:

1. The Greater German Reich with its Axis partner, Italy, is today the master of Europe. With the exception of Turkey, this has doubtless become clear in the meantime to all the nations on our Continent. I am convinced that in the course of this year even the greatest Turkish "gentleman" will recognize this and, if the person concerned were not too greatly involved personally with another side, then he would also draw his appropriate conclusions from this fact.

2. Thus Germany is today in the position at any moment and at any time to blot out the Turkish state within a few weeks by employing a small fraction of the greatest army that probably ever existed. The fact that we do not intend to do this but want to be friends again with our old ally from the World War is well known. Nevertheless, this is the actual political situation, and there should be no lack of clarity about this reality, even if that is not expressed.

3. In spite of this situation the Greater German Reich is willing to give the Turks a kind of general pardon for their hostile attitude since the outbreak of the war (both official and in press and radio) and to conclude a treaty with Turkey which, given the actual situation with regard to power, is overwhelmingly to the advantage of Turkey. For:

1. We guarantee the Turks the integrity of their [territory], which is naturally of value to them, for our soldiers are at their frontier.

¹ Document No. 586.

Whether Turkey guarantees us integrity of our [territory] is a matter of indifference to us, for I cannot imagine how the Turks wish to attack Berlin.

2. The formulation that neither will take any measures that are aimed directly or indirectly against the other party to the treaty is likewise something from which Turkey has more advantage than we.

3. Furthermore we state that in all questions affecting us jointly we intend in the future to consult with one another in a friendly way, which, considering the relationship of the two states in size is, of course, also primarily to the advantage of Turkey.

4. Furthermore, we recognize Turkish sovereignty in the Straits and even promise to support all the efforts of Turkey to secure the exercise of this sovereignty internationally, which is of very special importance to Turkey considering the fact that the Axis is the master of Europe.

5. Finally, we promise the Turks a border rectification at Edirne, to which they have always attached great significance without any performance [required] in return.

On the other hand, our interest consists in the fact that through this treaty with us Turkey detaches herself somewhat from her English ally. It remains to be seen what effect this fact will have on press and radio, considering past experience.

In summary it can be said that our offer of a treaty is so favorable for Turkey that unless she misunderstands the present situation fundamentally there should be no other course for her than quick acceptance. In any case we have no reason whatever to give any additional assurances beyond these advantages offered Turkey, such as, for example, with regard to Syria, which we cannot do in any case because of our relations with France. Turkish action against Syria would, moreover, naturally take place only in accord with England, and would thus be indirectly pointed against us and sooner or later have the most harmful consequences for the Turks. Incidentally, please in no case say to the Turks on this point what you propose in your telegram 658:² "We expected that Turkey would advise her English friends against an attack on Syria." Such advice on the part of the German Ambassador would doubtless have exactly the opposite effect on the English.

In regard to the remarks in your telegram 660 of June 2³ the following is to be said:

1. It is out of the question that any sort of clause will be included in the new treaty which once more expressly mentions the Anglo-French-Turkish tripartite pact of October 19, 1939, thus not only

² Of June 2 (265/172905).

³ Document No. 585.

representing it as a treaty commitment which still has current significance today, but also giving this treaty German approval after the event. The second paragraph of article 2 of the Turkish draft is therefore outside the scope of any discussion for us.

2. As I understand from your comment on the second sentence in article 1 of the Turkish draft, the Turks intend by means of such a clause to protect themselves against the possibility that the Italians might attack them. If in the discussion of our draft treaty it should be pointed out to you that another power allied with Germany could now attack Turkey in spite of our treaty, please reply that we would not have the slightest objection if Turkey also made a treaty agreement with Italy protecting herself against this. As I remark for your personal information, we could imagine that the Italian Government may perhaps be willing for its part, too, to reach a similar agreement with Turkey.

I am now asking you to resume the conversations with Saracoglu. In so doing, however, you must now take a position which takes into account the viewpoints stated above. Regarding the particulars, please proceed in accordance with telegrams 584⁴ and 585⁵ of June 1, but with the following changes:

1. At the conclusion of article 1 of our draft after the word "respect" there should be added: "and not take any measures which are aimed directly or indirectly against the other contracting party."

2. I cannot continue the authorization at the conclusion of telegram 585 of June 1 to tell the Turkish Foreign Minister orally, if necessary, that at the conclusion of the peace we would take account in so far as possible of any Turkish wishes in regard to the islands off the western coast of Anatolia. Rather please leave this question entirely untouched. Should the Turks bring it up once more, please tell them that perhaps one could come back to it at some later time; at present we could not commit ourselves in any way in this matter.

Report by wire on the progress of the negotiations.⁶

RIBBENTROP

⁴ Document No. 582.

⁵ Document No. 583.

⁶ In telegram No. 670 of June 5 (265/172916) Papen reported having handed Saracoglu the draft treaty with the necessary explanations in accordance with these instructions. The explanations as given to Saracoglu on this occasion are recorded in detail in a Papen memorandum of June 4 (2361/488556-57). According to this memorandum, Saracoglu mentioned "the rather meager contents of the secret protocol" and his disappointment with the proposed wording of article 1.

See, further, document No. 595.

No. 589

116/66872-73

The Minister in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ZAGREB, June 4, 1941—10:25 p. m.

No. 428 of June 4

Received June 4—11:00 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

Today there were discussions here regarding resettlement of the Slovenes and Serbs on the one hand and the Zemun border area on the other. Participants in [the discussion of] the resettlement question: Minister Kasche as chairman; Minister Dr. Benzler, State Councilor Dr. Turner, and Gruppenführer Neuhausen for the Military Commander in Serbia; Chief of the Civil Administration of Lower Styria, Gauleiter Uiberreither; Marshal Kvaternik, Corporation Minister Dr. Dumandzić; State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Dr. Lorković for Croatia; General Glaise v. Horstenau and the experts of those mentioned above. Agreement was reached that 5,000 politically tainted persons and intellectuals are to be resettled by July 5, 1941; 25,000 Slovenes who immigrated after 1914 by August 30, 1941; and about 145,000 Slovene farmers on the frontier by October 1941. The bulk of the 5,000 politically tainted persons and intellectuals are to go directly to Serbia, the bulk of the others to Croatia, while a corresponding number of Serbs are to be transferred from Croatia to Serbia. A record regarding this was drawn up. In the following discussion of experts led by Counselor of Legation Troll² details regarding the implementation were established. The minutes of the first conference and a general draft for agreements between the German Reich and Croatia and between Croatia and the Military Commander in Serbia will be brought along to Salzburg.³ General agreement was reached and cooperation for the execution was assured.

In the discussion of the Zemun frontier⁴ questions the following participated: Minister Kasche as chairman; Minister Dr. Benzler,

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 1835 to Fuschl, June 4, 11:25 p.m."

A notation on another copy (116/66881-82) indicates that the telegram was shown to Ribbentrop.

² Of the Legation at Zagreb.

³ No minutes of the conference dealing with the transfer of Slovenes and Croats have been found; a draft of June 5 by Kasche of a German-Croatian treaty regarding the transfer of the Slovenes is in the files (482S/E241324-29).

⁴ An unsigned memorandum of May 8 for Hitler (116/67027-28) indicates that this question arose as a result of the wish of the German military and political authorities in Serbia to keep the town of Zemun in the Syrmia district for the time being under the jurisdiction of the German Military Commander in Serbia.

State Councilor Dr. Turner, and Gruppenführer Neuhausen for the Military Commander, Serbia; Marshal Kvaternik; State Secretary Dr. Lorković and District Chief Dr. Elicker for Croatia. Minutes of this were drawn up.⁵ They recorded the decision reached that the line Drava-Danube-Sava-Drina was the boundary, thus making Zemun and its environs Croatian national territory. In order to secure the necessary military requirements, Zemun and its vicinity are at first to remain to a limited extent under the Military Commander in Serbia and to be included in the Serbian currency area. Cultural and judicial administration is to be under Croatia. The general and internal administration, railroad, post office, telegraph under Croatian direction, but subject to the Military Commander in Serbia. A draft treaty concerning taxation, remuneration of officials, and other financial questions, and also regarding the general contractual settlement of conditions is being drawn up by Dr. Benzler, Dr. Turner, Neuhausen, and a representative of the Croatian Government; it is to be handed to me so that I may consult with the Government here and then submit it to the Foreign Ministry for a decision. Dr. Elicker being the responsible district chief will himself and through special deputies establish and maintain continuous cooperation.

There was general agreement at the close of the discussion. The proposal is the best possible compromise, not an ideal solution. The office of the Military Commander is still in Zemun; because of lack of space in Belgrade, this solution could unfortunately not be avoided. In this connection a certain amount of disagreement between Turner and Neuhausen became evident. Moreover, today Military Commander General von Förster was relieved by General von Schröder.

I believe that the proposed solution is quite acceptable.⁶ The minutes will be passed on to Salzburg.

KASCHÉ

⁵ Not printed (116/67033-34).

⁶ Negotiations about final incorporation of the Zemun area into Croatia resulted in an agreement signed on Oct. 4, 1941, according to which the area was to be taken over by the Croatian administration on Oct. 10. This was reported in Zagreb telegram No. 1203 of Oct. 4 (245/161535). Pavelić expressed his thanks to Hitler in a letter of Oct. 16 (166/67046-47).

No. 590

71/50861-63

The State Secretary to the Legation in Iran

Telegram

TOP SECRET
[No. 282]¹BERLIN, June 1, 1941.
[Sent June 4.]
Pol. VII 2814 g.

It is of great importance for our policy in the Arab world that the impression does not arise that we drop our friends as soon as they have experienced a failure. Therefore please get in touch at once through suitable channels with the former Minister President Rashid Ali al-Gaylani,² and adjust your entire conduct toward him and those accompanying him accordingly.

According to reports we have here, Gaylani is put out because German and Italian aid did not arrive on time or in sufficient quantities. Please counteract such feelings by suitable means. It can be pointed out that the date of the outbreak of hostilities took us by surprise and came at a particularly unfavorable moment on account of the operation in Crete which required a concentration of all our forces. It can also be pointed out that effective measures for additional military aid were just getting under way when the collapse occurred, and that the considerable sum of money requested³ had already arrived in Athens for further transport by plane. Please inform Gaylani confidentially in this connection that we by no means consider Iraq's struggle for freedom to be lost, and that we are willing to supply further means for this purpose. We are also willing to supply him with funds at once if he needs money for himself and those who accompany him.

For the further treatment of the matter we should first find out whether Gaylani has the possibility of further political activity from Iran, and what his situation and that of those accompanying him is in general; and particularly, whether he was able to take with him all or part of the money which had been made available to him earlier.

Moreover, we are particularly interested in convincing the Grand Mufti, too, that we will continue to support him and the Arab fight for freedom. He can likewise be promised further financial support.

In maintaining liaison with Gaylani and the Grand Mufti we must naturally proceed with caution. However, we do not intend to

¹ Only a draft copy of this instruction has been found. The telegram number and the date of dispatch have been inserted from a reference in the reply, Tehran telegram No. 448 of June 4 (71/50867-68).

² See document No. 571, footnote 1.

³ See document No. 549.

disavow our Iraq friends. It follows likewise that the fact that official diplomatic relations were not resumed cannot be a subject of discussion for propaganda purposes either in the one or in the other sense.

Report by wire.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER

⁴ This was telegram No. 448 referred to in footnote 1 in which Ettel reported his conversation with Gaylani and the Grand Mufti. According to Ettel, both wished to take an active part in the struggle as soon as possible and were anxious to go to Syria by way of Berlin.

See, further, documents Nos. 599 and 606.

No. 591

2800/548137-92

Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs

BERLIN, June 4, 1941.

D IX 7 g. Rs.

Subject: The filling of positions in the event of an extended operation to the east.

With reference to the matter submitted D IX 1 g. Rs. of May 22.¹

A final decision has not yet been reached concerning the boundaries and administrative centers of the four future Reich Commissariats in the eastern territories.² Likewise, no fixed decisions of a general nature have as yet been taken concerning the individual independent states or governments (Reich Protectorates, autonomous governments, or parts of the Reich) to be set up. The opinions of the agencies in question: Reichsleiter Rosenberg, Reich Ministry of Interior (State Secretary von Stuckart), Reichsführer SS (SD) differ greatly. Each office is said to be trying to get a decision of the Führer in favor of its view.

At the present time the view is taken that the western Ukraine should for the time being constitute a special administrative area. Lvov is said to be tentatively under consideration as the seat of the future Reich Commissar for the western and eastern Ukraine. In that case the representative of the Foreign Ministry (Minister von Twardowski) would then also have to make his headquarters in Lvov. A special agency of the Foreign Ministry would then have to be established in Kiev, however, for which Consul General Karl Walther, who was heretofore chosen for Kharkov, would come into consideration. Consul Ehrt could be authorized to take over the direction of Kharkov. He has the necessary knowledge of the locale

¹ Not printed (2800/548138-40).

² See document No. 573.

and speaks perfect Russian. It would perhaps be well to make him subordinate to the Kiev office.

Regarding the future of the Baltic States, opinions differ widely. At first I had the impression that Reichsleiter Rosenberg was thinking of incorporating them into Reich territory as parts of the Reich. State Secretary Stuckart, on the other hand, is said to be of the opinion that they would have to be made into separate states having a certain degree of independence.

Regarding the White Ruthenian areas, to be merged with the Baltic States into one Reich Commissariat, the view is entertained that an independent White Ruthenian state should be established under German leadership. This state would border in the west on Lithuania, Latvia, and the General Government, in the south on the Ukraine, in the north and east on Muscovy. The border to the east is to be substantially extended. (In the northwest, to the Valdai Hills).

Let me mention incidentally that Reich Minister Dr. Frank is said to be working for an *extension of the General Government* at the expense of the former Polish and a part of the White Ruthenian areas that went to the USSR.

If it is decided that an independent White Ruthenia shall be created, it might be necessary to make independent the contemplated agency of the Foreign Ministry for White Ruthenia (White Russia) with its probable seat in Minsk, and not place it under Minister Zechlin, as originally planned. Dr. Kleist, of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, is already under consideration as its chief. Counselor Dr. Pfeiderer (at present, Paris) could be assigned to him.

The staffing of the agencies of the Foreign Ministry would then present the following picture:

1. *Ukraine*

Probable location, Kiev; perhaps also Lvov, for the time being.

Representative: Minister von Twardowski

Staff: Counselor of Legation von Herwarth

Consular Secretary Hermann Strecker

Referent Rost of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop

Kanzler Buchholz

Because of the spatial extension of the area, it seems necessary at the same time also to establish at the following places agencies which should be subordinate to the representative:

a) Kiev—Consul General Karl Walther

b) Kharkov—Consul Ehrt (Pol. V)

c) Odessa—Senior Counselor Roth

d) Rostov-on-Don—Consul Eckert

2. *Caucasus*

Probable location, Tiflis.

Minister First Class Dienstmann

3. *Baltic States* with extensions to the east

Probable location, Riga.

Over-all supervision: Minister Dr. Erich Zechlin

Officers for the individual countries:

a) Lithuania: Consul General Dr. Freundt (formerly Zagreb)

b) Latvia: von Brümmer (Information Department)

c) Estonia: von Wrangell (D IX)

Should it become necessary later on to establish special agencies in Riga, Tallin, and Kaunas, the following are being considered:

d) Riga: Minister von Kotze, who would also be the representative of Dr. Zechlin

e) Tallin: SA-Oberführer Spelsberg

f) Kaunas: Consul General Dr. Freundt

3a. *White Russia* and the Polish areas at present still belonging to the USSR

Probable location, Minsk.

Dr. Kleist, assigned by the Dienststelle Ribbentrop

Counselor Dr. Pfeiderer

4. *Central Russia (Muscovy)*

Probable location, Moscow.

Minister von Saucken or

Minister von Tippelskirch;

also assigned, Consul General Pfeiffer

5. Counselor of Embassy Hilger will remain available to the Foreign Minister as his personal interpreter.

As already stated in the paper of May 22, it would be advantageous at the very beginning of the movement to the east to assign the contemplated chiefs of the new agencies of the Foreign Ministry to the headquarters of the Army groups in question.

This staffing must naturally be made contingent upon the final demarkation of the borders, and the locations of the Reich Commissariats, and of the corresponding subdivisions and can therefore be considered only a *tentative* setup for the time being. Significant changes would hardly be likely to occur even later, however.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through Minister Bergmann and State Secretary von Weizsäcker.

GROSSKOPF

No. 592

M341/M015223-24

*The Chief of Staff of the German Army in Norway to the High
Command of the Army, Attaché Department*¹

Telegram

CHEFSACHE

HELSINKI, June 4, 1941.

For the OKW, WFSt., General Jodl.

1. Finland is now ready for full cooperation within the framework of the conversations of Salzburg and Berlin.² In the case that a military decision does not take place their political wishes for a guarantee as an independent state, for guarantee of their state territory with the former boundaries rounded out if possible, and regarding economic assistance will be transmitted by diplomatic channels.³

2. Mobilization will be carried out by stages, after arrival of the first German transports approximately June 10, the reinforcement of the frontier guard. On June 15 mobilization of the Fifth Army and of the troops earmarked for Hangö and the Åland Islands. Thereafter mobilization of the remainder in accordance with the development of the situation.

3. Occupation of the Åland Islands and the blockade of Hangö will be taken over by Finland. For the Southeast Front six divisions will be assembled as the first attack wave. The moving up of five to seven divisions during the further course of the campaign is possible.

4. The *Blaufuchs* movement⁴ can be carried out according to plan.

BUSCHENHAGEN

¹ This message was sent during the course of the military discussions held in Helsinki during the first week of June. Colonel Buschenhagen represented the OKW and Colonel Kinzel the OKH. General Heinrichs, General Ayro, and Colonel Tapola were the Finnish participants.

Colonel Kinzel's "Protocol on the Conversations in Finland, June 3-6, 1941", dated June 10, is to be found in file H3/1 (P5/P00307-10). It records that General Heinrichs "warned with deep earnestness against any attempt to set up any kind of Quisling government which would immediately paralyze any further cooperation between Finland and Germany."

Colonel Buschenhagen's "Summary of the German-Finnish Conversations in Helsinki, June 3-5, 1941," dated June 7, is found in the same file (P5/P00299-305).

² See document No. 554 and footnote 10.

³ No record of the expression of these political wishes has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry. Cf., however, John H. Wuorinen, editor, *Finland and World War II, 1939-1944* (New York, 1948), pp. 99-100.

⁴ *Blaufuchs*, code name for the transfer of the forces of the XXXVI Corps from Germany and Norway to Finland.

No. 593

2800/548202-04

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

Moscow, June 4, 1941.

Ag/301

Pol. V 3139 g.

Subject: Statements concerning Stalin's speech to the graduates of the Military Academy.

Nothing authentic has hitherto been divulged concerning the speech that Stalin made in the Kremlin on May 5, 1941, on the occasion of the graduation exercises at the Military Academy.¹ Schüle, the DNB representative here, has now obtained through an informant some statements by an eye-witness concerning the further contents of the speech, which he has set forth in the enclosed memorandum. One can naturally not vouch for the correctness of the statements; yet they do not sound improbable.²

SCHULENBURG

[Enclosure]

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

zu Pol. V 3139 g.³

On May 5, 1941, a ceremony took place in the Kremlin on the occasion of the graduation of the candidates of 16 military academies of the Red Army and of 9 military faculties of civilian colleges. On this occasion (on the day, moreover, before the taking over of the post of Head of the Government of the USSR by Stalin) there were assembled, besides delegations of the young officers, the heads of the State and the Party, as well as the Supreme Command of the Army and Navy as guests of the Soviet Government. As reported in the press the next day, in the course of this ceremony, Stalin made a speech lasting over 40 minutes, which was heard "with rapt attention." Only a very brief statement was published concerning the substance of this speech.

On this subject I have learned from a well-informed Soviet source that Stalin devoted more than two-thirds of his speech to a precise and completely dispassionate comparison between the German and the Soviet war potential. In his well-known quiet manner of speaking, without pathos of any kind, he gave his hearers a detailed demonstration of the strength and equipment of the German Army,

¹ The speech was mentioned in Schulenburg's dispatch of May 12, document No. 505.

² According to Gustav Hilger he later learned from Russian officers captured during the war that the tenor of Stalin's speech was entirely different from what is here reported. See *The Incompatible Allies*, p. 330.

³ Pol. V 3139 g.: The covering dispatch.

Navy, and Luftwaffe, by means of some figures, and just as clearly indicated the achievements of the German war and armaments industry, from time to time comparing them with corresponding data on the Soviet war potential. Stalin then came to the conclusion that the Soviet war potential was not a match for the German. In view of this fact, he had recommended that the two following inferences be drawn:

1. Soviet policy must take into account the present balance of power;

2. The Soviet military forces and the armaments industry had no reason to boast unduly of their achievements, considerable as these were, let alone to rest on their laurels. It was necessary to proceed with all their strength with the training and equipment of the Army, the development of the war industry, for the purpose of further strengthening the defense of the land.

Among the listeners to whom Stalin developed these thoughts in his short speech, the impression left had been predominantly that Stalin was anxious to prepare his followers for a "new compromise" with Germany.

SCHÜLE

No. 594

260/170001

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 387 of June 5

HELSINKI, June 5, 1941—5:24 p. m.

Received June 5—6:35 p. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 378.¹

Today the 7-day period expires which the English Government gave the Finnish Government for the reply in the matter of handing over of tonnage. The Finnish Government will reply today that it is prepared in August to increase the Finnish tonnage already sailing for England from 18,000 tons to 40,000 tons. A more precise date in the reply is avoided. The Foreign Minister hopes through this reply to prevent the English from proceeding against valuable Finnish cargo afloat.

BLÜCHER

¹ Of June 3 (4963/E276577). For earlier discussions of the Finns with the Germans regarding British demands for Finnish shipping space, see Weizsäcker's memoranda of Apr. 11 (260/169929-980) and Apr. 28 (260/169960).

No. 595

265/172920-21

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 679 of June 6

ANKARA, June 6, 1941.

Received June 6—2:25 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

Numan just told me that the Turkish Government has accepted with great satisfaction the proposal of the Reich Foreign Minister to settle Turkish-German relations by means of a treaty, in order, also in accordance with the wish of the State President, to return to the mutual relationship of sincere friendship. He had full understanding for the wish that the obligations entered into by both sides not be mentioned in this treaty. The proposed text,² however, would be capable of depriving Turkey of the sole advantage that remained to her from the triple pact. If, for example, Turkey should be attacked by a third party (Russia?), then she had the right to request English help. Under the treaty the Reich could regard this, just as any association with England, the enemy of Germany, as an indirect action against itself. In order to preclude this interpretation and at the same time to take account of the Foreign Minister's desire that the existing treaties not be mentioned, Numan proposes another wording of the preamble. He proposes to omit the sentence "to assure the preservation of peace during the present war", because such a wording produced the impression that we felt we were on the eve of a conflict, and to give the preamble the following wording: "The German Reich Chancellor and the President of the Turkish Republic, desiring to affirm the friendly character of their mutual relations in accordance with the spirit of the letters exchanged between them, and resolved not to demand anything of the other which would not be compatible with the existing obligations of the two countries, have agreed to conclude a treaty to that end."

Article 1 could remain unchanged with only the words "directly or indirectly" omitted.

In article 2, which is accepted unchanged, Numan wants to insert after the word "matters": "in so far as they relate to the present treaty." In the course of the conversation Numan also remarked that he had been instructed by the State President to stress once more that in case of a German-Russian conflict Turkey would maintain a more than benevolently neutral attitude.

PAPEN

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 1854 to Fuschl. June 6."

² See document No. 583.

No. 596

177/85161-65

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOKYO, June 6, 1941.

SECRET

Received June 6—8:55 p. m.

No. 893 of June 6

With reference to my telegram No. 873 of June 4.¹

I. The over-all political picture in Japan has been dominated for the past week by three influences:

Demand for a quick conclusion of the Chinese campaign, concern about America's entry into the war, uncertainty regarding German-Russian developments. The Chinese campaign is entering its 5th year and weighs on the people with visibly increasing economic and financial tension. As far as foreign policy is concerned, no important reduction of foreign aid for Chungking can be anticipated at present. Reasons of domestic and foreign policy therefore demand urgently a speedy conclusion of the campaign. Two power groups are exerting influence on the Government toward this objective:

The circles with Anglo-Saxon leanings, especially business, are striving for a settlement with America, whereby they would be ready for far-reaching concessions if America would cease to support Chiang Kai-shek and induce him to give in to Japan.

As opposed to this, the China Army, with the agreement of the naval forces employed there, demands aggressive action against Chungking, exclusive support of the Nanking Government, and uncompromising adherence to the objectives in China. As a leader of this direction the Japanese Ambassador in Nanking, Honda, who has activist opinions, recently took a hand in the debate on domestic policy. Because of the economic handicap of the China campaign and the domestic controversy of the different groups regarding the means for bringing it to a quick conclusion, Japanese policy has been placed in a weak position that is further worsened by the threat of America's entry into the war and numerous rumors about an imminent German-Russian conflict.

Under the pressure of this situation the Foreign Minister decided to respond for the time being to the American initiative for a kind of neutrality pact, and while unconditionally adhering to the Tripartite Pact to make the greatest effort to prevent America's entry into the war. The advance against Singapore discussed in Berlin has had to yield to this immediate necessity for the present.

¹ In this telegram (177/85149-51) Ott reported a discussion with Matsuoka regarding the appropriate attitude to be taken by the Powers of the Tripartite Pact toward the latest speech of Roosevelt.

The Foreign Minister evaluated the prospects of his attempt to restrain America as slight. The fact that America not only thus far postponed a reply but also in Roosevelt's fireside speech² further promoted the idea of entry into the war, and on the other hand the reports of a parallel British action to induce Chungking to fall into line, were connected with the American attempt to circumvent the Foreign Minister in his adherence to the Tripartite Pact, by offering his opponents in the Cabinet and in industry the compliance of Chungking under united British-American pressure, in return for Japanese assurances which would weaken the Tripartite Pact.

Pointing in this direction, among other things, is also C. Nomura's peace speech, reported in telegraphic report No. 886 of June 5,³ whereby the reconciliation group backing him evidently wanted to depreciate Matsuoka's sharp statement of May 30⁴ and shake Matsuoka's position.

As he has told me several times, Matsuoka considers the only sure way to keep America out of the war to be a quick German landing in England. In this connection Matsuoka repeated the request which I reported by telegram⁵ that he be informed from time to time about the development of German-Russian relations, in order to be able to evaluate correctly the many rumors about extremely intensive German preparations for aggression against Russia, and to make appropriate Japanese preparations. I consider compliance with this request, within the limits of the discretion which is always advisable with respect to Japan, to be an important means of strengthening the Foreign Minister's position in the Cabinet. The following in particular speaks for fulfillment of Matsuoka's request: There are signs that the pro-Anglo-Saxon opposition would use the outbreak of a German-Russian conflict and the confusion that would at first occur in consequence in Japan for a decisive attack on the Tripartite Pact. At the same time evidently the argument is to be used that because of the radical change in German-Russian relations the basis of the Tripartite Pact had shifted, since, as article 5 also shows, the Pact had envisaged peaceful cooperation of all the treaty partners with Russia. According to this, Japan's obligation of alliance arising out of article 3 would not exist if America should enter the war in consequence of a German-Russian conflict. In these circumstances it would doubtless be of value to keep Matsuoka informed in continuation of the Berlin conversations, in order that

² The reference is to President Roosevelt's "fireside chat" of May 27; see document No. 560 and footnote 2.

³ In this telegram (177/85152) Ott had referred to Nomura's speech of June 4 in New York, in which the latter had expressed his belief that peace must be preserved in the Pacific. Matsuoka expressed regret at the Ambassador's remarks.

⁴ See document No. 575, footnote 1.

⁵ See document No. 512.

prompt countermeasures may be taken. Moreover, Matsuoka repeated the opinion I have reported, namely that Japan would as a natural necessity be involved in a German-Russian conflict,⁶ adding that this was his purely personal opinion.

II. The situation in the Japanese Armed Forces:

Preparations by the Army and the Navy for highest combat readiness are doubtless in full swing. With regard to their employment in action the following could be determined:

a. The advance to Singapore, regarding the preparations for which I reported orally in Berlin, is still in preparation, to be sure, with the inclusion of the Philippines, but since the beginning of April it is less favorably evaluated tactically, since strong British forces are said to be concentrated there. Furthermore, it is now generally assumed that the attack on Singapore would bring America to enter the war at once. Finally, the military emphasis has been shifted of late to a speedy conclusion of the China conflict. In spite of the successful resumption of Japanese aggressive action and the further cutting off of the supply roads, however, in my opinion no military victory, decisive for the war in China, is to be expected unless at the same time the foreign support of Chungking is stopped.

b. In case the United States should enter the war the present Government will without a doubt take it as a case involving for Japan the obligations of the alliance. However, according to private statements by informed officers, military intervention by Japan is to be counted on only on the basis of consultations with allied Governments. The Japanese Armed Forces believe that considering the diversity and great separation in distance of the combat areas of the partners to the Tripartite Pact they must adjust their active procedure to the actual conduct of America.

Whether Japan would recognize it as a case involving the obligations of the alliance if a measure of assistance for England by the United States of America should lead to armed conflict with one of the Axis Powers has become questionable, to judge from the power situation in the Cabinet and the Navy. In this connection the question of whether aggression exists in the sense of article 3 of the Tripartite Pact will doubtless play a role in internal Japanese discussion. The Foreign Minister told me that he was opposing a restrictive interpretation of obligations under the alliance and was exerting influence on the Cabinet to reject the arbitrary interpretation of the American Government concerning the defensive character of its actually hostile actions.

c. In case of a German-Russian conflict there can be no clarity at the moment regarding the attitude of the Japanese Armed Forces. However, one can count on Japan's exploiting a weakening of Russia to attack Vladivostok and the Siberian coastal area. Preparations for this are so far not discernible. The time needed for concentration of forces is estimated by the Military Attaché to be at least 6 weeks. Japanese forces are not sufficient for a simultaneous attack both on America in the western Japanese ocean and on Russia.

⁶ See documents Nos. 464 and 512.

In summary, the main effort of Japanese policy is directed toward concluding the China campaign quickly and if possible avoiding armed conflict with America, and in this Foreign Minister Matsuoka is involved in a grave conflict against the internal opposition and the united efforts of England and America, who are trying to make the Tripartite Pact ineffective. In contrast to this, the strongest support of the Pact is the loyalty to alliances and the honest pro-German feeling of the broad masses of the lower classes of the population, such as also constantly comes out strongly in the Japanese press as a whole. I am naturally employing every means in cooperation with our friends in the Army and the Navy, the activist groups and those portions of the business world that are close to us, and making use of such possibilities for influence as are possessed by our Economic delegation,⁷ in order to assure Japan's active readiness to comply with the provisions of the Tripartite Pact. However, I would consider it would provide a decisive impetus to consolidation of the Japanese attitude if the Berlin main commission of the Tripartite Pact would be convened as soon as possible under the chairmanship of the Reich Foreign Minister and with the participation of the important persons in the Japanese Army and Navy who are still in Europe.⁸ In this way one could work toward a clarification of the concrete measures to be undertaken by Japan in the political and military fields in case the Pact should be invoked.

OTT

⁷ The Wohltat delegation. See document No. 429 and footnote 1.

⁸ See document No. 304 and footnote 1.

No. 597

341/199339

The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 884 of June 6

BUENOS AIRES, June 6, 1941—7: 18 p. m.

Received June 7—5: 00 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 337 of March 7.¹

At today's conference at the Foreign Ministry (cf. telegram No. 879 of June 6²) the economic specialist expressed regret that the Argentine Ambassador in Berlin had still not received any statement of our position regarding the note of December 23³ on the Argen-

¹ See document No. 166, footnote 6.

² Not found.

³ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 555.

tine customs union plan; ⁴ he indicated that positive statements from the U.S. and England had already been received.⁵

THERMANN

⁴ Marginal note in Wiehl's handwriting: "How do matters stand?"

⁵ In the files there is the draft of an instruction by Wiehl of June 13 (341/199337) informing the Embassy that on the basis of the report from Ambassador Prüfer (document No. 202) the matter had been left in abeyance but would now be taken up again.

For further developments see vol. XIII of this series.

No. 598

617/249959-60

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 385

BERLIN, June 6, 1941.

I asked the Afghan Minister of Economics to call on me today in order to acquaint him with the three German wishes or proposals mentioned in Under State Secretary Woermann's memorandum of June 3.¹ (It is a question of permitting a short-wave transmitter in the Afghan-Indian border area, inconspicuous German participation in using the radio transmitter in Kabul,² and tolerance of a certain amount of smuggling of arms.) Abdul Majid Khan received my statements with interest. He then turned the conversation once more toward a more general subject. One could see from this that the most recent developments in Iraq were not entirely without their effect on the pace at which Abdul Majid Khan believes he can proceed.

The Minister described how the British Government has been trying of late to activate the border tribes against Afghanistan. He said that his own sojourn in Germany and that of his relatives had aroused English distrust. He also emphasized that dealings with the border tribes between Afghanistan and India required great experience; if one passed out weapons there, one ran the risk of having them fall into the hands of the enemy by a wrong choice of persons. The Minister further intimated that before particular concrete wishes as described above were carried out, he wanted to mark out the general sphere that would apply [to relations] between Germany and Afghanistan and within which one could then proceed in stages. The Minister expressed the intention of bringing his friend, the Afghan Ambassador in Ankara,³ to Berlin for a conference. On the basis of his talk with the latter the conversation between us could then be continued, and this on the basis of an agenda which he would draw up.

¹ Not found.

² See document No. 300.

³ Fais Mohammed.

Abdul Majid Khan called it quite favorable that owing to the pause that has occurred in Iraq—he, as I, did not treat the reversal there as tragic in any way—enough time had been provided to place our cooperation on the firmer foundation that was needed.

The outcome is thus that the contact with the Afghan, who will go to Professor Sauerbruch again today, is being continued slowly and still without any commitment.

From certain sources it was learned today that the Italian Government in its well-known incautious manner has informed its Minister in Kabul⁴ of the Axis talks with Bose.⁵ We will have to observe whether this fact does not again bring about new reversals.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

⁴ Pietro Quaroni.

⁵ See document No. 561.

No. 599

71/50869-70

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

URGENT

BERLIN, June 6, 1941.

U. St.S. Pol. 509

According to telegram No. 448 from Tehran,¹ the former Iraq Minister President, Gaylani, the Grand Mufti, and the Regent, Sharaf, intend to take up residence in Syria for the time being. Gaylani and the Grand Mufti wish to come to Berlin for a short sojourn before going to Syria.

Gaylani and the Grand Mufti are of value for us and for the Arab movement only if they are in a position to participate actively. This will hardly be possible from Syria at the present time. Moreover, the situation in Syria is so uncertain that they would run unnecessary risks there. Therefore the journey to Syria should be postponed.

On the other hand it would be advisable to accept the proposal of Gaylani and the Grand Mufti that they come to Berlin for a short sojourn. This is also in accordance with the view of Minister Grobba, who has just returned. It could then be decided in Berlin where the two are to be put up for the time being. I would not suggest that they remain in Berlin permanently. A German spa such as Karlsbad or the Semmering could be considered, or also some place closer to the east such as one in the vicinity of Salonika or on the Black Sea. This does not have to be decided at this moment.

¹ See document No. 590, footnotes 1 and 4.

The draft of a telegram to Tehran on these lines is enclosed.² It also contains proposals as to the route of travel.³

Submitted herewith through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister.

WOERMANN

² Not printed (71/50871-72).

³ The draft telegram referred to in footnote 2 suggested that Gaylani and the Grand Mufti travel to Berlin by way of Turkey.

No. 600

593/245354-55

Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff

BERLIN, June 6, 1941.

With reference to telegram No. 1655 of June 4, 1941, from the Military Attaché in Washington:¹

It is possible that the attitude of the President in the matter of entry into the war is, among other things, also determined by the military arguments advanced by the American General Staff. But these considerations are not the deciding factor for the President, and one cannot therefore say—as General von Bötticher does in the telegram referred to above—that “as a result of the influence of the General Staff American entry into the war has been postponed, and has even been prevented for the time being.”

The situation is rather as follows: The President finds himself in a difficult dilemma. On the one hand he is being urged more and more strongly by England to bring about the entry of the U.S.A. into the war, and at heart he is actually prepared to do this; but on the other hand he cannot take the step as yet because of

- a. The still unsettled situation in the Pacific (Japan),
- b. public opinion in his country, which is still predominantly against entry into the war.

These are the decisive reasons which force upon the President his hesitating and temporizing policy. Without knowing what Japan will do the President cannot dare to enter the war; he cannot bring about an entry into the war, which under the constitution can be declared only by Congress, in opposition to the predominant public opinion among his people.

The questions of military preparedness and the getting under way of war industry are in my opinion of merely secondary nature. If American public opinion were behind him and the Japanese situa-

¹ In this report (593/245350-53) Bötticher discussed the attitude and influence of the United States General Staff which, he felt, had postponed and for the time being even prevented America's entry into the war.

tion were clarified in a way favorable to him, the President would bring about the entry into the war today rather than tomorrow. In that case he would not take any account of the military questions as to whether the armed forces were entirely ready for action and the war industry already in full swing. In 1917, too, Wilson did not permit himself to be influenced by these military and industrial factors.

Submitted herewith through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister.

DIECKHOFF

No. 601

235/157210-11

The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

RIO DE JANEIRO, June 7, 1941—2:20 a. m.

No. 1003 of June 6

Received June 7—5:40 p. m.

Unknown to the Foreign Minister¹ President Vargas asked me yesterday evening, through an intermediary, to call on him.

After he had given renewed assurance that the German ships laid up in Brazil would not be hampered in their freedom of movement, expressing special interest at the same time in the plan for purchasing some of the ships (cf. telegram No. 952 of June 3²), he brought the conversation around to the increasing American pressure. This was making itself felt of late particularly by the fact that President Roosevelt was urging him to visit Washington, and it was pointed out that Roosevelt's visit to Rio de Janeiro of several years ago had not been returned.

He, Vargas, had so far evaded all invitations. Now, however, he was afraid he would have to commit himself, and this was all the more embarrassing for him because after Roosevelt's last speech³ his visit in Washington would doubtless be interpreted and exploited as approval of American policy.

He now had the idea, which he himself called "vague", of depriving the visit to Washington of the propaganda effect desired by Roosevelt in such a way that he, Vargas, would come with a proposal for mediation instead of as an ally in the war. Now entirely without committing himself and trusting in such discretion on our part as

¹ Oswaldo Aranha.

² Not printed (235/157208-09).

³ See document No. 580 and footnote 2.

he for his part promised most scrupulously, he wanted to raise the question whether it would be agreeable to the German Government if he suggested in Washington in a rather general way and without indicating that he had a mandate from the Germans, that he act as mediator. He stressed time and again that he wanted only to make an entirely private suggestion; he himself was not yet clear as to how it might be further developed.

I replied to the President that I naturally could not express an opinion regarding his ideas but that I would report them to Berlin.*

PRÜFER

* See document No. 613.

No. 602

265/172928-29

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

ANKARA, June 7, 1941.

No. 686 of June 7

Received June 7—2:10 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 618 of June 7.²

1. I have found that the Turkish General Staff has the following view: Should the English attack Syria, which is to be considered probable according to English press reports, then Turkey would get into a very difficult situation in case the Baghdad Railway on the other side should fall into English hands. As is known, the Baghdad Railway is regarded as Turkish property, and the delimitation of the frontier, which changes between Turkish and Syrian territory four times, is considered to be exceedingly unfortunate because this might also make transports within Turkey impossible. Since Turkey is cut off from Europe, the Baghdad Railway forms the sole connection with the outside world.

Therefore, the General Staff takes the view that one could not hold it against Turkey if in protecting a vital interest she did not let the Baghdad Railway fall into English hands, if the occasion should arise.

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 1870 to the Special Train, June 7, 2:43 p.m."

² This telegram from Ribbentrop (265/172924) forwarded information from Rahn that, according to the French High Commissioner of Syria, Turkey was urging Britain to occupy Syria and intended herself to occupy Alep. Ribbentrop instructed Papen not to make any démarche with Turkey for the time being and to give his views regarding these reports from Syria.

2. After I became acquainted with this view I tried to sound out the Foreign Minister and Numan about this question a few days ago and I stressed the dangerous course the Turkish Government would be taking if it accepted the view stated above.³ Thereupon I was given this reply: If Turkey had wanted to use her alliance with England for asserting claims, she would have had opportunities ten times to do this. She remained true to this policy of limiting [her demands] to the inviolability of her own frontier. Numan asked me among other things whether, considering the new policy to be established between us, it would be an advantage for Germany if England laid hands on the Baghdad Railway? I replied that German-French cooperation in no case permitted a step by the Turkish Government directed against the French interest taken without our consent. As I heard from another quarter, my statements thoroughly achieved the desired effect.

3. I therefore do not believe that the information from the Syrian High Commissioner is accurate; on the contrary, I am convinced that Turkey does not desire any complications and therefore not an English attack on Syria either. The Military Attaché⁴ is of the same opinion, and confirms that no military measures have been taken along the Syrian border that could be interpreted as offensive. Nevertheless, should there be English attacks, the situation for Turkey would be difficult in so far as by your instructions the promise held out would be withdrawn that we would discuss with Turkey her wishes regarding these areas if the occasion should arise.⁵

PAPEN

³ Papen's memorandum of June 4 (2361/488558-59) records this conversation.

⁴ Col. H. Rohde.

⁵ In telegram No. 700 of June ■ (265/172932) Papen reported that "the Chief of the General Staff told the Military Attaché categorically Turkey would not intervene in Syria in any way nor had she been asked by Britain to do so." Papen also quoted the Chief of the Turkish General Staff as saying that "if Germany should participate in a defense or occupation of Syria, Turkey would not consider this a threat to her security since she had full confidence in Germany's intentions as a result of the Führer's letter."

No. 603

4691/48809-19

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Füh. 36

BERLIN, June 9, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND CROATIAN LEADER OF STATE DR. PAVELIĆ IN THE PRESENCE OF REICHSMARSCHALL GÖRING, THE FOREIGN MINISTER, GENERAL BODENSCHATZ, AND MINISTER HEWEL ON JUNE 7, 1941¹

Pavelić first expressed to the Führer Croatia's thanks for having regained her independence. The Führer replied that he had always followed developments in Croatia with great interest, since he knew the Croatian people very well personally from the time of his youth. The recent events had made him (the Führer) an unintentional instrument of the liberation of Croatia; for actually he had not intended at all to take action against Yugoslavia.

Now young Croatia was facing a great task of construction, in which Germany and particularly the Reichsmarschall were very much interested. Germany had always had the objective of making the Balkan countries good economic partners, and she had harbored anything but belligerent intentions. She simply wanted to assist in the development of these countries, not out of false sentimentality but because her own economic interest required this. Politically Germany had no interests of any sort which were contrary to those of the Balkan countries.

There existed the strong desire now to expand the economic relations between Germany and Croatia.

Pavelić replied that for her part, too, Croatia wanted to develop economic cooperation. In doing so she wanted to remain an independent state and was very jealous of her freedom and her independence. Therefore even in the past 2 months nothing had happened that could in any way place in question the political or economic independence of Croatia. The Führer and the German people were assured of Croatia's highest gratitude, for there had never been a case in history in which the liberation of a small people could be assured without the help of a big state. In the case of Croatia the Axis had helped. Therefore the people, too, had everywhere shown

¹ In telegram No. 192 of May 11 (116/66845) Kasche reported the request of Pavelić that he be received by Hitler at an early date. In telegram No. 287 of May 17 (116/66844) Ribbentrop informed Kasche that Hitler would receive Pavelić in the near future. Telegram No. 400 of June 2 (116/66867) directed that Pavelić be invited to Salzburg on June 6 for talks with Ribbentrop in Fuschl and with Hitler at the Berghof. Schmidt's memorandum of June 11 (4691/46795-808) recorded Ribbentrop's conversation with Pavelić in Fuschl on June 6. An unsigned memorandum (116/66879-80) lists for Ribbentrop the points to be discussed with Pavelić.

their gratitude toward the German troops during their passage through Croatia. This feeling of gratitude would never die, for the loyalty of the Croats was proverbial.

The Führer interjected here that he knew this very well.

In the further course of the conversation Pavelić turned to the ethnic composition of the new Croatian State. He termed the Moslems the purest portion of the Croatian people, with whom the national consciousness had remained strongest. In this connection he again brought up his wishes with regard to the frontier in the Sanjak and [of] Novi Pazar.²

The Führer replied that he knew from his Austrian period that the Croats and Bosnians had been among the elements most loyal to the state and most reliable. It was therefore of value for the Croatian State if a secure position could be occupied by the Moslem population with respect to the Serbs precisely in the eastern part of the country.

In this connection he mentioned that during a recent visit Mme. Stojadinović³ had called the Moslems fanatical Serbs. Incidentally, she was certainly no friend of Croatia and had also perhaps welcomed the coup in Belgrade for ideological [*ideellen*] reasons, too, since as a result of it the hated Cvetković had to step down. Pavelić stated in this connection that for reasons of consolidating eastern Croatia, as mentioned by the Führer, he would indeed transfer part of the Government there. Thus the Vice President, who was himself a Moslem, as well as several Government offices would be installed there.

The Serbian problem had actually existed only for the past 60 years. The portions of the population which had gone over to the Serbian Orthodox Church at that time had as a result been erroneously designated as Serbs, whereas they were in reality Croats.

In this connection, the Führer took up the subject of the resettlement plans on the basis of which Slovenes were to be transferred to Croatia and in return Serbs were to be sent to Old Serbia. This

² Croatian wishes for the incorporation of the territory of the old Turkish sanjak Novi Pazar and of other places in southern Serbia had been reported in Zagreb telegrams No. 230 of May 14 (245/161873) and No. 286 of May 19 (245/161886). These wishes were referred to in a memorandum of May 25 by Woermann (230/153241-42) summarizing the official German position regarding the new frontiers on former Yugoslav territory.

³ There are references to Madame Stojadinović, the wife of the former Yugoslav Minister President, in telegram No. 371 of May 13, from the Special Train (230/153226) forwarding instructions from Ribbentrop "that Madame Stojadinović be treated with special friendliness after her arrival in Berlin," and in a minute of May 30 by an official of the Protocol Department (230/-153255) recording that prior to her departure for Budapest from Vienna on May 29 she had expressed special appreciation of the accommodating attitude which she had encountered on her visit to Germany. No records of a meeting with Hitler or Ribbentrop have been found.

type of resettlement was naturally painful at the moment, but was better than lasting harm. At any rate Germany did not expect anyone to do what she did not do herself. She herself had transferred elements of her own national population from areas in which they had been living for 300-400 years. Such a surgery, such a reshuffling had to be carried out at some time; it was certainly painful at the moment but it would bring great advantages even to the children of those who had been resettled.

Incidentally, if the Croatian State was to be really stable a nationally intolerant policy had to be pursued for 50 years, because only damage resulted from too much tolerance in these matters.

Pavelić mentioned in this connection that the most difficult question for him had been Dalmatia, which, thank God, was now settled. The Führer termed this settlement very wise and clever. What was really expedient would probably emerge in detail only in the course of time. At any rate Germany was expressing her very good wishes for the success of the settlement.

Personally he (the Führer) was sympathetic toward the Croatian people. On the other hand Germany was allied with the Italian people. The Duce had placed him (the Führer) under a great obligation by his attitude during the *Anschluss* of his own Austrian homeland with Germany, and during the Czech crisis he had likewise done everything that was in Germany's interest. At the outbreak of the war Mussolini had tried to the very last to avert the disaster. Intervention by Italy had not been necessary at first owing to the absence of any acute danger. Then Italy, too, had entered the war, and since then the two countries were the closest comrades in arms. For all these reasons he (the Führer) was personally under an obligation to act most loyally toward Italy and he had been concerned about the danger of a crisis between Italy and Croatia. The Duce had to be able to point to successes, and in the case of the area in question it was a matter of old objectives regarding which promises had already been made to Italy in the World War. Germany herself did not claim anything in this area, since she did not consider herself the legal successor of the Austrian monarchy. She stood by Croatia as a sincere friend, ready to mediate and give advice in case of difficulties.

Pavelić replied that courageous and strong Croatia accepted the Führer's offer of mediation gratefully in case difficulties should arise.

He pointed, moreover, to the negotiations regarding frontiers going on for a considerable time and now concluded, which had been particularly difficult with respect to Italy until he had asked the

Duce for a conference.⁴ He also pointed in this connection to the excellent cooperation with the German national group.⁵

The Führer replied that if the countries of the southeast had been wise they would have treated the German minority well and in this manner created a connecting link of peace between their own countries and the German Reich. Unfortunately matters in Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Hungary had often gone differently, however.

Pavelić replied that the Croats got along so well with the German national group because after all they were not Slavs, as had been erroneously claimed. They were descended from the Goths, and the Pan-Slavic idea had been forced upon them as something artificial.

The Führer replied that there was of course no uniform Slavic race, as the obvious difference between Poles, Czechs, Dalmatians, etc., clearly showed, whereas on the other hand the Germanic peoples, as for example embodied in the Germans and the English, presented an absolutely uniform picture.

In this connection the Reichsmarschall pointed to the large Czech colony that resided in Dubrovnik, and which had to be watched. At the same time he congratulated Pavelić on the fact that Dubrovnik had gone to Croatia.

Pavelić replied that he had indeed fought very hard for this; however, for strategic reasons Kotor could not go to Croatia, although to be sure the strategic importance was not quite clear to him in view of the new situation in the Adriatic. Pavelić then pointed to the question of the Medjumurje still to be clarified with Hungary. Everything was being done by the Hungarian Jews so that this area would go to Hungary. The Führer replied that Horthy did not want to have this area, but simply wanted a connection and a free port. The Foreign Minister remarked in this connection that he assumed that this matter would be settled.

In the further course of the conversation the question of a king was also discussed; in this context Pavelić stressed once more that he had to reject a personal union with the Italian Royal House. He called the present solution an expedient.

After the Reichsmarschall had spoken about a few economic questions, as for example the development of shipping, roadbuilding, and tourist traffic, especially with regard to the littoral, the Führer advised Pavelić against establishing too large an army. It would be much better to have fewer troops that were fully equipped and well trained. For the rest he made a few remarks about Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact and the antecedents of this action.

⁴ See document No. 473 and footnote 2.

⁵ In telegram No. 233 of May 14 (245/161871-72) Kasche had reported the result of his conferences with Pavelić and the leaders of the German minority concerning the position of the German national group in Croatia.

Toward the end of the conversation Pavelić also mentioned a few personal experiences with the Catholic Church. Thus, for example, the Bishop of Croatia had given him the advice that one could rule only if one were as forbearing as possible. A young priest who was in the entourage of the Bishop, and like many young clerics belonged to the Ustaša movement, had made a few remarks which evidently did not suit the high reverend gentleman, whereupon the latter pointed out to Pavelić that the young priest "was not from his diocese," but had only come along in his company. The Pope, too, did not want to recognize Croatia, since "there were also Catholics on the other side." He had offered, however, to send an observer. Croatia had in turn refused this.

In conclusion the Reichsmarschall once more brought up questions relating to the economic development of Croatia. The Führer stated in this connection that if a reasonable, planned economy were carried out in Europe the European Continent could be self-sufficient. Pavelić declared Croatia's willingness to assist with all her power in the economic development of the country.

After a reference by the Führer to the policy of long-term trade agreements which were exceedingly favorable for industry and agriculture, tea was served to everyone, including Pavelić's aides.

SCHMIDT

No. 604

34/24530-32

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division I M

BERLIN, June 7, 1941.

Pol. I M (Att.) 4865 g.

A report of the Naval Attaché of the German Embassy in Moscow¹ of May 27 of this year, concerning the general situation in the Soviet Union, reads as follows:

"Various symptoms were detectable recently of an uneasy appraisal of the foreign situation by the Soviet Government. A case in point, which has been noticed continually since April 7 is, first of all, the calling up of older reservists, or those who have not yet served, and since the beginning of May, of recruits of the youngest age class, who were not due to be called until the autumn of 1941. Another of such symptoms is the considerable increase in the difficulty of travel for members of the foreign Missions, as a result of which they are prevented from making observations concerning troop movements on the railway lines and at the railroad junctions of the interior. Within the metropolitan area of the city of Moscow, on the other hand, military preparations of abnormal scope are, for the present, practically not noticeable. Residence of the representatives of the foreign Missions will in future be restricted almost ex-

¹ Capt. von Baumbach.

clusively to this place. The chief of the Soviet Army Attaché Group meanwhile admitted that the new travel regulations were also the result of the present general situation."

The report of the Naval Attaché then refers to the extraordinary fact that the harbor of Leningrad is closed to foreign shipping. This measure, too, was, by and large, to be explained only by the uneasiness with regard to the present foreign situation.

The report then reads further:

"If the Soviet Government deems preparatory measures necessary at present, these can bear only an exclusively defensive character. The Soviet armed forces are not strong enough to risk a struggle with the German Wehrmacht and to undertake one on their own initiative. The Finnish campaign of the Russians and the German victories over France and in the Balkans have made this abundantly clear to the whole world. It is possible, however, that differences of opinion have existed in the Kremlin with regard to the evaluation of the German Wehrmacht as such and in comparison with the Soviet armed forces. In February and March of this year, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Naval Staff were changed without apparent reason.² The relief of the former was announced publicly, while nothing concerning that of the latter has so far been announced by the Soviet Government officially. One might imagine that the two Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Navy, who were experienced tsarist officers, had given a realistic appraisal of the inferiority of the Soviet armed forces to the German arms, which would have required a cautious policy with respect to Germany. During the time following their resignations, however, there came the well-known Soviet-Turkish declaration³ and the pact with Yugoslavia.⁴ Immediately thereafter came the collapse of Yugoslavia and the speedy occupation of the Balkans by the German Wehrmacht. Since about this time, the Soviet press has grown silent on the subject of Defense Commissar Marshal Timoshenko. At the same time, Stalin's entry into the Government indicated that the Kremlin considered the situation extraordinary. There have been no further pinpricks at German policy since that time. Many measures may be regarded as conciliatory with regard to Germany. A more cautious and friendly attitude toward the great neighbor to the west does not preclude the fact, however, that in view of the general situation, uneasiness is still felt. In addition to the symptoms which indicate this, the effort is further apparent on the Soviet side to cooperate with Germany and clear up possible differences. Soviet deliveries to Germany are currently running at full speed. In addition, a complaint was even made by the Soviet side that the Soviet freight cars were piling up at the German border while the unloading and release of the cars was not taking place at the same tempo on the German side."⁵

KRAMARZ

² In February Gen. G. K. Zhukov succeeded Gen. K. A. Meretskov as Chief of the General Staff. In March Adm. I. S. Isakov replaced Adm. L. M. Galler as Chief of the Naval Staff.

³ Text in Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, p. 484.

⁴ Text in *ibid.*, pp. 484-485.

⁵ See document No. 380.

No. 605

274/177985

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 388

BERLIN, June 8, 1941.

King Boris of Bulgaria asked me today to come to the Hotel Adlon for a discussion which, as is usual with him, was rather lengthy.

At the start of the conversation the King received a coded dispatch from Sofia reporting that through Count Magistrati¹ the Italians there are presenting all sorts of complaints and demands. The King, during his forthcoming trip to Rome, hopes to persuade the Duce to abandon this policy of nervousness and pinpricks. As usual he did not restrain himself in his criticism of the Italians.

Naturally on this occasion, too, the Bulgarian hope of acquiring Salonika—with a privileged position for the Reich—was evident.

Aside from the King's gratitude for the help of the Führer and for the Foreign Minister nothing came up in the conversation that needs to be mentioned. I was able to note that most topics had already been discussed in Salzburg or at the Berghof.²

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Italian Minister in Bulgaria.

² A teletype message sent by Counselor Strack to Fuschl on May 29 (274/-177979) mentioned the journey of King Boris to Vienna and thence to Slovakia at the beginning of June. Through Draganov the King asked to be received by Hitler after June 3 and asked also to confer with Ribbentrop, Göring, and Branchitsch. No record of these conversations has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

No. 606

658/256848-49

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

TOP SECRET

SALZBURG, June 8, 1941.

In accordance with the instructions of the Foreign Minister I told General Jodl the following today:

Since the English have entered Syria¹ and since Admiral Darlan and General Dentz have urgently requested the withdrawal of the Manteuffel liaison unit² it is necessary to reach a new decision regarding the further stay of the various types of German personnel in Syria.

¹ On June 8 British and Free French forces crossed from Palestine into Syria and advanced on Damascus.

² See document No. 528.

With regard to Rahn, the Foreign Minister has ordered that he is not to leave for the time being, but is to have everything ready for departure.³ In any case he must not let himself get caught.

The Foreign Minister had Hewel make an inquiry with the Führer in regard to the Manteuffel liaison unit. The Führer expressed the opinion that the French will probably not be able to hold Syria in any case, and that therefore the right thing to do is to withdraw the German personnel there in time.

General Jodl said he did not consider the military situation there endangered to such a degree, to be sure, but he also considered it correct to withdraw German military personnel from Syria in time. He would take the necessary steps. Only the French should not come a week later and ask us to commit our forces again. I told General Jodl in this connection that in our opinion we could not in any case provide the French with real military help in Syria through commitment of German forces. An insufficient or merely symbolic commitment of German forces would encumber the political situation of France more than it would help. I pointed out that it would be better for the liaison unit to withdraw in time in an orderly way than to have to take flight from Syria after having waited too long.

I also pointed out to General Jodl that in withdrawing the liaison unit we would have to establish contact with the Italian Armistice Commission. General Jodl at first thought this was not necessary. I replied that the German liaison unit was after all attached to the Italian Control Commission in Syria. We at least ought to inform the Italian Armistice Commission at the same time of our intention. He agreed that this was so.⁴

RITTER

³ See document No. 587.

⁴ In a memorandum of June 11 (794/273276-77) Ritter recorded the following: "OKW suggests that the civilian and military staffs which had been active in Iraq and Syria and were now being withdrawn should not be disbanded but kept together for a possible later operation somewhere in the Near East. In this connection the mission Grobba and the mission Felmy (with Niedermayer) were specially mentioned."

To this Ritter added the comment that the civilian staff Grobba should remain under Foreign Ministry direction in Berlin while the OKW should concentrate the military Staff Felmy elsewhere.

In a memorandum of June 19 (794/273272) Ritter recorded that Ribbentrop considered it appropriate that General Felmy should keep his staff concentrated in Athens "to deal there with purely military questions for the future." The Staff Grobba, however, should remain in Berlin, having sole responsibility for foreign policy questions relating to Iraq.

No. 607

265/172932-36

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

MOST URGENT

FUSCHL, June 9, 1941—3:30 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received Berlin, June 9—4:13 p. m.

No. 526 from Fuschl

No. 631 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent June 9.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegrams No. 679 of June 6¹ and No. 686 of June 7.²

I. M. Numan raised the objection to our wording of the treaty that accordingly Germany may consider an appeal to England by Turkey for help against an attack by a third party, as well as any other association of Turkey with England, as actions indirectly aimed against Germany. He stated that the Turkish Government would like to exclude the possibility of such an interpretation of a German-Turkish treaty. He thereby expressed the basic Turkish position in the negotiations with us. Turkey wants to conclude a treaty with Germany in order to protect herself against a German attack, but, at the same time, she wants to remain allied with England and apparently reserve to herself the possibility of cooperating with the latter militarily and politically in case of need, at least indirectly. The Turkish Government must clearly understand that if Turkey cooperates even indirectly with England, with whom Germany is engaged in a life-and-death struggle, she will automatically come into conflict with Germany. She would thereby again abandon her neutrality, the restoration of which ought to be the minimum effect of a treaty with Germany. To be sure, we understand Turkey's wish to formulate the treaty with Germany in such a way that it would not mean an open breach of her treaty with England, and we have worded our proposals accordingly. If, however, Turkey demands of us direct recognition of her treaty with England and wants explicitly to reserve to herself the possibility of cooperation with the latter, it is, of course, unacceptable to us.

II. The possibility mentioned by Numan of an attack by a third party on Turkey is pure theory. In any event, this could only refer to Russia or Italy. In the case of both powers, however, fear of an attack on Turkey is not a political reality as matters stand, especially in view of Germany's attitude toward Turkey.

III. In view of this, it is an obvious assumption that M. Numan in his objections to our treaty proposal had in mind possible opera-

¹ Document No. 595.² Document No. 602.

tions against Syria. It is possible that envisaging precisely such a case he considered the explicit mention of indirect measures suggested by us as inexpedient. It is true that the answer of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs to your inquiry made in accordance with my telegram No. 625 of June 8^a sounds satisfactory, so that we apparently may assume that in the future the Turkish Government will continue to exercise complete restraint in the Syrian question. In this connection I also want to note concerning the last paragraph of your telegram No. 686 of June 7 that consideration for France makes it simply impossible for us now to give Turkey any written or even oral promises regarding Syria.

IV. Making use of the foregoing statements, please take the following position regarding the wording of the treaty in its particulars:

1. Preamble. The present wording of the preamble suggested by Turkey seems to us to be unfortunate. The expression "peace-loving character" is impossible from the point of view of language and should be replaced by the expression "friendly character". It is true that the words "in the spirit of the letters exchanged between them" were also included in the text proposed by us; subsequently, however, the objection was raised that, first of all, the exchange of letters between the two Heads of State has not yet been completed, since, as is known, the Turkish President has not yet replied to the last letters of the Führer.⁴ Besides, it seems hardly feasible that a treaty which is to be published should explicitly refer to an exchange of letters which is not published simultaneously. A publication of this sort has not been anticipated so far and seems to us untimely. Finally, it is also necessary to eliminate the concluding part of the wording of the preamble proposed by the Turks which discusses the present obligations of both parties because it would represent a clear recognition of the Turkish-English treaty. For your personal information I shall add that by accepting such a passage in the preamble we would bar our way to a further development of German-Turkish relations. Then Turkey would always have the convenient objection to possible future wishes of Germany that in the preamble of the treaty we had explicitly desisted from presenting such wishes.

It seems to us best in these circumstances to word the preamble very briefly in the following manner:

"The German Reich Chancellor and the President of the Turkish Republic, desiring to establish a strong basis for the friendly development of their mutual relations, have agreed to conclude a treaty to that end, etc. . . ."

^a In this telegram (265/172926) Ribbentrop had asked Papen to obtain clarification regarding Turkey's position in the matter of Syria in view of the news of the British attack on Syria and of new reports that the Turks had urged the British to intervene. Papen reported in telegram No. 694 of June 8 (265/172925) that Turkey's attitude with respect to Syria was unchanged even now and that military action was out of the question.

⁴ See document No. 514, footnote 7.

2. Precisely in view of M. Numan's arguments we must stress that in article 1 the words "directly or indirectly" be retained. Our arguments on this account follow from what was stated above under point 1; in this connection it should be pointed out especially that any cooperation with England which is indirectly aimed against us would be a violation of Turkish neutrality which is just now being restored by this treaty.

3. Through the supplement which the Turks wish to add to article 2, the meaning of this article would be greatly weakened and would again be limited to questions of the interpretation of the treaty, as it was originally suggested by the Turks. This desire seems to us the less comprehensible because the text of article 2 proposed by us involves only a minimum of what generally, as a matter of course, is included in similar treaties between two countries. If the Turks want to eliminate or weaken this in the manner indicated, their attitude, at any rate, is very far removed from that which guides us in concluding this treaty.

V. If Turkey now does not want to accept the form of the treaty proposed by us or again introduces proposals which weaken it, we must ask ourselves whether, in that case, such a treaty will serve the desired purpose at all. The attitude of the Turks, reflected in their conduct, is after all so reserved that the treaty, as formulated by the Turks, could ultimately be reduced to utter insignificance by commentaries of the Turkish press. And yet, taking the actual political situation into account, Turkey has a much more important political interest than we have in concluding this treaty. Hence, the Turkish Government would do well to take a definitive decision as soon as possible as to whether it accepts our offer of a treaty.

Please report by telegraph without delay about the progress of your talks with the Turkish Government.⁵

RIBBENTROP

⁵ In his reply telegram No. 708 of June 10 (265/172937) Papen stated that he had presented the arguments, used by Ribbentrop in this instruction, to Saracoglu who had not yet replied. See, further, document No. 620.

No. 608

51/34375

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

SALZBURG, June 9, 1941.

General Jodl informs me that during Grand Admiral Raeder's recent report to the Führer¹ the more sweeping orders to the naval

¹ Cf. U.S. Navy Department, ONI, "Führer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy, 1941," vol. I, pp. 77-78, 97. See also document No. 325.

forces that were discussed in connection with the Raeder interview² have been set aside for the time being. Likewise, the attack on North American merchant ships within the framework of the prize regulations was not permitted.³

The Führer wants to avoid everything that could lead to incidents with the United States.

RITTER

²In this interview, which Raeder gave to a representative of the Japanese News Agency, Domei, on May 26, the Admiral rejected the idea that Germany had any aggressive intentions against the United States. At the same time he expressed the view that American measures to extend the patrol activities of the American Navy in the Atlantic and to protect the shipment of goods to the British Isles would be considered as warlike acts. For text, see *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik* (Berlin, 1944), vol. ix, pp. 464-466.

³See document No. 316.

No. 609

8589/E602914-18

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, June 9, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.-IV/Qu) No. 44900/41 g. K. Chefs
By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 31

In order to create a clear and unified chain of command in the occupied Balkan area, I order:

1. I appoint Field Marshal List "Wehrmacht Commander in the Southeast" (W. B. Südost), with headquarters in Salonika.

The W. B. Südost is the highest representative of the Wehrmacht in the Balkans and exercises executive powers in the areas occupied by German troops.

The W. B. Südost is as such immediately subordinate to me.

2. Subordinate to the W. B. Südost there are:

a) for the area of Old Serbia: The "Commander, Serbia" (General of Antiaircraft Artillery von Schröder);

b) for the area of Salonika and the islands of Lemnos, Mytilene, Chios, and Skyros: the "Commander, Salonika-Aegean" (to be appointed by OKH);

c) for the area of Athens, Crete, Cerigo, Antikythera, and Melos: the "Commander, Southern Greece" (to be appointed by Ob. d. L.).

3. With the exception of the conduct of the offensive air war the Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast shall gather in his own hands all military questions of the Wehrmacht arising from the occupation, the security, the provisioning, from transportation and communication matters of the occupied southeast area for all three branches of the

Wehrmacht, and decide them in accordance with the over-all mission that devolves upon the Wehrmacht in the southeast area. The command will thus be simplified, and the branches of the Wehrmacht and the High Command of the Wehrmacht will be relieved of the many individual questions and differences of opinion which arise from offices of all branches of the Wehrmacht working side-by-side in the same area.

Specifically, it devolves upon the Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast:

a) To assure the *unified defense* of the parts of Serbia and Greece, including the Greek islands, occupied by German troops, against attacks and disturbances.

Besides the commanders mentioned, who in their respective areas are responsible for defense, in accordance with the general instructions of W. B. Südost, the Admiral, Southeast, and the Commander of the Luftwaffe, Administrative Command in the Balkans, are subordinate to him in the matters listed above. Both staffs are to be integrated with the staff of the Wehrmacht Commander. To what extent the staffs of the subordinate commanders of Salonika-Aegean and Southern Greece are to be combined with the offices of the other Wehrmacht branches shall be determined by the W. B. Südost;

b) The unified conduct and protection of the extensive maritime transport movements from and to Crete which will be necessary in the very near future.

c) The regulation of the cooperation with the Italian and—so far as necessary—with the Bulgarian armed forces in the Balkans;

d) The routing of supplies by land and sea for all branches of the Wehrmacht committed in the Balkans in accordance with their requirements and the transport space available for this at the given times;

e) Supervision of the *military administration* to be conducted by the commanders in the areas occupied by German troops.

4. The Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast has all the powers of a territorial commander in the parts of Serbia and Greece, including the Greek islands, occupied by German troops.

The areas occupied exclusively by German troops are a zone of operations. Here the W. B. Südost shall exercise executive powers through the commanders subordinate to him.

In the areas belonging to Italian occupied territory in which German troops are quartered, he exercises supreme military powers for all branches of the Wehrmacht in so far as the military mission of the German Wehrmacht requires it.

5. Regarding the delimitation of the powers of the W. B. Südost with respect to the "*Reich Plenipotentiary for Greece*"¹ see annex.²

6. The island of Crete occupies a special position in the southeastern area.

¹ See document No. 444 and footnote 2.

² Not printed (8589/602920-21).

It is the zone of operations from which the air war in the eastern Mediterranean is pursued in conformity with the situation in North Africa (see point 7).

The organization and development of this base, its protection and provisioning, are the most urgent tasks in the southeastern area at the present time.

As a base of operations for the Luftwaffe the island of Crete like a fortress is to be placed under a special commander (Commandant) of the *Luftwaffe*. He exercises executive powers in accordance with the general directives of the W. B. Südost as the deputy (or by order) of the Commander, Southern Greece. He is responsible for the unified defense of the island with all the troops stationed there and to be placed under him for this purpose. The facilities of the Army that are needed for the military administration are also to be placed under him.

The *Italian garrison* is assigned the eastern portion of the island up to the general line of the western rim of Mirabella Bay to and including the town of Hierápetra. In all tactical questions relating to the unified defense of the island, it is subordinate to the island Commandant.

7. The air war in the eastern Mediterranean is to be conducted in accordance with the orders of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe. The latter will make the necessary arrangements directly with the Italian Air Force.

8. Troop transports and supplies by sea and their protection on the water or from the air shall be regulated by the Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast through the Admiral, Southeast in cooperation with the Italian Navy and the X Air Corps.

The cooperation of the *Admiral, Southeast* with the Rumanian and Bulgarian Navies and questions of the operational conduct of sea warfare, should these Navies appear in the eastern Mediterranean, are to be regulated by the Commander in Chief of the Navy directly with the Admiral, Southeast.

9. Directive 29 of May 17, 1941,³ is canceled in so far as it is superseded by the above orders.

ADOLF HITLER

³ Document No. 536.

No. 610

378/209688-90

*The Office of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the
German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

WIESBADEN, June 10, 1941—1:00 p. m.

No. 171 of June 10

Received June 10—1:45 p. m.

For Secretary of Legation von Grote.

In instruction W.F.St/Abt. L (IV/K), RNN (IV/K) No. 001082/-41 G. Kdos. of June 6¹ the OKW informed the German Armistice Commission of new directives for the negotiations with the French delegation, which read as follows:

The German victories in the Balkans, the Mediterranean area, and in the Battle of the Atlantic have brought about a basic change in German-French relations. In particular, the Paris negotiations at the end of May 1941² have resulted in the French Government being willing to make available French facilities and bases for the benefit of German conduct of the war. The past directives for the negotiations of the Armistice Commission have therefore been superseded.³ In the future the following principles are to be observed:

1. It will now be the main task of the Armistice Commission to exploit the obligations entered into by the French Government in favor of the German conduct of the war and to see that they are utilized as soon as possible;

2. All of the German services in return which are provided for in the Paris Protocols are to be performed in so far as possible within the same period of time as the French services. Should the French unexpectedly fall into arrears in carrying out their obligations, the German services should be stopped for the time being with the reservation that further measures may be taken.

3. The Armistice Commission is being given the authority also to negotiate regarding further demands and suitable services in return within the general framework of the Paris Protocols. In matters of the occupied territory the OKH, Gen. Qu., or by his designation the Military Commander in France is to participate as a matter of principle. Questions affecting the Italian sphere of interest are to be referred directly and in first place by the French to the [Italian] Armistice Commission.⁴ If there is a German interest in the ful-

¹ Not found.² See document No. 559.³ See document No. 50.⁴ The accord of June 29, 1940 (vol. x of this series, document No. 54) defined the initial areas of jurisdiction of the two Armistice Commissions. A Foreign Ministry memorandum of Apr. 29 (2281/480940-43) records the rearrangement of these areas.

fillment of the French wishes, the [German] Armistice Commission is at liberty to exert the necessary influence on Italian Armed Forces authorities either directly or through the OKW/WFSt/L, in so far as it is not advisable in certain cases (e.g., in case of more extensive wishes), to refer the [Italian] Armistice Commission directly to the French.

If the demands and services in return go very much beyond the present framework, the decision of the High Command of the Wehrmacht should be obtained. This is particularly true in regard to all questions which are connected with the German conduct of the war and its probable future development. In principle it should be kept in mind in this connection that the outbreak of an armed conflict should not be provoked between France and England or the United States of North America for the time being.

4. In carrying out military cooperation care should be taken in principle that the French Government remains in a position to maintain the conditions of this policy. In general it will be possible to attain the necessary justification before French public opinion in accordance with the Supplementary Protocol only by means of simultaneous political and economic concessions. This applies in the first place particularly to the implementation of section III (without point 3) of the Paris Protocols.

To this end the [German] Armistice Commission is to proceed in close contact with the German Ambassador in Paris.

5. In addition it continues to be the task of the Armistice Commission to supervise the execution of the French obligations arising out of the Armistice Treaty. In carrying out supervision, account should be taken, however, of the present German-French relationship and it should be applied in a correspondingly generous manner, although strictness need not suffer thereby.

6. The High Command of the Wehrmacht will act in accord with the Foreign Ministry regarding the transfer of the Armistice Commission or parts of it to Paris. A decision on this will follow.⁵

WELCK

⁵ In telegram No. 539 of June 11 (378/209695-96) Ribbentrop informed the Embassy in Paris that the Foreign Ministry and the OKW had agreed not to transfer the German Armistice Commission to Paris.

No. 611

177/85171

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

U. St.S. Pol. 526

BERLIN, June 10, 1941.

Ambassador Oshima delivered to me today through Counselor of Embassy Kase the request to be received once again by the Foreign

Minister in the near future.¹ As the main topic of the conversation he pointed out the following:

The Japanese Government, or as he said, correcting himself, the Japanese Armed Forces had the desire to obtain bases for the fleet and the Navy in southern French Indochina. Kase added he personally believed that this wish could be traced back to the fact that the Japanese Armed Forces wished to create for themselves a favorable strategic position with respect to Singapore. Furthermore, Ambassador Oshima would like to talk with the Foreign Minister more generally about the German-French and French-English relations.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WOERMANN

¹ On July 19 Rintelen informed the Embassies in Paris and Tokyo that such a meeting had taken place on July 17. See vol. XIII of this series.

No. 612

326/194986-88

Minute by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

SECRET

BERLIN, June 10, 1941.

zu Ha. Pol. 2473 g.¹

2558 g.²

3874 g.³

The Brazilian Government concluded a contract on March 25, 1938, with the Krupp firm on the delivery of war material.⁴ Total value approximately 105 million reichsmarks; payment 25 percent in foreign exchange, the remainder in clearing marks. Originally delivery was to be made cost-freight-insurance, Rio; at the outbreak of the war Krupp and the Brazilian Government agreed that the contract is considered to have been fulfilled upon receipt at the delivery plants and that transportation is the concern of the Brazilian Government. Actually transportation after the outbreak of the war was continued at first in Brazilian ships until after November of last year (the incident of the SS *Siqueira Campos*) England no longer per-

¹ Ha. Pol. 2473 g.: This was telegram No. 630 of Apr. 23 (326/194974-75) in which Prüfer warned that the positions of the Brazilian President and of the Defense Minister would be seriously weakened and the United States would gain considerable advantages if war material deliveries were suspended.

² Ha. Pol. 2558 g.: This was a cover note and a copy of a letter of Mar. 11 (326/194976-82) from the Krupp Company to Col. Anor, Head of the Brazilian Military Commission in Berlin, which suggested various changes of delivery dates and substitutions in the contract for the delivery of war material to the Brazilian Government.

³ Ha. Pol. 3874 g.: This was a statement of deliveries and arrears and a proposed new delivery schedule of May 26 (326/194983-85) drawn up by Krupp concerning armaments and munitions for Brazil. These were annexes 1 and 2 referred to in the document printed here.

⁴ See vol. x of this series, document No. 145.

mitted further transports to get through.⁵ The additional material (gun carriages without barrels and a number of vehicles), which had already arrived at Lisbon at the time and been loaded on the SS *Bage*, was unloaded again and stored in Lisbon; in accordance with an agreement with the Brazilian Government the rest of the material to be delivered is to be stored in Germany until transport is possible again.

Brazil has already made advance payments of several million reichsmarks, whereas Krupp has fallen behind with the deliveries, as the OKH has partly confiscated the guns slated for delivery and partly no longer permitted their manufacture. What is still to be delivered under the contract and to what extent Krupp is already in arrears so far, can be seen from the statement in annex 1.⁶

Our Ambassador in Rio has repeatedly and urgently recommended that the deliveries be resumed. He points out that President Vargas and the leading persons in the Brazilian Army attach to the Krupp contract more than its practical significance and consider it an actual and ideological bond with Germany; that they have heretofore defended it stubbornly and skillfully against all machinations from hostile—particularly North American—quarters; and that if we leave them in the lurch in regard to the fulfillment of this contract they would be disavowed in regard to both foreign and domestic policy and would be badly weakened in their defenses against the North American pressure. He actually fears that if the deliveries continue to be suspended the bulwark against the inclusion of South America in Roosevelt's anti-German policy, which Brazil has heretofore represented, would collapse.⁷ The Reich Ministry of Economics, too, is most anxious that the contract should continue to be carried out; first, because of the foreign exchange received, but also because of the clearing marks (providing means of payment for our blockade-breaker purchases), and particularly also because of the repercussions which withdrawal of Brazil from the contract would have on the further supplying of South America with German war material.

Krupp has drawn up a proposal for temporary plan for partial deliveries (annex 2^o), and in so doing the firm took account of Wehrmacht interests to the extent that implementation of the plan would not affect Wehrmacht production in the so-called SS and S priority groups. The OKH (Army Ordnance Office and General

⁵ Prüfer reported in telegrams No. 1296 of Nov. 27, 1940 (326/194919), No. 1307 of Nov. 28 (326/194928), and No. 1385 of Dec. 12 (326/194944) on the case of the *Siqueira Campos* which, carrying German armaments and munitions to Brazil, had been captured by the Royal Navy and brought to England.

Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940*, vol. v, pp. 626 ff.

⁶ See footnote 3.

⁷ This point was made by Prüfer in telegram No. 630 of Apr. 23. See footnote 1.

Army Office) rejected it [the proposal], however. The rejection was explained orally (by Col. Hederich) with the statement that the OKH, in accordance with the general orders it has received, could not act differently at the present time and could change its position only on the basis of a special order from the OKW.

In these circumstances progress can be made in the matter only if the Foreign Ministry, for its part, exerts influence on the OKW and if necessary brings the matter to a decision by the Führer. I suggest that the Foreign Minister get in touch with Field Marshal Keitel by letter in this matter.

To be submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request that the enclosed letter to Field Marshal Keitel be signed.^a

WIEHL

^aNot printed (326/194989-93). The draft copy of this letter is marked "canceled".

For subsequent developments in this matter see vol. XIII of this series.

No. 613

235/157214

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Brazil

Telegram

TOP SECRET

FUSCHL, June 11, 1941—12:30 a. m.

No. 534 of June 11

from Fuschl

Received Berlin, June 11—2:15 a. m.

No. 798 of June 11 from the Foreign Ministry

For the Ambassador personally.

Please reply to the Brazilian President's inquiry reported in your telegram No. 1003 of June 6,¹ whether the German Government would approve if he should suggest in Washington that he act as mediator, that such a procedure does not seem opportune to us; rather, we asked him to refrain from taking such a step. Even if he should talk in a rather general way in Washington and not mention his conversation with you at all, it would nevertheless be suspected in Washington that he was perhaps put up to it by Germany; this could lead to entirely wrong conclusions, since Germany did not have the slightest reason to request any initiative whatever with respect to proposals for mediation. Rather, we were quite content to leave this to the other side, which would doubtless become convinced quite independently, sooner or later, of the hopelessness of continuing the war against Germany which it had provoked.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Document No. 601.

No. 614

67/47076-103

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Füh. 40

FUSCHL, June 13, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND GENERAL ANTONESCU AT THE FÜHRERBAU IN MUNICH ON JUNE 11, 1941, IN THE PRESENCE OF FIELD MARSHAL KEITEL, GENERAL JODL, AND GENERAL . . .¹

Antonescu first congratulated the Führer in glowing terms on his own behalf and on behalf of the Rumanian people for the great victories of the German armies in the Balkan campaign and in Crete. The Rumanian people knew that these victories were due to the genius of the Führer and the usual well-nigh classic and extensive preparation of the operations, and not least to the bravery of the German soldier.

The Rumanian people, as he (Antonescu) had stated before on his earlier visits, were prepared to march with the Axis unto death, because they had absolute faith in the Führer's sense of justice. The Rumanian people had linked their own fate with that of Germany because the two nations complemented one another economically and because politically they had to face a common threat. What was involved was the Slavic menace, which had made itself periodically felt for centuries and now must be eliminated once and for all. Rumanian policy and the Rumanian people were fully aware of this necessity.

For the rest, Rumania had now returned to the constructive course which she had pursued for 40 years under King Carol I, namely the course of cooperation with Germany. This was by no means a matter of a purely personal policy of Antonescu's; rather, it was something backed by the entire Rumanian people. The proof of this could be found in the general readiness with which the Rumanian people followed Antonescu's foreign policy line.

In the World War Rumania did not fight against Germany, but went to war against Austria and especially Hungary in order to enforce her ancient claims and the rights that had been hers for 2,000 years. Once these goals had been achieved there had been no more differences of view between Germany and Rumania. Nor must it be forgotten that some two and a half million Rumanians had been on the Austrian side during the World War and that many of them had fought as highly competent officers in the Austrian Army and had been decorated with the Iron Cross. Among these was also the

¹ No name listed in the original.

present Rumanian Minister of War.² If the Germans were saying that the interests of the former World War allies could not be disregarded, it ought to be taken into account also that Rumanians likewise had participated in the struggle on Germany's side.

Antonescu also recalled that he had given his assurance to the Führer on his last visit at Berchtesgaden³ that he would restore and maintain the social and political order in Rumania; that he would make every possible economic sacrifice to aid Germany in the prosecution of the war; and, finally, that he would place Rumanian territory at the disposal of the German Army for the establishment of strategic bases for operations in the Balkans and in the East. He (Antonescu) had shown in the past 3 months that he was keeping his word. To be sure, he had had to experience a domestic, social, and political crisis of the gravest order as a result of the disagreements between him and the Legion, and especially its bad leaders. But because he had had the people behind him, order had been restored. He could guarantee the Führer today that the internal order of Rumania was absolutely secure.

In the economic field he had done everything possible to help Germany in the prosecution of the war, and he had affirmed this in the agreement of December 4⁴ and the subsequent treaties. In doing so he had been compelled to impose on Rumania stringent economic restrictions which in turn had led to an economic crisis. But with the approach of the new harvest all dangers were eliminated in that respect, too. There would be no more serious economic crises or social difficulties in Rumania.

As to the pledge to place at the disposal of the German Army all resources and facilities for the accomplishment of its tasks in Rumania, he had kept his word 100 percent. Except in a few isolated instances, no one in the German Army would be in a position to complain about any lack of cooperation on the part of Rumania.

On his last visit to Berlin he had spoken of Rumania's past history, her present interests, and her international position within the framework of European and Balkan policy, and therefore did not wish to come back to these subjects again. He recalled that he had put forward no demands of any kind at that time, nor was he making any demands today. He was aware that the paramount task was to end the war, and that in order to end the war a very grave step had to be taken in the east. He had come to place Rumania's entire military, political, and social resources at the Führer's command for the execution of that step. In anticipation of this im-

² Gen. Josif Jacobici.

³ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 652.

⁴ See *ibid.*, document No. 402, footnote 1.

pending great event, he (Antonescu) had tightened the organization of his armed forces and developed his economic and financial resources. But none of this meant that he intended to surrender any part of his rights. He had absolute faith in the Führer's sense of justice and asked that no final decision be taken regarding Rumania's demands until the situation had once more been reviewed with the greatest care from the ethnographical, political, and historical viewpoints. Such a re-examination would have to take account of the future, for the Führer planned in long-range terms. For 400 years Rumania had formed a barrier against the Slavs and the Turks; and on account of her geographical situation and her political and economic conditions as well as her racial characteristics she would be able to perform a similar service for Germany in the future, too.

He (Antonescu) was no politician and diplomat. He was born a soldier and wanted to die as a soldier. As an improvised diplomat and politician he had not so far had the gift of convincing the Führer and his advisers of his country's rights. Conscious of this weakness, he was submitting a memorandum^{*} today analyzing Rumania's present position and demands. The Rumanians were an unhappy people who had been forced to suffer very cruel blows, not because of mistakes of their own, but because their misfortune was due to the mistakes of the ruling class and the last King in particular. In these circumstances he (Antonescu) asked the Führer not to take any definitive steps without consulting Rumania once more. Personally he, Antonescu, would persist in the course of sincere and loyal political cooperation with the Axis, on which he had embarked. He would continue to help Germany in the struggle for victory, but even now he had to point out that if decisions should be taken that were contrary to the vital interests of his country, his own position in Rumania would be most seriously undermined.

Personally, he felt himself to be a fighter. For 45 years he had had to contend with difficulties and disappointments, and never once had he despaired. In this process he had learned that perseverance was everything. And so he was determined now, too, to continue steadfastly on the road that would lead to the victory of the Axis in the present conflict and to the recognition of Rumania's rights.

The Führer replied that he wished first of all to express his sincere pleasure that Antonescu was visiting him for the third time now. He wanted to comment briefly on the present situation and point out the special circumstances which had led to it, in so far as it concerned Rumania.

Antonescu had justly pointed to the multitude of distressing events which were in no way the fault of the Rumanian people as such, and

^{*} Not found.

particularly not of Antonescu himself, and had explained that they were due to the mistakes of the ruling group and especially the last King. Unfortunately, the nations always had to pay for the mistakes of their leaders and the ensuing consequences. In the present case, however, the German people, too, belonged to these sufferers.

Since 1933 Germany had made an effort to establish good relations with all eastern European states, with which the Reich had neither political nor territorial differences. Economically we succeeded in many instances in improving the cooperation with these countries. Rumania, too, had cooperated with Germany economically. But although Rumania could have had no interest whatever in opposing Germany's demands for political revision, the former Rumanian Governments had regrettably always placed themselves in opposition to the Reich on these matters both in the League of Nations and at other international conferences, and in this fashion had strengthened the anti-German front. The situation in 1939 had been difficult. Germany, faced by the world-wide campaign against the Reich launched by France and England, with the Jews behind them, wanted to clarify her relationship with Rumania. King Carol had visited the Führer and suggested to him in the course of their conversations the establishment of a land connection between Germany and Rumania by awarding a portion of eastern Slovakia, and of the Carpatho-Ukraine as well, to Rumania.⁶ According to Carol's proposal, a highway and a railroad line should then be built across the land bridge established in this fashion. He (the Führer) had been unable to accept this proposal and indeed he had not accepted it. He had told Carol that he saw no possibility for establishing such a land connection, particularly because of the economic difficulties, above all those of a financial nature.

He (the Führer) had therefore been all the more indignant when no protest was made by the Rumanian Government against the downright ridiculous assertion by the English and French that Germany wanted to conquer Bessarabia.⁷ Through her silence, Rumania had associated herself with those circles which aimed at strangling Germany by a European or even extra-European coalition.

Although King Carol himself had put forward the proposal of a land connection with Germany, he had apparently believed the British allegations that the Reich threatened Rumania and had aligned

⁶ This apparently refers to discussions held during King Carol's visit to Hitler at Berchtesgaden on Nov. 24, 1938. Ribbentrop's memorandum of this conversation records King Carol's wish for "a secure line of communications with Central Europe," which would not go through Hungary and his interest in Germany's attitude on the question of the Carpatho-Ukraine, but does not mention any specific demand for territorial cessions by the King. Cf. vol. v of this series, document No. 254.

⁷ Cf. vol. vi of this series, documents Nos. 42 and 47.

his country with the anti-German front by accepting England's guarantee.^a

Exactly the same assertions had been spread regarding Germany's designs on the Baltic States and Finland in order to draw Russia into the Western European coalition. This was the reason why Germany had found herself in the painful predicament of having to go to Moscow in order to clarify matters regarding these accusations. In this way the solemn treaty with the Soviet Union had come about which stated that Finland, the Baltic States, and Bessarabia were not within the German sphere of interest. The consequences had been extremely distressing for these regions. If the countries concerned had not joined the anti-German front, there would never have been any necessity for Germany to go to Moscow. Only because of the acceptance of the British guarantee against Germany by certain states had this very painful treaty with Russia become necessary. Ideological and national viewpoints had from the very start stood in the way of a cooperation between the two countries. There was no need for him (the Führer) to point explicitly to the consequences of this treaty.

One year later, in 1940, the situation had developed to a point where but for Germany's intervention the Balkans would have become subject to Soviet Russia and perhaps would even have come under Russian rule. When King Carol then once again appealed to Germany at the last minute to turn away the fate which was gathering in dark clouds over the Balkans and threatened to descend upon them as it had on the Baltic States, it was clear from the outset that unless a way was found to dissolve the solid front of Rumania's adversaries by means of a peaceable understanding, Russia was sure to intervene in the affairs of the Balkans as the decisive factor. King Carol had requested a guarantee. After long and grave reflection, Germany had declared her willingness to give that guarantee. Germany had entertained no doubts that Stalin would interpret the assumption of this guarantee as a hostile act. In carrying out this guarantee German forces had entered Rumania at a critical moment and by their presence alone had prevented the worst from happening.

Politically the guarantee given to Rumania had had the result that Molotov on coming to Berlin^b had immediately raised the question whether this guarantee was also directed against Russia. The Führer had answered evasively that he did not suppose Russia had any aggressive designs on Rumania. According to the very letter

^a See vol. vi of this series, document No. 189.

^b On his visit of Nov. 12-13, 1940; see vol. xi of this series, document No. 328.

of the guarantee it was operative against any aggressor. Molotov had asked next whether Germany was prepared to assent to an analogous Russian guarantee to Bulgaria, which would also entail the occupation of Bulgarian territory by Russian forces. In this instance, too, the Führer had had to give a negative reply. He had pointed out, first of all, that owing to the absence of any Bulgarian request for a guarantee the case was not analogous with that of Rumania; and that, besides, he wanted to reserve any definitive answer until he could consult with his ally. Molotov had also mentioned Russia's design to secure bases for herself at the Dardanelles. Here again the Führer had answered with a counterproposal providing for certain concessions to Russia in the Straits Statute.¹⁰ This, too, had amounted essentially to a negative reply to the Russian question. As the last item Molotov had brought up the Finnish question, representing Russia as being "threatened" by Finland and adding that the state of suspense in Russo-Finnish relations was unacceptable for the Soviet Union. Here, too, the German answer had been negative inasmuch as the Führer, while acknowledging that Finland was not within the German sphere of interest, had referred to the outbreak of a Russo-Finnish conflict as an intolerable situation.

All this, in the last analysis, had been brought on by the Rumanian guarantee, and from that moment Russia had gone over to the camp of Germany's enemies.

The consequences of this attitude had become immediately evident in the military field. Thus, there were concentrations of large Russian motorized and armored forces at Germany's eastern border, there were large troop transports from the interior of Russia to the west, and strong air force units were massed at the German border.

Furthermore, Sir Stafford Cripps had found a more sympathetic hearing than heretofore, and the Russo-English relationship had lost its platonic character and become steadily more intimate. It was clear that Russia would not start a war during the winter, but it was quite evident that Russian policy was determined to take advantage of a favorable situation. However, the attack would probably not be primarily directed against Germany. Russia would content herself with an attempt to intimidate Germany by concentrating a gigantic army along her eastern border, and for the rest would take aggressive action against Finland and Rumania. In its practical implications, however, such action would be equivalent to a direct attack on Germany, because in the existing circumstances Germany would be compelled to act immediately if an indirect attack should occur.

¹⁰ The Convention signed at Montreux, July 20, 1936. For the text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 213.

While in the life-and-death struggle with England the Luftwaffe was needed in the west, now it was tied up by the Russian Army in the east. For while Germany was quite capable of engaging in defensive air operations on one front and taking the offensive on the other, she could not carry on an offensive on both fronts.

Since the winter of 1940-1941 Germany had come around to the bitter realization that Russia, as a result of the measures cited above, had become an enemy of the Reich. The consequences were incalculable, but there could be no doubt about the Reich's determination to meet all contingencies.

All other wishes and aspirations had to retreat into the background in the face of this serious situation. It was of decisive importance that within the world opposed to Russia no internal strains and difficulties should develop that might scatter or even paralyze the forces marshaled for the battle against the Soviet Union. He (the Führer) was therefore grateful that Antonescu had on his own recognized the gravity of the situation and had declared that he would not at this time insist on a solution of questions that were likely to produce strains in the anti-Russian bloc.

No matter on whose side the right may be in the individual case, the reorganization of Europe as a whole had to be undertaken with a view to the distant future in mind. Germany herself had made heavy sacrifices for this larger and wider organization on battlefields where she would never make any positive territorial gains, and had renounced all claim to large ethnic blocs, numbered in the hundreds of thousands, so as not to create difficulties for the larger, long-range settlement.

The prospect of this comprehensive settlement would fortify Antonescu's position, the Rumanian people would rally around him, and the attitude adopted by him and his people would be thoroughly vindicated at the conclusion of this great conflict.

The Führer summed up the particulars of the situation as follows:

1. Stalin would never forgive Germany for having opposed his advance in the Balkans.

2. The Soviet Union, by concentrating its forces at the German-Russian border, would seek to prevent Germany from disposing freely of her forces, and thus from giving a decisive turn to the war. Russia wanted to force Germany to lose time, hoping thereby to gain time for England and herself.

3. The Soviet Union would seize upon any weakening which Germany might undergo as a unique historical opportunity for attacking the state which it regarded as the principal obstacle to its further expansion in Europe. Moreover by his attitude Stalin was tying up

Japan's forces and thus preventing Japan from bringing her full weight to bear against America.

4. The Soviet Union was trying by its attitude to bolster the English will to resist and to give America the hope for a strong continental ally in Europe. Russia was hoping above all to be able to keep the war from ending in 1941. If this should not be the case, she was determined to draw the necessary conclusions from the situation herself.

Stalin had for the first time given evidence of this attitude a few days before Germany's intervention against Yugoslavia, by concluding the well-known treaty with Yugoslavia.¹¹ Only seemingly was this treaty theoretical and platonic. Actually it had strengthened Yugoslavia's resistance and it had, moreover, been supplemented by the Russian commitment to supply Yugoslavia with arms and ammunition. It was only the rapidity of the German advance that had prevented this commitment from being carried out.

The very outcome of the war in the Balkans had the result that Stalin established a closer relationship with England. The purpose of Cripps' presence in London at the moment, Germany was convinced, was to work for this end.

This situation had the following consequences for Germany:

1. Germany had been compelled, by keeping step with the Russian troop movements, to reinforce her eastern front, where previously she had maintained only a very small number of troops. Germany was compelled to protect herself especially by the transfer of strong units of the Luftwaffe to the east. Actually these units had been intended for the attack against England.

2. He (the Führer) had felt that in these circumstances he could not take the responsibility of carrying out an attack in the west. Such an attack was assured of success only if the entire Luftwaffe could be committed to the offensive.

3. The German military had by now familiarized themselves with the new possibilities in the east, and all the consequences they implied. Germany was in an awkward position in that the initiative might in certain circumstances be wrested from her, so that she was forced to parry thrusts as they occurred. Militarily this was intolerable.

The greatest danger, however, was the possibility that the war might not be brought to a decision in 1941 and that by 1942, apart from the Russian gain in material strength, England, too, might have built up her material. The situation had greatly deteriorated in the past few weeks in so far as the movement of Russian units to the German eastern border compelled Germany also to transfer an increasing number of divisions to the east, taking them away from

¹¹ See document No. 265 and footnote 2.

fruitful activities, interrupting their training and keeping them in a permanent state of alert.

The result of this was a concentration of forces for which Germany had given no occasion. Now Germany had to try belatedly to take defense measures; failure to do so could not be justified politically or economically. It was evident that in this way a concentration of troops on both sides of the border had taken place. Such a situation was filled with tensions and possibilities of a conflict. An explosion might occur at any moment.

As Führer of the German people and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht he had in that situation taken every measure to ensure preparedness, in order to preclude any surprises capable of threatening the future of the Reich and its allies, in the forefront of which he also reckoned Rumania. It was obvious that Europe's destiny would be at stake if this clash should occur.

In contrast with the practice of the English, however, he (the Führer) was not by any means asking Antonescu for assistance. If Germany should be forced to take the step referred to earlier, the Wehrmacht would have the finest equipment that had ever existed in history and would certainly fight through to a favorable decision. The Führer merely expected of Rumania that in her own interest she do everything to facilitate a successful conclusion of this conflict. He (the Führer) could assure Antonescu even now that after the conflict was over Rumania would receive indemnities which, as far as Germany was concerned, had no territorial limitations.

Following this the Führer explained, with the help of maps, the Russian concentration in each individual sector, from the Finnish to the Rumanian border. He mentioned in this connection the constantly increasing incidents of Russian penetration of German air space. The moment would come when force would have to be used against these incidents of penetration because continued nondefense would make the Russians more and more impudent. Special attention was also given in the discussion to the distribution of the Russian air forces, which the Führer likewise explained with the help of maps. The Führer and Antonescu were agreed that the Russians would certainly attempt to attack the oil regions and Constanța from the air. Russian paratroop operations would also have to be reckoned with. Antonescu in turn also presented a plan of operations against the Russians, which he discussed with the Führer from the military aspect. In addition he set forth in detail Rumania's defense measures against a Russian attack, likewise with the help of maps. Special attention was paid in these discussions to the preparations for flooding which Rumania had already initiated, but which will become ineffective around the end of June because of the falling water level of the rivers.

To the Führer's remark that he wondered whether Rumania should participate in the operations against Russia from the very first day, or whether Rumania's absence from the conflict might not induce Russia to observe a certain restraint with respect to the Rumanian territory, Antonescu replied that he himself wanted to join in the struggle from the first day. The Russians would bomb the oil regions even if Rumania should not participate at the start, and "Rumania would never forgive General Antonescu for letting the Rumanian Army remain inactive while the German forces in Rumania were marching against the Russians." For these reasons he was of the opinion that Rumania must actively participate in the fighting from the very first day. Finally, the question of the supreme command in Rumania was discussed. The Führer declared to Antonescu that he (the Führer) proposed to have him appear to the Rumanian people as the Commander in Chief in that area. He then explained the method by which in other instances, too, the Army commanders followed general directives worked out by central authorities, but had relatively much freedom of action with regard to details. In the case of Rumania, a liaison staff under General Schobert¹² would provide for compliance with the general operational directives and all matters would be settled in conjunction with this liaison staff.

Antonescu, visibly pleased, replied that being a soldier he was not after glory, but would gladly accept the offer that he be Commander in Chief and he would promise to do his best to carry out successfully the tasks entrusted to him.

In conclusion Antonescu thanked the Führer for his clear, systematic presentation of the international situation and of Rumania's position. He shared the Führer's opinion in every point. In particular, he as well as the Rumanian Army and the Rumanian people were certain that Russia, as always, was the common enemy who under the double flag of Slavism and anarchy intended to attack Germany because the Reich was the only European country that was absolutely consolidated both militarily and socially. The Russians wanted to defeat Germany and then resume their expansion in Europe which they had started time and again for 10 centuries as Slavs, for 3 centuries under the Tsars, and for the past 2 decades under Stalin. He was also in agreement with the Führer that Russia was preparing to open the attack at a favorable moment. Between Russia on the one hand, and England and America on the other, a plan of action would be agreed upon at the moment when these countries had achieved superiority in armaments.

¹² See document No. 544.

Rumania had discovered several indications of an active cooperation between Russia and England. Russia, as well as Yugoslavia and Turkey, who, of course, were backed by England, had unquestionably cooperated prior to the Balkan conflict. At the moment when Russia had concentrated her forces on the Rumanian border, the Turks had assembled 25 to 30 divisions in a militarily very unfavorable position in European Turkey, while Yugoslavia had simultaneously exerted pressure on Rumania.

This kind of cooperation had also been felt in the diplomatic sphere. Moscow and Washington had simultaneously approached Rumania in order to divert her from her present course. Molotov had told Minister Gafencu that the moment most favorable to a settlement between Russia and Rumania had arrived, and had then expressed himself in words of the highest praise for Antonescu's statesmanlike achievements.

Antonescu added that in his opinion any postponement of the conflict with Russia would jeopardize the victory of the Axis. If Russia's armed forces were to withdraw they would do so only in order to gain time. The power of resistance of the Army could not be rated very high, and the population looked forward to its liberation. The Rumanian people, on the other hand, had been thinking day and night of the hour when they could settle accounts with Russia, and they wished that the moment would come very soon for them to take revenge for everything Russia had done to them.

Antonescu was very optimistic about the prospects of a war with Russia. One must not allow oneself to be misled by examples from history. Whereas Napoleon and even the Germans in 1917 had still had to contend with the great problems raised by space, the motor in the air and on the ground had eliminated space as Russia's ally. The Führer commented that the object of the campaign was obviously not to permit the Russian armies to retreat into their vast country, but rather to annihilate these armies.

The conversation was followed by a luncheon for a large group, after which Antonescu took leave from the Führer after a short conversation.¹³

(SCHMIDT)

¹³ There is in the files a record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Antonescu also held on June 11. This record is incomplete and legible only in parts (F20/476-484).

No. 615

136/74958-59

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

MADRID, June 11, 1941—2:00 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received June 11—4:00 p. m.

No. 2016 of June 10

Today the Spanish Foreign Minister asked me to call on him in order to give me, in strict confidence, the following information, to be passed on to the Reich Government:

He had received a private letter from Count Ciano¹ in which the latter stated that among other things the Spanish question was also discussed at the recent Führer-Duce meeting at the Brenner;² Ciano brought up the question whether the moment had not now arrived—if not as yet for entry into the war—at least for Spain's official accession to the Tripartite Pact. He had immediately reported to the Generalissimo and on the latter's instructions had drawn up a reply to Ciano which had been sent by plane today.

The reply contained a listing of the advantages and disadvantages of such a step. The former consisted in particular in the whole world's finally seeing where Spain stood; this would establish a clear line for Spanish foreign policy, the final objective of which was entry into the war. Perhaps Spain's accession to the Tripartite Pact would also mean further loss in prestige for England. It was likewise possible that Spain's step would have a deterrent effect on a decision of the United States to enter the war.

On the other hand, however, Roosevelt might also interpret the Spanish step as a threat to the Western Hemisphere and accelerate the entry of the United States into the war. A further disadvantage was the elimination of the surprise factor if Spain one day would enter the war. Above all, however, the shipping space of 300,000 tons (of grain, maize, gasoline, etc.) now en route would be lost and a total blockade would be immediately imposed on Spain.

The Minister stated further that Spain was resolved to take and fill her place at the side of the Axis Powers; she wanted to perform really useful service to the common cause and not exhaust her contribution in gestures. The letter of reply contained neither assent nor dissent, but strove for a further exchange of views concerning (group garbled) price of accession at the present moment, for which Ciano had not given any detailed reasons in his letter. How seriously he [Serrano Suñer] took the matter is evident from the fact

¹ See Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 663-664.

² See document No. 584.

that he immediately had the Minister of Commerce designate the Canary Islands as port of discharge which could be more quickly reached for a number of transports now en route.²

STOHRER

² In telegram No. 2027 of June 11 (136/74965) Stohrer supplemented his report to the effect that Serrano Suñer had also mentioned that Spanish territorial aspirations should be taken into account by Hitler and Mussolini and that, on the whole, his reply to Ciano had been somewhat more positive than originally reported.

No. 616

386/211084-89

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, June 11, 1941—9:30 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received June 11—9:55 p. m.¹

No. 1761 of June 11

For the Foreign Minister.

The discussions with the political representative of the French Government, State Secretary Benoist-Méchin, and the military representative, Admiral Marzin, which were held at the German Embassy in Paris yesterday and today together with the Chairman of the Armistice Commission, General Vogl, and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Boehme, dealt with the following subjects:

1. The situation resulting from the English attack in Syria and the eastern Mediterranean area;²
2. The continuation of the measures provided for in the Protocol of May 28 for North and West Africa;³
3. The effect of the military events on the internal situation in France.

1. *Syria*

The French Government considers that Syria's moral will to resist has been proved. The Syrian Army, which in July 1940 was won over to a continuation of the fight against Germany and even until recently showed strong de Gaullist tendencies, was successfully persuaded through suitable handling of its military leaders by Rahn and Guérard⁴ that a policy of collaboration with Germany was necessary. Today it is ready to sacrifice itself in a struggle against English attacks, hopeless though it may be, because it believes that by

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 1938 to the Special Train, June 6."

² See document No. 606.

³ Document No. 559.

⁴ Jacques Guérard, special emissary of Darlan. See document No. 476 and footnote 3.

this demonstration of loyalty to Germany it can improve the position of metropolitan France and the rest of the colonial empire for the duration of the Armistice Treaty and in the peace treaty.

The native Arabs are basically antiforeign; however, as a result of the favoring of the Jews by the English and because of English action in Iraq, their dislike of England may be counted on to outweigh their dislike of France.

The interests of the Christian population of Lebanon and Syria are entirely commercial and the English promise of their inclusion in the sterling bloc and improved commercial opportunities for them was psychologically a clever choice.

Syria's readiness to defend herself militarily is most resolute, as shown by the very first engagements, but as a result of the shortage of heavy weapons, ammunition, and inadequate supply facilities, it cannot be long maintained in practice.

Regarding air defense, Syria has with her present number of planes virtually reached the capacity of her airfields, repair shops, and supplies of fuel and ammunition; as a result, requests are mainly for securing the supplies which these air forces need at any given time.

In order to strengthen the maritime defense of Syria, the French Government requests permission for the sailing of another destroyer from Toulon with urgently needed supplies of ammunition. One of the submarines stationed off Beirut has already expended its torpedoes. The destroyer *Guepard*, as a result of its attack on an English cruiser and its intervention in the land fighting by firing on English tank columns on the coastal highway, has expended most of its supplies of ammunition.

Because the supply transports which are to go by land cannot reach Salonika before 2 weeks, the French Government requests permission to employ transport planes for the most urgent reinforcements.

General Vogl granted the wishes proposed by the French, as far as they can be met with the means available.

As already reported,⁵ collaboration of German forces in Syria itself is for psychological reasons not requested by the French Government and in the opinion of French military authorities would also lead to insolvable problems of a practical nature, such as those of food and supplies.

On the other hand, the French Government very urgently requests military relief for Syria through German air attacks on Haifa and

⁵ In telegram No. 1730 of June 8, forwarded to Fuschl as No. 1885 (70/50387-88), Abetz had reported that Darlan did not want to appeal for German assistance at this time because he wished to show that the British attack lacked any pretext.

a bombing of the very numerous units of the British fleet cruising off the Syrian coast or heading for Syria.

In addition, the French Government again requests that an official German declaration be made to the effect that later on Syria will remain under France, and pressure be put on Ankara to permit the passage of military supply transports across Turkish territory.

2. North and West Africa

The French Government is willing to resort to reprisals against English bases like Gibraltar, Freetown, and Bathurst on account of the English attack on Syria but it is worried lest this lead to English operations on a larger scale against North and West Africa and does not as yet consider itself able to ward these off successfully. It would therefore propose a movement that would permit French operations, which today merely run parallel with those of the Germans, to be carried out within the framework and with the support of the German operations.

With regard to the commitments for the support of the German conduct of the war in North and West Africa which are assumed in the Protocols of May 28, the French Government takes the same position as in the question of reprisals. It is prepared, in principle, to carry out these measures that have been agreed upon, but would like to be able to propose a time for inaugurating them which would place it militarily and politically in a better position than at present in Syria.

The military reinforcements requested by the French Government for North and West Africa have already been set forth in the Protocol of May 28 and have been approved, with the exception of the contingent designated as necessary for a military offensive in Equatorial Africa. The French Government requests, especially with respect to the reinforcements approved for the naval forces, a simplification of the details of the procedure for giving approval, so that an urgent action may be carried out in time. The German Armistice Commission has promised to consider the question sympathetically and to consult with the Italian Armistice Commission in this respect.

3. Internal situation in France

The French Government points out that a continuation of the policy inaugurated by Darlan will meet with great psychological difficulties with respect to public opinion, particularly in the event of a military loss of Syria, unless political and economic alleviations, commensurate with the French sacrifices, can be granted. The reduction of the occupation costs to 15 million marks per day, which is being considered as the main concession in return for the readiness

of the French to take action in Syria,⁶ has been linked with economic conditions that actually involve an aggravation, not a lessening, of the burden of payments, and Darlan does not know how he can defend this before his Cabinet and the public.

I replied that the concessions made to France in return for her readiness to support the German conduct of the war would be studied by the German departments and carried out as speedily as possible. No doubt further political or economic concessions were still possible in some field or other. The French Government should not forget, however, that the French aid given to the Germans in the prosecution of the war was only of very minor interest to the Reich and without any essential significance for the winning of the final victory over England. The German concessions would understandably have to be determined mainly by the measure of interest which the French contributions have for Germany. The German Government certainly understood that in the event of a military loss of Syria the French Government would have to be able to defend this consequence of its decision to collaborate with Germany before the public. It had to be pointed out, however, that a number of political personalities and movements which advocated, with the utmost determination, a policy of complete collaboration with Germany were still outside the French Government and to some extent were even regarded by the latter with disfavor. The policy of collaboration and the temporary dangers it involved could certainly be made popular more easily with these forces than without them.

State Secretary Benoist-Méchin stated that Darlan and those members of the French Government who were honestly prepared for a policy of collaboration with Germany and everything that it involved were doubtless aware that there was still a great deal of housecleaning that had to be done in the French Government and administration before France would become a reliable political partner for Germany. They were determined to undertake this, but because of lack of German concessions they were at the moment in danger of losing the political credit needed for this.

Darlan requests another meeting with the Foreign Minister in order to be able to report personally on the foreign and domestic problems with which France is faced as a result of the military events.

ABETZ

⁶ See document No. 475, footnote 3.

No. 617

8589/E602942-46

Draft Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, June 11, 1941.

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
 OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) No. 44886/41 g. K. Chefsache
 By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 32¹

PREPARATIONS FOR THE TIME AFTER BARBAROSSA

A. *After the Soviet Russian armed forces have been crushed* Germany and Italy will dominate militarily the European Continent—for the time being without the Iberian Peninsula. There will then no longer be any serious threat to the area of Europe on land. For its protection and for the offensive operations still considered, essentially fewer Army forces will suffice than those which it has hitherto been necessary to maintain.

The emphasis in armament can be laid on the Navy and the Luftwaffe.

The intensification of German-French cooperation² should and will tie down additional English forces; eliminate the threat to the North African theater of war from the rear; further reduce the freedom of movement of the British fleet in the western Mediterranean; and protect the deep southwestern flank of the European theater, including the Atlantic coast of North and West Africa, from Anglo-Saxon attack.

Within the foreseeable future Spain will be confronted with the question whether or not she is willing to assist in the expulsion of the English from Gibraltar.

The possibility of exerting strong pressure on Turkey and Iran improves the prospects of utilizing these countries, too, for the fight against England, either indirectly or directly.³

¹ Although this directive is numbered and bears the date June 11, it was not signed. It was circulated to the High Commands on June 19 as a provisional draft (8589/E602941).

² See document No. 559.

³ According to an OKW directive of June 30 signed by Warlimont (8589/E603955-57) certain portions of this draft directive were replaced by a new version. The brackets indicate the passages which were altered by the new version with regard to content, wording, or arrangement. The revised wording reads as follows:

"On the basis of this situation as it will exist after the victorious conclusion of the eastern campaign the following strategic tasks for the Wehrmacht can arise for the late autumn of 1941 and winter 1941-1942.

"1. The newly won eastern territory must be organized, protected, and exploited economically with the full participation of the Wehrmacht.

"How strong these security forces will have to be can only later be stated with certainty. In all probability, however, about 60 divisions and one air

[B. On the basis of this situation as it will exist after the victorious conclusion of the eastern campaign the following strategic tasks for the Wehrmacht can arise for the late autumn of 1941 and winter 1941-42:

1. *The newly won eastern territory* must be organized, protected, and exploited economically with the full participation of the Wehrmacht.

How strong these security forces in the Russian area will have to be can only later be stated with certainty. In all probability, however, about 60 divisions and *one* air force, along with Finnish and Rumanian forces, will be adequate for the further tasks in the east.

2. The continuation of the struggle against the British position in the Mediterranean and in the Near East.

force along with allied and friendly forces will be adequate for the further tasks in the east.

"2. Continuation of the *struggle against the British position in the Mediterranean and the Near East* by means of a concentric attack which is to be launched from Libya through Egypt, from Bulgaria through Turkey, and possibly from Transcaucasia through Iran.

"a) In North Africa the important thing is to eliminate Tobruk and thus to establish the basis for continuing the German-Italian attack against the Suez Canal. The attack is to be prepared for approximately November with the proviso that the German Africa Corps will be reinforced with regard to man power and material to the greatest possible extent and that adequate reserves of all kind will be placed at its disposal (the 5th light Division to be reorganized into a full armored division), but that no additional large units should be transferred to North Africa.

"The preparations for the attack require an increase in the speed of transportation with every possible means making use of ports in French North Africa and if possible of the new sea route from the area of southern Greece.

"It is the task of the Navy in cooperation with the Italian Navy to provide that the necessary tonnage be made available through chartering of French and neutral ships.

"The problem of the later transfer of German PT boats to the Mediterranean is to be examined.

"The Italian Navy is to be given every support in the improvement of the unloading service in the North African harbors.

"Ob.d. L. provides the Africa Corps with adequate air force units and anti-aircraft artillery, to the extent that these are released in the east, for the further conduct of the operation and reinforces Italian air cover of sea transports by the commitment of German air force units.

"For the unified direction of preparations regarding transportation a 'Home Staff Overseas' [*Heimatsstab Übersee*] has been established which will operate in accordance with the directives of the High Command of the Wehrmacht and maintain liaison with the German General with the Italian High Command and with the Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast.

"b) In view of the English reinforcements which are to be expected in the Near and Middle East and particularly for the protection of the Suez Canal a German operation *from Bulgaria through Turkey* will have to be considered with the objective of attacking the English position on the Suez Canal from the east also.

"For this purpose provision should be made for concentrating in Bulgaria as soon as possible forces strong enough to make Turkey politically compliant or to break her resistance by force of arms.

"When the collapse of the Soviet Union has created the preliminary conditions for this, preparations should be made for the employment of a motorized expeditionary corps from Transcaucasia against Iraq in conjunction with the operations under b)."

a. The effort should be continued to carry out the *main attack* against the Suez Canal with German and Italian forces from Cyrenaica starting approximately in November.

Since by then one must reckon with a considerable reinforcement of the British forces in Egypt, the attempt must be made to add still further forces—about one armored and one motorized division—to the German Africa Corps, too, over and above the Italian reinforcements.

As soon as the eastern situation permits, these forces are to be equipped and made ready for the African theater.

This intention can be realized only if there is a satisfactory solution of the transportation problem.

Therefore an increase in the speed of transportation must be attained with every possible means, taking advantage of the French offer and if possible using the new sea route from the area of southern Greece.

It is the task of the Navy in cooperation with the Italian Navy to provide that the necessary tonnage be ready, through chartering of French and of neutral ships.

The Italian Navy is to be given every support in the improvement of the unloading service in the North African harbors.

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For the unified direction of preparations regarding transportation a "Home Staff Overseas" [*Heimatstab Übersee*] will be established which will operate in accordance with the directives of the High Command of the Wehrmacht and maintain liaison with the German General with the Italian High Command and with the Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast.

b. In order to facilitate the difficult attack on Egypt from the west, one should also consider exercising German pressure in the direction of the Suez Canal from the east.

At the very least the English defensive forces will thereby be divided.

For this purpose provision should be made for concentrating in Bulgaria as soon as possible forces strong enough to make Turkey politically compliant or to break her resistance by force of arms.

Within the framework of this army and also in the Caucasus when the collapse of the Soviet Union has created the conditions for such, motorized expeditionary corps are to be established in order later to open the way through Turkey and Syria to Palestine and through Iran to Basra.]

c.⁴ Utilization of the Arab liberation movement. In the case of larger German operations, the situation of the English in the Middle East will be all the more difficult the more forces are tied down *at the proper time* by centers of unrest or insurrectionary movements. All military, political, and propaganda measures serving this purpose must be harmonized very closely with one another in the preparatory period. I designate *Special Staff F* [*Sonderstab F*], which will make its headquarters in the area of the Wehrmacht

⁴ In the revised draft (see footnote 3) this paragraph becomes d) instead of c) but is not changed otherwise.

Commander, Southeast, as the central office in the field to participate in all planning and measures in the Arab area. It is to be given the best experts and agents.

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht will define the tasks of *Special Staff F*: in so far as political questions are affected in accord with the Foreign Minister.

3. *Closing of the western entrance to the Mediterranean by elimination of Gibraltar.*

The preparations for Operation *Felia*,⁵ which had been planned earlier, must be resumed in full during the winding up of the operations in the east. In this connection it can be expected that unoccupied French territory will also certainly be available for supply transports, if not for the transit of German troops. The cooperation of French naval and air forces lies also in the realm of possibility.

Only to the extent required for the security of the Strait are army units to be provided for transfer to Spanish Morocco after the capture of Gibraltar.

The defense of the Atlantic coast of North and West Africa, the elimination of the English possessions in West Africa, and the recapture of the area controlled by de Gaulle fall to the French, who will be granted the necessary reinforcements as the course which has been started is developed. The utilization of West African bases by the Navy and Luftwaffe and also among other things the capture of islands of the Atlantic will be facilitated after mastery over the Strait has been achieved.

4. Along with these possible operations against the British power position in the Mediterranean the "siege of England" must be resumed in full by the Navy and the Luftwaffe after conclusion of the eastern campaign.

All armament projects serving this purpose thus have priority within the over-all armament program. At the same time it is important to increase to the very highest degree the German air defenses. Preparations for a landing in England will serve the double purpose: of tying down English forces in the mother country; and of precipitating and completing by means of a landing that collapse of England which is foreshadowed.

C. It cannot yet be determined at what time the projected operations in the Mediterranean and in the Near East can be begun. The strongest operational effect would be attained by beginning the attacks on Gibraltar, Egypt, and Palestine as nearly at the same time as possible.

Whether that will be possible depends upon a number of factors that today cannot as yet be judged, but primarily upon whether the

⁵ See vol XI of this series, document No. 323.

Luftwaffe will be in position to commit at the same time the necessary forces for support of all three operations.

D. I request the Commanders in Chief to make their preparations regarding ideas and organization in accordance with these provisional aims and to inform me of the results in time so that my final directives can be issued while the eastern campaign is still in progress.

No. 618

177/85175-77

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

U. St.S. Pol. 537

BERLIN, June 11, 1941.

Ambassador Oshima informed me today through Counselor of Embassy Kase of the content of a telegram that left Tokyo on June 9 concerning Japanese-American relations, asking me to let the Reich Foreign Minister know at once. Ambassador Oshima again requested at the same time that the Reich Foreign Minister receive him as soon as possible in this matter. Foreign Minister Matsuoka also suggested in the telegram that its contents also be brought to the knowledge of the Führer. The telegram, which Counselor of Embassy Kase translated to me word for word from the Japanese text, has the following content:

1. Foreign Minister Matsuoka had not received any answer as yet from the Government of the United States and did not intend to ask it for an answer.

2. When Matsuoka had received the answer he would at once bring it up for discussion in Tokyo. He then intended to bring about a discussion on it with the German Government before the United States was given a further answer.

3. In Matsuoka's opinion there was no doubt at all that Roosevelt's true intention was above everything else to destroy the Tripartite Pact and to arouse among the American people the impression that it was still not quite certain that in case of a conflict between the United States and Germany, Japan would go in on Germany's side.

4. In Matsuoka's opinion there was also no doubt that the United States intended the following: It wants to drive Germany to fire the first shot in order then to claim self-righteously that Germany had started the war against the United States. This was to facilitate the voting in the Senate for entry into the war and to create the impression among the people that the United States was now forced to defend herself.

5. It was obvious today that Roosevelt had firmly resolved to enter the war. Only the method of doing so, mentioned above in paragraph 4, was still under consideration. The entry of the United States into the war as such was now only a question of time.

6. For the moment Roosevelt seemed to have given up the idea of extending the patrol service as far as Greenland. It was possible, however, that he had already decided to change the Neutrality Act¹ in such a way that the transportation of war material would be permitted on American ships and that convoys would be made available for this. This decision of Roosevelt's would come to the fore as soon as a beginning was made in repealing or amending the Neutrality Act. On the basis of these ideas Matsunoka was making every effort to prevent further progress by the United States along this course. However, he had strong doubts on the extent to which this attempt would be successful.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WOERMANN

¹ Approved Nov. 4, 1939; U.S. Statutes at Large, 1939-1941, vol. 54, p. 4.

No. 619

136/74966

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain

Telegram

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL TRAIN, June 12, 1941—1:52 a. m.

No. 542 of June 12 from

the Special Train

Received Berlin, June 12—2:35 a. m.

No. 1318 of June 12

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent June 12.

With reference to your telegram No. 2006 of June 10.¹

The speedy and complete restoration of the railroad bridge at Hendaye really seems so important that I shall ask you to speak to the Spanish Government in the matter.

Please, therefore, propose to the Spanish Government that we cooperate in repairing the railroad bridge again quickly and completely. You may approach the matter from the standpoint of the economic interests of both our countries which demand that railroad traffic between the two countries not be interrupted for any length of time; this might easily occur in view of the present dilapidated condition of the bridge. You may point out in this connection that Spain must see to it in her own interest that in the event of a military operation by England against Spain or Portugal, the material and other assistance which will then presumably be requested of

¹ Not found. In telegram No. 528 of June 9 from Fuschl (136/74956-57), Ritter informed Stohrer that the military authorities were concerned about the condition of the railway bridge at Hendaye. Because of its poor condition no immediate effective military help of German troops could be given to Spain in case of an enemy invasion of the Iberian Peninsula.

Germany, is indeed rendered effective at once. But this cannot be assumed with the bridge in its present condition.

Report by wire.²

RIBBENTROP

²In telegram No. 2094 of June 17 (136/74971) Stohrer reported that the Spanish Foreign Ministry in view of "the economic interests of both countries to maintain traffic" over the bridge had agreed in writing to restoration of the railroad bridge and construction of an auxiliary bridge between Hendaye and Irún.

No. 620

265/172947-49

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

ANKARA, June 12, 1941.

No. 715 of June 12

Received June 12—4:20 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 631 of June 9.²

1. In your instruction No. 631, point 1, you described the views of the Turkish Government entirely accurately. It is true that Turkey does not by any means want to dispense with all cooperation with her present allies as a result of the treaty which is to be concluded with us. The objective of the treaty for Turkey is a return to neutrality, thus exclusion of any military cooperation with England, which could be demanded according to the triple treaty. However, Turkey believes that in no case can she give up "political" cooperation, because every day questions can come up regarding which she must reach an understanding with England. This explains the extraordinary difficulty in agreeing to your demand that the existing tie not be mentioned. The view which I have taken here most emphatically, in accordance with your instructions, that there could be no question of reference being made to Turkey's present obligations, has produced the impression that by this treaty we wanted to force Turkey to pass immediately from the English camp into that of Germany. I personally, however, have held the view that this outcome could only be the consequence of a psychological evolution of which the treaty to be concluded represents only the first step. Indeed, the excited discussions within the Cabinet and among the political circles concerned have now led to a result which in no way accords with your wishes. Saracoglu stated that the Turkish Government recognized gratefully the consideration for its wishes in the secret protocol; it hoped that if a friendship between us should

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 1949 to the Special Train, June 12."

² Document No. 607.

develop on the basis of the treaty the Reich Government would later have appreciation for the Turkish wishes. At the present time, however, it would like to abstain from accepting such a secret protocol.

2. In case the German Government insists on not having the treaty obligations of the Turkish Government mentioned in the preamble to the treaty, the Turkish Government suggests the following wording of the treaty:

Preamble: "Desiring to place the relations between the two countries on a basis of mutual trust and sincere friendship, have resolved:"

Article 1: Germany and Turkey undertake mutually to respect the integrity and inviolability of their territories.

Article 2: The Turkish proposal as before, that is: Consultation in all questions affecting their common interests, in which connection M. Numan points out that thereby also all questions can be discussed which concern the establishment of mutual trust and sincere friendship, in accordance with the preamble. . . . (group garbled) letter regarding the trade agreement your proposal will be accepted.³ The statement regarding the press would have to remain as proposed by the Turks,⁴ since under the Turkish Constitution there exists so-called freedom of the press. If your proposal were accepted, to the effect that the two Governments obligate themselves to do "everything",⁴ then the Turkish Government would have to pass a new press law, which they do not intend to do.

3. I left the gentlemen in no doubt that this meager result would disappoint the German Government in every respect and bring about the failure of the treaty. To this M. Saracoglu remarked: "In order to make one last effort, we would be willing to accept the proposal of the German Government regarding articles 1 and 2 if in the preamble the sentence regarding the reciprocal obligations were accepted."

4. In weighing the advantages and disadvantages that are involved in the total collapse of the negotiations, and especially in order not to give the English, who after all have been kept informed by the Turkish Government,⁵ the pleasure of seeing our negotiations fail, I would request that it be considered once more whether it is not possible to accept the Turkish preamble. I remain firmly convinced that once the first step is made, we will be confronted with an entirely different situation in the autumn.

PAPEN

³ See document No. 582 and footnote 3.

⁴ The relevant passage of this declaration (see document No. 582, footnote 3) stated that the two Governments "will do everything to take care that an attitude in accordance with the spirit of the friendly relationship and mutual confidence is expressed in press publications and radio broadcasts of the two countries."

⁵ Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. III, pp. 864-865.

No. 621

265/172945-46

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division I M

BERLIN, June 12, 1941.

Pol. I M 4130 g.

The following important points from a report by the German Military Attaché in Ankara dated June 10¹ are submitted for your information:

I. The Chief of the Turkish General Staff, Azim Gündüz,² has authorized the Military Attaché to communicate the following:

1. Turkey will not intervene in Syria in any way. After the Führer's letter to the State President³ she has full confidence in Germany and will do everything to avoid a conflict with Germany.

2. The fact that Turkey nevertheless maintains a strong military force is primarily to be attributed to fear of Russia.

The measures along the Syrian frontier also are merely of a security nature.

3. The commander on the Syrian frontier has received the order to permit all Frenchmen, Germans, and Italians passing over to Turkish territory to cross the border and to treat them in a courteous manner. Military personnel would be interned, civilians left at liberty.

4. Turkey would not consider a German occupation of Syria and Iraq as a threat to her security either, but merely as a complication of her situation because this would cause the closing of the still open trade routes, particularly with America.

5. Aside from the emergency landing of a German plane off the Dardanelles some time ago and of another one near Antalya, no further emergency landings had occurred. All reports in this matter which were circulating were false.

II. The Chief of the General Staff asked the Military Attaché about the German concentrations of troops in Rumania against Russia and stated literally in reply to the evasive reply:

"If Germany crushes Russia the whole world will be happy and Germany will get her hands on more material than America will be able to deliver to England in 5 years."

A copy of the complete report will be submitted after it has been received.

KRAMARZ

¹ Not found.

² Actually the Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff.

³ See document No. 514, footnote 7.

No. 622

2361/488563-64

*The President of the Turkish Republic to Adolf Hitler*¹

ANKARA, June 12, 1941.

HERR CHANCELLOR: I have had the honor of receiving from Herr von Papen the letter that Your Excellency was good enough to have transmitted to me when your Ambassador returned to Ankara.²

In this re-affirmation of the Germany policy with respect to south-eastern Europe I noted once more the agreement of our countries' views, for they are animated by the common desire to prevent the war from spreading to the Near East and to restore tranquillity to the Balkans, which have paid such heavy tributes to the cause of independence through the centuries.

I am most grateful to Your Excellency for the hope you have revived with respect to this matter through your affirmations that reflect the deepest sincerity.

It is also with great pleasure that I have taken note of your statements concerning Turkey's legitimate interests. In reply to the suggestion you were good enough to make and sharing the conviction that there can be no real divergence of interests between our two peoples and countries, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has already gotten in touch with Your Excellency's Ambassador to establish the conditions under which Turkey and Germany will confirm their desire to maintain relations based on mutual friendship and trust.

I hope that the efforts exerted by both parties for that purpose will lead to the solution desired by Your Excellency and by me, and I believe that, in any case, the relations between our countries and our peoples, which are not separated by any real divergence, will be deepened and transformed into true friendship.

I wish, in concluding, to affirm to Your Excellency that upon hearing your words of praise, in your address of May 4,³ for the

¹This letter is in French in the original.

Weizsäcker's memorandum of June 18 (61/40154) records that the original of the letter was that day brought to Berlin by courier whereupon the Turkish Ambassador requested an audience with Hitler in order to deliver it personally. See Editors' Note, p. 1052.

²See document No. 514 and footnote 7.

³In this address before the Reichstag which dealt with the Balkan campaign Hitler made these statements about Turkey:

"Turkey was our ally in the World War. Its unhappy outcome weighed on that country as heavily as on us. The great genius who created a young Turkey anew was the first one to set a wonderful example for the rise of the defeated ally abandoned by luck and whom fate had dealt such a terrible blow. Whereas Turkey, owing to the realistic attitude of the leadership of the state preserved the independence of her own decisions, Yugoslavia fell victim to British intrigues."

For the text of Hitler's address see *Monatshefte für auswärtige Politik*, June 1941, pp. 449-484.

new Turkey, its brilliant founding father, and its present leaders, public opinion in my country was most favorably impressed, and it is my pleasant duty to express to you, in the name of all my fellow countrymen, my warmest thanks.

Please accept, Herr Chancellor, the assurances of my very high consideration.⁴

ISMET İNÖNÜ

⁴ Marginal note in Papen's handwriting: "Transmitted to the Foreign Minister by telegraph on June 15."

Telegram No. 732 of June 15 (265/172960-61) transmitted the text of İnönü's letter in German translation.

No. 623

265/172952-53

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

PRIORITY

TOP SECRET

No. 548 from Fuschl

No. 650 from the Foreign Ministry

RAM 263/R

FUSCHL, June 13, 1941—2:20 p. m.
Received Berlin, June 13—2:30 p. m.

Sent June 13.

With reference to your telegram No. 715 of June 12.¹

You inform us in your telegram that our wish that the reference to present Turkish obligations be eliminated produced the impression in Turkey that we intend by this treaty to force Turkey to pass immediately from the English camp into that of Germany. This impression is wrong. You have already been told that we have no other intention than to bring Turkey back to neutrality. At the beginning of the negotiations the Turkish Government itself wanted to declare its neutrality explicitly, but later abstained from doing so. Before we can consider at all the new situation created by the present position of Turkey, I should like to know whether another form for the reservation with respect to the present obligations could possibly be found. One could, for instance, visualize the following form: "Desiring to establish relations between the two countries on the basis of mutual trust and sincere friendship, both parties have agreed to conclude a treaty without prejudice to existing obligations . . ." Such a wording would substantially mean the same thing as the Turkish wording. It would not, however, have that unpleasant flavor that Turkey has to protect herself against Germany's demanding of her something which is incompatible with the present Turkish treaty obligations.

¹ Document No. 620.

Please ask the Turkish Foreign Minister about this and tell him that you have not yet received any answer to your report about your last conversation with Saracoglu, but merely this short inquiry. Therefore, you did not yet have any clear indication from Berlin whether a conclusion of a treaty was possible at all in view of the present position of Turkey, which differed so greatly from the one adopted at the beginning of the negotiations. In view of the fact that I shall leave for Italy tomorrow and shall not return until next week, please send me today the reply of the Turkish Government to this inquiry, for I should like to make a final decision on this matter before my departure.²

RIBBENTROP

² See document No. 625.

No. 624

260/170014

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, June 13, 1941—7:53 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received June 13—10:00 p. m.

No. 429 of June 13

The Minister of Foreign Affairs¹ spoke today on the political situation to the 17-member Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Parliament. From the Black Sea to the White Sea millions of soldiers stood facing each other in the highest state of preparation for war. Finland did not wish to be unexpectedly attacked by Russia. Finland therefore had begun the callup on June 10.² Finland's attitude toward the German-Russian conflict was clear. Finland had sounded out Germany as to whether she could in the circumstances count on moral and material support. The response had not been a refusal.

The explanations were approved by the great majority. Only one Radical Socialist expressed disagreement with the substance of the remarks. Three deputies, among them Cajandar, complained that the Committee was informed only at so late a stage. Another deputy emphasized that Finland must not conduct a war of aggression.

The Foreign Minister was visibly pleased with the outcome of the debate.

BLÜCHER

¹ Rolf Witting.

² In telegram No. 1372 of June 14 (260/170016) Schulenburg reported from Moscow that he had learned from the assistant to the Finnish Military Attaché that Finland had begun mobilization on June 9. See documents Nos. 592 and 636.
588471—62—70

No. 625

265/172954-55

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

ANKARA, June 13, 1941.

No. 720 of June 13

Received June 13—9:20 p. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 650 of June 13.²The instruction in your telegram No. 631 of June 9³ reads:

"The Turkish Government must clearly understand that if Turkey cooperates even indirectly with England, she will automatically come into conflict with Germany. She would thereby abandon her neutrality, the restoration of which ought to be the minimum effect of the treaty with Germany. If Turkey explicitly wants to reserve to herself the possibility of cooperation with England, that is naturally unacceptable to us."

Since in accordance with this instruction I have categorically rejected any reference to Turkish obligations, the impression could well arise which I reported to you in telegram No. 715.⁴

As I have already telegraphed you, Turkey is firmly resolved to continue to abstain from any military cooperation with England, and thus to return to neutrality. She is not willing, however, to abstain from discussing political questions with England; this could become necessary, for instance, with regard to the administration of the Baghdad Railway if England should occupy Syria. Thus nothing has changed in the original Turkish stand and the sincere desire to return to a neutral position.

The impression which I passed on to you in telegram No. 715 of June 12 has been entirely eliminated by the Berlin statement published this morning in the *Agence*.⁵ This statement made an *excellent* impression.

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 1981 to Fuschl, June 13."

² Document No. 623.

³ Document No. 607.

⁴ Document No. 620.

⁵ This refers to a statement by the Berlin correspondent of the Anatolian News Agency of which the most significant passages read as follows:

"In reply to rumors circulated by foreign correspondents in Berlin regarding an alleged German demand addressed to Turkey for the passage of troops, I was able to establish the following in talks with authoritative circles in Berlin: Germany has never made or even considered a demand addressed to Turkey for the passage of troops. Such a possibility belongs in the realm of fantasy. The events in Iraq and Syria have proved that the intentions and plans attributed to the Reich have no relation whatever to reality. The Reich has no intention of threatening the security of Turkey or of presenting demands which would be incompatible with the dignity and the interests of the Turkish nation. . ."

"It is Germany's fundamental policy with respect to Turkey to avoid any conflict and it is stated in Berlin with satisfaction that Turkey likewise has had no other goal during the past 18 months." (Transocean news release of June 13: 265/172956-57)

I have just asked Saracoglu in accordance with your latest instruction whether the new formula proposed by you for the preamble is acceptable to the Turkish Government. After a short consultation with Numan he told me that this formula satisfied the Turkish Government and that upon its acceptance the text proposed by you for articles 1 and 2 would be accepted. However, his reply still required the consent of the State President.

Saracoglu just informed me that he [the State President], too, has expressed his agreement. I am awaiting your further instructions.

PAPEN

No. 626

222/149875-78

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1723 of June 13

BUCHAREST, June 13, 1941—11:35 p. m.

Received June 14—12:20 a. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

State Minister Antonescu expressed to me once more in behalf of the Leader of the State his special thanks for having been received by the Führer.² The General was not entirely satisfied with his conversation with the Foreign Minister,³ especially as regards the Hungarian question. The Leader of the State asks me to repeat to the Foreign Minister the statement made to him orally, to the effect that he would loyally fulfill his commitments until the end of the war. However, if the Foreign Minister was of the opinion that the Hungarian claims that had been realized by the Vienna Award would also rightfully exist in full after the war, then (in coding clear text apparently left out) General Antonescu . . . having fulfilled his commitments arising from the Reich's struggle no longer in a position to retain his leadership of Rumania. General Antonescu did not regard the matter purely from political standpoints, but rather believed that an injustice had been done to the Rumanian people which somehow had to be repaired. In this context he had by no means in mind a *restitutio ad integrum*, but only wanted to state solemnly that the *present border* with Hungary was incompatible with his feelings as a Rumanian patriot and leader of the Rumanian people.

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 1723 to the Special Train, June 14, 1:13 a.m."

² See document No. 614.

³ See document No. 614, footnote 13.

State Minister Antonescu added that in Bucharest there was already a rumor circulating, probably spread by the Hungarians, according to which General Antonescu had in Munich waived all demands with respect to Hungary. Mussolini had stated yesterday that Hungary must make up her mind for a better treatment of her minorities, especially the Rumanian minority; otherwise she would be confronted with a new situation. Also the sentence in Mussolini's big speech where he condemned the existence of large compact minorities as an antiquated phenomenon^{*} was applicable to Rumania and was therefore welcome.

I limited myself to replying to M. Antonescu that there were now more urgent tasks to be performed first; after the war there would be a new atmosphere in which a final settlement of the border problems between states would be brought about by the Führer.

KILLINGER

^{*} Apparently a reference to Mussolini's speech of June 10 before the Chamber of Fasci and Corporations on the occasion of the anniversary of Italy's entry into the war.

No. 627

265/172964

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 724 of June 14

ANKARA, June 14, 1941.

Received June 14—12:40 a. m.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 720 of June 13.²

The State President sent word to me through Numan today that he was happy that a formulation had probably now been found which would satisfy both sides. If the treaty should come about [he] could be certain that the entire Turkish people would go along. I want to remark that, according to your instructions, I have left the question of the conclusion [of the treaty] entirely uncertain, but you can see from the foregoing how much they hope for a conclusion.³

PAPEN

¹ Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 1997 to the Special Train, June 14."

² Document No. 625.

³ In telegram No. 650 of June 14 from the Special Train (265/172965) Rintelen instructed the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to submit to Hitler copies of the telegram printed here and of three other telegrams (documents Nos. 620, 623, and 625) showing the progress of the negotiations with the Turks during the last few days.

No. 628

105/113497-99

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1368 of June 13

Moscow, June 14, 1941—1:30 a. m.

Received June 14—8:00 a. m.

People's Commissar Molotov has just given me the following text of a Tass dispatch which will be broadcast tonight and published in the papers tomorrow:

Even before the return of the English Ambassador Cripps to London, but especially after his return, there have been widespread rumors of "an impending war between the USSR and Germany" in the English and foreign press. These rumors allege:

1. That Germany supposedly has made various territorial and economic demands on the USSR and that at present negotiations are impending between Germany and the USSR for the conclusion of a new and closer agreement between them;

2. That the Soviet Union is supposed to have declined these demands and that as a result Germany has begun to concentrate her troops on the frontier of the Soviet Union in order to attack the Soviet Union;

3. That on her side the Soviet Union is supposed to have begun intensive preparations for war with Germany and to have concentrated her troops on the German border.

Despite the obvious absurdity of these rumors, responsible circles in Moscow have thought it necessary, in view of the persistent spread of these rumors, to authorize Tass to state that these rumors are a clumsy propaganda maneuver of the forces arrayed against the Soviet Union and Germany, which are interested in a spread and intensification of the war.

Tass declares that:

1. Germany has addressed no demands to the Soviet Union and has proposed no new closer agreement, and that therefore negotiations in this regard cannot be taking place;

2. According to the evidence in the possession of the Soviet Union, both Germany and the Soviet Union are fulfilling to the letter the terms of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact,¹ so that in the opinion of Soviet circles the rumors of the intention of Germany to break the Pact and to launch an attack against the Soviet Union are completely without foundation, while the recent movements of German troops which have completed their operations in the Bal-

¹ See vol. VII of this series, document No. 228.

kans, to the eastern and northern parts of Germany, must be explained by other motives which have no connection with Soviet-German relations;

3. The Soviet Union, in accordance with her peace policy, has fulfilled and intends to fulfill the terms of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact; as a result, all the rumors according to which the Soviet Union is preparing for a war with Germany are false and provocative;

4. The summer calling-up of the reserves of the Red Army which is now taking place and the impending maneuvers mean nothing but a training of the reservists and a check on the operations of the railway system, which as is known takes place every year; consequently, it appears at least nonsensical to interpret these measures of the Red Army as an action hostile to Germany.²

SCHULENBURG

² Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 148-149, and footnote 83.

No. 629

116/66909

The Minister in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 490 of June 14

ZAGREB, June 14, 1941—4:10 p. m.

Received June 14—5:10 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

There were arguments during the preliminary discussions about Croatia's accession to the Tripartite Pact¹ since the Poglavnik did not want to make the trip.

Only assurance of the Duce's presence and strong Italian pressure induced him to do it. His opinion was that as Chief of State he could not go to every treaty negotiation.

¹ In telegram No. 396 of May 30 (116/66864) Kasche reported that Pavelić was thinking of Croatia's joining the Tripartite Pact and that he would like to see Hitler on that occasion. In reply, Ribbentrop informed Kasche in telegram No. 502 of the same day (116/66869) that Pavelić's intentions regarding the Tripartite Pact were received sympathetically in Berlin. The Italian Government was also in agreement and intended to invite the Croats to Italy for the ceremony.

On June 4, Woermann noted (116/66877) that the Italian Minister in Zagreb had asked the Croatian Government to join the Tripartite Pact. The protocol was to be similar to the one used in the case of Hungary's adherence to the Pact and it was to be signed at Venice in the middle of June.

Marshal Kvaternik will also be in Venice. He requests the Reich Foreign Minister to grant him a short reception. Purpose: Expression of his personal thanks, request for a visit to Germany.

I request that the reception be granted.²

KASCHÉ

² On another copy (116/66911) there is the following marginal note: "RAM has invited Kvaternik. A date has as yet to be fixed. Resubmit after 4 days. As soon as developments are clearer [invitation] perhaps to General Headquarters. R[inteln], June 16."

The text of the Protocol of Croatia's accession has been filmed on 2871/-564943-44.

No. 630

4669/E221469-70

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, June 14, 1941.

zu Pol. I M 1776 g. Rs.¹ II.

On June 13 the Foreign Minister stated the following by telephone regarding the memorandum of June 12—Pol. I M 1776—concerning the *Robin Moor*:² The Foreign Minister does not consider the press treatment suggested to be expedient.

1. One should wait until it has been definitely established that the *Robin Moor* flew the American flag and how the ship was otherwise marked. The Naval War Staff will have to determine this.³

2. One should wait and see whether all of the crew and passengers who took to the lifeboats have been saved. This should be done because it is doubtful whether the assertion made by the Naval War Staff is correct, that adequate lifesaving measures required by the international agreements and the German prize regulations were taken. Did the sinking occur on a well-traveled route?

3. One should find out more particulars as to whether the cargo really consisted of more than 50 percent of contraband goods.

4. One should find out definitely whether the sinking occurred within or outside of the security zone.

In the future press treatment one thing should be avoided, namely [giving the impression] that the German press comments are more

¹ Pol. I M 1776 g. Rs. was a communication from the Naval War Staff; it has not been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

² The American merchant vessel *Robin Moor* had been sunk by a German submarine in the South Atlantic on May 21. First reports of this incident reached the Department of State on June 9 through a telegram from the United States Ambassador to Brazil, Jefferson Caffery. For further details, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. IV, p. 716.

³ According to a memorandum of June 11 (4669/E221472) the Naval War Staff had informed the Foreign Ministry that the German submarine *U-69* had sunk an American steamer named *Exmoor* on May 21. Further details were not available at the time because the submarine was still carrying out operations.

or less the unofficial announcement that from now on the German naval forces have instructions to attack American merchant ships. This must be avoided with respect to the United States. It must also be avoided, however, that the Führer's clear decision to the contrary⁴ is circumvented in this way. Naturally, the Foreign Ministry must not let the Naval War Staff push it into the role of the one who takes the initiative in such action, as the Naval War Staff evidently intends to do, to judge from the third to the last paragraph of the memorandum.

RITTER

⁴ See document No. 608.

[EDITORS' NOTE. Ciano's diplomatic papers, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pages 665-669, records a conversation which he held with von Ribbentrop in Venice on June 15. No record of this conversation has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.]

No. 631

105/113506

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Hungary

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 552 of June 15
from Venice

VENICE, June 15, 1941—9:40 p. m.
Received Berlin, June 15—10:15 p. m.

No. 1021 of June 15 from the Foreign Ministry

For the Minister personally.

Please inform the Hungarian Minister President as follows:

In view of the heavy concentration of Russian troops along the eastern German border the Führer will probably be compelled, by the beginning of July at the latest, to clarify German-Russian relations unequivocally and in this connection to make certain demands. Since it is impossible to foretell the outcome of these negotiations, the German Government considers it necessary for Hungary, too, to take steps to secure her frontiers.

The above instruction is of a strictly confidential nature. Please also mention this fact to the Hungarian Minister President.¹

RIBBENTROP

¹ In telegram No. 649 of June 16 (93/103717) Erdmannsdorff reported that the Hungarian Minister President had promised to take the necessary measures. A memorandum by Weizsäcker of June 16 (93/103718) records that the Hungarian Minister called on him stating that if German-Russian relations should deteriorate the Hungarian Government would not like to delay its military security measures "nor on the other hand would it want to do anything alarming which would interfere with German designs." Weizsäcker thereupon told Sztójay that Erdmannsdorff would undertake a démarche in the same matter in Budapest in the course of that day.

No. 632

593/245435-39

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, June 15, 1941.

For the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, with the request that it be transmitted to the Special Train.¹

For the Foreign Minister.

I. According to available Reuter reports from Washington and a DNB report from New York, President Roosevelt yesterday evening ordered the freezing of the German and Italian assets in the United States. The order is supposed to refer to all the other countries of the European Continent, too, but provides that Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Russia, and Finland can be granted a general license to dispose of their assets if the Governments of these six countries give the assurance that neither they themselves nor their nationals will make any use of the license which is not in accordance with the aim of the order. An official announcement regarding the order is still to be made. The freeze does not involve a confiscation, but only a blocking, i.e., prohibition to dispose [of the assets] without special permission.

II. The German assets in the United States which would be blocked still amount to about 120 million reichsmarks; the American assets in Greater Germany which have already been blocked in a similar way for years by our foreign exchange restrictions, amount to about 1.7 billion reichsmarks. The proceeds from German assets in the U.S.A., which up to now have been regularly transferred to Germany, but the transfer of which will now be permitted only with special permission, amounted recently to about 9 million reichsmarks per year. The transfers from Greater Germany to the U.S.A. made up to now, by special permission in spite of our foreign exchange restrictions, amounted to about 20 million reichsmarks per year. Thus the practical effects of the American step on Germany are much smaller than the effects which the German countermeasure will have on the U.S.A. More unpleasant for us, on the other hand, will be the extension of the American measure to the neutral countries of continental Europe, particularly Switzerland, since so far there has been the possibility of dollar transactions via Switzerland. We must wait and see to what extent these possibilities can be maintained in spite of the American measure. So far nothing has been reported regarding the extension of the measure to the South American coun-

¹ This memorandum was transmitted by teletype to the Foreign Minister, in reply to an inquiry by Ribbentrop of the same day (593/245435) as to what measures had been prepared in retaliation for the American seizure of Axis assets.

tries, although such efforts have already been under way for a long time with respect to South America, too.

III. For the long-anticipated case of the American blocking procedure as now ordered, the same blocking procedure in Greater Germany has been planned as a countermeasure.² No special governmental step is necessary for setting up the German blocking procedure since foreign exchange restrictions have existed in Germany for a long time. It is simply that regarding the practical application the authorizations for transfer to the United States, so far issued, will no longer be granted unless the American Government still permits disposal of assets in certain exceptional cases (e.g., to take care of the Missions abroad) in spite of the blocking procedure which it has imposed. We would then also continue to permit disposal in the same exceptional cases.

IV. In order to make the German measure stand out conspicuously the following DNB announcement, approved earlier by the Foreign Minister, is proposed in agreement with the competent departments: "By Presidential Order of June 14 the Government of the United States of America has imposed a freeze of the assets in the United States of German nationals, in so far as these German nationals are not residents of the United States. By order of the German Government the corresponding measures have therefore been taken with immediate effect as regards the assets in the German Reich of United States nationals who do not reside in the German Reich." Close of the DNB announcement.

Furthermore, oral directives for the guidance of the German press are being considered which will point out that Germany gave no cause of any sort for the American measure; that the German countermeasure corresponds exactly to the American measure; that considering the size of assets and amounts transferred which are involved on both sides the effects on the U.S.A. will be very much bigger than on Germany.

V. The DNB announcement can be finally edited and issued³ only after the official report from the Washington Embassy containing the text of President Roosevelt's Order has been received.⁴ Until that time it is advisable merely to say to the press, too, that the effects of the American freeze on Germany are relatively small owing to the reduction in German assets in the U.S.A., and that the Reich

² See document No. 93.

³ In a memorandum of June 16 (38/26467-68) Wiehl submitted, for Ribbentrop's approval, the press communiqué unchanged and added the oral directives which were to be given to the press.

⁴ This was transmitted by Thomsen in Washington telegram No. 1819 of June 16 (593/245442-44). In an earlier report (telegram No. 1808 of June 14: 593/245423-30), Thomsen gave some of the details and implications of the Executive Order freezing the assets of certain European countries which was issued by President Roosevelt on June 14.

Government will of course take the necessary countermeasures against this unjustified and illegal measure.

VI. Radio Rome announced at 2:00 p.m. that the Italian Government had taken immediate appropriate measures and ordered the immediate confiscation of all American property in Italy. It is being studied whether a confiscation is really involved, and not merely a freeze.

WIEHL

No. 633

F1/0586-87

*The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the
Foreign Minister*¹

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, June 15, 1941.

WFSt/Abt. L (IV/K) No. 00 1137/41 g. Kdos.

DEAR REICH MINISTER: The recently concluded conferences held by the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission in the German Embassy in Paris regarding the execution of the Paris Protocols have resulted in little progress.² The French, in accordance with the Supplementary Protocol, are making the implementation of their military obligations contingent upon the simultaneous granting of political and economic concessions.

I am taking this occasion to refer once more to the special significance of the military obligations of the French *for German conduct of the war*, as defined in the Paris Protocols.

This fully applies even at the present moment to the utilization of the port of Bizerte. Supplies for the German Africa Corps and the Italian units are proving to be in greater danger every day on the routes heretofore available. Without this port the transportation of stronger forces to North Africa for future operations is altogether impossible.

Likewise the utilization of the base of Dakar for the purposes of our own Navy is becoming more and more urgent, since in the last few days the floating supply organization of the Navy in the Atlantic has been exposed to irreparable losses through apparently systematic interference by the English.

It is entirely out of the question for the German armed forces now or in the future to seize by force the French bases mentioned, so as to make these usable for their own purposes. Likewise, German military measures against metropolitan France would be more likely to achieve the opposite of the purpose desired, that is to say, the French

¹ Marginal note: "Submitted by Ambassador Ritter, who has received a copy. Loh[mann], June 18."

² See document No. 618.

colonies would secede or become independent. Consequently there remains only the method of negotiation, the prospects for which, however, are probably all the more unfavorable for us, the better the French realize the urgency of the German military demands.

The military concessions offered to the French in return are, with the internal consolidation of the French colonies and the strengthening of their capacity to defend themselves against attack from abroad, largely in the interest of Germany's conduct of the war. In this regard, too, as the example of Syria shows, the situation calls for early consummation of the agreements.

For these cogent military reasons I request, my dear Reich Minister, that you approach the matter of political and economic concessions to France in a generous way and put them into effect speedily in accordance with military requirements.³

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

KEITEL

³ In a memorandum of June 21 (378/209719-20) Wiehl noted that Jodl had brought up the matter of Keitel's letter with Ritter in an urgent manner pointing out "that an early settlement of the questions of Bizerte and Dakar was much more important to the OKW than any payments by the French of millions toward occupation costs."

For Ribbentrop's reply, see vol. XIII of this series.

No. 634

38/26472-74

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1819 of June 16

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1941—2:06 p. m.

Received June 17—4:20 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister and the State Secretary.

Under Secretary of State Welles asked me¹ to see him this morning and handed me the following note:²

"It has come to the knowledge of this Government that agencies of the German Reich in this country, including German consular establishments, have been engaged³ in activities wholly outside the scope of their legitimate duties. These activities have been of an improper and unwarranted character. They render the continued presence in the United States of those agencies and consular establishments inimical to the welfare of this country.

¹ According to the account printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, p. 628, Thomsen was absent from Washington at that time and the note was handed to Dr. Tannenbergh, First Secretary of the Embassy.

² The following four paragraphs are in English in the original.

³ This has been corrected in accordance with the text printed in *Foreign Relations* (see footnote 1). The Foreign Ministry copy reads "consistent" which apparently is due to an error in transmission.

I am directed by the President to request that the German Government remove from United States territory all German nationals in anywise connected with the German Library of Information in New York, the German Railway and Tourist Agencies, and the Transocean News Service, and that each of these organizations and their affiliates shall be promptly closed.

I am also directed to request that all German consular officers, agents, clerks, and employees thereof of German nationality shall be removed from American territory and that the consular establishments likewise be promptly closed.

It is contemplated that all such withdrawals and closures shall be effected before July 10."

In the subsequent explanations of the note Under Secretary of State Welles first pointed out to me that the demand for withdrawal does not apply to the Embassy and its diplomatic activity. He then stated that the American Government was willing to assist in a liberal, cooperative manner in the removal of the officials and employees affected, as well as to provide the necessary means of travel and transportation. He also stated that the American Government would immediately start negotiations with the British Government on providing safe conduct and the travel route. The Embassy would be informed without delay concerning the particulars of the outcome of the negotiations. For the rest Mr. Atherton, Chief of the European Division, had been charged to settle with the Embassy all the details concerning the removal and related questions.

The Under Secretary of State did not give any more detailed justification for the demand for withdrawal; he referred, on this point, to the statements in the note. For the rest he indicated that all of the consular officials and employees as well as the employees of German nationality of the other offices named in the note, were to be regarded as *personae non gratae*.

From the conversations it was clear that the American Government is obviously not disposed as yet to break off, on its own accord, the diplomatic relations with Germany; it is determined, however, to face the consequences of its present policy unhesitatingly and hopes, in this way, to make Germany responsible for any possible breakoff of relations. A remark by the Under Secretary of State that the American Government had a perfectly clear understanding of the significance of its decision, was a clear indication of this. If one should try to find an explanation for today's request for removal, one would not be able to restrict oneself to the *Robin Moor* case,* but one would have to look for it primarily in the dilemma in which the American Government finds itself regarding the urgent calls for assistance from England. Inasmuch as they are not ready, for the time being, to fulfill or to produce more concrete war aid

* See document No. 630 and footnote 2.

than they have done within the present framework, they proceed with strong words and deeds against the Axis Powers and their "submissive" states. The hateful tirades of Roosevelt, the caustic declarations of Hull, directed to the Vichy Government, as well as today's note are along this line. Nothing would be more welcome to the American Government than if it would be given further chances in this direction.

The consular offices and posts concerned have been notified.⁵

THOMSEN

⁵ On June 19 Weizsäcker sent a circular to all Missions (38/26517-27) informing them of the American note, of the German reply, and of the note handed to the American Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin. For the text of the German notes, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 630-631.

No. 635

265/172972-75

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

TOP SECRET

IN THE TRAIN, June 16, 1941

No. 671

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 720 of June 13¹ and my telegram No. 665 of June 14.²

1. Since according to point 3 of your telegram No. 715 of June 12³ Saracoglu has stated that the Turkish Government would be willing to accept the proposal of the German Government in regard to articles 1 and 2 of the projected German-Turkish treaty if the sentence concerning the mutual obligations is included in the preamble, and furthermore since upon your inquiry now also the wording of the preamble which we have termed feasible has now also met with the approval of the Turkish Government and the Turkish State President,⁴ the prerequisites for the conclusion of the treaty now exist.

2. The German-Turkish treaty would accordingly have the following wording:

"The German Reich Chancellor and the President of the Turkish Republic, desiring to place the relations between the two countries on a basis of mutual trust and sincere friendship, have agreed,

¹ Document No. 625.

² In this telegram (265/172958) Ribbentrop instructed Papen not to resume talks about the conclusion of the treaty until he had received appropriate instructions.

³ Document No. 620.

⁴ See documents Nos. 625 and 627.

without prejudice to the existing obligations of the two countries,
to conclude a treaty and have appointed as Plenipotentiaries

The German Reich Chancellor

.....
The President of the Turkish Republic
.....

who on the basis of the full powers accorded to them have agreed
on the following provisions:

"Article 1. Germany and Turkey undertake mutually to respect
the integrity and inviolability of their territories and not take meas-
ures of any sort which are aimed directly or indirectly against the
other contracting party.

"Article 2. Germany and Turkey undertake in the future to con-
sult with one another in a friendly spirit in all questions affecting
their common interests, in order to reach an understanding regard-
ing the treatment of such questions.

"Article 3. This treaty shall enter into force on the day of its
signing and shall remain in force from that date for a period of
10 years. The contracting parties shall consult with one another
at the appropriate time concerning the question of an extension of
the treaty.

"Done in duplicate in the German and the Turkish languages, in
Ankara, on 1941."

Conclusion of the text of the treaty.

3. Since according to your telegram No. 715 of June 12 the Tur-
kish Government at present wishes to abstain from concluding the
secret protocol which we have proposed, we for our part shall also
abstain from so doing the more so as the secret protocol would have
represented essentially a German gift to Turkey.

4. According to your telegram of June 12, there exists agreement
concerning the exchange of notes on the economic relations to be
undertaken simultaneously with the conclusion of the treaty. Ac-
cordingly the note is worded as follows:

"Referring to the successful conclusion of the German-Turkish
treaty on this day, I have the honor to inform you, Your Excellency,
that my Government is willing to further the economic relations
between Germany and Turkey to the greatest possible extent, with
due regard for the possibilities inherent in the economic structure
of the two countries and on the basis of the experiences of the two
countries during the war for their mutual benefit.

"The two Governments will enter into negotiations at once in
order to establish the contractual bases for carrying out this agree-
ment as soon as possible."

Conclusion of the note.

5. For the statement regarding the press we would have wished a
somewhat stronger commitment by the Turkish Government. Since
it states that it is not in the position to do so for constitutional
reasons, we agree to the Turkish proposal, but request that the word
"wish" be substituted for the word "hope", and the word "will"

for the word "may",⁵ so that the text of the statement would be as follows:

"Referring to the successful conclusion of the treaty, the two Plenipotentiaries express the wish that the press of both countries as well as the radio on both sides will in their publications and broadcasts always take account of the spirit of friendship and mutual trust which characterizes German-Turkish relations."

Should, contrary to expectation, these small alterations present difficulties, you can drop them.

6. In a conference with Saracoglu concluding the negotiations, please establish the fact that there is now agreement on the foregoing texts. We would like to have the treaty then signed at once, if possible on Wednesday, June 18, so that it can be published in the morning newspapers on June 19. Furthermore, please arrange with M. Saracoglu that the Turkish press and the Turkish radio designate the treaty as a German-Turkish treaty of friendship and welcome it with appropriate warmth. This will be done in the German press, and it would make the value of the treaty illusory if the Turkish press and radio should proceed differently and M. Yalçin⁶ and company continue with their agitation against Germany.

7. Full powers for you for signing are here and will be transmitted. In case the Turkish Government should consider it important, the text can be confirmed to you in a special telegram or the original documents can be handed to the Turkish Ambassador here. Please clarify this question at once after receipt of this telegram and wire the exact time of the signing on Wednesday.⁷

RIEBBENTROP

⁵ The original Turkish proposal transmitted in telegram No. 663 of June 11 (see document No. 582, footnote 3) had stated that the two Plenipotentiaries "expressed the hope" that the press and radio of the two countries "may always take into account the spirit of friendship and mutual confidence characteristic of the two countries."

⁶ Husayin Cahit Yalçin, Turkish journalist, editor of *Tanin*.

⁷ See document No. 637.

No. 636

260/170017

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, June 16, 1941.

e. o. Pol. I M 1843 g. Rs.

General Jodl informed me on June 14, as follows.

The Finnish General Staff had:

1. Informed Colonel von Buschenhagen (Liaison Staff, Norway) that the Finnish General Staff was faced with the necessity of

deciding whether it should now issue internally the orders for a camouflaged mobilization;¹

2. Asked him whether in the event of the other alternative (negotiations) Finland could rely on the promise that the territorial wishes recently communicated would be fulfilled.²

The Finnish General Staff asked for a reply by noon of the 15th.

The Führer has authorized Buschenhagen to tell the Finnish General Staff that the first alternative could definitely be counted on.³ No date was mentioned in this connection.

REITER

¹ Buschenhagen's telegram of June 14 refers to the mobilization of the "principal forces." (M341/M015259)

² See document No. 592.

³ Keitel's telegram to Buschenhagen reads: "You are empowered to declare that the demands and prerequisites raised by Finland for the measures to be undertaken are to be considered as fulfilled." (file OKW/1972: P4/P00292-93)

No. 637

285/172980-81

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ANKARA, June 17, 1941.

TOP SECRET

Received June 17—1:22 p. m.

No. 741 of June 17

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your No. 671 of June 16.¹

According to your instruction I have just compared the treaty texts jointly with Saracoglu and we established their identity. Only in article 3 the following sentence ought to be added: "The foregoing treaty will be ratified and the exchange of ratification documents shall take place in Berlin as soon as possible."

2. There is full agreement concerning the exchange of notes with respect to economic relations.

3. Your wish will be taken into account in the statement regarding the press. Thus, the text is in accordance with your telegram.

4. Saracoglu is ready to sign Wednesday evening, June 18. He will let me know the exact hour tomorrow morning after having the matter presented to the State President. In accordance with your desire the treaty will be made public in the morning press of June 19. Thus, the German and Turkish radios will not make anything public in the broadcasts at midnight June 18-19 so that the news will first be reported in the press of both countries on June 19.

¹ Document No. 635.

Saracoglu, of course, will see to it that the Turkish radio and press will greet the treaty of friendship with appropriate warmth.

5. As to my full powers it is sufficient that you send a telegram addressed to me.

6. Please authorize me to sign the railroad agreement, if possible, at the same time.²

PAPEN

² A German-Turkish agreement regarding restoration and temporary resumption of service on the railroad line Svilengrad-Uzunkopru was signed by Papen and Menemencioglu on June 18 (4882/E253264-81).

No. 638

8589/E602935-88

Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, June 17, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

High Command of the Wehrmacht

No. 44885/41 g. K. Chefs. WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.)

By officer only

Enclosed is a compilation of the military wishes and those in the quartermaster field¹ which will be directed to Sweden with regard to *Barbarossa* at the proper time.

The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht
By order:
V. LOSSBERG

[Enclosure]

Enclosure 1 to OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) No. 44 885/41 g. K. Chefs.

I. In principle:

The campaign against Soviet Russia has been forced upon the Wehrmacht by the Russian troop concentrations. Finland, which constantly had to expect a new Soviet Russian attack, is joining the German campaign on its own free decision.

Germany does not expect any armed assistance of the Swedish Armed Forces outside Swedish territory, with the reservation that a Swedish wish for the participation of individual Swedish battalions in the "crusade against Bolshevism" can be complied with. On the other hand the German leadership expects that, if only in the interest of Finland, Sweden, by means of the measures listed

¹ The enclosure listing German requests in the quartermaster field is not printed (8589/E602939-40).

here following, will do everything to cooperate in the elimination of the danger from the Bolshevik armed forces threatening the Scandinavian area.

In particular:

II. *Questions of transportation and traffic:*

1. Sweden will permit the *transit of German troops* (about one division) on Swedish railroads and with Swedish rolling stock from the vicinity of Oslo to Finland (for this 950 railroad cars with Knorr air brakes) as well as use of the railroad lines leading to Trondheim and Narvik.

2. Sweden will make available her *roads and other means of transportation* (motorized transportation space) for the passage of supplies to Finland.

3. In case of interruption or destruction of the connection at Haparanda and Tornio, Sweden will make possible the *diversion of the transports by water* from Luleå to Tornio.

4. Sweden will maintain *maritime traffic* in Swedish territorial waters under protection of Swedish warships where possible and will make available for German-Finnish use ship tonnage that can be spared, including the Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors, particularly tankers.

5. A *German transport organization* will be sent to Sweden for the cooperation of the German and Swedish transportation authorities. Among other things its function will be to harmonize the German transports with the Swedish transports serving their own national defense.

6. Sweden will make her *communications network* available to the German communication service. The necessary liaison personnel in matters of communication will be assigned to the German Military Attaché.

7. Sweden will permit the *transit flight over her territory by individual airplanes* and will make available *airfields suitable for emergency landings* along with information on air safety.

III. *Questions of armaments and supply:*

1. Sweden will permit the German and Finnish armed forces to buy as many *motor vehicles* as possible as well as other economic requirements, and will make available to the Wehrmacht a *tank depot* in northern Sweden.

2. Sweden will also support the Finnish armed forces with *arms and ammunition* in accordance with their wishes.

3. Sweden will support Finland to the fullest possible extent with *supplies*, for example with food and feed grains.

IV. *Question of Swedish national defense:*

1. No German demands will be made in regard to the extent of the Swedish mobilization measures, but in the Swedish interest *strong protection for the Swedish Kattegat and Skagerrak coasts* is indicated.

It should be assured that the transit of German troops is not essentially slowed down by the Swedish mobilization measures.

2. Sweden will guard her roads serving the German transports in transit against *air attacks and sabotage*.

3. Sweden will lay *mine barriers* only in agreement with the German Navy and will comply with German demands for the laying of mine fields for the protection of Swedish coastal traffic and in order to supplement in Swedish territorial waters German mine fields.

4. Sweden will make certain that *weather reports* no longer go to Soviet Russia, whereas they will be available to Germany in full.

Sweden will remain lighted for the purpose of aiding aerial navigation. Along the coasts certain especially noticeable *beacon lights* are to be kept on for purposes of navigation. These control beacons will be made known to the Wehrmacht.

5. Airplane crews that have made emergency landings will not be interned, planes will not be confiscated. Sweden will support the measures to be taken by Germany for salvaging and repairing these planes by making personnel and means of transportation available.²

² See document No. 668.

No. 639

36/26085-86

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff*¹

BERLIN, June 17, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

The confidential agent working at the Soviet Embassy² reports as follows about his last meeting with his Russian employers:

My report on observations of German troop movements during my trip to Salonika did not make much of an impression on the Russians. M. Filipov called it "cold coffee." He gave me the task, described as extremely important, of trying to prepare sketches of the German airports in Wrocław and Wiener Neustadt and of marking on them with the most painstaking accuracy the hangars and the antiaircraft gun positions. I objected that it was impossible for me

¹ Marginal note at the head of the document: "Has been shown to the Führer, June 17."

² Orests Berlings, former Latvian journalist (36/25899-902).

to carry out this task, since I did not have any ground plan of the two airports. Filipov promised to obtain them for me. In the further course of the conversation the political situation was discussed. I asked anxiously what would happen to me personally in the event of a German-Russian conflict, for in such a case I would have no desire to remain in Germany. To this, Filipov replied calmly that:

1. the possibility of a German-Russian conflict was as yet not by any means indicated;

2. in case of a conflict I myself would have to continue working a long time for the GPU.

Filipov showed no further interest in the visits of King Boris and General Antonescu.³ When I took leave of him he admonished me once more to devote all my attention to the task of finding out whether peace negotiations were actually being conducted between Germany and England.⁴

L[IKUS]

³ The margin at this point has the notation: "?" and in another handwriting, "Führer."

⁴ Note at the bottom of the page: "Swindler!" and in another handwriting, "Führer."

Cf. document No. 645.

No. 640

36/26082-84

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff*¹

BERLIN, June 17, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

In circles of American diplomats and journalists the subject of Germany and Russia was discussed last evening. Opinions still differed concerning what was to be expected. But it was unmistakable that the number of those who still believe in a German-Soviet Russian collaboration has grown decisively smaller. The opinion prevailed that the Führer had decided to have an armed showdown with the Soviet Union in the course of the summer.

At the focal point of the conversation stood Dr. Häfing, the commercial adviser of the U.S. Embassy, who in 1917, as a native of Russia, was in the revolutionary Cabinet under Kerensky. Dr. Häfing stated that he was, to be sure, himself not yet convinced that the leaders of the Reich were seeking an armed showdown with Russia, since he did not doubt that, by preserving peace and putting persistent pressure upon Moscow, Germany would obtain for herself economically very much more from Russia than through the conquest of Russian territory.

¹ Marginal notes:

"[For] F[Führer]."

"Show to the Führer. Hew[el], June 17."

Dr. Häfting gave as his reasons that the Bolshevist economic system, particularly in agriculture, had developed in so unprecedentedly complicated a manner that, if it sustained a severe shock from the outside, not to mention collapse, a serious impairment of Russia's productive capacity would necessarily result.

Dr. Häfting further explained to the American gentlemen that he believed, to be sure, that the Soviet Russian regime was so weak internally that hardly any appreciable resistance could be expected in the event of a military operation on the part of the Reich. It was his impression that the greatest weakness of the Soviet regime was the persistent feeling of opposition in the Russian farm population. The two experiments of Bolshevism had not led to a relaxation of tension, but had only served to intensify the opposition of the Russian farmer to the Bolshevist state.² He did not doubt, therefore, that German troops would actually be hailed by the rural population as liberators if they entered Russia.²

But even with respect to the farmers, the Germans would find themselves in a serious dilemma; for the farmers would expect that, with the liquidation of Bolshevism, the kolkhoz system, by which they felt themselves oppressed, would likewise disappear.

This would, however, in his opinion, not be simple for a German occupation regime, for appreciable production results could be achieved in agriculture in the near future only if the structure of the kolkhoz system were not destroyed at the start. Concerning the effects that a German-Russian conflict might have on the American mentality, opinions in this American milieu differed widely. The conclusion was reached that numerous questions existed on this score which were difficult to answer from Berlin.

L[IKUS]

² In the margin opposite this passage appears an interrogation mark and opposite the following sentence two such marks, which are labeled in an unidentified hand as "by the Führer."

No. 641

B12/B000975-77

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy
Department*

BERLIN, June 17, 1941.

The status of the Italian negotiations is as follows:

1. *Coal*

The Italians have finally accepted a settlement whereby they will receive only 900,000 tons of coal per month in June and July instead of the 1,030,000 tons agreed upon. From August on, 1,000,000 tons

per month will again be delivered if at all possible. The arrears already accumulated for this year amount to 600,000 tons.¹

2. *Mineral oil*

I have told the Italians definitely that in June and July they can at the most receive 80,000 tons per month by way of the Danube and overland, instead of the 100,000 tons originally envisaged, and that we cannot at present make any firm commitments for the period after August 1.

In addition, 75,000 to 100,000 tons per month will come via Constanta in case the sea route really functions, which has not yet been determined. One tanker has been torpedoed off the Dardanelles.

The Italians have stated repeatedly that they cannot with that amount cover even the most urgent needs of the war economy. The situation is especially difficult, they say, for the Navy, whose supplies will be down to 100,000 tons by the end of June.²

3. *Other raw materials*

Even though the Italian wishes could only in part be fulfilled, deliveries of all important raw materials, such as iron and steel, pitch coke and petroleum coke for the production of aluminum, buna, copper, and metals for processing, have nevertheless been arranged for at least somewhat satisfactorily.

4. The Italians are constantly trying to secure their economic interests in the areas of what was formerly Yugoslavia and Greece.

In particular, they ask for the inclusion of Greece in the central clearing via Rome. I have refused this and asked that the direct German-Greek clearing for all of Greece be maintained.³ The Italians have thus far not agreed to this proposal. In the end, of course, they will have no other choice but to do so; without doubt, however, a certain amount of ill feeling will then be inevitable. Ambassador Giannini bases his argument especially on the declaration of the Duce in his last speech that Greece belongs to the Italian Lebensraum.

¹ In telegram No. 717 of Apr. 1 (B13/B001667-68) Wiehl had instructed the Embassy in Italy to inform the Italian Government that because of the congestion of the railway traffic, coal deliveries to Italy in April and May would amount to 835,000 tons per month instead of the agreed 1,050,000 tons. This was to be considered as a temporary restriction only, and it was to be explained that similar reductions were to apply to other countries and to the German domestic consumption of coal.

See document No. 91 and footnote 3.

² In telegram No. 1202 of May 23 (B12/B000919-20) Clodius reported from Rome that by the end of May the German deliveries to Italy from Rumania and Germany would show a deficit of 80,000 tons. Furthermore the Italians had used considerably more than had been estimated in the February program, this particularly because of the activity of the Navy and Air Force in the eastern Mediterranean. After June it appeared that Italy would have to cover all requirements by imports. The Italian experts estimated the monthly requirement at 260,000 tons and Clodius found their figures to be correct.

³ See document No. 652.

5. The Italians have requested the appointment of an Italian commissioner at the newly established Serbian National Bank, with the same rank as the German commissioner. I have rejected this request and have conceded the Italians only a commissioner at the former Yugoslav National Bank, now in liquidation, in which Italy as a successor state has legitimate interests.

6. The Italians have so far refused to acknowledge the assumption of their share of the obligations of the former Yugoslav State and the former Yugoslav National Bank. The Reich Ministry of Finance, the Reich Ministry of Economics, and the Reichsbank consider it of decisive importance that they now do so. I hardly think it will be possible to induce the Italian Government to give in on this point, unless we make the conclusion of all the arrangements contingent on this question.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.⁴

CLODIUS

⁴ Other documents on these negotiations are filmed on serials B12, 2033, and 2076.

No. 642

235/157217

The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

RIO DE JANEIRO, June 18, 1941—12:57 a. m.

No. 1087 of June 17

Received June 18—9:15 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 798 of June 11.¹

I made a statement to the President in accordance with the foregoing instruction. The President replied that considering the increased tension between the U.S.A. and the Axis Powers he, too, no longer considered the mediation he had proposed to be opportune. The English and Americans had become "very arrogant" in the last few days. I had the impression that the President is also very much concerned about the situation here. It is significant that I was received secretly through the good offices of the President's brother. When the Foreign Minister was announced the President asked me to leave without being seen by the Minister.

PRÜFER

¹ Document No. 613.

No. 643

260/170022

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, June 18, 1941—12:43 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received June 18—3:30 p. m.

No. 457 of June 18

With reference to my telegram No. 438.¹

1. In the English aide-mémoire, Finland is threatened only with economic pressure in the event that she enters the war against Russia on the side of Germany. From this it may well be concluded that in that event England does not for the time being intend to break off relations with or make war on Finland.

2. In Finland there is apparently no inclination in leading circles to take the initiative for a break even if the argument that a rupture would be attended with economic disadvantages is invalid.

3. In my opinion, the severance of Finnish-English relations is in Germany's interest. England would thereby be dislodged from an important part of the Baltic area and the consolidation of the Continent free of England would come closer to realization. Furthermore, with the [removal of the] English Legation in Helsinki, a dangerous espionage center would disappear from the zone of operations.

4. Please send me telegraphic instruction as to whether, in my conversation with the Foreign Minister, I should suggest to him the idea of a break in relations with England.²

BLÜCHER

¹ In this telegram of June 16 (260/170019) Blücher sent the text of the British aide-mémoire which stated that Finnish ships bound for Petsamo were being detained until the attitude of the Finnish Government was clarified.

² In telegram No. 511 of June 19 (260/170023), Ribbentrop agreed with Blücher's point of view and instructed him to work for a breach of relations between Finland and Great Britain.

No. 644

Nuremberg Document C-150

*Adolf Hitler to General Ion Antonescu*¹

CHEFSACHE

JUNE 18, 1941.

By officer only

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In connection with the subject of our last conference,² I would like to inform you of this definite position which I have now taken:

¹ This document was introduced at Nuremberg but is not included in the published collection. No copy of the document has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

² See document No. 614.

Russia's conduct, especially her daily increasing preparations for attack, compel me to employ the Wehrmacht in the near future to remove this threat to Europe, once and for all.

As I explained at our last meeting in Munich I will make every effort on the one side to provide that the unified direction of this tremendous offensive operation be concentrated in one hand, and on the other side that the fullest account be taken of the independence and of the esteem of the leading personalities among our allies both with their respective peoples and with their armed forces.

To this end, I request that you, General Antonescu, allow me to inform you from time to time of those wishes that concern the Rumanian armed forces; the execution of which is considered absolutely necessary in the interest of the unified development of the whole operation.

Eleventh Army Headquarters as a type of working staff of your Headquarters would then convert these wishes into military orders, and as soon as they involve essential decisions, issue them over your signature.

Close liaison will be maintained by having the Chief of the German Military Mission,³ the Chief of the German Naval Mission,⁴ and a liaison officer of the Fourth Air Force attached to your Headquarters, while the Deputy Chief of the Rumanian General Staff would be attached to Eleventh Army Headquarters.

In addition, the lower commands must arrange for mutual liaison detachments wherever necessary.

The following missions will be assigned to the allied forces in Rumania for the initial period after the commencement of operations:

1. Defense of Rumanian territory against penetration by Russian forces.

Of special importance in this connection is the protection of the oil region, so vital to the common war, of the harbor of Constanța, and of the Danube bridge against air attacks, parachute operations, and sabotage.

The disposition of our own forces must take into account the fact that, according to the results of the most recent reconnaissance, there are strong mobile units and armored forces of Soviet Russia in the southern part of Bessarabia and in the area of Chernovtsy. Apart from these main missions, it will be essential to deceive the enemy into thinking that German-Rumanian concentration is even *stronger* and to make use of favorable opportunities to gain bridgeheads east of the Prut river, which will make it easier to shift to the attack later.

³ Maj. Gen. Arthur Hauße. See document No. 544 and footnote 3.

⁴ Rear Admiral Fleischer.

2. The primary responsibility of the Rumanian Air Force is the protection of Rumania and in particular the protection of the oil region.

For the rest, the Rumanian flying personnel will be employed in support of the Rumanian army units. In this connection it is necessary that there be a clear delimitation between their tasks and those of the German air force corps and of the reconnaissance units under the command of the German Eleventh Army.

3. As the German offensive operation in northern Galicia proceeds, the enemy will after a time be forced to fall back, even with the forces on the Rumanian frontier. Then the group of allied forces in Rumania will face the task of pushing the enemy back by an attack in cooperation with the air force, preventing him from making an orderly retreat across the Dniester and contributing to his destruction.

As regards the particular missions to be undertaken by the Rumanian armed forces by that time, I will take the liberty of submitting further proposals to you, General Antonescu, when the time is ripe.

In true comradeship and with the most heartfelt greetings,

Yours, etc.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 645

36/26092

Minute by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

BERLIN, June 18, 1941.

For the Foreign Minister.

The Führer has repeatedly voiced the suspicion that the "confidential agent who is working at the Soviet Embassy," who is frequently mentioned in the Likus reports, was a swindler. He had analyzed especially the report of June 17 and described the questions that appeared therein, which Filipov is alleged to have raised as illogical and childish.¹ Especially the sentence: "Filipov showed no interest further in the visits of King Boris and General Antonescu," he termed completely improbable, because the interest of the Russians in the visit of General Antonescu must be decidedly great. He wondered what in the world this confidential agent was reporting to the Russians if the latter placed confidence in him over so long a period. The Führer desires that the agent be carefully watched so that he can be arrested at a certain time without fail.

HEWEL

¹ See document No. 639 and footnote 4.

No. 646

105/113518

Memorandum by the State Secretary

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, June 18, 1941.

St.S. No. 396

The Russian Ambassador had made an appointment with me today. He merely brought up a few current matters of lesser importance.

After this business part had been attended to, the Ambassador asked me about my visit to Budapest last week.¹ A few insignificant remarks were exchanged about Hungary and Rumania. Dekanozov then remarked on a map of Iraq lying on the table and inquired about the military situation in Syria.

The Ambassador took leave of me without anything whatever having been said about German-Russian relations. He carried on the conversation with complete unconstraint and in a cheerful mood.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The visit is mentioned in Ernst von Weizsäcker, *Erinnerungen*, p. 254.

No. 647

2111/456845

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, June 18, 1941.

Ha. Pol. 403 g. Rs.

In response to my oral representation, the Führer has decided that Germany should help Finland with grain until the new harvest when all other possibilities of additional supplies are exhausted. As such, the Soviet grain deliveries (20,000 tons) which are still in progress, enter into consideration, as well as the additional deliveries promised to Finland by Sweden. Since, according to Finnish figures, the entire Finnish deficiency would amount to approximately 60,000 tons, a German supplementary supply of grain would at most come to 30,000 tons. Finland's wish to obtain grain from Germany in the event of an emergency was also supported for military reasons by the OKW (Field Marshal Keitel, General of Artillery Jodl) with the Führer.¹

SCHNURRE

¹ In a memorandum of June 19 (2111/456846) Schnurre recorded a conversation with the Finnish Minister who mentioned the impending grain deficit and requested 25,000 tons from Germany.

No. 648

2871/564259

*German-Turkish Treaty Signed at Ankara, June 18, 1941*¹

The German Reich and the Turkish Republic, desiring to place their relations on a basis of mutual trust and sincere friendship, have agreed, without prejudice to existing obligations of the two countries to conclude a treaty. For that purpose the following Plenipotentiaries have been appointed:

By the German Reich Chancellor:

Herr Franz von Papen, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich,

By the President of the Turkish Republic:

His Excellency M. Sükrü Saracoğlu, Deputy from İzmir, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The German Reich and the Turkish Republic undertake mutually to respect the integrity and inviolability of their territories, and not to take measures of any sort aimed directly or indirectly against the other contracting party.

Article 2

The German Reich and the Turkish Republic undertake in the future to consult with one another in a friendly spirit on all questions affecting their common interests in order to reach an understanding regarding the treatment of such questions.

Article 3

This Treaty shall enter into force on the day of its signing and shall remain in force from that date for a period of 10 years; the Contracting Parties will consult with one another at the appropriate time about an extension of the Treaty.

The Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged as soon as possible in Berlin.

Done in duplicate in the German and Turkish languages, the two texts being equally authentic.²

ANKARA, June 18, 1941.

FRANZ V. PAPEN

S. SARACOGLU

¹ The Turkish text is filmed on 2871/564260-61.

² The exchange of notes on economic relations and the joint statement regarding press and radio (see document No. 635) were published simultaneously with the Treaty. For texts, see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, July 1941, p. 576.

[EDITORS' NOTE. Fragments of a memorandum of June 19 by Hewel (F20/471-75) dealing with a conversation between Hitler and the Turkish Ambassador apparently on the occasion of the transmittal of the letter from President İnönü (see document No. 622 and footnote 1) are found on a film of files from the Foreign Minister's Secretariat. These fragments are mostly illegible, except for the last few paragraphs, where it is stated that "the Führer once more expressed his pleasure at the conclusion of the German-Turkish Treaty of Friendship."]

No. 649

2800/548205-09

Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs

BERLIN, June 19, 1941.

e. o. D IX 10 g. Rs.

Subject: Conversation with Reichsleiter Rosenberg on June 19, 1941.

Gauleiter Meyer¹ had summoned me today to a conversation with Reichsleiter Rosenberg, which lasted from 10:30 a.m. to 11:45 a.m. The participants in this conversation were:

Reichsleiter Rosenberg

Gauleiter Meyer

Stabsführer Schickedanz

Consul General Bräutigam (part of the time)

I. Reichsleiter Rosenberg instructed me to present the following wishes of his to the Foreign Minister:

1. Of the buildings to be vacated by the Soviet functionaries on the day of the action in the East the Reichsleiter requests that the following be placed at his disposal for the purposes of the Ministry for the East which is then to be set up:

- (a) the house of the present Soviet Embassy at Unter den Linden 63;
- (b) the house of the Soviet Trade Mission at Lietzenburgerstrasse 11.

2. Reichsleiter Rosenberg requests the Foreign Minister to place Ministers Neubacher and Kasche at his disposal for his tasks. He requests further that the officials of the Russian sections in the Foreign Ministry, of the Moscow Embassy, and of the Consulates in the USSR, who will be free at the beginning of the action, be placed at his disposal. He mentioned by name Senior Counselor Dr. Schliep, head of the Pol. V division. It was not only officials of the higher service who came into consideration but also officials of the inter-

¹ Alfred Meyer, Gauleiter of Westphalia, North.

mediate service and office personnel who have had experience in Russian matters.²

II. Reichsleiter Rosenberg then said that on the part of the Quartermaster General there had been broached with him the question of the Foreign Ministry representatives to be assigned to the army groups. In a letter to Reich Minister Lammers³ he had already made known to the Foreign Minister his negative attitude concerning appointment of these men, who were later to be assigned to the Reich Commissars. Reichsleiter Rosenberg then repeated the reasons he had given in the letter already delivered by Reich Minister Lammers *and in addition emphasized particularly that regarding the future political organization of the territories in the East he had the commission from the Führer.*⁴ This commission was not limited as to time, and he intended to organize the political setup of these structures in accordance with his commission. He could not concede any influence over this organization even locally to the Foreign Ministry. As soon as independent states with their own governments had been organized there, the Foreign Ministry would of course come into its rights immediately.

I answered Reichsleiter Rosenberg that the Foreign Minister had already replied to the negative attitude of the Reichsleiter in a letter to Reich Minister Lammers.⁵ Reichsleiter Rosenberg had evidently not yet received this letter.⁶ I then told Reichsleiter Rosenberg that the Eastern territories' boundaries with the neutral states of Iran, Turkey, Rumania, Sweden (by way of the Baltic), and Finland made the presence of representatives of the Foreign Ministry absolutely essential in view of border incidents that might very well occur. Reichsleiter Rosenberg did not dispute this argument. However, he repeated what he had said before, that he did not want representatives of the Foreign Ministry locally to exert any influence over the political organization. He could only envisage the possibility of assigning to the Reich Commissars certain persons (to be selected by him) from the number of those gentlemen indicated by

² For the various grades of the former German civil service and foreign service, see vol. I of this series, Appendix V, pp. 1216-1217.

³ Letter of June 3 found in the files of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. It has been filmed on frames 001183-84, serial 86, roll 86, and the film microcopy, T-454, has been deposited in the National Archives.

⁴ Apparently a reference to Hitler's decree of Apr. 20 charging Rosenberg with "central direction of the questions of the Eastern European area." For text see *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxvi, document No. 865-PS (U.S. Exhibit 143), pp. 383-384.

⁵ Letter of June 13: Nuremberg Document NG-1691. For English text see *Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Nuremberg, October 1946-April 1949*, vol. XII, pp. 1277-1279.

⁶ In a letter to Lammers of June 20 (5078/E292519-23) Rosenberg commented on Ribbentrop's letter which he had meanwhile received. Referring to the conversation which Grosskopf recorded in the document here printed Rosenberg pointed out that his statements on that occasion represented also a reply to Ribbentrop's letter.

the Foreign Ministry for these posts and to serve as experts for matters of the Foreign Ministry on the staffs of the respective Reich Commissars.

I thereupon stated that the assignment of representatives of the Foreign Ministry in the General Government, in Holland, in Belgium, and in Norway to the agencies exercising German sovereign power had not led to any discord, and that the presence of representatives of the Foreign Ministry in territories for which subsequent independence was contemplated could only be advantageous.

I had the feeling that Reichsleiter Rosenberg was impressed by the arguments of the Foreign Minister. At the close of our conversation he said that he preferred to reach an agreement with the Foreign Minister about the position of representatives of the Foreign Ministry and to carry on these negotiations, which would have to lead to exact regulations for each party, directly rather than through the Wehrmacht.

In conclusion the Reichsleiter asked that the following be communicated to the Foreign Minister:

III. He had neither offered Herr Boehmer a post nor assigned him any duty, much less given him a letter.⁷ He had not even informed him about his duty. This must have been done by someone else.

IV. It had been reported to him that General Biskupski, the representative here of the Russian émigrés, at the suggestion of the émigré representative from Warsaw, who had indicated that he had received a government commission (in the General Government), had begun to form an administrative apparatus for Russia from the Russian émigrés residing here. A Russian church service too had already been held.

He had already informed the Gestapo.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

GROSSKOPF

⁷ Dr. Karl Boehmer was transferred to the Foreign Ministry in 1937 but retained his position as Chief of the Press Department of the Aussepolitisches Amt.

No. 650

821/198869-70

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI

SECRET

BERLIN, June 19, 1941.

Pol. VI 3302 g.

As instructed, I received today the former Lithuanian Minister, Škirpa,¹ who had requested an audience with the State Secretary.

¹ Kazys Škirpa, Lithuanian Minister in Germany, 1939-1940.

The purpose of his visit was to give me the enclosed "memorandum regarding the restitution of the political independence of Lithuania"² and to explain to me what propagandistic advantages there would be for Germany, in the opinion of M. Škirpa, if the German Government would assent to the restitution of the national independence of Lithuania.

As instructed, I replied to the Minister that I did not see any basis for his train of thought in the political situation, to which the Minister responded with a smile. Of course, I could receive only in a private capacity his memorandum addressed to the Reich Foreign Minister. The Minister did not seem to have expected anything else.

The following developed from his further remarks:

The National Committee of Lithuania, in whose name M. Škirpa had signed the memorandum, consists of the former Lithuanian Prime Minister, Galvanauskas, who fled here, as chairman, M. Škirpa as vice chairman, the former Lithuanian Minister in Rome, Lozoraitis, the Counselor of Legation at the Lithuanian Legation in Bern, Dr. Turauskas, and several others. The Committee also maintains connections with the Lithuanians in the United States.

M. Škirpa stated that in recent months he had kept in contact with the Dienststelle Ribbentrop (Dr. Schütte and Herr Kleist), with the Abteilung Abwehr of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (Lieutenant Colonel Graebe and Dr. Markert), the Gestapo (Dr. Graefe), and with Dr. Leibrandt of the Aussenpolitisches Amt.

According to the statements of M. Škirpa, numerous armed partisan bands have been formed in Lithuania, which have already delivered valuable intelligence material to our counterintelligence and are willing, at the proper moment, to take up the fight against the Russians.

Naturally I maintained an entirely noncommittal attitude during the conversation and at the close repeated once more that I had received M. Škirpa's remarks only in a purely private capacity.

M. Škirpa gave copies of the memorandum to the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, Abteilung Abwehr, Dr. Leibrandt, and the Gestapo.

GRUNDHERR

² Not printed (321/193371-84).

No. 651

265/172996

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 767 of June 20

ANKARA, June 20, 1941.

Received June 20—10:30 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 692 of June 18.¹

The French request is being refused. I had a confidential conversation with Saracoglu on this subject today; he told me that the Turkish Government had made known to the English and the French that arms transports will not be permitted for the benefit of either side. Gasoline transports do not come under this category.² Consideration could be given to the French request for more gasoline. Thus there would be no point to an official démarche by me. It would be better to arrange future gasoline transports through the French Embassy. Saracoglu has been notified by Turkish consuls that there is very little combat activity in Syria and negotiations are in progress by way of Damascus.

PAPEN

¹ Telegram No. 692 of June 18, Pol. IM 1795 g. Rs., not found. It presumably dealt with a French request made by General Huntziger that Germany support a French démarche made in Ankara asking Turkey to permit the transit of French arms through her territory (Schwarzmann memorandum of June 19: 386/211102).

² See document No. 556 and footnote 4.

No. 652

2033/445526

*The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department
to the Embassy in Italy*

Draft Teletype

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

BERLIN, June 20, 1941.

e. o. Ha. Pol. IV a 3622.

The negotiations with Giannini were concluded last night.¹ Although it was possible to grant the Italian wishes for raw materials only in part, the outcome on the whole is satisfactory, which is also recognized by the Italians. Coal will still be limited for June and July to 900,000 tons.² The Italians are still really anxious about the supply of mineral oil, especially fuel oil for the Navy. In this

¹ The Eighth Secret Protocol of June 19 and its annexes are filmed on 2033/-445489-525.

² See document No. 641 and footnote 1.

matter only a provisional arrangement until the end of July has been reached.³

Special German accommodations [were made] in the settlement of financial questions. We agreed to set off deliveries of war material from captured equipment and military stores against payments for German troops in Italy.

Greece's clearing with third countries will go through the central clearing at Rome; German-Italian clearing procedure will, however, not be affected thereby.

All further details will be reported by Graeff.⁴

CLODIUS

³ See document No. 641. The provisional arrangement for the oil supply of Italy in June and July is annex VII of the Eighth Secret Protocol (2033/-445519-25).

⁴ Friedrich Graeff, Counselor of Legation at the Embassy in Rome. His report has not been found.

No. 653

177/S5199-201

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOKYO, June 21, 1941—10:30 a. m.

No. 1009 of June 21

Received June 21—8:15 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Matsuoka, who had invited me, gave me the following information during a long conversation:

1. The renewal of negotiations between Japan and the Netherlands Indies is not to be expected. The existing tension is unbearable for the long run. For proceeding against the Netherlands East Indies, air and naval bases must be set up in French Indochina. Hence he had asked through Ambassador Oshima whether French consent to this could be obtained by Berlin, otherwise he would take up the matter with Vichy directly.

I have the impression that the active course of the session of the Congress of the Unity party [*Einheitspartei*], and the attitude of public opinion towards the problem of the Netherlands Indies, enables the Government to enforce an energetic stand against the Anglophile circles by appealing to public opinion.

2. Regarding Wang Ching-wei's visit, Matsuoka observed that Japan would not accept any solution of the China conflict without Wang Ching-wei. Chungking had previously been approached to this effect with Wang Ching-wei's consent. These efforts must be regarded as having failed.

He intends to seek the recognition of Wang Ching-wei by Germany and Italy, should this course be confirmed during another conversation with Wang Ching-wei. He is certain that the Axis Powers will consent to this, since the Reich Foreign Minister had recently replied to a question by Ambassador Oshima that he was ready, as heretofore, and as recently agreed upon in Berlin, to strengthen the position of Wang Ching-wei; adding, however, that the Führer had not yet taken up the matter.

3. The United States of America had not yet replied to the Japanese communication of May 12.¹ A report from Ambassador Nomura showed that Hull wanted to make his last anti-German declaration a firm, constituent part of an American-Japanese agreement. Such a nonsensical proposal will only prove that the United States of America wishes to cause the negotiations to fail while holding Japan responsible. He would try to act in such a way that this blame is unequivocally with the United States; this would be useful for domestic political reasons.

Upon my question Matsuoka confirmed that Ambassador Grew had recently forwarded a sharp note of protest concerning the shelling of an American gunboat near Chungking and the damage caused to the American Embassy there.² Actually the gunboat had not been hit and no personnel casualties had occurred in the American Embassy. He had drawn the attention of the American Ambassador to the exposed position of the American craft, promising, in addition, an investigation of the case. He presumed that this had settled the incident.

Since the protest by the American Ambassador was neither mentioned in the Japanese nor in any other press, I take it that both sides are striving for a settlement without any publicity.

4. Matsuoka further informed me that he knew of the development of German-Russian relations through concrete reports from Oshima. He repeated his previous statements on this subject. He hoped that in the future handling of this matter a way might be found which would ease his own position, and that of the Japanese Government. Japan would in no circumstances allow shipments of essential war materials from the United States of America to Siberia. He was certain that the measures taken by the Japanese Navy would restrain the United States of America from a utopian enterprise.

Matsuoka was pointedly positive and cordial during the conversation. He intentionally stressed that the Army and Navy agreed

¹ See document No. 512, footnote 2.

² The text of the note and Ambassador Grew's account of its presentation are in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. I, pp. 715-717.

with his policy, evidently in order to counter rumors concerning the difficulty of his and the Cabinet's position.

OTT

No. 654

105/118537

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, June 21, 1941.

[NEW DIRECTIVE FOR GUIDANCE IN CONVERSATION] ¹

The Foreign Minister was unfortunately not able to see the Russian Ambassador this afternoon, since he is out of Berlin for the afternoon and will not return until evening. After his return the Foreign Minister will notify the Russian Ambassador as to when he can see him.²

BRUNS

¹ The heading enclosed within brackets was written in by hand.

² See document No. 658.

No. 655

105/113539

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, June 21, 1941—3:45 p. m.

Transmitted by Herr von Sonnleithner:

Second directive for guidance in conversation in the event of another inquiry by the Ambassador of the USSR concerning an appointment with the Foreign Minister.

The Foreign Minister's Secretariat has not yet been informed as to when the Minister will return this evening. As soon as the Foreign Minister is back, he will be notified.

JASPER

No. 656

610/248625

The Minister in Slovakia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BRATISLAVA, June 21, 1941—4:25 p. m.

No. 620 of June 21

Received June 21—4:50 p. m.

The Chief of the German Army Mission, General Otto, just called on me and informed me that 2 days ago the Chief of the German General Staff, General Halder, had called on him incognito. General Halder expressed the wish of the Führer that the Slovak armed forces participate in an operation which might take place.

Since I am of the opinion that this measure does not involve a purely military matter but also a highly political one, I called on Minister President Tuka and State President Tiso in an entirely noncommittal way in order to ask whether they agreed in principle to a participation of the Slovak armed forces in operations that might take place. Both gentlemen answered unequivocally in the affirmative. I request immediate instructions¹ on whether this development is in accordance with the intentions of the Foreign Ministry, since General Otto is awaiting further instructions from me.

LUDIN

¹ Instructions not found. See, however, document No. 672.

No. 657

4669/E221464-65

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1941—8:07 p. m.

No. 1891 of June 21

Received June 22—1:30 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1875 of June 20.¹

Acting Secretary of State Welles transmitted to me a note dated June 20 concerning the *Robin Moor* case,² with text as follows:³

"I am directed by the President of the United States to transmit to you herewith, for the information of your Government, a copy of a message addressed today by the President to the Congress of the United States.

"Accept, etc."

Appended is the White House press announcement concerning yesterday's message to Congress by the President,⁴ the text of which I transmitted in open telegram No. 1876 of June 20.⁵ In this connection it was stated this morning in the State Department that the note represented the official protest of the American Government against the sinking of the *Robin Moor*. A reply is neither requested nor evidently expected. Compensation will probably be demanded only later when the extent of the damage is known.

What induced the American Government—if today's statement by the State Department really represents its (group garbled) political reaction to the *Robin Moor*—to this tactical departure from its original plans, cannot yet be precisely judged for the time being. This does not essentially change anything in the actual appraisal of the President's action in this matter in my prior telegram. The

¹ Not found.

² See document No. 630 and footnote 2.

³ The following paragraph is in English in the original.

⁴ Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. IV, p. 741.

⁵ Not printed (4669/E221466-68).

strong language of the President's message was primarily directed to the American people, and to England and her satellites, and if the President also wanted to have it appraised as a strong threat addressed to us, it was, nevertheless, not the expression of a purposeful policy which today is ready for everything.

The vigorous German countermeasure against the demand for closing of our consular establishments in the United States and withdrawal of our consular officials and employees,⁶ and in addition Italy's energetic measure of solidarity,⁷ have evidently convinced the President that the Axis Powers are resolved to bear every consequence of their measures and not to let the initiative be taken from them. Realizing this and concerned lest he be forced to take steps for which he is not yet prepared, Roosevelt seems to have abandoned the plan of addressing a strong political note of protest in this matter to the Reich Government. The transmittal of the message to me to the demand of [?]⁸ the Reich Government represents a convenient way out which makes it unnecessary to strike out any of the strong words, where one does not lose any prestige with one's own people and with England, and where one still believes that one can avoid undesirable complications at the moment. The note to be expected accordingly will likewise deal with technical matters, among other things, which, according to the given political or military situation, can either be couched in strong or legalistic language without involving prestige.

Considering the tone of the President's message I do not think it necessary to confirm the receipt of the note of June 20.⁹

THOMSEN

⁶ See document No. 634 and footnote 5.

⁷ Bismarck had transmitted the text of the Italian note to the United States in telegram No. 1382 of June 19 (B12/B000991-92).

⁸ This passage seems to have been garbled in transmission. The German text reads: "... zur Forderung der Reichsregierung ...".

⁹ In telegram No. 555 of June 24 (1527/E221463) Weizsäcker instructed Thomsen to inform Sumner Welles that he was not in a position to pass on to his Government the text of the President's message. For text of the German note based on this instruction, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. v, p. 363.

No. 658

34/24545-48

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. Pol. No. 411

BERLIN, June 21, 1941.

The Russian Ambassador, who had wanted to call on the Foreign Minister today¹ and had been referred to me instead, called on me this evening at 9:30 p.m. and handed me the attached note verbale.

¹ See documents Nos. 654 and 655.

This note refers to a complaint of the Russian Government of April 21 of this year, regarding 80 cases of flights of German aircraft over Soviet territory in the spring of this year.² In the meanwhile, says the note, 180 more flights of this kind had taken place, against which the Soviet border patrol had each time filed a protest with the German representatives at the border. Moreover, the flights had assumed a systematic and intentional character.

In conclusion, the note verbale expresses confidence that the German Government will take steps to put an end to these border violations.

I replied to the Soviet Ambassador as follows: Since I was not acquainted with the details and in particular was not conversant with the protests allegedly filed at the border between the local authorities, I would have to refer the note verbale to the competent offices. I did not wish to anticipate the German reply. I should like to say only this much in advance, namely, that I, on the contrary, had been informed of wholesale border violations by Soviet aircraft over German territory; it was therefore the German and not the Russian Government that had cause for complaint.

When M. Dekanozov tried to prolong the conversation somewhat, I told him that since I had an entirely different opinion from his and had to await the opinion of my Government, it would be better not to go more deeply into the matter just now. The reply would be forthcoming later.

The Ambassador agreed to the procedure and left me.

As a German interpreter for Russian could not be located at the time, I had Minister von Grundherr attend the conversation as a witness.

Submitted herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister.

VON WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

NOTE VERBALE FROM THE SOVIET EMBASSY

No. 018166

BERLIN, June 21, 1941.

By order of the Soviet Government the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Germany has the honor to make the following statement to the German Government:

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR by the note verbale of April 21² informed the German Embassy in Moscow of the violations of the border of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by German aircraft, which in the period from March 27 to April 18 of this year amounted to 80 cases registered by the Soviet border guard. The reply of the German Government to the foregoing note has not yet been received by the Soviet Gov-

² See document No. 881.

ernment. On the contrary, the Soviet Government must state that violations of the Soviet boundary by German aircraft during the last 2 months, namely, from April 19 of this year up to and including June 19 of this year, have not only not ceased, but are increasing and have assumed a systematic character, attaining the number of 180 in this period, regarding each of which a protest was made by the Soviet border guard to the German representatives at the border. The systematic nature of these flights and the fact that in several cases German aircraft penetrated 100 to 150 kilometers and more into the USSR preclude the possibility that these violations of the border of the USSR by German aircraft could have been accidental.

In drawing the attention of the German Government to this situation, the Soviet Government expects the German Government to take measures toward putting an end to the violations of the Soviet border by German aircraft.

No. 659

105/113558-62

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Draft Telegram¹
By Radio

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, June 21, 1941.

TOP SECRET

For the Ambassador personally.

1) Upon receipt of this telegram, all of the cipher material still there is to be destroyed. The radio set is to be put out of commission.

2) Please inform M. Molotov at once that you have an urgent communication to make to him and would therefore like to call on him immediately. Then please make the following declaration to him.

"The Soviet Ambassador in Berlin is receiving at this hour from the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs a memorandum² giving in detail the facts which are briefly summarized as follows:³

["I. The Government of the Reich, in 1939, putting aside grave objections arising out of the contradiction between National Social-

¹ This telegram bears no number or time of dispatch. Gustav Hilger has stated that it was not received in this form in Moscow; he has no recollection of translating the declaration. No other telegram from Ribbentrop to Schulenburg on this subject has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

According to Hilger (*The Incompatible Allies*, p. 336), at 8:00 a.m. of June 22 a telegram arrived from Berlin directing Schulenburg to go to Molotov. He was to state that Russian troop concentrations had reached such proportions as to force Germany to take countermeasures, but he was directed not to be drawn into further discussion.

² See document No. 864 and footnote 2.

³ The portion of this draft telegram comprised within the brackets was incorporated in the circular telegram Multex 401 (document No. 863) which was sent on June 22 to the 12 listed Missions.

ism and Bolshevism, undertook to arrive at an understanding with Soviet Russia. Under the treaties of August 23⁴ and September 28, 1939,⁵ the Government of the Reich effected a basic reorientation of its policy toward the USSR and thenceforth adopted a friendly attitude toward the Soviet Union. This benevolent policy brought the Soviet Union great successes in the field of foreign policy.

"The Government of the Reich therefore felt entitled to assume that thenceforth both nations, while respecting each the other's regime and not interfering in the internal affairs of the partner, would arrive at good, lasting, neighborly relations. Unfortunately it quickly became evident that the Government of the Reich had been entirely mistaken in this assumption.

"II. Soon after the conclusion of the German-Russian treaties, the Comintern resumed its subversive activity against Germany, with the official Soviet Russian representatives giving assistance. Sabotage, terrorism, and espionage in preparation for war were demonstrably carried out on a large scale. In all the countries bordering on Germany and in the territories occupied by German troops, anti-German feeling was aroused and the German attempt to set up a stable order in Europe was combated. Yugoslavia was gladly offered arms against Germany by the Soviet Russian Chief of Staff,⁶ as proved by documents found in Belgrade. The declarations made by the USSR on conclusion of the treaties with Germany, regarding her intention to collaborate with Germany, thus stood revealed as deliberate misrepresentation and deceit and the conclusion of the treaties themselves as a tactical maneuver for obtaining arrangements favorable to Russia. The guiding principle remained the weakening of the non-Bolshevist countries in order the more easily to demoralize them and, at a given time, to crush them.

"III. In the diplomatic and military fields it became obvious that the USSR—contrary to the declaration made at the conclusion of the treaties that she did not wish to Bolshevize and annex the countries falling within her sphere of influence—was intent on pushing her military might westward wherever it seemed possible and on carrying Bolshevism further into Europe. The action of the USSR against the Baltic countries, Finland, and Rumania, where Soviet claims even extended to Bucovina, showed this clearly. The occupation and Bolshevization by the Soviet Union of the sphere of influence granted to her clearly violated the Moscow agreements, even though the Government of the Reich for the time being accepted the facts.

"IV. When Germany, by the Vienna Award of August 30, 1940,⁷ settled the crisis in southeastern Europe resulting from the action of the USSR against Rumania, the Soviet Union protested and turned to making intensive military preparations in every field. Germany's renewed effort to achieve an understanding, as reflected in the exchange of letters between the Foreign Minister and M. Stalin⁸ and in the invitation to M. Molotov to come to Berlin,

⁴ Vol. VII of this series, document No. 228.

⁵ Vol. VIII of this series, document No. 157.

⁶ Gen. Georgy K. Zhukov, Chief of the General Staff, February–November 1941.

⁷ See vol. X of this series, document No. 413.

⁸ See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 176 and 211.

brought demands from the Soviet Union which Germany could not accept, such as the guarantee of Bulgaria by the USSR, the establishment of a base for Soviet Russian land and naval forces at the Straits, and the complete abandonment of Finland. Subsequently, the policy of the USSR directed against Germany became more and more obvious. The warning addressed to Germany regarding occupation of Bulgaria⁹ and the declaration made to Bulgaria after the entry of German troops,¹⁰ which was of a definitely hostile nature, were as significant in this connection as was the promise, given in March 1941,¹¹ to protect the rear of Turkey in the event of a Turkish entry into the war in the Balkans.

"V. With the conclusion of the Soviet-Yugoslav Treaty of Friendship of April 5 of this year,¹² which was intended to stiffen the spines of the Yugoslav plotters, the USSR joined the common Anglo-Yugoslav-Greek front against Germany. At the same time she tried rapprochement with Rumania, in order to induce that country to detach herself from Germany. It was only the rapid German victories that caused the failure of the Anglo-Russian plan for an attack against the German troops in Rumania and Bulgaria.

"VI. This policy was accompanied by a steadily growing concentration of all available Russian forces on a long front from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, against which countermeasures were taken by Germany only later. Since the beginning of this year, there has been a steadily growing menace to the territory of the Reich. Reports received in the last few days eliminated the last remaining doubts as to the aggressive character of this Russian concentration and completed the picture of an extremely tense military situation. In addition to this, there are the reports from England regarding the negotiations of Ambassador Cripps for still closer political and military collaboration between England and the Soviet Union.

"To sum up, the Government of the Reich declares, therefore, that the Soviet Government, contrary to the obligations it assumed,

1) has not only continued, but even intensified its attempts to undermine Germany and Europe;

2) has adopted a more and more anti-German foreign policy;

3) has concentrated all its forces in readiness at the German border. Thereby the Soviet Government has broken its treaties with Germany and is about to fall on Germany's back while Germany is in a struggle for her life. The Führer has therefore ordered the Wehrmacht to oppose this threat with all the means at its disposal."

End of declaration.

Please do not enter into any discussion of this communication. It is incumbent upon the Government of Soviet Russia to safeguard the security of the Embassy personnel.¹³

RIBBENTROP

⁹ See vol. XI of this series, document No. 668.

¹⁰ See document No. 153, footnote 1.

¹¹ Text of joint Soviet-Turkish statement of neutrality of Mar. 25, 1941, printed in Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, p. 484.

¹² See document No. 265 and footnote 2.

¹³ Cf. document No. 470.

No. 660

F20/032-031

*Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini*¹

JUNE 21, 1941.

DUCE: I am writing this letter to you at a moment when months of anxious deliberation and continuous nerve-racking waiting are ending in the hardest decision of my life. I believe—after seeing the latest Russian situation map and after appraisal of numerous other reports—that I cannot take the responsibility for waiting longer, and above all, I believe that there is no other way of obviating this danger—unless it be further waiting, which, however, would necessarily lead to disaster in this or the next year at the latest.

The situation: England has lost this war. With the right of the drowning person, she grasps at every straw which, in her imagination might serve as a sheet anchor. Nevertheless, some of her hopes are naturally not without a certain logic. England has thus far always conducted her wars with help from the Continent. The destruction of France—in fact, the elimination of all west European positions—is directing the glances of the British warmongers continually to the place from which they tried to start the war: to Soviet Russia.

Both countries, Soviet Russia and England, are equally interested in a Europe fallen into ruin, rendered prostrate by a long war. Behind these two countries stands the North American Union goading them on and watchfully waiting. Since the liquidation of Poland, there is evident in Soviet Russia a consistent trend, which, even if cleverly and cautiously, is nevertheless reverting firmly to the old Bolshevik tendency to expand the Soviet State. The prolongation of the war necessary for this purpose is to be achieved by tying up German forces in the east, so that—particularly in the air—the German Command can no longer vouch for a large-scale attack in the west. I declared to you only recently, Duce, that it was precisely the success of the experiment in Crete that demonstrated how necessary it is to make use of every single airplane in the much greater project against England. It may well happen that in this decisive battle we would win with a superiority of only a few squadrons. I shall not hesitate a moment to undertake such a responsibility if, aside from all other conditions, I at least possess the one certainty that I will not then suddenly be attacked or even threatened from the east. The concentration of Russian forces—I had General Jodl submit the most recent map to your Attaché here, General Marras—is tremendous. Really, all available Russian forces are at our border. Moreover, since the approach of warm weather,

¹ The file copy printed here does not bear a signature.

work has been proceeding on numerous defenses. If circumstances should give me cause to employ the Luftwaffe against England, there is danger that Russia will then begin her strategy of extortion in the south and north, to which I would have to yield in silence, simply from a feeling of air inferiority. It would, above all, not then be possible for me, without adequate support from an air force, to attack the Russian fortifications with the divisions stationed in the east. If I do not wish to expose myself to this danger, then perhaps the whole year of 1941 will go by without any change in the general situation. On the contrary, England will be all the less ready for peace for she will be able to pin her hopes on the Russian partner. Indeed, this hope must naturally even grow with the progress in preparedness of the Russian armed forces. And behind this is the mass delivery of war material from America which they hope to get in 1942.

Aside from this, Duce, it is not even certain whether we shall have this time, for with so gigantic a concentration of forces on both sides—for I also was compelled to place more and more armored units on the eastern border and also to call Finland's and Rumania's attention to the danger—there is the possibility that the shooting will start spontaneously at any moment. A withdrawal on my part would, however, entail a serious loss of prestige for us. This would be particularly unpleasant in its possible effect on Japan. I have, therefore, after constantly racking my brains, finally reached the decision to cut the noose before it can be drawn tight. I believe, Duce, that I am hereby rendering probably the best possible service to our joint conduct of the war this year. For my general view is now as follows:

1) *France* is, as ever, not to be trusted. Absolute surety that North Africa will not suddenly desert does not exist.

2) *North Africa* itself, in so far as your colonies, Duce, are concerned, is probably out of danger until autumn. I assume that the British, in their last attack, wanted to relieve Tobruk. I do not believe they will soon be in a position to repeat this.

3) *Spain* is irresolute and—I am afraid—will take sides only when the outcome of the war is decided.

4) In *Syria*, French resistance can hardly be maintained permanently either with or without our help.

5) An attack on *Egypt* before autumn is out of the question altogether. I consider it necessary, however, taking into account the whole situation, to give thought to the development of an operational unit in Tripoli itself which can, if necessary, also be launched against the west. Of course, Duce, the strictest silence must be maintained with regard to these ideas, for otherwise we cannot expect France

to continue to grant permission to use her ports for the transportation of arms and munitions.²

6) Whether or not *America* enters the war is a matter of indifference, inasmuch as she supports our opponent with all the power she is able to mobilize.

7) The situation in England itself is bad; the provision of food and raw materials is growing steadily more difficult. The martial spirit to make war, after all, lives only on hopes. These hopes are based solely on two assumptions: Russia and America. We have no chance of eliminating America. But it does lie in our power to exclude Russia. The elimination of Russia means, at the same time, a tremendous relief for Japan in East Asia, and thereby the possibility of a much stronger threat to American activities through Japanese intervention.

I have decided in these circumstances, as I already mentioned, to put an end to the hypocritical performance of the Kremlin. I assume, that is to say, I am convinced, that Finland, and likewise Rumania, will forthwith take part in this conflict, which will ultimately free Europe, for the future also, of a great danger. General Maras informed us that you, Duce, wish also to make available at least one corps.³ If you have that intention, Duce—which I naturally accept with a heart filled with gratitude—the time for carrying it out will still be sufficiently long, for in this immense theater of war the troops cannot be assembled at all points at the same time anyway. You, Duce, can give the decisive aid, however, by strengthening your forces in North Africa, also, if possible, looking from Tripoli toward the west, by proceeding further to build up a group which, though it be small at first, can march into France in case of a French violation of the treaty; and finally, by carrying the air war and, so far as it is possible, the submarine war, in intensified degree, into the Mediterranean.

So far as the security of the territories in the west is concerned, from Norway to and including France, we are strong enough there—so far as army troops are concerned—to meet any eventuality with lightning speed. So far as the air war on England is concerned, we shall, for a time, remain on the defensive—but this does not mean that we might be incapable of countering British attacks on Germany; on the contrary, we shall, if necessary, be in a position to start ruthless bombing attacks on British home territory. Our fighter defense, too, will be adequate. It consists of the best squadrons that we have.

As far as the war in the east is concerned, Duce, it will surely be difficult, but I do not entertain a second's doubt as to its great suc-

² See document No. 548.

³ See Editors' Note, p. 924.

cess. I hope, above all, that it will then be possible for us to secure a common food supply base in the Ukraine for some time to come, which will furnish us such additional supplies as we may need in the future. I may state at this point, however, that, as far as we can tell now, this year's German harvest promises to be a very good one. It is conceivable that Russia will try to destroy the Rumanian oil region. We have built up a defense that will—or so I think—prevent the worst. Moreover, it is the duty of our armies to eliminate this threat as rapidly as possible.

If I waited until this moment, Duce, to send you this information, it is because the final decision itself will not be made until 7:00 o'clock tonight. I earnestly beg you, therefore, to refrain, above all, from making any explanation to your Ambassador at Moscow, for there is no absolute guarantee that our coded reports cannot be decoded. I, too, shall wait until the last moment to have my own Ambassador informed of the decisions reached.

The material that I now contemplate publishing gradually, is so exhaustive that the world will have more occasion to wonder at our forbearance than at our decision, except for that part of the world which opposes us on principle and for which, therefore, arguments are of no use.

Whatever may now come, Duce, our situation cannot become worse as a result of this step; it can only improve. Even if I should be obliged at the end of this year to leave 60 or 70 divisions in Russia, that is only a fraction of the forces that I am now continually using on the eastern front. Should England nevertheless not draw any conclusions from the hard facts that present themselves, then we can, with our rear secured, apply ourselves with increased strength to the dispatching of our opponent. I can promise you, Duce, that what lies in our German power, will be done.

Any desires, suggestions, and assistance of which you, Duce, wish to inform me in the contingency before us, I would request that you either communicate to me personally or have them agreed upon directly by our military authorities.

In conclusion, let me say one more thing, Duce. Since I struggled through to this decision, I again feel spiritually free. The partnership with the Soviet Union, in spite of the complete sincerity of the efforts to bring about a final conciliation, was nevertheless often very irksome to me, for in some way or other it seemed to me to be a break with my whole origin, my concepts, and my former obligations. I am happy now to be relieved of these mental agonies.

With hearty and comradely greetings,

Your

No. 661

F5/0269; F5/0275;
F5/0277-78*Adolf Hitler to the Regent of Hungary*¹

JUNE 21, 1941.

YOUR HIGHNESS: After the German Government had attempted in 1939, through clarification of the mutual spheres of interest, to bring about a relaxation of tension with Soviet Russia, and, if possible, even a friendly cooperation with her, it became nevertheless evident shortly afterward that no essential change in the attitude and tendencies of that Government toward other countries had taken place. On the contrary: Already the occupation of the Baltic countries was undertaken with the insulting justification that they had to be taken under Soviet Russia's protection against a threat from without. And this happened although it was known to the Russian Government that Germany had rejected the earnest plea of Lithuania to send German troops to that country. The Russian attack upon Finland was also a hard blow to the sensibilities of the German people. The attempt of the Soviet Union to penetrate into the Balkans would have led to a dangerous threat not only to German vital interests but to those of the whole of Europe.

On the occasion of the visit to Berlin of Molotov, who had been invited in order that an attempt might again be made to bring about a clarification, the latter addressed a number of questions, or rather, demands to me to which it was impossible for me to assent. They dealt with problems ranging all the way from Finland to the Dardanelles. After the failure of these conversations not only did estrangement set in very quickly between our two countries, but, above all, the military threat to the German eastern frontiers grew increasingly stronger.

About 160 Soviet Russian divisions were concentrated in this area. Despite my confidence in the efficiency of the German transportation system, I was likewise forced in these circumstances slowly to order and carry out strong measures of defense. In the past few weeks the tension became unbearable. It was obviously the goal of the Russian Government and of its measures to tie down such large German forces in the east that our ability to carry on operations in other theaters of war would be obstructed or at least crippled. Thus time was passing and it was then up to England, or to England and Russia, to decide on the moment when they could seize the initiative from us.

¹The file copy printed here does not bear a signature. Regarding the transmittal of this letter, see document No. 667.

All other measures or statements of the Kremlin were merely phrases to conceal this purpose. Since in recent weeks and especially in the last few days border incidents continued to increase and finally led to bigger and bigger conflicts, I do not believe that I can assume responsibility any longer for continuing to watch idly this slow but sure strangulation of the Reich.

Since this morning extensive defense measures have been taking place along a front that extends practically from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. I am conscious of the gravity of the task but I also believe that I am at the same time acting in the spirit of the whole of European civilization and culture in trying to repel and push back this un-European influence.

How well-founded our view and our decision indeed are, Your Highness will see from those documents that I have now decided to release for publication.²

As far as the attitude of Hungary is concerned, Your Highness, I am convinced that in her national consciousness she will appreciate my attitude. I should like at this point to thank Your Highness for the understanding measures of the Hungarian armed forces, which by the mere fact of having strengthened their frontier defenses will prevent Russian flank attacks and tie down Russian forces.

Whatever the immediate consequences of this event may be, the remote ones will surely result in a pacification of Europe and, above all, in the possibility of concentrating all the military forces of the German Reich for the ultimate annihilation of the opponent, who refuses peace only out of sheer lust for war.

Please accept, Your Highness, at this hour my especially cordial and comradely greetings!

Yours,

² See Editors' Note, p. 1073.

No. 662

105/113550

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, June 22, 1941—1: 17 a. m.

SECRET

Received June 22—2: 30 a. m.

No. 1424 of June 21

Molotov summoned me to his office this evening at 9: 30 p.m. After he had mentioned the alleged repeated border violations by German aircraft, with the remark that Dekanozov had been instructed to

call on the Foreign Minister¹ in regard to this matter, Molotov stated as follows:

There were a number of indications that the German Government was dissatisfied with the Soviet Government. Rumors were even current that a war was impending between Germany and the Soviet Union. They found sustenance in the fact that there was no reaction whatsoever on the part of Germany to the Tass report of June 13;² that it was not even published in Germany. The Soviet Government was unable to understand the reasons for Germany's dissatisfaction. If the Yugoslav question had at the time given rise to such dissatisfaction, he—Molotov—believed that, by means of his earlier communications, he had cleared up this question, which, moreover, was a thing of the past. He would appreciate it if I could tell him what had brought about the present situation in German-Soviet Russian relations.

I replied that I could not answer his question, as I lacked the pertinent information; that I would, however, transmit his communication to Berlin.

SCHULENBURG

¹ See document No. 658.

² See document No. 628.

No. 663

105/113555-57

Circular of the Foreign Minister

Telegram

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, June 20, 1941.

Multex No. 401 of June 21

(1) Rome	to be dispatched June 22—3:00 a. m.
(2) Tokyo	" " 22—3:00 a. m.
(3) Helsinki	" " 22—3:00 a. m.
(4) Budapest	" " 22—3:00 a. m.
(5) Bucharest	" " 22—3:00 a. m.
(6) Ankara	" " 22—3:00 a. m.
(7) Madrid	" " 22—4:00 a. m.
(8) Sofia	" " 22—4:00 a. m.
(9) Bratislava	" " 22—4:00 a. m.
(10) Zagreb	" " 22—4:00 a. m.
(11) Tehran	" " 22—4:00 a. m.
(12) Kabul	" " 22—4:00 a. m.

For the Chief of Mission personally.

I request that—

to 1-6: in the early morning hours of Sunday, June 22;

to 7-12: as soon as you receive this telegram—

you call on the Foreign Minister there and inform him orally as follows:

In view of the constantly increasing threat to the Reich by the massed concentration of the Red Army on our frontier, the Reich Government has been impelled to counter this threat with all the means at its disposal. The considerations which led to this decision are set forth in a memorandum¹ handed to the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin by the Reich Foreign Minister on the morning of June 22, which will subsequently be made public. Briefly summarized, this memorandum states as follows:

[Here follows the summary declaration drafted for the Ambassador in Moscow to be read to Molotov. See the text enclosed within brackets in the draft telegram of June 21 to Moscow, document No. 659.]

Report by telegram on how your step is received.²

RIBBENTROP

¹ See document No. 664, footnote 2.

² Replies were received as follows: Ankara telegram No. 779 of June 22, document No. 670; Madrid telegram No. 2157 of June 22, document No. 671; Rome telegram No. 1406 of June 22 (B12/B001001); Tokyo telegram No. 1012 of June 22 (34/24639); Budapest telegram No. 679 of June 22 (105/113567); Bucharest telegram No. 1836 of June 23 (34/24641); Sofia telegram No. 645 of June 22 (34/24626); Bratislava telegram No. 624 of June 22 (34/24623); Zagreb telegram No. 544 of June 22 (105/113564-65); Tehran telegram No. 501 of June 22 (65/45727); Kabul telegram No. 197 of June 23 (617/249965). The reply from Helsinki has not been found.

[EDITORS' NOTE. On June 22, 1941, the German Government published Hitler's Proclamation to the German People and a Note of the Foreign Ministry to the Soviet Government, dated June 21. The Note set forth in much greater detail the argument of document No. 659 and was accompanied by three annexes entitled "Report of the Foreign Ministry on the Propaganda and Political Agitation of the Soviet Government," "Report of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Reich Government on the Soviet Deployment Against Germany," and "Report of the Reich Minister of Interior and the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police to the Reich Government concerning the Campaign of Agitation carried on against Germany and National Socialism by the USSR." The Proclamation, the Note, and the annexes are filmed on 34/24552-622, and the Proclamation and the Note are printed in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, July 1941, pages 545-563.]

No. 664

67/47072-75

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RAM 37

BERLIN, June 22, 1941.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND SOVIET RUSSIAN
AMBASSADOR DEKANOZOV IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AT 4:00 A. M.
ON JUNE 22¹

The Foreign Minister began the conversation with the remark that the hostile attitude of the Soviet Government toward Germany and the serious threat that Germany saw in the Russian concentration on the eastern border of Germany, had forced the Reich to military countermeasures. Dekanozov would find a detailed statement of the reasons for the German attitude in the memorandum, which the Foreign Minister then handed him.² The Foreign Minister added that he regretted very much this development in German-Russian relations as he in particular had made every attempt to bring about better relations between the two countries. It had, however, unfortunately transpired that the ideological conflict between the two countries had become stronger than common sense, upon which he, the Foreign Minister, had pinned his hopes. He had nothing further, the Foreign Minister said in conclusion, to add to his remarks.

Dekanozov replied that he had asked for an interview with the Foreign Minister because, in the name of the Soviet Government, he wanted to pose a few questions that, in his opinion, required clarification.

The Foreign Minister thereupon replied that he had nothing to add to what he had already stated. He had hoped that the two countries would contrive a sensible relationship with each other. He had been deceived in this great hope for reasons that were explained in detail in the memorandum just delivered. The hostile policy of the Soviet Government toward Germany, which had reached its climax in the conclusion of a pact with Yugoslavia³ at the very time of the German-Yugoslav conflict, had been evident for a year. At a moment when Germany was engaged in a life-and-death struggle, the attitude of Soviet Russia, particularly the concentration of the Russian military forces at the Soviet border, had presented so

¹ Another record of this conversation, by R. von zur Mühlen, differing only in minor details from that by Schmidt, is filmed on 67/47068-71.

² This was the Note of the Foreign Ministry to the Soviet Government, dated June 21, 1941, and published as part of the documentation accompanying Hitler's Proclamation to the German People of June 22, 1941; see Editors' Note, p. 1073.

³ See document No. 285 and footnote 2.

serious a threat to the Reich that the Führer had to decide to take military countermeasures. The policy of compromise between the two countries had therefore been unsuccessful. This was, however, by no means the fault of the Reich Government, which had carried out the German-Russian treaty in detail, but was attributable rather to a hostile attitude of Soviet Russia toward Germany, that had existed for some time. Under the impression of the serious threat of a political and military nature which was emanating from Soviet Russia, Germany had since this morning taken the appropriate countermeasures in the military sphere. The Foreign Minister regretted not being able to add anything to these remarks, especially since he himself had had to conclude that, in spite of earnest efforts, he had not succeeded in creating sensible relations between the two countries.

Dekanozov replied briefly that, for his part too, he exceedingly regretted this development, which was based on a completely erroneous conception on the part of the German Government, and, in view of this situation, he had nothing further to say except that the status of the Russian Embassy would now presumably be arranged with the competent German authorities.

He thereupon took leave of the Reich Foreign Minister briefly.

Minister SCHMIDT

No. 665

67/47065-67

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, June 22, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND
AMBASSADOR ALFIERI ON JUNE 22, 1941, AT 4:00 A. M.

The Foreign Minister informed Alfieri that he had just notified the Soviet Ambassador of the fact that, in view of the menacing attitude of Soviet Russia, Germany had been forced since this morning to take countermeasures. He added that hostilities between Germany and Russia had probably already broken out. He announced, moreover, that there would be a letter from the Führer to the Duce concerning these events.¹

The concentration of Russian troops along the German frontier had represented a threat to Germany, so that the Führer had decided to cut the Gordian knot. Germany had definite hopes of beating Russia within a short time.

¹ Of June 21, document No. 660.

The Foreign Minister then pointed out that he had first advocated a policy of reconciliation with Russia since, despite the great ideological differences, he had hoped in this way to be able to settle the problems and difficulties pending between the two countries. The Bolshevik doctrine had, however, proved the stronger, and so for almost a year now, Russia had come to take a hostile attitude toward Germany. The turning point had been the Vienna Award and the Rumanian guarantee.² Germany's attitude on the question of Finland as well as in the matter of the Russian guarantee to Bulgaria,³ and the Straits question had likewise influenced Soviet Russia in this anti-German course.

Moreover, Germany also had proof that Russia had entertained relations with England. Thus the threat had become so serious that countermeasures had to be taken without delay. The fight would be a hard one. It would by no means be a case of a mere military demonstration. But in the end Germany would win anyway. And once the war against Russia had been won, a big step would have been taken toward final victory.

Alfieri listened to these communications with interest and replied merely that he, too, firmly believed in the victory of Germany over Russia.⁴

SCHMIDT

² See vol. x of this series, document No. 413.

³ See vol. xi of this series, document No. 379.

⁴ Cf. Dino Alfieri, *Due dittatori di fronte* (Milan, 1948), pp. 197-199.

No. 666

B12/B000989-1000

The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, June 22, 1941—6:40 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received June 22—6:55 a. m.

No. 1405 of June 22

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to telegraphic instruction No. 1484 of June 21.¹

In accordance with instructions, I called at 3:00 o'clock this morning on Count Ciano in his private apartment, since the Duce is absent from Rome, and handed him the Führer's letter to the Duce,² delivered to me by special courier. Count Ciano read the letter through carefully and I assisted him in the translation; he then explained to me that in view of the importance of its contents, he con-

¹ Not found.

² Of June 21, document No. 660.

sidered it necessary to inform the Duce of the contents over the direct telephone line to the Duce that he had at his disposal. The telephone conversation between Count Ciano and the Duce took place in my presence, and the Duce asked, after Count Ciano had given him a resumé of the substance of the letter, that I be informed as follows, for transmission to Berlin:

1. The Duce sent the Führer his very sincere thanks for his letter and the information it contained, and would probably in the course of this same day send the Führer a reply to the letter.³

2. As the Duce had already told the Führer at the last conversation at the Brenner, he shared entirely the view of the Führer that the Russian problem required an immediate solution which, if it could not be achieved through negotiations, should be brought about by force.⁴

3. The Duce was convinced of the successful outcome of the undertaking.

4. The Duce asked that the Führer be informed that he was prepared to place at his disposal all the help that was needed for the undertaking.⁵

Because of the desire of the Duce to receive the complete text of the letter as soon as possible, he instructed Count Ciano to transmit the text to him at once on his secret teletypewriter. In this way he would come into possession of the document much sooner than through delivery of the letter by plane.⁶

BISMARCK

³ See vol. XIII of this series.

⁴ No record of such a statement by Mussolini has been found. See document No. 584.

⁵ See Editors' Note, p. 924.

⁶ Cf. *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for June 22, 1941.

No. 667

93/103732

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 681 of June 22

BUDAPEST, June 22, 1941—11:55 a. m.

Received June 22—1:30 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1062 of June 21¹ and to my telegrams Nos. 678 and 680 of June 22.²

At 10:30 a.m. I handed the Regent the Führer's letter.³ The Regent thanked me very much for transmitting this communication, which he called wonderful. For 22 years he had longed for this day, and was now delighted. Centuries later humanity would be thank-

¹ Not found.

² Neither found.

³ Of June 21, document No. 661.

ing the Führer for this deed. One hundred and eighty million Russians would now be liberated from the yoke forced upon them by 2 million Bolsheviks. This decision by the Führer would bring about peace, since England and the United States would now have to realize that Germany could no longer be defeated militarily and with possession of the rich raw material and agricultural areas of Russia was secure with respect to military economy and food supplies.⁴

ERDMANNSDORFF

⁴In telegram No. 679 sent earlier on June 22 (93/103731) Erdmannsdorff had reported Minister President Bárdossy's reaction to the communication made in accordance with Multex No. 401 of June 21 (document No. 663). Bárdossy stated "that the Hungarian Government, in accordance with its attitude toward the Bolshevik menace which had been known for a long time, not only had full understanding for the German decision but felt the greatest possible satisfaction because of it."

No. 668

205/142732

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, June 22, 1941—1:50 p. m.

No. 705 of June 22

Received June 22—3:45 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

In a lengthy talk with the Swedish Foreign Minister at 8:30 today, I discussed with him in detail Sweden's political attitude toward the conflict with Russia and the German military demands.¹ Günther showed a decided sympathy both in his basic political attitude and in regard to Germany's military demands as a whole. The discussion we had regarding troop transports and other measures demanded by us, plainly was designed to furnish him personally with arguments for the necessary debate within the Swedish Cabinet. He will take up the questions with the King and the Cabinet at once, and promised the earliest possible reply. The Swedish press will be steered in the desired direction by the Foreign Minister. Sweden has ordered alert measures by the Navy only for the protection of the Baltic coast.

¹The German demands to be made on Sweden in connection with the German invasion of the Soviet Union had been set forth in letters from the OKW to the Foreign Ministry of June 17 and from the OKM to the Foreign Ministry of June 18. For the demands proposed by the OKW, see document No. 638. The letter from the OKM of June 18 has not been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

The German demands had been presented in Stockholm by Minister Schnurre. No document containing the text of the demands as presented there has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry. The principal military demand involved permission for the passage of a German infantry division from southern Norway across Sweden to Finland.

I intend to call on the King together with Minister Wied, who gave me strong support in today's talk with the Foreign Minister, if Günther should feel that this would be conducive to reinforcing his standpoint.²

SCHNURRE
WIED

² For the further course of the negotiations regarding the German military and other demands, see vol. XIII of this series.

No. 669

260/170037

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, June 22, 1941—3:30 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received June 22—5:35 p. m.

No. 482 of June 22

1. This morning at 6:00 a.m., four Russian bombers dropped bombs on the small fortified Finnish island of Alskär, which lies between Alasse and Hangö and belongs to the province of Turku-Pori. This caused a conflagration.

2. Today the Finnish warships *Jemari* and *Vainemoinen* were attacked by Russian bombers in the neighborhood of Korpo. Apparently there was no damage.

3. The Foreign Minister, who told me this, will lodge a protest with the Russian Minister today; he wishes to handle the matter so that a break in relations does not occur before the scheduled dates for military operations.

4. From the standpoint of domestic policy it is of great importance that the acts of aggression be committed by the Russians.

5. The Government is preparing an extract from the Führer's proclamation for the Finnish people. The Finnish translation will read, in the fourth from the last paragraph, instead of "in league with the Finnish divisions," "side by side with the Finnish divisions."¹

6. Morale is strong and confident.

BLÜCHER

¹ For Hitler's proclamation, see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, July 1941, pp. 545-551. There the pertinent passage reads, however, "... Im Verein mit finnischen Kameraden ..." (p. 551). Cf. Wipert von Blücher, *Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie*, p. 227.

No. 670

265/173003

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 779 of June 22

ANKARA, June 22, 1941.
Received June 22—5:15 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your Multex No. 401 of June 21.¹

The memorandum has been handed to Saracoglu. Turkey is in transports of joy. Saracoglu had to disconnect his telephone in order to escape from congratulations. He is convinced that this just war will bring peace to Germany and the world. The detailed memorandum will be published immediately by the Anatolian News Agency.

Saracoglu will ask of the English Ambassador that England, who has so many countries on her conscience, remain aloof from this fight and that she request America to do the same, so as not to ruin the chance for peace which will exist once this struggle is concluded.

PAPEN

¹ Document No. 663.

No. 671

136/74986

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

MADRID, June 22, 1941.

No. 2157 of June 22

Received June 22—11:25 p. m.

Instruction Multex No. 401/21¹ carried out with Foreign Minister, who was in the country.

Serrano Suñer replied that he thanked the Foreign Minister sincerely for his communication and that he could state after having consulted the Generalissimo, that the Spanish Government had noted with the greatest satisfaction the beginning of the struggle against Bolshevik Russia, much as it naturally regretted that its ally, Germany, was faced with a new and difficult war. Germany's fight against Russia would arouse the greatest enthusiasm throughout Spain.

Having consulted the Generalissimo, he was asking the German Government to permit at once a few volunteer formations of the Falange to participate in the fight against the common foe, in memory of Germany's fraternal assistance during the Civil War. This

¹ Document No. 663.

gesture of solidarity was, of course, being made independently of the full and complete entry of Spain into the war beside the Axis, which would take place at the appropriate moment.

In concluding the conversation, the Minister again expressed in especially warm words his great personal pleasure in the developments, and his firm conviction that the war with Russia would be terminated just as quickly and victoriously as the previous wars had been.

The rumor current in journalistic circles that the Spanish Government, prompted by the outbreak of the war with Russia, intends to make a public declaration of sympathy or the like, is not correct.

I request instructions with regard to the offer to send Spanish volunteers.²

STOHRER

² In telegram No. 1422 of June 24 (136/74991) Ribbentrop advised Stohrer to inform the Foreign Minister that the German Government "acknowledges with pleasure and satisfaction the formation of volunteers of the Falange and will be glad to make use of this offer." For further developments in this matter, see vol. XIII of this series.

No. 672

610/248628

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Slovakia

Telegram

By closed circuit coded teletype

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, June 22, 1941.

TOP SECRET

For the Minister personally.

Please inform M. Tuka:

1. That we agree to the immediate rupture of diplomatic relations between Slovakia and the USSR, and

2. that (as you have already been informed by telegram¹) the Führer agrees to the participation of a Slovak contingent in the struggle against the USSR. The details are already being determined by the military authorities.²

The decisions of the Slovak Government on both points are being greatly welcomed by us.³

RIBBENTROP

¹ Not found.

² Weizsäcker's memorandum of June 22 (2134/467760) records that Černak, the Slovak Minister, informed him on June 22 at 11:00 p.m. of the rupture of Slovakia's relations with Soviet Russia and of Slovakia's willingness to cooperate with Germany militarily against the Soviet Union.

³ In telegram No. 637 of June 24 (610/248629) Ludin reported having been informed by Tuka that Slovakia was officially entering the war against the Soviet Union and that a proclamation to that effect had been issued by the Slovak Government.

No. 673

1527/373583

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1897 of June 22

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1941.

Received June 23—12:10 a. m.

For the State Secretary.

From the absence of any official stand on the German-Russian war so far one must conclude that in the face of the new situation the American Government finds itself in an unusual dilemma, and is probably waiting to see how England reacts. A sudden establishment of friendly or alliance-type relations with Soviet Russia is hardly to be expected for both ideological and practical reasons. The support of Russia under the Authorization Law¹ is out of the question,

1. because this is only for the benefit of "democracies",
2. possibilities neither for production nor for transportation exist.

America's main concern arising from the fact that the Russian Army is being contained at the western border is naturally the effect on Japan, which will get relief in every respect, among other things, by the probable cessation of Russian assistance to China.

THOMSEN

¹ See document No. 146 and footnote 1.

No. 674

534/239900-01

Ambassador Bergen to State Secretary Weizsäcker

CONFIDENTIAL

ROME, June 22, 1941.

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: The unpleasant and obstinate attitude of the Vatican radio has impelled me to have the "private reflections" annexed hereto delivered to the Pope.¹

The private exchange of views, which is acceptable to the Pope, takes place privately with avoidance of the official authorities. This form of discussion—brought about from time to time—is the continuation of a custom observed by Cardinal Pacelli and me for many years, in order to facilitate a candid and elastic disposition of often awkward questions. Usually it has a greater lasting effect than official steps and protests.

¹ In this memorandum (534/239902-13) Bergen refuted in some detail charges by the Vatican radio regarding the mistreatment of Catholics in the eastern occupied territories and in the Ostmark.

The reply to the annex was delivered to me verbally in the last few days. It stated: the Pope could really not be accused of lack of consideration for Germany; in actual fact his warm sympathies for Germany and his keen desire not to complicate the already difficult situation impelled him to very far-reaching reserve. The Vatican radio had dealt with only a small fraction of the actual events; in spite of all reserve, however, it was not proper for example to leave unanswered the German propaganda in Spain with its rose-colored statements about the position of the Catholic Church in Germany, since silence would have to be interpreted as agreement by Rome not only in Spain but all over America. The treatment of political questions had been prohibited to the Vatican radio from the outset. The informant added on his own initiative that incidentally no more programs of the sort objected to had been broadcast by the Vatican radio for weeks.

With the best regards and

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

BERGEN

No. 675

260/170038

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, June 23, 1941—2:35 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received June 23—6:25 a. m.

No. 485 of June 22

1) The Foreign Minister protested to the Russian Minister against Russian bombings.¹ The Minister denied the charges and refused to accept the protest. The Foreign Minister renewed the protest and demanded an investigation.

2) The Minister asked whether the Finnish Government had previously known of the proclamation of the Führer and Chancellor. The Foreign Minister denied that it had. The Minister thereupon in a decided manner requested an answer to the question whether the Finnish Government approved the passage concerning Finland.² The Foreign Minister found himself in a dilemma; he did not want to water down the Führer's statements; on the other hand, he wanted to avoid a rupture of relations at this stage. The Finnish

¹ See document No. 669.

² The passage relating to Finland reads: "The warriors of the Victor of Narvik stand on the Arctic Sea in union with Finnish comrades. Jointly with the Finnish heroes of freedom under their Marshal, German divisions under the command of the Conqueror of Norway protect (schützen) Finnish soil." See *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, July 1941, p. 551.

Army needs 6 more days for its strategic concentration. The Foreign Minister has to consider this and intends to temporize until then. The Government's statement to the Parliament is scheduled for Wednesday, in which the accent will probably be placed on the word "protect" [*schützen*] in the fourth from the last (clear text apparently lacking) Führer proclamation.³ The Foreign Minister will probably receive the Russian Minister again tomorrow in order to prepare him for the Government's declaration.

3) The Foreign Minister succeeded in terminating the conversation in such a way as not to sever the tie.

4) Please prevail upon the press and radio not at this early stage to treat Finland as an ally against Russia.

BLÜCHER

³ See footnote 2.

APPENDICES

Appendix I

ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY¹ AUGUST 1940

THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER

von Ribbentrop

- (a) *Secretariat:* Minister Dr. Schmidt (Paul Otto)
Senior Counselor Dr. Kordt (Erich)
Counselor Dr. von Sonnleithner
Secretary of Legation Dr. Bruns

For special assignments: Senior Counselor Bergmann

- (b) *Personal Staff:* Head: Senior Counselor Hewel
Counselor Dr. Baron Steengracht von Moyland

Staff of the Foreign Minister:

Head: Counselor Braun
Secretary of Legation Gottfriedsen
Secretary of Legation Schweimer

For special assignments:

Counselor Likus
Consul General Stahmer

THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

Freiherr von Weizsäcker

Secretariat: Counselor Dr. Siegfried

THE HEAD OF THE AUSLANDSORGANISATION IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

State Secretary E. W. Bohle

Attached: Secretary of Legation Dr. Gossmann

STATE SECRETARY FOR SPECIAL DUTIES

W. Keppler

Attached: Minister Dr. Grobba

¹ This organization plan has been translated and condensed from a German Foreign Ministry organization circular of August 1940, filmed as serial 293, frames 183945, 183948-84. No basic changes seem to have been made for the period covered by this volume. The subsequent changes, as shown by the organizational chart of December 1941, will be printed in vol. XIII. Similar tables for earlier periods are printed in the previous volumes of this series and of Series C.

AMBASSADOR FOR SPECIAL DUTIES

[Activities of the Foreign Ministry relating to economic warfare: general trade policy, economic warfare against the enemy and defense against economic warfare, blockades, contraband, blacklists, economic relations with neutrals, German property abroad and foreign property in territories controlled by Germany (1780/406615).]

Dr. Ritter ²

Attached: Minister Eisenlohr
Minister Leitner
Counselor Mackeben

PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT

Diplomatic Corps in Berlin, foreign consuls in the German Reich, audiences with the Führer and Reich Chancellor, ceremonial, state visits, decorations:

Chief of Protocol: Minister Dr. Freiherr von Dörnberg
Deputy: Counselor Dr. von Halem

DEPARTMENT FOR GERMAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS (D) ³

Director of Department: Minister Luther

Personal Assistant: Secretary of Legation Büttner

Party Section: Business between the Foreign Ministry and the departments of the NSDAP. The Party Rally. Minister Luther

D II Matters affecting the Reichsführer SS, the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, international police cooperation. Counselor Likus

D III Information for Foreign Missions about important internal political events. The Jewish question. Racial policy. Flags and insignia. National hymns. National holidays, etc. Secretary of Legation Rademacher

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT (PERS.)

Director of Department: Ministerialdirektor Kriebel

Deputy Director: Minister Schroeder

Special duties: Minister Schroetter

Director for Budget and Financial Affairs: Senior Counselor Dr. Schwager

² By a directive of Oct. 7, 1940, Ribbentrop further assigned to Ambassador Ritter the handling in the Foreign Ministry of all military questions affecting foreign policy, including those previously handled by Pol. I M. At the same time he was made immediately subordinate to the Foreign Minister or respectively to the State Secretary and personally responsible for keeping the Foreign Minister currently informed on questions of that nature (293/183950).

³ By a directive of the Foreign Minister of May 17, 1941 (1780/406573) sections Kult. A (questions concerning the German community) and Kult. B (economic questions concerning the national community, population transfers, etc.) were transferred to the Department for German Internal Affairs and were redesignated D VIII and D IX, respectively.

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT (POL.)

Director of Department: Under State Secretary Dr. Woermann

Deputy Director: Under State Secretary Habicht ⁴

Dirigent: Minister von Rintelen

Pol. I M	Military questions, armaments, national defense:	Secretary of Legation Kramarz
Pol. I Luft	Aviation questions:	Counselor Schultz-Sponholz
Pol. II	Western Europe (Great Britain, Ireland, British possessions—unless dealt with elsewhere—France—North Africa, Morocco, Tunisia—Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg):	Counselor of Legation Dr. Auer
Pol. III	Spain, Portugal, Vatican:	Counselor Dr. Haidlen
Pol. IV	Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy (Ethiopia, Libya), Yugoslavia, Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary:	Senior Counselor Dr. Heinburg
Pol. V	Eastern Europe (Poland, Soviet Union):	Senior Counselor Dr. Schliep
Pol. VI	Scandinavia and Baltic States (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania):	Minister Dr. von Grundherr
Pol. VII	Near and Middle East (Egypt, Afghanistan, Arabia, Ceylon, Cyprus, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, India, Iraq, Iran, Sudan):	Counselor Dr. Melchers
Pol. VIII	East Asia and Australia (Japan, Japanese mandated territories, China, Manchukuo, Mongolia, French Indochina, Siam, Straits Settlements, Malay States, Netherlands East Indies, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, South Sea territories):	Counselor Dr. Knoll
Pol. IX	America (North, Central, and South America):	Senior Counselor Freytag
Pol. X	Africa (except Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Italian possessions, Egypt, Sudan), mandate and colonial questions:	Senior Counselor Dr. Bielfeld
Pol. XI	War guilt questions:	Senior Counselor Dr. von Schmieden

⁴ By a directive of the Foreign Minister of Nov. 21, 1939, Under State Secretary Habicht, in addition to his duties as Deputy Director of the Political Department, was attached to the Foreign Minister personally for special duties and in that capacity was assigned to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat. To insure cooperation with the Ministry of Propaganda in the field of foreign propaganda the Information Department and the Radio Section of the Cultural Policy Department were placed under Habicht's supervision (1780/406605).

On Sept. 19, 1940, upon Habicht's entry on military service, these latter functions were assigned to Minister Luther (1780/406584).

Pol. XII	Peace questions:	Counselor Count von Hohenthal
Pol. Grenz	Frontier treaties and other technical questions concerning Reich frontiers which are the subject of negotiations with foreign governments:	Senior Counselor Dr. Roediger (Conrad)

ECONOMIC POLICY DEPARTMENT (W)

Director of Department: Ministerialdirektor Wiehl

Deputy Director: Minister Dr. Clodius

Liaison Officer with OKW (War Economy Staff):

Senior Counselor (unassigned) Dr. Dumont

W Frie	Economic questions related to the armistice treaties and the negotiation of the treaties of peace:	Senior Counselor (unassigned) Dr. Dumont
W I	General section for questions concerning economics and finance. Commercial and forestry attachés; German customs law, technical preparation of commercial treaties:	Consul General Doehle
W II	Western and Southern Europe (except Great Britain and Italy): Belgium, including colonies and mandated territories; France, including colonies, protectorates, and mandated territories; Luxembourg; Netherlands, including colonies: Switzerland; Portugal, including colonies; Spain, including colonies:	Senior Counselor Sa-bath Counselor Dr. Freiherr von Maltzan Counselor Schüller
W IIIa	Southeast Europe (except Rumania): Protectorate, Slovakia: Hungary, Yugoslavia: Bulgaria, Greece:	Minister Moraht Senior Counselor Dr. Hudeczek Oberregierungsrat Dr. Müller Counselor Dr. Busse
W IIIb	Italy, including colonies, Ethiopia and Albania; Rumania:	Counselor Dr. Junker
W IIIc	Near and Middle East (Afghanistan, Egypt, Arabia, Cyprus, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Transjordan, Sudan, Turkey, Yemen):	Counselor Dr. Ripken
W IV	Eastern Europe (Soviet Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, former Poland):	Minister Dr. Schnurre
W V	Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, economic questions affecting the Antarctic); whaling:	Counselor Dr. van Scherpenberg
W VI	Great Britain, British Dominions (except Canada), and British colonies. General questions of commercial and economic warfare:	Senior Counselor Rüter

W VII	East Asia (China, Hong Kong, Japan, Manchukuo, Philippines, Siam, South Sea territories):	Senior Counselor Dr. Voss
W VIIIa	North America (Canada, United States, Mexico), Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti; also Liberia:	Senior Counselor Dr. Davidsen
W VIIIb	South and Central America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela):	Secretary of Legation Dr. Pamperrien
W IX	Shipping (including care of crews and passengers of German ships in neutral countries):	Senior Counselor Dr. Bleyert
W X	Reich Office for Foreign Trade (economic news and information service; chambers of commerce abroad):	Senior Counselor Dr. Wingen
W XI	Raw materials, war industry, liaison for control for war economy of German ships in neutral ports:	Senior Counselor Dr. Bisse
W XII	Transport (except matters relating to deliveries):	Minister Dr. Martius

LEGAL DEPARTMENT (R)

Director of Department: Under State Secretary Dr. Gaus

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Dr. Albrecht

CULTURAL POLICY DEPARTMENT (KULT.)

Director of Department: Minister Dr. von Twardowski

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Rühle

Attached to the Director of the Department
for Special Assignments:

Consul General Dr. Nöldeke

NEWS SERVICE AND PRESS DEPARTMENT (P)

Acting Director: Senior Counselor Dr. Schmidt (Paul K.)

Deputy Director: Minister Braun von Stumm

INFORMATION DEPARTMENT

Director of Department: Minister Dr. Altenburg

Deputy Director: Counselor Dr. Rahn

Appendix II

LIST OF GERMAN FILES USED

The following table identifies the German file from which each document has been taken. The documents of the Foreign Ministry were bound into volumes when they were sent to the files. As documents in these volumes have been micro-filmed, each film of a file has been identified by a film serial number, while each page of the documents has been identified by a frame number stamped on the original at the time of the filming. (An exception was made with the treaty files, where the frame numbers were not put on the document pages but were attached to them at the time of the filming; thus the frame numbers do not appear on the originals but do, of course, appear on the microfilm.) The documents published in this collection are identified by the film serial number and frame numbers in the upper left hand corner of each document.

By reference to the following table of film serial numbers the location in the National Archives in Washington and in the Public Record Office in London of the copy of the document used in this publication may be determined. (Locating the original documents, which are now in the Foreign Ministry's archives in Bonn, is somewhat complicated by the fact that part of the archives have been reorganized since their return to the Federal Republic.) In some few cases separate files, usually on closely related topics, have been filmed consecutively under a single serial number; these are marked by an asterisk (*). A number of serials are given as supplementary to earlier ones; these are cases where a re-examination of the file in question indicated that additional filming might be useful to scholars or, as is more often the case, where in the process of editing for publication the editors wished to provide a film record of documents of lesser importance to which references appeared in the documents selected.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
19	State Secretary: United States.
34	State Secretary: Soviet Union. Under State Secretary: Russia.*
36	Dienststelle Ribbentrop: Russia (1940-1941).
■	Under State Secretary: United States.
40	Reich Foreign Minister: Foreigners.
41	Reich Foreign Minister: Indian Freedom Fighter Bose.
51	Under State Secretary: Naval Warfare.
61	Under State Secretary: Turkey.
65	Reich Foreign Minister: Iran. State Secretary: Iran.*
67	Secret Files of Paul Otto Schmidt.
70	State Secretary: Syria.
71	State Secretary: Arabia, Saudi Arabia.
73	State Secretary: Hungary.
83	Reich Foreign Minister: Iraq. State Secretary: Iraq.*
84	State Secretary: United States.
86	German Embassy in Italy: The Indian Legion in Germany: The Arab Legion in Italy.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
91	State Secretary: Ireland.
	Under State Secretary: Ireland (Veesenmayer).*
93	State Secretary: Hungary.
98	State Secretary: German-English Relations.
100	German Embassy in Italy: Mackensen's Papers.
104	State Secretary: Russia.
105	State Secretary: Russia.
116	Reich Foreign Minister: Africa, Albania, Danzig, Estonia, Croatia.*
124	State Secretary: Political Correspondence of the State Secretary with Officials of the Foreign Service.
129	State Secretary: Portugal.
136	State Secretary: German-Spanish Relations.
137	Under State Secretary: Spain.
141	State Secretary: Belgium.
142	State Secretary: Greece.
143	State Secretary: German-American Consular Exchange; Internment of Ships and Arrest of Seamen by Countries of Central and South America; the same by U.S.A., also Reprisals; South America.*
154	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Japan.
159	State Secretary: Greenland, Guatemala.*
171	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of the Soviet Union with the Northern States.
173	State Secretary: Netherlands; Netherlands Indies.*
174	State Secretary: Japan.
177	State Secretary: Japan.
195	State Secretary: India.
201	State Secretary: Rumania.
205	State Secretary: Sweden.
216	State Secretary: Indochina.
221	State Secretary: German-French Relations.
222	State Secretary: Rumania.
230	State Secretary: Yugoslavia.
233	State Secretary: Argentina.
235	State Secretary: Brazil.
245	State Secretary: Croatia.
247	State Secretary: Denmark.
260	State Secretary: Finland.
265	State Secretary: Turkey.
266	State Secretary: Egypt.
274	State Secretary: Bulgaria.
277	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Schulenburg's Personal Political File.
293	Tables of Organization of the German Foreign Ministry, 1929-1940.
295	State Secretary: German-French Relations.
321	State Secretary: Lithuania.
326	Economic Policy Department: Trade in Armaments, Brazil.
332	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Spain.
341	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Argentina.
359	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Special File.
378	State Secretary: Peace Negotiations with France.
386	State Secretary: German-French Relations.
419	State Secretary: Foreign Propaganda; Press.
426	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Military Affairs.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
449	State Secretary: Greece.
493	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Secret Files; Internal Politics.
510	Political Department: Yugoslavia's Political Relations with Germany.
529	Political Department: Ministries—Yugoslavia.
534	State Secretary: Holy See.
587	Under State Secretary: France.
589	State Secretary: United States.
593	State Secretary: United States.
610	State Secretary: Slovakia.
617	State Secretary: Afghanistan.
647	State Secretary: Arabia, Syria, Iraq.
658	State Secretary: Syria (Rahn Telegrams).
675	Under State Secretary: Greece.
699	Under State Secretary: Iraq.
711	Under State Secretary: Danube Question.
792	Under State Secretary: Iraq.
813	State Secretary: Memoranda on Diplomatic Visits.
833	Ambassador Ritter: Miscellaneous.
839	Ambassador Ritter: Bulgaria.
844	Ambassador Ritter: Bulgaria.
846	Ambassador Ritter: Denmark.
962	Ambassador Ritter: Greece.
979	Renthe-Fink: Personal Files; Notes on Internal Political Situation in Denmark.
1000	Under State Secretary: Egypt.
1002	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): German-French Armistice Commission—Economic Delegation.
1003	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): German-French Armistice Commission—Economic Delegation.
1005	Ambassador Ritter: Ireland.
1053	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Brazil.
1084	Pol. I M: Secret Documents.
1124	Under State Secretary: Egypt.
1125	Under State Secretary: Jewish Question.
1126	Ambassador Ritter: Rumania.
1127	Minister Luther: Rumania.
1199	State Secretary: Political Correspondence.
1287	Press Department (Schmidt): Memoranda for Foreign Minister.
1447	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Secret Political File.
1448	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Secret Political File.
1527	State Secretary: United States.
1671	Political Department: Secret Papers; War between Germany, England, France, and Poland: East Asia.
1711	German Legation in Denmark: Papers of Minister Hencke.
1742	State Secretary: Russia.
1780	Tables of Organization of the German Foreign Ministry, 1922-1941.
1951	Special Section for Germany [<i>Inland II</i>]: Secret Papers; Killinger Papers (Rumania).
2011	State Secretary: The War 1939.
2032	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Italy.
2033	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Italy.
2076	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Italy.
2108	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Russia.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
2109	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Turkey; Negotiations with Turkey Concerning Credit Agreement.
2111	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Finland.
2119	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Secret Files; Miscellaneous.
2120	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Croatia.
2134	State Secretary: Memoranda on Diplomatic Visits.
2159	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Danube.
2174	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Spain.
2192	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Rumania.
2281	German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers.
2345	State Secretary: Afghanistan.
2349	Reich Chancellery: Croatia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg.
2361	German Embassy in Turkey: Secret Instructions, Reports, Telegrams, etc., Armament Industry.
2362	Pol. V: v. Saucken Personal Files: German-Russian Border Commission; Igorka-Baltic Sea Border.
2366	German Embassy in Italy: Secret Files.
2548	Under State Secretary: Yugoslavia.
2551	Under State Secretary: Patagonia.
2670	German Embassy Paris: Secret Files; Franco-German Relations.
2800	Special Section for Germany [<i>Inland D IX</i>]: Secret Papers; Top Secret Papers of Division IX.
2871	Political Department: Treaties, 1936-1944.
3569	Pol. IV: Political Relations Between Yugoslavia and Hungary.
3613	Supplementary to 2361.
3637	Supplementary to 2361.
3697	German Embassy Paris: Secret Files; Armistice Commission.
3748	German Embassy Paris: Secret Files; Jews and Freemasons in France.
3784	Supplementary to 2108.
3846	Pol. II: Duplicate Reports from the German Embassy Paris.
3882	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Spain.
3883	Supplementary to 2361.
3941	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Danube.
4041	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Holland.
4137	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Secret Papers of Division P A.
4443	Under State Secretary: Indochina.
4608	Pol. IX: United States; Jewish Question.
4609	Economic Policy Department: Treaties; France.
4649	German Embassy Paris: French Colonies.
4661	German Embassy Paris: Secret Files; Territorial Guards.
4667	Ambassador Ritter: Miscellaneous.
4669	Under State Secretary: Security Zone.
4671	Special Section for Germany [<i>Inland II</i>]: Secret Papers; Section Kult. A; Yugoslavia.
4682	German Embassy Paris: Thailand.
4685	German Legation in Rumania: Secret Papers; Telegrams from Berlin.
4691	Secret Files of Paul Otto Schmidt.
4699	Special Section for Germany [<i>Inland II</i>]: Secret Papers of Department D VIII.
4799	German Legation in Switzerland: Political Relations of Egypt with Germany.
4805	Pol. II: Netherlands; Jewish Question.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
4809	Economic Policy Department: Secret Papers; Trade in Armaments, Iran.
4828	German Legation in Croatia: Resettlement of Slovenes, Hungarians, Croats, Serbs, Ukrainians.
4837	Economic Policy Department: Treaties 2; Portugal.
4849	German Embassy in Italy: Croatian Independence.
4854	Economic Policy Department IVb: Rumania; Trade Relations between Rumania and Russia.
4865	German Embassy in Italy: Secret Files.
4873	Supplementary to 2033.
4876	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): German-Italian Economic Negotiations.
4878	Reich Chancellery: Italy.
4880	Economic Policy Department IIb: British-Spanish Relations.
4882	Economic Policy Department: Treaties; Turkey.
4896	Economic Policy Department: Secret Papers; Trade in Armaments, Spain.
4963	German Embassy in Finland: Reports, Telegrams.
4964	German Embassy in Finland: Petsamo.
5070	Economic Policy Department: Personal Papers—VLR Dumont.
5078	Pol. XIII: Organization.
5112	German Legation in Finland: Secret Correspondence.
5122	Special Section for Germany [<i>Inland II</i>]: Secret Papers; Counter-espionage and Agents.
5129	German Embassy in Italy: Secret Files; German, Italian, and Other Merchant Ships in America.
6584	Under State Secretary: Patagonia.
6667	Economic Policy Department: Secret Papers; Trade in Armaments, Iran.
7815	Economic Policy Department IVb: Rumania.
8589	Navy Archives: OKW Directives.
9908	Economic Policy Department IVb: Rumania.
9936	Drafts of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, 1940-1941.
B12	State Secretary: German-Italian Relations.
B13	State Secretary: Italian-German Relations.
B19	State Secretary: Finland.
F1-	German Foreign Ministry film of files of the Reich Foreign Minister's
F20	Secretariat.
M175	OKW, Operation <i>Barbarossa</i> Timetable and Directives.
M176	Navy Archives: OKW Directives—Operation <i>Merkur</i> , Operation <i>Marita</i> .
M179	Naval War Staff: German Cooperation with Italy, Spain, Japan, Russia, Hungary, Rumania.
M275	Navy Archives: Operation <i>Merkur</i> .
M341	OKH Attaché Department: Secret Papers.
M346	OKH General Staff: Deployment Directive for <i>Barbarossa</i> .
MR- 1749	Film of file H22/251: OKH, Operations Division.
P2	OKW, Operation <i>Barbarossa</i> .
P4	Film of file OKW 1972: Operations Staff.
P5	Film of file H3/1: OKH Foreign Armies, East.

Appendix III

LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS¹

- ABDUL AZIZ IBN SAUD, King of Saudi Arabia.
ABDUL MAJID KHAN, Afghan Minister of Economics.
ABDULLAH IBN HUSSEIN, Emir of Transjordan.
ABETZ, Otto, Ambassador, Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the German Military Commander in France.
ACHENBACH, Ernst, Counselor of Legation, German Embassy in Paris.
ALFIERI, Dino, Italian Ambassador in Germany; member of the Fascist Grand Council.
ALTENBURG, Günther, Minister, Director of the Information Department, German Foreign Ministry; appointed Reich Plenipotentiary for Greece, April 28, 1941.
ANDRIĆ, Ivo, Yugoslav Minister in Germany.
ANFUSO, Filippo, Chef de Cabinet to Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister.
ANTRIĆ, Milan, Minister of the Royal Court of Yugoslavia.
ANTONESCU, Ion, Rumanian General, Leader of the State, Minister President, and Foreign Minister.
ANTONESCU, Mihai, Rumanian Minister of State attached to the Minister President's office.
AOSTA, Amedeo di Savoia-Aosta, Duke of, cousin to King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy.
ARANDA MATA, Antonio, Spanish General, Chief of the Military Academy.
ARANHA, Oswaldo, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
BÁRDOSY, László de, Hungarian Foreign Minister from January 28, 1941; appointed Minister President April 3, 1941.
BARGEN, Werner von, Counselor of Embassy, Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the German Military Commander in Belgium and northern France.
BARTHA, Karl, Hungarian Minister of Defense.
BENOIST-MACHIN, Jacques, Delegate General of the French Government in Berlin for the care of prisoners of war, December 10, 1940; attached to the office of the Vice President of the Council (Darlan) as Secretary General, February 25, 1941; as State Secretary, June 9, 1941.
BENZLER, Felix, Minister, Representative of the German Foreign Ministry at Army Headquarters List (Twelfth Army); Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry with the German Military Commander in Serbia, April 28, 1941.
BENZON, Branko, Croatian Minister in Germany from May 1941.
BERGEN, Diego von, German Ambassador to the Holy See.
BISMARCK, Otto Christian, Prince von, Minister in the German Embassy in Italy.
BLÜCHER, Wipert von, German Minister in Finland.
BODENSCHATZ, Karl Heinrich, German General, Chief of the Office of the Reich Minister for Air.
BÖTTICHER, Friedrich von, German General, Military and Air Attaché in the United States.
BOHEMAN, Erik, Secretary General in the Swedish Foreign Ministry.

¹ The biographical details given relate principally to the period and subjects covered by the documents in this volume.

- BOLTZE, Erich, Counselor of Embassy in the German Embassy in Japan.
- BORIS III, King of Bulgaria.
- BORMANN, Martin, Reichsleiter of the NSDAP, Chief of the staff of Rudolf Hess; Head of the Party Chancellery from May 12, 1941.
- BOSE, Subhas Chandra, Indian nationalist leader, former Secretary General and President of the Indian Congress party; leader of the left wing Forward Bloc.
- BOSSY, Raoul, Rumanian Minister in Germany, March 1941-June 1943.
- BRÄUTIGAM, Otto, German Consul General at Batum.
- BRAUCHITSCH, Walther von, Field Marshal, Commander in Chief of the German Army.
- BRINON, Count Fernand de, Delegate General, with rank of Ambassador, of the French Government in the occupied territory.
- BRUCKMANN, Hans, Colonel, German Military Attaché in Bulgaria.
- BÜRKNER, Leopold, Captain, German Navy; Head of the Foreign Intelligence Branch in the Office of Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the OKW.
- BULLITT, William C., United States Ambassador in France, October 13, 1936-January 7, 1941.
- BUSCHENHAGEN, Erich, Colonel, Chief of Staff, German Army in Norway.
- CADOGAN, Sir Alexander, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- CANARIS, Wilhelm, Admiral, Chief of the Office of Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the OKW.
- CASERTANO, Raffaele, Minister, official of the Italian Foreign Ministry, Chargé d'Affaires in Croatia, April 1941.
- CASTILLO, Ramón, Vice President of Argentina.
- CAVALLERO, Ugo, Count, Italian General, Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff.
- CHIANG KAI-SHEK, Generalissimo, leader of the Kuomintang; President of the Executive Yuan (Premier).
- CHRISTIAN X, King of Denmark.
- CHURCHILL, Winston Spencer, British Prime Minister.
- CIANO DI CORTELLAZZO, Count Galeazzo, son-in-law of Mussolini; Italian Foreign Minister.
- CINCAR-MARKOVIĆ, Aleksandar, Yugoslav Foreign Minister, February 1939-March 27, 1941.
- CLAUSEN, Frits, leader of the Danish National Socialist party.
- CLEMM VON HOHENBERG, Christian, Major, German Military Attaché in Greece.
- CLODIUS, Carl, Minister, Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- COSMELLI, Giuseppe, Counselor of Embassy in the Italian Embassy in Germany, with the rank of Minister.
- CRIPPS, Sir Stafford, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
- CUDAHY, John, United States Ambassador in Belgium, January 1940-January 1941.
- CVETKOVIĆ, Dragiša, Yugoslav Minister President, February 1939-March 27, 1941.
- DANKWORT, Werner, Counselor of Legation in the German Legation in Sweden.
- DARLAN, Jean François, Admiral, French Minister of the Navy and Commander in Chief of the Navy; Vice President of the French Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 9, 1941; Minister of Interior, February 17, 1941.

- DE GAULLE, Charles, French General, Head of the French National Committee and leader of the Free French forces.
- DEGBELLE, Léon, leader of the Belgian fascist Rex party.
- DERANZOZOV, Vladimir Georgievich, Soviet Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs; Ambassador in Germany.
- DENTZ, Henri, French General; High Commissioner in Syria and Lebanon and Commander in Chief of French forces in the Levant.
- DE VALERA, Eamon, Prime Minister of Ireland and Minister for External Affairs.
- DIECKHOFF, Hans Heinrich, German Ambassador in the United States, May 1937; recalled to Berlin for consultation, November 1938, and did not return to his post; on special assignment in the Foreign Ministry, 1938-1943.
- DÖRNBERG, Alexander, Freiherr von, Minister, Chief of Protocol of the German Foreign Ministry.
- DONOVAN, William Joseph, Colonel, American lawyer, personal representative of the Secretary of the Navy on special mission in Europe.
- DOYEN, Paul André, General, Chairman of the French delegation to the German Armistice Commission.
- DRAGANOV, Parvan, Bulgarian Minister in Germany.
- DYMEK, Valentin, Auxiliary Bishop of Poznań.
- EDEN, Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- ERBACH-SCHÖNBERG, Viktor, Prinz zu, German Minister in Greece.
- ERDMANNSDORFF, Otto von, German Minister in Hungary.
- ESPINOSA DE LOS MONTEROS, Eugenio, Major General, Spanish Ambassador in Germany.
- ETTEL, Erwin, German Minister in Iran.
- FABRICIUS, Wilhelm, German Minister in Rumania, 1936-January 1941.
- FALKENHAUSEN, Alexander von, General, German Military Commander in Belgium and northern France.
- FALKENHORST, Nikolaus von, Colonel General, German Military Commander in Norway.
- FAROUK I, King of Egypt.
- FEINE, Gerhard, Counselor of Legation in the German Legation in Yugoslavia.
- FELMY, Hellmuth, General of the Luftwaffe, head of the German military mission to Iraq, May 1941.
- FIEANDT, Rainer von, Chairman of the Finnish delegation to the Mixed Committee in Moscow to negotiate on the Petsamo nickel mines.
- FILOV, Bogdan, Bulgarian Minister President.
- FLANDIN, Pierre Étienne, French Left Republican deputy, former Premier; Foreign Minister, December 14, 1940-February 9, 1941.
- FRANCO Y BAHAMONDE, Francisco, Spanish Chief of State, President of the Government, and Generalissimo of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
- FRANCO Y BAHAMONDE, Nicolás, Spanish Ambassador in Portugal.
- FRANE, Hans, Reich Minister, former Bavarian Minister of Justice; President of the Academy for German Law; Governor General of the occupied Polish territories (General Government).
- FREUNDT, Alfred, German Consul General at Zagreb.
- FUNK, Walther, German Minister of Economics; President of the Reichsbank.
- GABBRIELLI, Luigi, Italian Minister in Iraq.
- GAFENCU, Grigore, Rumanian Minister in the Soviet Union.
- GANDHI, Mohandas Karamchand, Indian nationalist leader; President of the Indian Congress party.
- GAULLE. *See* DE GAULLE.
- GAVRILOVIĆ, Milan, Yugoslav Minister in the Soviet Union; appointed Minister without Portfolio in the Simović Cabinet, March 27, 1941.

GAYLANI. See RASHID ALI AL-GAYLANI.

GEFFCKEN, Karl, Counselor of Legation, German Legation in Sweden.

GEHRCKE. See GROBBA.

GEREDE, Hüseyin R., Turkish Ambassador in Germany.

GIANNINI, Amedeo, Director of Commercial Affairs in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with rank of Ambassador.

GLAISE VON HORSTENAU, Edmund, Austro-Hungarian General Staff officer, member of Austrian cabinets, 1936-1938; appointed "German General in Zagreb," April 14, 1941.

GOEBBELS, Paul Josef, Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.

GÖRING, Hermann Wilhelm, President of the Reichstag; Minister President of Prussia and Reich Minister for Air; Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe; Commissioner for the Four Year Plan; designated successor to Hitler; Reichsmarschall.

GRAND MUFTI. See HUSAYNI.

GRANDI, Count Dino, former Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs; member of the Fascist Grand Council; Minister of Justice.

GRAZIANI, Rodolfo, Marshal of Italy, Chief of the Army General Staff, November 1, 1939-March 25, 1941; Commander in Chief in North Africa and Governor of Libya, July 2, 1940-March 25, 1941.

GREGORIĆ, Danilo, Yugoslav journalist, political editor of the newspaper *Vreme*.

GREIFFENBERG, Hans von, Major General, Chief of Staff at Army Headquarters List.

GREW, Joseph Clark, United States Ambassador in Japan.

GROBBA, Fritz, German Minister in Iraq until 1939, subsequently on special assignments in the Foreign Ministry; used the names "Ihrke" and "Gehrcke" during his mission in Iraq, May 1941.

GROSSKOPF, Georg Wilhelm, Senior Counselor, Head of Division Kult. B of the Cultural Policy Department; Head of Division D IX of the Department for German Internal Affairs, May 17, 1941.

GROTE, Otto, Secretary of Legation, official of Political Division I M, German Foreign Ministry.

GRÜNDHERR, Werner von, Head of Political Division VI, German Foreign Ministry.

GÜNTHER, Christian, Swedish Foreign Minister.

GUÉRARD, Jacques, emissary of Darlan on special mission in Syria, May-June 1941.

GUSTAV V, King of Sweden.

GUZZONI, Alfredo, Italian General, Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff and Under Secretary in the Ministry of War, November 30, 1940-April 23, 1941.

HADDAD, Osman Kemal, private secretary and confidential emissary of the Grand Mufti; used the alias of Tewfik Ali al-Shakir.

HAIDLEN, Richard, Counselor, Head of Political Division III, German Foreign Ministry.

HALDER, Franz, Colonel General, Chief of the German Army General Staff.

HALIFAX, Viscount, Edward Wood, British Ambassador in the United States.

HARRIMAN, W. Averell, special representative of President Roosevelt in London with rank of Minister.

HAUSHOFER, Albrecht, Professor of Political Geography and Geopolitics, University of Berlin.

HAYE. See HENRY-HAYE.

HEEREN, Viktor von, German Minister in Yugoslavia.

HEINBURG, Curt, Head of Political Division IV, German Foreign Ministry.

- HEMMEN, Hans Richard, Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions with the German Armistice Commission.
- HEMPFEL, Eduard, German Minister in Ireland.
- HENCKE, Andor, Senior Counselor with official rank of Minister, representative of the German Foreign Ministry with the German Armistice Commission, June 1940-May 1941; also attached to the German Legation in Denmark and in charge of liaison with the Danish Foreign Ministry, April 1940-May 1941.
- HENRY-HAYE, Gaston, French Ambassador in the United States.
- HENTIG, Werner Otto von, Minister, Near East specialist, on special assignments in the German Foreign Ministry, 1939-1941.
- HESS, Rudolf, Reich Minister, Hitler's Deputy as leader of the National Socialist party until May 12, 1941.
- HEWEL, Walther, Senior Counselor, member of the Personal Staff of the German Foreign Minister and his personal representative with Hitler.
- HEYDRICH, Reinhard, SS-Gruppenführer, Chief of the Security Police and Security Service.
- HILGER, Gustav, Counselor of Embassy in the German Embassy in the Soviet Union.
- HIMMLER, Heinrich, Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police; Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of the German National Community.
- HITLER, Adolf, Leader of the German National Socialist party, Führer and Chancellor, Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.
- HOARE, Sir Samuel, British Ambassador in Spain.
- HOOVER, Herbert Clark, President of the United States, 1929-1933.
- HORTHY DE NAGYBÁNYA, Miklos, Admiral, Regent of Hungary.
- HOTNINGEN-HUENE, Oswald, Baron von, German Minister in Portugal.
- HUENE. *See* HOTNINGEN-HUENE.
- HULL, Cordell, United States Secretary of State.
- HUNTZIGER, Charles, French General, Minister of War.
- HUSAYNI, Haj Amin, al-, Mufti of Jerusalem; Arab leader.
- IBN SAUD. *See* ABDUL AZIZ IBN SAUD.
- IHRKE. *See* GROBBA.
- İNÖNÜ, İsmet, General, President of the Turkish Republic.
- JENKE, Albert, Minister in the German Embassy in Turkey.
- JODL, Alfred, Lieutenant General, Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff of the OKW.
- JUAN, Prince of Asturias, son of former King Alfonso XIII, pretender to the Spanish throne.
- KASCHÉ, Siegfried, SA-Obergruppenführer, German Minister in Croatia from April 17, 1941.
- KASE, Shunichi, Counselor in the Japanese Embassy in Germany.
- KAUFFMANN, Henrik de, Danish Minister in the United States.
- KETTEL, Wilhelm, Field Marshal, Chief of the OKW.
- KILLINGER, Manfred Freiherr von, German Minister in Rumania from January 24, 1941.
- KIROV, Sava, Bulgarian Minister in Turkey.
- KLEFFENS, Eelco Nicolaas van, Netherlands Foreign Minister.
- KÖSTRING, Ernst, Lieutenant General, German Military Attaché in the Soviet Union.
- KONOYE, Prince Fumimaro, Japanese Prime Minister.
- KORIZIS, Alexander, Greek Minister President, January 29-April 18, 1941.
- KOŠUTIĆ, August, Vice President of the Croatian Peasant party.
- KRAMARZ, Hans, Head of Political Division I M of the German Foreign Ministry.
- KROLL, Hans Anton, Minister, Counselor in the German Embassy in Turkey.

- KRUTIKOV**, Alexey Dmitriyevich, Soviet Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade.
- KULOVEC**, Fran, Slovene leader, Minister without Portfolio in the Cvetković Cabinet, Minister of Public Works in the Simović Cabinet.
- KURUSU**, Saburo, Japanese Ambassador in Germany, December 1939–February 1941.
- KVATERNIK**, Slavko, former Colonel in the Austro-Hungarian Army, leading member of the Croatian Ustaša movement; Field Marshal, Deputy Minister President, and Minister of the Armed Forces and Police of the "Independent Croatian State," April 17, 1941.
- LAMMERS**, Hans, Reich Minister, Chief of the Reich Chancellery.
- LAVAL**, Pierre, Vice-President of the French Council of Ministers, July 12–December 13, 1940; Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 28–December 13, 1940.
- LEAHY**, William D., Admiral, United States Ambassador in France.
- LEOPOLD III**, King of the Belgians.
- LIKUS**, Rudolf, Senior Counselor, official of the German Foreign Minister's Personal Staff and of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop.
- LINDBERGH**, Charles A., American aviator; Colonel, United States Army Air Corps Reserve.
- LIST**, Wilhelm, German Field Marshal, Commander of the Twelfth Army; Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast, June 9, 1941.
- LORKOVIĆ**, Mladen, leading member of the Croatian Ustaša movement; State Secretary to Pavelić in the field of foreign affairs.
- LUDIN**, Hanns, German Minister in Slovakia.
- LUTHER**, Martin, Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs, German Foreign Ministry.
- MAČEK**, Vladko, President of the Croatian Peasant party; Deputy Minister President of Yugoslavia to March 27, 1941; First Deputy Minister President, April 4, 1941.
- MACKENSEN**, Hans Georg von, German Ambassador in Italy.
- MALLETKE**, Walter, Head of the Offices for Southeastern Europe and Foreign Trade in the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP.
- MAMELI**, Francesco, Italian Minister in Yugoslavia.
- MANNERHEIM**, Baron Carl Gustaf Emil, Field Marshal, Commander of the Finnish Army.
- MARKOVIĆ**. See **CINCAR-MARKOVIĆ**.
- MARRAS**, Efsio, Italian Military Attaché in Germany; Italian General at the High Command of the German Armed Forces.
- MARTIUS**, Georg, Minister, Head of Division W XII in the Economic Policy Department, German Foreign Ministry.
- MATSUOKA**, Yosuke, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- MEISSNER**, Otto, Chief of the German Presidential Chancellery; State Minister with the rank of Reich Minister.
- MENEMENCIÖGLÜ**, Numan, Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry.
- MIHAI I**, King of Rumania.
- MILCH**, Erhard, Field Marshal, Inspector General of the Luftwaffe.
- MOLOTOV**, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union until May 6, 1941; subsequently Vice Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars; People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
- MORRIS**, Leland B., Counselor and Chargé d'Affaires in the United States Embassy in Germany.
- MUFTI**. See **HUSAYNI**.

- MUSSOLINI, Benito, founder of the Italian fascist party; Head of the Government and Prime Minister; Commander of the Armed Forces.
- NEHRU, Jawaharlal Pandit, Indian nationalist leader; several times President of the Indian Congress party.
- NEUBACHER, Hermann, Minister, special representative in charge of economic questions at the German Legation in Bucharest.
- NINČIĆ, Momčilo, Yugoslav Foreign Minister from March 27, 1941.
- NOGUES, Auguste Paul, French General; Resident General and Commander in Chief in Morocco.
- NOMURA, Kichisaburo, Admiral, Japanese Ambassador in the United States.
- NUMAN. *See* MENEMENCIOGLU.
- OLIVERA, Ricardo, Argentine Ambassador in Germany.
- ORTIZ, Roberto M., President of Argentina.
- OSHIMA, Hiroshi, General, Japanese Ambassador in Germany, November 1938–December 1939, and from February 1941.
- OTT, Eugen, Major General, German Ambassador in Japan.
- PAASIKIVI, Juho K., Finnish Minister in the Soviet Union, April 1940–May 1941.
- PAPEN, Franz von, German Ambassador in Turkey.
- PAUL, Prince, Regent of Yugoslavia, October 1934–March 27, 1941.
- PAULUS, Friedrich, Lieutenant General, Deputy Chief of the German Army General Staff for Operations (Oberquartiermeister I).
- PAVELIĆ, Ante, leader of the Croatian nationalist Ustaša movement; Leader (Poglavnik), Minister President, and Foreign Minister of the "Independent Croatian State" from April 15, 1941.
- PEŠIĆ, Petar, General, Yugoslav Minister of War to March 27, 1941.
- PÉTAİN, Henri Philippe, Marshal of France; Chief of State.
- PETER II, King of Yugoslavia.
- PIUS XII, Pope, Eugenio Pacelli, elevated to the Papacy in March 1939.
- PLESSEN, Johann von, Minister in the German Embassy in Italy.
- PONSCHAB, August, German Consul at Harbin.
- POPOV, Ivan Vladimir, Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- PRÜFER, Curt Max, German Ambassador in Brazil.
- QUISLING, Vidkun, leader of the Norwegian Nasjonal Samling movement.
- RAEDER, Erich, Admiral, Commander in Chief of the German Navy.
- RAHN, Rudolf, Senior Counselor, attached to the German Embassy in Paris and in charge of propaganda and information activities; on special mission in Syria, May–July 1941.
- RASHID ALI AL-GAYLANI, Iraq Minister President, March 31, 1940–January 31, 1941; April 3–June 3, 1941.
- RENTHE-FINK, Cecil von, Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark.
- RIBBENTROP, Joachim von, German Foreign Minister.
- RICCARDI, Arturo, Admiral, Chief of the Italian Naval Staff and Under Secretary of the Navy.
- RICKERT, Arvid, Swedish Minister in Germany.
- RICHTHOFEN, Herbert, Freiherr von, German Minister in Bulgaria.
- RINTELEN, Emil von, Minister, Dirigent in the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- RINTELEN, Enno von, General, German Military Attaché in Italy; German General at Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces.
- RITTER, Karl, Ambassador on special assignment in the German Foreign Ministry.
- RIZO-RANGABÉ, Alexander, Greek Minister in Germany.
- RÖSSING, Horst, Colonel, German Military Attaché in Finland.
- ROMMEL, Erwin, Lieutenant General, Commander of the German Africa Corps.

- ROOSEVELT, Franklin Delano, President of the United States of America.
- ROSENBERG, Alfred, Reichsleiter, Head of the Ausenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP; deputy of the Führer for supervision of spiritual and ideological training of the NSDAP; charged by Hitler with "central direction of the questions of the Eastern European area," April 20, 1941.
- ROSSO, Augusto, Italian Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
- RYTI, Risto, President of Finland.
- SALAZAR, Antonio de Oliveira, Portuguese Minister President; also Minister of Finance, Minister of War, and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- SALLET, Richard, specialist for American affairs in the News Service and Press Department, German Foreign Ministry.
- SARACOGU, Sükrü, Turkish Foreign Minister.
- SAUCKEN, Reinhold, Minister, assigned to the German Embassy in the Soviet Union to deal with repatriation of Volksdeutsche from Soviet-occupied territory in former Poland.
- SCAVENIUS, Erik, Danish Foreign Minister.
- SCHRAMBURG-LIPPE, Stephan, Prince, Counselor of Legation in the German Embassy in Argentina.
- SCHELLENBERG, Walter, SS-Sturmabführer, Head of Office IV E (counter-espionage) of the Gestapo.
- SCHICKEDANZ, Arno, Chief of Staff of the Ausenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP.
- SCHLOTTERER, Gustav, Ministerialdirigent, German Ministry of Economics.
- SCHMIDT, Paul Karl, Minister, Director of the News Service and Press Department, German Foreign Ministry.
- SCHMIDT, Paul Otto Gustav, Minister, interpreter in the German Foreign Ministry; attached to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.
- SCHNURRE, Karl, Minister, Head of Division W IV in the Economic Policy Department, German Foreign Ministry.
- SCHOBERT, Eugen Ritter von, Colonel General, Commander of the Eleventh German Army; "Commander in Chief of the German troops in Rumania," May 1941.
- SCHROEDER, Hans, Deputy Director, later Director of the Personnel and Administrative Department, German Foreign Ministry.
- SCHULENBURG, Friedrich Werner, Count von der, German Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
- SCHWARZMANN, Hans, official in the Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister.
- SERRANO SUÑER, Ramón, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- SEYSS-INQUART, Arthur, Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands.
- SIMA, Horia, leader of the Rumanian Iron Guard (Legionnaire Movement); Deputy Minister President to January 27, 1941.
- SIMOVIĆ, Dušan, General, Head of the Yugoslav Air Force; Minister President from March 27, 1941.
- SOBOLEV, Arkady, Secretary General of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
- SONNLEITHNER, Franz, Counselor, official in the Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister.
- SPOLETO, Aimone di Savoia-Aosta, Duke of.
- STAHLECKER, Walter, SS-Oberführer, later Brigadeführer, official of the Reich Ministry of Interior, detailed to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, November 1940-June 1941.
- STAHMER, Heinrich, official in charge of Far Eastern questions in the Dienststelle Ribbentrop; assigned to the Embassy in Japan with the rank of Minister, subsequently with that of Ambassador.

- STALIN, Josef Vissarionovich, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union and member of the Politburo, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, May 6, 1941.
- STAUNING, Thorvald, Danish Minister President.
- STEDINGK, G. Friherre von, Major, Swedish Military Attaché in Finland.
- STENGEL, Adolf, Baron, Counselor in the German Foreign Ministry; member of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff.
- STEINHARDT, Laurence A., United States Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
- STOHRER, Eberhard von, German Ambassador in Spain.
- STOJADINOVIĆ, Milan, Yugoslav Minister President, June 1935–February 1939.
- STÜLFNAGEL, Otto von, General, German Military Commander in France.
- ŠUBAŠIĆ, Ivan, Ban (Governor) of the autonomous Croatian province in Yugoslavia.
- SUÑER. *See* SERRANO SUÑER.
- SZTÓJAY, Döme, General, Hungarian Minister in Germany.
- TELEKI, Count Pál, Hungarian Minister President, February 1939–April 2, 1941.
- TERBOVEN, Josef, Reich Commissar for occupied Norway.
- TEWFIK ALI AL-SHAKIR. *See* HADDAD.
- THERMANN, Edmund, Freiherr von, German Ambassador in Argentina.
- THOMSEN, Hans, Counselor of Embassy, Chargé d'Affaires of the German Embassy in the United States.
- TIPPELSKIRCH, Kurt von, Lieutenant General, Deputy Chief for Intelligence of the German General Staff (Oberquartiermeister IV).
- TIPPELSKIRCH, Werner von, Minister, Counselor in the German Embassy in the Soviet Union.
- TISO, Joseph Monsignor, leader of the Slovak People's party; President of Slovakia.
- TSOLAKOGLU, George, General, Commander of the Greek forces in Epirus and Macedonia; Minister President of an Axis sponsored Greek Government in Athens, April 29, 1941.
- TUKA, Vojtech, Slovak Minister President.
- TWARDOWSKI, Fritz von, Director of the Cultural Policy Department, German Foreign Ministry.
- UIBERREITER, Siegfried, Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter of Styria; "Chief of the Civil Administration in Lower Styria," April 15, 1941.
- UTTMANN, B. von, Major General, German Military Attaché in Sweden.
- VARELA IGLESIAS, José Enrique, General, Spanish Minister of Defense.
- VARGAS, Getulio Dornelles, President of Brazil.
- VEESENMAIER, Edmund, SS-Standartenführer, on the staff of State Secretary for Special Duties Keppler in the Foreign Ministry; on special assignment in Zagreb, April–May 1941, in Belgrade, June 1941.
- VICTOR EMMANUEL III, King of Italy.
- VOGL, Oskar, General, Chairman, German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden.
- VYSHINSKY, Andrey Yanuaryevich, Vice Chairman, Soviet Council of People's Commissars; First Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
- WANG CHING-WEI, Chinese political leader, Head of a Chinese Central Government at Nanking sponsored by Japan.
- WARLIMONT, Walter, German General, Chief of the Department of National Defense (Abt. L), Wehrmacht Operations Staff.
- WAVELL, Archibald P., General, Commander in Chief of the British Forces in the Middle East.
- WEIZSÄCKER, Ernst, Freiherr von, State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry.

- WELCKE**, Wolfgang, Freiherr von, Counselor in the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry, assigned to the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden.
- WELLES**, Sumner, United States Under Secretary of State.
- WERTH**, Henrik, General, Chief of the Hungarian General Staff.
- WEYGAND**, Maxime, General, Delegate General of the French Government in French Africa.
- WIED**, Viktor, Prinz zu, German Minister in Sweden.
- WIEHL**, Emil Karl Josef, Director of the Economic Policy Department, German Foreign Ministry.
- WITTING**, Rolf, Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- WOERMANN**, Ernst, Director of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry with the title of Under State Secretary.
- WOHLTHAT**, Helmuth, Prussian State Councilor, Ministerialdirektor for special assignments in the Four Year Plan; Bank Commissioner in the Netherlands, 1940-1941; Head of the delegation for economic negotiations with Japan from April 1941.
- WOLFF**, Karl, SS-Gruppenführer, Chief, Personal Staff of the Reichsführer SS.
- WOOD**, Robert E., Brigadier General, chairman of the board of Sears, Roebuck and Co.; head of the "America First" Committee.
- ZAMBONI**, Guelfo, Counselor, Italian Embassy in Germany.
- ZHUKOV**, Georgy Konstantinovich, General, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army from February 1941.

Appendix IV

GLOSSARY OF GERMAN TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS¹

- AA**, Auswärtiges Amt, the German Foreign Ministry
- Abt.**, Abteilung, department
- Abt. L.**, Abt. Landesverteidigung, the Department of National Defense in the Wehrmacht Operations Staff
- Abwehr**, counterintelligence, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the OKW
- Ang.**, Angabe, a designation given when action of more than one sort was to be taken on a paper. In such cases the relevant instructions were usually split up as Ang. I, II, etc., which designations followed the file numbers
- AO**, Auslandsorganisation, foreign organization of the National Socialist party concerned with German nationals living abroad
- APA**, Aussenpolitisches Amt, foreign affairs office of the National Socialist party
- Attila**, code name for a German occupation of unoccupied France
- Aus.**, Ausl., Ausland, the foreign intelligence department of the OKW
- Ausl./Abw.**, Amt Ausland/Abwehr, the office of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence of the OKW
- Barbarossa**, code name for the German military operation against the Soviet Union
- BRAM**, Büro RAM, Secretariat of the Reich Foreign Minister
- Chefs.**, Chefsache, top secret military
- D**, Abteilung Deutschland, Department for German Internal Affairs in the German Foreign Ministry
- Del. W.**, telegraphic symbol for the Special Commission on Economic Questions with the German Armistice Commission
- Deutsche Diplomatische Korrespondenz**, the official organ of the German Foreign Ministry
- Dienststelle Ribbentrop**, office of Ribbentrop in his capacity as foreign affairs adviser to Hitler; of decreasing importance after his appointment as Foreign Minister
- Dirigent**, the deputy head of a department of the German Foreign Ministry
- DNB**, Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, German News Agency, owned by the Ministry of Propaganda
- e. o.**, ex officio, where this precedes the file number, it indicates that there are no previous papers on the subject bearing this number
- Felix**, code name for the intended German operation against Gibraltar
- g.**, geh., geheim, secret
- Gau**, the largest territorial administrative unit of the National Socialist party
- Gauleiter**, highest official in a Gau
- Gen. Qu.**, Generalquartiermeister, general staff officer in charge of supply and administration
- Gen. St. d. H.**, Generalstab des Heeres, Army General Staff
- g. K.**, g. Kdos., geheime Kommandosache, top secret military
- g. Rs.**, geheime Reichssache, top secret
- Gruppenführer**, SA and SS rank, equivalent to Major General
- Ha. Pol.**, symbol for the Economic Policy Department in the German Foreign Ministry

¹ Abbreviations are explained by giving the full German terms. These terms are explained at their proper alphabetical listing.

Haupttreuhandstelle Ost, German Government agency in charge of Jewish and enemy property in the eastern areas

Isabella, code name for a German occupation of the Iberian Peninsula

Kanzler, head of an archives department or chancery in a German diplomatic mission

Kriminalrat, rank in the German police and security administration

Kult., Kulturpolitische Abteilung, the Cultural Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry

Landesgruppe, German National Socialist party organization for a foreign country, controlled by the **Auslandsorganisation**

Landesgruppenleiter, leader of a **Landesgruppe**

Leibstandarte, originally a bodyguard, later an SS elite regiment

Luftwaffe, the German Air Force of the era of World War II

Marita, code name for the German military operation against Greece

Merkur, code name for the German military operation against Crete

Ministerialdirektor, a grade in the German Civil Service, usually the director of a department in a Ministry

Ministerialdirigent, a grade in the German Civil Service, usually deputy director of a department in a Ministry

Multex, a circular telegram

NSB, Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging, the National Socialist movement in the Netherlands

NSDAP, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, National Socialist German Workers party, the full title of the National Socialist party

Ob. d. H., Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, Commander in Chief of the Army

Ob. d. L., Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe

Ob. d. M., Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine, Commander in Chief of the Navy

Oberführer, SA and SS rank equivalent to a rank between Colonel and Brigadier General

Obergruppenführer, SA and SS rank equivalent to Lieutenant General

Oberregierungsrat, a grade in the German Civil Service

OKH, Oberkommando des Heeres, High Command of the Army

OKL, Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, High Command of the Luftwaffe

OKM, Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, High Command of the Navy

OKW, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, High Command of the Wehrmacht

Organisationsleiter, rank in the National Socialist party organization

Poglavnik, title of Ante Pavelić as head of the Croatian State

Pol., Politische Abteilung, Political Department of the Foreign Ministry; sub-divided according to geographic areas, **Referate**, each designated by a Roman numeral, e.g., Pol. IV (see Appendix I)

R, Recht, Rechtsabteilung, Legal Department of the German Foreign Ministry

RAM, Reichsaussenminister, Reich Foreign Minister

Referat, division within a department of a German Ministry

Referent, drafting officer, expert, specialist; also, head of a **Referat**

Reichsbauernführer, Reich Peasant Leader

Reichsführer SS, Commander in Chief of the SS

Reichsgau, administrative division of territories, formerly part of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, which were incorporated into Germany

Reichsleiter, highest rank in the National Socialist party organization

Reichsmarschall, Reich Marshal, military rank given to Göring

Reichsschulungsleiter, highest party official in charge of political indoctrination of the NSDAP

Reichsstatthalter, Reich Governor, representative of the Reich in a German territory, either a land or a

- Reichsgau, with powers of control over its entire administration
- Rk., Reichskanzlei**, Reich Chancellery
- RLM, Reichsluftfahrtministerium**, Reich Ministry of Air
- RM, Reichsminister**, Reich Minister
- SA, Sturmabteilungen der NSDAP**, Storm Troops of the NSDAP (brown shirts)
- SD, Sicherheitsdienst**, security service; intelligence and counterintelligence agency of the SS and the Security Police
- SKL., Seekriegsleitung**, Naval War Staff
- Sonnenblume** (Sunflower), code name for the dispatch of a German armored unit to North Africa
- SS, Schutzstaffeln**, elite corps of the National Socialist party, used for police and military purposes
- Stabsführer, Stabsleiter**, head of the staff of a central department in the National Socialist party
- Standarte**, SA and SS unit equivalent to a regiment
- Standartenführer**, SA and SS rank equivalent to Colonel
- St.S., Staatssekretär**, State Secretary
- Sturmbannführer**, SA and SS rank equivalent to Major
- U. St.S., Unterstaatssekretär**, Under State Secretary
- Volksdeutsche**, ethnic Germans, i.e., persons belonging to the German cultural community living outside the frontiers of the Reich and not Reich subjects
- Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VOMI)**, central agency for problems concerning Volksdeutsche; formed as the Büro von Kursell in 1936, renamed and placed under SS-Obergruppenführer Lorenz in 1937; directed covertly the political agitation of German minorities
- W., Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung**, Economic Policy Department in the German Foreign Ministry
- W. B. Südost, Wehrmachtbefehlshaber im Südosten**, the German Military Commander in Southeastern Europe
- Wehrmacht**, designation of the German armed forces after 1935
- WFSt, Wehrmachtführungsstab**, Wehrmacht Operations Staff, an office in the OKW engaged in operations planning
- zu**, to, in connection with; where this precedes the file number it indicates that the previous papers in the subject have this number

Agreed Partition of Yugoslavia, 1941

(See document No. 534)

- Partition boundary, 1941
- International boundary, 1937

